VOLUME XXVI JUNE 1946 NUMBER 3

Editor i.. CAW! CoLO,... AlimlUlS L_

Editor. N/)Tth Am.,.;""" Edition Sp"nish-Americ"" Edit;",. Brnzil"''' Editioto 14u J. McADAMS LT COL C. A. MOIn"ILLA CAPT P. M. ALVRI. Brazilian Ana,. CAPT D. MAlSSUROW 14AJ A. F. BRUNO CAPT G. PADuA. Brazilian Arm,.

Editorial A ...... tsnu CAPT A. HILERA, LT J. PRADOS HERRERO. LT F. J. RAMOS

Administra.tion Administrative Officer: MAJ L. C. MILLIGAN; Production Manager: MAJ G. M. SMITH. JR. Washington Representat;'·,· COL W. H. VAN DINE; 4B919 Pentagon Bldg: Tel: REpublic 6700, Ex 6298

CONTENTS

Occupation of Japan and Japanese Reaction .... 9 Breaching the Siegfried Line 9 PTs in the Pacific "" · .15 Movement of Division Command Post in a Fast Moving Situation · .21 Civil Affairs and Military Government .... '" ..25 Strategic Logistical Planning ...33 Sixth Army Quartermaster Operations in the Luzon Campaign ...41 The Essential Elements of Information and the Intelligence Plan · .51 Training Staff Trainers ._53 The Reauction of Intramuros "" ...57 ~ Antiaircraft Artillery Guns in a Ground Support Role " .61 The Twentieth Air Force ...... 65 Thil'k it Over · ...... _70 Carl' of Ammunition ...... 76

ARY REVIEW-Published monthly by the Command and General Stall School at Fort Leavenworth, x.u.-. teed as seeond-elass matter August 81, 1984, at the Post Office at Fort Leavenworth, Katl88ll, under the Act of h 8, 1897. Subscription rates: $3.00 (U.S. currency) per year for 12 issues. No extra charge for forei!rn taa'e on new or rE'newaJ BubaeriPtione. t. -' COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL

LIEUTENANT GENERAL L. T. GEROW ______Commandant

Staff COLONEL E. D. POST, InJantry ______Chief of Staff COLONEL F. S. MATTHEWS, InJantj·y ______A. C. of S., G-l COLONEL DON C. FAITH, InJant)·y ______A. C. of S., G-2, G-3 COLONEL N. E. MCCLUER, Field Artillcl·y______A. C. of S., G-4

Faculty MAJOR GENERAL O. P. WEYLAND______Assistant Command~nt LIEUTENANT COLONEL W. R. KREINHEDER, Coast Artillel'Y COI·ps______Sccretary COLONEL W. A. CAMPBELL, Field AI·tillery______Coordinating Director of Instruction CAPTAIN J. B. EARLE, United States Navy ______Director, Naval Instruction COLONEL A. W. PENCE, COI'PS oj Engineers ______. ______Director, Service Instruction COLONEL WILLIAM NALLE, Cavalry______. ____ Director, Ground Instruction COLONEL R. C. CANDEE, Air Corps ______Director, Air Instruction MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM F. DEAN ___ ------______Director, Command Class COLONEL J. H. VAN VLIET, InJantl'y ______Director, Ground Class COLONEL W. J. BAIRD, InJantl·y______Director, Service Class COLONEL PHILLIPS MELVILLE, Air Corps______Dircctor, Air Class COLONEL W. H. HENNIG, Coast Artillery CorJls______Director, Latin American Class COLONEL H. J. SCHROEDER, Signal COI·ps______Chief, Personnel Division LIEUTENANT COLONEL A. M. CLARK, Air CO)·ps______Chief, Intelligence Division COLONEL S. A. GIBSON, InJantry______Chief, Operations Division COLONEL T. DeF. ROGERS, Corps oj Engineers______Chicf, Logistics Division COLONEL L. B. CONNER, Cavalry______Chief, Ground Division COLONEL L. E. BATES, JR., Air Corps______Chief, Air Division COLONEL G. K. WITHERS, Corps oj Engineers ______~ __ Chief, Service Division . LIEUTENANT COLONEL W. B. MCCALL, JR., InJantry______Chief, Training Division Occupation of Japan and Japanese Reaction MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES'A. WILLOUGHBY, General Staff Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army Forces, Pacific N 26 August 1945, after three years quarters at Wakayama, assumed control in O and nine months of war, the American southern Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu. By Third Fleet under Admiral Halsey dropped the first of October our forces were firmly anchor in Sagami Bay in the opening move established throughout Japan. of a swiftly developing plan of occupation. General MacArthur's headquarters, estab­ At 0900/1 on 28 August communications lished in Tokyo as both General Headquar­ experts, after being delayed two days by ters of the Supreme Commander for the typhoons, were landed at Atsugi Airdrome Allied Powers and General Headquarters seventeen miles west of Yokohama, followed, United States Army Forces Pacific, included: three hours later by thirty-eight transports Lieutenant General R. K. Sutherland; Chief carrying combat troops, supplies and equip­ of Staff, and Brigadier General B. F. Fel­ ment. The next two days having been spent lers, Military Secretary; Major Generals S. in readying the airfield and reconnoitering J. Chamberlain and R. J. Marshal, Deputy the surrounding area, large-scale landings Chiefs of Staff; Major General C. A. Wil­ of the Eighth Army's 11th Airborne Division loughby and Brigadier Generals W. E. troops were begun at 0600/1 on 30 August, Chambel's and H. E. Eastwood as Assistant forty-men plane loads descending at three­ Chiefs of Staff; and Brigadier General W. minute intervals throughout the day, Simul­ E. Crist, Chief of the Government Section. taneously the 4th Marine Regimental Combat British, Soviet, Chinese, and Australian liai­ Team under command of Rear 'Admiral Bad­ son officers were accredited to Allied Head­ ger landed and took possession of Y okosuka quarters. !'l'aval Base. Within two weeks of the astonishingly At 1400/1 General of the Army Mac­ smooth initial landing in Japan, a sudden Arthur, accompanied by Generals 'Sutherland flurry of newspaper and editorial demands and Eichelberger, landed at Atsugi and, pro­ for "tightening control" of Japan, and the ceeding to Yokohama, established temporary occasional reference to "kid glove" adminis­ headquarters in the New Grand Hotel. Two tration policies, suggested that the Press and days later, on 2 September, the surrender the Public had not fully realized the range documents were signed aboard the USS 1lJis­ and character of our occupation of Japan. 80W'; and General Order Number 1, requiring The enormous initial military risks of all Japanese forces at home and abroad to landing with token forces on the Japanese lay down their arms and submit to the di­ mainland, into a colossal armed camp, the rections of the Allied authorities, was issued obvious gamble of landing with only two and by the Japanese Imperial General lfead­ a half divisions, confronted by sixty-four quarters by eommadl:l. of the Emperor. Gen­ Japanese divisions, thirty-six brigades and eral ;\facArthur presided at flag-raising cere­ forty odd regiments, were apparently not monies at the American Embassy buildings fully appreciated. All possible landing areas, in Tokyo on 8 September, and on 17 Sep­ in the event of American armed landing, tember moved his headquarters to Tokyo and were completely organized by the Japanese took residence in the Embassy. Army and each one of these areas had the The remainder of September saw the potentiality of another Okinawa. There were Eighth Army, under command of General perhaps five or six such areas, along the Eichelberger, with headquarters at Y okoha­ East Coast of Japan-Kyushu, Shikoku, the rna, extend its control over northern Honshu Kanto Plain, the Sendai Corridor, and others. and Hokkaido, while the Sixth' Army, under The Japanese General Staff had enough divi­ command of General KrUeger, with head~ sions and brigades to make an attack expen­ 4 MILITARY REVIEW sive everywhere. At Okinawa, from two to e. "We believe that Japan can make a two and a half Japanese divisions exacted peaceful contribution toward culture a total of approximately 40,000 American and civilization. Through such a con­ casualties ot land, not to mention the shat­ tribution, Japan can find a just po­ tering "Kamikaze" attacks on the Fleet. This sition among the nations." affords a completely authentic yardstick to d. "We believe that permanent peace forecast what it would have taken in losses cannot be maintained or controlled had we gone in shooting. The sinister ratio through armed force. There is no doubt that two and a half Japanese divisions exact of our guarantee that the people of 40,000 casualties, spells: Japan can remove the possibility of Kyushu 13114 Divs - 200;000 future wars and can guide Japan to Shikoku 4,5 Divs 80,000 cooperate with other nations again." Kanto 22 Divs - 400,000 From the above it would appear that the Sendai 2 Divs - 30,000 Emperor has indicated by his acts and deed;; The conclusions al'e inescapable. that he is willing to cooperate. Japanese Reaction to U.S. Occupation Government Japanese reaction to American occupation Since the Potsdam Declaration there have cannot be accurately sensed by a mere read­ been several cabinets. The first govemment ing of excerpts from the daily pr('ss, nor as headed by Higashikuni, ~as hastily designed an acceptance of present conditions having for all practical purposes to cuny out the all happened at one time. Rather the re­ terms of occupation and demobilization. That actions have been cumulative and an effort this cabinet was not fully cooperative and has been made to trace this development as it maintained an air of reluctance to submit has progressed in different sections of society. to Allied demands was proved by its resig­ The general tenor of Japanese reaction to nation because of its inability to carry out United States occupation was established by the Allied Memorandum of 4 October which the Impel:ial Address to the Diet, 4 September provided for the removal of restrictions on 1945, in which the Emperor urged his people political, civil and religious liberties. to "Work to regain the trust and faith of The following government headed by Baron the world; to contribute to world civiliza­ Shidehara, who was also appointed by the tion through the establishment of a peaceful Emperor, created an Imperial precedent for Japan." method of appointment of his Prime Minis­ All the agencies of the people have, in gen­ ter. The Emperor in his desire to appoint a eral, followed the precepts of their ruler and liberal who would be acceptable to the Su­ apparently sincere effort has been made to preme Commander ignored his advisory sen­ cooperate with United States forces. ior statesman in his choice. This appointment The Emperor's initial reaction to the new was significant because by his actions he situation is covered in his speech to the Diet, by-passed the militaristic cliques or fantastic 4 September 1945. Additional reaction is nationals in his endeavor to satisfy Allied found in a translation of the following state­ demands, to provide for the concern of his ments attributed to the Emperor inan inter­ people as head of the "family" or to main­ view with American correspondents: tain the self-preservation of his throne. What­ a. "We did not act with the intention ever the motives back of this oriental mind, that Tojo should make use of the Im­ the fact remains that all outward deeds perial Declaration of War on the day point to a receptive Emperor who in turn of the Pearl Harbor attack." appointed a liberal minded Prime Minister b. "'Ve desire that constitutional mon­ with a wide experience in Western manners archy be established in Japan." and foreign affairs. "", OCCUPATION OF JAPAN AND JAPANESE REACTION 5 The Shidehara cabinet although considered sons, before they are disposed of as war by many to be an interim one or of the criminals, are already exposed to severe earetaker status, is not one which is rep­ judgment from the entire nation." resentative since it is appointed, and there­ Numerous articles have appeared in its fore does not represent the will of the people. columns which would have been suicidal be­ The press is taking advantage of its new­ fore but are now typical newspaper copy. found freedom to ask the cabinet to hold The press has accepted its added responsi­ immediate general elections so that in the bility and has printed its editorials in a near future the government will be repre­ fearless manner which is in marked contrast sentative of the people and not until that to the controlled press of the militaristic becomes a fact will the outside world have factions. Its columns have reproduced let­ a chance to get the true reaction to the ters critical of government conditions. It has Allied demands for democratic freedom. made frequent and strong demands for the The Allied demands for freedom have im­ comp'lete retirement or disposal of govern­ printed in the minds of the Lord Privy Seal ment officials and decentralization of author­ and the Shidehara Cabinet that constitu­ ity; which greater independence. would en­ tional revisions are quite necessary to inake able local authorities below prefectural level the government representative of the people. to act more energetically in the solution of That two agencies of the Emperor are sep­ the local problems. arately conducting investigations on this The press has on numerous occasions in­ subject suggests that Prince Konoye alarmed dicated that it will champion the human the present cabinet with his remarks that rights of the Japanese people and it is making the constitutional powers of.the Emperor a test case against the brutal police methods should be drastically curtailed. This might throughout Japan. It is another indication be an indication that the Shidehara govern­ that the Allied cause is being aided by the ment is one which favors the Emperor as attacks on the police who have maintained the supreme ruler. If this is so, then it does such a stranglehold on the freedom of the not seem to be a cabinet for the people. Japanese. This has aided 'in producing a co­ It is also a fact, though paradoxical, that operative populace in opposition to the po­ Baron Shidehara also reiterated the Charter lice and militaristic factions and has made Oath of Five Articles which has in theory the work of our occupation forces more provided Japan with a charter of democracy simple. As a final factor the press has re­ ,inre the Emperor Meiji's rescript in 1869. acted remarimbly in favor of the abolition Press of State Shintoism and by means of editorials The occupation of Japan has provided the has justified the abolishment of the pseudo press with a rebirth of freedom. It has not religion. been slow to capitalize on this new freedom Military Powers and i~ undoubtedly l.1'efiecting the increased Due to utmost loyalty for the Emperor, feelinl.':s of the J ap'anese people. the will of the Emperor has been imposed Fint example of this is an article which upon the Army and Navy to comply with appeal ed in the Asaki newspaper 5 Septem­ the Allied directives for the disarming and ber 1i145. "Understanding people now under­ demobilization of military forces. All evi­ stand fully that it was Nazi ideology by dence points to the fact that cooperation SOfiE' tJffieial circles which brought about the has been as complete as conditions permit curse of tQday. In our country, which is and every effort has been made, except in rooted in the people, and where the Sover­ a few isolated cases, to carry out the direc­ eign is one with the people, we had from tives to a speedy end. Very little procras­ the hottom of our hearts hated the position tination has been noted and it is apparent of leaders with dictatorial airs. Such per-" that whatever the outcome, the Army and 6 MILITARY REVIEW Navy are now ready and willing to accede of Education" makes a healthy change to the Emperor's desires for his people. and development in the Japanese out­ Industry look. In discussing the attitude neces­ sary for educational reform the article The reaction of industry to Allied occupa­ puts a fresh interpretation on the tion is one of indecision. Some of the leaders meaning of "Good Japanese." Formerly are desirous of reconversion to peacetime a "Good Japanese" could be described ,consumers' goods. Minimum control and maxi­ as an obedient. narrow-minded pa­ mum production was announced as policy triot. But now, the editorial states, he by the Ministry for Industry and Commerce. must strive to become a good human This is in contrast to the tight government being and world-wide citizen as well. control in the war days. An editorial in This cannot be achieved merely by "Asaki" 10 October 1945. envisages the pos­ official educational guidance; individual sibility of a combination of Allied capital reflection and judgment are necessary. and Japanese cheap labor uniting to produce Japanese must have the moral COUf­ large-scale entel·prise. Another example of age to stand up for what they believe reaction in industry is the agitation for re­ is right even in the face of puhlic form in the vast Mitsui house. It is instigated opinion. by young progressive elements who are dis­ b. A teacher who insisted on the com­ satisfied with the inertia of their elders and pulsory study of the military system they are now making the most of their op­ was asked to resign. portunities. c. "The Education Minister, Tamon Mao­ Police da. gives the following as an integral The firm grip maintained by the police on part of the new educational policy: the people of Japan has been broken by the ( 1) Freedom of speech. in so far as directive of 29 September. issued by the Su­ it is truthful. will be permitted in preme Commander. As a result new trends the schools. (2) Criticism of the Em­ a re developing: peror will not be permitted." u. The Home Minister in appointing the d. "Bureaucratic control of education is Director of the Police Bureau and the incompatible with freedom." Jnspector General of Police realized e. "The restrictive bureaucratic policy that the old tyrannical rule is over. pursued during the last ten to fifteen The voice of the people must be heard. years must be abolished, and the Japa­ b. The Mainichi paper has demanded. nese student,; taught to think and act through its editorials. a better police for themselves." force with higher standards and an Public Opinion indoctrination of the understanding of When the Japanese get out of the bewil­ civil rights. dered stage they are now in and their anger c. Efforts are being made to attract a at those in authority. and realize that better type of recruit to the police the thought police have been eradicated in force. entirety, freedom of thought will assert it­ d. It can be noted that there have been self and the roots of democracy will have a numerous instances of evasive action, beUer opportunity to take hold. At present on the part of the police, to directives an indicative gauge of the less timid Japa­ issued. The people still fear the police. nese can be measured from the letters that Education are appearing in the columns of the news­ Reactions in the educational field are il­ papers. The following are some examples: . lustrated by the following; a. A writer dares to criticize the abuse a. A current editorial entitled "The Basis of national policy"'and makes the fo1­ OCCUPATION OF JAPAN ,AND JAPANESE REACTION 7 I lowing"statement: "I believe that one have heretofore misused their religious func­ of the basic reasons for the defeat tions under government oppression, to free was the suppression of all discussion themselves from the yoke and carry out on national policy. What developed their true mission of restoring faith and during the last few years was a ty­ eliminating indifferences, degeneracy, and rannical and biased national discus­ savagery. The effect of this edict is qui~e sion along the lines 'We are right and reactionary on the Japanese who have been all others are wrong'." thoroughly schooled in a nationalistic religion b. Transfer of the Imperial prerogatives which recognized only its own race as to of legislative power, of supreme com­ the right of survival. mand of the armed forces and the There has been no comment on the status power to confer titles of nobility. of religions by religious leaders, therefore c. Popular election to an office something it is not kno':'}n what reactions are in order. between that of the Prime Minister One internationally known Christian leader of England and the President ,of the may possibly have expressed the sentiments United States. of the clergy1however in his remarks made d. The official so elected would represent in an open forum concerning democracy. He the government. No vital decisions apparently still favors retention of an un­ could be made without concurrence of changing central figure (i.e. the Emperor). the two elected houses of the Diet. Korea e. The new constitution would place in The occupation of Korea by Allied Forces the people's hands the power to pre­ has not been on the even kecl as has been vent the recurrent war. Vital decisions noted in 'Japan. The sudden freedom for must not be under the 'power of any Korea has found the people unprepared to one man' and the people must be taught govern or discipline themselves to the real­ to assume individual responsibility by ities of a necessary occupation. exercising right of franchise. The "pent-up" emotions of the people have f. To implement the foregoing, it is es­ been manifested in criticism of initial Al­ sential for all heads of Ministries, lied policy, in a critical contempt for the Sections and Departments in the Gov­ Russians, acts of vandalism and the almost ernment, Regional and Prefectural daily incidents of local disturbances, mainly Govern.ors, and even mayors who were against Japanese or Japanese-owned prop­ appointed during the past five year~ erty. As the novelty of freedom eases off to be retired. and the Koreans institute a government of The newly won freedom is bound to un­ their own people it can be expected that the leash the opinion of the communist, liberal, discipline of the people will improve so as to the educated and the progressive. As bold eliminate the tendencies of youth and others opinion is dared to be made it will undoubt­ to go uncontrolled about the country. edly soon crystalliz.t into trends which will The Japanese have for all practical pur­ need to be analyzed thoroughly. poses been cooperative. The Japanese civil­ Church ians are evidently concerned over the sever­ With the ultimatum from the Supreme ity of the Korean attitude towards them Commander that "State Shintoism" had to and were even willing to try to evacuate be abolished, it will now be necessary to themselves directly to Japan in small boats. observe the reaction that will or has taken The Japanese A;med Forces appear to be place. cooperating completely except for some minor To date one newspaper has delivered a cases of former Kempei Tai members who surprising approval of the Allied demands are suspected of being affiliated with under­ and it challenges the religious leaders, who, ground terrorist organizations. 8 MILI'l'.\BY BIlVIE1I' Conclusions speak his mind, the government is breaking Japanese reaction to American occupation away from the old traditions, a new philo­ has been like that of an individual who having sophy of education is developing, political been drugged, finds, as the effects of the status of Japanese subjects has been broad­ drug wear off, his facultics returning to him ened, and the principles of democracy are little by little. The press has been unshack­ beginning to make themselve~ felt through. led, the man on the street is not afraid to out the land.

Lessons From the Pacific Air Power Paramount; The basic fact is that in the war against Japan, even more so than in the war against Germany and Italy, victory was won through air power. In the Pacific, a complete victory was scored through the air, without the need for surface invasion and bypassing the enemy's immense surface forces. The classic doctrine that a nation cannot be defeated while its army is intact has been cancelled out for all time. Japan's Aviation Blunders: The Japanese, like the Germans, failed to understand the potentialities of strategic air power until too late. In all their war planning, they had limited themselves to a tactical air force capable of supporting army and navy strategies. Japanese reSOUI"ces were completely com­ mitted to this type of air power; besides, they lacked the technological knowledge for the creation of effective strategic air force. Inferiority of Enemy Equipment; Another conclusion is that Japanese equip­ ment became backward. Not only did it reflect backward strategic concepts, but it became technologically inferior, and in some respects relatively primitive. This, in some instances, operated to conceal certain of our own deficiencies; in hedgehog" meters in' depth behind the river-railroad rlefense. Thus the Siegfried Line contained line. At only one point in the line was there mainly a large number of reinforced con­ an appr~ciable thinning out of these pill­ crete pillboxes for machine guns and 37-mm boxes. This occurred at the point where the antitank guns. There was a very limited Wurm River Valley joins the Roer River preparation of open earthworks for heavier Valley; and this junction is itself a barrier artillery, and extensive hasty preparation of to cross-country movement; so to protect it, field fortifications for infantry. the greatest concentration of pillboxes in the The Siegfried Line was built on the first whole sector occurred on the nose south of natural barrier east of the German frontier, the stream junction. and where this natural barrier was weakest Mission.-The major overall mission of the pillbox concentration was strongest. The the XIX Corps was to rupture the Siegfried basic principle behind the placement of pill­ Line and advance to secure a bridgehead boxes and antitank barriers.was simple and across the Rhine River in the Cologne­ IOg'ical: namely, to increase the defensive Dusseldorf area. potential of the terrain along the German The Attack frontier. Where tanks and infantry would Artillery and Ail' Suppol-t.-The artillery have a difficult job in attacking (as across preparation for the XIX Corps assault on the Rhine River) the defenses were sketchy. the Siegfried Line began on 26 September Where a natural attack corridor existed (the and continued until 2 October. A 155-mm Belfort Gap, the Moselle River Valley, the gun battalion was given the mission of de­ Aachen' Plain), the~ the defenses were most stroying all pillboxes which could be located dense. ' on the 30th Division front. The battalion In the XIX Corps sector, the Line was fired on a total of forty-five pillboxes, within a continuous obstacle extending across the its field of fire and observable, with varying Whole Corps front. It was here constructed success, during this period. to implement the natural obstacles formed The second phase in the artillery prepara­ by the Wurm River and, in the north five tion was the "blacko~t" of the enemy's anti­ kilometers of the sector, the Wurm and Roer aircraft batterie~. For fifteen minutes just Rivers. The only portions not lying behind prior to the air strike 100 different anti­ a water barrier were immediately north and aircraft installations were fired on by XIX west of Aachen. To make up for the lack and VII Corps Artillery and the 30th Divi­ of the river barrier across the ridge line, sion Artillery. This program was highly suc­ 10 " MILITARY REVIEW - cessful, since there was hardly any ack-ack by battalions from both Corps and Army ar­ reported over the target area and no planes tillery. This program was greatly intensified were lost in the operation. over that originally planned, due to the fact The airstrike at H-120 was intended (1) that the air strike left most of the target to etl'ect a saturation bombing of the break­ area completely untouched. through area and (2) to knock out by dive­ The 30th Division Artillery plan vh·tually bombing the pillhoxes immediately facing the blanketed areas from which German fire two assault -regiments as well as (3) to knock could be brought to bear on the attacking in­ out all reserves which could be used for fantry. For use during the attack, in addition immediate counterattack. However, IX Tac­ to the 92d Chemical Battalion's 4.2-inch mor­ tical Air Command was able to supply only tar barrages and other fires, 339 previously a limited number of medium bombers and prepared concentrations were designated. fighter bombers. A misunderstanding caused Starting at H-hour, XIX and VII Corps ar­ confusion among the mediums of the first tiIIery fired counterbattery missions on enemy miRsion as they approached the target, and artillery locations which had been plotted as a result, only four groups of bombers and verified over the preceding five to six dropped any bombs on the target area. Fight­ days and against batteries capable of fi.ring er-bombers, on the next mission, dropped into the 30th Division sector, as well as sev­ their gasoline "jelly" bombs in close prox­ eral other counterbattery missions fired on imity to the pillboxes that were their target, locations picked up subsequent to H-hour. after the waiting infantry of the 30th Divi­ The [nj"anfl·y A8salllt.-The assault of the sion noticed them circling uncertainly and 117th Infantry was made at and just south aided their aiming with red smoke laid on of Marienberg; that of the 119th Infantry the exact targets by their artillery. was at and just south of Rimburg. The With the completion of the air strike at regiment moving on Marienberg pushed rap­ H-hour (1100), the two assault regiments, the idly down the hill to the Wurm River and 117th and 119th Infantry, attacked abreast. streamed across on footbridges thrown across The 30th Division Artillery supported the the river in a matter of minutes. By night­ attack with an elaborate program of prear­ fall the first battalion had seized its objec­ ranged fires. The regimental plan for con­ tive, an area in and east of Palenberg. tinuous use of all mortars until the last Together with the second battalion it had possible minute and then shifting the mortar reduced eleven pillboxes, entirely without fire to the edges of the town when the bat­ tank support. talions reduced the pillboxes, was one of the The 119th Infantry attacked at 1100 in a main factors in the speed with which units column of battalions, the 1st Battalion lead­ crossed the river and the railroad track. The ing, followed by the 2d and 3d Battalions. 4.2-inch chemical mortars, after the mission The 2d Battalion was commited after the of breaking all wire on the assault front, 1st Battalion was held up. The thick woods took up a rolling barrage in front of the on and in front of the steep slope that 117th's first battalion. During this entire confronted the assault elements of this regi­ time the 81-mm mortars of the entire ment made impossible _any observation of regiment, employed in battalion batteries, pillboxes or enemy movement within its area. fired on adjoining areas along the clitl' on The 155-mm guns (self-propelled), were un­ the north edge of Palenberg. This continuous able to damage the pillboxes in the woods. mortar fire, Up to the time the boxes were The etl'ects of the jelly bombs dropped dul"ing reduced, absolutely prevented any outside the air strike were also negligible. No pill­ assistance to the pillboxes. The divisional boxes were hit, and the woods failed to burn artillery in the meantime neutralized likely because of the dampness and green nature assembly areas on the flanks and rear of of foliage and und~rbrush. the objective, being reinforced in this phase Artillery fire on the 1st Battalion was'rela­ BREACHING THE SIEGFRIED LINE 11 tively light initially, becoming heavier as Battalion effected a penetration to the north­ attempts to assault the woods frontally were eastern edge of the woods. It then swung made. Artillery reaction on the 2d Battalion its attack to the southwest to mop up the was heavy and concentrated. Here, for a defenders in the woods and destroy the period of forty minutes, the enemy put over pillboxes. The steep slope around each pill­ a battery concentration every fiye seconds. box was honeycombed with communication The enemy had direct observation of this trenches and machine-gun emplacements. area until several days later when the at­ When any break in the underbrush permit­ tack forced their observation posts off the ted artillery or mortar fire, and friendly high ground to the north and south of the troops were drawn back to permit this fire,

o '0 MILES CONTOUR INTERVAl 100 METERS

breakthrough. Attempts by the 2d Battalion the defenders would go into the pillboxes to install a treadway bridge over the Wurm for protection and man their outside posi­ River during daylight were rendered im­ tions when the shelling lifted. Tanks and possible by enemy artillery. The bridge was TD's, [tank destroyers] could be used on finall}' installed at night but was subsequently only'a few of these pillboxes because of the knochd out twice a~ damaged several times. steep slope and thick woods. Flanking these Two l'l\emy machine-gun companies initially positions by moving around on the open mannvd the defenses in the greater part of ridge above the woods was prevented by the woods and throughout put up a deter­ direct fire weapons firing from the vicinity mined stand. (These were reinforced later of Merkstein IWlstadt. Clearing of the woods by another company when approximately was accomplished after severe close-in fight­ half of the woods had been cleared.) Ob­ ing with opposing lines rarely getting farther served artillery fire and mortar fire could apart than twenty-five to fifty yards. rarely be used against this defense because The Wurm'River proved a serious obstacle of the closeness of the opposing lines. After to the attached tanks and the attached TD's. a strong position at the Rimburg castle had In the 119th Infantry sector the 10th En­ been reduced by the 2d Battalion, the 1st, gineer Combat Battalion got a' treadway 12 llILITAlty ltEVIJ:W -

LEGEND tI " ...... -.::c:=-===-= RR TRACK DOUBLE " -t--+--+---I--RR TRACK SINGLE ~-==~WJL~4=J~ • GERMAN PILLBOX _____ TANK TRAP

-X-X-X-X-X-)(- BARBED WIRE

SCALE IN FEET 1000 1000 1 9 1 CONTOUR INTERVAL - 10 METERS BREACHING THE SIEGFRIED LINE [bridge] in; but on reaching the far side hostile shelling was even more intense. Two all but one platoon of tanks became mired battalions, one from each regiment, launched in the boggy meadow. By the next morning, a coordinated tank-infantry attack south the 247th Engineer Combat Battalion and the from Ubach; and though one was held up l104th Engineer Combat Group had installed by fire on its left flank, the other reduced a treadway at Rimburg and a Baifey [bridge] eleven pillboxes and reached the high ground at Marienberg. On 3 October, aided by tanks of the 743d Tank Battalion and Combat Command "B" (CCB), 2d Armored Division, the 117th Infantry continued to advance. One battalion of the 119th In­ fantry, in the wooded area of the castle at Rimburg, attacked south against the flanks of the pillboxes that were interdicting a direct advance east. Three of these pillboxes were cap­ tured without any tank support. Marshy terrain canalized tank movement and prevented their use in this maneuver. In the early morning of 4 Oc­ tober. the enemy launched his first serious counterattacks, two against one regiment and one against the other. Not more than two companies were / em­ ployed in these counterattacks, and they were repelled after a stiff fight. Supporting artillery played a dominant role in break­ ing up these counterattacks. Two ~maller counterattacks were beaten off in the latter part of the afternoon. Ubach was the focal point of the operations this day. CCB, ~d Armored Divi,ion, was passing through the town on its way east and northeast, while infantry units wert' trying to organize attacks out <.f Ubach to the south. The enelll,\' took advantage of this YARDS conc('ntration to place the heav­ iest artillery fire on Ubach which our troops had ever received. east of Herbach. The remaining two battal­ Th" following day, despite ninety-nine ions of the 119th Infantry, still without coumerbattery missions by the artillery, t~e tank support, made slow progress in elean., ·14 MILITARY REVIEW ing out the woods facing the railroad tracks attack recaptured four pillboxes, forced the south of Rimburg castle. second battalion of the 119th Infantry to CCB, 2d Armored Division, outflanked and withdraw 800 yards, and caused considerable captured the pillboxes north of Palenberg on casualties before it was stopped. The lost 5 October up to and including Frelenberg. ground, however, was regained by nightfall, Other elements of CCB advanced northeast and the 3d Battalion of the 117th Infantry two to two and a half kilometers. pushed down to Ubach. In the meantime, the On 5 October 1944, the 3d Battalion, 120th 1st and 3d Battalions of the 119th Infantry Infantry was attached to the 119th Infantry with tank support cleaned out the remaining and crossed the Wurm River in the vicinity pillboxes in the woods south of the Rim­ of Rimburg with the mission of attacking burg castle. The enemy's efforts to check the south in the gap between the 1st and 2d penetration had definitely crumbled. Battalions, and seizing the high ground south By 16 October the 30th Division had rolled of Herbach. Main enemy opposition after up the Siegfried Line from north to south the battalion attacked consisted of heavy and with the 2d Armored Division had com­ artiJIel'Y concentrations from the east and pletely destroyed the pillboxes along a four­ small-arms and 75-mm direct fire from the teen-mile front, and had penetrated six miles vicinity of Herbach. On 6 October the bat­ through the Line. talion continued the attack to its objective. The A.nnol'ed Assuult.-The shock action On 7 October this battalion was ordered provided by the entry of the tanks into the to seize an objective 500 yards east of Her­ . battle played a dominant role in securing zogenrath. The route of this attack was gen­ and holding thc north half of the penetra­ erally cross-country. tion and bridgehead in the Line. The German Observation posts and foxholes in open will to fight was appreciably affected by the country were camouflaged with straw to re­ penetration of tanks into the rear zones of semble small haystacks. Pillboxes with steel the Line. eupolas were apparently used principally as observation posts with the aid of a very The technique used most frequently to at­ good periscope. Ports in cupolas make 360· tack pillboxes was to concentrate heavy ma­ fire possible for weapons as big as Model chine-gun fire with an occasional round from MG 42. No anti-personnel mines were en­ the 75-mm 01' 76-mm tank gun at the pillbox countered. Antitank mines were not used firing port with a section of tanks. The re­ extensively, except in the vicinity of Her­ mainder of the tanks fired on other pillboxes zogenrath where they had been sown in great in the vicinity and various prominent fea­ confusion. tures and entrenchments which threatened The 120th Infantry Regiment, less the 3d those working on the pillbox. Under cover Battalion in division reserve, aided the pene­ of this fire the tank dozer moved in and tration by making feint attacks, and by seiz­ sealed up the ports and doors of the pillbox. ing the populated area of Kerkrade west Another successful method was smoking the of the Wurm River, immediately south of pillbox and moving in the tank dozer while the point of actual penetration by the 117th other tanks covered boxes in the vicinity; the and 119th Infantry Regiments.' tank dozer, however, because of difficulty of Operations on 6 October ended all Ger­ observing his own work in the smoke, at man hopes of holding ,the Siegfried Line times did not completely seal the ports. in the XIX Corps sector. At 0700 the enemy An important lesson relearned was that launched its strongest counterattack against artillery fire, as a rule, had little effect on our forces, employing a maximum of two tanks. A few tanks, however, were damaged battalions, four assault guns, two tanks, and slightly as a result 0.£ direct hits on critical heavy artillery and mortar fire. The counter­ points such as turr~trace or gun mantle. "" PTs in the Pacific CAPTAIN M. R. BROWNING, United States Navy Instructor, Command, and General Staff School ELATIVELY few people, either within While the United States boats formed the R or outside of the armed services, have a great majority of the squadrons and flotillas full appreciation of the vital contribution involved in the battle zones, there were Brit­ made by the Motor Torpedo Boat to the ish and Dutch craft present also, and fre­ United Nations victory in the Pacific. True quently in.the thick of the almost innumerable enough, at the very start of the war, the actions fought. In like manner, the Japanese, spectacular work of the six boats of Lieutenant themselves, made extensive and good use of Bulkeley's Squadron Three at Corregidor re­ the type in the bitter three years of island ceived wide publicity and acclaim; but little warfare from Guadalcanal to Okinawa. was ever published, thereafter concerning the The typical United' Nations PT of World

Motor Torpedo (PT) Boat (Official U.S. Navy Photo). subsequent achievements of these swift and War N was a craft, of about SO-foot length, paper-thin little cra.!t. Actually, they were 20-foot beam, and 5-foot draft. Her l]Ianned present and figured importantly in every cam­ and equipped displacement averaged about paign in the step by step advance of our fifty tons. She was capable of very high speeds force~ toward the enemy home islands. During on the order of forty knots in reasonably the war, a total of 694 motor torpedo boats smooth water. At slow speeds, she could sneak (designated "PT"s) were built for the along almost silently. Usually, she was triple United, States Navy. One out of every ten-a screw propelled, with multiple rudders, and total of sixty-nine-were lost due to all causes could maneuver very swiftly and radically. including enemy action, but that figure does Except for some very light splinter shielding not by any means indicate the true percentage at control stations, she was unarmored, and loss in battle; a large number of the boats her hull was reinforced plywood of cardboard were retained on our own east and west thickness. She carried four or five machine coasts and never reached the forward areas. " guns ranging in sizes from .50 caliber to 4 16 MILITARY REVIEW 40-mm. As her class name implies, her main engagements took place deep in enemy held offensive weapon was the torpedo, of which territory and separated by thousands of mile~ she carried one or two in launching racks on of open water from the nearest American each side of her deck. She was also fitted to bases. In the meantime however, as rapidly as carry depth charges and she frequently did the boats could be built and put into service, so for use against enemy submarines. She they were being placed at all our outlying had excellent high frequency radio equipment strongpoints to bolster their defense. Squad­ and efficient radar. Smoke generating ap­ rons were located at Panama, Hawaii, the paratus on her stern completed her armament. Aleutians and Midway. In the Battle of Mid­ Her main reliance against more heavily armed way, a unit of eleven PTs contributed marked surface vessels, such as destroyers, rested in assistance in repelling the enemy air attacks (1) stealth and concealment during approach, on the first morning of the engagement. Had (2) her speed, agility and small size, (3) the Japanese landing actually been attempted, smoke cover in retirement. it is a sound conjecture that these PTs would Japanese PTs were smaller, slower, less have been one of the most effective elements heavily armed, and lacked the fine electronic of the island's defense. Throughout the night and communicating equipment of the typical of 4-5 June, the entire squadron swept the American and British boats. sea to the northwest of Midway seal'ching for th(' disabled enemy carriers and intending to Early Pacific Operation;; torpedo them. That they were unable to locate Following the southward retirement of the their quarry was due to the fact that the American, British and Dutch naval forces Japanese ships had sunk sometime during the from the Philippines in December 1941, they hours of darkness. fought the series of abortive delaying actions Following the Midway battie, the next ap­ known as the Java Sea Campaign in the pearance of the PTs in action was in the waters nOl·th of Java. PTs-mainly Dutch­ . South Pacific. Here, the months of August based on ports in eastern Java, participated \"1942 to February 1943 found the United Na· in the deployments of the heterogeneous al­ " tions' forces locked in the savage struggle lied units in these operations, but they never for Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. The succeeded in any effective action against narrow and sheltered waters and innumerable Japanese ships. Many of them fell into the bays and inlets of the Solomons archipelago hands of the enemy when Java was finally offered ideal conditions for effective employ­ overrun in March 1942, following the virtual ment of motor torpedo boats. The Japanese annihilation of the United Nations' cruiser were known to have been making good use of and destroyer forces during the last days of them there from the outset of the campaign. February. Some of these same captured Dutch There were indications that they were proba­ PTs wel'e encountered by our forces in cam­ paigns two and three years later when the bly present at the first Battle of Savo Island tide of war had reversed. nil the night of 8-9 August, and they may have After, the Java Sea Campaign. there re­ made torpedo hits on at least three of the mained in United Nations' hands no PT forc(' four h('avy cruisers which were lost to us in able to participate in further effOI'ts to stem that disastrous action. Whether or not that the Japanese advance toward Australia was the case, there could be no questioning in during the first months of 'Hl42. In the the fact that the Solomons offered a "natural" Central and Western Pacific. there was, of theater for PT operation, and we, according­ course, no opportunity to employ such boats ly. bent every effort to get them there. How­ in the carrier raids and running bombard­ ever, there were tremendous obstacles to be . merits of Jap-held islands which comprised overcome before this could be accomplished . the only actions in those areas until the The boats could not ~rosS>the long reaches of Battle'of Midway on 4-6 June. All of those the Pacific under their own power, and they PT. IN 'rUE .PACll"tc 17 were far too frail to be towed for long location forthwith and incorporated under distances in the open sea. The only possible the overall' command of the Commanding Gen­ way to accomplish their passage to the area eral, Guadalcanal. Additional boats joined to was to ship them out in cargo vessels in augment the squadron from time to time which, at that critical time, every cubic inch ~ during the following months, as fast as they of space was desperately needed for other arrived in Noumea and could be unloaded and purposes. Furthermore, the boats were too processed. heavy to be handled by any ship's hoisting No time was lost in getting the new weapon equipment in any vessel we had, so that ex­ into action against the Japanese. At that ternal heavy crane facilities were required time, and from then on until the final com­ at both ends of the trip. This was simple plete evacuation of the enemy's Guadalcanal enough at the United States west coast ports position, the "Tokyo Express" ran almost I. and in Hawaii, but at the outer terminal of nightly from Bougainville down "The Slot." the voyage the nearest dockside cranes which From the first of November on, the ships of were capable of handling the 50-ton loads the "Express" were attacked repeatedly by "ere at Brisbane-l.200 miles of open water our PTs in the waters between Guadalcanal from Guadalcanal. Notwithstanding these and Savo Island. On many occasions the difficulties, the potential value of the boats enemy operations were so harassed and im­ III thl' peculiar warfaJ'e being waged, was peded by these attacks that they VTere com­ such that it was imperative that they be pletely ineffective in aiding his beleaguered brought in by some means. The problem was troops ashore. But the little force of PTs finally solved by building a cantilever crane did not confine its damage to the enemy to ) III sections back in the States together with mere harassment and annoyance. Onthe night . l sectlOnal ponton barge to mount it, shipping of 6-7 November they sank a Japanese de­ the sections to Noumea, New Caledonia. and stroyer. Shortly thereafter they got torpedo anloaJing and reassembling it there. As it hits in two more destroyers; these, however, was, this "Rube Goldberg" crane was barely succeeded in escaping to the north. On the able to negotiate the lift of the boats from night of 13-14 November, during the three­ the decks of the eargo ships and each such day fateful Battle of Guadalcanal, six PTs jpick-up was a hair-raising operation requiring accomplished a task for which a major task ideal weather conditions and consuming many force would ordinarily have been required, hours. for they forced a strong enemy force of After having been unloaded, the PTs were cruisers and destroyers to break off a de­ ifueled and loaded with ammunition and sup­ structive bombardment of Henderson Field plies and given a brief test of main engines which we were unable to oppose by any other Iand all equipment. As soon as all gear was means that night. In their attack on that found functioning properly, they were dis­ occasion, the PTs fired seventeen torpedos patchl'd ih groups of four or five boats with with one known hit and probably several a convoying vessel tol\nake the thousand-mile more. It has been said that this David and run to Guadalcanal by a series of steps from Goliath engagement may well have saved Island t~ island, up the New Hebrides chain. Guadalcanal, for there was no way in which Th~y l,e'pt to sheltered water on the leeward . Henderson Field and its airplanes could be side of the successive islands whenever and sheltered from the enemy~ ships' fire, and a wherever possible. By this devious and piti­ previous similar bombardm~nt in October had fully slow method, the first four United resulted in destruction or' crippling damage States PTs to enter the Solomons campaign to nearly every aircraft on the field. In the I arrived at Tulagi, in the Guadalcanal area, light of the fact that, on the following day, at dawn on 25 October 1942. An advanced the all-out amphibious assault of the Japanese MTB operating base was established at that joint task force was met and disastrously de­ 8q

