On Autonomy and Self-Binding Charlie Coil University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
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University of Arkansas, Fayetteville ScholarWorks@UARK Theses and Dissertations 8-2018 Abandoning the Dream of Omnipotence: On Autonomy and Self-Binding Charlie Coil University of Arkansas, Fayetteville Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd Part of the Applied Behavior Analysis Commons, Behavioral Economics Commons, and the Comparative Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Coil, Charlie, "Abandoning the Dream of Omnipotence: On Autonomy and Self-Binding" (2018). Theses and Dissertations. 2893. http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/2893 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. Abandoning the Dream of Omnipotence: On Autonomy and Self-Binding A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy by Charles Coil, Jr. University of Arkansas Master of Arts in Philosophy, 2009 August 2018 University of Arkansas This dissertation is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council. ______________________________ Eric Funkhouser, PhD Dissertation Director ______________________________ ______________________________ Jacob Adler, PhD Tom Senor, PhD Committee Member Committee Member Abstract I offer a prolegomenon to the philosophical study of a uniquely human activity—the self- binding act. This philosophical interest directly connects with the Enlightenment project of centralizing personal autonomy and individual freedom as primary values of personhood. Self- binding represents an easily referenced action that introduces a possible clash between autonomy and freedom on the one hand seen as in conflict with other ancient basic human values like self- control and avoiding akrasia. This dissertation investigates the inverted manner whereby an act of self-binding, which voluntarily and effectively limits a person’s options, can end up augmenting rather than interfering with personal autonomy. I claim that, properly understood, self-binding, rather than a threat to personal autonomy, turns out to be a paradigmatic act of autonomous agency and a tool for overcoming akrasia. I show how the self-binding act assists and even expands Harry Frankfurt’s concept of volitional necessity which overestimates the potential stability of the human will and underestimates the impact of three considerations related to the instability of the will: (1) the ontological reality of time; (2) the psychological reality of a tendency to assent to or rebel against authority and (3) a discounted reality wherein future negative consequences are minimized or dismissed. Accounting for these three realities in the act of self-binding fortifies volitional necessity into a tighter, more integrated concept. There are obvious traversals with the concepts of agency, autonomy, rationality and the inevitable reductionist claims to consider along with worries about coercion and paternalism. Antecedent authority-sourcing is a central issue for autonomy and self-binding. Surprisingly, the Self as the sole, ultimate source for self-binding turns out to be more complicated than at first glance. Finally, I have made an attempt to elucidate why and how the self-binding act might work by proposing several analogues, particularly a striking correspondence with the functions a fence. ©2018 by Charles Coil, Jr. All Rights Reserved Preface. “O beloved Pan and all you other gods of this place, grant that I may become beautiful in my soul within, and that all my external possessions may be in harmony with my inner self. May I consider the wise to be rich. And may I have such riches as only a person of self-restraint can bear or endure.” —Socrates, Phaedrus 279c Everyone knows what a patient is, and we know that people voluntarily check themselves into hospitals to be treated as patients. Philosophers also know of Aristotle’s theory of change involving the changer and the changed and his conjecture that an agent of change could also be a patient in the process.1 But a more involved, contemporary notion of “patiency” was new to me until a few years ago when I ran across an expanded, more inclusive or holistic take on the meaning of human agency as a corollary of personhood or selfhood. A feminist philosopher named Soran Reader at Durham University in Great Britain, who tragically died of cancer in 2012 at a relatively young age, was inspired by a concept from David Wiggins which he described as a philosophy of need.2 concept of “patiency” which she described as “the other side of agency.”3 Reader asserts that there is a pervasive and longstanding bias in favor of agents or perpetrators or actors which has led philosophers to neglect or misunderstand the role of patients and patiency, those in need or those who are characterized as victims. Her view of patiency includes certain aspects of personhood that involve dependency, subjectedness, suffering, passivity, victimhood and harm. These, she claimed, are just as constitutive of selfhood as the 1 Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Greek: Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς |Latin: De Generatione et Philosophical Study (New York: Oxford University Press 1982). 