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2016 The Legacy Of China’s Social Policy Failures and The One-Child Policy Andrea Ploch
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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY
THE LEGACY OF CHINA’S SOCIAL POLICY FAILURES
AND THE ONE-CHILD POLICY
By
ANDREA PLOCH
A Thesis submitted to the Department of International Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduations with Honors in the Major
Degree Awarded: Spring, 2016
The members of the Defense Committee approve the thesis of Andrea Ploch defended on April 5, 2016.
______Dr. Whitney T. Bendeck Thesis Director
______Dr. Jonathan Grant Outside Committee Member
______Dr. William G. Weissert Committee Member
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Table of Contents
Introduction ...... 4 A Brief Word on Mao Zedong ...... 4 Deng Xiaoping Era ...... 5 Population Theory at its Beginnings ...... 6 The Drawbacks ...... 9 The Hukou System ...... 9 Unsettled Social Inequality: The Migrant and Rural Struggle ...... 11 Urban Middle and Upper Class Benefits of Having Just One Child ...... 14 Market Limits: Upside-down Population Pyramid ...... 15 Weak Infrastructure: Welfare and Health Care ...... 17 Social Control: Limiting Social Change ...... 20 Confucian Inheritance and Legacy ...... 22 The Skewed Sex-Ratio in Contemporary China ...... 22 Trafficking of Women ...... 23 Dangers from STD Migration...... 26 Woman’s Health ...... 28 Urban Women...... 28 Migrant and Rural Women ...... 30 Conclusion ...... 32
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Introduction
Reeling from the devastation of Maoism, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sought to create a powerful economy in China by combining communism with capitalism in 1978. capitalism was seen as a method of making the economy flourish and communism sustainable.
However, China faced an alarming population growth that threatened to consume much of the economic growth. Hence, influenced by Malthusian theory, China’s leaders devised a plan to cut the amount of mouths to feed through population control, and the infamous One-Child Policy was born. Implemented in 1979, the policy was used to regulate childbearing so that couples were restricted to conceiving just one child. While the law was applied throughout China, it was most enforceable in urban centers. If the law was violated, coercive methods such as forced abortions and revoked state aid were used as forms of enforcement.
This thesis will explain how the social repercussions associated with the One-Child
Policy are not all directly linked to the policy nor are all unique to China. The body of the article is divided into two sections explaining how outdated and rigid government infrastructure and
Confucian culture is directly linked with the growing social issues. The paper ends by concluding how ulterior motives, such as the prosperity of the Chinese economy and the legitimacy of the CCP, dictated the manner in which the government handled the growing public problems, and in all, how the One-Child Policy exacerbated them.
A Brief Word on Mao Zedong
When the CCP came to power in 1949, Mao Zedong took over as China’s championed peasant leader. In order to create a leading superpower that stood as proof of the success of the communist model, Mao set out to create a self-sustained nation. However, his policies proved to be catastrophic. Those policies, most notably the Hundred Flowers Campaign, Great Leap
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Forward and Cultural Revolution, left China economically and socially devastated1, with upwards of seventy million people dead due to starvation and purges. In addition, China’s natural resources and landscape lay wasted, and widespread poverty was coupled with rising inflation2.
The CCP also experienced backlash from the Chinese public because of the horrendous policies.
Vulnerable, the government sought to reverse the effects of Maoism by stimulating the economy as a means to create stability and validity. Incidentally, despite the massive number of deaths across the country, there was a baby boom that propelled the Chinese population from 560 million in 1949 to 850 million by 19763. The CCP saw the population growth as a threat to
China’s economic progress (a fear only heightened after the official 1982 census revealed that
China's population had exceeded the one billion mark). Therefore, the government used propaganda such as the wanxishao or "Late, Long and Few”, for population control, which served as the foundations of the One-Child Policy4. It was not until after Mao’s death in 1976 and the arrival of Deng Xiaoping’s leadership shortly thereafter that the government formalized the One-Child Policy.
Deng Xiaoping Era
Deng Xiaoping, a moderate communist with capitalist tendencies, stepped in and took over as China’s paramount leader in 1978. Deng oversaw the reform era that centered on combining capitalism, rapid urbanization and population control as the means of achieving economic prosperity and government legitimacy. His goals were to maximize the Four
Modernizations; strong agriculture, heavy industry, secured national defense, and controlled science and technology, as quickly as possible to help China flourish.
Deng began China’s transition by opening schools and businesses closed during the
Cultural Revolution in order to return critical thinking in scholarship, and the CCP’s cadre
5 | Page system and laws were restructured to decrease corruption, while simultaneously moving away from a strict centrally planned system5. The CCP also re-opened diplomatic relations with the
West through its 1978 Open-Door policy, which encouraged the exchange of ideas from the
West to the East6. During the second stage, Deng introduced a socialist market economy, in which “the state, Party and people uphold socialist production relations, adjust mechanisms like the market to the situation and guarantee against a capitalist restoration”7. Despite the reform’s conflict with fundamental communist ideology, the CCP was able to rationalize this dramatic shift in ideology through the “reinterpretations of the language of orthodox Marxism in urging the Chinese to develop a new political consciousness, one that would pave the way for rapid economic reforms.”8 The propaganda hid the political maneuver by penning it as a means of modernizing, using capitalism with Chinese features9. Deng encouraged this line of thought through his motto “to get rich is glorious.”10
Simultaneously, elite Chinese scientists competed privately to parent the dramatic population control policy meant to accelerate the effects of the economic reform11. The following section will discuss how the One-Child Policy came to be, and how its creation fits into the broader theme of policy failures by the CCP, which are directly linked to China’s overall social issues.
Population Theory at its Beginnings
Population theory is founded on the works of social scholar, Thomas R. Malthus. His book, An Essay on the Principle of Population, stated that if the human population increased at a greater rate than its means of survival, without natural disaster or political check to control the population, widespread hardship and famine would be the result12. However, the theory did not become relevant globally until the 1950s, when populations were exploding dramatically across
6 | Page the world. Seen as a form of “social engineering,” population control became the method of securing financial and social stability, especially in developing countries. The field grew from the 1950s to 1970s with the establishment of the Population Council in 1952 in New York City, and the first UN organized world Population Conference in 197413. As the field developed, social scientists split on the methods of applying population control. They debated whether to promote the use of contraceptives, or legitimize aggressive government intervention. For example, India created its International Planned Parenthood Federation based on dramatic state intervention, which at its peak, had millions of “voluntary” sterilizations in the months of 197714.
Nonetheless, as the field of population control gained popularity globally, the CCP’s perspective changed various times over the years, and the One-Child Policy’s inception remained relatively cryptic until the works of Susan Greenhalgh throughout the early 2000s. Through her investigations, Greenhalgh shed light on the framework of the One-Child Policy, portraying the deeply politicized and narrow environment in which the policy was formalized. Her research found that the CCP had originally been indecisive about the use of population control, until the
Song Group, named after leading ballistic missile specialist, Song Jian, emerged as the dominant voice of the field using their collective political prestige15.
Composed of China’s best scientists, the Song Group contained prominent members such as Yu Jingyuan and Li Guangyuan, both systems engineers, who – as part of Mao’s military defense program – had access to the best technologies and education available in China, including Western works that were normally restricted from the public16. Using limited demographic data, the Song Group based their theories off the writings of the Club of Rome, a
Western group that believed a dramatic reduction of the world’s population was the only way to keep the Earth’s natural resources from collapsing. Hence, the Song Group focused on a
7 | Page biological based approach to provide a solution to China’s rapid population growth and gain political power17.
Ultimately, the Song Group released statistics throughout the late 1970s, based upon seemingly legitimate mathematical projections using advance methodologies, predicting that
China would reach 4.26 billion in population by the year 2080, crippling the country under its weight if something was not done18. Shocked, the top CCP leadership rapidly agreed that there was a necessity for population control. Propaganda was used to state openly and publicly that this was a national issue that needed to be addressed if China wanted to reach economic prosperity, effectively creating a “crisis atmosphere”19.
Consequently, the Song Group was given immense power and freedom to devise the target population equation that would make China sustainable. They focused on controlling human behavior and underlying biological drives, like human reproduction, but did not address the social, familial and spiritual consequences that would result from such a restrictive policy, effectively ignoring social and cultural traditions and preferences20. When it was established that the CCP had to keep the Chinese population to around 1.2 billion by the year 2000, the One-
Child Policy was devised to be the most efficient method of achieving that goal21. Chinese social scientists, humanists, and opposing groups in the field voiced concerns about the effects of such restrictive legislation like the One-Child Policy; stating their apprehensions on the rapidly aging labor force, coercion, and cultural values22. Indeed, some recommended instead a 1.5 or 2 child policy, allowing peasants to have children until a boy was born, or implementing the policy over time, and more23. But since the Song Group sold the idea as accurate quantitative data that represented the impending doom China faced, and public policies were generally subordinate to economic prosperity, the CCP’s crisis mode effectively inhibited its ability to objectively view
8 | Page the situation24. In reality, the population control field was a fledging area with much variability, often criticized as being detached from reality25. Additionally, the Song Groups’ prestigious status made them untouchable, and their data went unquestioned26. In part, the policy was a reflection of the detached centrally planned government, which was absolute27. Moreover, the narrow ideological social perspective was customary in the communist system Mao had created, evident in his many failed public policies.
Hereinafter, the following sections focus on how the adverse effects predicted by critics of the One-Child Policy became prominent national issues thought its interactions with preexisting phenomena, as well as how and why the CCP failed to adequately adjust existing policies or develop new ones to respond to them.