18 Mlt.lTARY REVIEW

oUgainUille ~ '\::.:. .cBuin-Faisi \.. 0 M 0 N E' t o~~ 0 J'/ot"~"~ j_-Tulagi Munda--~", . t~ New Georgie! ..."\ ~~~------RusseU-~~~~------~--10oS ~Ndeni Sauo ... Vanikoro

C' 0 JSII A L 5

1

feated by planes from Henderson Field, it pletely in the hands of our troops, our tiny may well be that our six "mosquito" boats PT force had run up a confirmed box score of actually did save the island and, with it, our. three Jap destroyers sunk and at least eight whole South Pacific position. of them seriously damaged, plus a large In the two and a half months following the number of enemy barges and landing craft, naval Battle of. Guadalcanal, the PTs con­ and considerable quantities of supplies, de­ tinued their unique and invaluable work, be­ stroyed. In addition, they had repeatedly per­ ing officially credited with "inflicting substan­ formed superbly in rescuing survivors of tial damage" on the "Tokyo Express" in its United States men-of-war sunk in the fre-j nightly runs. By 8 February, the date upon quent. and violent 'nigl\!:. s?-rface ship encoun­ which Guadalcanal was announced as come ters In the area. In the same period of time,

" PTa IN THE PACIFIC 19 our PT losses due to enemy action were two and larger. The Motor Torpedo Boats, Pa­ boats destroyed and three damaged. Our little cific, had developed into a vital factor in the investment was starting to pay tremendous island warfare and their crews were be­ dividends. coming seasoned veterans of the swift and February 1943, saw a lull in P'l' activity; stealthy night combat which formed their the enemy was no longer risking his ships forte. . ­ far enough to the south for them to be Lessons Learned reached by small craft. The quiet period was The operations of those first nine months utilized to prepare for the next step in the delineated the tactical pattern of PT employ­ march up the Solomon chain. At month's ment in war, and high-lighted the need for a end, an MTB advanced base was established number of improvements in the original' in the Russell Island group, some thirty miles equipment of the boats. Of these latter, the northwest of Guadalcanal. A squadron of three most important and far-reaching PTs, working from that base, provided an changes were: (1) installation of more ef­ essential element in the defensive cover for our assembly, in the Russells, of forces and ficient radar, (2) improvement in radio supplies for the coming assault on the Japa­ equipment, and (3) need for automatic fire­ nese positions in the New Georgia group. power heavier than .50 caliber. These lessons Meanwhile, additional boats continued to were the origin of the much improved PTs which appeared in the combat zones in the arrive from the States and to be sent on up to the advanced bases which we had built. By later years of the war. mid-June, we had four such bases in full In the matter of tactics, the outstanding operation, with upwards of forty-eight op­ weakness which was divulged by the Guadal­ erating PTs working out of them. canal and New Georgia campaigns was the For the New Georgia assault, the main need for better recognition between PTs and landing was scheduled to start at dawn on other friendly ships and aircraft. There were 30 June. The MTB squadron based in the numerous instances when our PTs attacked­ Russells screened and covered assault boats or were themselves attacked by-our own air­ during the landing. As operations progressed, planes and ships. Several of these resulted two more advanced PT bases were established in destruction of one or the other unit, or in in New Georgia inlets which we seized, and, severe damage, and there was some loss of from then on throughout the remainder of life. On one occasion-the night of 14-15 the campaign the boats were employed in a November 1942 American battleships and manner similar to the pattern of their pre­ destroyers, sweeping around the western tip vious operations at Guadalcanal. Nightly, of Guadalcanal on their way to the night they patrolled the narrow and tortuous water encounter in which the last of the attacking passages" which provided the only link be­ Japanese naval force was routed, were re­ tween the now surrounded enemy and his ported by our patrolling PTs in clear voice bases to the northwlst. Every night of the radio, under the belief that they were Japa­ five wfek's battle until the main position at nese ships. The United States task force com­ Mund~ fell into our hands was featured by mander, Admiral Lee, was forced to open up, brisk PT engagements with enemy destroyers, himself, and broadcast a plain language order barges. and shore parties. Again, the little to the boats to prevent almost certain disaster. craft paid off in terms out of all proportion Fortunately, the ~nemy force, which was to their cost. Again, as had been the case at still some distance away to the northwest, Guadalc'anal, there were costly failures in did not pick up this dangerous exchange of identification and in coordination, but as messages, or, if it did, failed to interpret time went on, the mistakes became fewer and it properly. A factor of prime importance in the credit side of the ledger loomed larger " connection with such incidents, was the im­ 20 MILITARY REVIEW - practicability of providing PTs in the combat tous PTs were everywhere with the single areas with coding devices for secret communi­ exception of those covering naval actions cations. Naturally, no highly classified de­ which took place too far at sea for them to vices could be so exposed to the risk of enemy participate. In the operations along the capture or salvage. Without such equipment, southern flank of the great two-pronged ad­ however, boats on patrol could not be in­ . vance, they repeated again and again, with formed by radio of changes in tactical plans, each bound forward, the now familiar cycle or of unexpectcd dcvelopments such as the of patrols, night barge encounters, and pc­ unscheduled appearance of a friendly force casional opportunities to strike with their in the area, without jeopardizing security and torpedos at larger enemy ships. Along the surprise. There was no way to eliminate this northern flank, they saw less combat action serious handicap; the most that could be done only because, in that sector, practically was to endeavor to brief the boats thoroughly nothing that could float had been left to the at the last minute before they left base for Japanese. Here, however, they formed an in­ patrol, and to rely on the judgment, indoctri­ dispensable element in the defense and utility nation and recognition training of their crews forces of each island base as we seized it. to prevent disaster when the unforeseen oc­ They saw some action at Saipan, Guam and curred. The cases of breakdown of recogni­ in the Palaus, and when the Southwest and tion and coorJination which occurred in the Central Pacific drives met in October 1944, early months in the Solomons led to vastly at Leyte, they came once more into their own, improved training and briefing in later op­ for the inland Philippine waters and the erations. By October 1943, when we had swarms of Japanese small craft there offered finally killed off all Japanese resistance in the another "natural" like those in the Solomons New Georgia group, such occurrances had and New Guinea. become extremely rare. Just how' much enemy tonnage was sunk or To The Philippines and War's End seriously damaged during the war by our After New Georgia, the route of our ad­ PTs alone will never be accurately known.. vance in the South and Southwest Pacific Neither is it practicable to make any worth­ took us into Bougainville and thence, in leap­ while quantitative estimate of the number of frog fashion, along the north New Guinea enemy personnel so put out of action, 0'" of coast to Morotai Island and then into Leyte, the military value of supplies which they in the Philippines. In the Central Pacific, a destroyed. But one thing is abundantly clear; similar thrust speared rapidly westward no naval weapon in the Pacific war had a from the Marshalls to Saipan and Guam and more gallant and spectacular record of thence to Leyte to close the pincers. The twin achievement, and none returned more valuable offensives were coordinated in time and results when measured against its cost in strategy. Throughout them both, the ubi qui­ men, money and war effort.

There is no doubt that the demobilization is rapid, even hasty, and that the efficiency and the discipline of our overseas forces has declined seriously . . • But it is a mistake to suppose that anyone can measure American power in the future. or even in the present, by the condition of these remnants of the wartime army. For he is overlooking the basic fact that American power is peculiarly and specially amphibious . . . The Europeans have never really seen the fundamental military power of the United States. The bulk of it was in the Pacific, largely invisible to the masses of the people and not really appreciated by European statesmen and generalA who were preoccupied with the terrible struggle of massive land aril'i.ies. Walter Lippmann in "NY Herald Tribune" Movement of Division Commanp Ipost in a Fast Moving Situation COLONEL CHARLES E. JOHNSON. General Staff Corps Chief of Staff. 3d Infantry Division

O URING its long combat histo·ry from was evolved, indeed, practically forced upon D8 November 1942 to 8 May 1945, the us, by our combat experience and the exi­ 3d Infantry Division, possibly more than any gencies thereof. other like unit, has become famous for its a. Division CP [Command Post] (OP lightning-like dashes into enemy territory. GI'OUp) [Observation Post]. The mountain­ Beginning with its wheel around the outer ous terrain and narrow, tortuous roads of perimeter of over half of the Island of Sicily, the Island of Sicily, through sheer impos­ and continuing the fighting over tortuous sibility to do otherwise, caused the Division mountain roads in Southern Italy, the 400 Headquarters (that is, the entire headquar­ mile race from the French Riviera to the tel'S less the Administrative Center) to be Vosges Mountains in Alsace, and ending with divided into two echelons which were called a fiJul' hundred mile trek from the Rhine respectively the "Division CP" and the "Rear to Berchtesgaden, it has become second na­ Echelon." The Division CP, corresponding. ture for the division to make prolonged, rapid roughly to the so-called regimental and bat­ moves. Not only has it learned to move, but talion OP groups, consisted of the Command­ also it has learned to control and direct ing General, Assistant Commanding General its units, both combat and administrative, and Aides, Chief of Staff, G-2, G-3, G-4, throughout these long and rapid advances. As Liaison gec.tion, Division Signal < Officer, in all military problems, there are no doubt Division Engineer, Headquarters Comman­ many solutions. The 3d Division's answe~ is dant, Provost Marshal and their sections. submitted herewith for consideration. The entire CP was mounted either in trucks After it has been done a few times there or built-up trailers and was, therefore, en­ IS probably nothing very remarkable in mov­ tirely mobile. This gives a relatively small, ing and setting up a Division Command Post compact group, all of whom are primarily once or twice daily for a period of months, interested in the operational phase of com· continually maintaining communications and bat. Artillery matters are handled by a enabling the Division Commander to direct liaison (field) officer furnished by the CG and control his troops. However, this is how [Commanding General] of the Division Ar­ lte did it. First and foremost it must be tillery. He remains in the CP and habitual1y accepted that it is im[I(Jrtant and necessary works in the War Room. The organization to make such moves and that you are ac­ of this group was somewhat flexible. For tually going to do it. Secondly, it must also instance, certain of the attached G-2 organ­ be accepted that radio and messenger will izations such as CIC [Counter-Intelligence be the primary mean~of communication 'al­ Corps], Order of Battle, and PIU [Photo though every effort should be made to put Interpreters Unit] were often quartered with in wire whenever remotely possible. The the "Rear Echelon" or elsewhere in towns. mechanics of the move can be discussed under L'pon occasion the Provost Marshal was three hC'adings: shifted to the "Rear Echelon" and also the 1. Organization of the Headquarters. G-4 section was at times placed with the 2. Technique of Displacement. "Rear." However, it was always necessary 8. Communications. --and particularly in the fast-moving situa­ 1. Ol'aanization of the Headquarterll. The tion we are discUl!sing-to have the G-4 Qr attached chart shows the organization of his assistant with the CP, this due mainly the Headquarters of the Third Infantry to the extremely close cooperation necesasry Division. It is mostly self-explanatory. It ,between G-3 and G-4. 22 MILITARY REVIEW

ORGANIZATION OF HQ 3D INFANTRY DIVISION

DIVISION CP (FORWARD ECHELON,

COMMANDING GENERAL

REAR ECHELON

/-----.------';DMINISTRATIVE CENTER

NOTES 1. Ordnance, Quartermaster & Medics separate and under G.. 4 for operation and movement--Ordnanee & Quartermaster officprs & their staffs remain with their respective companies and not in division headM quarters. 2. Combination of personnel from G-2, G-3. & CIS section comprises war room (operations room) in forward CPo

b. The "Rear Echelon" of the Division CP G-l, who cleared all movements through the consisted of all remaining officers and sec­ Chief of Staff. The Rear Echelon often tions of the Headquarters (less the Admin­ moved into the location vacated by the for­ istrative Center). It was located initially ward CP and in this way expedited the set­ anywhere from the same location as the ting up of the headquarters and maintenanee Division CP to a distance of five miles in of communication since they were able to the rear. Many times when the Division CP use the wire lines which the forward CP was moving daily, the Rear Echelon would had used and of course any buildings or not move, but the following day move double other installations already prepared. the distance in order to catch up. This lag­ The advantages of this organization of ging of the Rear Echelon often served as the Division Headquarters are obvious and a valuable communications link between the Division CP and the service troops and in­ are particularly advantageous in fast moving stallation of the Division. The Rear Echelon situations. They are chiefly: was .commanded and moved on order of the ( 1 ) Gives small, coii'lpact, mobile groups MOYmlEN'l' OF COMMAND POST IN A FAST MOVING SttUATION capable of rapid displacement and requiring 2. Technique of Displacement may be best' little space in which to operate. illustrated by a typical day in the moving (2) Diminishes vulnerability and increases of the Division CP during rapid progress. seeurity. a. In early morning the Division Com­ (3) Provides communications link, hence mander holds meeting with General Staff, control, to the rear. .' outlines plans for the day and selects ten­ (4) Due to the shortage of transportation tative area for movement of CPo at times, the transportation of the Division b. Commanding General and Assistant CP Group was sometimes used to move the Commanding General move out to contact Rear Echelon forward. units with idea of rejoining the CP at ad­ Disadvantages are: vance location. With Generals are jeeps mount­ (1) The additional requirements of men, ing SCR 193's for communication with CPo officers and equipment necessary to operate these headquarters both in the Headquarters c. Chief of Staff and/or G-3 interview Company and the Signal Company. (The Signal Officer and Headquarters Comman­ dant, indicate area for advance location of Signal Company, of course, has to reorgan­ CP, and direct these two individuals to move ize its displacements to conform.) out together immediately. (2) Some delay experienced at times in d. Headquarters Commandant and Division getting in contact with staff officers in one Signal Officer with detachment from Head­ headquarters who are needed at another. quarters Company, including Defense Pla­ c. The Administrative Center, grouping toon, move out, taking with them advance the Adjutant General's Office, Finance, Staff Signal displacement. Judge Advocate and Unit Personnel Sections was born as a combat expedie'nt when th~' e. Headquarters Commandant, upon reach­ division sailed, combat loaded, for North ing advance location, radios or telephones G-3 or Chief of Staff that advance location Africa. The Administrative Center due to for CP is satisfactory or, if not satisfactory, insufficient shipping lift, could not accom­ pany the division and operated during this proceeds to a. satisfactory locality and sends messages. period from a staging area in the States. The same organization was used in the Si­ f. Chief of Staff directs immediate dis­ cilian Campaign and again at Anzio and. placement of the War Room (combined G-2, Southern France. During the early periods G-3, Operations Room, usually installed in of such operations the "Ad Center" makes a building but equipped with CP tent and an excellent "Rear link" for the division on storage tent, all contained in one 2%-ton the "near shore." During the Anzio Beach­ truck and trailer which contains electric gen­ erator) and directs the G-2 and G-3 with head siege, the Administrative Center for four months functioned in the vicinity of the advance echelons of their sections to move forward and set up in advance loca­ Naples, whereas the division was some seven­ tion. G-3 quite frequently accompanied the ty-five miles away s~arated by water'and enemy-held territory. Not only is the Ad­ Commanding General when he moved out. ministrative Center peculiarly adapted to g. Temporary War Room set up in G-3 amphibious operations but was also found trailer with Assistant G-2 and G-3 on duty to be the ticket during a fast moving tac­ and Chief of Staff physically present in tical situation. In the latter case, during charge. actual rapid progress, no attempt was made h. When War Room and advance echelons to move the Center. Only when the situation of G-2 and G-3 sections arrive forward com­ slowed up or halted was consideration given mand post, G-3 or Headquarters Comman­ to the movement of this ;nstallation. Com­ dant notify Chief of Staff that Command llIunication was maintained ' y radio, messen­ Post is in operation. ger, liaison plane, and at til 'es by telephone. i. Chief of Staff notifies all headquarters a; 24 MILITARY REVIEW that advance Command Post is open and Two complete Signal Displacement Instal­ directs closing of the Rear CP and move­ lations were organized for the Division CPo ment forward. One was kept inoperative and mobile at all j. At late afternoon or night G-l and . times, leap-frogging the operating displace­ possibly other staff officers from Rear Eche­ ment during moves. The "Rear Echelon" had lon vi~it Chief of Staff andlor Commanding only one displacement which moved as a unit General to get necessary decisions on press­ when that installation displaced. As prev­ ing matters, si!?-,natures, etc. iously mention~d, the Commanding General The primary function of the War Room and certain staff officers were furnished SCR is that of an information center. Therefore, 193's mounted on jeeps which accompanied it becomes a focal point of communications. them whenever they left the CP and were It cannot be too strongly stressed how im­ in constant communication with the Signal portant the communications are in this Center at the CPo Call signs changed daily "Nerve Center" nor how vital it is that com­ and, in addition, simple codes were worked munications be established with it upon out between the CG and Chief of Staff and its location in a new area following a others so that messages could be sent rapidly displacement. in the clear. Training in use of voice radio Discussion of this technique of movement facilitates this means of communication im­ should include the movement of the Division measurably but constant refresher is neces· Artillery Command Post. Being small it is sary as this method is not much employed not divided into a main and rear command in more stabilized situations. To further ce­ post. More frequent moves than the Division ment unit control and to get information to CP are the rule. Every effort was constantly unit commanders, particularly during dis­ made to keep a direct telephone circuit to placement periods. frequent and extensive Division Artillery but this was more often use was made of unit Liaison Officers. During than not impossible and radio was the rule. movement of the CP they were usually held However, this was not too important as the at the old CP until briefed and released by Infantry Regiments were for the most part the Chief of St~ff, whereupon they proceeded in excellent communication with their direct to their units, rejoining the Headquarters support battalions which moved in close co­ at the new advance CPo ordination with them, and further, the na­ The above organization of Division Head· tUre of the situation precluded, for the most quarters and procedures were evolved through part, coordination and massing of artillery eight major campaigns on two continents fires on a division level. In most rapid mov­ and over all conceivable types of terrain. ing situations, the direct support battalions Rapid movements were the features of Rome of the Division Artillery had one, two and of these campaigns, namely: sometimes three non-organic (Corps and Army troops attached to the division) ar­ a. The 28-day Sicilian Campaign. tillery battalions attached, and functioned b. The 400 mile dash from Southern France as a Division Arti11ery Headquarters under to the Vosges in one and a half months. the command of the direct support command­ c. The fight from the Rhine to Berchtes­ er, keeping contact with division and many gaden, 400 miles in one month. The organ· times Division Artillery through the Regi­ ization is the result of actual experience, mental communications, and radio. insures unbroken communications and place s. Communications. Our Signal Company the Chief of Staff and G-3 (only staff offi was augmented by additional men, radios cers normally authorized to make decision (particularly SCR 193) and small vehicles, for the Commanding General) in accessibl specifically the 'A-ton and *-ton, furnishing and key spots during movement. Our metho extra wire laying teams and messengers. may not be the best Jlut it worked. Civil Affairs and Military Government COLONEL E. H. VERNON, Infantry Instructor, Command and General Staff School IVIL affairs includes all of the ramifica­ Army personnel were first sent to the School tions of the government and control of for Military Government. The program was Cdvilian populations by military commanders. later enlarged to include "Civil Affairs Train­ !hroughout the course of military history ing Schools" located at several universities, the handling and control of civilians has had which gave specialized training, including a profound effect on military operations. languages. The graduates of these schools re­ While Civil Affairs cannot win wars, it can ceived additional training at a civil affairs oontribute much toward victory. staging area before going overseas. Civil af­ Throughout the centuries, there has been fairs staff sections were organized in advance a long evolution from a civil affairs policy for the purpose of planning, coordinating, and of destruction and enslavement, to a more supervising civil affairs activities. Civil affairs intelligent policy, which aims toward the operating groups or detachments were estab­ fullest possible utilization of enemy resources, lished to work under the military commander both human and material, to insure military and carry out civil affairs functions, thus re­ ·success. We now strive to prevent disease and lieving combat commanders and troops of such epidemics among civilians, not necessarily as duties. a humanitarian measure, but because we know When the School for Military Government that disease is no respecter of persons, and was first established in Charlottesville, Virgi­ that disease which strikes down our enemy, nia, in 1942, a rush of articles appeared in may quickly spread to our troops, with disas­ the press, some charging that the purpose of trous results to us. We treat the enemy popu­ the school was to train "Gauleiters" to take lation fairly, though firmly, because we must over the government of the United States. preserve public order and we want to use a Others, equally untrue, charged that starry­ minimum of our own troops for that purpose, eyed dreamers were being trained to take leaving a maximum free to fight the organized "sweetness and light" to the aliens of Ger­ military forces of the enemy. We have learned many and Japan at the expense of the United that a population made desperate by hunger States. Actually, the object of civil affairs and hardship will riot, where under fair and control by military forces is to assist military efficient rule, with equable and adequate dis­ operations. It has the objective of furthering tribution of food and supply to meet even national policies in accomplishing war ob­ minimum requirements, they will remain jectives. Long range objectives must, of neces­ quiet. The evolution from extreme harshness sity, give way to the carrying out of the im­ to a more humane policy may have been mediate military mission until the fighting is motivated· by self-interest and may have. de­ over. Then civilian agencies may take over veloped in part froJ)! a realization among more and more, relegating the' military forces conquerors that fortune is fickle and that the to the job of watch dog. An adroit handling viet or of today may become the vanquished of of civil affairs will facilitate the pursuit of tOlll0l'l'ow. Th~ essential point is that an en­ national policy and further a simple and easy .lightened civil affairs policy, efficiently ex­ transition from military government to con­ lUted, aids military operations and shortens trol by civilian agencies. \mpaig'ns. The civil affairs objective of assisting ,In World War II, very careful planning military operations is achieved by maintain­ hd organization for civil affairs control was ing order, promoting thy security of the oc­ ,otablished. Civil affairs personnel for our cupying forces, preven~pg interference with l'my and Navy, was, for the first time, car~­ military operations, red~cing active and pas-

lly procured and.trained for its special job. o sive sabotage, relieving cbmbat troops of civil 26 MILITARY REVIEW administration, and mobilizing local resources. by the military force occupying it. That is The sole reason for the existence of left for the peace table. However, the mil­ separate civil affairs personnel, is to assist itary commander does have absolute control and advise the military commander in civil and authority, limited only by international affairs and to relieve the other military forces' law and the instructions and orders of his of all possible burdens in controlling and ex­ superiors. In practice, Civil Affairs Control ploiting local populations and resources. They in the territory of an ally, whose soil is being are specialists, comparable to Signal, En­ fl'eed from the enemy, is usually exercised gineer, or Ordnance Specialists and should be through the government of the ally and is not used accordingly. Any tactical commander "Military Government" in the strict sense of who forgets this and fails to use his civil the word. Its objective is to assist the ally in affairs staff and operating personnel to the the control of his own country and it is cUstODl­ fullest extent and in the most efficient way ary to refer to it as "Civil Affairs Control," possible, is failing in his mission as a com­ or perhaps, just as "Civil Affairs"-never as mander. "Military Government." The theater com­ 'The terms "Civil Affairs Control," "Civil mander, however, must have the authority to Affairs," and "Military Government" are set up military government if it should be­ often used interchangeably and somewhat come necessary. The term, "Military Govern­ loosely with resultant confusion. "Civil Af­ ment," is used to describe.the means whereby fairs" is an all-inclusive term. It describes civil affairs control is exercised in conquered all activities on the part of the popUlation enemy territory, such as in Italy, Germany, of an occupied area, other than that of an and Japan. "Civil Affairs Control," by means organized military character. "Civil Affairs other than, "Military Government," was used Control" is the supervision of the activities in France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Den­ of civilians in an occupied area by an armed mark, Norway, and the Commonwealth of the force, no matter what the means used in Philippines. exercising that supervision. It may be "Mil­ Military government is a necessary con­ itary Government," it may not. sequence of waging war on hostile soil. The "Military Government" is a basic term and supreme military commander bears full re~ means the supreme authority exercised by an sponsibility for military government and, armed force over the lands, property, and the therefore, must be given full authority. Con­ sequently, Theater Commanders are usually inhabitants of hostile territory. "Civil Af­ designated as the military governors of their fairs" includes "Civil Affairs Control" whether it be by "Military Government" or by some theaters. other means. "Civil Affairs Control" includes The Theater Commander's discretion, in the "Military Government." While "Military Gov­ exercise of his authority in military govern­ ernment" is "Civil Affairs Control," "Civil ment, is limited by War Department Direc­ Affairs Control" is not necessarily "Military tives and by International Law. The provi­ Government." That is, a red snapper is most sions of Field Manual 27-10, "Rules of Land certainly a fish, but a fish is not necessarily Warfare," are mandatory. Field Manual a red snapper. 27-5, "United States Army and Navy By an "occupied area" we mean territory Manual of Military Government and Civil not only physically occupied, whether by Affairs," is a statement of principles which force or agreement, but where the occujlying usage has proven to be sound. It is a guide, troops have, in fact, assumed supreme but not a directive. Nathmal political, fiscal. authority, substituting military authority for and economic policies are enunciated by the that of the previous government or sovereign. joint action of the several executive agencies Sovereignty is not transferred by the occupa­ and gu~de the theater commander and may tion of territory and the assumption of rule limit his discretionary powers. In our govern­ CIVIL AFFAmS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT 27 ment, military power is subordinate to civil all other communications facilities-tele­ power and, while given a free hand in the phone, radio, postal, telegraph. Transporta­ winning of war and in carrying out all mili­ tion facilities must be restored. Banks must tary operations, it does not set national policy. be opened and supervised, public finance con­ In practice, however, military necessity trolled and agriculture, manufacturing, public usually dictates what shall and shall not be health, trade, fisheries, forestry, refugees done in the theaters of operation. Military and displaced persons, education, all must government exists by reason of military neces­ receive their share of control, supervision sity and by right of military power. The and aid. Military Commander must have, and does Military government acts through indige­ have, great power. International Law rec­ nuous officials. Usually, it is necessary to re­ ognizes this and allows him considerable move many political officials from office. This latitude in meeting local conditions. Further­ action may include the removal of the actual more, International Law is often ambiguous and nominal heads of the national govern­ and contradictory, and its provisions are more ment, cabinet ministers, and the heads of negative than positive. Although some things principal political divisions. So far as prac­ are definitely forbidden, few acts are positive­ ticable, subordinate officials should be retained ly ordered. Although just and reasonable in their offices unless it is desirable to re­ treatment has been found to be more con­ move them because of membership in political ducive to cooperation on the part of the in­ or terroristic organizations such as the Nazi habitants of occupied territory than unneces­ Party, the Black Dragon Society in Japan, or sarily harsh or cruei measures, the theater police organizations such as the German Ges­ commander must be prepared tQ use his power tapo or the Japanese Kempai Tai.'Whenever to meet and forestall any lack of cooperation it is necessary to remove native officials, they or actual overt acts on the part of a hostile should be replaced by other natives who must popUlation. Force may, and must, be used be required to assume full responsibility for to the extent necessary to subdue those who their assigned duties and to discharge them resist military authority and to prevent the under the control and supervision of civil escape of persons suspected of crime. Prompt affairs personnel. These local officials include and fair trial is essential, with punishment police tv preserve order. proportionate to the offense. This acts as a This use of local officials and police is deterrent on other possible offenders. Ex­ necessary since there will not be enough mili­ perience with a given population, as well as tary civil affairs personnel to do the work. a study of its laws, customs. beliefs, and Native officials may be reluctant to help and habits will indicate whether or not punish­ must be watched carefully to prevent a<;tive ments should be carried' out in public, and or passive sabotage and deliberate inefficiency. what types will be most effective. For exam­ So, military government must be backed by ple, General Pershi~g, in his control qf the military force, preferably by military police Moros in Mindanao,'made use of the Moham­ units attached to civil affairs operating groups medan fear of contamination by pigs. or detachments. If military police units are Since military occupation of enemy terri­ not available, military government should be tory suspends the normal operation of civil supported by tactical groups. In Italy the government, the military commander must Carabinieri-nominally part of the Italian exercise its functions. While the most im­ Army, actually a trained police force skilled portant duties of military government prob­ in dealing with ciyilians, was used to preserve ably are the restoration and preservation of order, largely taking the place of military order, the prevention of epidemics and the police. Tactical troops would have had to be control of black markets and inflation, mili­ withdrawn from combat if the Carabinieri tary government must also see that public had not been available or had failed to func-­ ntiUties are restored and controlled, as are tion satisfactorily. Willful failure of local 2S M.ILITARY REVIEW officials to perform their duties in a satisfac­ in civil law or to Summary and Special. tory manner is a serious offense against mili­ Courts-Martial in the Army. They should' tary government and punishment should be have sufficient power to controi and deter the· meted out accordingly. Also, it may be neces­ more common and less serious type of offense. sary to provide .. protection for persons who' The composition, authority, number, jurisdic- : continue in, or are assigned to public office tion, and procedure of any military COUrt is : under military government. set by the theater commander in the directives Existing laws, customs, and governmental establishing ,them. Provost Courts may be institutions, as well as old political boundaries given the power to levy a fine of five thousand' and subdivisions should bc retained to facili­ dollars and to sentence the offender to confine­ tate military government and avoid confusion ment for a period of five years. This power, unless there is reason to the contrary. The might well be doubled if the theater com- . people of the area are familiar with their own mander sees fit, because Provost Courts are . civil organization, laws, and customs and it on the ground, know local conditions, have im­ is unwise to impose others upon them unless mediate access to and control over witnesses. the original· customs conflict with the aims and can act more promptly than any other of the occupying forces and are inimical to court. Prompt trial and prompt punishment their best interests. Laws and customs, how­ is the best deterrent to crime and for this ever, which are repugnant to good morals, to reason Provost Courts are especially effective civilization, 01' which permit religious or if they have sufficient prestige and power. ; racial persecution should be immediately More serious offenses against military gov­ terminated. Religious freedom must be al­ ernment are tried before military commissions lowed except where rel;,ious activities serve which are given the power of imposing ,the. at< a cloak for subversive activities 01' breed death penalty. During tactical action if is disorder. Persons who have been imprisoned effective to delegate to all commanders having for political, religious, or racial reasons only, general courts-martial jurisdiction, the power should be released after invesfigation with of appointing military government courts, warning that political activity on their part with the power of imposing the death penalty·. rluring the period of military government will This gives the division commander power to not be tolerated. meet acts of sabotage, murder, or espionage Military government announces its exist­ by the local civilian population immediately ence by proclamation, but this is a matter of and effectively. custom, not legal necessity. It begins when In addition to the two types of military the point of the advance guard forces the courts mentioned, a third or intermediate first civilian off the road, and continues as court may be set up as was done by General long as military occupation lasts or until Eisenhower in Germany. He directed that· government is taken over by some civilian three types of military courts be constituted: agency. "(a) General Military Courts consisting of Prompt action must be taken to punish not less than three officers, of whom at least acts against military government and mili­ one shall be a lawyer serving in MiJ'itary tary courts are set up to try such offenses. Or­ Government, (b) Intermediate Military dinances should be posted from time to time Courts consisting of one or more officers. of informing the civilian population what it whom at least one shall be a lawyer serving will do and what it will not do, and to set in Military Government and, (c) Summary forth penalties for disobedience. As a matter Courts consisting of one officer, who shall be of practical procedure, proclamations and a lawyer serving in Military Government, if ordinances should not be verbose. available." Minor offenses are usually tried by Provost The civil courts of the occupied area may Courts having powers similar to police courts be allowed to fun~tion"from the first day of CIVIL AFFAmS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT 29 occupation or may be reconstituted later. nesses, the system did work sati8f~torilY, They will be supervised by the legal section partly because the Arabs were glad to see of Military Government. All offenses com­ the Italians leave, and the Italians, in turn, mitted by natives not directed against Mili­ were glad to have the Germans go. tary Government or our forces, and all litiga­ The operational type of organization is tion between civilians under thei; own laws characterized by vesting full responsibility will ordinarily be tried before native courts. and complete authority for civil affairs con­ Members of the armed forces come under the trol in the military commanders. Here the jurisdiction of courts-martial which are of chain of command for civil affairs control is no concern to civil affairs military govern­ the same as the operational chain of com­ ment officers as such. Any legal cases involv­ mand. This insures that all activities, in­ ing our nationals or those of our allies will be cluding the relations between troops and in­ tried before military government courts, not habitants within the zone concerned, will be' native courts. fully coordinated in support of the military There are two types of organization for operations of the commander. It obviates pos­ detailed civil affairs (MG) planning: ter­ sible friction and misunderstandings which ritorial and operational. In the territorial are apt to arise when two officers, having type of organization, the civil affairs (MG) overlapping responsibilities, are mutually in­ chain of command is independent of military dependent. It hopes to prevent fumbling and commanders below the level of the theater buck-passing. commander. It by-passes the communications Experience has shown that during the tac­ zone, communications zone section, army, tical phase of military o;~rations, the op­ corp8, and division commanders. There are erational.type of civil affairs organization many arguments in favor of organizing civil is the most efficient and should be used. With affairs (MG) under a territorial system. stability and consolidation som~ features of First, military commanders and the bulk of the territorial type may be incorpol'ated, thtl theil' staffs are untrained in civil affairs system changing progressively from the op­ (MG) and are apt to overlook the importance erational organization to one having features of this function: Second, the magnitude of of both types. After the cessation of hos­ civil affairs (MG) is too great a burden to tilities, the territorial type may be used to add to a staff already fully occupied with pave the way for the transition from military tactical considerations. Third, combat units government (MG) to control by civilian are subject to frequent movements, which agencies. would result in frequent changes of civil af­ Whenever possible, old political boundaries fairs (M G) personnel in a given area, thereby should be used to simplify administration and de"troying continuity of operation and caus­ indigenous officials and police agencies re­ ing frequent variations in policy. Fourth, it tained. The heads of local civil government is onlY' by accident that native political agencies should not be under the orders of boundaries coinci~ with tactical bounda­ two or more military commanders or confli~ ries; consequently, either a single civil and confusion will result. This may occur if aff,tirs (MG) officer will have to deal with the political subdivision lies within the zone officials from several different civil units, such of more than one military commander. It as cities or counties, or, one civil affairs (M G) probably will not be possible to retain old officer will have to take orders from more political boundaries ahead of army service than 'one military commander. The weakness areas and often )Yill not be possible ahead of of this system is obvious: The tactical com­ the communications zone. In Western Eu­ mander is denied authority and consequently rope, boundaries down to Corps and Divisions cannot be held responsible. The organization were adjusted when at' all possible to meet first used in North Africa and in Italy was these principles. In the communications zone, of the territorial type. Despite definite weak­ the civil affairs (MG) chain of command will 30 MILITARY REVIEW probably be separate within its comp~nent is organized by the theater commander in sections. groups or detachments to do the necessary In organizing civil affairs (MG) personnel, work of on-the-ground operations. Civil af­ two types of :t\el'sonnel and organization are fairs (MG) detachments or groups must be needed; staff and operational. Staff sections 'sent forward and begin functioning as soon may be organized on the general staff level as possible. This should be as soon as small­ as was done in Europe, the G-5 section being arms fire has ceased falling on the area but the civil affairs (MG) section, or on a special while the area is still subject to artillery fire. staff level, as was the practice in the Pacific. Civil affairs (MG) groups~must find and The arguments advanced in favor of a general guard all enemy supplies, civilian as well as staff level organization are that it increases military, saving them for later use. If this efficiency to have civil affairs (1\1G) on the is n~t done, natives may loot, our own troops coordinating level, as this enables the civil may needlessly destroy food, rice for exam­ affairs (MG) staff officer to know better what ple, not caring to eat it themselves, livestock is going on; that he will be listened to more may be needlessly killed, thus destroying readily; and can thus better effect coordina­ supplies which may be desperately needed tion. Arguments for having the civil affairs later to be doled out to the civilian popula­ (MG) section on a special staff level are: tion. Tactical troops may have to assist in that there must be a special staff section for these functions. Civil affairs functions include civil affairs anyway to do the operational keeping the roads clear for combat troops, work, this section being composed of such segregating civilians, and carrying out the spccialists as legal affairs experts, medical activities already described. ­ experts, public safety experts, etc. and; that In figuring the size of the civil affairs it is more efficient to have G-l do the coor­ (MG) groups or detachments needed, a num­ dinating and the senior civil affairs (MG) ber of factors must be considered: first, how officer do the operating with the help of his many civil affairs (MG) personnel are avail­ experts, as civil affairs (lUG) specialists gen­ able for the locality; second, what its popula­ erally do not have sufficient staff training to tion is. Then there are other factors; the function efficiently as general staff officers. military situation, the attitude of the people, their habits and customs, economics, geogra­ The important thing is to keep the mission phy, availability and reliability of the native of a civil affairs (1\1 G) staff section clearly officials, training and ability of other natives in mind. That mission is to advise the com­ who might be used as officials and police, mander on all civil affairs (MG) matters, to health conditions, and all other things that prepare the civil affairs (MG) paragraph of enter into the theater commander's planning. administrative orders, to prepare civil affairs It will never be possible to divide the popula­ (MG) annexes and orders in the communica­ tion by the number of civil affairs (MG) tions zone and, as directed by the commander, officers available and, presto, place one officer to supervise and coordinate the activities of to thirty thousand natives. operational personnel within the zone of the commander. Civil affairs (MG) staff section, To begin with, there should never be less whether organized on general or special staff than two officers in any civil affairs (MG) levels, should exist in theater staffs, commu­ detachment. It is obvious what would happen nications zone staffs, as well as or the staffs if there were only one and he became ill or of various communications zone sections, the unable to fulfill his duties. staffs of army groups, armies, corps, and divi­ Rural popUlations must be taken into con­ sions. These staff sections are a permanent sideration but do not need separate civil part of the unit to which assigned and should affairs (MG) personnel. Experience has accompany the unit wherever it goes. shown that for every four civil affairs (MG) Operational civil affairs (MG) personnel officers needed in cltiesl"-'only one is needed CIVIL AFFAmS ANI> MILITARY GOVERNMENT 81 for rural communities, and by rural commu­ progress and original civil affairs (MG) nities, towns and villages are meant as well groups or detachments are left behind. in their as isolated farms. Detachments must be kept permanent locations, new groups must be pro­ as small as possible and over-specialization vided to take over in newly occupied territory, avoided. The detachment or group for the the process being repeated, until occupation city is made large enough to care for the is complete. rural popUlation of its surrounding area It is, fairly obvious, of course, that if the which can be controlled by patrolling and enemy advances instead of our troops, the inspection. Small detachments consist prima­ civil affairs (MG) detachment may find itself rily of "general administrators," who are re­ passing from the control of division, not to sourceful persons of the jack-of-all-trades corps, but to the enemy and to bille~s in an type and can meet emergencies with practical enemy prison camp. • good sense, calling upon the specialists in While the above, theoretically, is considered higher echelons for technical advice and aid to be the most efficient way of organizing for sa needed.· In larger cities and on provincial civil affairs control and military government, or prefectural levels as well as on army and it has not always been followed in the theater staffs, specialists will be needed and theaters. While theater commanders have their technical knowledge must be made im­ found it to be the most efficient in the com­ mediately available on call to the civil affairs munications zone, they have preferred other (MG) officers of the general administrative methods in the combat zone. type who operate on lower levels. The following are some examples of various Ideally, the needed civil affairs (MG) de­ procedures used in different theaters. In Haly tachments are pin-pointed-are organized to "AMGOT," "Allied Military Gove'rnment of meet the requirements of the specific locality, Occupied Territories," later known as "AMG," are held in readiness and at appropriate times "Allied Military Government," had a chain attached to divisions with the provisions that of command in the communications zone these detachments will remain permanently through provincial and regional civil affairs in the geographical iocation to which they officers direct to theater level, by-passing the are assigned as long as military government Commanding.General of the Communications or civil control is continued. There may be Zone and the commanders of its sections. This adjustments made, personnel added or taken led to friction and inefficiency. :For example, away, but operational units should be per­ when a typhus epidemic developed among the manently assigned to the place and not to civilian population of Naples, both the senior the unit. The unit is under the absolute and civil affairs (MG) officer and the communica­ complt'te control of the military commander tions zone commander claimed jurisdiction. as long as it is in his area, but as fighting As a result of this dispute, it was necessary continues and front lines advance, the civil for a third agency to come into the picture. affairs detachment may, and will, find itself Because of this confusion, the epidemic was passing from the lUvision area to that of probably more severe than it would have corps, from Corps to Army, and finally. to been otherwise. communications zone. As this procedure In Western Europe "spearhead" detach­ evolves, the civil affairs (MG) detachment of ments were tried, in some instances, in ad­ a city may find itself in the ~ame tactical vance of permanent detachments. This led to areas as the detachment at the provincial loss of continuity in policy and control, as capit~: and, as soon as this happens, the time is seldom available for a complete turn­ subordinate group should now come under over of information and ideas from the one the c('ntrol of the higher group, both being to the other; nor is this humanly possible, under the command of the same tactical com­ even though there be ample ,time. Also, the mander or area commander. As front lines officials appointed by one civil affairs officer G

