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Home , First Intifada, Second Intifada

Women and the Intifadas: the Evolution of Palestinian Women’s Organizations

Maura K. James

Strife Journal, Issue 1 Hilary Term 2013, (March 2013), pp. 18-22

Strife Journal, Issue 1 Hilary Term 2013 (February 2013) 18-22

‘were full of hope and dreams of change.’3 Women and the Intifadas: the Evolution These women craved political of Palestinian Women’s Organizations independence and a state for . Maura K. James They dreamed of returning to their homeland and were bolder than the first generation in asserting women in the This contribution seeks to explore the role political struggle. The third generation of Palestinian women during the first and came into political consciousness during second intifadas from a gender perspective the 1967 war. The Six Day War had a by tracing the changing role of women’s galvanising effect on all three generations. organisations in Palestine. Since the end of ‘If the Israeli occupation of the World War I and the fall of the Ottoman and was déjà vu for the first Empire, Palestinian women’s organisations generation, reviving dormant pain from the have been active and productive 1948 catastrophe, for the second and third components of a vibrant civil society. In generations, it was a confirmation of long- the early and mid-twentieth century, the held fears – that could reach them organisations provided charitable and even in the mighty Arab capitals.’4 The institutional support to local communities majority of the third generation was born in the form of orphanages and schools. as refugees in diaspora outside of Israel After the Naqba in 1948 these and of what became the Occupied organisations became more formal and Territories after 1967. The ’67 war was a extended beyond individual villages. From message to all that they could 1948 until the Six Day War in 1967 not rely on Arab leadership or armies to women’s organisations served the take back their homeland. It was an Palestinian community in mainly awakening of the Palestinian political charitable ways. Their work focused on 1 consciousness. From ’67 onward, these education and refugee support. three generations of women leaders focused on the national struggle and Amal Kawar’s book, Daughters of became a strong network of women that Palestine: Leading Women of the provided politically and socially for their Palestinian National Movement, outlines communities in diaspora. three generations of Palestinian women leaders who shaped the national struggle A fourth generation of Palestinian women and added to the vibrant civil society that leaders, composed of academics, is critical ultimately initiated the . Most of the older generations’ commitment to of the first generation leaders were born the national cause at the expense of and came of age in, what is today, Israel. women’s rights. ‘The academics were a In 1948, during the Naqba, many of them new element in the coalition of women’s became refugees who fled or refugees who nationalist groups… and were previously remained in Israel. The first generation’s unorganised but had gained visibility political consciousness was formed by the during the Intifada.’5 In the , as Naqba, and this generation articulated a women lost gains made by the three early female political voice and allowed for generations in the political area, the fourth greater participation by the second and generation offered a new agenda focusing third generations. Some in the second 2 solely on gender issues. ‘Their generation, born between 1935 and 1948, contribution to the Palestinian cause remember the Naqba. Their political centered on speaking and writing about the consciousness was formed by Nasser social, health, and economic situations of through the 1950s and 1960s and they Palestinian women under occupation.’6

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Strife Journal, Issue 1 Hilary Term 2013 (February 2013) 18-22