The Drawbacks
The Hukou System
The Household Registration System, or the Hukou, is a classification system that assigns
Chinese citizens a residential status that ties them to a location, type of resources and quality of benefits they receive from the CCP. Implemented as a means of state control in the 1950s, the
Hukou has been a source of controversy for its diverging effects on Chinese society28. The key distinction in classification is the rural versus urban divide. These distinct labels have created a deliberate economic segregation because rural areas receive fewer social services and economic opportunities compared to their urban counterparts. In addition, the services available are limited and substandard29. As a result, men and women often illegally leave their Hukou to migrate to urban centers to seek better economic opportunity.
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The CCP was originally strict with migration. The lack of social mobility for migrants was connected to the Central Politburo’s concern that if poor migrants came by the masses to cities, government agencies would suffer from the pressure of providing adequate education, waste management, health care, and more30. However, care for their well-being changed during
Deng’s economic era. As coastal areas urbanized quickly and became large finance centers, more migrants than ever moved to these centers in hopes of wealth. The CCP attempted to stop the flow, but ultimately loosened its laws because of the large push. Soon, local governments in urban enters saw they could profit from the migrant population, as migrants paid national fees which local governments pocketed for themselves31. In addition, migrants became a steady source of cheap labor for industries and manufacturing. Since migrants predominantly took jobs described as "dirty, heavy, dangerous and low paying"32 for relatively cheap– positions no educated urban native was willing to take– and with the large volume of migrants, China became extremely attractive to foreign investment. Hence, municipalities developed a dependency on the migrant population for globalization 33.
In spite of the economic prosperity, the issues within the CCP’s social services were not addressed34. Migrants tended to face the same barriers to resources in cities as they did in the countryside, effectively becoming a “de facto underclass”35. So as China evolved into a communist system with capitalist tendencies, class division deepened between the rich and poor.
Hence, the following sections will discuss how the CCP’s economic focus has truly created the social issues normally blamed on the One-Child Policy. When the One-Child Policy was implemented in China it helped increase overall living standards; at the same time, it combined with the socioeconomic issues of the Hukou and exacerbated social inequality. Singletons from well endowed families had the resources to advance at a faster pace economically compared to
10 | Page the migrant and rural class, who were left struggling with limited public help, therefore, increasing the income gap and deepening class division in the long run36.
Unsettled Social Inequality: The Migrant and Rural Struggle
Despite the One-Child Policy’s forced decrease of family sizes and greater availability of resources, financial instability among migrant and rural families remains rampant. Migrants suffer the most from the inequality because of the disparity of rich and poor in the cities. In fact, the Gini coefficient, or income distribution measurement, found that in its index of 0. 00 representing perfect inequality and 1.00 representing perfect equality, China’s inequality increased from 0.3 in the 1980s, to at or above 0.45 in the 2000s. That meant that China joined the 25th percentile of countries with the greatest inequality according to the World Bank37.
One of the contributing factors is elevated living costs which consume a large percentage of worker’s salaries. For example, according to the NGO China Labour Bulletin, migrant workers’ wages increased on average 13.9%, while living expenses increased 21.7% in 201338.
Historically, since migrants were not official urban residents under the Hukou system, resources did not have to be allocated to them. The government justified the lack of adequate social services to migrants by indicating that they are technically temporary urban residents, and are expected to return home to their rural Hukou, where their share of government benefits awaits39.
The CCP has since changed this policy, stating that local urban governments must also provide for the migrant population, but its impact has been debatable.
Children of migrants are greatly affected by this inequality. Those living in cities with their parents face a cycle of poverty because of the restricted education services available to migrant children. For example, one study found that migrant families had to pay annual fees ranging from 1,000 to 30,000 Renminbi (about 150 to 4,600 USD) to have their child enter an
11 | Page urban public school40. But since migrant wages usually fall at the minimum wage, and the minimum wage in China is reported by the U.S.-China Business Council to equal around 1,250 to 1,820 Renminbi (about 200 to 280 USD) a month in cities like Beijing, school fees were overly expensive for migrant families to afford41. In addition to the fees, migrant schools tended to have poor quality equipment, faculty, and management compared to normal urban institutions42. If parents could not afford the school fees, migrant children were expected to return to their rural schools, where they faced similar low performing institutions, as well as bias from universities, that discriminate against admitting students from rural academic programs43.
As a result, a large portion of migrant children drop out of school and begin working at an early age44. One 2003 Beijing study found that dropout rates over the years have increased from 0.8% to 15.4% among migrant children, while another study found that about 10% of migrant children were missing from schools45. Although education in China is compulsory for the first nine years, migrant children are typically hard to keep track of because of their high mobility, and so easily missed within the school system and hard to track in surveys.
In many cases rural parents leave their children behind when they seek work in the cities.
Children left by their migrant parents, known as economic orphans, were not any better. These children received low quality education and faced a heightened risk of experiencing physical and mental health issues46. In 2010, researchers studied over 600 children in various villages from
Hunan province; half of the children had been left by their migrant parents, while the other half remained with their parents. The study found that the difference in school performance, and emotional and social stability between the two groups was substantial. Those left behind found to develop lasting communication and mental health problems47. Another survey conducted in the
Hubei province showed that more than half of their sampled junior high school students reported
12 | Page difficulties adapting to the left behind life, with 16.6% feeling abandoned and 6.5% feeling
“anguished”, directly affecting their academic performance and future life trajectories48.
Likewise, children from rural regions mirrored those faced by the migrant population.
Academic services in rural regions were not competitive with those of urban areas because rural areas suffered the most from resource deprivation of the Hukou system. Even when a rural child finished his/her compulsory education, the likelihood of going into higher education was low because of discrimination and heavy financial burdens. In addition, the professional occupations available in the countryside were limited and those in the cities were competitive and more likely to be taken by middle and upper class urban children49. Thus, the limited academic and social mobility for rural children has facilitated the increase in the rural to urban income gap from
16.9% to 19.3%50.
Mysteriously, the CCP has had the resources to invest back into rural regions. However, the CCP’s focus has been on economic progress, not social progress. Scholars have noted that the CCP has focused primarily on making agricultural production as efficient as possible, installing new technologies and machines, that displace and move rural residents into service and industry jobs; making critics question whether cheap labor has become the guiding point in social agenda for the CCP51.
In short, the Hukou has spurred mass migration from the countryside to urban areas while simultaneously limiting social benefits. Migrants who already suffered from low wage jobs and with little or no accumulated wealth, were driven further financially beneath their urban neighbours, which aggravated the existing economic divide and in turn increased overall economic inequality. The CCP has failed to adapt their welfare, educational and support policies to the migration crisis they had created. This is especially apparent in the separation of migrant
13 | Page families and disruption of education, which continues to implicate long-term problems for the rural and migrant population. The one seeming common benefit of the One-Child Policy failed to reach the marginalized population, and instead created a substantial uptick in one of the most basic measures of a society’s overall well-being: income inequality.
Urban Middle and Upper Class Benefits of Having Just One Child
Meanwhile, urban middle and upper class families have enjoyed the expanding financial sector, and have accumulated enough savings and property to emerge as a large, strong social class in China52. Notably, the income of the middle and upper class is rising quicker than that of the migrant and rural class. As a consequence, urban middle and upper singletons have enjoyed the elevated benefits of being single children in a financially stable home. These are children who as the “suns” of their family, grow up as “little emperors”53 enjoying the bulk of the attention and financial capabilities of their families. In this regard, they have benefitted from the
One-Child Policy. The same can be said for their educational opportunities. China’s rapid urbanization has allowed for the private sector to flourish, and in turn, provide private competitive education for those who can afford it54. The wealthy singletons’ education quality is higher than that of other social classes, and produces better return benefits than any other social class55. This has helped propel urban singletons into higher rated universities, which translates into white collar jobs56. In addition, over the past decades there has been a trend of sending middle to upper class children abroad to the West for their higher education; an especially notorious trend among the children of CCP high officials. A recent example of this was President
Xi Jinping’s daughter, Xi Mingze, who studied English and Psychology at Harvard University57.
Education has become a significant factor in accessing higher income and lucrative opportunities in China. As the resources have become concentrated at the top social classes, the
14 | Page lower economic classes become increasingly segregated58. The limited family numbers by the
One-Child Policy has allowed for the wealth accumulation by the middle and upper class urban families, coupled with the lack of social mobility allowed by the Hukou system, has resulted in increased economic inequality. Ironically, China has since begun to revise these two institutions because of looming economic problem caused by the One-Child Policy’s direct effects: the artificially created upside-down population pyramid. The market constraints from the current upside-down population pyramid has forced the CCP to readdress its rural and migrant class issues, because as the labor force lowers, there is an increased chance of future economic troubles that will be discussed in the following sections.
Market Limits: Upside-down Population Pyramid
In October of 2015, the CCP announced the discontinuation of the One-Child Policy as of
2016 for various economic reasons, most importantly, for the burgeoning aging population. By the year 2035, China is projected to have 391 million seniors, or people over the age of 65, increasing the amount of elderly in China’s population from 10.9% to 35.8% over the past decades59. This upside-down population pyramid paints a somber future for China’s economy, for as the baby boomer population retires presently, the amount of people in the workforce will decrease, simultaneously increasing the number of those in need of monetary assistance. As a consequence, economic scholars have predicted that the rapid shrinking of the labor force will reduce the availability of cheap labor, meaning foreign investment will slow, and so will the economic growth60.