MILITARY REVIEW may not be to the liking of another, his "B" teams were given the mission of taking ordinances and rules may be disliked by the over from "A" teams as the division advanced new, as may be his policies in general. Any . and of continuing the~r work; the "B" teams such changes as the new group may make to remain permanently in place, "A" teams due to personal reasons, may prove confusing to continue with the division as it advanced to the civilian population and possibly lead and to be continually relieved by new "B" to a loss of prestige on the part of local mili­ teams as needed. tary governments. The final solution was to The task of "C" teams was to set up and assign permanently civil affairs operating de­ operate civilian concentration camps as tachments as well as staff sections to combat needed, each team being capable of operating units, and for them to advance when the a camp of ten thousand capacity. "D" district combat unit advanced. The advantages of teams were for the purpose of administering having the tactical commander thoroughly whole districts or areas, controlling all civil know and trust his civil affairs operational affairs teams within the district concerned. personnel, as well as his staff sections, was Actually, in practice, the "A" teams were felt to more than compensate for the ad­ usual1y! split into sections, one remaining at mitted diRadvantages from the standpoint of division headquarters and functioning as a the civilian population. staff section, the other being attached to the In the Philippines, all civil affairs operating infantry regiments or combat teams and per­ units were originally of the same size and forming staff functions and the collecting of organization, with identical equipment. Plan­ civilians. "B" teams, instead of taking over ning was careful and complete and function­ from the "A" teams, generally took over from ing excellent. It was found necessary. how­ the start the area to which they were to be ever, to break up some of the detachments assigned permanently. later, to obtain greater dispersion. This is In Okinawa, the main function of civil af­ difficult to do unless the table of equipment is fairs proved to be disaster relief, and its pre· suitable for such division into smaller de­ dominent problem was that of supply. As far tachments. Similar results might be obtained as local civil government was concerned, it by organizing minimum size units, organized simply had ceased to exist, conditions being and equipped to permit efficient combining of completely chaotic. two or more into larger units of the size Tables of organization and equipment now needed. This method fails to meet the need exist in tentative form for a "Headquarters for specialists that arises after groups reach and Headquarters Detachment, Military Gov­ a certain size. ernment Group" (T/O&E 20-52T), and for In Okinawa "spearhead" detachments were a "Military Government Headquarters and again used. These "spearhead" detachments Headquarters Company" (T/O&E 20-56T). also served as division staff sections. These Whatever the definitions and names used: "teams" were organized into various sizes to "Civil Affair;," "Civil Affairs Control," or meet various needs. "A" teams consisted of "Military Government"; whatever the organi­ four officers and eleven enlisted men, "B" zation; whatever the use; one thing must al­ teams of eight officers and nineteen enlisted ways be kept clear. The reason for having men, "C" teams of ten officers and twenty-six specially selected and trained civil affairs per­ enlisted men, and, "D" teams of twenty-two sonnel separately organized, is to aid in win­ officers and sixty enlisted men. "A" teams ning the war and in preserving the peace. It were commonly attached to divisions. They is the duty of every member of the Military were charged with the conduct of Military and Naval establishments, in so far as it lies Government reconnaissance, assistance in the within his power, to contribute his share to control of civilians, the establishment of the cal'eful selection, J!roper training, and, civilian collecting points, the posting of proc­ above all, to the full and efficient use of civil lamations and the issue of relief supplies. affairs personnel. Strategic Logistical Planning COLONEL G. O. N. LODOEN, General Staff Corps HAT is Strategic Logistical Planning? studies which can be used for preparing War W From my own experience in logis­ Department projects for projected operations, tical planning the following concept is pre­ or these studies can be used in assisting in sented; it is the art of long range ·planning determining the feasibility or non-feasibility from the standpoiJ'lt of time, long distance of projected operations. from the linear standpoint for the concen­ Guidance for determining normal equip­ tration, movement, and supply by land, sea, ment and supply required by the Army is or air lines of communication of troops, their largely based on the troop basis and the transport and supplies on a large scale. troop deployment published by the War De­ To the Army Service Forces, which, through partment, which shows the strength of our its technical services procures all supplies forces in various theaters by periods, thus used by the Army throughout the world, ex­ enabling the technical services to determine cept those peculiar eo the Army Air Forces, the amount or different types of Class II or advanced planning is of tremendous impor­ other unit equipment required. For example, tance when one considers the lead-time in from the troop deployment the Chief of En­ the procurement. By lead-time is meant the gip.eers has the necessary information shoW­ length of time it takes to procure equipment ing the strength of forces in the tropical and have it available ready for issue at our areas of the Pacific and can thereby make depots. To this, then, must be added the a sound estimate of tropical type equipment time to transport it to the ports for over­ required. Based on experience in the various seas shipment, the loading time involved, and theaters, the technical services are also able then the time element for arrival at its final to set up a replacement factor for the types overseas destination. Many items of heavy of supplies furnished. From the troop de­ equipment take eighteen months or more. ployment the requirement for Arctic equip­ The bulk of the major Ordnance items runs ment can also be determined based on the approximately nine months. Therefore, if an strength of the forces in the areas of Arctic operation is to take place three or four climate. months from now, planning would have to Special projects are developed to deter­ have been accomplished quite some time in mine the War Department requirements over advance in order to meet requirements. and above that provided by the normal Tables In order to provide for the necessary ad­ of Basic Allowances and Equipment. These vanced planning, the Army Service Forces projects cover generally Class IV equipment has set up in the Planning Division, the and supplies such as construction materials Strategic Logistics Branch. This branch is and additional transportation required to primarily concerned with the logistical im­ augment organic transportation in order to plications" of future

20

15

10

7900 TONS 5 PER OAY

o 0+40 0+50 D+60 0+70 D+80 0+90 0+100 0+110 0+120 0+130 LEG!:NO: OVERLORD PLAN AVAILABLE FACILITIES ------} TONS DISCHARGEO ACTUAL DISCHARGE _._._.-._.­ Figure 1. move. An example of this is Marseille, where progress for track, maintenance of way, sig­ pre-war capacity was 50,000 tons per day nal, water, and repair systems, availability and channel blocking reduced that to 4,000 and condition of motive power and rolling tons. They were able to restore the capacity stock. Can foreign cars use the tracks with­ to 17 or 18,000 tons a day in about two out impaired clearance at bridges and tun­ months after the J'ort was captured. nels? The density and type of bridges per The chart (Figure 2) shows a method for track mile is the controlling factor in de­ developing the capacity and the estimated termin'.lg the rate of rehabilitation progress. cargo discharge required in l6ng tons per For example, in the Rhone Valley from twenty hour days for support of fourteen­ Marseille to Toulon to Belforte, the require­ divisi.ons in assault and a six-division build­ ments would be based on ninety-three bridges up b(>tween D+30 and D+60. (average length' twenty-five yards) in a b. Railroads.-Factors to take into con­ track distance of 117 miles using the follow­ sideration are: known peacetime capability, ing factors: assumed demolition, percentage of capability 1. Main line track replacement: 100/0 at successive periods, troops required to con­ running rails and accessories. dition and maintain, rate of rehabilitation 2. Average length of.bridge: 75 f~t 4 36 MILITARY REVIEW a. Bridge replacement: 30% equipment which comprises critical items b. Bridge repairs: 30% such as Signal Corps stocks, certain types 3. Minimum turnouts will be required of amphibious equipment, and Class IV sup­ as follows: . plies above T /BA [Table of Basic Allow­ a. Two at each junction. ances] and TIE [Table of Equipment] al­ b. Ten at each marshaling yard. lottments. The fact that certain types of c. One at each station. equipment do not exist during the planning 4. Water pumping stations for loco­ stage is not necessarily an indication that motive water supply will require the operation should not be mounted. Possible 50% replacement. methods of relief are always present when 5. Repair shops will be 10% opera­ the following are considered: tional. 1. What substitute equipment may be 6. American locomotives required will used without hindering the success be 100% for initial operation. of the operation? There is always 7. American rolling stock will be 70% the fine but practical distinction be­ of total requirements. tween desirability and essentiality c. Waterways.-Factors similar to rail­ to be carefully considered. ways must be taken into consideration. Again 2. Although the item is currently de­ bridges and locks are the controlling factor. ficient, what will the actual pro­ How many are there? What is their per­ duction figure make available by centage of destruction? How fast can they the time that the operation is to be be cleared for traffic? mounted? It is desired to point out d. Air Transport.-Controlling factors that actual production figures are in Air Transport are the operational ca­ indicated because there are two pacity of the particular type of plane by production figures; one is the the­ squadron or other unit, gas capacity of the oretical or programmed, which may planes, range, width of doors, navigational or may not be met in an overall equipment, and the climatic and topograph­ period of time; the other is the ical conditions in the particular area. actual production figures which may The Hostile Logistical Plan to oppose the definitely show a serious shortage Operation.-This plan should indicate the at the time the operation is to be probable logistical plan for enemy forces and mounted. The fact that deficiencies indicate critical points, destruction of which will be made up after the date for would cause the most serious effect on the mounting the operation is of only enemy plan. academic interest from the view­ Capabilities of the Lines of Communica­point of the particular operation. tion to support the Hostile Plan.-Consider­ Conclusions.-The conclusions should set ations similar to those employed for the forth a definite statement that the project friendly lines of communication pertain to is logistically sound or unsound; they should this subject. include the important factors that were Shipping Implications.-The shipping im­ developed during the study; and while brief. plications include two distinct categories­ they must not confuse clarity with brevity. personnel shipping and cargo shipping. It The conclusions must be sufficiently extensive would be very unusual that sufficient ship­ so that the import of the study can be under­ ping could not be made available for a task stood without a complete reading of the force. However, the factor to be considered study and its appendices. The body of the is-if this shipping is made available what study is for those interested in the detail but will be the cost to other theaters? not for those interested only in the decision. Supply Implications.-The supply implica­ Recommendations 0t. Alternative Sugges­ tions, in general, focus about the special tions.-As previously brought out, one should STRATEGIC LOGISTICAL PLANNING 37

C..p.ell,. In LT/20 Hr. Day Po,," Additional D day Reatored to Selected DUKW Normal DUKW Normal G 600 1.200 H SOO 300 6.. 300 Capacity In LT!20 lit day I 600 600 Selected J 600 600 Combat Loaded Tonnage to pan Po.... D day AUgmentation K 600 600 L 500 600 bOO 1.200 over beaches and thru available portl DUKW Normal D+30 D+60 D+90 M 500 600 500 600 trom DfO to DrlO.@ 3 STIman In- N 500 300 500 600 dudmg vehicles eahmated at 1/10 men A 600 600 1,~OO 1.800 1.800 0 1000 300 1,000 600 ~ 1·"" ST. - 14 Dlv @24,ooOmen B 1,000 600 1,200 2,400 6,200 .p 000 600 500 600 P us • Grp F @ 6,000 men C 500 600 ],200 1,200 1.200 Total men - 366000 0 I.WO 600 1,800 3,000 3,000 Total 3,600 6,100 :J.600 6,900 Total vehicles - 31i,6OO E 1,000 1,200 2.400 3.600 4.800 Cargo 63.1.000 SIT F 000 1.200 2400 3000 3,000 Leas 2{l7c 700 1.020 100 1.380 5T - Stup or Measurement Tons Total 4,600 4,800 10,200 15,OQO 19,000 For Weather 2,800 4.080 2,800 5,520

26-

24 r-- ,

6 V .. 4f---I---+--lr---+----+----+----+----+---~ :-

o " ,D. D + 30 0+60, 0+ 9D D + 120 D + ISO D + 180 do, ~\i\ -y\ I'". 0" :1. G,p H B Total Farer Tlmf' ~ Sl'rVlti' (ollow·up + 4~,"F 20 Du' Grollnd & Ser"'ce - 700,000 X- 0 1 Dlv Assault follow·up ~ 8~~:: 0 1Jlt~t~b =!g:g~ - Total _ 780,000 1 D,v AUBUit + "Crp F 4 Figure 2. :­ d 38 MILITARY REVIEW not hesitate to present suggestions which it blanks are filled in with port names and is believed may relieve some of tbe defi­ the end of the description might look like ciencies in the plan. this: "to a total capacity of 25,000 long The logistical study having been made and tons per day." the conclusions being favorable, it is then (b) Similarly, "repair, restoration necessary to determine the actual quantities and improvement of two additional ports to a and types of supplies and equipment to be capacity of 5,000 long tons per day each." required. The extent of coverage of items To these statements must be added the time is a matter of choice but the minimum com­ element because that is an augmentation putations must cover the controlled and re­ of the other ports that you want and in­ stricted items, i.e., those in short or crit­ dicates the phasing of construction required ical supply or being newly developed. These to implement port capacity in support of detailed bills of materials are based on proj­ the operation. ect descriptions known as War Department (2) The next project is "Warehouses" Prepared Projects. and you go through the same procedure, WU1' DepuTtment Prepa)'ed P)·oiects.-A show the type of warehouses to be con­ logistk study of a projected operation is structed, whether it is the theater of oper­ implemented by determining the special proj­ ation type, a local type, or a type developed ects that will be required, i.e., construction within the theater itself. A local type means material for restoration of ports and rail­ of native materials or designs such as used roads, warehousing, hospitalization, shops, in the Southwest Pacific. The requirements additional motor transport to augment or­ for open storage areas are spelled out as ganic transportation in maintaining proper necessary to provide for the proper pro­ supply and other special equipment for sup­ portion of sixty days of Class I, II, and plies of a Class IV nature. The provision IV supplies for, say, 600,000 men. Similarly, of these special projects should not be con­ it states the necessary facilities for 120 days fused with the equipment which Tables of of ammunition storage will be provided. The Basic Allowance and Equipment normally proportion of closed, shed, and open storage furnish troops j however, they do take into required is then determined from experience consideration the SLOE's [Special Lists of factors. These requirements vary in the dif­ Equipment] that have been provided troop ferent theaters of operations depending on units in some theaters. climatic conditions and on the proportion of The Strategie Logistics Branch, Planning usable space it is estimated will be found Division, Headquarters Army Service Forces, in the area. developed a form of project descriptions for Each other project is set up in a similar use in a logistic study to enable the tech­ manner and the blanks filled in to meet the nical services to determine for each project conditions of the logistical study. the supplies and the equipment which they When these projects are presented to the will have to procure for future operational technical services, since they include the use. These are generally planned to be phased level of supply, the strength and phasing from six months to eighteen months in the of the forces under the various conditions, future. These projects cover other than nor­ and the general areas to be occupied, we mal operational requirements and, based on have given the technical services sufficient the assumption and outline included in the information on which to apply their experi­ logistical study, the completed descriptions ence factors and form a base for computation of the projects are developed along the fol­ of their requirements. They in turn prepare lowing lines: enlarged and detailed descriptions with bills (1) Project 1-Ports: of materials and equipment for critical items (a) Repair, restoration and improve­ for each project. . ment ·of three ports located at •...• These It is necessary that "'qUite a number of .. 8TftATEGtc LOGtSTtOAL l't.ANN1NG 89 items be covered-shopB, refrigeration, tent What are the weather conditions? Are you camps, housing, hospitals, laundries, special going to require cold weather equipment? water supply and utilities, roads, railways, Snow removal equipment? How about ~he airfields, petroleum distribution, prisoner of soil and lubricants and anti-freeze to meet war enclosures, field fortifications, fire-fight­ weather conditions? What are the probable ing equipment, forestry equipment' including conditions affecting the operation which would necessary logging and sawmills, and special require extra equipment such as caused by operational supplies including Class IV re­ excessive rain, snow, and mud? What are quirements for beach operations and other the requirements for explosives, materials assault phases. In order to provide the in­ handling equipment, and special seacoast de­ formation concerning the availability of local fense demolition requirements going to be? resources, an economic study is sometimes All of these items must be evaluated and necessary so that an estimate can be pre­ the necessary supplies and equipment in­ pared of the type of logging and sawmill cluded in the bills of materials for this project. equipmenVrequireg, tactical bridging, field Since more than one technical service is fortifications, warehousing or other buildings involved in the computation of requirements expected to be available locally. Since a com­ for many of the projects, the correlating plete economic study would be too voluminous agencies are indicated at the end of the for inclusion in the logistical study it will project list. This shows, for exatnple, that ordinarily only cover the principal items of the Corps of Engineers will have to correlate local resources and contain a bibliography or coordinate the projects in which they of all known intelligence sources from which have the primary interest, since they involve the technical services can evaluate and make engineer construction effort, but tlie require­ their own estimates of the amount of local ments for which may come from two or material and facilities that will be available. three other technical services. In other words, The evaluation of technical intelligence in, anything that requires construction of a cludes detailed study of aerial photography plant or facility, that must be correlated by to determine the percentage of destruction the Engineer with the other technical serv­ from aerial bombardment, to amplify infor­ ices concerned. mation on bridging and bridge destruction, There are other special requirements which which mayor may not be'fully evident from may not appear in these projects since they intelligence sources, and to provide a means are primarily Class II in nature. One of for up-to-date correction of maps used in these is the matter of clothing. The Quarter­ planning. master, having had a great deal of experi­ A project covering special services is in­ cluded and covers "reconstruction of facil­ ence in this line, normally keeps clothing ities and provisions for breweries and bottling requirements under continuous study and works to provide beer and soft drinks for determines requirements based on the total 100,000 men." That~may sound funny; but strength of the Army and where the oper­ it is a fact established in every theater, and ations are going to be conducted. They ha­ you have to provide for it. bitually set up the requirements for Arctic The project "Special Operational Require­ clothing, ordinary temperate weather cloth­ ments" must be based on know1edge of the ing, and tropical clothing. The matter of area that you are going into and on a brief having on hand sufficient Arctic clothing or of the' tactical plan. Are you going into an other clothing of' a special type is under area over beaches where there will be rice paddies as soon as you get away from the continuous consideration and is, therefore, beaches? If so, what type of vehicle do you not included in project requirements. need to clear the equipment and supplies In developing the logistic plan for the from the beaches if you don't have roads? project, of course, we must consider our ship­ MILITARY REVIEW ping capabilities. Here, again, you have to effort or requirements. (Note: This applies look to the Transportation Corps which, in to planning for base developments.) turn, working with the Navy, determines . There is one additional phase, a difficult the shipping requirements and the shipping one, to a completed logistical plan or project. availability based on experience factors. Five That is the determination by the technical measurement tons (MT) per man for initial service of the troop requirements to accom­ shipment of equipment and 0.8 measurement plish the operation. Troop selections which tons per man per month for replenishment are actually made by the theater commander thereafter are the factors most commonly directed to accomplish the operation will used. For the first three months after the rarely ever agree with the long-range plan start of an operation a factor of 1.6/MT/ in detail. However, they will be sufficiently Man/Month can be used, to insure computa­ accurate to indicate troop requirements. In tion of sufficient port capacity and shipping analyzing the troop requirements submitted availability to build up the depot level in by the technical services, the staff must be the operational area. These data usually constantly alert for evidence of "Empire appear in a Transportation Corps project Building" or disregard of known data con­ description covering ports. Likewise, the Of­ tained in the troop basis projections. flce, Chief of Engineers, coordinates with These are the things which must be accom­ the Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks to plished in developing a complete strategic determine the overall base development plans logistical plan and supporting projects be­ and harbor facility plans which the Navy fore coming to your final conclusion that the may be contemplating in the operational operation can or cannot be successfully sup­ area. If the Navy is constructing certain ported. The decision, of course, will have to wharves, piers, or large ammunition storage rest elsewhere, but you must present the areas, the Engineer layout will be coordinated facts as you have them, evaluated to the to prevent interference and duplication of best' .of your ability and judgment.

We are not sure of the war of the future. We hope there will not be one. Prudence, in fact our national existence, dictates that we prepare for such a conflict. We can be sure that it will be unlike World War II. The role of air, sea, and ground forces will probably be materially changed. Still all are of the opinion that there must be unity of command in their employment. On the other hand the same services must be provided no matter what may be the employment of the combat arms. All will continue to eat, be subject to wounds, accidents and disease, all will require food and clothing, transportation. All the multitude of personnel services will be needed and probably increased. It is certain also that the present duplications and waste can be minimized by a frank recognition of the present situation and by a consolidation of these complex activities reaching not only into all field operations but into the very heart of our national life and of our fundamental capacity to wage war. If unity of command in the field is indicated by our experience in this war, unification of services in a single service force is demonstrably far more essential. General Br~hon '>Somervell Sixth Army Quartermaster Operations in the Luzon Campaign From an official report of the Sixth Army Quartermaster activities by BRIGADIER GENERAL C. R. LEHNER, Quartermaster Corps HE essential facts of Quartermaster P.!.) Operation, ASCOM was attached to activities and accomplishments in the Headquarters Sixth Army for the purpose TLuzon operation, from the initial landing on of insuring continuity of supply operations S.day, 9 January 1945 through the official at such time as the Army Service Area closing date of the campaign, 4 July 1945, should be established and major units (corps, are presented in three major sections: divisions, and RCT's) should be relieved of Planning, Operations, and LessoBs Learned. responsibility for discharge of shipping and The following information on USASOS the operation of supply installation in the (United States Army Service of Supply) base area. ASCOM was charged with logis­ units which coordinated logistically with Sixth tical planning and support in conjunction Army supply services during the campaign, with the Sixth Army Staff, and with the id furnished to clarify specific references. development of a USASOS base in the Lin­ Shortly after S-daya provisional USASOS gayen Gulf area. unit under Sixth Army control disembarked Operation and Logistic Instructions.­ at Lingayen Gulf (see Map). This force, Operation and logistic instructions from known as ASCOM (Army Service Command), GHQ supplied the basic data for planning, lVas under Major General Hugh J. Casey and assigned responsibilities as follows: and contained general and special staff sec­ a. The initial strength of the troops land­ tions. On 13 February 1945; ASCOM left ing in the Lingayen Gulf area for whom Sixth Army control and become known as Quartermaster supplies and services were' LUBSEC (Luzon Base Section). On 20 April to be furnished was 160,000 with a pro­ 1945 the designation LUBSEC was changed jected increase to 210,000 by S+18 and to PHIBSEC (Philippine Base Section). 282,000 by S+45. Dnder each of its appelations this agency b. Quartermaster supply and service were furnished USASOS sUPIlort to Sixth Army to be accomplished by the Army Quarter­ throughout the operation, establishing three master through the Quartermasters of the bases: Base M at San Fabian, Pangasinan, Army Service Command, the I Corps, the on 11 January 1945; Base X at Manila on XIV Corps, participating divisions and RCT's, 29 January 1945 (Manila was not, however, and by liaison with attached Air Force Serv­ designated Base X until 20 April 1945); ice Commands. and Base R at Batangas on 20 April 1945. c. USASOS was to provide all Quarter­ (See Map.) On 7 June 1945, USASOS was master supplies; deliver them afloat, loaded officially redesignated AFWESPAC (Army for selective discharge, to Sixth Army reg­ ulating stations; and move them to the ob­ Forces Western paeific). 0 jective area as scheduled by the Army Planning Quartermaster. Planning of the Quartermaster functions d. Eighth Army was to furnish initial for the operation involved three major factors: Quartermaster supplies and equipment re­ 1. Operation and Logistic Instructions quired by Sixth Army troops staging in from GHQ. areas under Eighth Army control. 2. The Quartermaster Plan for Operations Plan of Operation on the Far Shore.­ on the Far Shore. The Quartermaster plan for operation on 3. The determination of requirements of the far shore was divided into three phases: Quartermaster supplies and equipment. a. The first phase of the plan covered As had been the case in the K-2 (Leyt~, the period from the landing until ASeOM, - MILITARY REVIEW

Map of Luzon

AQMSP NO 6 30 MAY-I JULY (TURNED OVER TO EIGHTH ARMY)

CAGAYAN . ~ALLEY

AQMSP NO 5 I MAY - I JULY (TURNED OVER TO EIGHTH ARMY)

AQMSP NO 3

BASE X 29 JAN

CORREGIDOR I AQMSP NO 4 24MAR-20APR Nalugbo Bay

BASE R 20 APR

o BASES AND SUPPLY POINTS @ SALVAGE POINTS

Map showing bases, supply points, and salvage points­ installations on the Island of iLuzon, Philippine Islands. ",.. SIXTH ARMY QUARTERMASTER OPERATIONS IN THE LUZON CAMPAIGN under control of the Commanding General, corps, troops, and army troops were to send USASOS, should assume supply responsi­ organic transportation to Army Supply Points bility for troops in the objective area for wherll supplies were to be loaded by oper­ which the target date was S+20. During ating personnel, ASCOM installations were this phase, supply responsibility )Vas to be to continue to serve corps, divisions, and decentralized. Major units (corps, divisions, army troops located in the Base area. ReT's, ASCOM, AAF and Army troops) The Quartermaster, ASCOM, was to es­ were to be responsible for unloading their tablish and operate the following services: troops, supplies and equipment scheduled for (1) bakery, (2) laundry, (3) salvage, (4) landing at the several beaches, and for es­ sales store, (5) purchasing and contracting, tablishing and operating their respective (6) refrigeration, (7) graves registration, dumps. Service units were to be attached, (8) drum and can refilling stations (MT as necessary, to the major units to enable gasoline), and (9) vehicle refueling stations them to perform these functions. ASCOM at selected points along the main supply was to locate permanent 'dumps and receive roads. and store Quartermaster supplies discharged from resupply ships so that ASCOM supply The Determination of Requirements of points could operate by S+20. It was con­ Quartermaster Units and of templated that initial unit stocks (with the Quartermaster Supplies exception of MT fuel and distillate) would and Equipment suffice during the first thirty days, but in Quartel·master Units.-The Army Quar­ case of unforeseen shortages, ASCOM was termasters' initial request for service troops to be prepared to make emergency issues was cut approximately 400/0 by GHQ. The when approved by the Army Quartermaster. reduction might have seriously affected the Motor transport fuel and distillate were to success of the operation had not a fair amount be available from bulk tanks by S+7. of civilian labor and some rail transport facilities been available in the objective area. b. The second phase was to extend from Quartermaster units, attached to Sixth Army the time ASCOM, as directed by the Com­ for the M-l Operation by GHQ, were, for manding General, Sixth Army, assumed sup­ the most part, initially reattached by Army ply responsibility (target.date S+20), until to ASCOM or to the Corps, Divisions or the Army Quartermaster should assume that RCT's as indicated in the table on page 44. responsibility for troops forward of the Prior to the operation, all Quartermaster ASCOM base area. ASCOM Supply Points, units were inspected by representatives of stocked from resupply ships, were to be augmented by unconsumed supplies taken the Army QUartermaster to assure that they would be capable of performing their pri­ over from corps, divisions and separate unit mary missions. Inspections covered the state dumps. Organizations, using unit transpor­ of training of personnel and the status and tation, were to draw supplies from these condition' of equipment. central dumps. With the exception of ten DIS carried with troops, Quartermaster sup­ Qum·termaste1" Supplies and Equipment.­ plies arriving during this phase were to be Initial supplies were to be furnished from moved directly to ASCOM dumps. mounting bases in Leyte, New Guinea, New Britain and the Solomons. Sixth Army troops, c. The third phase was to begin when the I Corps, XIV corps, 158 RCT and ASCOM Army Quartermaster should assume supply troops arriving in. the objective area on as­ responsibility for all troops forward of the sault echelons (S Day to S+10 inclusive) ASCOM base areas, ASCOM was to displace were to carry a minimum of 10 DIS of Class supplies forward to Army Supply Points to I, II, III and IV Quartermaster supplies. The be selected by the Army Quartermaster and Commanding Generals of the above major operated by Sixth Army personnel. Divisions" commands were to be responsible for the deli­ .. 44 MILITARY REVIEW

U"lt ARMY lOB RCT 1 Corps XIV Corps ASCOM Total (Co) Hq & Hq Dot. QM Bn ea 1 1 7 QM Bakery Co plat 16• 4 QM Car Plat plat 2 2 QM Depot Sup Co plat 6 2i QM Fum & Bath Co plat 2 1 QM Gas Sup Co plat 1 plat+det 2 4+ QM Graves Reg Co plat Hq Det Det 2 1 1 QM Ldry Co (SM) plat 4+sec 4+so< QM Ldry Plat (Type A) plat 3 3 QM Ldry Plat (Type B) plat 4 1 9 QM Petr Prod Lab ea QM Rhd Co plat Det 8+Det 1 QM Refrig Co plat 3 1 QM Salv Coli Co plat 2 l! QM Salv Rep Co plat 2 QM Serv Co plat 2 10 10~ QM Trk Co plat 6 30 16+plat QM War Dog Plat plat 3