This kind of rhetoric was instrumental in operations. Unfortunately, ‘That securing international funding, which was movement [local women’s committees] needed as the women’s organisations came to an end in the early 1990s, reduced depoliticised after the first intifada. As to a few local committees….’10 With the women were marginalised from the disbanding of the Women’s Action political arena following the first intifada, Committees came the silencing of female they found new niches in communities voices in Palestinian political parties. offering trainings on women’s legal and social rights. Though the fourth generation Women’s participation in the first intifada gained international support, women’s ‘brought a greater visibility to the exclusion from the political dialogue and women’s committees.’11 In 1987 the the stifling of civil society during the Oslo occupation was everywhere and the period ultimately led to an unsustainable intifada was in every community. Women peace. participated in alongside their male counterparts. Not all women’s Before the first intifada in the period after participation came in the form of 1967 women’s organisations became very formalised committees. ‘Enthusiastic active. The Palestinian Women’s Union support for the uprising came from was an organisation created by many of organised and unorganised women alike, the first generation leaders in 1965. but was ultimately sustained by Though it was banned for 1966 to the mid- widespread networks of Palestinian 1990s, women’s federations and charities institutions – including women’s created a network across the diaspora ‘to committees and charitable societies….’12 participate in the Palestinian liberation While women all over Palestine effort and to represent women’s interests in participated in what Penny Johnson and national and international forums.’7 By the Eileen Kuttab call ‘”mother activism”… early this network had four main when older women sheltered youth and unions sponsored by the four major defied soldiers’13 the formal societies kept political factions in Palestine.8 Their the intifada in motion from the top. The membership numbers and participation as women’s unions ‘participated in of 1990 ‘symbolise the ability of women distributing the secret communiqués of the from the main PLO factions to navigate Unified Leadership, delivered PLO funds past Israeli suppression of political activity for social relief, visited prisoners and their in the Occupied Territories.’9 One of the families, and performed other unions, the Women’s Action Committee, activities….’14 This involvement resulted was more decentralised than the other in higher visibility of women’s programs. unions and encouraged local leadership After the 1988 ban of committees by and initiative. The style of the Women’s Israel, women’s groups were marginalised. Action Committee was useful because, The ban coupled with a shift from even before the 1987 intifada, it was grassroots Palestinian leadership to difficult for women in remote villages and outside, more formal leadership by the members in Gaza to participate in PLO led to the steady decline of women’s operations centralised in , political participation in the 1990s. , and . The Women’s Action Committees across Palestine were At the same time women’s organisations active throughout the first intifada and were becoming more visible and vocalised integral in the uprising. Even after opposition to the occupation politics banned civil society activities in 1988, within the Occupied Territories was many of the informal Women’s Action evolving. The shift from internal territorial Committees were able to continue leadership to external leadership by those

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Strife Journal, Issue 1 Hilary Term 2013 (February 2013) 18-22

in exile was exacerbated by the intifada. backlash. What Kawar calls ‘the veil The pivot towards and the affair’17, was a period when women, PLO within Israel and Palestine followed mostly in Gaza where had taken by the endorsement of the PLO by the root, were forced to veil. This coercion international community proved fatal to was not written into law nor was it the once vibrant women’s unions and endorsed by the PLO. Initially, though, it committees. The effect of the first intifada was not opposed by the PLO nor did the on women’s movements was women’s organisations, based in the West ‘paradoxical’. ‘Women were politically Bank and Jerusalem, present a unified visible in clashes with Israeli soldiers and voice against the oppression of women. in leadership podiums… At the same time, Women’s activists in Gaza rejected the the Intifada brought about a new political unofficial veiling, since they reality in the Occupied Territories that ‘.…understood that the campaign was caused the Women’s Committees’ about the type of political and social future Movement to unravel.’15 the intifada would lead to.’18 In 1989, after months of rampant discrimination and As the peace process lurched forward after scare tactics, the PLO finally ended the the first intifada, the women’s leadership campaign even if it was to be renewed realised that ‘Women had lost out and with minimal success in 1990. This become politically marginalised after the incident weakened the women’s first few months of the Intifada… there organisations and illustrated that was an underlying realisation that nationalism could not be won at the grassroots mobilisation of women had expense of gender issues nor would gender slowed tremendously.’16 As evidenced by issues ever follow the creation of a state. the , during the Oslo years The two, political activation and gender women’s grassroots civil participation equality, had to be realised simultaneously. came to a screeching halt. Even the charitable works provided and established After the first intifada it was apparent that by the women of the first generation were the national movement would not suspended. The PLO became responsible safeguard women’s liberties and many in for the welfare of the Palestinian people the women’s organisations realised they and took over roles such as education and could no longer ignore the gender health care that used to be administered by inequalities within their society. Once women’s organisations. Arafat returned to the Occupied Territories in 1994 and began appointing other exiled Towards the end of the first Intifada, as men and outsiders to government offices Hamas and the Islamic expanded, an the gender imbalance was highlighted. event shocked the leadership of women’s ‘The early stages of setting up self-rule organisations and caused the eventual shift confirmed that undoubtedly a deep from political activism to social welfare. tradition of sexism still prevails among the Palestine observes a conservative culture, comrades in the national struggle, as but it was the seat of secular liberalisation evidenced by their initial appointments.’19 in the Arab world in the period prior to the Aside from the appointment of Hanan first intifada. The nationalist movement Ashrawi as spokeswoman for Arafat grew out of upper-middle class liberals. In during the peace process, which checked fact, many of the women leaders Kawar the gender box for the international studied espoused the importance of a community, few women were to be found secular nationalist movement. Between in the PLO. 1988 and 1989, however, the women’s groups were met with conservative