According to a report presented to the U.S. Congress, China’s economic growth has averaged about 10% a year since 1978, in addition to becoming the largest manufacturer and exporter61. Economic prosperity was achieved by a large availability of low cost labor and the
15 | Page populous labor force manufacturing cheap goods. But because of the One-Child Policy’s man- made upside-down population pyramid, by 2050 China’s working population will decrease from
1 billion to 696 million62. Furthermore, since 2004, when unskilled migrant shortages were seen for the first time, there was a noted increase in wages of an average of 10.3%, which has continued to grow63. This has threatened foreign investment, and foreign companies may leave
China to find competitively cheap labor, in countries like Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, and
India.
Although in the past professionals have stated that China’s economic growth was unsustainable and bound to hit its limits, China’s risk for a recession and another legitimacy crisis is high. Yet others dispute the negative predictions because China may be approaching its
Lewis Turning Point, when rural labor surplus reaches zero, which means that the country is losing its labor surplus and entering the stage where there is an increase in wages, alongside technological and capital growth, which would improve the overall quality of living64. The Lewis
Turning Point has been used as a tool indicating if developing countries’ economies are transitioning and developing beyond their menial labor focus. Proponents do state that this may be a prime time for China to switch its economy from cheap manufacturing to higher valued goods and services to diversify the market in ways that may bring about a higher quality of jobs and living65.
Just as China’s economy seems primed to enter the next stage of development, however, its progress may be offset by the upside-down pyramid. As the size of the aging population continues to swell, resources may have to be allocated between non-working and working age citizens for a period of time. This will leave those in the workforce to deal with increased financial and personal burdens, and the social classes who will face the most strain are those
16 | Page from rural and migrant families. There are studies indicating that by 2030, China will have about
235 million elderly people, with 27 million over 80 years old needing help caring for themselves, including social and medical support66.While by 3025, The worker to pensioner ratio will drop from 3:5 to 2:167.
Thus, as China became rich off the labor of rural migrants, the One-Child Policy allowed for urban families to become substantially prosperous, with affluent singletons reaping from the economic and social benefits of being an only child. Meanwhile, the upside-down population pyramid has begun to shrink the labor force, and with wages rising, foreign firms seeking cheap labor are fleeing the country, therefore decreasing the chance of economic growth. Another byproduct of the shrinking labor force is the decreased ratio of workers to pensioners.
Furthermore, with the issues plaguing China’s social care system, which will be discussed in the following section, workers will bear larger and larger retiree burdens while the health of the marginalized population will suffer.
Weak Infrastructure: Welfare and Health Care
The infrastructure into which the One-Child Policy was born remains relatively underdeveloped because of its Maoist foundations. The CCP’s social safety net faced obstacles in addressing public needs because of its original flawed framework. Since the foundation of the communist party, the CCP attempted to create a cradle-to-grave welfare policy, dubbed iron rice bowl, which was supposed to provide for all the basic social needs to almost all of the population68. The policy, which was extremely expensive and therefore unsustainable, partially failed because people became dependent on welfare69. In addition, rampant corruption obstructed the distribution of sources. As party officials diverted the bulk of the supplies to state employees, family members, top administrators, profitable agencies, and more, the disparity in distribution
17 | Page between rural and urban areas was greatly inflamed, creating a socioeconomic contrast that is still in effect today70.
Deng Xiaoping oversaw the CCP’s shift away from a centrally planned government towards a competitive structure combining elements of a planned economy and de-centralization, allowing state businesses to compete with private enterprises71. As part of this decision, the
Central Politburo arranged for all social services to be available to Chinese citizens according to a set of guidelines, while local authorities and private enterprises were to carry the plans out.
Unfortunately, this process saw large administrative mismanagement and political abuse by enterprises because of the complex and sometimes conflicting laws, prevalent corruption, and private interests72. The 1980s and 1990s in China saw massive social unrest because of the lack of adequate education, health care, and housing, along with high unemployment rates73. To combat this, the CCP began implementing a series of corrective public reforms that provided direct assistance to those marginalized by the economic reforms74. These included medical insurance, basic financial aid for rural regions, free education, unemployment allowance, worker’s compensation, and more75.
China’s present day welfare and health care system is currently developed around a multi-layered finance system to support it. China officially has almost universal health care coverage, but mainly relies on public funds and copayments by companies, employees, and local government to contribute to basic, and sometimes, supplementary welfare benefits with limited financial risk protection and reimbursements76. Meanwhile, the services are plagued by problems such as poor quality of services, limited coverage, inept management, and minimal employer accountability77.
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The CCP also has different health care and welfare benefits for rural and urban Hukou, while cities have discretion in implementing the services, a common breeding ground for corruption. In addition, certain areas of China’s insurance and health care programs are underdeveloped because of the immensity of the country and the restrictions set by the Central
Politburo78. This is an issue, because those not participating in the labor force have limited options outside the social insurance system. As the price of living, housing, and health care increases, those who are unemployed or disabled are forced to rely on family support and savings for living expenses. This is an increasing problem for singletons facing the 4-2-1 phenomenon, which have two sets of grandparents, and one set of parents to support at the same time.
Critics point to the fact that China’s economy swiftly grew and outstripped China’s social infrastructure, which is part of the reason why the CCP failed to address its infrastructure in relation to the Hukou system79. Thus urban economic centers benefitted from the abundance of wealth, while the rural agrarian regions were left behind and faced with “market and price volatility”, one of the risks of agricultural industry80.
The CCP addressed migrant concerns in July 2014 when it announced the end of the
Hukou system, which in its essence is not completely over81. The government is relaxing migration into cities, but not ending the overall social control. This is a phenomenal step up, but the CCP has failed to address the Hukou system with regards to the socioeconomic inequality sponsored indirectly by the effects of the One-Child Policy. This means that migrant and rural populations remain especially vulnerable to the weak infrastructure, particularly in regards to the aging issue. Elders from marginalized economic groups suffer most because hospitals and health centers have encountered problems adequately tending to the aging population. Furthermore, there is limited retirement homes available and medical treatment is unaffordable, hence fewer of
19 | Page the older generations are using health care even when needed82. And since the majority of elders have lower education levels, low incomes, and are more likely to be in poorer health, the vulnerability for elder members of the migrant and rural segments increases83. In addition, with the cost of living and medical expenses going up, and the infrastructure failing to match the changes quickly, the number of elders living in relative poverty increases84. For the singletons of those sectors, the financial burden on those of working age has increased, especially on migrant and rural children, who in turn lag further behind in quality of living.
Social Control: Limiting Social Change
The CCP, officially, has various and widespread funded programs that help alleviate the economic hardships of low socioeconomic families, but the effectiveness of those programs are questionable. The CCP regularly releases figures and data that are often skewed to fit its projected expectations85. As mentioned before, legitimacy is of the utmost importance for the
CCP. The government has created methods of compliance that seem to fulfill its set quotas and reinforce its released figures via state control. Propaganda has especially been a tool for the CCP to maintain national harmony86. Another method of control has been the “Great Firewall”, which censors released public media, particularly the internet87. The arrival of the internet in China back in 1994 led to the systematic implementation of “regulations, surveillance, imprisonment, propaganda, and the blockage of hundreds of thousands of international websites”88 officially in
2003, which has been an effective tactic of cyber control, and in its essence, social control89.
The Hukou system, economic inequality, and welfare deficits are structural weaknesses interconnected with the One-Child Policy which the CCP should have considered when creating the population policy. To begin with, One-Child Policy’s purpose as an economic tool hindered its function as a social policy, but benefited the CCP’s overall economic agenda. In the 1990s
20 | Page and 2000s, with the economy rapidly thriving, government expenditure should have been invested back into creating an active, supportive and transparent social legislation as opposed to focusing solely on economic policies 90. Although one could argue that the CCP could not have anticipated how successful Deng’s economic agenda would be, the social problems that have plagued the communist government have been present since its inception. At any rate, the issues affecting Chinese society today reflect the criticism of scholars, claiming that the CCP has eyes only on economic prosperity, and perhaps on political security, as opposed to the well-being of the population. Another criticism is how China is experiencing the effects of capitalism in a communist system. Embarking upon a competitive system such as capitalism, where its economic purpose is for self-interest, conflicts with the ideological foundations of communism.
In the attempt to marry the two ideologies, there has been a debatable legacy on socioeconomic inequality. Regardless, the One-Child Policy has indisputably amplified the social issues by increasing the quality of resources for those who have enjoyed the benefits of having one child to feed, while increasing the family burden on marginalized singletons.
Therefore, the CCP needs to address the social effects of the One-Child Policy, the
Hukou system and upside-down population pyramid collectively. As urbanization quickens and the One-Child Policy’s influence on socioeconomic inequality increases, it may effect social unrest if the marginalized population continues without proper safety nets in place91. Broadly reviewing the social issues, it is undeniable that the CCP’s capability to handle current public problems remains fruitless because of its fundamental interest in facilitating economic growth, as if at all costs. Using tools meant to benefit people’s social care as market devices defeat their purpose, and China is seeing the effects of this political agenda.
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Confucian Inheritance and Legacy
As much as structural failures have impacted the bulk of the One-Child Policy’s effects on modern China, Confucian culture is responsible for the most actively devastating consequences. Confucian culture has promoted the subjection of women for thousands of years.
A woman’s worth was minimal according to Chinese tradition, with the belief that women were useful primarily for childbearing and domestic duties. The greatest influence the male dominated
Confucian tradition has had on the One-Child Policy has been the infanticide of girls.