2 David Wiggins, “An Idea We Cannot do Without: What difference will it make (eg. to moral, political and environmental philosophy) to recognize and put to use a substantial conception of need?” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 57 (December 2005): 25-50. 3 Soran Reader (1963-2012) was a philosophy professor at Durham University. Cf. https://www.dur.ac.uk/philosophy/soran-reader/ traditional Enlightenment view of human agency.4 This made intuitive sense if for no other reason than the traditional differentiation made in philosophy between acting and being acted upon, or between our own actions and those things that simply happen to us. I had written some on this topic for other graduate classes before taking a seminar at the University of Arkansas on Identification with Dr. Eric Funkhouser. We looked particularly at Harry Frankfurt and several other philosophers, mostly in response to Frankfurt’s ideas. That is, the moment when the happy coincidence occurred was upon reading Frankfurt and then talking with Eric about some kind of thesis involving this fascinating conundrum of the expansion of selfhood by means of a kind of denial of self. Dr. Funkhouser then introduced me to the sociologist Jon Elster and his notions of self-binding or precommitment. I was hooked immediately, and the ideas for a dissertation topic began forming. What if this patiency idea could be totally intentional and purposeful? That is, what if I can voluntarily make myself or acquiesce to becoming a patient in order to achieve some objective that I intend? Stoicism places us all in this patient role and then asserts that our agency emerges in how we respond to everything that happens to us. But I want to ask a different question. Instead of a tight-lipped Stoic extinguishing of desire altogether, might the control of the self be augmented and temptation be preempted by a binding or limiting action in advance, so that despite my ‘heat of the moment’ desire, I have already cut off the option to fulfill that desire? But therein lies a problem. Engaging in such an act of voluntary patiency appears to threaten some important aspects of personal autonomy. If I intentionally limit certain personal options for action, it 4 David E. Cooper, “Reason and Agency: Enlightenment, Kant, and Romanticism,” ch. 3, in The Measure of Things: Humanism, Humility and Mystery 58-63 (New York: Oxford University Press 2007). appears that I am intentionally limiting my freedom to act in certain ways. It is this special kind of action that begs to be further clarified and described philosophically. Accordingly, a topic for philosophical consideration was born. So, the question that this dissertation addresses is fairly straightforward: how is it that a person’s action which effectively limits her options to act, can turn out to enhance her self-governance or autonomy? In my opening quote for this paper I reference a line from Harry Frankfurt who adds the term “liberated” to describe the resulting sense of autonomy that is achieved in this intentional option- limiting action often described as self-binding.5 The notion of liberation or freedom however, potentially opens a door related to the free will-determinism debate which I will not enter. What’s more, I do not present self-binding as some deep dark puzzle or unresolvable paradox. By my own experience, it is clear to me that I discover a greater self-governance or autonomy through temporarily limiting certain options, which might also appear to limit my personal autonomy. Self-restraint is considered a characteristic feature of becoming a responsible adult. This is what Frankfurt means by “abandoning the dream of omnipotence” and goes to the heart of what it means to identify ourselves as autonomous persons.6 We want to be free to choose, yet we also recognize the wisdom of intentionally limiting our choices from time to time. But what kind of wisdom is this that finds liberation in subjection? Looking further into the topic, I have 5 Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays (New York: Cambridge University Press 1988): 266. 6 Harry Frankfurt, “Comments on MacIntyre”, Synthese 53, No. 2, November 1982: 319-321. One discerning note. The “omnipotence” that Frankfurt is pointing out which is beyond the limits of human capability is not the topic of his little essay “The Logic of Omnipotence” in his Necessity, Volition and Love (New York: Cambridge University Press 1999): 1-2. That brief entry is Frankfurt’s response to the ancient “Omnipotence Paradox” or the “Paradox of the Stone” concerning divine omnipotence. One of the first requirements of mature personhood, says Frankfurt, is the recognition that we are not omnipotent.