The Evolution of Palestinian Women's Organizations

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The Evolution of Palestinian Women's Organizations Women and the Intifadas: the Evolution of Palestinian Women’s Organizations Maura K. James Strife Journal, Issue 1 Hilary Term 2013, (March 2013), pp. 18-22 Strife Journal, Issue 1 Hilary Term 2013 (February 2013) 18-22 ‘were full of hope and dreams of change.’3 Women and the Intifadas: the Evolution These women craved political of Palestinian Women’s Organizations independence and a state for Palestine. Maura K. James They dreamed of returning to their homeland and were bolder than the first generation in asserting women in the This contribution seeks to explore the role political struggle. The third generation of Palestinian women during the first and came into political consciousness during second intifadas from a gender perspective the 1967 war. The Six Day War had a by tracing the changing role of women’s galvanising effect on all three generations. organisations in Palestine. Since the end of ‘If the Israeli occupation of the West Bank World War I and the fall of the Ottoman and Gaza Strip was déjà vu for the first Empire, Palestinian women’s organisations generation, reviving dormant pain from the have been active and productive 1948 catastrophe, for the second and third components of a vibrant civil society. In generations, it was a confirmation of long- the early and mid-twentieth century, the held fears – that Israel could reach them organisations provided charitable and even in the mighty Arab capitals.’4 The institutional support to local communities majority of the third generation was born in the form of orphanages and schools. as refugees in diaspora outside of Israel After the Naqba in 1948 these and of what became the Occupied organisations became more formal and Territories after 1967. The ’67 war was a extended beyond individual villages. From message to all Palestinians that they could 1948 until the Six Day War in 1967 not rely on Arab leadership or armies to women’s organisations served the take back their homeland. It was an Palestinian community in mainly awakening of the Palestinian political charitable ways. Their work focused on 1 consciousness. From ’67 onward, these education and refugee support. three generations of women leaders focused on the national struggle and Amal Kawar’s book, Daughters of became a strong network of women that Palestine: Leading Women of the provided politically and socially for their Palestinian National Movement, outlines communities in diaspora. three generations of Palestinian women leaders who shaped the national struggle A fourth generation of Palestinian women and added to the vibrant civil society that leaders, composed of academics, is critical ultimately initiated the first intifada. Most of the older generations’ commitment to of the first generation leaders were born the national cause at the expense of and came of age in, what is today, Israel. women’s rights. ‘The academics were a In 1948, during the Naqba, many of them new element in the coalition of women’s became refugees who fled or refugees who nationalist groups… and were previously remained in Israel. The first generation’s unorganised but had gained visibility political consciousness was formed by the during the Intifada.’5 In the 1990s, as Naqba, and this generation articulated a women lost gains made by the three early female political voice and allowed for generations in the political area, the fourth greater participation by the second and generation offered a new agenda focusing third generations. Some in the second 2 solely on gender issues. ‘Their generation, born between 1935 and 1948, contribution to the Palestinian cause remember the Naqba. Their political centered on speaking and writing about the consciousness was formed by Nasser social, health, and economic situations of through the 1950s and 1960s and they Palestinian women under occupation.’6 18 Strife Journal, Issue 1 Hilary Term 2013 (February 2013) 18-22 This kind of rhetoric was instrumental in operations. Unfortunately, ‘That securing international funding, which was movement [local women’s committees] needed as the women’s organisations came to an end in the early 1990s, reduced depoliticised after the first intifada. As to a few local committees….’10 With the women were marginalised from the disbanding of the Women’s Action political arena following the first intifada, Committees came the silencing of female they found new niches in communities voices in Palestinian political parties. offering trainings on women’s legal and social rights. Though the fourth generation Women’s participation in the first intifada gained international support, women’s ‘brought a greater visibility to the exclusion from the political dialogue and women’s committees.’11 In 1987 the the stifling of civil society during the Oslo occupation was everywhere and the period ultimately led to an unsustainable intifada was in every community. Women peace. participated in civil disobedience alongside their male counterparts. Not all women’s Before the first intifada in the period after participation came in the form