Notwithstanding the gendercide, the population has seen additional unexpected consequences that have been both positive and negative. Some have even developed into larger issues that the CCP could not ignore any longer, as it historically did, as a result of their movement into economic centers. Those issues include human trafficking, the spread of sexual diseases, and the changing of women’s health. Although once overlook, these social trends have grown so rapidly that both the people and government have begun to address them in order to minimize their impact as they move with the migrant population.
The Skewed Sex-Ratio in Contemporary China
One of the “three grave unfilial acts” in Confucian belief was for a wife to fail to have a son92. Thus, thirty-five years after the commencement of the One-Child Policy, the sex-ratio in
China has risen to rates of approximately 117 males per 100 females depending on the region93, while the average rate around the world falls between 107 to 102 males per 100 females94.
Rural regions saw the greatest spike in skewed sex-ratios despite the One-Child Policy’s leniency in enforcing the one child rule. Grass-roots Confucian beliefs motivated citizens to consider infanticide as a rational way of upholding cultural expectations. One of the main reasons for the gendercide was the idea that women were considered temporary members of their
22 | Page biological family. Once a woman was married, her husband’s family absorbed her as their own, bringing few benefits to her biological family95. In this way, a son meant security, passing on the family name, guarantee of income, and someone to take care of the family when parents aged.
Thus various reports cited Chinese couples paying heavily for prenatal sex determination and for sex-selective abortions96. If unable to terminate the pregnancy, underreporting of female births and abandonment were common as well97. One prime example of unequal treatment baby girls received can be seen in the high the mortality rate between the ages of 1 to 5 during the
1990s. When the baby girls were sick, parents were less likely to seek medical assistance than they were for baby boys, revealing how the males were more highly valued and cared for than females98.
Finally, there is an estimated 37 million “missing girls”, or disappeared female babies, as a result of Confucian influence following the One-Child Policy’s mandate99. The unexpected deficit number of women has led to various social consequences in Chinese society, including the inability to fulfill “familial duties” for millions of men, and in turn, an increase in risky behavior in fragments of society100.
Trafficking of Women
For China, marriage is a fundamental pillar of life and a social expectation. However, by the year 2020, there will be about 8.5 million more men of marriageable age than women, with data indicating that the ratio is rising101. Thus, there will be a large quantity of men with limited prospects of marriage. Given that marriage will become reserved for a limited amount of men, it is primarily lower-class, undereducated, rural men that will face the greatest hardships in finding a wife. As a result, these men, dubbed guang gun, or bare branches, have resorted to risky practices to fulfill their supposed familial and sexual needs102. Although trafficking is a world-
23 | Page wide issue that plagues every country, China faces a huge influx of trafficked women because of the One-Child Policy’s influence. Not surprisingly, this has resulted in the buying of kidnapped and trafficked women as brides and the increased use of sex workers103.
As the demand for a bride outweighs supply, studies show that poor rural men are at a disadvantage in the marriage market—especially with the increasing trend of women migrating to other areas for better marriage prospects104. As more men turn to the match-making or traditional bride markets to find or buy their partner, they are faced with increasingly high bride prices, in addition to paying for the ceremony and festivities105. For example, in the 1980s a bride cost between 870 to 2,000 Renminbi (about 130 to 300 USD) in China106, but now brides can cost anywhere between 30,000 to 100,000 Renminbi (about 4,500 to 15, 000 USD)107.
Although bride-buying has been practically eradicated in urban China, rural regions continue to see some prevalence of it because of the tight hold tradition has in some of the most isolated areas.
In addition, poor rural men are discriminated against for being the lowest in the social hierarchy. Even if the men’s families are able to save for years or borrow money to afford a bride, their low socioeconomic status decreases their chances because of the mediocre standard of living compared to others108. Evidence suggests that the new standard for marriage include at least an apartment109. As a consequence, many rural men look beyond conventional means of marriage and instead focus on lucrative agencies that work in human trafficking. These agencies operate in the business of abducting those who are most vulnerable to disappear, such as foreign women, women of extreme poverty, the mentally ill, and those abandoned as babies who grow up in orphanages or otherwise without registration110.
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What is recognized is that trafficked brides follow the same path as those trafficked as prostitutes and for forced labor. Women from neighboring countries with economic instability are the ones most susceptible to being sold to traffickers by an acquaintance or family member, usually lured into China with the notion of finding steady employment and a decent living111.
Women in surrounding countries such as Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Mongolia, Malaysia,
Cambodia, Laos, and North Korea are the most at risk for trafficking. Several news outlets, such as the Wall Street Journal, The Economist, and The New York Times have recorded numerous stories of trafficked women who were promised well-paying jobs and better lives beyond the means they found at home112. After the women are transported to China, they are subsequently forced into marriage, prostitution, or forced labor with limited legal and financial means to leave.
They are often secluded and subjected to physical and financial coercion as well113.
During the Mao era, the CCP outlawed the sale of brides in order to move women into the public sphere to increase their labor force participation114. Yet with the fear of social unrest,
Chinese officials have in more recent times looked the other way as poor rural men hire illegal organizations to find a bride. Unfortunately, the amount of women trafficked for marriage is unknown and there is not enough research in this field to measure and compare to past decades.
As mentioned before, because of the low socioeconomic status of most rural men, affording a trafficked wife may not be an option even though the women are half as expensive as those found through traditional bride markets. Therefore, a great portion of poor rural men have turned to prostitution as a means of dealing with their bachelor life. One study found that those regions with the greatest number of single men tended to be those with the highest amount of men paying for prostitutes115.
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Prostitution is illegal yet notorious in China116. Prostitution is ingrained in Chinese society through finance and culture, and difficult to eradicate. An example is how prostitution is imbedded in the lifestyle of traveling business men. As part of the business culture, men hire xiao jie and sanpei xiaojie, or hostesses, for a night for entertainment at places like clubs, karaoke bars, and spas.117. Cities also rely on sex tourism as a major source of revenue from foreigners and business men118. As the central government has moved towards leaving municipalities in charge of managing their budget, corruption has become an issue, and local governments are financially incentivized to ignore what is happening behind the scenes119.When efforts are made to stop the sex trade, police departments are deterred by the spread of new technologies, such as “back-water” websites and cell phones120. They allow for traffickers to use other networks for the sale of sex, and move out of traditional red light districts away from police scrutiny121. As a result of the increased demand for sex workers, there is an increased danger of
STD transmissions spreading from pockets of the Chinese population throughout mainland
China which will be discussed in the following section.
Dangers from STD Migration
Rural and migrant men are the most at risk demographic for infections because of their high mobility, lack of education, difficulty in the marriage market, and barriers to access health care resources122. Currently, there are only portions of the Chinese population who suffer from high infection rates, but with the new reforms made to the Hukou system; STDs are currently spreading from high risk populations into the general population through the migrants123. This thesis will focus on the spread of HIV particularly because of its danger, and because of the data available compared to other STDs.
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In 2012, the Ministry of Health of China reported that the percent of HIV spread through sexual transmission in China has increased from 33.1% in 2006 to 76.3% by 2011, meaning that sexual intercourse has become the leading method of HIV infection, as opposed to needle sharing by drug-users in years past124. Although it was historically attributed to homosexual sexual contact, there is substantial data showing that heterosexual sexual contact is the main mode of transmitting125. Thus, there is an increasing danger for the HIV disease to move from segregated malnourished areas, like the southwest of China, to coastal areas and cities, especially as the country becomes even more interconnected. The spread of sexual diseases into the general population happens through a chain: from prostitutes to clients, then from the clients to their spouses or other sexual partners. Prostitutes by default are more likely to contract a sexual disease given the nature of their job, and the men who have bought sex once tend to do so repeatedly and tend to have various partners126. An example of this chain is the town of
Dongguan, located in Guangdong Province. There is an estimated 300,000 prostitutes who serve urban and migrant clients, as well as the Hong Kong business men, who travel back and forth between Dongguan and their homes127.
The CCP has since been incentivized to focus its resources on collecting data on migrant and rural problems because of the movement of these social and health issues into financial centers. Historically, marginalized at-risk citizens were ignored because of the CCP’s focus on economic affairs as discussed in the previous sections. However, the detrimental effect of the
One-Child Policy on poor single men has encouraged the CCP to find a solution to these problems. Because migrants are moving at higher rates into cities to fulfill the labor gap, and since the migrant population is broadly composed of single men, their problems will spread quickly under the inadequate infrastructure.
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In order to target the rising social issues, the government must acknowledge that the gender imbalance has increased social pressures, as opposed to continuing to rationalize the matters under the Confucian mentality. The One-Child Policy is a policy that did not address the gendered lives men and women in China live and have lived for hundreds of years. Although the
One-Child Policy has reduced fertility rates as it was meant to do, the CCP has failed to acknowledge the “patriarchy rationale”128 in which the Chinese families are historically built upon, which has since led to the buying of women as if a commodity to fulfill cultural expectations.
The effects of Confucian influences on the One-Child Policy are inherently a reflection of the conflict between the old and new culture of China. As a result, an unseen consequence has been the varying degrees of positive influences in which Chinese women’s lives have been affected. But in spite of the changes, the areas where tradition persists, such as rural regions, the women’s lifestyles have improved only minimally.
Woman’s Health
Urban Women
Studies conducted around the world have shown that there is a high correlation between low fertility rates and women's empowerment129. The One-Child Policy has unintentionally facilitated this phenomenon for urban women, where the policy has been most successfully enforced130.