very of sufficient additional supplies to bring Lack of sufficient trucl, transportation made the total to the following levels: it very difficult to supply rapidly advancing Class I. II. IV 30 DIS combat troops until it was possible to place Class III. MT Fuel & Distillate 15 DIS the railroad in operation. Notwithstanding All other Cl III items 30 DIS all obstacles, however, Quartermaster sup­ All units arriving after S+10, including plies and services were at all times ade­ reserve divisions, were to bring 30 DIS of quately maintained to meet the needs of Class I, II & IV and 10 DIS of Class III. the troops. Ten days supply of Class I for 20,000 Fil'st Phase. Initial landings were made troops were set up at Leyte for air dropping on 9 January 1945 (S Day) against light if the need should arise. The major portion of Quartermaster re­ opposition, and the beachhead was rapidly supply requirements was to be provided by extended. Quartermaster supply responsibil­ 22 balanced loaded ships from the United ities were decentralized. Divisions began un­ States, each loaded with 30 DIS of all classes loading troops and initial supplies over their for 20,000 troops, which were to arrive in respective beaches. Great difficulty was ex­ the objective area between S+4 and S+55. perienced on some of the beaches due to Supplemental vessels, with supplies required the high surf. In many instances it was not over and above the maintenance stocks on possible to discharge rations and other es­ balanced resupply ships, were to arrive on sential supplies from troops ships until sev· S+15. eral days after the troops had landed. Other Two Liberty type ships loaded solidly with troop units failed to bring the prescribed Class III supplies were to be held available level of initial supplies. Because of these as floating reserves for combat losses or factors, it became necessary for ASCOM to other emergencies. begin issuing rations on S+ 10 (19 January Operations 1945). Unloading of the first resupply ship In general, supply operations proceeded by began on S+6 (15 January 1945). This en­ phases according to the plan of operations forced procedure, coupled with the difficulty outlined above. The unloading of resupply experienced in unloading shipping, unbalanced shipping was hindered by poor landing beaches ration stocks in ASCOM dumps. Subsequent and high surf resulting in a rather "hand­ recapture of rations' on >troop ships did not to-mouth" existance during the early stages. materially correct this condition. ASCOM SIXTH ARMY QUARTERMASTER OPERATIONS IN THE LUZON CAMPAIGN 45 established its main supply point, 11 January Army. This control passed to Sixth Army' .1945, at San Fabian and a sub-base at on S+33 (11 February) and supply respon­ Dagupan. sibility in turn, passed to this headquarters Second Phase began on S+10 (19 January on 8+54 (4 March). 1945) when, because of the rapid movement For amphibious landing on Corregidor on of the XIV Corps southward in the Central S+38 (16 February) the 1st Battalion of Plains area, ASCOM was directed to assume the 34th Infantry Regiment, reinforced, was responsibility for all unloading operations supplied 10 DIS Quartermaster supplies from in the objective area. Units, however, con­ the Subic Bay (XI Corps) dump. On S+38 tinued to draw from unit dumps, supple­ (16 February) the 503d Parachute Infantry mented whenever necessary by issues from RCT, mounted by Eighth Army, made a ASCOM. The ASCOM Base Area was es­ parachute landing on Corregidor. XI Corps tablished and its boundaries defined. ASCOM continued to supply this force from its stocks was directed to assume full logistic respon­ at Subic Bay. sibility for the M-l·area on S+20 (29 Janu­ Some of the major difficulties encountered ary 1945) and, as of that date, all uncon­ during the third phase were as follows: sumed supplies remaining in unit dumps were turned over to that agency. The advance toward Manila was more rapid than had been expected and resulted in a Third Phase. Combat units having ad­ severe strain on transportation facilities. As vanced 'beyond the economical hauling dis­ a result, supply points were not able to build tances of unit trains, it was necessary to up their prescribed levels of supply and, in establish Army Quartermaster Supply Points many instances, it was necessary~ to break (AQ:\ISP) in the Army Service Area. down and issue supplies as fast as they were AQMSP No.1 opened at Ros~les on S+23 received. (1 February 1945), AQMSP No.2 opened at Tarlac on S+21 (30 January 1945) and Filipino labor rations failed to arrive as AQMSP No, 3 opened at San Fernando, scheduled, causing appreciable reduction of Pampanga on S+50 (28 February 1945). Army ration stocks. Other supply points were established as in­ There was considerable delay in the estab­ dicated on map. (See Map.) lishment of the bulk gasoline distribution A minimum of 3 DIS of all classes was system necessitating the discharge of both to be maintained at each of the supply points. reserve Class III ships. Bulk distribution was Supp01·ting and Adjacent Operations.­ finally established 10 February 1945. Several major supporting operations took Class II & IV supplies for Philippine Army place during this period: and Filipino Guerrillas were ordered prior The XI Corps, mounted by the Eighth to the M-l Operations, but the supplies did Army at Leyte, landed north of Subie Bay not arrive as requested. This necessitated & at San Antonio on ~+20 (29 January) and the issuing of Class II IV supplies from on S+21 (30 January) passed to the oper­ Army stocks causing a drain on Class II tional control of Sixth Army. Initial supplies & IV supplies, especially small sizes in shoes and resupply shipping set up for this oper­ and clothing. ation by the Eighth Army were sufficient Replacements arrived without proper equip­ to support this operation until S+74 (24 . ment, again necessitating issue from Sixth March) when AQMSP No.4 was established Army Class II &; IV stocks. m the Subic Bay area and Sixth Army as­ On 13 February (S+35) the Luzon Base sumed supply responsibility. Section, USASOS, was established, The Com­ The 11th Airborne Division landed in the manding General, USASOS, within the area Nasugbo Bay area on S+22 (31 January) of the Luzon Base Section, assumed respon­ under the operational control of the Eighth" sibility for advancing supplies and logistic MILITARY REVIEW support of all Sixth Army troops either di­ for the 37th Infantry Division by air trans­ rectly from USASOS bases or from Army port was, therefore, initiated on S+157 (15 Quartermaster Supply Points. June); and continued for the remainder of Concluding Phase. The amphibious land­ the operation. ing at Legaspi on S+82 (1 April) by the . AQMSP No.1 and No.2, at Rosales and 158th ReT, was supplied from Base "K" Tarlac respectively, were closed 15 March. located on Leyte Island. These supplies were AQMSP No. 4 at Olongapo was closed 20 augmented by perishables shipped by air April. On 1 July 1945, operation of AQMSP from Manila, No.5 and No.6 was transferred to control AQMSP No.5, located at San Jose, Nueva of Eighth Army, in accordance with pro­ Boiga Province, was opened on S+112 (1 visions contained in Field Order 70, Head­ May) to support troops in that area and quarters Sixth Army, 17 June 1945. AQMSP operations into the Cagayan Valley through No. 3 at San Fernando, Pampanga, con­ the Balete Pass. This supply point was tinued to operate under the direction of the stocked with 5 D /S Quartermaster supplies Quartermaster, Sixth Army, in order to fa­ for a strength of 60,000. cilitate re-equipping of units staging in ad­ jacent areas for further oper­ ations. During the operation the Sup­ ply Points had furnished to Sixth Army troops, 96,682.2 tons (DWT) of Quartermaster supplies. Specialized Quartermaster Activities Bakel'ies.-The number of bakeries assigned was sufficient to provide the full allowance of bread. The plan was to set up bakeries at each of the QM Supply Points as they were es­ tablished. The first of these went into operation at Rosales. Gl's massing bread and placing it in baking pans at 262d A full issue of bread was avail- QM Bakery, AQMSP No.3, San Fernando, Pampanga. able in that sector on 3 Febru- Upon capture of Balete Pass and the start ary 1945. As the forces moved to the south, of 'the drive up the Cagayan Valley, Army AQMSP No. 2 at Tarlac commenced opel'­ Quartermaster Supply Point No.6 was opened ation, and bread was first issued there on on S+141 (30 May) at Solano, Nueva Vis­ 5 February 1945. A bakery unit was sent caya Province. It was stocked with 10 DIS to San Fernando, Pampanga on 16 February Quartermaster Class I and III and expend­ in advance of the QM Supply Point to be able supplies for 35,000 troops. This supply established there. Ingredients were delivered point was established to give logistical sup­ by truck from Tarlac. Operation of this port to the Cagayan Valley drive and to bakery enabled troops in Manila and civil­ insure a constant supply in the event the ians at the Santo Tomas Interment Camp hazardous road through Balete Pass became to obtain fresh bread concurrently with the temporarily impassable. The progress of the liberation of that city. combat units in this area was so rapid that Further 'south bakeries were established it was extremely difficult to maintain supply at Paranaque and Calamba. No particular lines. Delivery of Class I and III supplies difficulties }were en~ounllered at either of ~ SIXTH ARMY QUARTERMASTER OPERATIONS IN THE LUZON CAMPAIGN 47 these locations and full allowances of bread signment of platoons continued until the were always available. control and operation of the dumps were When the XI Corps landed in the Subic transferred on 18 March to LUBSEC. Upon Bay area a bakery unit was assigned to the this transfer, two platoons were returned to organization and set up at Olongapo. It con­ LUBSEC control. Throughout the campaign tinued operation under Corps direction until the method of using salvage collecting pla­ the AQMSP was taken over by Army. Troops toons working with corps was adjusted to on Corregidor and Mariveles received daily '. the requirements of the tactical situation, issues of bread from this source via LCM. platoons and sections of platoons being trans­ During the closing phase of the operation, ferred as the need arose, to units operating bakeries were operated at AQMSP No.5 at in areas where salvage material was· most San Jose and at AQMSP No.6 at Solano. plentiful. Throughout the entire operation combat Salvage dumps were established by Sixth troops were given first priority in the issue Army at Balungao, Pangasinan; Dau, Pam­ of bread. They res:eived an average of 8 panga; San Jose, Nuev:a Ecija; and Quezon ounces of bread per ration while nonLcombat City in Manila (see Map). All salvage, ex­ troops received an average of 7.5 ounces per cept that requisitioned by Technical Intel­ ration. Every possible effort was made to ligence or Civil Affairs personnel, or re­ get fresh bread into the hands of troops tained by capturing units for immediate on the front lines. With few exceptions, this combat use, was collected and evacuated to was successfully accomplished. these \ dumps, where segregation, classifica­ During the campaign the bakeries issued tion and storage were accomplished. Disposi­ 20,342,056 pounds of bread to Sixth Army tion of salvage from the dumps was accom­ troops. plished by (1) issue of needed items to supply Salvage Operations.-Early in the cam­ services and combat units, and (2) transfer paign it became apparent that much larger to LUBSEC (Iater PHIBSEC). Recovered quantities of enemy equipment and supplies civilian vehicles were turned over to the were being captured by our troops than in previous oper­ ations against the J apane.se. A Salvage division was therefore organized in the office of the Sixth Army Quartermaster to plan, coordinate and supervise the collection, segregation, clas­ sification, storage, and disposi­ tion of all salvage. Initially, only the 678th QM Salvage Coliecting C9mpany was attached to Sixth Army; how­ ever, as the campaign pro­ gressed, the first and third pla- , toons of the 236th QM Salvage Collecting Company were at­ tached from LUBSEC. One sal­ vage coliecting platoon was at­ tached to each of the three corps and the remaining two platoons were ·used to operate Captured Japanese ammunition collected in a Corps Army salvage dumps. This as­ Collecting Point near Rosario, Pangasinan. 48 MILITAltY REVIEW the latter stages of the oper­ ation, the dead who were pre­ viously buried in isolated graves and battlefield cemeteries were exhumed and the remains re­ interred in one of the two PHIBSEC semi-permanent eem­ eteries. > Sixth Army Graves Registra­ tion personnel processed for burial approximately 10,370 fa­ talities during the operation. In addition, prior to the assumption of responsibility for USAF cem­ eteries by AFWESPAC, Sixth Cemetery at Legaspi Port No.1. (XIV Corps). Army graves registration person­ nel accomplished 5,877 burials. Provost Marshal General for disposition. Employment of Other Quartermaster Units Constant liaison was maintained with lower Truck Ul1its.-Throllghollt the operation, units in order to insure prompt recovery, Quartermaster truck units were under the evacuation, and issue of all captured and operational control of the Transportation abandoned material. Section, Sixth Army. The Quartermaster Sec­ Graves Registration.-As combat troops tion's responsibility in connection with such advanced, corps and divisions est3:blished units was accordingly limited to administm­ cemeteries where combat dead were evacuated tion control of the Transportation Section, fori burial. Initially, one corps advanced so Sixth Army. The Quartermaster Section's re­ rapidly it was necessary for several small sponsibility in connection with such units was cemeteries to be established in the corps accordingly limited to administration. zone of action. On S+17 (26 January 1945) ASCOM established a cemetery to which the Service UlIits.-Except for the use of one QM Service Company at each Army Supply deceased of one corps were evacuated for burial. Graves registration units serving Point, all service units were attached to Divisions of this particular corps established Corps for operation. The Army Quarter­ Division Graves Registration Collecting Points master did not maintain a labor pool. on the main supply routes where bodies of Car P[afoolls.-The two Quartermaster those killed on the field of battle were re­ Car Platoons attached to Sixth Army were ceived. Here the bodies were properly proc­ sub-attached to Army Headquarters to pro­ essed, prepared for burial, and evacuated to vide transportation necessary for the accom­ the ASCOM cemetery where interment was plishment of staff functions. accomplished by ASCOM graves registration Depot Supply and Railhead Units.-All personnel. In those localities were no central­ Quartermaster Depot Supply and Railhead ized ASCOM cemetery existed, corps and divi­ units were used at Corps and Army Supply sions established temporary cemeteries to re­ Points. Normally, a Quartermaster Railhead ceive the dead in accordance with the above­ Company receives, stores and 'issues Quar­ mentioned plan of evacuation. Here burial was termaster supplies for 30,000 troops. During accomplished by attached corps and division the Luzon operation, for extended periods graves registration personnel. Temporary during troop movements, a platoon of the cemeteries initially established by the two 558th Quartermaster Railhead Company at corps under this command were consolidated AQMSP No. 1 anli a platoon of the 559th into a centralized LUBSEC cemetery. During Quartermaster Railhead'Company at AQMSP SIXTH ARMY QUARTERMASTER OPERATIONS IN THE LUZON CAlltPAIGN 49 No. 2 received, stored and issued Quarter­ and the recording of burials; maintaining master supplies, in each case, for 75,000 to recorda of Quartermaster units and super­ jllO,()()() troops. Each platoon was supported vising allocation of Quartermaster replace­ ny a Quartermaster Service Company and ments and transfer of personnel; recommend­ a section of a Quartermaster Gas ,Supply . ing unit and individual awards for Quarter­ Company. master units and personnel; receiving and Quartermaster gas supply platoons hand­ dispatching all mail, radiograms and publica­ led the issue of bulk and packaged petroleum tions; and maintenance of office :files. at Corps and Army Supply Points. Bulk Supply Division.-Planning and supervis­ mnks were set up at Tarlac, San Jose, and ing all matters pertaining to Quartermaster Dau to handle V -80 and Diesel which were supplies and equipment; operation and ad­ delivered'through pipe lines and by tankers ministration of Quartermaster depots and from Base M. At other points where bulk supply points; initiation of daily telegrams; plants were not established, POL was re­ initiation and processi;ng of requisitions of ceived by rail and tru~ks in 55-gallon drums. critical items for the resuppJy of units and The following methods of issue were used: Army Supply Points; coordinating corps and n, Exchange of drums or cans at supply separate major unit supply points; insuring points. delivery of supplies by initiation of follow­ b. Dispatching a tank trailer to a division up action on requisitioned items; arranging area and discharging into unit containers. air shipments of critical items from supply c. Dispatching unit vehicles with contain­ bases to army supply points, and from army ers to a drum or can refilling point. Five­ suppJy points to forward combat units; and gallon cans were seldom used. Units pre­ maintaining close liaison with USASOS sup­ ferred the 55-gallon drum probably because ply bases. they had become accustomed to the use of Field Service Division.-Training of Quar­ the drums in previous operations when suf­ termaster units; planning the number, type ficient five-gallon cans had not been available. and attachment of Quartermaster units; Laundry Units.-The only laundry units maintaining contact in the field between the available to Sixth Army during the cam­ Army Quartermaster, Quartermaster units paign were nine type "B,". Quartermaster and installations, and USASOS .bases; in­ Laundry Platoons. Each of these was at­ itial installation, initial organization, and tached to a field hospital. Laundry for other development of Army Quartermaster supply units and their personnel was handled by points; inspection of units prior to and crvilians through unit and individual ar­ during the operation to determine their fit­ rangement. The nine Sixth Army laundry ness for operation in combat areas. platoons processed 1,731,544 pounds of ma­ Salvage Division.-Planning and supervis­ relial during the operation. ing the collection, evacuation, segregation, ar Dog·Platoons.-The three platoons of temporary storage and utilization of salvage. war dogs assigned to ~ixth Army Quarter­ Lessons Learned master were redesignated as Infantry units Conclusions: and assigned by G-3 to Infantry Divisions. a. Prescribed DIS of rations and supplies Organization of the Army Quartermaster were not brought into operational areas by Office many non-divisional units. DUring the M-1 Operation, the organiza­ b. Most Quartermaster units were put ashore ban and functions of the Army Quarter­ promptly, butin some cases supplies and equip­ ll!aster Office were generally as follows: ment were not discharged for several days. Administrative Division.-Preparing and c. The loading of heavy deck cargo on llaintaining statistical and logistical data; the hatches and in the holds of Quarter­ Siipervi~ing the establishment of cemeteries Il)aster re-supply ships caused considerable MtLITARY REVIll,\\, delay in discharge of urgently required Quar­ b. All commanders be reminded that the termaster supplies. value of service units is greatly reduced if d. Quartermaster re-supply ~hi)Js contained their equipment is not available for USE an insufficient quantity of small sizes of when the personnel arrive in the objective clothing' and shoes. . area. This is especially true of truck and c. Pilferage and other damage to supplies bakery companies. resulted from the failure of units to take c. All heavy deck cargo which will dela~ proper security measures in safeguarding the discharge of Quartermaster supplies b~ initial maintenance stocks. In a few instances, removed from re-supply ships prior to their complete loss of initial maintenance stOel{R arrival in the objective area. was experienced. d. Quartermaster re-supply ships contain 1. In Class III supplies, therc were no sufficient small sizes of clothing and shoes. tank trucks initially available to handle bulk e. Strict measures be taken by unit com· V-80 gasoline. Two and one half-ton cargo mandel'S to safeguard stocks of supplies ac­ trucks were converted into tank tl'Ucks by us­ companying their units on landing operations. ing Navy cubes and captured Japanese tanks. J. Gasoline Supply Companies be provided g. Initially, there was an insufficient sup­ with sufficient tank trucks. ply of drums for refilling Class III supplies. g. Larger stocks of drum gasoline be fur­ h. Initially, combat troops were not thor­ nished in the early stages of future oper­ oughly familiar with their responsibilities in ations. regard to graveR j'(·gistration procedure. In h. Early re-supply be accomplished by bal· some cases deceased were evacuated from anced loaded amphibious shipping of from the front lines without pertinent informa­ 50.000 to 80,000 man days of supply. During tion accompanying the bodies. In other cases, the operation the number of available am· "Emergency Medical Tags" were improperly phibious ships was barely sufficient to most prepared, thereby making it necessary for troop movement requirements. graves registration personnel to seek infor­ i. Sufficient Quartermaster unit~ De pru· mation sometimes difficult to obtain when vided so that trained personnel will be avail· the body had been removed from the loca­ able to furnish adequate service fo], combat tion where it had been recovered. Combat troops. troops initially were lax in the matter of j. Prior to entering combat, designated making a thorough battlefield search for un­ personnel throughout the divisions be thor· recovered bodies after combat had ceased oughly schooled in the responsibilities of in the sector. combat troops in regard to graves registra· i. Delay in the evacuation of salvage to tion service. guarded dumps resulted in destruction by k. Three ~-ton trucks be added to the the enemy and in pilfering. This delay was TIE allowance of vehicles for Salvage Col­ caused by (1) lack of sufficient transporta­ lecting Companies (present T IE allowance: tion to make rapid reconnaissance of cap­ one ~-ton -truck). This will permit rapid tured and abandoned material, and (2) lack reconnaissance for captured and abandoned of facilities for moving very large items. material by salvage collecting units which often operate as separate platoons or de· Recommendations tachments, over wide areas. It is recommended that: I. Three lO-ton wreckers and three low· a. At the time of staging and loading of bed engineer type trailers be added to tht units, closer supervision be exercised in order TIE allowance for Salvage Collecting Com to assure that the prescribed supplies and panies. (At present neither of these iteml equipment accompany units to the opera­ is included in the TIE.) This will facilitatl tional area. This applies primarily to small prompt removal of cumbersome and hea attached units. captured or abandol'led material. The Essential Elements of Information and the Intelligence Pian COLONEL H. D. KEHM, Field Artillery Instructor, Command and General Staff School ANY commanders and staff officers who ly assigned. The intelligence plan unlike most M participated in long and arduous cam­ other plans, is not a set piece that is started paigns and never saw essential elements of and played out like a tactical operation such mformation (EEI) or an intelligence plan as an assault on a hostile shore or an air as outlined in our field manuals are quite attack on an enemy airdrome. The intelligence skeptical when yards of EEl and reams of plan results in instructions to various intelligence plan are found regularly in agencies to do specific things. These are schools and unit training. usually physically independent of each other. Since this feeling is more or less wide­ Some are completed quickly, others take con­ spread we should re-examine our doctrines siderable time. Hence, as the operation pro­ and their application to see if something has gresses certain of these missions are no deteriorated. longer possible, certain others can no longer First, we should inquire why we have EEl yield valuable information, and still others and an intelligence plan. The only reason for are fully accomplished. At the same time new their existence is to produce intelligence in­ missions arise because new enemy capabilities structions ,or missions which should supply (or modifications of former ones) have the information needed without any unneces­ arisen. sary duplication of effort. The EEl state the The intelligence picture develop~ contin­ mtelligence needs in broad general terms. The uously to meet the needs of new phases of mtelligence plan is the process by which these the operation. There is seldom the need for needs are analyzed and converted into specific preparing a complete new plan at any mformation-gathering jobs or missions. particular time. Intelligence presents a mov­ If this is true why don't we see EEl more ing picture--not a series of "stills." frequently? The answer is based on the If this is true, why don't we scrap the plan fundamental nature of intelligence activity. conception? There are two good reasons for It is a constantly developing moving picture keeping it. Fi/'st, it outlines a logical pro­ in which blanks must be filled while the scene cess through which one must go if he wishes IS changing. By frequent, at least daily, con­ to insure the greatest chance that all possible tact with G-2 and with subordinate and indications of prospective enemy action will .e higher commanders and through his own be sought. Second, it is the best insurance t. observations the commander maintains a against issuing conflicting and duplicating .. running- picture of the capabilities of his instructions which will "harass the troops." .d enemy. Furthermore, a good commander and This process of analyzing intelligence require­ Id G·2 are always fighting the battle or phase ments to produce logical missions should be :h ahead of the one in progress or about to get followed whether a single EEl or a dozen e. under way. For these two reasons, novelties are under consideration. The process does not or variations in intelligence requirements are have to take place on paper. That always ~. constantly arising. As they conie up, G-2 helps. However, a skillful and experienced ~e promptly transforms them into missions, G-2 can do the process mentally and put n. often without asking the commander to only the results on paper. n! authorize any formal announcement of EEL Our training is 'often misleading too be­ .tI If new intelligence missions are contin­ cause it cannot present what constitutes SOP. uously heing given it is clear that they must We usually ask the Nth Infantry to report replace, supplement, or modify those previous­ any change in the enemy strength on its 52 MILITARY REVIEW front. Yet we know that if the Nth Infantry so far as concerns intelligence. We can do had enough training to get to the battlefield this by presenting situations such as: You they will report such a fact as a matter of are G-2, you know what has happened since routine. Units ordinarily report certain the last formal report. The Commanding Gen­ classes of information, e.g., any strengthen-' eral has just returned from a visit to one of ing of the enemy facing them, without specific the subordinate commands. You have a chancp orders. Just what these are is difficult to to speak with him for a few minutes. Re­ portray in most exercises and problems. This quired: the topics you will discuss. does work itself 'out in operations, but even Tell him what you've learned. Suggest any then in 110 two cases docs it work out exactly new EEl or intelligence missions and get the same way. Our training, quite properly his views on them. is on the conservative side. Situations of this general nature readily We note that our doctrine in respect to suggest themselves. Conversations can and EEl and the intelligence plan is sound. It should frequently be staged in training'. needs more thoughtful application. Second. Each unit should set up a limited Our training and instruction can assist number of specific items of intelligence and this "more thoughtful application" by placing information which are always reported when more emphasis on the following: discovered. Similarly, lists of standard in· First, by frequent-usually informal-con­ formation always sought by intelligence ferences the commander and G-2 are con­ agencies such as PI (Photo Interpretation), tinuously determining new EEl or modifying IPW (Interrogation of Prisoners of War), existing ones. and documents personnel should be prepared. Second, an alert intelligence section by for­ These might very well be included in the mal or informal action quicIdy transforms SOP of the unit. They should be kept to such EEl into new intelligence missions or mod­ a minimum that they can be memorized easily ifications of existing ones. These new or mod­ and used without reference to any paper. ified instructions are disseminated formally Such a list will result in reducing the work in or informaIIy as soon as they are prepared. preparing an intelligence plan and will de. The original intelligence plan is therefore crease the number of instructions which need usually patched and altered so that it grad­ to be issued. What is more important, it will ually gr'ows into a new one instead of being serve as a device for focusing effort 'and replaced in its entirety. , attention on basic intelligence essentials. Third, the formal announcement of EEl Third. We should put less time in working and the resulting working out of a detailed in­ out complete intelligence plans and more on telligence plan is the safest procedure when practice in modifying and developing an ex­ a complete change in nature or scene of action isting one by the introduction of new or takes place. This occurs when, for example, modified EEl in accordance with a develOP-I a unit moves from one front to another or, ing situation. Such training will put an intel­ when it passes from the static defense to the ligence section on the alert and will emphasize offensive or when it is earmarked for a special the need for anticipatory plannning. It will operation such as a landing on a distant also drive home the conception that intel­ hostile shore. In the "normal" progressive ligence missions are something that must be operation the gradual evolution described constantly reviewed to 1,eep them in harmony above is more appropriate. with events and needs. How can we train in these points? Fourth. As training progresses there should First. We can tr.ain in informal briefings be frequent practice in which the step is and conferences, a subject in which our directly from new enemy capability to intel-' training has been weak generaIIy-not only ligence instructio~s. "", Training Staff Trainers .. LIEUTENANT COLONEL BENJAMIN F. BOYER, Infantry Former Chief, Training Division, Command and General Staff School HE wartime mission of the Command By December 1942, the size of the wartime T and General Staff School hall been to classes was increased. Over a thousand of­ provide the basic staff training needed to ficers were attending each ten weeks course. meet the requirements of divisions, corps and The number of those detailed by the War similar units of the Air, Ground, and Service Department to the Staff and Faculty of the Forces. Wartime classes operated at the School also increased. The peacetime faculty school over a three year period. In that time had numbered about fifty. It rose to more 17,000 students successfully completed the than one hundred. Parenthetically, it may be course. remarked that on VJ -Day the Staff and All of these students were indoctrinated Faculty totaled 165. with the techniques necessary for them to At the same time that the Faculty was en­ function at the gel1€ral staff level. Training larged, the average tour of duty as an in­ these students, however, was not the only structor was decreased. By January 1945, it training problem which had to be solved at was only a year in length. This progressiVe the Command and General Staff School. It reduction in length of tour accentuated the was necessary that suitable instructors be rapid rate of turnover in faculty. There was trained, too. a distinct possibility that it might impair the It goes without saying that, if staff officers maintenance of the traditional high standards were to be taught properly, it was necessary of instruction at Leavenworth. Since only five to provide a suitable inst1'Uctio)1al staff. The classes of ten weeks length each were given staff trainers had to be trained! The respon­ every year, there was a likelihood that in­ sibility for training the school's instructors structors would hardly become acclimated be­ was assigned to the Training Division, Com­ fore their tour of duty was completed. mand and General Staff School. The Commandant, being of the opinion that This article describes the creation and the rapid turnover of instructors required dutie8 of the Training Division as well as that they be speedily prepared for effective the orientation and indoctrination which the work, created the Training Division. new instructor receives before he appears be­ Duties of Training Division fore classes at the Command and General Under current regulations (AR 350-110), Staff School. the Assistant Commandant is charged with The Training Division, all matters pertaining to instruction at the Command and General Staff School School. It is logical, therefore, that the Train­ Prior to 1943, a Training Division, as such, ing Division function under him. As of did not exist at the Command and General August 1945 the Training Division was as­ Staff School. Such l-instruction in training signed six different responsibilities. They methods as a new instructor might receive may be briefly stated: was at the hands of an older, more ex­ The Training Division (1) provides a con­ perienced instructor who was told to help sulting service to all instructors on the appli­ the new instructor "get settled." In those cation of teaching techniques, (2) supervises days, the average tour of duty as an instruc­ the development and use of instructional aids, tor was from two to two and one half years. (3) orients new 1nstructors, (4) supervises There was ample time for a new instructor the conduct of the Latin American Class, to 0rient himself and to learn to find his way (5) supervises the operation of the consult­ arouncj the School before he appeared on ing service on Climate, Oceanography and the platform before a class. Meteorology (C-O-M), and (6) periodically 54 MILITARY REVIEW conducts, for Directors of Latin American aids available which will assist the instructor Military Schools, the Special Course in In­ in his task. structional Methods. As mentioned, familiarization with educa­ These duties are diverse and multifarious. tional techniques comprises the second por­ Yet they are all connected, related and . cion of instructor orientation. A series of dependent. The ol'icntation of instructors is conferences are aimed at presenting the fol­ followed up by maintaining the consulting lowing: (1) sources for materials and the services indicated. And the Special Instruc­ development of materials for platform use; tional Methods course rationalizes and pre­ (2) methods for evolving or creating situa­ sents our techniques and methods for visiting tions, exercises and problems; (3) require­ school directors from Latin America. ments and devices for examining or testing Orientation of New Instructors and grading the student; (4) the role of the instructor in map maneuvers, tutorials and Orientation of new instructors is the most committee work; and (5) the use of instruc­ important of the duties assigned to the tional aids. Training Division. The large size of the classes and the short tour of duty requires When this material is understood, the new that each instructor be speedily prepared to in~tructor moves on to a consideration of carry his share of the teaching load. the third and final phase of his orientation. During 1\)44 and H)45 approximately one­ He now is ready to prepare a specific sub­ fifth of the school's instructors completed ject for rehearsal and presentation to the their tours of duty at the end of each ten class. week's class. Thus there was virtually a com­ This preparation of a subject tests the plete turnovcr of the teaching instructors instructor's ability and permits formulation every calendar year. To rc>place (Ieparting in­ of judgment on the desirability of retaining structors the Training Division was required him on the faculty. to train approximately twenty new instructors The normal sequence in preparing a sub­ every ten weeks. ject is as follows: First, the instructor is The training of new instructors was ac­ assigned a directive. This directive states the complished through a formal course in in-. subject to be presented, indicates the class structional methods and through informal which receives it and the time allotted. It conferences and personal guidance. often describes in detail the scope of instruc· Orientation for the embryonic' instructor tion desired and the emphasis to be given to lS divided into three parts. The first famil­ particular portions of the topic. iarizes him with the physical plant at the Once the directive is obtained, the instruc· school. including the available facilities and tor must analyze it to formulate his own their location. The second deals with educa­ outline. Here in logical sequence, he states tional techniques, while the third and final and develops the points he wis,hes to make in phase requires the preparation and rehearsal his presentation. When the outline has been of a formal classroom .presentation. approved, the instructor develops the outline. Familiarization with the School and its fa­ He does this by writing a complete manuscript cilities is dOlle in several ways. First, the of his presentation. At the same time, the In· organization of the Faculty, the Staff, and structional Aids Section of the Training the ~chool Services is explained. There fol­ Division is consulted. It provides expert ad­ lows a tour of the plant. This insures a vice on whether a particular point can be realization of the facilities which are avail­ best presented with the aid of a slide, a map. able to assist in the preparation and presenta­ a chart, a film or an exhibit or display. The tion of instructional materials. By explana­ integration of audiovisual aids with the writ­ tion and demonstration at this stage there ing of the manuscript insures maximum ef· is secured a thorough understanding of the fectiveness in presentations. TlI.AINING STAFF 'l'RAlNEll.S 65. Much of the instruction at the Command b. 'School Services. and General Staff School is presented to c. Tour of Plant. audiences ranging in size from two hundred II. Method8 of Instruction (General). to one thousand students. The size of classes a. Theory and Methods of Military In­ makes the employment of public address struction (FM 21-5). systems imperative. The easy informality b. Basic Educational Methods. which often contributes to the success of c. Specific Methods for Command and Gen­ small-group instruction cannot prevail with eral Staff School. a large class. Therefore, special attention is d. Use of Instructional Aids. given to the instructor's preparation. He must become adept to the use of the microphone, III. Measurement and Evaluation of Educa­ he must utilize all available training aids to tionq.l Achievement. avoid the formality which is likely to appear a. General Theory. in large-group instruction. He prepares notes b. Preparing Requirements for Command for use on the platform and rehearses the and General Staff School. entire presentation several times before he c. Marking system, Command and General is permitted to appear before a class. During Staff School. rehearsals criticism is made as necessary of IV. Research and Preparation ()j In8truc­ any mannerisms which might detract from tional Materials. teaching. The aims of the Training Division a. Techniques of Research. are to make the instructor feel at home on b. Fundamentals of Writing and Outlining. the platform and his teachings clear, ac­ c. Instructor Relationships with Publica­ curate, readily understandable and effective. t ions Divisions. When the new instructor has completed the V. Techniques of Presentation. work outlined above, a dress rehearsal is held in the hall where the presentation is to be u. Elementary Public Speaking. made to the class at a later date. A satisfac­ b. Superviqed Rehearsals. tory final rehearsal, usually held in the c. Microphone and Classroom Techniques. presence of the new instructor's future Divi­ d. Supervised study of presentations by sion Chief, is followed by a recommendation experienced instructors. to the Assistant Commandant that the in­ e. Presentation of Instructor's prepared structor be assigned to a Division of the materials. Faculty. If the recommendation is approved, VI. Applicatol'Y Work. the instructor is released from the Training a. Preparing a Conference. Division and begins his work with the classes. b. Working as assistant on Map Maneuvers or Tutorials. Outline of Instructional Methods Course c. Serving as assistant on marking com­ The formal instruction given as orientation mittees and solving committees. for the new instruc)or may, for convenience, be divided into six separate sub-courses. The Summary material presented in each of these sub­ The new instructor usually spends from Courses is indicated in the follo'o/ing outline: two and one half to three weeks in the Train­ Course in Instructional Methods (1945) ing Division. In that time he receives a com­ (Training, Division, Command prehensive knowledge of the facilities and and General Staff School) services available' to assist him in teaching 1. Command and General Staff School the future General Staff Officers of our Orientation. Army. He refreshes his memory on educa­ a. Organization, Command and General tional techniques and receives indoctrination Staff School. in special educational techniques employed at MILITARY REVIEW the Command and General Staff School. In tionaI philosophy which is used with the addition, he actually prepares one exercise or classes at the school is also used in training conference for presentation to the classes. it!; instructors. The time devoted to orienting In all of the training of the new instructor, the new instructor is intended to make him the emphasis is placed on "learning by doing." aware of his duties as a teacher and how he In orienting him the applicatory system is can discharge those duties. Through it the employed constantly. Thus. the same educa­ staff trainers receive their training.

Biological Warfare A type of warfare that might have been employed in .world War II-a poten­ tial avenue of attack by our enemies-was biological warfare. Biological warfare may be defined as the use of bacteria, fungi, viruses, rickettsies, and toxic agents from living organisms (as distinguished from synthetic chemicals used as gases or poisons) to produce dealh or disease in men, animals, or plants. This type of warfare was not unknown in World War I, although it was employed only on a very limited scale. There is incontrovertible evidence, for example, that in 1915 German agents inoculated horses and cattle leaving United States ports for ship­ ment to the Allies with disease-producing bacteria. The War Research Service wa~ organized in the SUlllmer of 1942. It served primarily as a coordinating agency and drew on the facilities, personnel, and experience already existing in the Government and private institutions. While it is not possible to reveal at this time the specific agents on which intensive work was done, the general nature of the problem and the type of in­ formation that was obtained in this field can now be told. It should be emphasized that while the main objective in all these endeavors was to develop methods for defending ourselves against possible enemy use of biological warfare agents, it was necessary to investigate offensive possibilities in order to learn what measures could be used for defense. A wide variety of agents pathogenic for men, animals. and plants was con­ sidered. Agents selected for exhaustive investigation were made as virulent as possible, produced in specially selected culture media and under optimum condi­ tions for growth, and tested for disease-producing power on animals or plants. Intensive investigations were conducted on many aspects of this field, including studies of how well various organi~ms of high disease-producing power would retain their virulence and how long they would remain alive under different storage conditions; biological, physical, and chemical protective measures; the number of organisms required to produce infection; the effectiveness of antibiotics and chemo-therapeutic agents; the incubation period of various diseases; and the effectiveness of certain chemicals (01' coagents) when used with pathogenic agents or toxins in influencing their disease-producing powers. Studies were made of methods and means by which biological warfare agents might be employed against us. The activities of the United States in the field of biological warfare, undertaken under the goad of necessity and aimed primarily toward securing for this nation and its troops in the field adequate protection t against the possible use by our enemies of biological warfare agents, were carried on with that teamwork which has characterized so many of our efforts in wartime. -From a news report. . ..', The Reduction of Intramuros MAJOR REGINALD S. JACKSON Press Relations Officer, XIV Corps Prologue main strength and armament along the east ROOPS of the XIV Corps invaded Lin­ wall siting in twenty-nine mutually support­ gayen Gulf in central Luzon on S-day. ing machine guns and twelve guns including Twhich was 9 January 1945. The landing was two antiaircraft, one 75-mm -and two l05-mm made without ground opposition, although pieces. Tank and vehicle obstacles were enemy aircraft continually attacked shipping placed at the junction of Taft Avenue and in the harbor and harassed landing craft Burgos Street just southeast of Victoria traveling to the beaches from transports. Gate; at Quezon and Victoria Gates. Mine Meeting sporadic resistance, the corps fields were laid before the sally ports pro­ drove rapidly south and by 15 February had tecting Parian and Victoria Gates. \ broken all Japanese organized resistance in Along the north wall defenses were second­ central Luzon and Manila with the exception ary only to those to the west. Fifteen ma­ of strong defenses which still existed in the chine guns, seven guns and one 150-mm how­ sixteenth-century walled city (Intramuros). itzer comprised the armament. Included Four days later the main effort of the among the guns were: one 8-inch, one 37-mm, 17th Infantry Division, progressing from the one 120-mm and one 6-inch. The preponde"r­ east with its northern limiting point the ance of artillery along this wall indicates Pasig River, had reached Taft Avenue. that these weapons were used to fire upon In the 37th's southern sector, the 148th United States troops advancing into the city Infantry Regiment was meeting stiff opposi­ from the north as well as for fin!a defense. tion from Japanese defenses in the City Hall, One of the machine guns was emplaced at the Legislative, Finance and Agricultural the southern approach to Jones Bridge to fire buildings. These strong points were con­ across the span. An obstacle was placed at tained by the 148th and mopping up began as the gate behind the Mint and mine fields were Jlajor General Robert S. Beightler, command­ laid between the Mint and the wall. ing general of the 37th Division, completed Next in priority in the planning of the his plans for the reduction of lntramuros. defenses was the west wall. Here seven ma­ Meanwhile, the 1st Brigade of the 1st (Dis­ chine guns, four guns and a 105-mm how­ mounted) Cavalry Division, under control of itzer were utilized. One of the guns was of lO5-mm. Two obstacles protected the en­ the Commanding General, 37th Division, was threatening from the south to imperil any trance to the city on Aquana Street. There were no mine fields laid. The artillery Japanese withdrawal in that direction. The weap~n along the west wall indicated Japanese enemy made no attempt to fortify and de­ fend the Port Area which isolated lntramu­ preparations for a United States amphibious ros from Manila Hybor. landing south of the Pasig River in the Port Area. The Defenses Resistance of the enemy in the city build­ The walls of Intramuros are of stone ings southeast of Intramuros enabled Ad­ block, forty feet thick at the base, tapering miral Iwabuchi to concentrate his weapons through sixteen feet of height to a width of elsewhere, and along the south wall were twenty feet at the top. Space for seven gates fifteen machine guns and one gun. An ob­ IS included in the walls, six defended by sally stacle and mine ·fields were placed outside ports and the seventh by the Philippine Gov­ the South Gate. In certain places in the walls ernment Mint Building. tunnels were constructed to provide for shift­ Rear Admiral Iwabuchi, commander of the ing of weapons. Manila Naval Defense Force, had placed his Virtually all trenches were constructed, 58 MILITUT ll1!:VIBW THE REDUCTION OF INTRAMUROS 59 paradoxically, in the southwest section of ment began its attack from Taft Avenue di­ the city, and barbed wire, used sparingly, rected at the hole in tpa northeast corner was placed along machine-gun final defense of the city's walls, and elements of the 129th lines. Infantry Regiment crossed the Pasig River The Attack in engineer assault boats between the Mint Lieutenant General O. W. Griswold, com­ and Jones Bridge. manding general of the XIV Corps, in a mes­ First assault troops of the 145th arrived sage to Admiral Iwabuchi on 16 February at the wall at 0833 to be joined by troops asked that the Japanese commander sur­ of the 12nth at 0836. To screen the attack render his forces, since his situation was from Japanese remnants still holding out in hopeless. "If you do not agree to surrender," the four government buildings southeast of General Griswold said, "I exhort you that true to the spirit of the Bushido and the code of Samurai, you permit all civilians to evacuate the Intramuros by the Victoria Gate without delay, in order that no inno­ cent blood be shed." The message was received by the Japanese commander, who made no reply, and on In February artillery shelling of Intr1\muros be­ gan. It had been decided initially to level the city by aerial bombardment, but the plan wag changed in the assumption that artillery could concentrate on purely mHitary targets, thus rendering the maximum effort for the safety of interned civilians. Machine-gun crew enters the Intramuros. Breaching of the wall began with targets Intramul"os, 4.2 chemical mortar smoke was just north of Parian Gate and between Parian placed just south and southeast of Intra­ and Victoria Gates. The first forty rounds muros. of eight-inch howitzer shells at the latter North of the Victoria Gate a brisk fire target resulted in a hole in the wall large fight en~uE'd, but flamethrower teams re­ enough through which to drive a two and duced this resistance. The crossing of the one-half ton army truck. assault bouts was not contested. Tanks, tank destroyers and 37-mm guns The Japanese withdrew, as their positions fired at the walls from ranges of 300 to 500 were in danger of being overrun; and set up yards. Later in the day 155-mm howitzers their machine guns to bring United States were brought up and fired at the walls from troops under murderous cross fires at street a distance of 600 yards. ' intersections. Artillery fire cone1nued to enlarge the two In Fort Santiago, where many hundreds of apertures for the next four days, and 24 civilians were murdered, the 129th Infantry February was set as the date for the in­ met stern opposition. Bitter fighting ensued fantry assault on Intramuros. in the ancient bastion in and around de­ At 0730 the artillery preparation was be­ vastated buildings, tortuous tunnels, and dark gun with all corps artillery firing supple­ pits which the Japanese had turned into mented by 8-inch and 240-mm howitzers. One desperation defenses. By night main re­ hundred eighty-two tons of shells were sistance in the fort had been reduced and dropped into an area 800 by 900 yards in the 400 bodies were counted in the aged Spanish hour's concentration. fortification. Simultaneously, the 145th Infantry Regi­ In the 145th Infantry sector more than MILITAKY REVIEW '­ 2,000 refugees fled from the Del Monico Discussion Church, seriously impeding the continuation The plan of defense of the Japanese com­ of the attack in that zone. At this time heavy mander was logical, but the tremendous su­ enemy machine-gun fire was being directed at our troops. After rapid evacuation of periority of American weapons in caliber 'civilians, elements of the 145th supported ancl number nullified enemy preparations no by tanks, self-propelled howitzers and tank matter how carefully conceived and executed, destroyers clrove the Japanese out of Intra­ Admiral Iwabuchi correctly estimated that muros. the main attack would come from the east with a possibility that it might be shifted to enter the city from the north. However. the Pasig River provided an obstacle where­ us thel'e was no such obstacle to the east. It is doubtful that the Japanese commander might have been able to coordinate more ably the artillery pieces at his disposal, since the c10sp range made artillery support in the defense improbable. The pel'fect coordination of the lifting of ,,-,-,,;;Ji the at·tillery barrage, the jump-off of as­ saulting troops, and the laying of protective smoke simultaneously perhaps saved many American lives. 145th Infantry enters the Intramuros. AIHI as it has been proved so many times The next night, 25 February, Japanese at­ in World War II, defenses no matter how tempted to infiltrate the south wall unsuc­ stout, can be broken by superiority of weapons cessfully, and fire power.

The remarkable efficiency of handling both prisoners and displaced persons along the routes of an advancing victorious army was the fruit of lim intensive elIort to establish a new conception in the organization of military police. Our experience in the old AEF indicated that a highly trained military police force could be of tremendous value to military operations. Up to that time military police were used simply to enforce discipline and the regulations to which troops were subject. A careful study of World War operations coupled with experience in the first maneu­ vers brought the concept of using military police for helpful control of military traffic moving to and during battle. For this purpose special training schools were established by the Provost Marshal General. Insofar as possible older men were selected for the training. The returns of this elIort were especially rich in the drive across France which heavily depended on the forwarding of the troops and 'supplies which had been put ashore in Normandy. Later in the collapse of German resistance the military police performed miracles in regulating the dense, rather chaotic traffic on the roads, burdened with combat troops and their supplies surging forward and millions of prisoners and displaced persons straggling in the opposite direction. General of the Army George (6. Marshall Antiaircraft Artillery Guns in a Ground Support Role LIEUTENANT COLONEL HOWARD P. PERSONS, Coast Artillery Corps Instrnctor, Command and General Staff School N Tunisia no matter what caused the dual role of primary antiaircraft defense and I explosion it was always creqited, cor­ secondary ground support, or it can be em­ rectly or incorrectly, to the omnipresent ployed solely in ground support-either as "88"-if a bomb had been dropPed it was the an artillery or antitank weapon. It should JU-88, if a shell had arrived it was the not be used in a dual role with the ground SS-mm Flak gun. Greatly were both "88's" support role primary, and under no circum­ hateu and respected by our ground troops. stances should it have an additional role From the African desert, where the 88-mm when assigned to antitank defense. The 90­ Flak gun deployed in ambush played a cru­ mm antiaircraft gun is most valuable when cial part in the destruction of some 230 out performing a dual role with the primary of 300 British tanks in a single battle, to role as antiaircraft and the secondary role' the Elbe, the Germans used their medium as medium artillery on general support and antiaircraft gun in constant support of the reinforcing missions--only then are its full ground battle. potentialities realized. Although well aware of the potentialities In order to understand the value of this of our own 90-mm antiaircraft gun as a powerful weapon, let us examine its capa­ ground support weapon, we were unable to bilities and limitations: exploit its capabilities in this role until the Capabilities gun was available in quantity sufficient to High rate of fire: One battery~ (four M2 provide adequate local defense of the Field guns) is equivalent to one and one-half bat­ Forces and important ground' installations talions (l05-mm howitzers) of field artillery against the enemy air threat. It was not in volume of fire and weight of metal deliv­ until the winter of 1943. when our advance ered, an important consideration in surprise was slowed in the mud and mountains of fire where a heavy concentration at the Italy, that the degree of air superiority at­ target within the shortest possible time is tained by our Air Force and the need for desired. more and more artillery by the ground force High muzzle velocity: A muzzle velocity made it possible for the antiaircraft artillery of 2,800 feet per second insures great strik­ to put into practice the basic army doctrine ing power and makes the projectile inaudible that artillay is never held in reSel·ve. on approach to the target, an effect very Born, as artillery, at Cassino, the 90-mm demoralizing to troops. antiaircraft guns located in Corps zones, Relatively long range: An effective range when not actively engaging hostile aircraft, of 18,000 yards as compared to an effective thenceforth engaged in ground support with range of 14,000 yards for the 155-mm how­ a vengeance. Quickly becoming famous as itzer makes the 90-mm gun valuable as a the "Baby Long Tont," these guns fired alon~ general support weapon with the Corps or 40,000 rounds in Fifth Army's attack and Division Artillery. breakthrough of the Gustav Line and Unlimited travel'se: A 360-degree traverse materially assisted in the breal"mt at Anzio, insures maximum flexibility. neutralizing artillery, battering strongpoints and breaking up troop concentrations. Limitations With no modification to gun or mount, the Ammunition: 9O-mm ammunition is of the 90-mm M1A1 or M2 gun can readily be used fixed type; the powder charge cannot be as a ground support weapon, either to re­ varied to suit the mission as is possible with inforce field artillery or to reinforce the field artillery ammunition. The 90-mm pro­ antitank defense. It ean be employed in a jectile is light in weight and has limited 62 MILITARY REVIEW destructive power compared with field artil­ craft battalion might be tied in to a different lery guns and howitzers of similar range. It Field Artillery FDC) (see Diagram I). From ,is more suited to neutralizing or harassing the Field Artillery FDC fire missions are missions than to destruction missions. All assigned direct to the antiaircraft unit with types of fuzes (impact, time, VT, and con- ' which communications have been established. crete-piercing) are available for use with If the mission is within the battery's capa­ the standard antiaircraft ammunition. bilities and ammunition allowance, the Flat trajectory: While invaluable in di­ battery fires without further orders. If the rect fire (tanks, pillboxes, caves) a flat mission is not a suitable one, the battery trajectory is a definite limitation for in­ commander (or the battalion commander direct fire whenever defilade is essential since when a battalion FDC is operated) is au­ the mask eliminates fire at short ranges. thorized to refuse it. Observation of fire is High silhouette: A relatively high sil­ conducted either by the field artillery ground houette makes the gun difficult to camou­ observers or Air OP's (light liaison-type flage and requires that the gun be dug in aircraft), or by antiaircraft ground ob­ for protection. Positions are generally pre­ servers trained in forward observer methods; pared in advance of occupation. the majority of the observing is normally Weight: Routes over which the 90-mm can done by the field artillery. Employment in move are limited to Class 24. The gun crew this manner requires first, that all echelons can not manhandle the gun. Twenty minutes be completely trained; and second, a com­ are required to emplace it in firing position prchensive Standing Operating Procedure. (firing from the wheels is possible only as an In all cases complete understanding and liai­ emergency measure). son must be secured between the antiaircraft and the field artillery on all levels. The anti­ Employment aircraft gun battalion commander (normally Dual role: When the primary mission i~ through the anti-aircraft Group or Brigade) to provide antiaircraft defense and the sec­ keeps the Corps or Division Artillery Com­ ondary mission is to provide reinforcing ar­ mander constantly informed of his position tillery fire, antiaircraft gun battalions de­ areas, his dead areas, his ammunition status~ ployed in forward areas habitually select and the results of al1 missions fired. The position areas from which their primary mis­ antiaircraft always has the final say, in· the sion can be accomplished with as little prej­ dual role. as to which missions will or will udice as possible to the accomplishment of not he fired. After a little experience at work­ the secondary mission. Control for the anti­ ing together. missions need seldom be re­ aircraft role is exercised in the normal fused. At first, however. the field artillery manner through an Antiaircraft Operations has the tendency, for example, to assign all Room (AAOR). Control for the field artil­ night harassing missions to the antiaircraft lery role is exercised by the Field Artillery so that the field artillery can sleep. The field through it Fire Direction Center (FDC). In artillery must be impressed with the fact relatively stable situations the antiaircraft battalion (as the reinforcing unit) establishes that missions which they can perform should communication with the nearest Field Artil­ not he assigned to the antiaircraft, that the lery FDC, normally by wire line from the antiaircraft should only be called on to fire antiaircraft battalion FDC. In fast moving missions when additional artillery is needed situations, control is decentralized and each either to increase the mass of fire, to cover antiaircraft gun battery (batteries are sel­ an area that would otherwise have to be left dom located in the antiaircraft role less than uncovered, or to hit a target whose pecu­ 6,000 yards apart) operates its own FDC liarities call for this special weapon; in other and runs a wire line to the nearest Field words, that antiaircraft is to reinforce. not Artillery FDC (each battery in an antiair­ substitute. "" ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY GUNS IN A GROUND SUPPORT ROLE ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY IN DUAL ROLE

Brigade or Group ~I ...... _ I I "'-_ I 0J I II ---- . I-l -- I MOR ~ -__ I IF 1 - ---....-.. / /' I \ I --__ / / 1/ \ ~ ;>--fi'L II \ ~ ,~I '/ • \ I \ /// 1/ / \ I \ /' I, \

I \ / I \ / \ /'/ /1 / I \ ~ \ / \, I I \ \ / \ ,/ __ --/...... / I \ \ / \// // I \ I --,' / \ \ / ///\ / -- /1 ,/'\ 1'-----1 \ '. I ,,-~ / \ I 1----_ \ \ ~';/ \~;{/' \~J ''---~

-- _. ---- Field Artillery Control Channels ---- _. Antiaircraft Control Channels ------Administerative Channels :- Diagram I. Grolmd role only: To employ antiaircraft the battalion will normally be used as medium guns in a primary field artillery or anti­ artillery on general support and reinforcing tank rule requires a command decision from missions and will operate as a battalion; the commander of the Division, Corps, or control will not be decentralized to batteries. other major unit to which attached, since The battalion will function in every way only the Commander can decide when air exactly as though it were a field artillery defenf(, may be neglected in favor of other battalion and its operation requires no further operations. explanation here. ~.' "!llhen the mbission .assi.gnethd an at~lltiaircralft t~llhen the mbisstiton .assi.gntehd an at~tatiakircralft I altl ery gun attalIon IS e ar I ery ro e, ar I ery gun a alIOn IS e an I n ro e, 64 MILITARY REVIEW the battalion will be employed similarly to the possibilities for deception alone, our fail­ the old Tank Destroyer Battalion, towed, ex­ ure to use such guns was a mistake. To use cept due to the limitations of' the weapon it only one example-during the German winter should be used only to reinforce the normal offensive in 1944, we were forced to with­ antitank means within the Corps, i.e., it draw much artillery from the Dueren-Juelich should not be used in the first line of anti~ sector for use in the Ardennes. High-ranking tank defense, but rather should be disposed prisoners of war have stated that this fact in depth to cover possible breakthroughs in could be clearly recognized. Had a few roving the front line. Use of antiaircraft guns in guns been employed in the old artillery posi­ this role is justified only in cases of emer­ tiollS. the enemy would have been deceived gency such as occurred during the battle of about the strenght of our artillery. the Ardennes, where they were used to good The 90-mm antiaircraft gun is an excel­ effect. The only important points to re­ lent weapon for use as a roving gun because member in employing antiaircraft guns in an of its high rate of fire, its relatively long antitank role are: (1) that they must be range and its flexibility. To a limited extent deployed in ambush, (2) that they must be this weapon was used in this role, particular­ deployed at least in pairs and preferably by ly in the French sector of Sixth Army battery of four guns, and (3) that they are Group, where it was employed to harass Ger­ helpless against hostile infantry without our man installations on the east bank of the up­ own infantry or engineer support. per Rhine. The effectiveness of this harassing Direct fire role: The 90-mm antiaircraft fire was not lessened by the use of relatively gun has demonstrated considerable ability few guns. Since the guns moved constantly, as a direct fire weapon in this war partic­ the Germans never knew from where or when ularly against Japanese caves and against the fire would come, or whether it would pillboxes where its flat trajectory and high come in heavy volume for a short period or muzzle velocity were exploited. The accuracy' in less volume over a longer period. of the weapon permits firing directly into cave mouths or pillbox ports and embrasures Conclusions from distances as great as 1,000 yards. In The 90-mm antiraircraft gun is a weapDn the attack of a fortified zone, fire can be which no commander desirous of utilizing all continued in order to deny the defenders the his available means to their fullest extent can use of embrasures for returning fire until afford to overlook. Whether used in its the assault parties have actually reached the primary role as antiaircraft 01' used in a fortifications. Batteries can be detached from ground support role as reinforcing artillery battalion control. moved forward and as­ or antitank, this weapon can render in­ signed this type mission whenevel' the oc­ valuable assistance and every staff officer ,of casion demands. division or higher level should be fully con­ Roving gun role: Our artillery in this war versant with its principal capabilities and made little use of roving guns. Considering limitations.

