Kant on Human Dignity: a Conversation Among Scholars

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Kant on Human Dignity: a Conversation Among Scholars Kant on Human Dignity: A Conversation among Scholars Author: John Victor Enslin Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/3807 This work is posted on eScholarship@BC, Boston College University Libraries. Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2014 Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted. Boston College The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Department of Philosophy KANT ON HUMAN DIGNITY: A CONVERSATION AMONG SCHOLARS a dissertation by JOHN VICTOR ENSLIN, S.J. submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 2014 © copyright by JOHN VICTOR ENSLIN, S.J. 2014 Kant on Human Dignity: A Conversation among Scholars John V. Enslin, S.J. Dissertation Director: Prof. Ronald Tacelli, S.J. Abstract This dissertation aims to examine the notion of ‘human dignity’ in Kant by means of a conversation with three Kantian scholars. One cannot understand Kant’s notion of human dignity without placing it in the context of his moral thought. For this reason we look in Chapter One at the philosopher Roger Sullivan. His major work Immanuel Kant’s moral theory includes a highly detailed treatment of human dignity. I shall present an analysis of his understanding within the context of his methodology and his general approach to Kant’s moral philosophy. We look in Chapter Two at Susan Shell’s ‘Kant on Human Dignity.’ In addition to this, we consider Shell’s methodology and some of her work on the early Kant where we find the roots of Kant’s conception of dignity. Chapter Three addresses Oliver Sensen’s novel interpretation of Kant’s use of the term ‘dignity.’ Utilizing the tools of Analytical Philosophy, he enters into dialogue with Kantian interpreters, suggesting that their understanding of dignity in Kant harbours elements at odds with Kant’s thought and that they thus fail to grasp the radical nature of Kant’s notion. In the final and Fourth Chapter, I try to bring these scholars into a conversation with each other. First, I show the strengths of each position and then, using insights of Sullivan, Shell and Sensen, I venture to ask whether one could not develop the notion of a phenomenology of dignity. I also consider whether in both Shell’s and Sensen’s account there is not an implicit dynamic at work, which suggests the necessity of transcendence and the Good. Table of Contents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................. IV INTRODUCTION: KANT AND THE QUESTION OF DIGNITY ............................................. 1 1. THE PLACE AND IMPORTANCE OF DIGNITY .......................................................................... 1 2. THE QUESTION OF DIGNITY IN KANT ............................................................................... 14 2.1 KANT’S ‘TERMINOLOGICAL CONFUSIONS’? ............................................................................ 16 3. KANT ON DIGNITY: SCHOLARS IN CONVERSATION ............................................................... 18 CHAPTER ONE: THE FORMULA OF RESPECT FOR THE DIGNITY OF PERSONS: ROGER SULLIVAN’S TAKE ON HUMAN DIGNITY IN KANT ....................................................... 20 PRELUDE ..................................................................................................................... 20 1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 21 2. INTERLUDE: BACKGROUND ........................................................................................... 22 2.1 THE STRATEGY OF THE GROUNDWORK I ................................................................................ 22 2.2 THE DOCTRINE OF THE TWO VIEW-POINTS ............................................................................. 27 3. THE FORMULA OF RESPECT FOR THE DIGNITY OF PERSONS .................................................... 29 4. PERSONS AND THINGS ................................................................................................. 37 5. RESPECT FOR PERSONS ................................................................................................ 42 6. SELF-RESPECT ............................................................................................................ 55 7. OUR OWN HAPPINESS .................................................................................................. 60 8. RESPECT FOR OTHERS .................................................................................................. 61 9. CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................................................................... 72 CHAPTER TWO: SUSAN SHELL ON KANT AND HUMAN DIGNITY ................................. 76 PRELUDE ..................................................................................................................... 76 1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 78 2. INTERLUDE I: THE ROOTS OF THE QUESTION IN THE EARLY KANT ............................................. 80 2.1 SEARCHING FOR THE QUESTION IN THE FACE OF RELENTLESS NATURE .......................................... 82 2.2 THE MORAL TURN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR DIGNITY ............................................................. 88 3. THE MATURE KANT ON HUMAN DIGNITY ....................................................................... 105 4. DIGNITY AND AUTONOMY .......................................................................................... 110 5. DIGNITY AND VALUE ................................................................................................. 117 6. REASON AND END-SETTING ........................................................................................ 126 7. IMPLICATIONS OF KANT’S CONCEPTION OF HUMAN DIGNITY FOR ETHICS AND POLITICS .............. 133 8. HISTORY AND THE COLLECTIVE WORTH OF HUMAN EXISTENCE ............................................. 139 9. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 144 10. CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................................................................ 149 i CHAPTER THREE: OLIVER SENSEN ON KANT AND HUMAN DIGNITY .......................... 150 PRELUDE ................................................................................................................... 150 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 150 2. INTERLUDE I: CRITICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS ....................................................................... 153 2.1 VALUE AS METAPHYSICAL PROPERTY? ................................................................................. 155 2.2 VALUE AS FOUNDATION? ................................................................................................. 167 2.3 KANT’S CONCEPTION OF ABSOLUTE INNER VALUE ................................................................. 173 2.4 THE FORMULA OF HUMANITY ........................................................................................... 178 3. THREE PARADIGMS OF DIGNITY ................................................................................... 185 3.1 THE CONTEMPORARY PARADIGM ...................................................................................... 185 3.2 THE TRADITIONAL PARADIGM ........................................................................................... 189 3.2.1 The Aristocratic Paradigm: the Origin of the Traditional Paradigm ...................... 190 3.2.2 Cicero and the Traditional Paradigm ..................................................................... 192 3.2.3 Leo the Great ......................................................................................................... 194 3.2.4 Pico della Mirandola .............................................................................................. 196 3.3 THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO CONCEPTIONS ............................................................ 198 3.3.1 Dignity is not a value .............................................................................................. 199 3.3.2 Dignity is a two-fold notion.................................................................................... 200 3.3.3 Dignity does not yield rights .................................................................................. 201 3.3.4 Perfectionism ......................................................................................................... 202 3.4 KANT AND THE TRADITIONAL PARADIGM ............................................................................. 203 3.4.1 Dignity as elevation and not a value ...................................................................... 205 3.4.2 The Two Stages of Dignity ...................................................................................... 210 3.4.3 Dignity, Duty and Rights ......................................................................................... 212 3.4.4 Dignity and Duties toward Oneself ........................................................................ 214 4. THE APPEARANCE OF ‘DIGNITY’ IN KANT’S WORKS ........................................................... 220 5. DIGNITY IN THE GROUNDWORK .................................................................................... 225 5.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................
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