Civil Affairs and Military Government

Civil Affairs and Military Government

VOLUME XXVI JUNE 1946 NUMBER 3 Editor i.. CAW! CoLO,... AlimlUlS L_ Editor. N/)Tth Am.,.;""" Edition Sp"nish-Americ"" Edit;",. Brnzil"''' Editioto 14u J. McADAMS LT COL C. A. MOIn"ILLA CAPT P. M. ALVRI. Brazilian Ana,. CAPT D. MAlSSUROW 14AJ A. F. BRUNO CAPT G. PADuA. Brazilian Arm,. Editorial A ....... tsnu CAPT A. HILERA, LT J. PRADOS HERRERO. LT F. J. RAMOS Administra.tion Administrative Officer: MAJ L. C. MILLIGAN; Production Manager: MAJ G. M. SMITH. JR. Washington Representat;'·,· COL W. H. VAN DINE; 4B919 Pentagon Bldg: Tel: REpublic 6700, Ex 6298 CONTENTS Occupation of Japan and Japanese Reaction .... 9 Breaching the Siegfried Line 9 PTs in the Pacific "" · .15 Movement of Division Command Post in a Fast Moving Situation · .21 Civil Affairs and Military Government .... '" ..25 Strategic Logistical Planning ...33 Sixth Army Quartermaster Operations in the Luzon Campaign ...41 The Essential Elements of Information and the Intelligence Plan · .51 Training Staff Trainers ._53 The Reauction of Intramuros "" ...57 ~ Antiaircraft Artillery Guns in a Ground Support Role " .61 The Twentieth Air Force ................65 Thil'k it Over · .................. _70 Carl' of Ammunition ......76 ARY REVIEW-Published monthly by the Command and General Stall School at Fort Leavenworth, x.u.-. teed as seeond-elass matter August 81, 1984, at the Post Office at Fort Leavenworth, Katl88ll, under the Act of h 8, 1897. Subscription rates: $3.00 (U.S. currency) per year for 12 issues. No extra charge for forei!rn taa'e on new or rE'newaJ BubaeriPtione. t. -' COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL LIEUTENANT GENERAL L. T. GEROW ____________________________________Commandant Staff COLONEL E. D. POST, InJantry ____________________________________Chief of Staff COLONEL F. S. MATTHEWS, InJantj·y ________________________________ A. C. of S., G-l COLONEL DON C. FAITH, InJant)·y ____________________________ A. C. of S., G-2, G-3 COLONEL N. E. MCCLUER, Field Artillcl·y__________________________ A. C. of S., G-4 Faculty MAJOR GENERAL O. P. WEYLAND____________________________ Assistant Command~nt LIEUTENANT COLONEL W. R. KREINHEDER, Coast Artillel'Y COI·ps____________Sccretary COLONEL W. A. CAMPBELL, Field AI·tillery______ _Coordinating Director of Instruction CAPTAIN J. B. EARLE, United States Navy ________________ Director, Naval Instruction COLONEL A. W. PENCE, COI'PS oj Engineers ______ . ______ Director, Service Instruction COLONEL WILLIAM NALLE, Cavalry____ ____________ . ____ Director, Ground Instruction COLONEL R. C. CANDEE, Air Corps ________________________Director, Air Instruction MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM F. DEAN ___ ---------- ___________ Director, Command Class COLONEL J. H. VAN VLIET, InJantl'y ________________________ Director, Ground Class COLONEL W. J. BAIRD, InJantl·y_____________________________ Director, Service Class COLONEL PHILLIPS MELVILLE, Air Corps________________________Dircctor, Air Class COLONEL W. H. HENNIG, Coast Artillery CorJls________Director, Latin American Class COLONEL H. J. SCHROEDER, Signal COI·ps__________________Chief, Personnel Division LIEUTENANT COLONEL A. M. CLARK, Air CO)·ps____________Chief, Intelligence Division COLONEL S. A. GIBSON, InJantry_____ _____________________ Chief, Operations Division COLONEL T. DeF. ROGERS, Corps oj Engineers_______________Chicf, Logistics Division COLONEL L. B. CONNER, Cavalry____________________________Chief, Ground Division COLONEL L. E. BATES, JR., Air Corps____________________________Chief, Air Division COLONEL G. K. WITHERS, Corps oj Engineers _____________ ~ __ Chief, Service Division . LIEUTENANT COLONEL W. B. MCCALL, JR., InJantry__________Chief, Training Division Occupation of Japan and Japanese Reaction MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES'A. WILLOUGHBY, General Staff Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army Forces, Pacific N 26 August 1945, after three years quarters at Wakayama, assumed control in O and nine months of war, the American southern Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu. By Third Fleet under Admiral Halsey dropped the first of October our forces were firmly anchor in Sagami Bay in the opening move established throughout Japan. of a swiftly developing plan of occupation. General MacArthur's headquarters, estab­ At 0900/1 on 28 August communications lished in Tokyo as both General Headquar­ experts, after being delayed two days by ters of the Supreme Commander for the typhoons, were landed at Atsugi Airdrome Allied Powers and General Headquarters seventeen miles west of Yokohama, followed, United States Army Forces Pacific, included: three hours later by thirty-eight transports Lieutenant General R. K. Sutherland; Chief carrying combat troops, supplies and equip­ of Staff, and Brigadier General