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Strife Journal, Issue 1 Hilary Term 2013 (February 2013) 18-22

As the women’s committees’ movement education are equally important, the died in the early 1990s, the fourth women’s movements in Palestine have generation of academics started the been unable to supply both tools women’s centers movement. ‘The central simultaneously. strategic goal of the women’s centers movement is women’s empowerment, and The second intifada was a completely the agenda focuses on women’s political different experience than the first intifada. education and women’s rights.’20 The The hope of the first intifada culminated in fourth generation understood the failure of 1993 on the White House lawn when the earlier generations to further a rights Arafat and Rabin signed the . agenda. Instead of working toward a rights By late 2000, when the second intifada agenda combined with the nationalist erupted, the hope of 1993 had diminished banner, the fourth generation has focused and was replaced by militarised fear. Not on women’s issues and legal rights. Since only did women’s roles decrease in the women are still marginalised in the PLO second intifada, there were conditions and the Palestinian nationalist movement present to heighten gender role stress. has yet to result in statehood, this approach has seen a decline in women’s political and Johnson and Kuttab draw contrast between economic grassroots organisations. ‘The the ‘site of the struggle’ in the first and mass activism that marked the women’s second intifadas. ‘The community, its movements’ experience in the [first] street, neighborhoods and homes…’23 was intifada has largely been replaced by an the site of the struggle. During the first NGO model of lobbying, advocacy and intifada women, along with the rest of the workshop-style educational and community, were surrounded by the developmental activities….’21 The resistance. One could not avoid the first academic secular approach of the fourth intifada. In contrast, due to the PLO’s generation is appealing to international piecemeal control of the Occupied organisations. Alienation from the PLO led Territories, in the second intifada: many in the fourth generation to turn to .…the confrontations take place at NGOs for funding. The groups, already border and crossing points between politically marginalised by the PLO, areas in the Oslo checkerboard… distanced themselves even more from the In this context, women’s roles in politics of the uncertain peace agreements direct resistance are minimal, given in order to secure support and funding the absence of community context, from the international community. ‘This the militarised environment and the transformation has had contradictory differential impact of restrictions effects on potentials for advancing gender on mobility on women.24 equality in the transitional context.’22 The militarisation of the second intifada Although the women’s centers movement versus the first intifada made the conflict is led by feminists and is effective in more like a war than a struggle of reaching out to marginalised women in resistance. ‘The second intifada… is… rural villages, the movement did not retain closer to war, albeit an uneven one in the grassroots mobilisation of the women’s condition of belligerent occupation, than it committees’ movement that resulted in is to the ‘low-intensity conflict’ of the first political and economic returns for the intifada.’25 The escalation of militarisation nationalist cause. Instead of giving women on both sides led to the decline of civil tools to fight the occupation, the women’s society in general. ‘The greater level of center movement has prepared women for militarisation and militarised violence, the a democratic state that has not yet come to less participation from women and the fruition. Although nationalism and rights wider community.’26 Whereas the first