Historically, gender stereotyping has created substantial differences in behavior, education, and opportunities according to one’s sex131. Yet, financial needs have overcome tradition; parents have been incentivized to "raising a daughter as a son", and have shown a heightened parental investment in all aspects of their daughter’s life as opposed to prior
28 | Page generations132.This phenomenon has shown its effects mainly through education, where research shows girls meeting the same academic expectations as their male counterparts133. For example, a 2010-2012 study by the Education Ministry of China stated that 49.6% of undergraduates and
50.3% of graduate students in China were women134. This, in turn, affects the amount of women employed as opposed to year’s pasts135.
Unfortunately, urban women face gender based inequality throughout their professional careers. In the 2015 Global Gender Gap Report, China ranked 81 out of 145 countries for improving the gender gap in economic participation and opportunity136. Women’s ability to rise to top positions in Chinese firms was 4.5 out of 7 and only 18% of firms had women as head managers137. Women were also relegated to certain areas of employment, such as commerce and hospitality, while men were overrepresented in higher paying jobs such as government and corporate organizations138. In addition, skilled Chinese women were ridiculed and labeled sheng nu, or leftover women, for having a higher education and for being career-goal oriented, despite the One-Child Policy’s effects on restraining the eligibility pool of women for men to marry139.
Likewise, women were still expected to fulfill their domestic role140, and it is reported that Chinese women have a higher sense of family obligation and are more likely to physically and actively care for their parents’ financial and emotional well-being compared to their male counterparts141. Women still face many cultural obstacles when entering the public sphere in modern day China142.
However, overall urban women testified to enjoying more independence and freedom, indirect long term effects of the One-Child Policy 143. Some scholars noted that women of high skilled backgrounds had higher expectations for their partner, giving urban woman bargaining power in the marriage market as opposed to traditional matchmaking customs144. Also, despite
29 | Page the fact that the One-Child Policy violated the right of women to procreate when they wanted, a substantial portion of urban women cited that even now, when they will be allowed to have two children, they would still prefer one child because of the financial costs and personal benefits145.
Regrettably, the few positive effects of the One-Child Policy on women are restricted according to demography and region. Those belonging to the migrant, rural, or ethnic minority population face minimal lifestyle changes.
Migrant and Rural Women
The migrant, rural, and ethnic minority populations face minimal lifestyle changes because, as women of primarily of low socioeconomic status, they are marginalized and faced with limited personal autonomy, and are more likely to be married early compared to their urban counterparts146. Also, migrant women who work in urban centers similarly face restricted lifestyles through their employer management, largely made up of males, which has kept female laborers under watch and living in mediocre conditions, with limited health benefits147. When migrant women marry, it is under similar circumstances as their rural counterparts.
Reports cite marginalized women have lowered mental and physical health. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), suicide in China accounted for a quarter of all suicides across the world148, and China has the highest suicide rate among women, particularly rural women149. The Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention found that in 2011, 300,000 people committed suicide, with about 75% committed in rural areas, and women accounted for majority of those deaths150.
Studies have found that suicidal Chinese women are not necessarily always suffering from a mental disease. Instead, they explained to be feeling hopeless because of their unhappy lives, primarily stemming from family conflict and violence based on patriarchy151. Maltreatment
30 | Page of rural and migrant women is relatively common. Since women have been subjugated under the
“patriarchy rationale”152, domestic abuse is not seen as an issue in some households. One study that used data from a 2000 Chinese Health and Family Life Survey, containing 5,000 participants, found that 34% of couples reported at least one episode of male perpetrated violence on the female, while half of all low socioeconomic women had experienced abuse sometime in their relationships153. The abuse usually involved alcohol and could range from the woman complaining to jealousy.
The ability to cope with violent partners for marginalized women is limited because of several factors. Rural and migrant women often travel away from their families or support systems to live with their husbands. Marginalized women are also more prone to enduring the marriage because of limited personal resources, therefore accepting abuse as a normal part of married life154. Divorce is also not a popular option, for there is a stigma of shame associated with divorce in Chinese tradition, as well as because of the high likelihood of the woman being left destitute, since the husband is usually the main financial provider155. Unfortunately, because of their location and Hukou label, these women also faced barriers to healthcare services and were isolated within their households.
Despite the fact that rural and migrant women suffer from an array of hardships, the One-
Child Policy has benefited them simultaneously. Women are no longer tied to the home caring for multiple children. Moreover, because of China’s growing economic prosperity, the expanded ability to work in urban centers has also temporarily separated nuclear families for work, meaning women had more liberty in their daily lives156.
The CCP has been active since the 1990s in displaying propaganda of a daughter’s benefit to society and offering financial incentives across the country to fix the gender issue. Yet
31 | Page as ambitious as their project has been, these are centuries old beliefs that will take longer than a few decades to adjust. Gender issues are at the center of the lives of marginalized women – even for women from privileged backgrounds – hence the government should have considered them when crafting the One-Child Policy.
In light of it all, the One-Child Policy is forcing change on social dynamics and indirectly challenging the justifications for continuing patriarchy in family and professional settings, even in rural regions. Urban women are proof of the benefits, and the ongoing changes bring hope in modernizing women’s roles in traditional households.
Conclusion
This thesis argues that the social challenges associated with the One-Child Policy are not all direct byproducts from the policy. The Hukou system, China’s aggressive economic focus, inadequate infrastructure, and Confucian influence are all contributing factors to the social consequences facing China today. The only effect explicitly resulting from the One-Child Policy is the upside-down population pyramid – and though a similar trend can be noted in many developed countries, China’s population inversion is unique because it was artificially created.
The CCP’s failure to adapt to the policy it created is ultimately to blame for the succession of these issues upon Chinese society. As mentioned before, part of the issue may stem from the
Central Politburo basing its legitimacy on its economic prosperity, which plenty of countries around the world strive for. Yet, Deng Xiaoping’s economic agenda was brilliant and successful, and although certain practices and issues outlined in this essay are profoundly troubling, the CCP has completed its goal of redefining itself in the world while maintaining control over China. In addition, the One-Child Policy has produced some positive results, specifically in the realm of
32 | Page women’s health and empowerment. However, the government’s economic focus has overtaken any public needs for which a communist system is supposed to address. Subsequently, it produced a rapid succession of socioeconomic troubles for the CCP to contain, ironically, because its economic growth was at stake. These are problems that the Central Politburo has had the resources to address; however, it chose not to until they became prominent national issues for one reason or another.
A challenge in fully assessing the scope of China’s social problems revolves around the large gap in available data, alongside the issue of the government’s tendency to misreport. This greatly hinders our ability to understand the social challenges plaguing China. Although only time will reveal if the CCP's abandonment of the One-Child Policy will produce any positive results, using the existing scholarship, it can be confidently argued that the One-Child Policy was developed to support China’s economic policies, to help China become a global economic power. Hence, as an economic support system, it was successful, but shortsighted and neglectful of China’s public needs.
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1Xizhe Peng, “Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces,” Population and Development Review 13, no. 13 (1987): 640, 650-655.; Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 110; Joseph A. William, "A Tragedy of Good Intentions: Post-Mao Views of the Great Leap Forward," Modern China, 12, no. 4 (1986): 435- 440. William described the CCP structure used to develop the Great Leap Forward, and then the Cultural Revolution. The same mentality can be found in the makings of the One-Child Policy, 433-452. 2 Nai-Ruenn and Chi-ming Hou, “China's Inflation, 1979-1983: Measurement and Analysis.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 34, no. 4 (1986):814, 817-818, 821-823. 3 Rajan, S. Irudaya, “China's One-Child Policy: Implication for Population Aging,” Economic and Political Weekly 29, no. 38 (1994): 2502. Irudaya’s work is a necessary read because of the manner in which she writes it. Written as if one were experiencing the One-Child Policy’s foundation and eventual institutionalization from the inside and from the outside, her article provides a side-by-side comparison needed when opinionating on the policy. 4 H. Yuan Tien, “Wan, Xi, Shao: How China Meets Its Population Problem,” International Family Planning Perspective 6, no.2 (1980):65. 5 Gregory C. Chow “Economic Reform and Growth in China,” Annals of Economics and Finance 5 (2004):130, 137-138. Chow explains China’s economic agenda in such a way that I would not be surprised if the economy mimicked his predictions. 6 Guocang Huan, “CHINA'S OPEN DOOR POLICY, 1978-1984.” Journal of International Affairs 39, no.2 (1986): 1-18. 7 Xiaoqin Ding, the Socialist Market Economy: China and the World.” Science & Society 73, no. 2 (2009): 236. 8 Xing Lu and Herbert W. Simons, “Transitional Rhetoric of Chinese Communist Party Leaders in the Post- Mao Reform Period: Dilemmas and Strategies,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 92, no. 3 (2006): 266. 9 Wang Feng et al., “Population, Policy, and Politics: How Will History Judge China’s One-Child Policy?,” Population and Development Review 38 (2012):118. 10 “To Get Rich is Glorious,” Last modified July 25, 1994, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1994/07/25/to-get-rich-is-glorious. 11 Irudaya, “China's Population Aging,” 2502. 12 Thomas R. Malthus An Essay on the Principle of Population (St. Paul’s Church Yard, 1798):1-125. I have given an extremely narrow of Malthus’s theory within the thesis, and greatly recommend reading his book to better comprehend his argument. 13 Fend et al., “Population, Policy, and Politics,” 116; John Bongaarts, “Population Policy Option in the Developing World,” Science 263, no. 5148 (1994): 771. 14 Penelope ReVelle and Charles ReVelle, “Limiting Population Growth” in The Global Environment: Securing a Sustainable Future, ReVelle et al. (Boston: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, Inc., 1992), 137. 15 Susan Greenhalgh, “Science, Modernity, and the Making of China’s One-Child Policy,” Population and Development Review 29, no.2 (2003): 169. 16 Ibid. 17 Susan Greenhalgh, Just One Child: Science and Policy in Deng’s China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2008), 136-165. 18Irudaya, “China's Population Aging,” 2502. 19 Greenhalgh, Just One Child, 287. 20 Song Jian et al., “Population System Control,” Mathematical and Computer Modeling 11(1988): 496- 497. Provides proof of Song’s detachment from China’s sociopolitical landscape. 21 Yan Hao, “China’s 1.2 Billion Population Target for the Year 2000: ‘Within’ or ‘Beyond?’,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 19, no. 20 (1988): 165-183. 22 Greenhalgh, “Science, Modernity,” 184. 23Ibid, 183, 187. 24 “’Overpopulation; Ideas have Consequences,” last modified July 1, 2003, https://www.pop.org/content/overpopulation-ideas-have-consequences-1814; John Bongaarts and Susan Greenhalgh, “An Alternative to the One-Child Policy in China,” Population and development Review 11, no. 4 (1985): 586-587. 25 Mosher, “’Overpopulation Consequences.”