B. F. Fel­ ment. The next two days having been spent lers, Military Secretary; Major Generals S. in readying the airfield and reconnoitering J. Chamberlain and R. J. Marshal, Deputy the surrounding area, large-scale landings Chiefs of Staff; Major General C. A. Wil­ of the Eighth Army's 11th Airborne Division loughby and Brigadier Generals W. E. troops were begun at 0600/1 on 30 August, Chambel's and H. E. Eastwood as Assistant forty-men plane loads descending at three­ Chiefs of Staff; and Brigadier General W. minute intervals throughout the day, Simul­ E. Crist, Chief of the Government Section. taneously the 4th Marine Regimental Combat British, Soviet, Chinese, and Australian liai­ Team under command of Rear 'Admiral Bad­ son officers were accredited to Allied Head­ ger landed and took possession of Y okosuka quarters. !'l'aval Base. Within two weeks of the astonishingly At 1400/1 General of the Army Mac­ smooth initial landing in Japan, a sudden Arthur, accompanied by Generals 'Sutherland flurry of newspaper and editorial demands and Eichelberger, landed at Atsugi and, pro­ for "tightening control" of Japan, and the ceeding to Yokohama, established temporary occasional reference to "kid glove" adminis­ headquarters in the New Grand Hotel. Two tration policies, suggested that the Press and days later, on 2 September, the surrender the Public had not fully realized the range documents were signed aboard the USS 1lJis­ and character of our occupation of Japan. 80W'; and General Order Number 1, requiring The enormous initial military risks of all Japanese forces at home and abroad to landing with token forces on the Japanese lay down their arms and submit to the di­ mainland, into a colossal armed camp, the rections of the Allied authorities, was issued obvious gamble of landing with only two and by the Japanese Imperial General lfead­ a half divisions, confronted by sixty-four quarters by eommadl:l. of the Emperor. Gen­ Japanese divisions, thirty-six brigades and eral ;\facArthur presided at flag-raising cere­ forty odd regiments, were apparently not monies at the American Embassy buildings fully appreciated. All possible landing areas, in Tokyo on 8 September, and on 17 Sep­ in the event of American armed landing, tember moved his headquarters to Tokyo and were completely organized by the Japanese took residence in the Embassy. Army and each one of these areas had the The remainder of September saw the potentiality of another Okinawa. There were Eighth Army, under command of General perhaps five or six such areas, along the Eichelberger, with headquarters at Y okoha­ East Coast of Japan-Kyushu, Shikoku, the rna, extend its control over northern Honshu Kanto Plain, the Sendai Corridor, and others. and Hokkaido, while the Sixth' Army, under The Japanese General Staff had enough divi­ command of General KrUeger, with head~ sions and brigades to make an attack expen­ 4 MILITARY REVIEW sive everywhere. At Okinawa, from two to e. "We believe that Japan can make a two and a half Japanese divisions exacted peaceful contribution toward culture a total of approximately 40,000 American and civilization. Through such a con­ casualties ot land, not to mention the shat­ tribution, Japan can find a just po­ tering "Kamikaze" attacks on the Fleet. This sition among the nations." affords a completely authentic yardstick to d. "We believe that permanent peace forecast what it would have taken in losses cannot be maintained or controlled had we gone in shooting. The sinister ratio through armed force. There is no doubt that two and a half Japanese divisions exact of our guarantee that the people of 40,000 casualties, spells: Japan can remove the possibility of Kyushu 13114 Divs - 200;000 future wars and can guide Japan to Shikoku 4,5 Divs 80,000 cooperate with other nations again." Kanto 22 Divs - 400,000 From the above it would appear that the Sendai 2 Divs - 30,000 Emperor has indicated by his acts and deed;; The conclusions al'e inescapable. that he is willing to cooperate. Japanese Reaction to U.S. Occupation Government Japanese reaction to American occupation Since the Potsdam Declaration there have cannot be accurately sensed by a mere read­ been several cabinets. The first govemment ing of excerpts from the daily pr('ss, nor as headed by Higashikuni, ~as hastily designed an acceptance of present conditions having for all practical purposes to cuny out the all happened at one time. Rather the re­ terms of occupation and demobilization. That actions have been cumulative and an effort this cabinet was not fully cooperative and has been made to trace this development as it maintained an air of reluctance to submit has progressed in different sections of society. to Allied demands was proved by its resig­ The general tenor of Japanese reaction to nation because of its inability to carry out United

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