This war has demonstrated completely that the resources of this nation in man­ power and in raw materials are not unlimited. To realize this is to comprehend the urgent need for finding a \\ay to allocate these resources intelligently among the competing services. This means designing a balanced military structure reflecting a considered apportionnH'nt of responsibility among the services fl>r the per­ formance of a joint mission. President ,Harry S. Truman "", The Twentieth Air Force LIEUTENANT GENERAL N. F. TWINING Former Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force N announcing the Twentieth Air Force was the start of a chain of accomplishments I with General Arnold as its commander which led to the dramatic morning six years the War Department made this statement: later when the crew of a B-29 over Hiroshima "The Twentieth Air Force was ~reated by watched the atomic bomb blast an end to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the application the war. of a new refinement of global warfare. In 1941 when Pearl Harbor plunged the "The Twentieth Air Force will be in the United States into war, the concept of the nature of an aerial battle fleet, able to B-29 was altered from that of a defensive participate in combined operations, or to weapon to that of a long-range heavy bom­ be assigned to strike wherever the need is bardment airplane. This necessitated radical greatest. Just as the naval fleets are avail­ changes in the designs and blueprints. able for assignment by the Joint Chiefs of In 1942 the first B-29 was flown success­ Staff to any vital. project, so the Twentieth fully by the late Eddie Allen, chief test pilot Air Force can likewise be assigned. It is not, for Boeing. By February 1943 three experi­ therefore, because of its great potentialities, mental B-29's had been completed and the the weapon of a single agency of the Army program well started. Air Forces, but a central aerial battle fleet Major General Kenneth B. Wolfe was di­ in whose employment and deployment all the rected to assume charge of the B-29 project. top commanders, including air, land, and sea, However, in that same month Eddie Allen will have a voice, and all of whom will be and the entire test crew were killed in the kept in constant touch with its operations." crash of the first experimenta1 B-29 at The story of the Twentieth Air Force and Seattle. With them went most of the accumu­ its employment in the war against Japan lated knowledge of the mechanical complexi­ should ,)rovide the basis for thoughtful re­ ties of the new plane. Another man might flection on the part of any potential aggres­ have thrown up his hands at this tragedy. sor. It is a typically American story; its in­ Instead, General Wolfe suggested that they gredients are foresight and ingenuity, dogged go ahead with the as yet unfinished plane, determination, the capacity fOf infinite labor commit it to production, and work out the and sacrifice, and the cold bright courage of bugs as they developed; and to speed it into American fighting men. 'combat, start training crews, accumulating The Twentieth Air Force, though not supplies, establishing the overseas bases, and formed until Ap~ii 1944, and not announced getting the organization setup. General until the strike against Japan in June of Arnold approved the plan. 1944, had its beginning in an idea of General On 1 June 1943, the 58th Bombardment Arnold's, as far back as 1939. He believed Wing-first combat unit of the Twentieth AmeriCan defense~cal1ed for a super long­ Air Force---was activated and the actual range, hard-hitting land-based bomber. Even training got underway. Just a year later, the though these splendid airplanes, the B-17 and 58th was to strike the first blow at the Japa­ B·24, were just emerging from the assembly nese homeland since the strike led by Lieu­ plants, he foresaw that they ,would be too tenant General James H. Doolittle from' the small for the test to which American defense carrier Hornet in April 1942. might" be placed. Those intervening months were grim, He envisioned aircraft which could reach wearing, nerve->yracking days and nights of out 1,000 miles from bases, carrying heavy incessant work, against formidable odds, and loads of bombs. In that vision was the birth ever-pressing time. At the Cairo conference of the B-29, and the Twentieth Air Force. It in November 1943 President Roosevelt had 66 MILITARY REVIEW promised the Chinese the strategic bombing the XX Bomber Command flew more photo­ of Japan would be undertaken from Chinese graphic reconnaissance missions than actual bases. He promised a definite number of bombing sorties. planes and crews by a certain date. Chiang­ In the meantime, the Marianas conquest Kai-Shek, in turn, promised the bases. . had been completed. Steam shovels and bUll­ The bases were built. Planes and crews dozers were tearing the coral from the pits arrived in India in April 1944. B-29'5 landed by day and night to lay the runways for this on Chinese fields later in the month. second phase of the Twentieth operations. More remained to be done. Supplies had to This phase was awaited eagerly. The Maria­ be flown into the forward bases in China. nas, on a main water-borne supply line. For every plane to take off against the would have little of the worries about gaso­ Japanese, twelve round-trip flights across line, bombs, and spare parts, so well known the Himalayan Hump had to be made. On 15 by the XX Bomber Commana. June the B-29's lashed out at Yawata, and In October, General Hansell brought the the Twentieth Air Force was announced. first B-29 to the Marianas. The planes of the And even as the XX Bombel Command 73d Wing, commanded by Brigadier General planes were hitting at Yawata, the XXI E. O'Donnell, soon followed. Even as they Bomber Command was gathering its staff and settled down on Saipan from their incoming training crews at bases in Kansas and Col­ voyage, the steam shovels. bull-dozers, and orado. At the same time the Marines, acting other equipment of construction were going under orders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, full blast on Tinian and Guam. Construction were storming ashore on Saipan to secure the in the Marianas called for eleven landing bases from which the XXI Bomber Command strips and hundreds of hardstands. At Tinian was to operate. the world's greatest military airport 'was to With the B-29 and the Twentieth Air Force be constructed. translated from vision to actuality and the Then, on 24 November, just three days first strike against the enemy's homeland after the China based planes of the XX complete, General Wolfe returned to the Bomber Command under General LeMay had Materiel Command as its commander. struck at Omura in their eighteenth mission, In August Major General Curtis E. LeMay the Saipan based planes of General Hansell arrived in the China-Burma theater to as­ hit Tokyo. The air battle of Japan had joined. sume command of the XX Bomber Command. The Twentieth Air Force, on moving into That same month General Hansell assumed battle, had been given this broad directive command of the forming XXI Bomber Com­ from the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "-the ear­ mand with Headquarters at Peterson Field, liest possible progressive destruction and dis­ Colorado. His post as chief of staff of the location of the Japanese military, industrial. Twentieth was taken by Brigadier General and economic systems, and to undermine the Lauris Norstad. morale of the Japanese people to a point The early months of operations by the XX where their capacity for war is decisively de­ Bomber Command were, primarily, months feated." It also had been generally bound to of aircraft and men getting to know each support the broad Pacific offensive. as I have other. But the Japanese were getting to know already indicated. them, too. The Japanese homeland, Man­ The Joint Chiefs of Staff had instructed churia, occupied China, the stolen empire of that its planes be directed against coke and Malaya, Burma, Dutch East Indies-all steel, aircraft, oil, and shipping targets, and these felt the weight of the mounting as­ against the urban industrial areas of Japa­ saults. And, over this empire of the enemy, nese cities. The priority of target: (1) Air­ the winking eyes of the reconnaissance cam­ craft, (2) Urban industrial areas, (3) eras began to lay bare secrets of the Jap's Shipping•. war machine; it is interesting to note that Two phases of this its mission against the At the same time, aircraft of the Twentieth Japanese still were plentiful. In China the Air Force Photo Squadron, far to the west, problem of supply was acute as ever, though were searching Okinawa's secrets. the outstanding efforts of the Air Transport During these weeks further blows had been Command had relieved some of the burden of given the Jap. The floating drydock at Singa­ freighting gas and supplies over the Hima­ pore was blasted, as was the Rama VI rail­ layar, Hump. In the Marianas the XXI had road in Burma. In addition, the airfields and run into a new and formidable enemy­ aircraft production facilities on F'ormosa had weather. Between the islands and Japan, the been effectively neutralized. The XXI Bomber air crews encountered weather as variable Command 29's had put a further crimp in as the Jap'anese themselves. Nip plane production with a thorough blast. 68 MILITARY REVIEW ing of the Nakajima Ota plant near Tokyo. these attacks, the XXI Bomber Command Then on 25 February Japanese cities got carried out ninety-three separate attacks a warning of what was to come. More than against the airfields of :Kyushu and Shikoku 200 B-29's, representing three wings, joined in the attempt to rob the enemy of the bases to hit Tokyo urban-industrial areas. What' from which the suicide attacks were launched. seemed to be a vast area, one square mile, A total of 7,850 tons of bombs was dropped was destroyed. March 4 was an important on these targets. During this period eight day to the men who flew the 29's-the first strategic bombing missions were flown. Super:(ort landed on Iwo Jima. The long One of these had definite significance. On 5 "sweat" home was over for the crews. Up to May the Hiro Naval Aircraft factory, near the end of the war the crews of more than Kure, was heavily blasted by planes of the 2,000 Superforts were to find haven there. 73d and 58th Wings. The 58th Wing, original­ The ten-day period, 10-19 March, broke the ly based in India and China, had been trans­ J ap back. Making one of the great tactical ferred quietly to the Marianas, bringing the decisions of the ail' war, General LeMay battle-wise accurate bombing crews who had sent in the force at altitudes of from 5,000 full supplies that they had longed for. The to 10,000 feet at night to sear and burn the force was now all together. heart out of Japan's key cities. By this time the blows of the Twentieth These blows were the real turning point Air Force had seriously crippled Japanese of the air war against Japan. production. Accordingly, attention was March saw the beginning of another oper­ switched from aircraft to oil and on 10 May ation which was to surprise, bewilder, and the Japanese Navy lost its fueling stations, strangle the enemy. Working in close coopera­ storage tanks, and refining facilities at Toku­ tion with the Navy, the B-29's of the 313th yama, Oshima, and Otake. Wing began the systematic mining of the Then, on 14 May, the B-29's, numbering home waters of Japan. These operations were now more than 500 started another series of to extend and grow until even the closed incendiary attacks that were to remove the waters of his Inland Sea became a death cities of Nagoya, Tokyo, Osaka, Kobe, and pond, and supplies for homeland piled up on Yokohama from the list of targets. the docks at Korea. The air force was in full swing. Using In March the Twentieth Air Force had varying tactics, various bomb loads, hitting come of age. Its fleets numbered more than by day and night, mining, blasting, and burn­ three times the original force. Its crews and ing, it ranged over Japan at will. In June, planes had been battle tested and battle the smaller cities began to wither and die proved. under the rain of incendiaries. The critical On 7 April the first fighter-escorted mission industrial targets such as the Nagoya Arsenal was flown by P-51's rising from the still factories, the light metal plants at Osaka, the bloody dust of Iwo. The target was Tokyo. On Kure Naval Arsenal and the rest of the air­ the same day another force of B-29's laid to craft plants~these became heaps of rubble. rest an old enemy-the Mitsubishi Aircraft On 26 June, the specially trained and engine factory at Nagoya. This factory, the equipped 315th Wing under Brigadier Gen- ' largest in the world, was ninety-four per cent eral Frank Armstrong went into action with destroyed. Japan's remaining oil and gasoline resources In the period between 17 April and 11 May as its list of targets. In a period of less than th~ second part of the directive from the two months the 315th Wing had destroyed Joint Chiefs of Staff was completed. The at­ the cream of these targets. tack on Okinawa had been started. The battle­ During July the Twentieth Air Force B-29's ships, carriers, and cruisers of the Pacific were like locusts over the land. They cele· fleet, SUPPOI:ting that operation, were feeling brated the Fourth of July with more than 550 the sting of the Jap suicide planes. To ease Superforts in the idr. Buring July, just thir­ THE TWENTIETH AIR FORCE 69 teen months after the first attack on Yawata lead, two major steel plants damaged to the by less than 100 airplanes, the Air Force flew extent that Japan's steel capacity was re­ more than 6,500 sorties and dropped 42,000 duced measurably, as well as fourtElen oil tons of bombs and mines. By now 600 B-29's storage and refinery installations. In the air, were able to take the skies on simultaneous 2,334 Japanese aircraft were destroyed, while operations. an additional 1,034 were destroyed on the On 5 Juiy General Carl A. Spaatz took ground, a total of 3,368. Some 12,998 mines command of the Strategic Air Forces in the had been sown in enemy waters; these caused Pacific, with headquarters on Guam. Lieu­ destruction or damage of up to 1,000,000 tenant General Barney M. Giles became his tons of shipping. I deputy commander. The XX and XXI Bomber At the end of the war, Ithe Twentieth Air Commands were inactivated and became the Force still had not reachtid its top strength. Twentieth Air Force. The Strategic Air Plans were under way which would have put Forces were to embrace the Twentieth and more than 1,000 B-29's into the air at one also the Eighth. time. Five wings were in full operation from On 2 August, I took over the Twentieth bases on Guam, Tinian, and Saipan. The when General LeMa'y went to USSTAF as largest air depot in the world was supplying Chief of Staff. On 6 August the atomic bomb these bases from Guam. The staging area at fell from a Twentieth Air Force B-29 over Iwo had gone into operation and B-29's stag­ Hiroshima, and to all purposes the war was ing from Iwo runways had brought all points over. In the fourteen months of its operation in the Jap homeland within reach. The the Twentieth had ranged from Sumatra to Seventh Fighter Command under Brigadier the borders of Russia and from India to General E. Moore had become a part of the lIarcus Island-an area of more than 10,­ air force, and could put more than 300 long­ 500,000 square miles. . range fighters into the air. Three hundred sixty-five regular scheduled As a part of the Strategic· Air Forces, and oombing and mining missions had been flown in conjunction with the Eighth Air Force against the Japanese, excluding those against the Twentieth was at war's end ready to Truk. In addition, thousands of miscellaneous bring Japan such destruction as the world ~llssions-weather, photographic, rescue, had never seen. " training-had been flown. Approximately I cannot close this brief history without 1;0,000 tons of bombs and mines had been paying full tribute to all branches of our dropped. An aggregate of 32,636 flights by armed forces, and those of our allies which mdividual aircraft had been executed. Four made the Twentieth. Army engineers and hundred twenty-three B-29's were lost, and Chinese civilians built our bases in China. 293 crews on these flights. Air Transport Command pilots dared the Sixty-seven Japanese cities, representing Hump to fly in our supplies. Fighter pilots of populations of more than 20,000,000 had been the Fourteenth Air Force flew cover over our attacked. The major portion of the industrial China bases. Marines, Army, and Navy men , capacity of sixty-one" of these had been' de­ died to take our Marianas bases and Iwo , ;troyed. The Japanese themselves said that Jima. Crews of submarines, Navy vessels, almost one-sixth of home island populations and airmen risked death time after time to had been casualties or made homeless. rescue our crews from ditched aircraft. Sea­ Almost 600 important factories 'Were either bees and aviation engineers accomplished .con­ destroyed or damaged. Included were twenty­ struction feats outclassing the building of the' three major factories of Japan's aircraft in­ Pyramids. AI! these, and thousands of others dustry, destruction of which resulted in an played their parts with splendid unselfish estimated sixty per cent reduction in produc­ cooperation, giving everything they had. tion. Included also were five of Japan's major To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Twentieth arsenals, two plants producing tetraethyl Air Force can report: "Directivescarried out." Think It Over COLONEL HENRY J. SCHROEDER, Signal Corps Chief of Personnel Division, Command and General Staff School Wide range of opinions exist as to how by the commander and translated into orders, A the division G-l should function under usually affect the individual daily lives and combat conditions. His many activities have habits of widely diversified groups. of in­ little apparent relation to each other, except dividuals, each with his own separate views" that they require individual treatment and hopes, and ambitions. ' application to military personnel. It is the Poorly planned, unjust, or impractical per- I individual who is G-l's concern. sonnel plans and orders breed discord and If we analyze G-l's various functions, We make for general inefficiency. Wisely planned find this individual treatment constantly personnel orders, which fill definite needs, stressed. Personnel record files eventually or correct injustices, or alleviate hardships", break down into separate cards each carrying assist in building up the spirit and combat' different entries and pertaining to individual effectiveness of the units of the division. men and officers. Replacements are, or shOUld Let us see how a G-l of an infantry di-' be, selected individually for the specific MOS vision functions during combat. Let 'Us ex­ [military occupational specialty] vacancies amine the mechanics or techniques of per­ they are to fill. Pay is delivered to the in­ sonnel section planning. To do this, let us dividual, and after allotments and deduc­ assume that G-l is making a formal estimate tions, different sums are paid to each in­ of the division personnel situation as of two dividual. Mail is eventually delivered letter days before a resumption of the attack in a , by letter to the individual to whom addressed. general offensive operation. First let us;' Recreation, religion, and wclfare assistance examine the Personnel Estimate Form in' are matters of individual choice. Battlefield general (see pages 71-75). The following is' graves are marked with the name of the in­ a brief summary of the five paragraphs of the dividual. The viewpoint could be expanded at G-l estimate form: length. Paragraph 1. MISSION.-Mission of the However, to deal individuallY with the in­ command, and of the personnel section sup­ dividual problems of some 14,000 men and porting the command mission. ' officers in a division is obviously beyond the Paragraph 2. SITUATION.-Tactical con­ capabilities of one division G-t. He must de­ siderations including enemy capabilities and centralize. He deals with personnel problems dispositions of our own forces; logistics dis­ by establishing broad policies for manage­ positions affecting personnel; the personnel ment of personnel. He sets up personnel plans situation including current factual personnel . well in advance, which, when approved, are data with present and impending personnel carried out by a varied number of special problems indicated. staff sections, special troops, and commanders of subordinate units. The subordinate com­ Paragraph 3. POSSIBLE LINES OF ACTION.­ manders deal with individual men and of­ Elements of the personnel situation requiring ficers, but in conformity with the general per­ action with feasible lines of action to meet sonn!'l plans and policies of the division com­ these current and impending personnel mal}der, as drafted by the G-1. problems. . These personnel policies 'and plans, while Paragraph 4. COMPARISON OF LINES OF usually originating in the G-l section, must ACTION.-Advantages and disadvantages of be coordinated with the other staff sections lines of action in Paragraph 3 above. and the commanders concerned. Such coor­ Paragraph 5. CONCLUSIONs.-The recom­ dination requires more than the usual care mended lines of· action; when coordinated and study. Personnel plans, when approved and approved, these c6nstitute the personnel THINK IT OVER 71

,FORM No.1-STAFF ESTIMATE OF THE PERSONNEL SITUATION .(OMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL I 95 Inf Div (Unit)

KOMONO (123-456) (Place) 1800,9 Aug (Hour and Date) !l,PS:" I MIS810N.-otate the mission of the Command. To furnish personnel support for the division aetivities with emphasis on the attaek N, 110700; take objective 8mi to N, then prepare for further offensive action.

2. SITU nlON.- All circumstances affecting personnel, to inclnde: a. Tadical Considerations: (I) Enemy.-(Information from Intelligence Section). (a) Enemy capabilities affecting personnel plans. /. Present disposition and actions of enemy's forces. See Map:' Enemy division, ~ strength, somewhat disorganized. Units: See G-2 Report,' 8 Aug. 2. Minor capabilities-(oabotage, air or ground raids, etc., likely to affect personnel plans) Enemy infiltrates and raids each night; possible small parachute suicide raids especially near CPs and supply areas; enemy takes few prisoners, leaves few wounded; uses snipers, mines, booby traps and civilian disguises. 3. Fight stubborn delaying aetions on successive lines. (2) Own forces.-(Information from Operations Section). (a) Present disposition of major elements. See Map A. * (b) Probable Tactical Developments. 1. Atk N, 110700 about 8 mi to objective. ~. Period estimated to carry out above: 3 days. 3. Expected locations of major elements of the command at intervals during the period: about 2Y:J mi advance each day. 4. Probable natur~ of attack at intervals during period: 1st day-Jungle fighting against prepared positions. 2d day-Attack continued. Limited pursuit to flanks. 3d day-Hard fighting to take prepared position on hill. (3) Logistic dispositions affecting personnel plans.-(Information from Logistics Section): 1. See G-4 overlay.' ATTACtt. PERSONNEL SITUATION. MAP OR OVERLAY HERE

'Omitted; not required for an understanding of the use of the form. 72 MILITARY REVIEW

b. The Personnel SitlLation.-Factual data and status of: a. POSSIBLE LINES OF ACTION.-List elements of the Per­ I sonnel situation requiring action, together with feal­ I ible solution to each.

!I (1) Troop Strengths and Locations. -(lndic~t~- ~~II-- * ent troop strengths, nnd locations.) - Div Periodic Pers Rpt, Station List, 9 Aug.* Ihv II Sta List, 9 Aug.. I

(2) Replacements.-(Shortages-pre"ent and antici- I Plan!. HequisltIOD for known losses at once. pated. requisitions, depots, creditR. proces~ing. II ", Requisition for lo"ses after reaching Obj 121200 forwarding.) 1 Aug~ 800 replacements (750 Inf, 50 FA) to Div Rr Erh 101200. L ReqUIsition for 108ses aftpr withdrawal from lin{> 421 replacements still on requisition. II about 151800 Aug. Replacements usually arrive on fourth day after requisition. Ij 4, CombinatIOn of 1 and 3. F,1fwarn 800 replacements due today to Regtl tralOR area ~~~ks~S~:~~~t~f~~~:e~bee~~~e~era~!~;~~no~~ °A~~ sl~ ,! Illg'ht 10/11 Aug to bring Regtg to equal strength present situation. 10 Aug: (See G-l report OR2100-l'). " 901 Repl Bn 6 mi S of Rr Ech, KUMa. I (3) Law and Order.-(Stragglers, collectmg pOlOts, I~ :\-fove Straggler Line N to BAK R. following FA, AWOLs. disci plioe-. rmlitary poliC"f', mIlitary II Call p, AGOYA: Posts at fords. justice.) I Stragglers: I, (a) On hand: 43. I (b) Processed daily (est): 7f,~ /1

(4) Prisoners of War.-(Numbers, safE:';ua~di~=~,-;ll~~:= 1-=- ­ ~!ovp PW ColI Pt Br N YA MA. tion points, evacuatIon, utIlization, orienting own troops.) I (a) On hand: 124. (b) Taken daily (est): 300_

(5) Burials and Graves Registration.-(Organization. 1/ Cemetery' 1 mi N MAGO~ cemeteries, burials-numbers. fl'cords and re- J ~~)tsb~~;~pI~~~d~') US-100, enemy- 1,000, I civilian (est)-5,000_ 1\ (b) Daily killed (est): US-flO, enemy--I,500, civilian--l,OOO. I (e) GR Units: none. ) (d) Labor: 100 voluntary ciVlhan~. ) (e) K~meteries: ~ne near ~~~tr _ECh. ~:e ~1a~ ;=~ _-== --=-==".=,~~~~~=~~~ (6) Morale.-(Status of morale, postal and courier I . service, rest areas, special servic(>s, motion pic­ tures" radio broadcasts, usn, army exchanges, army periodicals, leaves and furloughs, welfare : services, decQrations and citations, religious I activities, sanitation and hygiene.) I (a) Mail: Unrestrirted. 'I (b) Sanitatio~ and Hygiene: \Vater-borne dis­ eases on mcrease. 11 (c) ,Morale: Good but deterioratmg ag ('ombat : 15 prolonged. . !, ~!? ~~~oL;~~: rJ!i~~on; none. I: (I) Discipline: Good but slackemn~ I; (g) Decorations: OnJy those approved hy Ihv I, eG and Purple Heart. j; (h) Religious' .'Affairs: Chaplains VI"

/: THINK IT OVEn 78

I~ 4. COMPARISON OF LINES OF ACTION.-State advantages 5. CONCLtJSloNs.-a. State conclusions7 decisions, or rec­ and disadvantages of each line of action listed 111 ommended action for each of the several personnel Par 3. activities listed under 3. They should include as many of the elements of "what/' "where," "who," "how:' Hwhen," and "why," as may be appropriate. b. State notable deficiencies.

1----- ,----'----­ ------I * (1) Troop Strengths and locations. *

=--~~=.=~ =~~~i (2) Replacements: 1. T~~~~v:~s~~!~Uti~:.y:b~~~~~~~I!~~~:~l~c~~d~:lI~~ J 2. Too late. , 1. Allot 800 Repls to Regts and FA Bns to bring units to strength. ~: ~~~nli~t€'immediat€'ly assistants to supply umt~. re-plal'E"- I~ 2. Requisition for known losses 111200 Aug.-Repls ments absorbed t:ragual1Y to rehabilitation area, 15 Aug. 3. Requisition again 132100-Repls to rehabilitation 'I area. 11 Aug. I, !. Data to Adm O. ·!~o~_-==- RlVer is natural drift barrier. il ~3\ Law and Order: •

:1

'~~~~~:"'" ~~II~----======- On main road; near forward Div CPo :, (4) Pnsoners of War: *

(6) Morale:*

-----II==~-~-===== I 74 MILITARY Rlt~

(7) Civil Aifaira.-(Population density, control, mili­ tary government, collecting points, MP units. security" measures, food, medieal care, supplies, pay.) . (a) Population density: About 1,000 per sq mi. (bl Attitude: Frightened and hostile, Unco­ operative. (c) Control required: Must be constantly on guard. See Diy SOP, Civil Affairs, 23 July. (rl) Proclamation 3 Aug. prohibits circulation: little effect. (0) Diy Ciy A Oet 2-0, 9-men. (8) Personnel Procedures and Adjustmenta.-(Classitl­ cation, assignment, promotion, flying evalu­ ation, reclassification, army publications.)*

_,(9) Personnel Estimates and Plans.-(Personnel econ­ * amy measures, manning table, area organization, quartering and billeting, personnel allocations.)*

(0) Civilian Employees.-(Sourc€s, procurement, utili­ '* zation anti management, relation to civil affairs, fplation to troops.)*

(11) Personnel Records and Reports.-(Tlme of submis­ sion, period covered, form, channels, status re­ ports.)*

(12) Terrain and weather. Jungle valley. volcanic mountains on flanks; few roads, many wqndering trails; units and individuals get lost easily; maps abundant but only fair accuracy and infor­ mation: streams swollen. ~=~~=,~~~==~~~~~~~~~-=

CONCURRENCES·

ApPROVED: Colf;

section plan. This arrangement is similar to riving at logical conclusions. and produces that of the commander's estimate. wo,rkable plans. A G-l personnel estimate would probably . Much of the technical and operational never be completely written out. It does offer procedure connected with and resulting from a guide to a logical mental summary of per­ personnel planning is not found in this es· sonne) facts and data; a review of the timate. Such procedures are contained in problems to be met, an analysis of the merits field manuals. and in division standing op' of the methods of solving these pl'oblems, erating procedures (SOP's) on personnel and finally. conclusions or a proposed per­ activities, The estimate stresses general staff sonnel plan. With minor changes in content. plans as to time, place, volume, and policy, it could be used in a similar way, by per­ rather than administrative procedure (see sonnel section chiefs of any type units and pages 71-75). of any arm or service. Use o{ the form does The above estimate.,..analyzes personnel con· encourage orderly thinking, assists in ar­ ditions for a given future period of time and THINK IT OVER 75

(7) Civil Affairs: *

11' I'

I' I · (8) Personnel Procedures and Adjustments: * ~ • (9) Personnol Estimates and Plans: * I

(10) Civilian Employees: * ," · i

~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~=== (11) Personnel Records and Reports: * I · ! - - (12) Adequate Support.-(Indicate ;heth~r or not i, · this recommended personnel plan win adequate­ ! ly support the tactical line of action under con­ , sideration.) Adequate to support action to 121200 Aug. I (13) Unavoidable dejieiencie8.-(State unavoidable de­ fi<'iencies in the plan, if any.) . Unable to completely search battlefield by 14 i Aug and bury enemy dead. I (14) Future difficulties.-(State probable effect of ma­ jor adverse conditions on the plan and alterna­ tive measures necessary to overcome them.) ! (a) Aggressive action is required to procure re­ placements promptly in period 12-20 Aug. :! (b) Enemy may decide to make an all ('ost stand, " call in reserves to delay the outcome several days. In this event, replacements will be I! ~ asked for to arrive 13 Aug in rear of com­ bat area. ,I

assists in' setting up ~ plan for the problems in the data. changes in lines of action. and which already exist or can be foreseen. by modifications of the proposed conclusions or experi~nce. study of report. or staff visits to plan. Periodically a new estimate form is the subordinate units. This estimate carries prepared. This is usually done' when a new a date and hour. Obviously. personnel con­ set of personnel plans are initiated. or a new ditions change and sometimes rapidly. The line of tactical action. For example. the divi­ estimate must be correspondingly revised sion may change from offensive to defensive with these changes and conditions. As was or withdraw from' the line. Several days in indicated above, the estimate when written advance of this contemplated change in mis­ out at all is usually in rough draft form and sion a new and up-to-date personnel estimate can readily be kept up to date by corrections form would be initiated. Care of Ammunition LIEUTENANT COLONEL NORMAN W. REMLEY, Ordnance Department Instructor, Command and General Staff School "COLONEL, this is but the small part proper handling and loading by port units, of the Class V supplies which the quartermaster service units and labor troops, Army left us when they moved up. As you caused a large number of wooden crates and see, it is in very bad condition. We will be cases to be broken. Many powder cases of able to renovate only about half of it. There fixed and semi-fixed artillery ammunition will be several thousand tons that will have were badly dented. Grommets were pulled· to be destroyed," said the commanding officer off resulting in burring of the rotating bands. of an Ammunition Renovation Platoon to Base plates on high explosive separate load­ the commanding officer of an Ammunition ing shells were frequently cracked. Provision f Depot being organized just behind the Army for prompt repacking would have, in some:' area in the Communications Zone. cases, taken care of ninety per cent of the; "Yes, and think of all the shipping that renovation and reclamation problem. was used getting it over hCl'e when shipping Some early shipments in the Mediterranean, was critically needed for trucks and the Theater had as high as twenty-five per cent 1 many other items on our shortage list. A of the cartridge cases of artillery ammuni-! large part of this ammunition certainly tion so badly dented as to be unserviceable. > failed in its mission," was the reply" Metal ends of fiber containers for 155-mm; There wel'e several rcasons why much propelling charges were often knocked off: ammunition in the various active theaters and then carried for some time awaiting had to be destroyed as being unsafe to fire, use, :Vloisture would then render the charges' and much more required a certain amount unserviceable. In Normandy, stacks of am-' of renovation. Possibly, the outstanding rea­ munition sank well into the ground because ,. son was that proper care in handling, ship­ of the unavaiJability of dunnage and hard­ ping, and storage had to be made secondary standing. In the Central Pacific, white phos­ to expediency, There are other good reasons phorous smoke shells were exposed to tbo for the loss, such as an insufficient number hot a temperature while lying down, result­ of ammunition units for proper storage, in­ ing in the filler melting and later resolidify­ spection and renovation; insufficient storage ing and causing the projectile to become space available to provide adequate disper­ eccentrically loaded. The shell, being out of sion; and the fact that usually the construc­ balance, would give very erratic results when tion of adequate shelter, hardstanding and fired. drainage was not feasible. At the present time and throughout Period! There are other reasons for rapid deterio­ II and Period III, proper care in handling,!. ration that likely could have been avoided. shipping, and storing must be enforced, as For example: Much ammunition was aban­ expediency is not so essential and relatively doned or turned in by using units because large permanent reserves of ammunition the eontainers had been opened and the con­ stocks will be stored, with a much slower tents carried around without containers for turnover. Safety must be the rule-a hard a considerable length of time. Thousands of and fast one-not only in the Zone of the rounds of various types were destroyed be­ Interior but also in the occupied areas. cause there were no means of reclamation All ammunition stocks in the various thea­ available. Lack of adequate control of issues ters shOUld be carefully inspected by ord-' sometimes permitted the using units to over­ nance personnel each time they are handled stock, and even to leave what appeared to in order to destroy all unserviceable am· be a large number of ammunition dumps munition that cannot be economically re­ scattered over the former division area. Im­ claimed, to replace ol'Prepair damaged crates CARE. OF AMMUNITION 77 i and containers, and to effect prompt renova­ In shipping, the truck and railroaq car, tion if required and feasible. Destruction of together with the dunnage used, should be some stocks will be necessary to reduce the inspected for protruding nails, and the nails hazard of ac'cidental detonation and to avoid removed. The truck or car should be swept unnecessary handling and shipping of prac­ clean of all forms of debris and inflammables. tically worthless material. Repacking should During loading operations, the car and maga­ reduce the amount of damage as result of zine doors should be closed when locomotives reshipping and aid in retarding further de­ or speeders are passing. Loaded cars and terioration. Prompt renovation will stop or trucks should not be spotted or left parked retard deterioration and thereby lessen the in the open area between magazines or stQck labor that will be required for the renova­ piles as they may act as an intermediate tIOn process. step in propagating an explosion. It may Personnel must be impressed with .the im­ seem unnecessary to caution guards placed portance of correct ammunition handling. on rail shipments that they must not smoke, Careless handling will result in denting or or use canned heat or any' type of gasoline breaking of contail)ers. Moisture will cor­ or kerosene stove in or near cars containing rode the contents of a broken container in ammunition. but accidents still occur with a relatively short time. Containers should such violations as the cause. in no case be dropped. Men should be re­ During the loading or unloading of am­ minded of the fact that boxed rockets may munition on ships. the safety regulations for explode if dropped several feet. Officers and open fires, stoves, gasoline, matches, smoking, noncommissioned officers must. rigidly enforce etc., should be strictly complied with. Decks, ammunition handling discipline in order to runways, and docks should be kept free from prevent unwieldy accumulations of unsorted dirt, rubbish, and spilled explosives. K~ep stocks and to prevent large quantities from ammunition as far from the boiler room as becoming unserviceable. possible. lI10st accidents involving demolition bombs leave but little evidence and few close wit­ Separate loading projectiles, if shipped nesses to determine the cause of the accident. lying flat, should have rows alternated so However, from near accidents and observa­ that the base or the lifting plug of a shell tions of commOn mistakes, the following have in one row is in contact with the same part been advanced as the most probable causes of the shell in the adjacent row or rows, in order to guard against cracking the base of accidents: plates. Shells with cracked base plates can 1. Rough handling of fuzed bombs. 2. Use of oversize slings in hoisting bombs. not be fired due to danger of premat'!je 3. Failure to inspect fuze cavities before detonation of the bursting charge. ~ fuzing. Storage of ammunition and other explo­ 4. Rough handling of bomb bodies in ship­ sives probably presents a greater problem ping and in de~very to landing strips. than the storage of any other type of ma­ It can therefore be seen that with proper terial, due to the hazardous nature of the handling a great reduction in accidents in­ material itself and because a very small fire volving bombs should result. Similar reduc­ or explosion may be augmented in a very tion in the number of accidents involving short time into a tremendous disaster. Am­ other types of ammunition could' be effected munition improperly stored is a distinct ha­ by proper care in handling. Familiarity nor­ zard and menace to life and property. An mally breeds contempt. A system of rotating explosion, in incorrectly stored material, labor shifts, designed to prevent the over­ seems to love company. If proper distances taxing of personnel, will help to reduce between different type~ of ammunition are casualties as well as damage to ammunition not observed whole sUlrage areas may be containers resulting from careless handling. losti whereas, had minimum distance be­ 78 MILITARY REVIEW tween stacks and groups of stacks, together dirt and grit. Any corrosion, mold or rust with the maximum quantity in the group found present should also be removed. Dam­ of stacks, as set forth in Technical Manual aged containers should not be stored in a 9-1900, been adhered to, only the material magazine. Such containers should be repaired involved in the original fire or explosion or the contents transferred to new or serv­ would have been lost. iceable containers. Such repair or transfer While combat units in the various theaters should not be done in the magazine, but were actively engaged and a quick turnover in a building or shed located at least 100 of ammunition stocks occurred, covered stor­ feet from the magazine or building contain­ age in the theater was not usually provided. ing explosives. Containers that have been Now, provisions for covered storage must opened should be closed again as securely as be made for such stocks as will be retained when originally packed. Containers should for use of occupation troops. be at least two inches off the floor to prov­ Smokeless powder becomes dangerous when ide circulation of air. it has deteriorated. Normally, this deterio­ All magazines should be inspected at least ration proceeds very slowly and the powder once each month and some more frequently. remains serviceable for years. But under un­ It is difficult to prevent the deterioration favorable storage conditions, where the POW­ of material but with inspections at proper der is subjected to temperatures above 80" intervals, deteriorated stocks may be seg­ F. or is exposed to moisture, the rate of regated and disposed of before they do any deterioration is greatly accelerated. Ob­ damage. When a temperature of 80' to 85' viously, then, ammunition, and particularly occurs in the magazine for more than two smokeless powder, must be protected from days, something must be done to cool it. heat and moisture· while in storage. Adequate ventilation must be provided. While I<'iber containers, in some locations, have exudate is not as common as formerly, it been attacked by ants and contents soon is still sometimes found and, being an in­ damaged by moisture entering the containers flammable material, constitutes a real hazard" through the holes made by the ants. Fiber unless removed almost as soon as it appears. containers that have been alternately soaked Magazines should be kept clean and free of by rain and baked by strong sunlight will unused dunnage. swell and crack. It is estimated that fully The amount of combustible materials in fifty per cent of all pyrotechnics available vicinity of ammunition stocks should be held to;the XXIV Corps during the Leyte oper­ to a minimum. Extreme vigilance must be ation became unserviceable because the pack­ observed around aJl storage areas to prevent aging' was subjected to more moisture than fires from starting. In the majority of cases it was able to withstand. it is perfectly safe to fight a fire in an If it became necessary for a short time to ammunition area provided fire-fighting crews store small-arms ammunition in the open, can go into action immediately and get the the cases should be stacked upside down; fire under control. otherwise, moisture would seep through the In conclusion, the ammunition that was lid, collect on and corrode the solder joining obtained for the destruction of the enemy the cover to the metal liner, and soon reach and protection of the owner, if not properly the cartridges. handled, stored and maintained, may be found When ammunition is stored in magazines, to be useless to its owner, or even to destroY it and the containers should be free of loose him instead.

Unity of cOf1mand is not alone sufficient. Unity of planning, unity of common item procurement and unity of doctrine are equally necessary. General of the Army Henry Y. Arnold }~------~ MILIT ARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD

SWEDEN Swedish Lifeboat: This epoch-making lifeboat has been con­ Sweden's Future fleet: structed by a Swedish engineer. The boat is The enormous development of aerial bomb­ self-erecting and self-emptying. It contains ing during the war has greatly altered plans a series of watertight bulkheads and two for the Swedish Fleet. In Sweden's narrow coupled superstructures which can be closed navigable waters, which would be dominated by bomber planes based at the Baltic or west coast ports, naval operations against an enemy having air superior­ ity would be possible only in darkness or fog, where ships in their turn are superior to their '.,!., .. wing-cd opponents. Difficulties of protecting warship bases against annihilating aerial attacks have also become very great. In line with this trend, Rear Admiral Gunnar Bjurner re­ cently proposed a ten-year con­ struction program beginning 1 July 1947 to continue the pre­ sent five-year pIan, in the course of which the Swedish Navy ac­ quired ninety new ships, most of them small. Two 7,OOO-ton ar­ mored destroyers recently completed are the and made watertight. It is supplied with an only hE'avy units ~anned. automatic self-operating wireless plant, which The new ten-year program includes six is specially designed so that it broadcasts coastal destroyers, twelve submarines for the signals even if the crew on board are with· high seas, twelve large and thirty-six smaller out any knowledge whatever with regard to motOl' torpedo boats, partial moslernization of radio and unable to work the apparatus. the three armored ships of the Sverige type, (The Sphere, Great Britain) destroyers of the "city" class, minesweepers of the Arholma class, and the conversion of ~USTRALIA two destroyers of the Ehrenskold class into Scientists to Advise on Defense: fast minesweepers. A strengthened aviation Australia's future defense is to be shaped for naval support was also proposed. by a scientific committee to be formed soon. (Volk och F'or8var. Sweden) The ('ommittee's immediate job would be to 80 MlLITARY REVIEW make a survey and appreciation of scientific weapons and, later, to forecast the shape of weapons to come. It would study closely atomic bombs, atomic energy and other scientific developments for their possible destructive­ ness in a future war. Australia would keep abreast of all such developments. The pcrsonnel of the scientific committee had not yet been chosen but it would not be long delayed. The acting Commander in Chief of the Australian Military Forces is to revert to his position as Chief of the General Staff. Control of the Army then is to be taken over by the recently­ constituted Military Board. The Board would make recommen­ Bat Bomb under the wing of a Privateer. dations to the Government on defense mat­ heavy charge of high explosives. They are ters, which would be considered in con­ launched from Privateer patrol-bombers and junction with the reports from the scientific are guided to their objective by radar echoes; committee. they will follow their target despite evasive (The Australian News Summary) maneuvers. The small size of the "bat" and its amazing speed make it almost immune from enemy fire. The name suggests the' GREAT BRITAIN principle on which the weapon operates: live The "Bat" Bomb: "bats" give out sound-pulses and guide them­ A closely-guarded secret of the war was selves by the echo. The "bat's" radar p'ilot disclosed by the American Navy on 12 De­ was more efficient than its Jap Kamikaze 'cember when it was revealed that the Navy counterpart in the "baka" bomb. The radar had perfected a radar-guided "bat" bomb, could "see" under any conditions, was quicker resembling a baby plane. It has been credited to react, and never got "cold feet." Navy with destroying many tons of Japanese naval Privateer patrol-bombers, with a "bat" slung and mercantile vessels during the last year under each wing, could stay out of antiair­ of the war. The "bat" is about twelve feet craft range to launch the missiles. long, with a ten-foot wing span; it carries a (The Sphere, Great Britain) The "Manx": The most recent aircraft of unconventional design to be pro­ duced in Great Britain is the tailless "Manx." Built for spe· cial flight research tests, it has "curved" wings whose span is more than twice the length of the stubby fuselage. The "Manx," aJ<·two-seater which in The "Bat" Bomb. flight has the appearance of a JIIILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD 81 bird, is powered by two 140-horsepower de Operation Deadlight: Havilland Gipsy Major engines driving push­ One hundred German U-boats have been er propellers at the rear of its wings. sunk at a spot about 100 miles east of Bloody , Foreland off the northwest coast of Ireland, the scene of the sinking of fifty Allied mer­ chantmen in the dark days of 1942. This spot had been chosen for its great depth of 1,000 fathoms in order to avoid the contamination of fishing by oil seepage. "Operat~on Deadlight," as it is called, was carried out by naval vessels of the Allied nations, with the aid of German crews who themselves manned (The Illustrated London News) the vessels during hostilities. The operation began from Loch Ryan, where most of the Naval Construction at End of War: U-boats were spending their last days. The When hostilities ceased lastyear, shipsunder German crews helped to fix the U-poats to construction or contracted to be built for the the towhawsers of the destroyers, and they Royal Navy included the bat- tleship Vanguard, now almost ready for trial; three large fleet aircraft carriers said to be com­ parable with the American "Mid­ way" type, the Gibraltar, Malta and New Zealand; four carriers of over 30,000 tons, the Afri­ ca, A I'k Royal, Audacious and Eagle; eight carriers of. over 18,000 tons, known· as the "Her­ mes" class; and several units of the "Colossus" class of light fleet carriers, all of them except the Hercules already launched. Destroyers in hand comprised at Il'ast twenty destroyers of the "Weapon" c1ass~ over thirty of the "Battle" class; several of the "e" class; a full flotilla of the "D" class, and at least as many of the "G" class. Sub-, marines on order included about fort~· of the "A" class, and per­ haps as many more belonging to "S." "T," and "U" groups. Three sloops, several frigates and a few fleet minesweepers were also on order. were then towed out to the twenty square (The Navy, Great Britain) mile scuttling ground. The weather was so 82 MILITARY REVIEW bad that the first batch-all practically fighters have the power plant in the fuselage. brand-new examples of the Mark 23 type of The German jet engine is a Jumo 004, of a . 250 tons-could not be destroyed by the ex­ type similar to several other German engines plosive charges placed in the hull, and had to' being studied in ATSC laboratories. be blown up by gunfire from the destroyers. Another difference is that the German (The Sphere, Great Britain) plane has slots in the leading edges of both wings to increase rate of climb and to re­ GERMANY duce landing speed. ME 262 A-I Jet fighter: The ME 262A-l has a wing span of 41 feet and an overall length of 35.5 feet. Its speed . The first ME 262A-1, a jet-propelled Ger­ at level flight is estimated at from 515 to 530 man fighter, captured intact by the AAF is miles per hour and in a dive from 625 to 650 being studied by aircraft technicians of Head­ miles per hour. quarters, United States Air Technical Serv­ ice Command, to determine whether any of Its range is estimated at ninety minutes at its features can be adopted to improve new 20,000 feet altitude and forty-fiVE! minutes or Allied jet planes. less at altitudes lower than 10,000 feet. Ap­ The main difference between the German parently, it is capable of makin&, several passes at a plane it is attacking, "-- - -_._._--] before it must land to refuel. @GERMAN JET (A viation Review, Canada) -. ---~-- ~.----. German Kamikaze Planes: Use of the' fateful Kamikaze planes was not exclusively a Japanese prerrogative during World War II, but would also have become a German weapon had the Allies not gained. vic­ tory in Europe when tbey did. German development of a Kamikaze plane was completed and ready for use when the Allies stormed the streets of Berlin. It was never used, how­ ever, because of the inability of . its promoters to sell the idea to the high command. The German style differed considerably from that utilized . by the Japanese, and although it never progressed as far as actual operational use, it did jet plane's power plant and the General represent considerable effort and planning. Electric jet engine is that the former utilizes It is reveaJed that tests were made on a an axial flow compressor whereas the G-E man-controlled V-I but these were not COIl­ engine has a centrifugal compressor. The aidered successful enough for practical ",., German plane is powered by two jet engines, use. one' mounted in each wing, while Allied jet (Army and NaV1J Journal) MILITARY NOTES AR011NlJ THE WORLD 83 UNITED STATES

The "Snake": about 9,000 pounds, approximately half of Details have been revealed by the War which is its load of high explosives. Department concerning one type of the The snake has a pear-shaped nose that rumored "Army "snakes" that were use(i in guides it along and assures its passage over the European theatet to cut wires and det­ rough land. The nose is flexible enough to onate enemy mines dbead of advancing Al­ guide the snake over rocks. lied forces. The snake cleared a trail wide Special elliptical explosive cartridges, used !nough for a line of tanks to move forward with the snake, were placed in the trough at without danger of enemy land-m'ines. intervals of about two and a half feet. They This type of mine destroyer is a long were exploded by an impact fuze which was m!tal trough, loaded with two parallel linear detonated by machine-gun fire from the explosive charges encased between corrugated propelling. tank. . aluminum plates, bolted together to form a These snakes were used mostly at night in rigid assembly which can be towed or pushed order that they would not be destroyed by by a light or medium tank. It is 400 feet long, the enemy. They were assembled in the field, 14 inches wide, 5 inches high, and weighs " carefully camouflaged with grass and pro­ 84 MILITARY REVIEW --] tected with sandbags, and pushed forward moved forward at a rate of about two miles in the hours of darkness when the pushing an hour. tanks would be difficult to see. The snakes' (Science News Letter)

"Snake" in position to clear a path. Results of explosion.