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26 Ibid. 27 Jean C. Oi, “The Roles of the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy,” The China Quarterly, no.144 (1995): 1132-1135, 1147. With the CCP’s change in how it manages the country, this article provides insight on how economics and politics worked at the micro level in China after Mao. Hence, shedding light into how large, complex, and yet limited local governments are when developing their areas, and how sometimes it is at odds with the central CCP leadership. 28 Tiejun Cheng and Mark Selden “The Origins and Social Consequences of China’s Hukou System,” The China Quarterly 139(1994): 644-668. The article is a great piece describing the extent to which the Hukou prioritized certain financial sectors, and created a long-lasting social hierarchy. 29 Martin King Whyte, “Social Change and the Urban-Rural Divide in China,” In The Irish Asia Strategy and Its China Relations, ed. Fan Hong and Jörn-Carsten Gottwald. (Amsterdam: Rozenberg Publishers, 1999), 45-60. 30 “China’s ‘Floating Population’,” last modified October 12, 2013, http://scir.org/2013/10/chinas-floating- population/. 31 Hayden Windrow and Anik Guha, “The Hukou System, Migrant Workers, & State Power in the People’s Republic of China,” Northwestern Journal of International human Rights 3, no. 1 (1998): 3-11, 14-15. 32Kay-Wah Chan, “Chapter 8: China’s Labour Laws in Transition,” in Law, Wealth and Power in China: Commercial Law Reforms in Context, John Garrit, (Routledge, 2010), 165. 33 “Chapter 4: China’s Urbanization and Land A Framework for Reform” in Urban China: Toward Efficient, Inclusive, and Sustainable Urbanization, The World Bank, Et al. (Washington, D.C.: 2014), 266- 267. 34 Zhiqiang Liu, “Institution and Inequality: the Hukou in China,” Journal of Comparative Economics 33(2005): 154-156. 35 Kam Wing Chan, “The Household Registration System and Migrant Labor in China: Notes on a Debate,” Population and Development Review 36, no. 2(2010): 358. 36 “Chapter 3: Heavy is the Head of the “Little Emperor” Pressure, Discipline, and Competition in the Stratification System” in Only Hope: Coming of Age under China’s One-Child Policy, Vanessa L. Fong (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 87- 100. This is a great excerpt from Fong’s book explaining how the One-Child Policy has created a competitive atmosphere amongst every social class. The increased wealth and overall standard of living has not prevented the singletons, and particularly parents, from pushing for more. It is worth noting how parents with the money and means pushed their children forward in the educational ladder did so at every step. 37 Terry Sicular, “Inequality in Focus: The Challenge of High Inequality in China,” The World Bank, 2013. 38 “Real wages for China’s migrant workers stagnate as cost of living escalates,” last modified May 14, 2014, http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/real-wages-china%C3%A2%E2%82%AC%E2%84%A2s-migrant- workers-stagnate-cost-living-escalates. 39 Kam, “Household Debate”, 357-258. 40 Fei yan, “Education Problems with Urban Migratory Children in China,” The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare 32, no. 3(2005):5. 41 “China raises minimum wage in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin: Report,” Last modified April 1, 2014, http://www.cnbc.com/2014/04/01/china-raises-minimum-wage-in-beijing-shanghai-tianjin-report.html. 42 Yan, “Education Problems,” 6. 43 Kam, “Household Debate,” 359. 44 Ming Tsui and Lynne Rich, “The Only Child and Educational Opportunity for Girls in Urban China,” Gender and Society 16, no.1 (2002):76. 45 Jung Guo, Migrant Children School Performance in China: A Pilot Study in Beijing (Berkeley: University of California, 2007), 15. 46 Hui Feng et al., “Sociodemographic Correlates of Behavioral Problems Among Rural Chinese Schoolchildren,” Public Health Nursing 28, no. 4 (2011): 297-307. Great article detailing the effects that the left-behind children suffer, as well as the long-lasting consequences of these issues. 47 Ming Wen and Danhua Lin, “Child Development in Rural China: Left Behind by Their Migrant Parents and Children of Nonmigrant Families,” Child Development 83, no. 1 (2012): 126-135 48 Ibid, 122. 49 Zhiqiang, “Inequality in China,” 151. 50 Biwei Su and Almas Heshmati, “Analysis of the Determinants of Income and Income Gap between Urban and Rural China,” China Economic Policy Review 2, no.1 (2013): 17. 35 | Page
51 Qiang Fu and Qiang Ren, “Educational Inequality under China's Rural-Urban Divide: The Hukou System and Returns to Education,” Environment and Planning 42, no. 3 (2010): 593-595, 607. 52 Martin King Whyte, “China Post-Socialist Inequality,” Current History (2012): 232-234 53Toni Falbo and Dudley L. Polston, Jr., “The Academic, personality, and Physical Outcomes of Only Children in China,” Child Development 64, no.1 (1993): 18-35; L. Cameron, Et al. “Little Emperors: Behavioral Impacts of China’s One-Child Policy,” Science 22 339, no. 6122 (2013): 953-957. I included articles that argue for various facets of the “Little Emperors” theory. Unfortunately, I am limited in my writing to indulge in the physical and psychological outcomes of singletons. Luckily, there is a large surplus of data in this area, and these articles are only a few of the hundreds that explore this topic. 54 Ka Ho Mok and Yat Wai Lo, “The Impacts of Neo-Liberalism on China’s Higher Education,” Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies 5, no. 1 (2007): 323- 334. This article highlights the argument about educational disparities with great clarity. Few articles look at the various long-term effects of education inequality in Chinese society, and the authors accomplished bringing the issue forward as a current social dilemma that must be dealt with. 55 Biwei Su, Almas Heshmati, “Analysis of the Determinants of Income and Income Gap between Urban and Rural China,” Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper Series no. 7162 (2013):13. In the thesis, I primarily focus on migrants because of their key importance in China’s market equation. However, these authors argue that the rural areas suffered more from the inequality in education than migrants. 56 Whyte, “China Inequality,” 231, 233. 57 “What Did China’s First Daughter Find in America?,” Last modified April 6, 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-did-chinas-first-daughter-find-in-america. 58 Tiejun Cheng and Mark Selden, “The Origins and Social Consequences of China’s Hukou System,” The China Quarterly, no. 139 (1994):657- 662. 59 Li Jianmin, “China’s Lopsided Population Pyramid,” China Security 3, no. 2(2007):54; Somnath Chatterji, and Et al., “The Health of Aging Populations in China and India,” Health Affairs 27, no. 4 (2008): 1052. Jianmin’s article is an interesting read because Li touches upon the idea of China changing or diversifying its economic performance, but does not mention the Lewis Turning Point or other economic arguments. Li does mention the urgency in which the infrastructure must be address to deal with the brunt of the aging population in a well summarized manner. While the second article mentioned is a rather unsettling, but important observation about the interaction between the elderly and chronic diseases in countries with large populations such as China and India. While reading, please consider how prevalent and debilitating certain diseases are according to socioeconomic status. Also consider how disparity in health according to socioeconomic class supports Marxist class theory. 60 “China Begins to Lose Edge as World’s Factory Floor,” last modified January 6, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323783704578245241751969774. 61 Wayne M. Morrison, “China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States,” Paper prepared for Members and Committees of Congress as part of the Congressional Research Service Report, October 21, 2015, 5; “Urban China Part II Supporting Reports: Urbanization and Economic Growth” Series of reports presented by the World Bank with the Development Research Center of the Stat Council, the People’s Republic of China in Washington, D.C., 2014, 83. 62 Hongbin Li, Et al., “The End of Cheap Chinese Labor,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 26, no. 4(2012): 68. As someone with little background in economics, I have to thank the authors of this article for providing an easy insightful read into China’s changing market(s). 63 Cai Fang and Wang Meiyan, “Four Topics on Wage Changes in Chinese Economy,” Paper presented at the 34th Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Beijing, China, 2010, 2; “Wages and Employment,” last modified 2015, http://www.clb.org.hk/content/wages-and-employment. Cai and Wang do a great job of writing about how China’s wage convergence is facing various obstacles, which in turn, affects its Lewis Turning Point. One significant factor in their article is the subtle way in which they critically address the shortcomings of the Hukou system in relation to economic inequalities. 64Yang Yao and Ke Zhang, “Has China passed the Lewis turning point? A structural estimation based on provincial data,” China Economic Journal 3, no. 2 (2010): 155-162. 65 Ray Brooks and Ran Tao, "China's Labor Market Performance and Challenges," Paper sponsored by the International Monetary Fund Asian and Pacific Department, November 2003: 1-25. 66 Zeng Yi and Zhenglian Wang, “Dynamics of Family and Elderly Living Arrangements in China: New Lessons Learned from the 2000 Census,” 3, no.2 (2003):98. Although the data used here is a bit outdated, I chose to use it because it is still relevant and matching the current projections to what the elderly 36 | Page