of 1967 women’s organisations became very formalised committees. ‘Enthusiastic active. The Palestinian Women’s Union support for the uprising came from was an organisation created by many of organised and unorganised women alike, the first generation leaders in 1965. but was ultimately sustained by Though it was banned for 1966 to the mid- widespread networks of Palestinian 1990s, women’s federations and charities institutions – including women’s created a network across the diaspora ‘to committees and charitable societies….’12 participate in the Palestinian liberation While women all over Palestine effort and to represent women’s interests in participated in what Penny Johnson and national and international forums.’7 By the Eileen Kuttab call ‘”mother activism”… early 1980s this network had four main when older women sheltered youth and unions sponsored by the four major defied soldiers’13 the formal societies kept political factions in Palestine.8 Their the intifada in motion from the top. The membership numbers and participation as women’s unions ‘participated in of 1990 ‘symbolise the ability of women distributing the secret communiqués of the from the main PLO factions to navigate Unified Leadership, delivered PLO funds past Israeli suppression of political activity for social relief, visited prisoners and their in the Occupied Territories.’9 One of the families, and performed other unions, the Women’s Action Committee, activities….’14 This involvement resulted was more decentralised than the other in higher visibility of women’s programs. unions and encouraged local leadership After the 1988 ban of committees by and initiative. The style of the Women’s Israel, women’s groups were marginalised. Action Committee was useful because, The ban coupled with a shift from even before the 1987 intifada, it was grassroots Palestinian leadership to difficult for women in remote villages and outside, more formal leadership by the members in Gaza to participate in PLO led to the steady decline of women’s operations centralised in Ramallah, political participation in the 1990s. Nablus, and Jerusalem. The Women’s Action Committees across Palestine were At the same time women’s organisations active throughout the first intifada and were becoming more visible and vocalised integral in the uprising. Even after Israelis opposition to the occupation politics banned civil society activities in 1988, within the Occupied Territories was many of the informal Women’s Action evolving. The shift from internal territorial Committees were able to continue leadership to external leadership by those 19 Strife Journal, Issue 1 Hilary Term 2013 (February 2013) 18-22 in exile was exacerbated by the intifada. backlash. What Kawar calls ‘the veil The pivot towards Yasser Arafat and the affair’17, was a period when women, PLO within Israel and Palestine followed mostly in Gaza where Hamas had taken by the endorsement of the PLO by the root, were forced to veil. This coercion international community proved fatal to was not written into law nor was it the once vibrant women’s unions and endorsed by the PLO. Initially, though, it committees. The effect of the first intifada was not opposed by the PLO nor did the on women’s movements was women’s organisations, based in the West ‘paradoxical’. ‘Women were politically Bank and Jerusalem, present a unified visible in clashes with Israeli soldiers and voice against the oppression of women. in leadership podiums… At the same time, Women’s activists in Gaza rejected the the Intifada brought about a new political unofficial veiling, since they reality in the Occupied Territories that ‘.…understood that the campaign was caused the Women’s Committees’ about the type of political and social future Movement to unravel.’15 the intifada would lead to.’18 In 1989, after months of rampant discrimination and As the peace process lurched forward after scare tactics, the PLO finally ended the the first intifada, the women’s leadership campaign even if it was to be renewed realised that ‘Women had lost out and with minimal success in 1990. This become politically marginalised after the incident weakened the women’s first few months of the Intifada… there organisations and illustrated that was an underlying realisation that nationalism could not be won at the grassroots mobilisation of women had expense of gender issues nor would gender slowed tremendously.’16 As evidenced by issues ever follow the creation of a state. the second intifada, during the Oslo years The two, political activation and gender women’s grassroots civil participation equality, had to be realised simultaneously. came to a screeching halt. Even the charitable works provided and established After the first intifada it was apparent that by the women of the first generation were the national movement would not suspended. The PLO became responsible safeguard women’s liberties and many in for the welfare of the Palestinian people the women’s organisations realised they and took over roles such as education and could no longer ignore the gender health care that used to be administered by inequalities within their society.
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