Army Buzz Bomb: Development of a jet-propelled buzz bomb Improvements to the lI.1unching platform which could be used aboard landing craft has cut the length of the tracks to fifty feet, been announced. capable of installation on an LST. The Designated the JB-lO, it succeeds a twin­ backbone of each launching sled is a four­ jet machine which Northrop first built for teen-foot aluminum tube, with the bomb rest­ the army, patterned after its flying wing. ing on cradles within the tube. It is catapulted into the air at 220 miles an hour with the aid of four rockets. The craft's weight is 7,000 pounds, including exp]o-­ sive charges of 3,700 pounds. In contrast to the earlier twin­ jet craft, which carried its bombs on either side of the engine, the JB-IO's explosives are in mag­ nesium cast housings within the wing on either side of the fuse­ lage. (From a news report) FOREIGN MILITARY

DIGESTS

CONTENTS

Major Difficulties Experienced in Establishment of General Hospitals in Normandy, "Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps" (Great Britain) __ 86 Aircraft versus Ships at Sea, "Krasnyi Flot" (U.S.S.R.)_ 89 The Role of the General Staff School in Brazil, "A Defesa Nacional" (Brazil) ______'______

How the Fourteenth Army was Reinforced, "Journal of the United Service Institutions of India" (India) ______96 Training the Soldier, "A Call to Arms" (Eire) ______99

Preparation of Troops for Breakthrough Operations, "Krasnaia Zvezda"' (U.S.S.R.)______103 Analysis of Some Doctrines of Aerial Warfare, "Ejercito" (Spain) ______106 The Strategy of the War, "The Navy" (Great Britain)_ _110 Modern Naval Warfare as Seen by a Navy Man, "Revue de Defense Nationale" (France) ______116 Modern Naval Warfare as Seen by;m Aviator, "Revue de ~efense Nationale" (France) ______119 The Work of Division Headquarters during a March and Meeting Engagement, "Krasnaia, Zvezda" (U.S.S.R.) ______122 Our Strategy in Italy, "Fighting Forces" (Great Britain) ______124 The Education and Training of Officers, "Revista de la Fuerza Aerea" (Chile)______127 86 MILITARY REVIEW

Major Difficulties Experienced in the Establishment of General Hospitals in ,Normandy Digested at the Command and General Staff School from an article by Colonel P. R. Mitchell, Royal Army Mpdical Corps. in the uJournal of the Royal Army Medical Corps" (Great Britain) November 1945. ONE of the most important factors on and equipment of General HORpitals on the which success or failure of a seaborne opera­ "far shore." tion depends is the rapidity with which the State of Readiness base is established following the entry of the "assault" and "follow-up" troops. This In assessing the state of readiness of any applies to the medical area in the base, as unit, attention is mainly focused on its train­ much as it does to those established by other ing, its personnel and its equipment. All services, for until such time as sufficient hos­ are of equal importance. If one is deficient, pital beds are available to permit a "holding" 100 per cent efficiency will never be attained. policy to be introduced, General Hospitals It is essential that the unit be given the must continue to operate on a "C. C. S. opportunity of becoming' a team and its labors (Casualty Clearing Station) basis" with the in this direction must not be hampered by resultant fatigue to surgeons and nursing constant changes in personnel, by lack of officers, strain on the administrative staff­ training facilities including training stores, or by outside commitments. While these fac­ especially the Evacuation Staff-and. above tors were fully appreciated, the planning all. to the detriment of the wounded. staff were driven, by general scarcity of In the early stages of the campaign in both medical and nursing officers in the northwest Europe certain difficulties arose Corps, into using General Hospitals as a pool which materially delayed the opening of from which reinforcements could be drawn, General Hospitals forming the main com­ which the inevitable and unfortunate reper­ ponent of the medical base area. They oc­ cussion on these units as a whole. curred both in the pre-invasion phase and In the pre-invasion stage it was found after arrival in Normandy. The fact that necessary to "milk" Hie vast majority of they were surmounted reflects the greatest General Hospitals of their personnel. They credit on each individual hospital, and they were required for surgical teams, used to have been recorded in the hope that the "bolster up" early phased-in medical units, suggestions made as to how they might have for medical crews to man the LST's required been avoided may be of some use in future for evacuation of casualties, for reinforce· planning. ments and for duties in the United Kingdom. It would appear on the surface that the Again, certain General Hospitals found speed with which a large number of Gen­ themselves attempting to mobilize while run­ eral Hospitals could be established in any ning large static installations in the United Base Area is entirely dependent on the Kingdom. The personnel were so busy pro­ "phasing in" dates of individual units. This fessionally that they had little or no time is the case, however, if the following factors to learn the equally important military side are taken into consideration: of the work they would have to undertake (1) The state of readiness of the unit; "on the other side." On the other hand, some (2) strict adherence to the Second Key Plan; hospitals found themselves unemployed and (3) the necessity for close cooperation be­ "buried" in the heart of the country for tween the RE (Royal Engineers) and RAMC several months. In these units it was notice­ (:Royal Army Medical Corps) services; (4) able that the initial bloom of enthusiasm adequate provision of Pioneers; (5) adequate and expectancy gradually faded. Such train­ l arrangements for the reception of personnel ing as was possible with the limited avail­ FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 87 &hIe resources became tedious, cohesion was Adherence to Second Key Plan wst owing to continuous changes in person­ Except in the most exceptional circum­ tel, and the hunger for professional "\York stances, it is unlikely that the sites selected Dverwhelming. In fact visits by senior ad­ in the. First Key Plan for the establishment ministrative officers were awaited with an of the various installations in the Base­ eagerness unusu:tl in such units, a; it was taken from a maze of information, maps and felt they might bring some exciting news air photographs, made available to the plan- . of the futUre with the resultant release from ning staff-must be considerably modified. boredom. It is essential, however, that the Second Key There were many factors which led to Plan made "on the ground" must be adhered this unfortunate situation, not the least of to as far as is humanly possible. This re­ which was the accomodation problem. It has quires the closest liaison with all concerned. to be remembered that in the pre-invasion In the Normandy beachhead it was decided phase the enormous force, both British after arrival to have two hospital areas some and American who were to be employed in three miles apart. This decision was very the assault and build-up, had to be housed largely made by the Chief Engineer and mthe United States. Suitable accomodation was governed by the lack of an adequate for units such as General Hospitals was water supply. Under the existing conditions at a premium. If the circumstances had per­ it was found that the speed of the opening mitted, the ideal would have been to arrange of a General Hospital was very closely re­ for the early phased-in units to mobilize and lated to the speed with which water points train alongside the later phased-in units, could be established on the various hospital latter being those temporarily running static sites. Installations. With adequate stores and space Cooperation Between RE and RAMC Stalls for training, a period of six weeks would r.ave been ample to mold the recently mobi­ The general principles of the layout of hzed General Hospitals, and if, for security a General Hospital, 600 and 1,200 beds, are or other reasons, it was essential to extend clearly laid down in the Manual of Military the period of waiting, professional work Engineering. It is essential that the earliest would have been readily .available. information be given to the Commander, Royal Engineer concerned, of the policy Mention must also be made of the scarcity regarding the phase to which individual hos­ of administrative officers with a detailed pitals are to be constructed, for unless this knowledge of the organization and training information can be given in the very early of a General Hospital. This is a matter of planning stage, it is probable that certain the utmost importance and it is considered RE stores required to complete the various that a large dividend would be paid if care­ phases will not be forthcoming when re­ fully selected ex-Commanding Officers of quired, as they are unlikely to have been General Hospitals, fully briefed, were each included in the shipping program. This is placed in a group ~f six hospitals in the not always easy to estimate, as it is inevit­ pre-invasion phase. Uniformity in training, ably linked up with the general staff estimate administration, and layout would then be of the situation some weeks after the land­ possible. ing has been ellected. While it was found impossible to "freeze" Properly constructed cook-houses and ablu­ the specialists, duty medical officers and tions make an enormous, indeed essential, nUrsing officers, it was fortunate that the difference to any tented camp, but they are administrative "triumvirate"-the Command­ of the greatest benefit to a General Hos­ ing Officer, the registrar and the principal pital and should have a high priority in matron-remained in the majority of cases the phasing-in of RE stores. They should unchanged. not be considered as "frills," for in the early 88 MILITARY REVIEW stages, when the turnover of patients in hos­ may make it impossible to unload ships' pital is high, and crash expansion to fifty stores, while it may stilI be possible to dis­ per cent of its normal holding capacity a charge personnel craft. Again, a sudden distinct possibility, the adequate cooking of' change in the day's priority of unloading­ food under reasonable conditions and as ammunition, for example, might be urgently speedily as possible is highly desirable. It required-may result in the ship carrying should be remembered that it is not always hospital equipment having to lie off shore possible to call forward these stores. The for a longer period than was originally in­ emergency demands on shipping are nor­ tended. This and many other factors only mally devoted to the needs of the front line too well known to the "Q" [Quartermaster] troops and it is for this reason that the Movement Staff can, over a period, cause above suggestion is made. In Normandy, serious delay in the "marrying up" of per­ while the lack of' camp structures did not sonnel and equipment shipped independently. immediately delay the initial opening of It might appear to the casual observer the hospitals, it unquestionably delaycd the that the Movement Staff should be able to smooth running of these installations to the delay the arrival of personnel once it has detriment of the patients. become obvious that there would be a' delay in the arrival of equipment. The reason why Provision of Pioneer Labor this is not possible is immediately obvious Through the gcnerosity of the staff, Pio­ to those who have passed through what has neer Sections were made available to all been termed the "Sausage Machine." Into General Hospitals. As each hospital arrived this machine-with its inlet in the United four sections (100 men) were attached. Two Kingdom-were crammed the thousands of sections were withdrawn after a week and units to be employed in the invasion. Slowly a third after a further period of two weeks, but surely the machine revolved, passing the leaving the unit with one section permanent­ units through the concentration areas, the ly attached. Nothing but the highest praise marshaling areas on to landing craft, across. can be paid to the work carried out by these the Channel, and finally turned them out on men and it is true to say that without them the far shore in their planned order. Once the General Hospital could not have carried the machine has started nothing must stop on. It would have been of inestimable value, it, otherwise chaos would reign. Communica­ however, if the Pioneer Section had been at­ tion with the contents of the machine-par. tached to the early phased-in hospitals a ticularly individual units-is difficult. month before their departure from the United Alternatively, it might be suggested that Kingdom. They would then have had the in the planning stage the equipment should opportunity of learning the nature of their be phased into the shipping program in a duties both in the establishment of the hos­ way that would insure its arrival in advance pital and later when it was fully functioning. of the personnel. This is most undesirable. Arrangements for the Reception of unless it is accompanied by a small advance party, for the following reason. Clearance Personnel and Equipment of stores from the docks must be rapid if As has been stated, it was decided in the the build-up program of maintenance stocks planning stage that personnel and equip­ is to be maintained. This means that maxi­ ment of General Hospitals would be shipped mum use must be made of all available trans­ independently. In the very early stages of port and labor. If the equipment of a 1,200 a campaign of this nature, it is possible, bed hospital is unloaded at the docks prior in fact essential, to arrange that both arrive to the arrival of the personnel, unaccom­ simultaneously. As time goes on, however, panied by even a small advance party, it is I various factors may cause a delay in the obvious that it has to "'be stored in either arrival of one or the other. Bad weather an Ordnance Depot or under arrangements lI'ORE1GN MtLITARY DIGESTS 89 made by the ADMS (Assistant Director of their equipment. The serIousness of such a Medical Service) concerned. This is uneco­ situation cannot be over-emphasized for it noinical as it involves a double "lift" and, can, and did, occur at a time when all were merefore, more labor and more transport striving to get as many beds as possible lie required before the equipment ean be established in the theater in order that a aelivered to its final destination. As the lat­ . holding policy could be introduced. Unfor­ ter is merely sixty acres of open space, it tunately this situation was not fully visual­ IS apparent that some personnel must be ized, and it was some time before it was on the spot if this equipment is to be safe­ possible to arrange for the nursing officers guarded. Unguarded equipment has a pe­ to travel independently on a hospital carrier. culiar habit of disappearing. To circumvent this very real difficulty the The implications caused by the delay in following suggestions are put forward: the arrival of equipment are many, and in Where it is not possible for the personnel Normandy they seriously interfered with the and the equipment to be shipped together, establishment of the la:ter phased-in hospitals an advance party should accompany the as well as interfering with those already es­ stores which should be phased-in prior to tablished. The reception and transit camps the personnel. This advance party would In the far shore were intended to retain accompany the equipment sent direct to the personnel for a maximum period of twenty­ site allotted to the medical area in the Base. four hours. They had no accommodation for Where such a procedure is impracticable and female personnel. As a result arrangements ships' stores, for example coasters, cannot had to be made to accomodate the personnel accommodate the personnel of an advance in the hospital area, and so acute did this party, sufficient canvas and cooking" equip­ aecomodation problem become that a com­ ment, taken from the general equipment of plete 1,200 bed General Hospital was con­ the unit, should accompany the personnel in verted into a hotel for the personnel of order that they can be self-supportin~ on General Hospitals awaiting the arrival of arrival.

Aircraft versus Ships at Sea

Translated and digested at the Command and General Staff School from B Russian arti.le by Lieutenant Colonel F. Makukhin in "Krasny; Flot" (Red Fleet) 1 August 1945. A series of air operations against German order to sink a cruiser, it is necessary to shipping in the Northern Theater of Opera­ score direct hits either with three 500-kilo­ tions, and especially in the Baltic Sea, have gram, armor-piercing bombs, or with two shown that, when mutual support is properly 1,000-kilogram demolition bombs, or with organized and when tl)e shortcomings of one three torpedoes. Torpedo planes, dive bomb­ plane are compensated by the strong points ers, and low altitude bombers are therefore of another, decisive results can be reached used for such missions. In making up the in the shortest time. In the course of this attacking force, the problem is to determine war, massed air strikes coordinated as to the share that each will have in the destruc­ place, time, and objective have become the tion of the target, and from this to establish principal method of attacking enemy ships proportionately the .strength of each group. at sea. Obviously, the functions and the tasks of Before a warship is attacked, it is im­ the various classes of aircraft participating portant to ascertain the personnel and ma­ in a strike are not the same. Yet, the torpedo teriel needed for the operation. Combat ex­ planes and the bombers invariably constitute ~rience has shown, for instance, that, in "the main body of the striking force. This 90 Mn.ITARY Rl!lVIEW fact has been confirmed in all major opera­ termines the precision of cooperation in a tions in World War II, particularly in the combined air attack is distribution of tar­ Pacific Ocean. These planes play the prin­ gets. The experience of the final large-scale cipal role in attacking heavy armored war­ naval engagements in the Pacific Theater ships, while operations against small and demonstrates the necessity of destroying the light-armored ships call for low-altitude aircraft carriers first. Accordingly, when at­ bombers, dive bombers, and attack planes tacking a large convoy and when the main (Stormoviks). In the interest of the group attack is delivered from medium altitude, the that carries the brunt of the attack the use first ships to be put out of action are those of all types of aviation becomes one of the equipped with antiaircraft weapons. This basic principles of mutual support. further assures freedom of attack against Success in the combined attack is attained the main targets-the transports. through concentration of effort of all groups When delivering a blow against a naval with respect to time and place. Coordination combat unit, the operations of all groups of operations with respect to place demands must display coordination and cooperation precise distribution of the main directions of the highest degree. Here, it is imperative of attack, of altitudes, and of targets among to maintain rigidly the principle of succes­ the attacking groups. The most important sive destruction of each target in tho es­ requirement here is the freedom of maneu­ tablished order of attack. But if adequate verability. Consequently, when planning an forces are available, all large hostile ships operation, the staff ,must attempt to distri­ should be attacked simultaneously. This up­ bute the directions or approaches in such a sets the coordinated action of the enemy's manner as to allow the most effective utiliza­ antiaircraft defenses, restricts his maneuver­ tion of the capabilities of all planes and of ability, and prevents him from evading the their armament. blows. Coordination with respect to place (the For a successful combined attack, it is area of attack, the direction of approach,. expedient to echelon the groups vertically. and the operational altitude), cannot be ef­ Generally, the highest altitude should be al­ fective if it is not planned with sufficient lotted to the heavy bombers, and only in precision with respect to time. A disruption the final stages of combat, when the anti­ in the successive and continuous pressure on aircraft defenses of the ships in the entire hostile defenses usually leads to unnecessary convoy are neutralized, can the succeeding losses, gives the enemy an opportunity to echelons attack from medium and low al­ radio for additional covering forces, and titudes. The allocation of altitude for the allows him to maneuver his defensivll means dive bombers must receive prime considera­ and to repulse one by one a sllries of isolated tion. This is explained by the fact that the -and for this reason, woak attacks. altitude necessary for a recovery from a When organizing an operation, the staff dive must be such as to eliminate the dangers must first establish the duration of the at­ involved in leveling off. tack, its sequence, and the intervals between The attack planes (Stormoviks) attack groups. The principles underlying the or­ from altitudes of 100 to 1,500 meters; in ganization are as follows: the use of a large the Baltic operations in the spring of 1945, number of aircraft. for a short duration; however, they attacked from low and hedge­ minimum exposure to the enemy's defeI\o'live hopping altitudes. The fighter planes for air action; and the neutralization of hostile anti­ cover fly at the altitudes of the groups which aircraft defenses for the duration of the they escort, while air clearing groups and attack. The overall duration of the attack­ mop-up groups usually operate 1,500 to 2,000 even of very large .air ~"roups-as shown by meters above the low-level bombers. combat experience, should not exceed ten Another very important element that de­ minutes. During this period, the strike is FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 91 well organized, the enemy's convoy ca~ be and transports, which put up heavy anti­ subjected to the blows of approximately 120 aircraft fire. The dive bombers attacked the flights of dive bombers and sixty tactical 4,000 and 8,000-ton transports. The dive groups of torpedo planes. bombers were followed by the low-altitude Depending on the composition of the con­ bombers and finally by the torpedo planes. voy and on the situation, the attack'may be Perfect coordination, the thorough organ­ made by a constant stream of groups of one ization of the attack, and the correct utiliza­ 'type of aircraft followed by another or by tion of the strongpoints of every type of parallel blows delivered from high, medium, aircraft-all contributed to the success of and low altitudes simultaneously. The pro­ the attack. The convoy was utterly destroyed. cedure most often employed in attacking an Almost all the large ships were either sunk individual target, such as a large warship, or damaged. is the continuous and successive stream, When using parallel blows, the operations When attacking a convoy, a more convenient of combined groups are carried 'out differ­ method is that of parallel blows. ently. The first planes to attack the target The sequence of different air groups in are the fighters. Then the ships are attacked flight is not constant. It depends on the sit­ by groups, consisting of dive bombers and uation, the enemy forces, the composition attack planes, the mission of which is to of the combined group, and the distance of neutralize the antiaircraft defenses. Then the objective from the air bases. follow groups of torpedo planes, low-altitude An example of excellent coordination was bombers, and dive bombers descending on shown by a group of the Baltic Air Force the targets from various levels and from in an engagement on 14 March 1945. An different directions simultaneously. ~ enemy convoy was observed by, our recon­ The length' of intervals between successive naissance between Libau and Danzig. Groups attacks is generally determined by the prin­ of torpedo planes, low-altitude bombers, and ciple of minimum exposure to the hostile de­ dive bombers flew out to destroy it. Shock fenses. This time interval, however, must groups of attack planes and fighters covered allow freedom of maneuver for the with­ the operations. drawing group and must prevent the planes The first wave consisted of dive bombers of the approaching groups from being de­ and attack planes (Stormoviks). The attack stroyed by the explosions of bombs dropped planes delivered a blow on the escort vessels by the preceding group.

Sometimes, though not always, people are wise after the event, but it is also possible to be wil!e before the event and yet not have the power to stop it happening. In war misfortunes may come from faults or errors in the High Command. They may also come from the enemy being far too strong, or fighting far too well. It is easy ",hen the tide is adverse to contend that alterations in the structure of the war direction would have made or will make amends for the vast and gaping lack of men and resources or power of transportation. It is easy, but it may not be true. Winston Churchill quoted from "Life" 92 MILITARY REVIl!lW

The Role of the General Staff School in Brazil Translated and digested at the Command and General Staff School from an article in Portunes. by Colonel Renata B. Nunes in "A Defesa Nacional" (Brazil) Octaber-November 1945. WE were, up to about three decades ago, . must, likewise, orientate the solution of other practically ignorant of the problems and problems which are carefully defined by them, realities of the art of war. Not that we were but outside their reach due to their national lacking in intelligence or a desire to study­ scope. on the contrary, we read a great deal; but The period immediately following a Wllr in an unsystematic manner and without a constitutes, as a rule, a period of peril for knowledge of fundamental tactics, which is the efficien,cy of the victorious armies, es· I indispensable for a good understanding of pecially when there exists the insistent, i the subject and to adapt the ideas thus gained utopian belief that war with its indescribable to our own realities. horrors will never again occur. There are two A few reminiscences, if the facts were not kinds of ideas which help to create this apparent in the minds of all of us, would danger: the tendency to be'satisfied with the confirm my assertion; a discussion which de­ instruments of war with which victory was veloped after a class period in the Escola de won, and the tendency to wait till new Aper/ei{Joamento de O/iciais (Officers' Re­ weapons are conceived and constructed before fresher School) among fellow officers who a better army is organized. The latter is were by no means among the least informed, peculiar to those countries which have not wi,th regard to whether automatic weapon organized their military forces with the fire should cover the front or the rear of maximum possible efficiency according to the barbed wire obstacles; the enthusiasm and resources they have at their disposal. eagerness with which we all hurried to the It is true that both conceptions possess. book stores when there appeared at the School points that justify their existence, but not the first copy of the Manuel du Grade d'In/an­ when adopted separately, excluding one or terie (NCO's Infantry Manual). Reading is the other. As is always the case, in media profitable only when the subject matter is stat virtu8 or, in other words, virtue resides systematically and properly selected. in the judicious combination of the two tendencies. To create is the hardest; to perfect is This means that the organization a'hd a lighter task. In the transitional phase, it training of an army must not follow rigidly may be said without exaggeration that every the lessons of the last war, nor be postponed one of our tactical schools was one grade indefinitely till plans can be elaborated which, below its proper place in the instructional however perfect they may be, will be difficult level. The courses of the School of ArI~s were to conceive and uneertain as to the future. loaded down ~th many subjects which should These plans will not be executed, therefore, have been studied before, and as a result, with the necessary energy, continuity, uni· some of the links were left out of the chain formity, propriety, or complete objectivity. of professional instruction. The logical, imperative and indispensable The complex and highly varied problems thing is never to neglect to increase the relative to the preparation for war, in all its efficiency of the army, as if it had to go into military, political and economic aspects, are action tomorrow, with the means at our dis· so interrelated that a long and uninterrupted posal today. It is just this trival and self· series of tasks must be accomplished in all evident truth that is in danger of being the fields of national activity. The higher forgotten or disregarded just at the vital officers and special army organizations are in moment. The side that is vanquished does not charge, of all work of military character but forget, but rather profits from the lessons FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 93 taught by experience and paid for at the cost a single brigade or into a division. This does of blood and not infrequently with the loss of not mean, however, that this question is of its independence. minor importance. It is a matter of great To maintain the existing state of efficiency consequence, but it is a problem of another of an army which has just fought a .success­ nature. It is of concern to the leaders who ful war is an objective which is possible to have to combine. and operate the pieces on attain. It is not sufficient to foresee all the the chessboard of war. Organization is, in circumstances of a future which is more or common with all things human, susceptible. less remote and indefinite. We should try to of improvement, but the thing to do is to protect ourselves against the eventuality of make use of the knowledge one already has a wal' that is suddenly thrust upon us or and put it into practice with the equipment which threatens to break out within a short and means that are actually available, while space of time. With an efficient organization the more advanced problems of command it is possible to offer resistance to the first organization are being studied. attacks and gain time and space for the afflux This problem is not solved by merely imi­ of new resources but only on condition, let tating, for in war there are no universal and us repeat, that the organization has not suf­ invariable patterns or rules, nothing that is fered deterioration during the period of independent of the physical medium in which peace. the action occurs. Flexibility in formations, There will not always be other friendly variety in combination of forces, ease of belligerants to help in gaining the time and command are things which must be required space necessary for correcting our lack of a priori, by a command organization; confi­ foresight and preparation, as is the case dence in one's self, and in one's oWn possi­ when identity of interests or common danger bilities of action are the most powerful moral facilitates understanding and tacit or forced factors. alliances. It is, therefore, indispensable to The combat training, which is now con­ the security of a country that its army be ducted in a more effective manner since it always equipped and trained as if war were also includes the various commands, is able imminent. This preparation and training to reveal with finality the good or bad points must be based at least on the means and in the organization. In order that the results forms of action advantageously employed in of this experience may be conclusive, it is the last war. imperative that the execution, that is, the Observation, and experience gained in past instruction and training of the men and wars, can orientate the perfection of existing subordinates be as perfect as possible. We means (materiel and training), while the fall back, therefore, on the leitmotif: effective, creation of other instruments of war is a continuous, objective instruction and training function of time, the financial resources, and extended to all echelons of command, cadres economic and industrial powers of a country. and soldiers, is the basic condition on which The question of ma~riel is not, however, of every decision must be based when it is great importance if the permanent army is desired to increase the efficiency of the army. provided with at least the means of action Scarcity of means does not justify a mere considered adequate at the present time to pretense at training, much less, lack of guarantee its efficiency. effort. On the contrary, it is scarcity and not For the man who is doing the fighting, superabundance of means that requires better the pI'oblem is very simple and will always training of the officer; he must have greater be the same-to kill without being killed. In mental flexibility and more fertility of the matter of surpassing the enemy in will imagination if he desires to .obtain better and action, it makes little difference to the results and certainty of success for the forces soldi'"r whether his unit is incorporated into " under his command. 94 MILITARY REVIEW It is not the people who provoke wars, for able method of attaining the contemplated they are well aware of the cost. Nor is it objective." individual interests. The causes of war, the It is true that the incessant progress that real and hidden ones and not those which' has been made in the arts and sciences, the serv.e as an ostensible excuse, have always improvement of existing weapons, and the bet'n economic interests-the conquest of creation of others far more powerful, is markets, of raw materials, freedom of ocean responsible for new forms of action. The routes. J.j: is those in control who call for number and forms of combination of the them when they are not afraid to lay hands forces of destruction have increased, but this on this last line of reasoning in handling the does not invalidate the fundamental knowl· high problems of collective interests of na­ edge previously acquired. On the contrary. it tions. Those in control change periodically, enriches with new factors, the logical process and good understanding between those in of reasoning that must lead to the proper authority alone does not constitute a sure decision. There is nothing more false, how­ guarantee of peace. Until two or three genera­ eV,er, than the idea that we have to Jearn all tions are educated against the horrors of over again how to wage war. war, this scourge will always hang threaten­ Now we come to the principal motive be· ingly over the head of humanity, and war can hind these considerations. The General Staff only be avoided by means of another and School may be considered the principal insti­ more powerful material force-that is to say, tution and is, also, the only one that has being ready for it. maintained, up to the present time, its initial Let us examine, now, the other danger that efficiency. may develop in the postwar period. Nothing In this School are prepared the officers produces a greater effect on our minds that who are to exercise the function of supreme the sight of victorious forces and the things command, and those who are to serve with they bring back with them, things never be­ the General Staff-the first stage in the fore seen, things that are new to us. We find training of general officers. It constitutes a in this the most frequent risk, either because laboratory of previous intellectual experiences' of our failure to give du(: consideration to to test new conceptions relative to the organ­ the observations and {'xpericnces of the past ization of command and new means of action or because of our failure to recognize in them referred to it by the General Staff of the the things that are essential and enduring. Army-in short, everything that should con­ Hence the false ideas, unfortunately much tribute to a doctrine of war whose practical more widely diffused than it appears to be, and objective test would occur afterwards in that "methods of waging war have changed field maneuvers with large units having ade· completely." quate personnel and equipment. It has often been criticized by routine· Rare are the minds that are able to ana­ minded persons as "given to romantic lyze and discern the essential and fundamen­ methods," since in theoretical exercises it has tal causes of things. Not all remember or are made use of weapons and other means of convinced that tactics is not a set of rules action considered at that time entirely beyond and universal principles, applicable no matter our reach and, therefore, utopian. They forgot when, where, or how. It is a set of truths that the mind is as able to develop and and experiences comprising the intellectual strengthen itself by means of mental exercise arsenal to which one resorts under circum­ as is the physical body by means of gymnastic stances that are always different, yet inherent exercises, and that it is common sense to in the problem at hand, in search of the prepare oneself at least mentally, for the reasons which justify the selection, employ­ contingencies of f~ture wars, ment, and combination of the means at one's , It may still be criticized today, but in the disposal, in order to decide on the "most suit­ opposite sense, aU of which is the fruit of FORl1lIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 95 hasty conclusions and excessive generaliza­ through centuries of observation and ex­ tion: "War has undergone a transforma­ perience? Have they ceased to be funda­ tion," they say, "and the instruction given in mental factors in the search for the most the School has, therefore, become obsolete and fitting manner in which to act in the pur­ inadequate." It is the eternal tendency to suance of an objective? On the other hand, confuse desires with realities and dogmatic in the field of psychology, has man ceased principles with the reasoning faculty. What to have the same inspirations of weakness we lack, above all, is experience. and heroism that he has always had through. OUI' forces have just participated in World the ages? It does not seem so. IVaI' II, and no one has the right to utter And what is it that is taught in the Gen­ anything against the bravery and devotion eral Staff School? Recipes for winning a shown by our officers and soldiers; but it war? Hardly so. One is taught there, to must be recognized that their experience was be sure, how to reason in a methodical and neither complete nor conclusive. There is a logical manner and without omitting any of great deal of difference between cooperating the essential factors which influence the cor­ in a war and having on one's shoulders the rectness of the decisions necessary to con­ entire responsibility for its outcome. This is front each particular and well-defined tactical especially true when one acts alone and only situation. with the means at his disposal. It would be A check is then made whether or not the just as mistaken an idea to judge what we method is general and rational, and the ef­ now have as sufficient for all time to come, as fort is made to implant it in the subconscious to think that in all future or possible wars mind by applying repeated and varied solu­ we will always have to fight under an tions to concrete cases. This metho'i:! is in­ "umbrella" of airplanes and behind the steel dependent of the epoch and the existing wall of tanks and projectiles of every sort. means of action, and must, of necessity, lead What is the essential and most general the officer to ascertain the "best way of act­ characteristic of the operations of World ing, the way which offers the greatest pos­ War II? It is the absolute, crushing, pul­ sibility of success in imposing his will on verizing superiority of material might, com­ the enemy." It is this that is called the bined with speed. It is cleaF that, since man decision; and the decision is the prerogative is the soul of the machine, moral force and of the leader. The mission, that is, the thing enormous masses of men must also be taken one desires to do; the enemy and his pos­ . into account in computing this might. But, sibilities of action; the terrain where we can mass multiplied by velocity be substituted and the enemy are going to act; the dis­ for the maneuvers of large units? position and employment of the means we Let the brilliant maneuvers of the Rus­ have at our disposal-are the constant and sian generals-to cite merely the first re­ essential factors to be consider~d. They have action to the German avalanche-provide.the always existed, at all times and in all places. answer to our questiqJ!. The tactics employed Let new weapons be given the Army; let by the German forces were very much like the existing ones be improved; let the forces those of the bull who downs his adversary be reorganized, but the teaching of the Gen­ with his brutal impetus after catching him eral Staff School will always be up to date, umprepared; it advanced to Dunkirk and because these new factors which influence the Caspian Sea, but well-aimed and pain­ decisions, will enter automatically into the ful darts were driven into hi~ back and he reaso"ning process. l'his constitutes the basis returned to Berlin. of its permanency. Have the' tactical verities (to avoid the In the General Staff School, tactics is no ambiguous term of principles) which con­ longer taught by means of lectures as it stitute the logical basis of tactical reason­ was in 'the beginning. Instruction is based ing lost the essential significance acquired on the solution of tactical problems, that Mlt.lTARY REvttW is, the objective and rational application of be taken into account, in arrIvmg at the the norms, rules, precepts, or principles rela­ most fitting solution in each particular case. tive to the art of war, prescribed in Tactical . Participants change, means and methods Regulations and regarded as actual truths change, but logic, never. And this has al­ attested by experience and observation. This ways constituted the basis of our reasoning. is not because of any specific value attri­ Let us continue. therefore. to practice with buted to any of these principles, but rather what we have, while improvements that will ,because they were regarded as factors to come later are being planned.

How the Fourteenth Army was Reinforced Digested at the Command and General Staff School from an article by Brigadier General' J. H. Gradidge. O.B.E., in "The Journal of the United Service Institution of Indiau October 1945.

WITH the capture of Rangoon there came was to control the training and administra­ to an end one of the most interesting and tion of Reinforcement Camps then located as revolutionary periods in reinforcements pro­ follows: Two at Gaya, one at Comilla, one cedure and organization. Little is known b~ at Gauhatti, and one just moving into Ko­ the average man of the immense work and hima (see sketch). Each of these camps was organization required to keep up to full designed to hold and train 3,000 men, for strength the units of an Army in the field; which the staff provided was only one Lieu­ and, when it is considered that the Four­ tenant Colpnel (CO), one Major (second in teenth Army had to be reinforced over high command), an Adjutant and Quartermaster. mountains, large rivers and jungle, the whole Each camp had, in addition, a Major and without any rail communications, the fol­ a Captain as instructors, with a small in­ lowing description of how those difficulties structional staff, all supplied from India and, were overcome will interest the reader. having no experience of the requirements of The history of the reinforcing of the Four­ forward units. teenth Army from the date of the Army's Camps were subdivided into ten sections birth in November 1943, to the capture of each of 300 men; no provision was made for Rangoon and the reopening of sea commu­ an officer to command these sections other nications, fell naturally into two phases; the than a note in the War Establishment, which first phase, which was prior to the invest­ laid down that they should be "provided ment of Imphal, was entirely by road and from reinforcements passing through." But rail, while the second phase, the advance to rely on a changing, and not always avail­ from Imphal to Rangoon, was entirely by air. able, quota of .Reinforcement Officers to ad­ First phase: In order to get the picture minister and train 300 men was an impos­ quite clear, it is necessary to go into certain sible proposition; and it can be stated, with­ details of past history, as these details were out fear of contradiction, that this lack of primarily responsible for the working of the officers was largely responsible for the dis­ intricate system which had to be evolved, in satisfaction justifiably felt at the state of order to carry out Phase Two. reinforcements received by forward units. In March 1943, a Reinforcement Group It was early realized by Reinforcement was formed on the same lines as that which Group that no 'improvement could be expected had been operating for some time in the until semi-permanent section commanders Middle East. This Group was incorporated were appointed, but not until August 1943 in the Headquarters of Eastern Army, then were these appointments""incorporated in the controlling the war in Burma, and its charter War Establishment. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 97 The second, and pe~haps most far-reach­ Gaya remaining in a transit role to provide ing improvement inaugurated was the placing a very necessary cushion. of each cl!-mp on a Divisional basis, which Of the above camps, Nos. 20, 21, and 25 meant that camps were reorganized to hold took an active part in the manning and de­ the reinforcements of one Division ol)ly, with fense of Imphal while Camp 24 fought all a proportion of Corps troops. It should be through the epic battle of Kohima. When it noted here that owing to the extended and is considered that these units were training difficult L. of C. (Communica­ tion Zone), it was imperative that the number of reinforce­ ments held forward should be greatly in excess of the peace­ time estimates, and the final figures rose to as high as three months wastage, i.e. eighteen per cent. Infantry, nine per cent, Engineers, and Services in proportion. The Divisional basis com­ pletely changed the aspect and morale of the camps, as, with­ out exception, Divisional Com­ manders and their staffs became personally interested in their camps, both in training and administration. Divisional flags were flown at Camp Headquar­ ters, and Divisional Signs worn by camp staffs, with the result that men coming forward felt at once that they were already part of their Division. In ad­ dition, Section Commanders and Instructional Staff were all prov­ ided from the Division, with the result that men met, for the first time in their long progress to the and holding units only, and were not or­ front. in"structors who could speak with au­ ganized or staffed for fighting and, in ad­ thority on the latest~ctions of their units and dition, contained' for the most part young teach lessons based on personal experience. recruits who experienced their first baptism Wlth the reorganization of camps it was of fire under most difficult circumstances, it considered that they should be located as must be admitted that their work was be­ far forward as possible in order to obtain yond praise, particularly that of Camp 24, the dosest liaison with their Divisions. This whose exploits have been. unfortunately, also conformed to the Hospital layout. At overshadowed by .the more spectacular feats the time of the Japanese advance, camps of other formed, and well-known regiments. were situated as follows: three in the Imphal With the investmeht of Imphal and Ko­ area, one at Kohima, two at Gauhatti, two hima it was decided that it would be im­ at Comilla, one at Chittagong, also two at. possible to maintain so many months wastage 98 MILITAltY REVIEW forward, and the four camps were moved to as many as five different airheads, col· back (three of them by air) to Comilla, as lected from seven separate reinforcement were the hospitals. This brought Phase Two camps, and made up into plane loads of into operation. . twenty-five men, it will be realized that an Phase Two.-With the dosing of Imphal absolutely foolproof organization had to be road, it became necessary to fly in an re­ established. inforcements, and from then onwards, to One of the most difficult problems was to the capture of Rangoon, a daily air lift convince formations and units that priorities was maintained, the aircraft used being the were rigidly controlled by Fourteenth Army, ubiquitous Dakota, flown by both the RAF and that Reinforcement Group was only em­ and the American Army Air Force. The powered to act on these priorities, which efficiency of the air supply service to Four­ changed almost daily in ~ccordance with teenth Army has been written up so often operational necessity. This -system did not that there is 'little need to stress it here, always suit formations, but it must be ob­ except to state that, throughout the latter vious that with the vast number of demands part of last monsoon and during all the on aircraft, as well as an ever-changing bat­ difficult times which followed, not one single tle situation, one coordinating authority was reinforcement was lost in air transit. That essential. unique achievement could only be fully ap­ The organization behind the "fly-in" was preciated by the fighting formations. one which required intense study, and which The first experience of Reinforcement had to be evolved from practical experience Group in the organization of an air lift took only, as no textbooks were available for place during the time that the Imphal road reference, nor had any study of this prob­ was dosed, and it immediately became ap­ lem been possible previously in this theater parent that a most stringent control was of operations. necessary to balance the claims of food, am· An extra commitment which Reinforce­ munition, stores, and men. This control was ment Group was faced with was the estab- . in the hands of IV Corps, who lidd down lishment of an Air Dispatching Center on priorities of units, and sometimes even of Comilla Air Strip. This was necessitated by individuals, who were to be flown in. During the late briefing of air crews and the eaily the time the road was closed 10,500 reinforce­ takeoff. Most planes flew two sorties in a ments were flown into ImphaL day, which made it essential that reinforce­ In April 1944 a conference was held to ments were moved to the strip the night be­ consider the establishment of a permanent fore emplaning. A well-run and efficient dis­ organization responsible for the "fly-in" of patching center was therefore essential, but all reinforcements to Fourteenth Army. The no provision for it had been made, nor were number of daily sorties was then estimated staffs available. at ten. This proposal was not accepted, as However, with the help and cooperation it was considered that insufficient aircraft of the Reinforcement Camps, the center was would become available for this purpose. established and accomodation provided for Nevertheless, during the peak period of Four­ 600 men, with dining halls, officers' rest room, teenth Army's advance, no less than forty­ and a canteen for all ranks. That center was four sorties, carrying 1,100 reinforcements, by no means perfect, and the only ,reason were flown in, in one day. for mentioning it is to draw attention to the The total number of reinforcements flown necessity for advance planning, and to stress in totaled 63,500, the average daily lift for that a successful "fly-in" is not only a ques­ 1944 being 110, and for the first four and tion of providing aircraft, but of producing . one-half months of 1945, 265. When it is men at the right time...and place, and in considered that these men had to be delivered good heart.

