sign in sign up
<<
Home , First Intifada

Naval War College Review Volume 61 Article 17 Number 2 Spring

2008 Psychological Warfare in the Intifada: Israeli and Palestinian Media Politics and Military Strategies Robert L. Perry

Ron Schleifer

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review

Recommended Citation Perry, Robert L. and Schleifer, Ron (2008) "Psychological Warfare in the Intifada: Israeli and Palestinian Media Politics and Military Strategies," Naval War College Review: Vol. 61 : No. 2 , Article 17. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss2/17

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. BOOK REVIEWS 137 Perry and Schleifer: Psychological Warfare in the Intifada: Israeli and Palestinian Me

attempts to anticipate the patterns of taxonomy as his theoretical basis, and future strategic history will be more he is at his best when using the compo- right than wrong. nents of the PSYOP manual to analyze and compare how both sides prepared STEPHEN B. SMITH University of Reading their campaigns, determined and ap- plied consistent themes or messages, chose and used dissemination tech- niques and tactics, responded to enemy messages, and applied countermea- sures. He offers convincing evidence Schleifer, Ron. Psychological Warfare in the Inti- that within the first few weeks of the fada: Israeli and Palestinian Media Politics and uprising, the PLO seized and main- Military Strategies. Portland, Ore.: Sussex Aca- tained the initiative and dominated demic, 2006. 272pp. $69.50 what we now call “the information en- In the wake of the second Palestinian vironment,” while the , riven by intifada against (2002 through internal ambiguity and dissent, 2006), it has been easy to lose sight of floundered. the fact that the first intifada (Decem- Unfortunately, this work is ultimately ber 1987 through October 1991) was unsatisfying, because its organization largely nonviolent but highly successful. and thesis have logical flaws. Readers It achieved the primary goal of the Pal- interested in a more concise, better or- estinian Liberation Organization ganized analysis of nonviolent conflict (PLO)—forcing Israel to recognize the based on psychological operations can PLO by initiating negotiations. In this find it in Schleifer’s 2006 article “Psy- work Ron Schleifer offers a unique, chological Operations: A New Variation though logically flawed, perspective of of an Age Old Art: versus Is- the first intifada, which he describes as rael,” published in Studies in Conflict & “political warfare.” That is, he examines Terrorism, volume 29, pp. 1–19. For how the PLO assumed control of what readers interested in the specific tactics began as a spontaneous nonviolent up- used in the first intifada, this book will rising in December 1987 to produce a serve as a high-quality resource. This successful campaign that was based on a work has several critical shortcomings, range of largely persuasive techniques one of them its title. A better title might and lasted more than three years. have focused on the key concept and Schleifer analyzes the successful Pales- not the methods. Second, although he tinian tactics and compares them to the thoroughly reviews how “propaganda” unsuccessful Israeli response through and “psychological operations” ac- the components of “psychological oper- quired their negative connotations be- ations” (PSYOP) as presented in the fore and after World War II, Schleifer U.S. Army Manual of Psychological applies only a restrictive definition of Warfare. PSYOP. The PSYOP manual, however, Schleifer’s book is based on research uses a different primary definition and gathered for his doctoral dissertation categorizes different types. He analyzes completed at the University of Leeds. a complete taxonomy in terms of his He chose the PSYOP manual and its own different, limited, definition.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008 1 138 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 2, Art. 17

Third, although his basic premise is that “Stop, before you hurt yourself! Why? the were conducting “polit- Because I said so”—a common diktat ical warfare,” he only briefly discusses from a caring parent to child, about set- the concept and does not apply all the ting limits on behavior. The historical elements of his definition to the intifa- role of grown-ups has been to nurture, da. Schleifer asserts that the term, in- protect, and teach fledglings about vented by the British to replace self-destructive behavior. So how, then, “propaganda,” encompasses a broader is raising children the unifying theme of range of strategies, everything from a book about the decline of Western nonviolent propaganda and civil dis- civilization? obedience to violent terrorism and in- The answer, as Diana West argues con- surgency. He claims that the primary vincingly, is a direct correlation be- commonality of these strategies (to re- tween decades of moribund moral place or complement conventional war- norms, owing to vanishing societal ma- fare) is sufficient for a theoretical turity, and America’s inability to grasp analysis of the intifada. But he excludes the seriousness of emerging global dan- violent action (terrorism and insur- gers. Like a child that keeps playing, un- gency, as practiced primarily by Islamic willing to obey the call for bedtime, and Hezbollah) from his analysis America is simply not paying attention of how the Palestinians conducted po- to a world of growing challenges. Worse litical warfare. Examining only a few yet, the author contends, there are no categories of political warfare appears adults around to take away the toys. to undermine his theory. Of course West, an esteemed syndicated In sum, Schleifer has written an inter- columnist and writer, is not the first to esting study of how the PLO and its observethedeclineofadultinfluenceor partners used a variety of nonviolent the erosion of individual responsibility, persuasive tactics to achieve a signifi- nor is she original in excoriating society cant short-term political goal. Future and lamenting the erosion of the nu- study should define “political warfare” clear family. Nonetheless, West’s metic- more precisely and examine how and ulous assemblage of tangible evidence, why this term substantively differs from superb research, insightful analysis, and , nonviolent conflict, application of theory to national secu- low-intensity conflict, propaganda, and rity issues make this book psychological operations, and whether extraordinary. it offers a significant new perspective. According to West, the gradual “death ROBERT L. PERRY of the grown-up” began not with the Naval War College revolutionary 1960s but rather directly following World War II. Business vi- sionaries saw the exploding generation of youth as future consumers with un- paralleled financial potential. Through- West, Diana. The Death of the Grown-Up: How out the 1950s the magic of the America’s Arrested Development Is Bringing anti-adult was personified, according to Down Western Civilization. New York: St. Mar- tin’s, 2007. 256pp. $23.95 West, by the likes of music’s Elvis Pres- ley, fiction’s Holden Caulfield, and https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss2/17 2