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Strife Journal, Issue 1 Hilary Term 2013 (February 2013) 18-22

intifada was the result of civil society growth and hope for state realisation of A Palestinian activist of the fourth nationalist aspirations, the second intifada generation during the first intifada said, illuminated the broken dreams and ‘After all, if women on both sides of this repression of Palestinians during the Oslo conflict held real political power, we period. probably would have had peace a long time ago.29 How do women’s organisations Just as the first intifada offered lessons to on both sides of the green line reclaim both the early generations of women’s leaders, the nationalist and feminist agenda? It is a the second intifada provided the women’s daunting task but one that must be centers movement with feedback. Their undertaken. There is no better time to feminist agenda, sans national rhetoric and usurp the dialogue. ’ PLO political involvement, was failing. By is slowly dying and Hamas is coming to a rejecting the previous generations’ standstill with both the Israeli government nationalistic discourse they had failed the and the PLO. This may be the beginning of essence of the women’s struggle since the third intifada.30 If that is the case, 1948. The roles of women in the two women must not let this intifada sink into intifadas mirrors the two approaches to despair. It is time to revive the grassroots feminist discourse in Palestine: the women’s committees’ movements so those nationalist agenda and the gendered in the women’s centers can put their rights agenda. ‘Many activists in the women’s training to use. Until the international movement are deeply aware of the community intervened during the Oslo contrasts in women’s roles in the two period, the women of Palestine always Palestinian intifadas – and clearly found ways to organise around the articulate the urgent need to develop new obstacles of occupation. They can again strategies that link their gender agendas to harness their power to throw off the yoke national goals and struggle.’27 of Israeli and international colonialism and insert themselves again as the leaders of Beyond the need for a more unified agenda their communities. lies a deeper female struggle. When women are marginalised and banned from civil society, government, and, in the Palestinian case, from the peace process society as a whole suffers. With the steady decline of women’s political networks, civil society in Palestine decreased. The instability and frustration of the Oslo period resulted in the second intifada. The lack of representation led to a decrease in grassroots political participation while political activism and representation relies on vibrant local civil society. This resulted in a weaker second intifada that did not force negotiations, as the first intifada had. ‘Women’s representation in the political arena is weakened by the absence of women’s political or economic grassroots organisations….’28 When women are weak, local and national communities are also weak.

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References

1 A Kawar, Daughters of Palestine: Leading Women of the Palestinian National Movement, State University of New York Press, 1996. 2 Ibid, p. 10 3 Ibid, p. 11 4 Ibid, p. 16 5 Ibid, p. 121 6 Ibid, p. 121 7 Kawar, 1996, p. xiii 8 Ibid, p. 102 9 Ibid, p. 102 10 A Kawar, ‘Palestinian Women’s Activism after Oslo’ in Sabbagh, Suha Palestinian Women of Gaza and the West Bank, Indiana University Press, 1998, p. 237 11 Kawar, 1996, p. 112 12 Ibid, p. 112 13 P Johnson and E Kuttab ‘Where Have All the Women (and Men) Gone? Reflections on Gender and the Second Palestinian Intifada’, Feminist Review, No. 69, Winter,2001 p. 37 14 Kawar, 1996, p. 113 15 Kawar, 1996, P. 114 16 Ibid, p. 123 17 Kawar, 1996, P. 119 18 R Hammami, ‘Women, the and the Intifada’, Middle East Report, No. 164/165, May-August 1990, p. 27 19 Ibid, p. 126 20 Kawar, 1998, p. 237 21 Johnson and Kuttab, p. 25 22 Ibid, p. 25 23 Ibid, p. 31 24 Ibid, p. 31 25 Ibid, p. 32 26 Ibid, p. 31 27 Ibid, p. 39 28 Kawar, 1998, p. 243 29 Morgan, p. 167 30 A Bregman, 16 Jan. 2013, lecture