,I :tl FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 99

Training the Soldier 'Dill'osted at the Command and General Staff Sehool from an artiele by Major General M. J. Costello in "A Call to Arms" (Eire) IN view of the number of men affected, courses, advanced courses for those reach­ the training which the Army gives to its ing higher grades, and special courses when members is a matter of great national im­ new subjects, new weapons, or new methods portance. Those with a paternal or other are introduced. personal interest in a soldier are naturally The Army exists for defens~. It can be concerned to know what the Army makes of justified only by reference to its fitness for him. But every citizen who takes his duties this task. The ultimate test of its efficiency of citizenship seriously should be interested can take place only on the battlefield and in this topic as a citizen, even if he is not the highest aim of its officers and NCO's is concerned as a parent or guardian. He should to fit themselves to lead with skill, judgment he concerned to know the nature of the in­ and courage the units which they have the fluence which Army training has on the na­ honor to' command, and to give their men tional character, or at least upon those citi­ the training that will lead to success in bat­ zens who are given it. tle. But this training involves much more It will readily be understood that soldiers than purely military skill. Army physical are constantly learning new skills, and prac­ training, which is obviously of the highest ticing to reach ever higher standards of importance to the soldier, is no less val\lable proficiency. It is not so easy to grasp the to a man in civil life and, by its effect upon complexity of Army training. The. business men who pass through the Army, it is a of fighting a modern army is nowadays so factor of importance to the general standard complicated that a great deal of specializa­ of health in the State. Training in personal tion is necessary. . hygiene and sanitation is obviously valuable to the majority of those who pass through Each branch has' its specialist schools. the Army. The habit of discipline is one In each branch of service there are so which our past history prevented us from many grades, and corresponding standards acquiring, and the same history shows how of knowledge, skill and experience that there necessary it is and how on many occasions are several categories to be trained. Even the nation suffered from the want of it. Suc­ within the specialist corps there are indiv­ cessful military training will develop alert­ idual specialists or groups of specialists whose ness and self-confidence, and in this way training has to be conducted on lines ap­ help the trainee to make the most of him­ propriate to their specialty. There are, for example, .eighty-two separate trades or oc­ self in any occupation. cupations in the Army whose members're­ Much of the training given in the Army ceive proficiency pay.l-A.U of these are trades has a practical value in civil life altogether which are followed in civil life, but there independent of the moral and physica1 re­ are over seventy other categories of soldier sults. The administration of the Army is a specialists whose skills are purely military. vast business and calls for administrative This vast teaching establishment has to skill which does not come from inspiration. train almost all its teachers. These are its It comes from formal courses of instruction officers and NCO's, to most of whom teach­ as well as practica1 apprenticeship training. ing is an everyday task. They spend most Apart from a few large and progressive in­ of their time at school either as pupils or dustrial firms there is no comparable ad­ teachers, for the Army's teachers are con­ ministrative training given in the country stantly required to requalify by refresher today. 100 MILITARY REVIEW It is not proposed in this article to assess purse. And, finally, consider the fact that the success of army training. The real and. expansion took place at a time when some ultimate test of its success is the test of of the needed supplies were unobtainable, battle and our people have providentially others in short supply, and most commodities been spared for this. Only when the story obtainable only with difficulty and delay. can be fully told of the rapid expansion of For reasons which it is yet too soon to the Army in 1940 will it be possible to assess discuss, the expansion of training facilities the quality of its instructors or the sound­ was even more remarkable than the expan­ ness of its training system. Judgment belongs sion of the administrative machine. But even properly to those not engaged in the work. at this stage I feel bound to record that But it may be permitted to one of the par­ there were four factors which rendered this ticipants to offer a few remarks which may possible: explain to those who come after us how a (1) The national aptitude for teaching; seemingly impossible rate of expansion was (2) The national aptitude for soldiering; achieved. The Army is, of course, no exception to (3) The high quality in character and in­ general human failings and imperfections. telligence of the men who joined the Army No more than any other human institution gave us material to train which must be does it realize fully the aim of its training. considered above the general level of the It gets results that correspond to the human nation and much above that available in the material at work in it. But these results, ranks of many professional armies; even though they vary greatly according to (4) Our pre-emergency training aimed at the quality of the pupils no less than the training most commissioned and noncom­ quality of the teachers, ar.e generally so missioned ranks, not merely for the job of good as to be astonishing to many. The rate the man immediately higher, but for the high of expansion found possible, and consider­ posts which in peacetime seemed to be at.­ ing the circumstances, the comparatively few tainable only by a few. and small cases of loss, waste and other in­ In the Army schools we consider the train­ efficiency are in themselves proof .of the . ing of the soldier under three heads, nalnely, soundness of the pre-emergency tl'aining in moral, mental and physical. Moral training our very small regular army. The situation has for its object the development and is much as if a retail business with ten strengthening of character, especially the in­ branches hud to expand ill a few months to culcation of the military virtues of loyalty, one of one hundred branches-branches of patriotism and discipline, and the habits of the same size, but with a greater volume of order, regularity and thoroughness. It aims business in each and in doing so had to at developing the self-respect of the soldier depend on totally inexperienced persons for and with it his self-confidence and determina­ the additional staff required. Or' it might tion to be a worthy defender of his country. be compared to the problem which would It extols courage and fortitude in adversity, face one of our leading colleges if it were and it teaches the enduring of hardship with­ suddenly called upon to set up nine additional out murmuring. colleges and to depend at the same time on Physical training aims at a harmonious existing staff and pupils and untrained re­ development of the body. It tries to develop cruits for its increased' staffs. strength, agility and balance and to exercise lungs and heart as well as muscles. Consider further the difficulties of this ex­ panding business, or this college, if it were Mental trainin~ is concerned not merely required to purchase and account through with the acquisition 'by the soldier of the a system of accountancy in which a primary knowledge necessary and useful to him in aim must be the protection of the public war, but aims at developing his alertness, FOnEIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 101 powers of observation and reasoning. It en­ continuous throughout the soldier's career courages him to think for himself. It exer­ but it is particularly important in the earliest cised his mind as physical training exercises days, for discipline is a habit of mind and . his body. It proceeds on the well-founded be­ it is essential to secure from the first devel­ lief that the intelligent and resour.ceful sol­ opment of good rather than bad habits. In dier is many times more useful than the addition to teaching and developing habits unthinking 01' unintelligent one. of discipline and attention, drill has the In actual practice, of course, there is no physical effect of making the soldier quick watertight division of these aspects of train­ and precise in his movements and in the' ing. Physical training, properly conducted, operation of his weapons. has a moral effect-especially in promoting Morale is a much abused 'and somewhat self-confidence and poise-which is second overworked word. It may be defined as the only in importance to its effect upon the state of mind of a group; it includes self­ body. Much of the technical military train­ confidence on the part of its members, but ing of the soldier 'consists of drilling with principally and more important, it implies various weapons and each driII requires the mutual confidence and trust in the group as formation of a physical habit. The attain­ a whole. It includes in its military signifi­ ment of the necessary dexterity in the hand­ cance a whole-hearted acceptance by' the ling of arms and other equipment calls for members of a unit of the ultimate purposes mental as well as physical effort. of that unit and a firm determination to When the civilian joins the Army the first achieve them. It includes and is inseparable thing he has to be taught is how to look from a spirit of good comradeship and a after himself in the absence of the mother determination not to let down ·/j;he side." or sister or other womankind upon whom From the first stages of training to the end of his military career the morale of the sol­ h~ has been accustomed to depend for assis­ tance. The extent of that assistance in per­ dier is fostered by suggestion, exhortation sonnal life is something which few realize and emotional appeal. His pride in his own until they are thrown on their own resources. appearance and worth-while achievements are but part of that pride in his unit and his The alertness of the sojdier, and his abil­ comrades which is the basis of mutual con­ ity to concentrate or pay attention to what fidence and comradeship. Since the purpose he is doing or what he is being taught, is of a military unit is the defense of the State, developed right from the beginning. In this the basis of morale is a common patriotism matter -the recruits vary a great deal, de­ which is cultivated in every possible way. pending upon the amount and nature of their earlier education and civil employment rather The officers and NCO's are required to than on their brain power. take a personal interest in the private life of the soldier, to advise and support him in The soldier is given an explanation of his difficulties, to warn him against bad com­ the true nature a~ purpose of discipline. panions and bad habits, to see that whole­ He learns that it amounts to a willing sub­ some recreation or employment is available ordination of self and selfish interests to to him during off duty hours, and especially the eommon good, that it means the cheer­ to see that he has forceful examples of clean ful and willing performance of duty and and good living kept before him in a favor­ respect for authority as such. The precise able light. In this work the Chaplain plays rule~ of conduct that govern his life as a a proIIjinent part. soldier are explained gradually, not only so that he may know what to do and what not In order to fit the soldier to undergo stren­ to do, but so that he may appreciate the uous military training, and to develop his practical purpose and necessity for every powers of resistance to disease and hardship, disciplinary rule. Disciplinary training is the Army conducts systematic physical train­ 102 MILITARY REVIEW ing. Physical training instructors are taught in automatic weapons may be remedied, how to anatomy and some physiology so that they load, unload and fire, and he is practiced may conduct their exercises not only with . on the ranges firing live ammunition. He is an avoidance of strain but also with a view taught a little of the theory of small-arms to the harmonious development of the body fire so that he may better understand' the as a whole. The work is carried out under practical application to it. the close supervision of Medical Officers. Men In order to secure military efficiency the who become especially expert and agile are preservation of health and the prevention trained, as part of their recreational train­ of disease are highly important objects ..,{ ing, in advanced gymnastics. military training. Drill of various kinds occupies a great deal of training time in the Army. All drill aims The army does not always attain fully the at the development of habits. Those things object of its training. Apart from the varia­ which the soldier is required to do without" tions in the human material available and conscious mental effort, and to do always special difficulties of accomodation and equip­ with precision, are practiced as a drill until ment that beset it ill some instances, there they become habits and can be performed is a natural tendenc~' for the efforts of even automatically. Close order foot drill is taught the best of men to peter out. And the com­ and practiced so as to permit a party of plexity of army tr::..ining is such, the ob­ soldiers to be moved about in an orderly man­ stacles are so many, and the excuses for ner, to teach the soldier to carry himself inaction so plausible, that great energy on well when standing, walking and running, the part of the leaders and teachers is nec­ to develop the habit of attention, and for essary to keep up a constant effort, to arouse its moral and disciplinary effect in producing interest, to reawaken it when it begins to a prompt response to orders, and in develop­ droop and to maintain enthusiasm. Various ing a sense of power and the confidence and steps are taken to deal with this situation. unity which well-executed drill movements One is to have regular changes of appoint­ tend to give to the men in the ranks. ment, thereby introducing periodically new Weapon training is a subject that figures blood or new brooms among the leaders. But very prominently in training programs. Be­ reliance is placed mainly upon regular and sides drills with the weapons the soldier is systematic inspections by higher authority. taught to care for and clean his weapons, These are held to test the current standard how the mechanism operates, how stoppages and the progress made in each unit.

In these days when people are speaking of atomic bombs it might be thought that the soldiers' personal weapons did not count a great deal. That would be a tremendous mistake. No matter what other weapons there may be for offensive and defensive fighting. the personal weapon is still important. The rifle and the machine-gun are very important in defense. Eamon de Valera in "An CQnsant6ir" .... 'FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 103

Preparation of Troops for Breakthrough Operations Translated and digested at the Command and General Stall' School from a Russian srtieIe by Major General P. Tikhomirov in "Kra.naia Zvezds" (Red Star) 7 October 1945. IN modern warfare, a breakthrough of a this sharply reduces the effectiveness of artil­ deeply echeloned and strong defensive posi­ lery and mortar fire. tion calls for great skill, a high degree of The training of troops under such difficult creative ability, and utmost exertion of energy conditions should begin with the selection and on the part of the men, officers, and generals. the construction of a training area with the The organization and the technique of the terrain features which will be encountered on breakthrough, therefore, is undoubtedly the the battlefield. Under these conditions, the most important phase in the preparation of most important problem is the skillful organi­ troops for combat. zation of artillery and mortar fires. The of­ First of all, modern defenses are dis­ ficer in charge of training must make all unit tinguished by their depth. Our troops have commanders seek continuously better meth­ often encountered solid, well-developed lines ods of using artillery and mortar fire. This ofllermanent fortifications which were located will compel aU the commanders to learn the far beyond the enemy's main line of resist­ peculiarities of employing artillery and ance. This means that the training of troops mortars in the swampy and wooded terrain. must not be limited to the breaching of the World War II has introduced a number of first position. It is also necessary to work changes into the old concepts of the.c employ­ out, with absolute thoroughness, the problems ment of fires. Now, the chief and the decisive arising during the breakthrough" of the entire factor is artillery fire-the main strikirig zone. Inasmuch as the breakthrough of such force of the Red Army. Consequently, when fortified zones is difficult, the troops, in order organizing an offensive, the primary object is to receive the best preparation in this form to gain superiority over the hostile artillery of combat must take full advantage of the and mortars. This should be considered in lessons learned in this war. working out the problems involved in all While training the troops, some of our phases of the offensive. Even the commanders officers do not fully appreciate the importance of small units without any means for effective of the character of hostile fortifications and countermeasures against hostile artillery and of the terrain on which the organization and mortars must nevertheless be shown how the the accomplishment of the breakthrough is to artillery superiority is to be attained by take place. And yet, in the course of the train­ higher commanders, for all officers must ac­ ing period, one often wonders whether the quire the skill and the knowledge of how to commander trains his unit in the methods of fight hostile artillery i.nd mortars. advance through a wooded area or through Toward the end of ,the war, all German an open field. It iff' well known from our infantry divisions in 'defense had a large combat experience that in the training for number of tanks and assault guns. This fact an offensive operation all peculiarities of the had completely changed the defensive tactics. terrain should be taken into account. Near Leningrad, for instance, the Germans Our troops are often confronted with the had for the first time employea tanks and as­ organization and the execution of offensive sault guns as a mobile armored belt. The operations through wooded and swampy areas enemy used his armor in ambushes and often or wooded, swampy, and ro~key areas. Here concentrated it in the centers of resistance the range of observation, even from good located in the rear areas and endeavored to points of vantage, is usually limited to no route our attacking troops by sudden counter­ more than one and a half kilometers, and attacks. These peculiarities must also be 104 MILITARY REVIEW taken into consideration in the training of physical exercises should be built up gradual­ troops. ly, and this principle applies to tactical It is obvious that the units not trained in preparations of troops ail well. the intricacies of fighting static and mobile The objective should be approached grad­ defenses are not capable of carrying on offen­ ually. In the beginning, a distance of eight sive operations in modern warfare. There­ kilometers should be covered in about six or fore, the training areas should be properly eight hours. Then, day by day, this time is equipped and the training conditions should shortened and the tactical problems are enable the officers and men to acquire prac­ made more difficult. tical experience in dealing with entrenched Frontal movements must be avoided. Every or attacking armored vehicles. frontal attack is to be combined with out­ In this training the preparation of the flanking and enveloping maneuvers. The infantry is the most difficult. The emphasis training should be planned so that every bat­ here, must be placed on infantry tactics, talion, company, and platoon understands and without, of course, forgetting other forms of knows how to execute this tactical maneuver. preparation. Along with this type of maneuvering, the In tactical training of infantry, the master­ infantry should master the technique of fire ing of the technique of swift and bold ma­ maneuver. All officers should acquire skill neuver, but without losing contact with the and experience in massing fires and achieving supporting weapons is of primary importance. fire superiority. They also should be taught In breakthrough operations against per­ how to secure a continuous fire support of the manent and deeply echeloned defense lines, organic and attached weapons and how to the success of the operation is determined by fight the enemy's armored vehicles. the ability of the troops to advance swiftly Our infantry should be trained to be self­ and incessantly through the entire depth of sufficient in overcoming obstacles ranging the defense with the continuous support of from the least to the most difficult, including. its attached artillery and mortars. water barriers. A great deal of emphasis This means that the infantry has to be must be placed on assault operations against taught how to advance continuously together reinforced-concrete and earth-and-timber with its reinforcing elements to a depth of pillboxes. Another phase of training is to be six to eight kilometers. Moreover, this devoted to securing the trenches and strong­ distance should be covered in two or two and points captured from the enemy, and to re­ a half hours. The fault of some units in the pelling enemy counterattacks. course of this war, during the training Actual combat experience has brought periods for offensive operations, was that about new problems, such as resumption of while the infantry advanced forward rapidly, the offensive interrupted by an unexpected the attached reinforcing weapons lagged be­ situation. Not infrequently, the infantry and hind. Heavy machine guns, mortars, and the artillery commanders were not able to re­ artillery, were hardly able to advance at aU, sume operations on the second day of the let alone conduct fire. This caused the at­ breakthrough and blindly repeated the same tack to die down in the very first hours of artillery and attack methods they used on the offensive. the first day of the operation. They did not Another error committed by some com­ realize that now they were confronted with · mandel'S was an attempt to throw the advance a different enemy, disposed in a different into high gear right at· the start: This also manner, and possessing a different grouping was never successful;'-the men rapidly got of artillery and mortars. · out of breath, the advance slowed down, and For this reason, the J?roblems related to • soon stopped. These officers had failed to take the resumption of an interrupted offensive into account the law of physical training. All should be the subject of special training. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 105 The main objective of this training is to An important element of tactical training develop in the officers the ability to organize is the mastering of the technique of deploying' temporary defense while in the process of the second and the following echelons advancing. Here, too, the officers learn the (waves) and the ability to conduct recon­ methods of reconnaissance, of seleeting the naissance during the offensive. ,­ lines of departure, of determining the order It is imperative that the training of troops of moving out of the infantry units, and of for breakthrough operations be based on the rapid organization of advance. lessons learned in this war.

The Four Phases of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force THE participation of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (BEF) in the struggle in Italy may be divided into four periods. The first Degan on 15 September 1944 when a detachment commanded by Gen­ eral Zenobio da Costa went into the front lines in the vicinity of the west coast. after nearly two months of training in Italy. It contained elements of all the arms and services, and the Fifth Army was engaged in the battle of the Arno where it had already had success. Fighting in "combat teams," the Brazilians progressed deeply into the enemy position. taking Comaiore and Monte Prano. The second period of our operations extended from the beginning of Novem­ ber to the middle of February. It was in this period that the First ExpeditioIlJiry Infantry Division was employed. in the area to the north and west of Porretta Terme, on the west bank of the Reno river. General Mascarenhas de Morais. who had been supervising the training of the latest troops to arrive. assumed command of all the units of the Division. The third period extended from the latter part of February to the beginning of March. In this period our operations were characterized by attacks on positions that had been fortified by the enemy. The snow disappeared and it was warmer. We attacked the Germans, who were estl'iblished in excellent positions. and routed them, as did also the American 10th Mountain Division which was fighting along­ side us under the IV Corps. On this occasion we took Monte Castello, which we had attempted to take in November and December. The fourth period began in April and came to a close with the end of the war in Italy on 2 May 1945. Our operations were coordinated not only with the IV Corps and the Fifth Army, but also with the entire Fifteenth Army Group. The Spring Offensive of the Allies had been launched. From our own stand­ point, this offensive may be divided into three phases. The first of them was marked by ouJloattack on the last of the German positions in our zone, CUlminating with the capture of Montese. The second was the exploitation of this success, with the Germans in organized retreat. We advanced toward Vignola, engaging in battle at Zocca and Marano sui Panaro. In the third phase, the Germans were disor­ ganized, many of them surrendering and many completely routed. We now ad­ vanced through Vignola and Turin, passing through Piacenza and Alessandria. When this advance was halfway completed, the spectacuJar episode of CoHec­ chio and Fornovo took place. The BEF captured one of the best German divisions­ the 148th Infantry. When this phase, and the war itself, came to an end both the Brazilian troops to the west of Turin, in Susa, had effected a junction with the French troops from the east.-Colonel Humberto Castelo Branco in "Nar;ao Armada," Brazil. 106 MILITARY REVIEW

Analysis of Some Doct~ines of Aerial Warfare Translated and digested at tlte Command and General Staff Sehool from a Spanish article by Colonel Manuel Martinez Merino, Air Corps, in UEjercito" (Spain) June 1945. WHEN World War I came to an end, no lose the war in which, during the first period, doctrine of aerial warfare had been they were certain of victory. Possibly few elaborated. Combat tactics had had a be­ people realize that this battle for air suprem­ ginning in that war, but there was no such acy may have changed the course of history. thing as aerial strategy. The men who had been called visionary were The theories developed by Douhet, Mitchell, proved right. . and Seversky after 1918 had the following 4. Great aerial offensives and the total de­ points in common: struction of cities and vital centers of the 1. War will be total. Aviation carries war enemy, and enemy morale, are possible. Avia­ to the furthest corners of the nations. Their tion can win the decision with its own means. entire territories, all their inhabitants and The destruction of Coventry, Rotterdam, all their resources constitute a part of the Hamburg, Cologne and other cities, and in­ front. The allegation thao aerial' warfare dustrial zones, entirely or partially, leaves against the enemy's rear was cruel, calling no room for doubt as regards the first part it illegitimate, assuring that it would be of this statement. As to the second part, the prohibited by international agreement, is a achievement of total destruction, is a question thing of the past and no longer considered of numbers. valid. As regal'ds the neutralization of the fight­ 2. The necessity of achieving ail' suprem­ ing spirit and the decision of a war by means acy. The German European campaign, the of air action, the failure of the Luftwaffe in Normandy invasion, the Allied campaigns in its bombing operations has usually been taken France and in the Mediterranean, were all as the supreme negative reply. There is' preceded by the attainment of air supremacy nothing more untrue. If, in the battle between by the victor. The re-embarkation at Dunkirk the two air forces, the Germans lost, this and the battle of England show that the fact cannot be considered as any argument Germans could not win, because local air against the value of air attacks, since the first supremacy belonged to the British. condition for realizing them is the attainment 3. Victory is guamnteed to the side that of air supremacy, and the Luftwaffe failed has ail' supremacy, and is impossible without to achieve it. it. There have been contradictory attitudes 5. Aviation should form an army separated with respect to this affirmation which have from the ground and naval forces-the army gone so far as to contend that in dominating of the air. The auxiliary air forces-those the air, one dominates nothing, since the air belonging to naval and ground forces---must is a military vacuum. disappear. This affirmation has been the most In each new battle of the war, it is proved debated point of the two opposed sides. One anew that victory would have been impossible of the most serious obstacles the creation of without air superiority. Air supremacy has armies of the air has encountered, is the fact come to be a matter of such importance that that aviation was the offspring of land and some· of the campaigns that have been under­ sea forces in which there was a natural taken appear to have been principally battles reluctance to relinquish their hold on so use­ for the acquisition of air bases needed for ful an element. ulterior purposes. Of the principal air forces that were en­ The Germans lost one important air battle gaged in the war, t4.~ British, German, -tha,t of England. It is almost certain that French, and Italian were organized as in­ the loss of this air battle caused them to dependent arms; the Japanese and the Rus­ FOltEIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 107 sian were divided into army and naval avia­ fense is attack by means .of an air force. Ex­ tion, and the American, which also is com­ perience has shown that regardless of the posed of army and naval aviation, has reached amount of antiaircraft defense, or even of a state of organization, today, where there fighter aviation, a. powerful air fleet always exist in the War Department two equally passes and bombs its objective. This does not autonomous staffs or departments-ground mean that fighter aviation, antiaircraft de­ and air. fense or defense of other types should be German aviation has shown that a ground done away with, but it does teach us that army without aviation of its own is not de­ only aviation employed offensively gives total prived of necessary support. Rather, the op­ freedom from danger from the air. posite defect may be laid to the charge of the With air supremacy, supremacy on the seas· German Luftwaffe, in spite of the fact that can be achieved. Ships will be sunk by means even the antiaircraft artillery in the hands of planes. This war has done away with many of the army belongs to the air forces and is illusions and ideas relative to security. The served by its personnel. Too much preoccupied Norway campaign was the first surprise. The with the matter of having plans capable of German success with a poor squadron, though close cooperation with the ground forces, Ger­ opposed by the best navy in the world, is a many failed to give thought, perhaps, to the perfect demonstration of what air supremacy need for stra~egic aviation, for true aviation. is able to do on the sea. This caused her to lose the battle of England. The re-embarkation of Dunkirk would not In addition to the common ideas we have have been possible in spite of all the efforts just noted, each of the doctrines possesses a of the British fleet if the RAF with its Spit­ few points peculiar to it alone. fires and ·Hurricanes had not gained air One of the most discussed of them is supremacy at that point. In order to prevent Douhet's doctrine: Resist on the surface in the battle of the Atlantic from being lost to order to be able to attack in the air. It is the German submarines and planes, the Al­ quite obvious that, so far, Douhet has not lies were obliged to resort to air supremacy, been correct in his prediction that ground accompanying their convoys with their planes warfare would be static as in the preceding and establishing air bases at strategic points. war; with the advantage' on the side of the Lastly, the sinking of the battleships defense, whence was born the idea of winning Prince of Wales, Repulse, Tirpitz,. Roma, the decision by means of an aerial offensive. Hanma, those at Pearl Harbor, and others More modern in his views, Seversky dissem­ in the Pacific, has completely proved the inates a new idea relative to this point: possibility of sinking ships through air ft will iil'st be necessary to determine whether action. the war is one of possession or elimination. As regards the intervention of the army According to him, when it is a war of pos­ of the air in ground operations, General session, occupation should be effected by Montgomery, in his personal experiences, means of armies advancing by land, sea, or both in the disaster in France as well as in air; when it is a war of elimination, this his successes in the Mediterranean area, has can he effected better through the use of arrived at the following conclusions which

the air fleet. > have been expressed by him on several oc­ In aerial warfare, technical surprise is casions: The early failure of the British Army definitive. Quality will always count for was sharply in contrast with its later suc­ more than quantity. This principle which is cesses. At the beginning, the men were driven common to both Douhet and Seversky, was from their positions by the enemy's dive proved during the two World Wars and in bombers, against which they felt themselves the Spanish civil war. powerless. It was learned that before be­ Against air forces, the only possible de,­ ginning a ground offensive, air supremacy ---~~--.------q 108 MILITARY REVIEW was necessary. Experience also showed that fleeted in a weakness in Britain's air force certain changes in the organization and em­ which led to serious disasters. ployment of the supporting air forces were The United States.-Air doctrine and necessary-. organization are still a matter of discussion Air victory is the key to victory on the in the United States. In principle, its avia­ ground. IIf one notes the campaigns in which tio'n is divided into Army and Navy aviation, the British took part, says the General, from each independent of the other. EI Alamein, Tunis, Sicily and Italy, it will The aviation of the Army, the more im­ be seen that they never began the ground portant of the two, has evolved from a serv­ operations till the air battle had been won. ice within the Army into an arm with its own "The ail' battle must always be won before recruiting and officers, and at the present that on the ground or on the sea." time the War Department is divided into two equally important parts, Army and Aviation, Different Air Organizations with separate high commands and staffs. The Luftwaffe was organized as an ail' There exists, however, a service force that is army indepenoent of both ground and naval common to both of them. forces. There existed no independent air The Army Air Forces, therefore, have forces belonging to these arms, and all neces­ unity of command with respect to the Army. sary cooperation was given by the Luftwaffe but unity is lacking between the two different in a close collaboration. Unity of command types of aviation, which creates adminis­ was achieved hy the existence of the Wehr­ trative and procurement problems. An effort macht, a joint organization which included is now being made toward the unification of all the armed forces of the nation (ground, the high commands. sea, and air). The American naval aviation is also very When it was necessary to employ the Luft­ powerful. Due to the enormous volume and waffe on purely aviation missions (attack on power of the American Navy, perhaps in the England in 1940 and later defense of Ger­ United States as in England, the complete many), the German army of the air proved union of all aviation, especially as long· as to be inadequate. Lack of this strategic arm carriers exist, may present a difficult problem, caused her to suffer defeat in the battle of Russia.-The Soviet military aviation in England, which was so definitive that it an­ 1941 did not possess unity of command, being nulled all previous Nazi victories. divided into army and naval aviation, Its German errors in this battle were: the at­ dependence on the Communist Party was im­ tempt to engage in strategic bombing with plemented through the Commissariat of War. aviation which did not have sufficient combat Within the Army, aviation formed an arm ability to eliminate or neutralize enemy air with special recruiting and uniform: the air power; bad selection of vital objectives; in­ forces were organized into divisions that adequate destructive power in comparison were under the command of the Army. Russia with useful load of the aviation of that day; has had very powerful air forces from the and lack of continuity of action. point of view of numbers, but these have not Great Britain.-In Britain the RAF was been well oriented from the standpoint of created, together with naval aviation and an equipment or employment. The air forces of independent Air Ministry. Soviet Russia have not, really, been engaged When the war began, Great Britain was in in aerial warfare, but have confined them­ the forefront from the standpoint of the selves to the support of ground forces with­ quality of her aviation, and had her own out any sign of strategic employment. The doctrines. But aviation had not been accepted recent evolution of Soviet aViation is believed with the view of basing on it any sort of to have progressed but little in the doctrine strategy, and this lack of confidence was re- of employment. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS l09 France.-French aviation, insufficient both tacks, the only way to defend oneself is to in quality and in numbers, disappeared with­ attack. in a few days under the blows of the German (i) With air supremacy, the operations till aviation. now regarded as the most difficult will be The Future easy-naval .or air landings, re-embarka­ The recent war can only be regarded as a tions, blitz-advances, blockades, etc. transitional period between the birth of avia­ (j) Without air supremacy, surface or air tion (1914-1918) and its aU-out employment, operations which appear very easy will be difficult or imp·ossible. \~hich is still to come: In the future, we shall no longer be able (k) The nation that has not' "National­ to speak of doctrine of air warfare, just as ized" the construction of its planes and the' we shall not be able to speak of doctrines of procurement of the fuel necessary for them, . ground or naval warfare; we shall have ('an not have air power. doctrines of genera,! or total warfare, in­ (!) War will be total. cluding all three elements. In summary: (m) When total possession of an enemy country is not contemplated. an aerial of­ (a) Up to the present time, it has been fensive will suffice for its elimination. said that some countries were land powers, and otheJ;s naval powers. In the future all (n) The particular tactics and strategies will have to be, first of all, air powers, and of the ground and naval armies will have to afterwards, whatever their geography be changed, the third dimension being ad­ dictates. mitted into all their plans. (b) Air forces will be armies of the air, (0) Offensive strategy is the sPQcific mis­ even in those countries in which their sep­ sion of the air arm. aration from the ground or naval armies (p) A supreme command, acting as coor­ appeared most difficult, on account of the dinator of the efforts of the three armies, is traditional preponderance of the latter. indispensable. (e) No country will dare go to war with­ (q) The air battle must not be lost; it out certain or probable air supremacy. Air will always be the first to be met before any­ supremacy is the only indispensable factor. other battle on the ground or sea. (d) Between air powers, air supremacy (r) Aviation will not be able to dedicate will not be total, but local or relative. itself exclusively to its mission of aerial war­ (e) Air power can be defeated only through fare. It will have to dedicate a part of its greater air power. forces to the support of surface operations. (f) The number of planes in an air force (s) A naval fleet is not sufficient to control will give but a slight idea of the power of the seas anywhere within range of land-based the country, if their relative quality is not aviation. taken into consideration. In the air, techpical (t) War may have a ground, a naval, or surprise will always ,lfle decisive. an aerial decision, but this will always be (g) The offensive power of an air force won in collaboration with the other elements. varies inversely with the distance to the (u) War between countries without land objective. frontiers will be a mission of the air forces. (h) The action of the army of the air will Carelessness with regard to either air action be preponderantly offensive. Against air at­ or ground support may lead to disaster.

The impetus of all activity comes from above. There are no poor groups. The poor ones are the colonels. There are no inefficient batteries; it is the captains that are inefficient. The equipment gives an idea of the unit commander. "Revi$ta Militar," Bolivia 110 MILITARY REVIEW

The Strategy of the War Digested at the Command and General Staff Sehool from three artleles by Major General B. Ro....an· Robinson in "The Navy" Battle of Britain-a victory which gave bombers to every fighter-a policy which us the assurance, eventually justified though proved a sore handicap to our troops in the but by a narrow margin, that Britain would retreat to Dunkirk and which, but for the never be decisively beaten. It was then that temporary technical superiority of our ma­ we slowly built up our strength, thanks to chines, would certainly have lost us the Lend-Lease-that magnificent gesture-and Battle of Britain. thanks to the naval guard against the savage The third factor in our strategy and the assaults of the U-boats. It was then that one regarded as of least importance was we struck the most daring and imagi.native the army. Its role was to furnish a strong blow of the whole war in robbing our tiny antiaircraft defense at home, to playa minor guard at home to send reinforcements to part on the Continent in subordination to the Middle East at a moment when Britain's our French allies and to guard naval and own peril seemed to be at its height: aerial bases throughout the Commonwealth. With the advent to power of a virile leader It was our weakest spot. It contained in­ in Winston Churchill, the Maginot mind had deed, a few highly trained divisions in Brit­ been swept out of our councils, never to re­ ain, Egypt, and India, but the Territorial turn. His stroke laid the foundations, both Army, full of good stuff but sorely lacking for Wavell's victories and for the eventual in the training needed for modern war, had domination of the Mediterranean. been only recently embodied and the conscript Crete was an unhaIWY interlude, forced at the -outset displayed no great enthusiasm upon us not by the needs of strategy but by FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 111 psychological and moral reasons. It threat­ doing so, he created that second front which ened our hold on the Levant and seemed would grow in menace until it overwhelmed likely to open a way through the Middle him. The second phase of the war was over, East via Syria. Happily for us, Hitler was the worst dangers past. Britain had ridden then concentrating for his assault on Russia. out the storm. In the Aegean he had suffered mol''; loss than The next phase was short. It lay between be could afford, and dared pot seriously the assault by the Germans on 22 June 1941 pursue his effort there, even with the aid and the first check to their victorious army offered him by Vichy France. at Moscow arid Leningrad four months later. The 22nd June 1941, brought our isolation At one time the situation looked dark indeed. to an end and, therewith, the second phase The Germans made rapid progress, defeating of the war. Henceforth, the Soviet army, sup­ their opponents repeatedly. In the process plied to no small extent by British ships they captured vast numbers of prisoners. Not escorted through perilous seas, was to be a satisfied, however, they gave vent to gross permanent and principal factor in Allied strategy. In our time of loneliness, much as we had to thank our brilliant leaders r and the gallant fighting of our warriors of all services, we may '\ have owed even more to Hitler's mistakes. It is an arguable point whether or not he could have broken through our naval and aerial guard after Dunkirk­ certainly there was no army to oppose him. But it is sure that, in the full flush of success when the morale of his men and the prestige of his victories were at peak, he should have c~ncen­ trated his navy, his aircraft and ,.. the bulk of his army to destroy what he well knew to be the stiffest obstacle between him and Domination of the Mediterranean-HMS Valiant oiling a destroyer at sea. • a thousand years of Nazi rule. Victory would have won him the war; a re­ exaggerations, largely in order to impress pulse would not have caused him to lose it. Japan and persuade her to join in such an Far beyond the haz~ds of the venture" were easy conquest. Certainly, had she done so, the prospective rew~rds. Russia, sandwiched - between two powerful Malta could no longer act as a great naval foes, could hardly have survived. Instead, base; but, otherwise, it was a pearl of great she withheld her support. German victories priCe. And it lay within sixty 'miles of the and loud-voiced claims may indeed have de­ airfield of Sicily on which Hitler could have cided Tojo to strike, but the nature of his concentrated not only the Regia Aeronautica stroke was wholly to Hitler's disadvantage. but also the bulk of the Luftwaffe. Fortunate­ It was not aimed at Russia, and it' con­ ly for us, ohwever, he failed to do so; failed fronted him with the vast potential of the to exploit the flexibility of the air arm. United States, greater by far than the power His culminating fault lay in invading Rus­ of Japan at its zenith. sia before he had eliminated Britain. III The 16th October marked the limit of the c 112 MILITARY REVIEW German advance in 1941. Stalin had collected take Hawaii. These two engagements robbed reserves from his eastern territories and had him of his command of the Pacific; and they held them with admirable patience until his also brought the aircraft-carrier into the opponents had exhausted themselves against limelight, causing the United States to em­ the Soviet positions covering the capitaL He bark on an expansion of her previous carrier then launched his counterstroke and had program far beyond the capacity of her op­ considerable success, not alone in stemming ponent to elllUlate. the enemy's progress but also in regaining In order finally to obviate the threat to some of his lost territory. Australia, the Allies struck at the Solomon In the meantime, British troops re-estab­ Islands where, early in August, they seized lished their positions in the Middle East. an airfield on Guadalcanal, thereby initiat­ They conquered Syria and Iraq and, in con­ ing a struggle which was not completed on junction with the Russians, occupied Iran. Guadalcanal until March 1943, and not in Thus Turkey and the southern flank of the the group as a whole until the Japanese Soviet Union were safeguarded. West of surrendel'. The battle was largely one of Egypt, the British held Tobruk. Otherwise attrition. It was won only by a hairbreadth, the fighting in that theater was on a small American carriers in the Pacific being re­ scale and indecisive. duced in its course to a single damaged vessel. The fourth phase opened with the treach­ It resulted in the virtual abandonment of erous attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor. the Pacific by the hostile battle fleet and In the attack the Japanese destroyed or in its withdrawal to home waters, thus open­ damaged so many American warships and ing the field for the American counterstroke aircraft that they obtained complete com­ to follow. mand in the Pacific for some eight months. In New Guinea, the enemy reached a point ' Thereby endowed with the initiative, they unpleasantly near Port Moresby. He was i were able during that period to transport thrust back in October 1942 by an Australian I their armies at their pleasure, to seize prac­ force under MacArthur which, combined later ~1 tically all the islands in that ocean, to con­ with Americans, and enjoying magnificent quer Malaya and Burma and to threaten naval and aerial support, was to win its way, India and Australia with invasion. Long and largely through a secession of water-enve- i"" . secret preparation, plus calculated perfidy, lopments, along 2,000 miles of 'jungjp-clad had enabled a small island power to inflict coast, thereby, for all essential purposes, seriously incapacitating wounds on two great effecting the conquest of the island. powers, both fighting in their main element. Elsewhere, during the first half of 1942, I The Japanese had fortunately failed to the Allies were in evil plight. In Russia, the , draw profit from their success either by Red armies were driven to the Volga and . seizing the Hawaiian Islands as a base for the Caucasus. Their retreat was due primarily an attack on the United States or for sever­ to defeat, but also in part to the traditional ing the connection between Australia and Russian strategy of evading complete disas­ American. Our ally was therefore able to ter by making use of the vast available space • proceed undisturbed with his production and -recnler pour mieux sauter: a strategy af­ training, to dispatch reinforcements to Aus­ forded the best possible chance by Hitler tralia and to change that continent from a whose policy it was to pursue to the limits danger-spot into a secure offensive base. Con­ set by exhaustion and then to hold conquests sequently our situation began to show signs to the last in spite of conditions obviously of improvement. In May, the American fieet adverse--in this case a line of supply 1,500 administered a salutary check to the enemy miles in length running back to Berlin and in the Coral Sea. A month later, it inflicted under the consta'nt attack of guerrillas. a severe defeat on him off Midway Island, In the Middle East, Auchinleck, opening when on his way to repair his omission to an offensive in November 1941, just managed FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 113 to defeat Rommel _near Tobruk and then sian counteroffensive, and the elimination of pursued him to EI Agheila. There, however, the Axis forces from Tunisia. his strength emasculated by the immense In July 1943 the Allies, aided for the first length of his life-line, he was thrown back time, though with no marked success, by to a position covering Tobruk. .Defeated airborne forces on a considerable scale, ef­ again in May 1942, he lost Tobruk and was fected a landing on Sicily. In less than six compelled to beat a rapid retreat closely weeks they had conquered the island and, pursued by an exultant foe. Only at El Ala­ a month later, they landed in Italy. At Sa­ mein, with seventy miles of Alexandria, was lerno they .had difficulty in retaining their he able to turn and fight. This was a critical point in the war. Hitler might have completed the victory had he transferred the bulk of the Luftwaffe from Russia to Egypt. Fortunately, however, he failed to grasp the opportunity, and Auchin­ leek's line holding, the situation was saved. At sea, the position was at its worst. Losses had been cata­ clysmic: in the Far East, two capital ships, three cruisers and acarrier; in the Mediterranean,­ Barham, Ark Royal and two cruisers sunk and Valiant and Qlteen Elizabeth severely dam­ aged. Our shipping, denied the llediterranean, except for the l!alta convoy, had to voyage to the Middle East by a route 12,000 miles long; and that at a period when it was being strained to the utmost by V-boat attack in the Atlantic. Never­ theless, the spirit of the sailor and his faith in his great in­ strument were eventually to A-critical point in the war-at EI Alamein, where prevail. :- the tide turned in our favor, an infantryman In a Britain bursting with takes cover as a 2,OOO-pound bomb bursts. Allied troops, the cry of many lips was for hold on the beaches and might have been the immediate formation of a Second Front driven into the sea but for Warspite and ill Ol'del' to Rave Russia from destruction. Valiant, which were summoned to the rescue The Allied Command held, however, unswerv­ and countered the hostile onslaught with their sixteen-inch· guns. Advancing thence, mgly to their purpose. They planned offen­ they quickly occupied Naples and the air­ ~Ives j'ldeed, but only where and when feas­ field at Foggia, but thereafter had to fight ible. A, summer wore on, prospects brightened. their way slowly forward through the moun­ Then came the turn of the tide: EI Alamein, tains in the grimmest of winter conditions the descent of North Africa, the great Rus- . until brought to a halt by the Gustav Line {' 114 MILITARY REVIEW covering Rome. Delivering fierce assaults cause the ground formation was given too there, they drew on themselves the bulk of long a distance to cover in the time avail. the German reserves, and that enabled them' able. The lesson of Arnhem was, however, to" effect a landing at Anzio in the enemy's of value later fOr the passage of the Rhine. rear. Unfortunately, the scarcity of landing Between the two came Rundstedt's remark­ boats was such that only two divisions could able counterstroke. He managed to effect con­ be set ashore at a time and, being consequently centration and surprise in spite of bombed unable to exploit their success quickly they communications and Allied aerial reconnais­ were attached and held on the beachhead. sance, and he advanced to a depth that caused Not until four months had elapsed did they some anxiety. The High Command had lent manage to break out. reserves for the stroke and, presumably, In the Pacific, the Americans, in a three­ aimed at disabling the Western Allies during pronged offensive, retook Attu and Kiska in the impending Russian offensive. the north, carried out the great sweep through New Guinea in the south, and, in the center, In the east, the Russians reached their captured successively the chief islands in the objective in three jumps divided by long Gilbert and Marshall groups. In June 1944 pauses. The amazing length of their ad· they landed on Saipan-an island from which vances was due first, to the meticulous prep­ they could bomb Tokyo, only 1,300 miles aration and the magnitude of the blows away. For Japan Nemesis was at hand. which, together, gave them a high initial In Burma, there was stalemate until early momentum; and, secondly, to their sound in 1944, when the Japanese launched a skill­ use of superior force. They applied pressure ful and determined attack in Arakan which, relentlessly along the whole front so that at though only after some anxious moments, no point could the enemy denude his line in was completely defeated-the first British order to provide troops for a counterstroke victory over our oriental foe. elsewhere. The outstanding feature of the invasion In the Atlantic, thanks largely to increased of France was the elaborate nature of the production of escort vessels, to the extended preliminaries. The spirit of our leaders was use of long-range aircraft and to the ,loan such that the project came under considera­ of the Azores, the Navy maintained the upper tion immediately after Dunkirk. Planning hand of the U-boats. began in the summer of 1942, and action in In the Pacific, Nimitz and MacArthur February 1944, when the enemy's bombers stepped from island to island up the ap­ were deprived of the power of decisive in­ proaches to Japan. For the assault, whether tervention by the virtual annihilation of his by sea or land, they always brought maximum fighters. Later, all communications of rele­ force to bear-a procedure economical of vance to the operation were hammered to life and time. Once the Allies were within an extent that would seriously hinder the bombing range' of Tokyo the Japanese fleet, movement of the reserves on which Rommel which had remained for two years in the would depend for his count~rstroke. Finally, inner sea, was compelled to come out and came the bombardment of coastal defenses. give battle, but it never stood a chance. On the sweep through France that fol­ Lacking power of aerial reconnaissance, their lowed Falaise, supply, as so often the case, plans went awry and they were inevitably' set its limit. With the approaches to Antwerp beaten.in the battle of bombs. Their suicide closed, the buildup of stores for an assault planes proved indeed a serious nuisance, but· on the Siegfried Line would be a matter of only for a short period prior to the advent months. Eisenhower therefore attempted to of the --radio-bomb. restore continuity to his advance by turning The strategy ~f th'El' war and discoveries, that line through a combined attack of subsequent to the war, of enemy weapons • ground, and airborne troops. He failed be­ nearing production, point to a number of FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 115

