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China's Future Under Xi Jinping

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China's Future Under Xi Jinping Political Science ISSN: 0032-3187 (Print) 2041-0611 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpnz20 China’s future under Xi Jinping: challenges ahead Bates Gill To cite this article: Bates Gill (2017): China’s future under Xi Jinping: challenges ahead, Political Science To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2017.1313713 Published online: 05 Jun 2017. Submit your article to this journal View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rpnz20 Download by: [Australian National University] Date: 06 June 2017, At: 22:59 POLITICAL SCIENCE, 2017 https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2017.1313713 China’s future under Xi Jinping: challenges ahead Bates Gill Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Coral Bell School of Asia PacificAffairs, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia ABSTRACT KEYWORDS No development in international politics is attracting as much China; Xi Jinping; China’s attention as the emergence of China as a great power. But many foreign policy questions and uncertainties attend China’s rise. What are the long- term goals of Chinese power? Does Beijing view the international system as fundamentally beneficial to its goals or as an impedi- ment to them? Will China emerge as a more open, prosperous, just and sustainable society or less so? As China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping is the single-most powerful individual shaping his coun- try’s answers to those questions. It is therefore important to illuminate and understand the forces which are likely to affect his thinking and his responses to them. With that in mind, this essay will delve into Xi’s background, his stated vision for China’s future and the challenges which confront that vision. From there, the essay concludes with an assessment of how these factors are likely to play out in Chinese domestic and foreign policy in the years ahead. Introduction As a scholar, military strategist, decorated officer, a direct participant in the twentieth century’s greatest conflicts and proud son of New Zealand, Sir Howard Kippenberger would no doubt be keenly aware of the dynamic shifts of power in the Asia Pacific today and the growing opportunities and challenges which these changes present for New Zealand, the region and the globe.1 Standing out as one of the largest of these opportunities and challenges is the emergence of China as a great power in regional and, increasingly, global affairs. But many questions and uncertainties attend China’s rise. Strategists around the world are asking, ‘What are the long-term goals of Chinese power?’‘Does Beijing view the international system as fundamentally beneficial to those goals or as an impediment to them?’‘In pursuing these goals, will China emerge as a more open, prosperous, just and sustainable society or less so?’‘If we can come to some conclusive answers to those questions, what strategic policies should China’sneighboursadoptin response?’ CONTACT Bates Gill [email protected] This essay is a revised and updated version of the 2016 Sir Howard Kippenberger Lecture which was presented at Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand on 18 August 2016. © 2017 The Research Trust of Victoria University 2 B. GILL China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping is the single-most powerful individual shaping his country’s answers to those questions. It is therefore important to illuminate and understand the forces which are likely to affect his thinking and his responses to them. With that in mind, this essay will delve in Xi’s background, his stated vision for China’s future and the challenges which confront that vision. From there, the essay concludes with an assessment of how these factors are likely to play out in Chinese domestic and foreign policy in the years ahead. The paramount leader of China Xi Jinping has been in this high office for more than 4 years, nearly halfway through his expected 10-year term. In the view of many Western analysts – not to mention many in China – Xi has achieved a quasi-cult-like standing within China reminiscent of the 1960s when the ‘Great Helmsman’ Mao Zedong lorded over the Chinese masses. According to relatively reliable polling, Xi is enormously popular amongst the laobaix- ing – the common folks on the street in China.2 He is the subject of dozens of laudatory videos and other social media messaging cranked out by Chinese propaganda organs. His declared ‘China dream’ of realising ‘the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ resonates across all sectors of a proud and ambitious society. Riding this popularity, Xi has overseen a far-reaching anti-corruption campaign, bagging extremely well-connected political, military and business figures, as well as potential political rivals. Along the way, he has marginalised the authority of the country’s Premier Li Keqiang leading to some speculation that Li would not be given the normal second 5-year term in office when his current term expires later this year. Meanwhile, Xi has put himself in charge of numerous ‘leading groups’ and other central bodies to direct policy on sensitive issues such as internal security, economic reform and foreign affairs. According to one analysis, as of early 2017, Xi held 12 different leadership roles, as shown in Table 1 (Chan 2017). In October 2016, at a plenary meeting of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Xi was named as the ‘core’ of the Party, an accolade which granted no specific powers, but appeared to solidify his unrivalled position as paramount leader. Neither of his two predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, received such recognition. Table 1. Xi Jinping’s leadership roles, 2012–2017. Year of Title appointmenta General Secretary, Central Committee, Communist Party of China 2012 Chairman, Central Military Commission 2012 Leader, Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs 2012 Leader, Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs 2012 President, People’s Republic of China 2013 Leader, Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms 2013 Leader, Central Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs 2013 Chairman, Central National Security Commission 2014 Leader, Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatisation 2014 Leader, Central Leading Group for National Defence and Military Reform of the Central Military Commission 2014 Commander-in-Chief, Joint Battle Command, People’s Liberation Army 2016 Chairman, Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development 2017 Source: Chan (2017). aSome of the years are approximations. POLITICAL SCIENCE 3 Casting his eyes abroad, Xi has visited more than 40 different countries and through 2016, in his first 4 years in office, has spent more than 150 days abroad – more than 1 month of foreign travel every year (‘Xi Jinping’s 154 days’, 2016). In doing so, he has set out an ambitious foreign policy agenda. Among his major undertakings, Xi has launched the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, while overseeing China’s massive land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, expanding China’s military footprint thousands of kilometres offshore. Xi made the first-ever appear- ance as China’s paramount leader at the 2017 World Economic Forum gathering in Davos, and was feted by the world elite as the champion of globalisation and free trade. It seems he has had a remarkable run. Or has he? Just how powerful is Xi Jinping? What do we know about his leadership style and his vision for China’s future? Will he be able to deliver on the Chinese dream or is he in fact far more constrained and vulnerable than he seems? And what will this mean for China’s neighbours in the future? A red princeling’s life It is worthwhile to begin at the beginning and review what we know about Xi’s background.3 In the country that was China in June 1953, he was born to great privilege, less than 4 years after the founding of the People’s Republic, as the son of a vice premier and revolutionary hero, Xi Zhongxun, and his wife, Qi Xin. The relative comforts of the young man’s early life – attending the August 1st School for high-ranking cadres’ children and spending time inside the walls of Zhongnanhai, the Communist leaders’ compound adjacent to the Forbidden City – came to a precipitous end in 1962 when his father was purged from his leadership positions, accused by Mao of being an anti-party rightist. At first held in detention at the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, he was sent to safer conditions in the countryside in 1968, living near relatives in Yan’an in Shaanxi Province and working alongside the local peasantry. He did not leave Yan’an until 1975 – seven formative years between the ages of 15 and 22. In 1975, he entered Tsinghua University and studied chemical engineering. But, as a ‘Worker–Peasant–Soldier’ student, prior to the full opening of Chinese universities, he spent considerable amounts of his time studying Marxist–Leninist–Mao Zedong thought and the virtues of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as well as doing farm work in the fields near the university. From 1979, at the age of 26, and with his father rehabilitated, he began his 30-year ascent through the party and government ranks, serving in county-, municipal- and provincial leadership roles in the more prosperous and growing eastern provinces of China. It was during this period that he made his now-famous visit as a mid-career official to Iowa in the United States in 1985. By 2007, he became the Party Chief of Shanghai, a posting that traditionally means a national-level appointment is in the offing.
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