population in China will look like. Also, the analysis provided is superior to other short studies released currently. 67 Darren Wee, “China's rocketing elderly population prompts a rethink on pensions,” The Guardian, October 1, 2012. 68 Qingyue Meng and Shenglan Tang, “Universal Coverage of Health Care in China: Challenges and Opportunities,” Paper presented as a World Health Report in 2010: 4-6.The citation of the World Health Report does not do it justice in its scholarly benefits. The authors did an amazing job addressing China’s health care system’s benefits and shortcomings. Although it lacks some skepticism, which might be described as personal bias, the paper is insightful in providing a view into how difficult it is to provide for a country as large as China. 69 Binggin Li, “Social Welfare and Protection for Economic Growth and Social Stability,” in A Changing China: Emerging Governance, Economic, and Social Trends, Civil Service College, Singapore. (2012), 39- 60. 70 Yanjie Bian and John R. Logan, “Market Transition and the Persistence of Power: The Changing Stratificatioin System in Urban China,” American Sociological Review61, no. 5 (1996):744. 71 Gregory C. Chow, “Economic Planning in China,” A working paper presented to Princeton University’s Griswold Center for Economic Policy Studies discussion series, Princeton, New Jersey, June, 2011:1-2. Chow provides a quick view into how the CCP plans and manages its economic agenda. 72 Windrow, Et al., “The Hukou System,” 6; Perry Keller “Sources of Order in Chinese Law,” The American Journal of Comparative Law 42, no. 4 (1994): 711, 729-731. Keller’s journal provides a well organized layout of China’s historical legal basis and how that has influenced the way the CCP carries about today. 73 Stein Ringen and Kinglun Ngok, “What kind of welfare State is emerging in China?” Paper presented by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2013:7. A Highly recommended reading; the paper supports the argument of China focusing, at least, its welfare agenda towards fueling its market economy, creating many shortcomings and errors. 74 Ibid, 7-9. 75 Joe C.B. Leung, “The emergence of social assistance in China,” International Journal of Social Welfare 15, no.3 (2006): 188-190. 76 Mukul Asher and David Newman “The Challenges of Social Security Reform in Transition Economies: The Case of China,” Indian Journal of Social Development, no.1 (2002):1, 10-15.; Christopher Needham, “Social Welfare Protection: The EU, USA, and China” Paper presented as a library briefing to the Library of the European Parliament, August 01, 2013: 5-7. 77 Joe C.B. Leung, “Social Security reforms in China: Issues and Prospects,” International Journal of Social Welfare 12, no. 2 (2003):18. 78 Ringen Et al., “What kind of Welfare is Emerging in China?,” 9, 13-15; Xian Huang, “The Politics of Social Welfare reform in Urban China: Social Welfare Preferences and Reform Policies,” Journal of China Political Science 18, no.1 (2012):72. 79 Weiping Wu, “Urban Infrastructure Financing and Economic Performance in China,” Urban Geography 31, no.5 (2010): 649, 651-657.Weiping’s article outlines in great detail how the developing infrastructure in China has been hindered by several factors such as uneven access for sources of infrastructure financing, the unification of revenue across regions, historical tendencies, and more. 80 Sarah Cook, “After the Iron Rice Bowl: Extending the Safety Net in China,” Paper presented as a discussion piece to the Institute of Development Studies, no. 377 (2000):5. 81 Goodburn, “End of Hukou?,” 1. 82 Yean-Ju Lee and Zhenyu Xiao, “Children’s support for elderly parents in Urban and Rural China: Results from a national survey,” Journal of Cross-Cultural Gerontology 13 (1998):40, 50; “Meeting the needs of Elderly People in China,” Last modified August 17, 2006, http://www.bmj.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/content/333/7564/363.short. 83 Albert Park and Et al., “Relying on Whom? Poverty and Consumption Financing in China’s Elderly.” Paper presented as part of the Policy Research and Data on Needs to Meet the Challenge of Aging in Asia from the U.S. National Research Council and U.S. National Academies Press. 84 Jianmin, “China’s Pyramid,” 57. 85 Iacob N. Koch-Weser, “The Reliability of China’s Economic Data: An Analysis of National Output” Paper presented as a U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Project, last modified January 28, 2013, accessed 2016: 20-34. Koch-Weser’s excellent article is a straight-forward 37 | Page
informative piece on the intentions and manners in which the CCP manipulates its information for mainly political reasons. 86 Zhoe He, “Chinese Communist Party Press in a Tug-of-War,” in Power, Money, and Media: Communication Patterns and Bureaucratic Control in Cultural China, Chin-Chuan Lee (Evanston: Northwestern University press, 2000), 115-116. 87 Daniel Anderson, “Splintering behind the Great Firewall of China,” Queue 10, no. 11(2012):2; Gary King, Et al., “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,” American Political Science Reivew 107, no.2 (2013):328. 88 Xiao Qiang, “The Rise of Online Public Opinion and Its Political Impact,” in Changing Media, Changing China – Online Censorship, Susan L. Shirk (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 206. 89 Xiao Qiang, “The Battle for the Chinese Internet,” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 2(2011): 50. 90 Lu Mai, “China’s Social reform and Rebuilding the Welfare System”, Paper by the Secretary General of the China Development Research Foundation as policy analysis report, Beijing, China, 2008, 14. 91Carol Graham, “Stemming the Backlash Against Globalization.” Paper presented as a policy brief from the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., April, 2001, 2-5. 92 Sheila Hiller, “Women And Population Control in China: Issues of Sexuality, Power and Control,” Feminist Review, no.29 (1988): 104. Hiller’s article stresses the technical importance that the CCP saw in institutionalizing the One-Child Policy. The hoops and obstacles faced by the government, even with its ideology challenged, displays how deeply and truly the Politburo felt that the country needed a drastic demographic policy for its future well-being. 93 “China to ease One-Child Policy,” Last modified November 15, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/15/c_132891920.htm. 94 “The World Factbook” Last modified unknown, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/fields/2018.html. 95 Wendy Wang, “Son Preference and Educational Opportunities of Children in China ‘I Wish You Were a Boy!’,” Gender Issues 22, no. 2 (2005): 5-6. 96 Therese Hesketh, Et al., “The consequences of son preference and sex-selective abortion in China and other Asian countries,” 183, no. 12 (2011): 1374. 97Daniel Goodkind, “The claim that China's fertility restrictions contributed to the use of prenatal sex selection: A skeptical reappraisal,” Journal of Demography 69, no.3 (2015): 270. Goodkind offer great arguments and insights into additional reasons why the One-Child Policy is not solely to blame for the skewed-sex ratio. Since my essay’s focus lays mainly on the strong Confucian influence, which I perceive as the most dominant factor, I did not mention the other areas that attribute this to the gendercide and recommend Goodkind’s article as a means of exploring the other areas. 98 Mare Hvistenhahl, “Making Every Baby Girl Count” Science 323, no. 5918 (2009): 1165. Provides insight into the benefits and incentives the CCP offers for couples to consider having daughters. 99 Lily Lee, “No Woman or Girl Left Behind: Restoring Girls in China and Cambodia,” Priscilla Papers 28, no. 1 (2014): 20. Lee offers a religious point of view to handling the issue of skewed-sex ratio, which might facilitate the reading for those interested. 100 Avraham Y. Eenstein and Ethan Jennings Sharygin, “The Consequence of the ‘Missing Girls’ of China,” The World Economic Review 23, no. 3 (2009): 411. 101 Joseph D. Tucker, Et al., “Surplus men, sex work, and the spread of HIV in China,” AIDS 19, no. 6 (2005):541. This article provides every possible argument as to why China faces an alarmingly high risk for the spread of HIV. 102 Therese Hesketh, Et al., “The Consequences of son preference and sex-selective abortion in China and other Asian countries,” Canadian Medical Association Journal 183, no.12 (2011): 1375-1376. 103 Susan Tiefenbrun and Christie J. Edwards, “Gendercide Cultural Context of Sex Trafficking in China,” Fordham International Law Journal 32, no. 3 (2009): 733. 104 Therese Hesketh and Zhu Wei King, “Abnormal Sex Ratios in Human Populations: Causes and Consequences” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103, no. 36 (2006): 13273. 105 Weiguo Zhang, “Dynamics of Marriage change in Chinese Rural Society in Transition: A Study of Northern Chinese Village,” Population Studies 54, no.1 (2000): 57-59; Quanbao Jiang and Jesus J. Sanchez-Barricarte, “Bride Price in China: The Obstacle to ‘Bare Branches’ seeking marriage,” The History of the Family 17, no.1 (2012): 6. Personally, as a Westerner, bride price or arranged marriages are unheard of in my environment. Thus, if the reader need of understanding the historical and modern contexts of these practices in China, both articles cited provide great insight. 38 | Page