Fighting in the Pacific. conclusions of which per~aps the following Corresponding to unity in the Empire there are outstanding: should be unity among the fighting forces. The nature of modern weapons is such In all the talk of atomic bombs, rockets, that the nation must be ready to deal im­ aircraft-carriers, etc., there is a danger of confusing instruments and their use with mediately with aggression. It cannot wait principles and their application. Weapons for decisions by the Security Council, councils come and go with the advance of science, being proverbially slow, or for any form of but principles are steadfast. The aircraft­ mobilization. carrier, for instance, proved to be the out­ Britain alone would lie definitely iIi the standing naval weapon in the Pacific. The second rank of PowElot"s. The British Empire Americans, therefore, built large numbers of is unquestionably a Great Power. Hence them and proved correct in their judgment. unity of voice in world councils, and unity But the carrier embodies no principle and of action in foreign liffairs and'defense are may at any moment become outdated. We most desirable if the Commonwealth is to need therefore to be cautious as to follow­ exercis... its influence in the forging of a ing the example of the United States Navy new world. ·Five voices, five opinions, would Department in suggesting for its future fleet shatter themselves vainly against the single 116 carriers against eighteen battleships. It voice and undeviating policy of Russia. As is even possible, indeed, that big ships as a to defense, security of imperial communica­ class may have to go, deeprooted though tions is the first essential. they may be in our system. 116 MILITARY RlilvIEW Modern Naval Warfare as Seel\ by a Navy Man Translated and digested at the Command and General Staff School from an article in French by Captain Lepotier. French NavYt in uRevu'e de Defense NatioDale" (France) October 1945. THE international character of the last one hundred tons in sixty days of travel while world conflict has resulted in attaching a surface blockade runner was able to carry still greater weight than in the past, to the from 6,000 to 10,000 tons in the same time. importance of being able to control lines of The conduct of a war to a victorious conclu­ sea communications. It was, in fact, the sion works out from this quite naturally, for battles for the control of sea lanes that exclusive use of sea routes for transportation decided the outcome of the war. purposes permits the supplying of armament Even in the case of belligerents on the beyond the reach of enemy air attacks, the same continent, naval supremacy, which made training of enormous armies, their concen­ the blockading of the adversary possible tration in advanced bases, and lastly, their while the other nation has access to the re­ transportation to the battlefield. sources of the entire world, is of inestimable Everyone is agreed that in order to get advantage. When the belligerents are transportation through, it is necessary to de­ separated by oceans, it is obvious that this ~tl'oy the enemy forces capable of preventing supremacy conditions everything, for opera­ it. But for the attainment of this objective, tions can then be undertaken in the enemy's the "traditionalists" hold that it is necessary tel'ritory. to oppose them with more powerful and On land, victory is clinched by the occu­ numerous forces of the same kind. In other pation of the enemy's territory. On the seas, words, to seek naval superiority, while those it insures exclusiveness in the use of sea of the new school place their hopes in the routes for purposes of transportation. Up to employment of new and much less costly the present time, maximum efficiency in this weapons. transportation is assured only by the use of It should be noted that as naval weapons ocean vessels, each carrying an amount of are improved, their effects become more and cargo equal to that carried by ten trains, or more frightening, yet so far there is no 2,000 trucks. Naval operations are ,under­ example of a nation or alliance of nations be­ taken, therefore, to insure sea traffie of ing able to use the seas for decisive purposes maximum cargoes with the least risks and with~ut possessing naval superiority. On the where it is most useful to the general contrary, in the absence of this superiority, strategy. It is also the most diffieult problem, modern naval forces are able to hinder and for ships are very vulnerable and they can­ make this exploitation of the seas almost not be converted into combat vessels and still impossible by even the most powerful of retain their efficiency as carriers. merchant fleets. Aviation, submarines or surface naval Twice, in 1918 and in 1944, all-out and craft can only insure emergency service of intensive submarine warfare has finally been very low efficiency incapable of supplying overcome by the powers that possessed operations of any importance. We have noted superiority in surface craft. The same thing this in the case of the communications of the was true with respect to aerial warfare in AfJ'ika KOJ'ps during the battles of the spite of the sensational initial successes Desert and Tunisia and, inversely, when the achieved against naval units, especially at attempt was made to supply Malta with its Pearl Harbor and Malacca. We hasten to say essential gasoline and food by means of sub­ that this does not mean that it was surface marines. The same was true in the case of ships that won pver the submarine and air· the communications between Germany and plane, but that superiority in this type of Japan: a submarine carried from fifty to \ ships remains the necessary condition for in· ~()REIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 117 !1lring full efficiency of the means employed noted that the situation did not turn in their 10 antisubmarine and antiaerial warfare. favor until they were able to use the 35,000­ The submarines were conquered by use of ton South Dakota and Wa8hington, which a considerable number of escorting surface decided the issue of the "three-nights battle" vessels, mine detectors, depth-bombs, and es­ of 12 to 14 November 1942. cort carriers which insured permanent aerial Before the decisive intervention the South surveillance over great distances around the Dakota had shown, in the battle of the Santa convoy. This disposition was not justified ex­ Cruz islands on 26 October, that the battle­ cept on condition that it could not be pene­ ship was now able to face an air attack with trated by powerful enemy surface vessels, chances of success. The American ships were and this is where we observe the protective attacked by more than 170 Japanese planes, role of friendly escort vessels that are able fifty-six of which were shot down. The new to intercept enemy sorties. We must also re­ American battleship alone brought down member that when the German battleships thirty-two of them during three unsuccessful were sent out against the British convoys in mass attacks. On the other hand, the airplane the Atlantic in 1941 there was for the time carrier Hornet was sunk, as were the Lexing­ being no other solution than to assign to ton and Yorktown, while the Wasp was tor­ British ships of equivalent power, the task pedoed by submarines. It should also be noted of protecting the convoys. that certain of the ships had to be finished off The objection could be raised that carrier­ by American torpedo boats because, disabled based fighter planes are able all alone to as they were, they could no longer keep up combat the enemy ships effectively before with the main force. they arrive within range of gunfire, and thus In European waters, the British~ airplane the ail' fleet has triumphed over the battle­ carriers Courageous, Ark Royal, and Eagle ,hip. It is true that the two battleships Prince were torpedoed by submarines, and the of ~ales and Repulse, which left Singapore Glol'iou~ was sunk by gunfire from the on 8 December 1941 to attack Japanese con­ Scharnlzol'st during the Norwegian campaign. voys, were discovered and sunk by enemy From all this, it seems that, granting that aviation. On the other hand, although they the airplane is to be an essential weapon in had for the moment lost tHeir superiority in naval warfare from now on, it has not, how­ hattleships after the air attack on Pearl ever, as yet definitely supplanted any other Harbor, the Americans did not hesitate to go weapon; and that supremacy in surface mto the waters controlled by the enemy fieet, units, adapted to modern air-naval warfare, with nothing but airplane carriers and light is still necessary for obtaining victory. surface units. As a result of this, the great To insure the immediate participation of air·naval battles of the Coral Sea and Mid­ planes in a sea battle, it has been thus far way Island took place, in the course of which necessary to carry them on ships provided the air forces of the two adversaries attacked with a flight deck. It does not seem that a the naval units, cau~g great losses. considerable increase in aerial autonomy The first of the decisive battles lasted six (which is possible in the future) will be able months and had as its objective the island of to free us from this necessity, because either Guadaicanal, the Stalingrad of 'the Pacific. the plane will become a flying ship with DUring the first months the American air­ equivalent radius of action, and then it will naval forces did not succeed in dominating no longer possess the ability and speed neces­ the neighboring sea areas, an essential con­ sary for the present type of combat (dive­ e dition for success. Their light forces were bombing, torpedoing, machine-gunning, acro­ several times wiped out by the enemy, notably batics, etc.) ; or else, if it desires to retain its dUring the night of 8-9 August 1942, when present capacity and characteristic, it will they lost four heavy cruisers. It should be have to sacrifice autonomy and take off from 118 MILITARY REVIEW a position close to the field of battle, from a The second World War, likewise, confirmed carrier. It remains for us to decide the dimen­ the teachings of the past relative to the con­ sions of the ship which Will carry the fighting' demnation of the heavy·cruiser. From the planes. The Japanese have built a combina­ IO,OOO-ton cruiser to the German "pocket tion of battleship and plane carrier, the front battleship," the question is merely one of half of which is that of a battleship provided varieties. It is necessary, however, to rec­ with heavy caliber guns, and the rear half, ognize the fact that these models did not that of a carrier. Both English and Amer­ correspond to conceptions of naval tactics, icans have studied this formula, which has but, rather, were the product of various tech" also been popularized in the press. It is to nical acrobatics within the limitations be feared that such a ship would be a poor arbitrarily imposed by the so-called armament battleship and a poor carrier. As regards the limitation treaties. first point, this appears true not only in that War is a single and indivisible thing. To it would possess only half the artillery of a the theories of "air only," "sea only," and complete fighting ship, but especially in that "unity of ground operations," the experience the presence of planes, and therefore of of six years demonstrates the vital need for gasoline in tanks and pipes, would present a unified ~round-sea-air action. It is because very serious fire hazard (nearly all the plane of misunderstanding or inability to effect this carriers that have been struck by shells, union, that we experienced the cruel tactical bombs, or torpedoes, have been burned and surprise of 1940. this risk has Jed to getting rid of the few On the seas as on land, the most character­ catapult-launched planes carried by war ves­ istic evolution that has occurred in modern sels at the beginning of the war). As regards tactics is the generalized employment of· the second point. it would be merely a plane heterogeneous grouping of units acting in, carrier with its capacity and flight deck re­ close cooperation. Each of these groups is: duced by half. made up in accordance with its contemplat{\d The Anglo-Saxon navies have a leaning to­ mission, its nature, and importance. On the ward the tactical combination of warship and seas, such a group, which is necessarily air­ carrier, with each of these ships possessing naval, is called a Task Force by the Amer­ practically the same characteristics as to. icans. This, in our estimate, is the most en­ protection and antiaircraft defense and, in during conception to come out of the recent addition, the one carrying the largest possible experience. Coordination, at any given caliber artillery and the other the maximum instant, of such mobile forces cannot be number of planes of the most efficient type achieved except by permanent collaboration. for combat. This appears to be the basic The aviation which enters into the composi­ "cell" of the air-naval fleets of tomorrow, but tion of the air-naval operational groups must it must be supplemented mainly by escort vessels. live on the seas inl constant and fraternal Two principal categories of escort carriers contact with the surface and under-water have been designed. The slow, or convoy personnel. escort, propelled by motors with a maximum In conclusion, the fleets of tomorrow will speed of around twenty knots; and the escort be, therefore, air-naval task forces whose vessel for naval forces propelled by turbines backbone will continue to be composed of with. a maximum speed of around thirty gun-mounted vessels of maximum power, and knots. In addition, the rapid escort vessel is plane carriers accompanied by light cruisers provided with a group of torpedo tubes. and fast escort vessels. "'". Real bravery in a soldier is noble, generous, respectful of human rights. Duque de Cuxius FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS

Modern Naval Warfare as Seen by an Aviator Translated and digested at the Command and General Staff School from an article in French by Colonel L. M. Chassin in "Revue de Defense Nationale" (France) October 1945. MODERN naval warfare is aero-naval in tions. As a matter of fact, the naval battle /haracter. Aero-naval operations are those continued to be conceived in purely naval in which naval and air forces are involved terms; following the Jutland type, the air at the same time, whether these air forces action constituted only a very secondary part belong to the navy, to the ground forces, or of the drama. In the same way, transport 10 an independent ministry. They may there­ operations (convoys) were conceived with­ fore be divided into two large categories: out any thought of air protection. wmbined ground-air-sea operations, and com­ On 8 October 1939, the British fleet with bined air-sea operations without the inter­ its battleships in the lead, after having vention of ground forces. executed a "sweep" in the North Sea, was Combined ground-alr-sea operations (desig­ attacked in German waters by dive-bombers. nated by the Americans with the poorly­ Although the bad weather prevented part of formed but suggestive word triphibioU8 war­ the Stukas from fip.ding their objective, those fare) comprise landing and embarkation op­ which did succeed in finding it were able to ,rations. Air-sea operations, generally car­ score a hit on a large vessel and came very ried out on the high seas, comprise aero­ close to several others. The British fleet was naval battles. transportation operations able. however, to reach port without having (convoys). and blockades. suffered any major damage; but th.!! lesson An examination of all these operations had struck home. From then on, the British during the course of World War Ii shows that ships avoided getting too close to German the importance of the air arm never ceased airdromes. They remained prudently behind togrow during the course of the war, and at the nets of Rosyth or Scapa Flow. ,resent it is evident that none of them could From the invasion of Norway on, the im­ be undertaken without air supremacy. portance of air ilupremacy was always Judging from the importance of air su­ evident. The battle of Crete in particular was premacy. it appears that th~ airplane carrier an air victory in which the Luftwaffe forced bas already dethroned the cruiser as the the Royal Navy to fall back. It proved that a backbone of modern fleets. The question naval force without the protection of aviation arises whether its reign will be ephemeral and was incapable of preventing the landing of whether land-based aviation will some day parachute or airborne troops. Later, at the supplant the carrier in the navies of aero­ time of the landing operations at Salerno naval type. and Anzio, aviation showed that it consti­ The great. maritime countries were obliged tuted the best defense of troops that had to order the constru~ion. each according to been landed. In desperate situations, the Its means. of a certain number of carriers: counterattacks of German tanks were stopped But in a navy, they were regarded as im­ by the American fighter planes and bombers. pedimenta. They must keep out 9f the way Lastly, in Normandy, the counterattack of the ships of the line. Their need to sail launched on 6 August, by Rommel on the Into the wind in order to launch their planes Avranches was stopped by Typhoons with was H'garded as a serious limitation. They rocket projectiles: the four German armored were finally placed in the rear, protected by divisions'were not'able to make the twenty armored vessels and given a speed superior kilometers which would have turned the tide. 10 that of the masters of the sea to permit The battle of France was won. them to catch up with the line as soon as In addition to these operations, air power they had finished their areonautical opera­ played an increasingly large role in the 120 MILITARY REVIEW purely naval operations in the waters of in New Guinea, and in the northern Soiomons Europe. It was the British torpedo planes in January 1942. that won the victory of Taranto on 11 No-' In May 1942, Corregidor capitUlated and vember 1940. It was the planes of the For­Burma and the Dutch East Indies were con­ miduble which on 28 March 1941 delivered to quered. Japanese torpedo planes sank in the the British war vessels a crippled Italian Indian Ocean on 6 April, the cruisers Dorset­ fleet off Cape Matapan. Likewise, two shi1'e and Cornwall, and the carrier Hermes months afterwards (27 May 1941) the tor­ on the 11th. The Nipponese then plunged to, pedo planes of the Home Fleet carriers de­ ward Australia. They gathered at Tulagi, livered over to the guns of the Rodney and neal' Florida Island (Solomon Island Group), _ King George V, and later to the torpedoes of and at Deboyne Island, in the Louisiade the Sheffield and the Dorsctshire, a Bismu1'ck Archipelago, an invasion fleet comprising that was incapable of defending itself. numerous troop trangports and boats loaded Lastly, even though the Scharnhorst ias with planes and hydroplanes. This invasion sunk by the guns of the Duke of Yo)'k on 26 force was protected by two naval attacking December 1943, it was the planes of the forces each comprising approximately two Fleet Ail' Arm and the Lancasters of the carriers. several cruisers and some twenty Bomber Command which on 12 November destroyers, Its objective was the seizure of 1944 sank the Th'pitz, the last German battle­ Port Moresby and the establishment of bases ship in service, in the Fjord of Trondheim, in Australia on Cape York peninsula, The well-preparcd Japanese aggression in The tide was turned, however, by the the Pacific permitted the Nipponese to seize carriers Y o)'ktown and Lexington in the battle possession of an immense empire with mini­ of the Coral Sea, On 4 May 1942 the dive mum forces; it sufficed for them to be "not bombers and torpedo planes of the Y v)'ktown quite as weak" as their adversarics. Thanks made a surprise attack on the invasion fleet to their being installed in Indo-China, they at Tulagi and sank one heavy cruiser. two were able to concentrate sufficient air forces light cruisers, three destroyers, three troop to achieve air supremacy in Siam, Burma, transports, one boat loaded with hydroplanes, and Malaya, and four gunboats. On 10 December 1941, three days after the The battle of Midway Island from 4 to 6 sudden attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese June 1942 is extremely interesting, for it rep­ aviation put a -definitive end to the theory of resents the first battle waged against a fleet the battleship's being able to defend itself comprising carriers and land-based planes, against aviation. The Repulse ~nd the A~ a matter of fact, it was the planes of 'the Prince of Wales, which had starte& out to American carriers which completed the defeat hunt down the Nipponese fleet without air of the Japanese fleet, for when their attacks protection, were sunk by Japanese bombers occurred, the Nipponese had already aban· and torpedo planes. The British Far East doned their march toward Midway and were Fleet was, for the time being, eliminated. on their way back to Tokyo. In the meanwhile, the Japanese had de­ Like their adversaries, the Americans also' cided to attack territories beyond the range created task forces composed of line ships and of their airfields. Since they had understood carriers, but from then on it was clear that the necessity for air supremacy, they had the latter played the principal role. The wisely created "naval attack forces" made up other vessels merely protected the former' of ships of the line and airplane carriers. It from enemy air and submarine action. During was with such forces that they were able to the course of all the great battles of the PII' cover their landings in the Philippines, Wake cific, never was' a cfi/l}Jitul ship able to fire Isfand, Guam, and the Gilbert Islands, during a shot at another capital ship. All these new· the month of December 1941, and at Rabaul type naval battles were fought between FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 121 planes and ships only, the tleets remaining 2. The uselessness of having airplane ear­ several hundred kilometers from one another. riel'S in the theaters where the unsinkable In 1945 the final assault on Japan showed carriers, represented by land bases, are to what an extent the improved performance available. of land-based equipment allows a cI!ange of The strategic value of ships in offensive strategy. The B-29's made possible the sys­ operations is greatly reduced. Their defen­ tematic bombardment of Japan as soon as sive value is limited for the time being to Saipan was taken, though this latter is siJt­ the zones that are outside the radius of action uated at a distance of 2,450 kilometers from of enemy air forces. Since we can already see Tokyo. Tp.e P-51 fighters, with their great radius of action, provided an escort for the in the near future the day when combat bombers as soon as Iwo Jima was taken, planes will have a range of action of 20,000 which is located at a distance of 1,200 kilo­ kilometers, we see that the world will soon meters from the Mikado's capital. Okinawa, have become too small for the ship of the line. which is 550 kilometers from Kyushu, was At the most, a few naval units may be the last springboard before the final leap; preserved for auxiliary tasks under the pro­ the new planes being able, from their bases, tection of aviation.. to insure sufficient cover, even without air­ In the face of convincing facts, it is diffi­ plane carriers. . cult not to reach a conclusion. The new· In relation to ocean covoys the air arm phenomenon of the atomic bomb increases the has become more and more important. In damages which the plane can inflict upon a spite of all the magnificent work done by the fleet-a threat of extraordinary gr,tlvity. escorting vessels it has been necessary to pro­ long the covering action of the land-based Technical evolutions impose constant mod­ plane till it extends over the entire course. ifications on strategy and tactics. And it is After installing catapulted fighter planes on possible that, during the course of the next certain merchant vessels, the protection of conflict, the plane in its turn will become an convoys on the Atlantic was finally effected obsolete weapon. by means of a task force with carriers. Later For the moment, we may consider: (a) that on, from 1943 on, small escorting carriers the position occupied by aviation in aero­ carrying a dozen planes, were included in all naval operations has been constantly ex­ the convoys, and it was from this moment panded, the pJane having proved that it was that the battle of the Atlantic may be re­ capable of assuming all the offensive and de­ garded as having been definitllly won, For fensive tasks which formerly pertained ex­ the plane is the number one enemy of the clusively to the navy; and consequently, that submarine. Provided with all the detection air supremacy gives mastery of the seas; (b) equipment possessed by boats, its mobility that the existence of the large war vessels and range of observation endow it with the (battleships and heavy cruisers) is con­ abilit~· to sight and :-attack the enemy more ditioned by the existence of airplane carriers rapidly. charged with the mission of insuring their Thi, review of the principal aero-naval protection against air attacks; therefore, the operations of the war has shown us: usefulness of ships of the line is no longer 1, The necessity of possessing air suprem­ obvious, the carrier becomes the "capital acy Oil the seas as well as on the land; hence ship," and (c) lastly, that this latter still has the groWing importance of airplane carriers a few years ahe/!d of it before it becomes In the fleets. obsolete.

An order is not given to one or various units but to their commander. "Memoriq,l del Estado Mayor," Colombia 122 MILITARY REVIEW The Work of Division Headquarters During a March and. Meeting Engagement Translated and digested at the Command and General Staff School from a Russian article by Colonel A~ Lesnichenko in uKrasnaia Zvezda" (Red Star) 9 December 1945. IN June 1943, in order to stop our offensive this plan is to insure ·cooperation between towards Bolhov, the units of the German units at the beginning of the engagement. 19th Armored Division and 18th Motorized March schedules are prepared and march Division counterattacked us in that sector. orders are executed by the staff officers ac­ One of our guard infantry divisions was cording to the commander's directives. A given a mission to stop the enemy from written field order is a basic document used spreading north and northwest. After a on the march. It is much shorter when a forced march south, this division anticipated march table is attached. Designating the the enemy in reaching two localities and had phase lines, estimating the depth of columns, established a defense line. Employing all the and the march schedules precede the draft­ available artillery, the units of this division ing of the field order. withstood a fierce enemy tank and infantry Meantime, the operations section should attack. Later on, after several similar un­ organize security on the march (particularly successful attempts made by the enemy, this when the entire division follows the same divisiol1,.Jaunched the offensive. route), and should issue instructions to the The battle that took place in the Bolhov military police and traffic regulation detach­ area was a meeting engagement with enemy ments. A signal communication and coor­ reserves employed to stop our attack. The dination table is issued. The probable location success of this operation should be attributed of command posts is shown on the map. Plans to the proper evaluation of the conditions are provided for antitank and antiaircraft surrounding a meeting engagement. defense as well as combat security. The work of a division headquarters in a The operations section is also responsible meeting engagement is a fundamental sub­ for appointing a leading unit, the comman­ ject discussed in this article. der of which is ordered to headquarters and The principal duty of the divisional staff is personally briefed on his missions either is to assist the commander in making a sound by the division commander or the chief of decision by furnishing him the necessary in­ staff. This verbal explanation can be sup­ formation concerning the enemy, our own plemented by a written field order. The offi­ troops, and the terrain. Topographical re­ cer in charge of the leading unit is issued ports, condition of roads, schedules of road a signal communication table, two more copies marches, and reconnaissance plans are sub­ of which are kept by the chief signal officer· mitted to the chief of staff. After a careful and the operations section. study of this information the latter submits If no plans for road reconnaissance have a report to the division commander. Using been provided, the chief of the operations this report the commander decides on a section decides upon areas to be reconnoitered: march. Depending on time available, he either personnel and means of transportation to be issues a verbal order or simply explains the used, time schedules, and forms of report order of march to his staff officers and the to be submitted to the headquarters after unit commanders. From notes taken down the completion of this mission. One of the' by the staff officers a field order is later assistants of the operations section is ap­ made up and a march table is sometimes pointed as a division headquarters reconnais­ attached. The division commander verball~ sance group commander; the group also in­ informs the unit commanders about his plan cludes representatives of the arms and serv­ of action in critical zones. The purpose of ices and one officer of the advance guard. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 123 Regiments are made responsible for recon­ effort. Setting up the command post in a noitering their respective areas. meeting engagement is completed in a short­ The successful control of units in this en­ est possible time. Arrival of the division gagement largely depends on proper location commander and his staff to a partly com­ of the command post during the march. Ac­ pleted command post is a daily occurrence. tual experience justifies echelonmenf of the At first, equipping the command post is lim­ division headqflarters in all types of opera­ ited to setting up a radio: center, a message nons (usually two echelons). The location center, and an operational group. Prior to of the first echelon is selected so as to provide the battle and upon his own' initiative, the full control of units during the march, and chief signal officer takes all the necessary especially upon entering the combat. Con­ steps for setting up signal communication s1quently, the commander and his staff should means, including wire communications. be at the head of the main column. Tactical control is carried out by verbal Well-organized liaison and intelligence serv­ orders. At first, only radio (for Short mes­ ices will insure efficient control of units in sages) and liaison officers are em ployed. the march formatioit. Every column and Cooperation is personally planned by the regiment should have divisional communica­ division commander when he assigns the mis­ tion means. Regimental signal officers march sion. He tries to achieve mutual understand­ with their respective headquarters. The signal ing between the unit commanders. center marches with the first echelon, while signal reserves move at the head of the The chief of staff transmits plans for co­ main column. operation to regimental headquarters, checks At the beginning of the engagement, the signal tables and map codes. and issues the division commander usually moves forward additional signs that will be necessary to to the advance guard post or some other conduct the operation. position advantageous for observation. He The chief division reconnaissance officer IS accompanied by mobile signal communica­ sets up an observation system for the regi­ tions. the operations officer, and the chief ments, establishes an observation post at the reconnaissance and signal officers. An order command post, sends out additional observers, to occupy artillery positions is generally given and achieves constant flow of information. hy the division artillery commander. Mobile observation points are used when nec­ Having decided upon the new location, the essary-a single tank or an armored car. division headquarters sets up its command The complexity of a meeting engagement post. It is generally established neal' and demands a systematic study of the enemy under the protection of the advance guard. and the situation. Readiness of units for Later on, when the main body of troops is combat is predetermined to a large extent committed to combat, the command post may by preparations for the march and by the be moyed. forward in the direction of main control of the marching units.

Success in the training and education of troops are unthinkable without firm discipline and strict military order, to maintain which is the uppermost duty of t he entire army personnel. It is our commander cadres in the first place, including ~ergeants major and Rergeants, the closest and immediate superiors and teachers of the Army, who must constitute the mainstay of discipline and orders. Generalissimo Josef Stalin 124 MILITARY REVIEW Our Strategy in Italy Digested at the Command and General Staff School from an article by Lieutenant Colonel Alfred H. Burne, in uThe Fighting Forces" (Great Britain),. December 1945. IT is remarkable how milititry lessons re­ sixteen days later, after which, in accordance peat themselves, war after war, almost bat­ with the trap, a few day's pause was es­ tle after battle---just as in peace-time they sential before the Salerno landing. A fairer did in "maneuvers" after "maneuvers." charge would be to say that there was lack In the Italian campaign, the first note of of flexibility about the arrangements for Sa­ criticism concerns the apparent waste of lerno. It was confidently believed that op· ammunition covering the Reggio landing. In position would be slight, and hence heavy a case like this it is, of course, easy to be stuff-guns, tanks, etc.~was not immediately "wise after the event." Still the fact is that forthcoming on the beaches. our landing was virtually unopposed. More, Meanwhile the Germans were reacting it was actually assisted by our quondam with the military speed and resolution so enemies. "I do not suppose that in the history characteristic of them in this and the last of waI' there has ever been a case of an war. The result was that the Eighth Army invading army being met by its opponents was called to the rescue. We watched its on the shore of their native land with a progress with interest tinged with anxiety, touching of caps and a request to 'carry and it was with mingled feelings that we your bag, sir?'" heard that contact had been made. Every­ The strategy of the Naples campaign was one's first thought was, What were the ar­ simple. The Eighth Army was to lead off mored cars of the Eighth Army doing? A war with a landing on the "toe"; a few days correspondent writes: "At the time, Mont· would then clapse in order to draw down gomery was criticized for slowneRs. There the German defenders, after which the Fifth m~y be something in the charge. Enough Army would land south of Naples, and the supplies might have been gotten together to Germans would find themselves between two send a small token force up the west coast -. fires; Naples would fall, and the Fifth Army road, which was flat and had no broken would then cut across the Peninsula to Fog­ bridges." Another war correspondent says: gia and capture its vast airfields. A pretty "We had come through 120 miles of no man's trap, but the Germans did not fall into it. land from one army to another, but anyone The question arises whether we should not else could have done it, and the episode have been more prompt to mount a fresh strengthens my previous conviction that a strategy-an alternate plan-if the trap quite unnecessary slackness had been allowed failed. It looks as if there was a slight lack to develop in the British forces in this matter of flexibility in planning-one of our beset­ of following up and maintaining contact ting sins in the past. with a retreating enemy. There was too much n is now known that if we had landed inclination to accept demolition as an Act earlier at Salerno we should have found the of God." place practically undefeated-but not quite. Though oUl' object in landing at Anzio has A German diary shows that arrangements never been officially announced there is little had been made to whistle up reinforcements doubt that it is correct to assert that it was fairly rapidly. And that is what happened. to cause the Germans at Cassino to fall back. Nor would it be fair, in this instance, to This attempt was frustrated on the beach charge our leaders with slowness. Our inva­ at Anzio. sion had been projected for 15 December, and Howsoever it be, the object of the Anzio it was only on 15 August that Churchill landing was not l1-chieved, and Alexander was asked General Alexander to advance the date. left with the unplea§11nt alternative of sit­ The landing was accordingly carried out only ting it out in an unfavorable position both FOREIGN MILITARY nAiESTS 125 strategically and tactically, or cutting his be taken as round about twenty miles in fusses and, at the expense of prestige and diameter. This was just the diameter of our morale, evacuating the beachhead. As every­ beachhead, so it ,may be claimed that we one knows, he decided on the former. It was had both time and space to maneuver, and a notable decision and it is worth. while consequently our position was strategically dwelling upon it for a moment. much sounder than appeared at first sight. I have said that the position was unfavor­ But there was yet another consideration, able strategically and tactically. Let me ex­ very much present in the mind of our Com­ plain. Strategically we were on interior lines. mander. Anzio was not the only "pebble on The enemy eould theoretically apply the the beach." Sixty miles to the southeast the ''pincers'' to the beachhead. Moreover, with Fifth Army was battling. The force at Anzio, the sea behind us there was only one line if viewed "in a vacuum," was operating on of retreat. Tactically, we were holding the interior lines, but if viewed in conjunction lower p:round, while the enemy from the with the Cassino troops it was on exterior higher ground had aU the observation. lines with respect to the intervening Ger­ But there were certain assets, not imme­ mans. Sixty miles is considerably more than diately obvious, but not hidden from the ex­ my suggested figure pf twenty miles neces­ perienced and discerning eye of General sary for freedom of maneuver, but if the Alexander. In the first place, though theo­ Cassino force could, by attacking, reduce this retically the enemy could attack from all distance materially, the strategical situation sides, in practice this was hardly feasible. would become very favorable for a decisive "All roads lead to Rome." Very true; Rome operation on exterior lines. ~ a bottleneck of communications, and as We need not dwell upon the brilliant trans­ Kesselring could not spare troops from the ference of the bulk of the Eighth Army to Cassino front all reinforcements for his Anzio the decisive point (very reminiscent of the troops had to pass through Rome. Now in famous transference in the battle of Tunis), order to approach the southeastern face of nor upon the futile bombing of Cassino Mo­ our beachhead they would have to pass right nastery, nor of the delay of three days before across our front along the Latin Way, and the infantry followed it up with their attack. orer the Lepini Mountains. (see sketch), a These are all tactical lessons and pretty ob­ mllieult. circuitous road. Concealment would vious. But strategy came into its own on lI: impossible, and by the time we had com­ 17 May, when the breakthrough from Cas­ mand of the air, they would be bound to sino occurred and the great plan began to ~ke a heavy toll. Alexander therefore judged unfold itself. A rapid advance during the that the risk of convergent attack ,from the next five days brought the Americans on southeast and northeast could be faced. And the left flank, on the 23d to well within forty he judged right. Whenever Kesselring at­ miles of the beachhead. The great moment tacked Arizio (and he did so three times) had arrived, the moment for which the de­ he received a "bloody lonose." The reason for voted garrison had been patiently waiting this brings out a further point, doubtless for four literally bloody months. In the previ­ not ovcdo.oked by our Commander in Chief, ous few days the Anzio beachhead had been namely, that a force operating Qn interior materially reinforced. On the 25th, at the lines reaps some benefit from them if it signal from Alexander, they sprang to the posses!'cs time and space to maneuver. The attack. Kesselring had just transferred three amount of time available depends of course divisions from before Anzio to bolster up on the motions of the enemy. Since it was his Gustav Line before Cassino. But, acting not convenient for him to attack on both as he was on exterior lines, he had not time sides :.:t once he accorded us the necessary to ma"neuver, nor in a short while space time. Space to maneuver is a somewhat em­ either. For American armor dashed forward pirical figure, but at the present day it may " along the famous Appian Way, and on the 126 MILITARY REVIEW 25th the pincers met in the vicinity of Lit­ for the attacker by advancing straight to his toria. The battle was won, and Kesselring front simultaneously safeguards his own com. gave the order to pull out. munications and threatens those of the enemy. A reference to the map is now necessary. This is precisely what Alexander proceeded Roughly parallel to the Latin Way (now to do. While a portion of the Anzio garrison sometimes called Highway Six), and about advanced southeast to join up with the troops THE ROME CAMPAIGN

, , , I I ;

'1" CASSINO, ANZIO • \~ /~ . I ...... , ,-.; ...... , <;:;) MINTURNO

LEGEND --- -- ALLIED LINES ( ALLIED MOVEMENTS ¢=:=='GERMAN MOVEMENTS ?~~~==lio....~2~O====~~OMI ten miles....from it, run the Lepini Mountains, advancing from Cassino the main attack was culminating on the west in the Albano Hills. directed northeastwards, making straight for Germans to the south of this line had now the vital Latin Way. been liquidated but the passes remained in Good progress was made, and on the 26th their hands. Now as we have seen, the Latin a position only three miles short of it had Way formed the main German line of com­ been reached with practically no opposition. munications. Hence the Germans lining the It was not in.fact until six days later that Lepini Mountains were holding a line parallel the Latin Way was cut and the Germans to thei. communications; in other words they. finally and complete~ cut off from Rome. had been forced to "form front to a flank." We must agree that, taken all in all, it was This is a notoriously unfavorable situation, a beautifully executed campaign. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 127 The Education and Training of Officers Translated and digested at the Command and General Staff Sehool from an article in Spanish by Colonel Martin Olmedo Prat in "Revista de la Fuerza Aerea" (Chile) May-June 1945.

THERE are many qualities an officer should sess the fundamental qualities required in possess, and these are expounded at" length an officer-proper mental and physical ability in well-known works. These may be grouped and moral aptitude-selecting men from all into intellectual, physical, and moral qual­ walks of life. ities. The relation that should exist between With the assignment of the officer to a those of the intellectual and physical cate­ body of troops, one phase of his education gories merits consideration. and training comes to a close and another In.the lower ranks physical qualities have is opened which will last till he reaches the acertain preponderance, due to the fact that highest ranks, in some cases and, in general, the command of small units is exercised in as long as he remains in active service; al­ the field and the example has to be set by though, more properly stated, one should say the leader. as long as he remains capable of serving, As one rises in rank, the activities of the for when he becomes a part of the reser:ve, unit under one's command increases, the ex­ he will have to continue working to preserve ecutive work requires more time, and the the qualities he has thus far acquired and, personal appearance of the commander in if possible, improve them and render himself any of the subordinate parts of the unit is capable if need be, of meeting still higher infrequent, since it is rarely possible for requirements. him to be present even before the unit as The essential task of the profession is awhole. command. Every activity destined for train­ An obvious example of this concept would ing and perfecting the officer in a profes­ arise in any fairly large unit when the ques­ sional way must be conducted with this fact tion arises whether it is better that it be in mind. commanded by an officer of little intelligence The training of the officer, in it~ theo­ and education, though a real athlete, or by retical and practical aspects, begins "lith his a very intelligent officer. highly educated incorporation in a unit and must 1)e con­ though of mediocre qualities from the phy­ tinued without interruption till he lIecomes sical stand point. a general officer. In other words, to be an officer a young The training of the officer must be based man of sound body and health, which will on systematic and well-coordinated studies msure normal development, is required. But, throughout his entire career. Here we out­ above all else, intellectual qualities are lleeded line a plan which, though perhaps not the that will render possible the gradual and ideal solution, indicates the principal ideas intensive "education and training required in relative to this interesting point: the development of t}ie personality of a com­ (a) A course for lieutenants in the school mander who, above all else, must "know how." of arms. To prepare them for the command No one, nowadays, is ignorant of the con­ of the basic unit (company, squadron or cept of the "nation in arms." Matters have battery). • gone even further than this, and at present (b) A course for captains in the school of war is waged by the entire nation; the na­ arms. To prepare them for the command of tional defense must be prepared and organ­ the unit immediately above the basic unit. ized by all the intellectual and material re­ (c) A course in the General Staff School sources a country possesses. (Academia de Guerra). To train Staff offi­ In selecting young men for training as cers and prepare them for the command of officers, care must be taken that they pos­ large units. 128 MILITARY nE:VIEW Courses in specialized branches: Tech­ gencies of modern war, and the degrees nical aspect of army equipment, topography, advancement achieved by our armed orga geodesy. izations. In order to obtain an efficient PI' (d) Army War College course (Curso de fessional class, it is necessary to subject i EsclIeia Superior de GlIerm). To train Staff throughout the entire period of its servic officers for national defense and to train with the armed forces, to systematic an senior officers for the command of large units. well-coordinated training and instruction. (e) Military Intelligence courseR for offi­ A military career involves the renunciatio cers of various rankR in the armR or services. by those who enter it. of that which usual! Both lieutenants' and captains' courses is most attractive to men-the prestige gaine should be conducted rIuring the first years in civilian life-attaining wealth and eco of the respective grades, for it is quite pos­ nomic independence. Service to the anne sible that the command of a higher unit forces and the country ennobles the profes will, by chance, be exercised by him first. ~j"n it is true; but because of the very fac Training him, beforehand, for such an even­ th::.t tl:el'e are sacrifices in it, care should b tuality is, in all cases, preferable to training taken not to add to them any serious inteT him for the command of a basic unit, es­ l'uptions in the progress through the various pecially when he might nev('r again in his grades till the highest are reached, since this carrel' have' to exercis(' command over such is the only recompense and true stimulus: a unit. that is accorded the person who, enthusiasti­ The General Staff School ~hould be at­ cally and patriotically throughout the greater tended by those officers who have {'ompleted part of his life. dedicates himself without' the captains' course in the school of arms reserve to the service of the armed forces. and who have excelled in command. for the It is not fitting that there should be offered­ function of the G('nl'Tal Staff, although not the same opportunities to the officer who directly exercising command, requires the through effort and complete dedication to the collaboration with those engaged in its exer­ service has rendered himself capable of per· cise. FOl' this reason, staff officers must de­ forming his official duties without any ex­ finitely spend a certain amount of time with ceptions, as to the officer who, though he does troops, and both they and the military in­ not fail to fulfill his daily duties, has never­ ~tructors must participate in maneuverR in theless neglected his training and improve­ the commanrI of troops. ment and who displays defects which permit It will be difficult to obtain officers who only a very limited employment of his serv­ have mastered more than one of the spe­ ices. An organization which does not give cial Staff courses, such as those pertain­ due thought to selection, which does not stim­ ing to the technical aspects of army equip­ ulate its members and which makes indis­ ment or topography, where these subjects criminate use of both those with and those call for considerable time in the field, but without abiiity, will make no progress but it is not well to limit the officer's oppor­ will, on the contrary, soon show signs of tunitie~ of perfecting his training. The more decadence and it will not be strange if it he learns, the better fitted he will be to fulfill begins to show symptoms of decomposition., his professional duties, providing he does not An armed force will be worth just what lose sight of the fact that the fundamental its officers are worth. Making them efficient thing is command, and that no concessions and maintaining them so, in accordance with can be made in putting this into practice. the growing requirements of modern war· The creation of the Army War College is fare, is the first duty of the functionaries' an imperative necessity imposed by the exi­ responsible for national defense. .... One can never have too many guns; one never has enough. Napoleon