106Christina K Gilmartin, “Violence Against Women in Contemporary China,” in Violence in China, Essays in Culture and Counterculture, Jonathan N. lipman and Stevan Harrell. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 217. 107Quanbao Jiang, Et al., “Marriage Expenses in Rural China” China Review 15, no. 1 (2015): 214. This is a great article explaining the reasons why marriage in China is so expensive, and why that is related to the social inequality prevailing in the country. 108 Shang-Jin Wei and Xiaobo, “The Competitive Saving Motive: Evidence from Rising Sex Ratios and Savings Rates in China,” Journal of Political Economy 119, no. 3 (2011): 12. Another informative article dictating how competitive marriage has become nowadays in China because of the skewed-sex ratio. 109 Whyte, “China Inequality,” 234. 110 Kay Johnson, “Chinese Orphanages: Saving China’s Abandoned Girls,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs no. 30(1993): 80. 111 Kathleen Davis, “Brides, Bruises and The Border: The Trafficking of North Korean Women into China,” SAIS Review of International Affairs 26, no. 1 (2006): 133. 112 Samantha Marshall, “Vietnamese Women Are Kidnapped And Later Sold in China as Brides,” The Wall Street Journal, last modified august 3, 1999, http://mx1.samanthamarshallghostwriter.com/files/vietnamese-women.pdf; “Battered Brides,” The Economist, last modified march 12, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/13278577; Nicholas Kristof, “Meet a 21st-Century Slave,” The New York Times, last modified October 24, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/opinion/sunday/meet-a-21st-century-slave.html. 113 U.S. Department of State, “Trafficking in Persons Report,” Annual government report (2015): 120-121; U.S. Department of State, “Trafficking in Persons Report—Tier 3 China,” Annual government report (2013). 114 Jessica Fulton, “Holding up Half the Heaves: The effect of Communist Rule on China’s Women,” IUSB Undergraduate Research Journal 3(2000):37. 115 Avraham Y. Ebenstein and Ethan Jennings Sharygin, “The Consequence of the ‘Missing Girls’ in China,” World Bank Economic Review 23, no.3 (2009): 410. 116 Tiefenbrun, Et al., “Gendercide Cultural Context,” 754. 117 “Chapter 4: Prostitution and Corruption” in China's Peaceful Rise in a Global Context: A Domestic Aspect of China's Road Map to Democratization, Jinghao Zhou. (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010), 81. 118 Sheila Jeffreys, “Globalizing Sexual Exploitation: Sex Tourism and the Traffic in Women,” Leisure Studies 18, no.1 (1999): 186. Although not explicitly talking about China, the article itself provides insight into how sex tourism is a global phenomenon that is fueled by the same economic incentives, regardless of country or culture. 119 Neil C. Hughes “Smashing the Iron Rice Bowl,” Foreign Affairs 77, no.4 (1998): 74-75. 120 Tiefenbrun Et al., “Gendercide in China,” 743. 121 Bates Gill, Et al., “China’s HIV Crisis,” Foreign Affairs 81, no.2 (2002): 4.This article greatly details how large of a problem HIV is and may be in the future for China. 122 Xiushi Yang, “Temporary Migration and the Spread of STDs/HIV in China: Is There a Link?,” The International Migration Review 38, no.1(2004):215. Yang provides a view into the social circumstance that make HIV a pandemic through the influx of the sex trade. 123 “HIV and AIDS in China,” last modified May 1, 2015, http://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-around- world/asia-pacific/china#footnote1_z6ql6jb; Tuo Fu Zhu, Et al., “High risk populations and HIV-1 infection in China,” Cell Research 15, no. 11(2005): 853. 124 Ministry of Health of the People’s Republic of China, “2012 China AIDS Response Progress Report” Paper published as part of the requirements of the Global AIDS Progress Report of the UNAIDS: 25. 125 Ibid, 23. 126 Vincent E. Gil, Et Al, “Prostitutes, prostitution and STD/HIV transmission in Mainland China,” Social Science & Medicine 42, no.1 (1996):146-148. 127 Gill, Et al., “HIV Crisis,” 4. 128 Gracie Ming Zhao, “Trafficking of Women for Marriage in China: Policy and Practice,” Criminology& Penology 3, no. 1(2003):4. Zhao’s article is a wonderful example of Chinese Feminism, an area of study in China that itself tends to receive a lot of backlash and is shunned. Zhao details how the institutionalism of Confucianism and Patriarchy within Chinese society, in particular in the criminal justice system, continues to be a quiet perpetrator in social issues, especially for women and in relation to the One-Child Policy. 39 | Page
129 Ushma D. Upadhay, Et al., “Women’s Empowerment and Fertility: A Review of the Literature,” Social Science & Medicine 115 (2014):117. 130 Vanessa L. Fong, “China's One-Child Policy and the Empowerment of Urban Daughters,” American Anthropologist 104, no.4 (2002): 1099. 131 Fanny M. Cheung, “Chapter 3: Gender Role Development,” in Growing Up the Chiense Way: Chinese Child and Adolescent Development, Sing Lau, (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996), 49-57; Fengshu Liu, “Boys as only-children and girls as only-children—parental gendered expectations of the only-child in the nuclear Chinese family in present-day China” Gender and Education 18, no. 5 (2006): 493-495. 132 “Chapter 4: ‘Beat Me Now and I’ll Beat You When You’re Old’ Love, Filial Duty, and Parental Investment” in Only Hope: Coming to Age Under China’s One-Child Policy, Vanessa L. Fong (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004)135; Kristine Sudbeck, “The Effects of China’s One-Child Policy: The Significance for Chinese Women,” Nebraska Anthropologist (2012): 54. Much like Greenhalgh’s studies, Fong’s work has been key and extremely influential in my research on Confucian culture. 133Tsui, Et al., “Educational Opportunity,” 84. 134 “Women in China Face Rising University Entry Barriers,” last modified October 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/world/asia/08iht-educlede08.html?_r=0. 135 Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “The World’s Women 2010: Trends and Statistics.” Paper presented by the United Nations as an annual data report, New York, 2010, 81-86. 136 “2015 Global Gender Gap Report” Paper presented by the World Economic Forum as an annual insight report, 2015, 141. 137 Ibid. 138 Bjorn Gustafsson and Shi Li, “Economic Transformation and the gender earning gap in urban China,” Journal of Population Economics 13, no. 2 (2000): 313. 139Sandy To, “Understanding Sheng Nu (‘Leftover Women’): the Phenomenon of Late Marriage among Chinese Professional Women,” Symbolic Interaction 36, no.1 (2013): 1-4, 10. 140Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “The World’s Women 2010: Trends and Statistics.” Paper presented by the United Nations as an annual data report, New York, 2010,16-17; Jiping Zuo and Yanjie Bian, “Gendered Resources, Division of Housework, and Perceived Fairness- A Case in Urban China,” Journal of Marriage and Family 63, no. 4(2001): 1125, 1131-1132. 141Andrew J. Fuligni and Wenxin Zhang, “Attitudes toward Family Obligations among Adolescents in Contemporary Urban and Rural China,” Child Development 75, no. 1 (2004): 186; Heying Jenny Zhan, “Aging, Health Care, and Elder Care: Perpetuation of Gender Inequalities in China,” Health Care for Women International 26, no. 8 (2005): 701-706. 142 Haiyan Qiang, Et al., “Chapter 12L Chinese Women’s Participation in Educational Leadership,” in Women Leading Education Across the Continents: Sharing the Spirit, Fanning the Flame, Helen C. Sobehart, (Plymouth: R&L Education, 2009), 94. 143Tsui, Et al., “Educational Opportunity,” 86-88; “More Than Half the Sky,” last modified February 16, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TrUWrNd8HuY. 144 Chapter 7: The Strategies of Partner Choice: Maximizers, Traditionalists, Satisficers, Innovators,” China's Leftover Women: Late Marriage Among Professional Women and Its Consequences, Sandy To, (New York: Routledge, 2015), 138 -150. 145“Chinese women may prefer one child even when it's not official policy,” Last modified Novemeber 19, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1359391/chinese-women-may-prefer-one- child-even-when-its-not. 146 C. Cindy Fan and Youqin Huang, “Waves of Rural Brides: Female Marriage in China,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 88, no.22 (1998): 229-231, 239. Explains why marriage was a form of economic opportunity for marginalized women, and how the economic reforms in China have allowed for the marriage field to both expand, and worsen, a woman’s personal autonomy. 147 Anita Chan, “The Culture of Survival: Lives of Migrant Workers through the Prism of Private Letters,” in Popular China: Unofficial culture in a globalizing society, Andrew Morris, Et al., (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001): 163, 172-177. Beautiful work detailing, heartbreakingly, the struggle to survive as a disenfranchised female worker through the letters of women. The humanity of these issues truly shines through this article. 148 “Women and Suicide in Rural China,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 87, no.12 (2009): 885- 964. 40 | Page
149 Paul S. F. Yip and Ka. Y. Liu, “The Ecological fallacy and the gender ratios of suicide in China,” The British Journal of Psychiatry 189, no. 5 (2006): 465. 150 Namrata Hasija, “Rising Suicide Rates Among Rural Women in China,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, September 26, 2011. 151 Veronica Pearson, Et al., “Attempted Suicide among Young Rural Women in the People's Republic of China: Possibilities for Prevention,” Suicide and Life—Threatening Behavior 32, no.4 (2002): 362-363. 152 G.M. Zhao, “Trafficking for marriage,” 4. 153 William L. Parish, Et al., “Intimate Partner Violence in China: National Prevalence, Risk Factors and Associated Health Problems,” International Family Planning Perspectives 30, no.4 (2004):177. 154 Ibid, 178-179. 155 Hasija, “Rising Rates.” 156 Fan, “Waves of Brides,” 234-236, 241.
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