STREAMLINING GOVERNANCE SYSTEM OF FATA (PAKISTAN): A STUDY INTO THE CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND RESPONSES OF THE TRIBAL PEOPLE
By
ASGHAR KHAN
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR, PAKISTAN
(MAY 2017) STREAMLINING GOVERNANCE SYSTEM OF FATA (PAKISTAN): A STUDY INTO THE CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND RESPONSES OF THE TRIBAL PEOPLE
By
ASGHAR KHAN
A dissertation submitted to the University of Peshawar, Pakistan in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR, PAKISTAN (MAY 2017) AUTHOR’S DECLARATION
I, Asghar Khan hereby state that my PhD thesis titled “Streamlining Governance System of FATA (Pakistan): A Study into the Challenges, Prospects and Responses of the Tribal People” is my own work and has not been submitted previously by me for taking any degree from this University of Peshawar or anywhere else in the country/world.
At any time if my statement is found to be incorrect even after my graduation the University has the right to withdraw my PhD degree.
ASGHAR KHAN Date: May 2017
ii PLAGIARISM UNDERTAKING
I solemnly declare that research work presented in the thesis titled “Streamlining Governance System of FATA (Pakistan): A Study into the Challenges, Prospects and Responses of the Tribal People” is solely my research work with no significant contribution from any other person. Small contribution/help wherever taken has been duly acknowledged and that complete thesis has been written by me.
I understand the zero tolerance policy of the Higher Education Commission (HEC) and University of Peshawar towards plagiarism. Therefore I as an Author of the above-titled thesis declare that no portion of my thesis has been plagiarised and any material used as a reference is properly referred/cited.
I undertake that if I am found guilty of any formal plagiarism in the above-titled thesis even after the award of PhD degree, the University reserves the right to withdraw/revoke my PhD degree and that Higher Education Comission (HEC) and the University have the right to publish my name on the HEC/University Website on which names of students are placed who submitted plagiarized thesis.
Student/ Author Signature: Asghar Khan ______
iii CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL
This is to certify that the research work presented in this thesis, entitled “Streamlining Governance System of FATA (Pakistan): A Study into the Challenges, Prospects and Responses of the Tribal People”, was conducted by Mr. Asghar Khan, under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Taj Moharram Khan.
No part of this thesis has been submitted anywhere else for any other degree. This thesis is submitted to the Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.
Student Name: Asghar Khan Signature: ______
Examination Committee: 1. Prof. Dr. Shabbir Cheema, Senior Fellow, Research Program and Director, Asia Pacific Governance and Democracy Initiative, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. Email: [email protected]
2. Dr. Sana Alimia PhD, SOAS London Research Fellow, Leibniz-ZMO (2016-2019) Kirchweg 33 Berlin, 14129 Germany. Email: [email protected]
3. Prof. Dr. Amna Mahmood Chairperson Signature: ______Politics & International Relations, International Islamic University, Islamabad. Email: [email protected]
4. Supervisor Prof. Dr. Taj Moharram Khan Signature: ______
5. Head of Department/Chairman Prof. Dr. A. Z. Hilali Signature: ______Email: [email protected]
iv ABSTRACT
This thesis entitled, “Streamlining Governance System of FATA (Pakistan): A Study into the Challenges, Prospects and Responses of the Tribal People” addresses, why Pakistani state is facing persistent challenges in extending and consolidating its governance (authority) throughout its territories especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)? What factors challenge state governance (authority) in the tribal areas of FATA? The need for these questions arises due to the state weak/limited governance in FATA. This dissertation addresses these questions by focusing on the factors and dimensions of un-governability of tribal areas from a multi-dimensional perspective of top down and bottom up approaches to governance. These perspectives include state-centric, society-centric and state-in-society approaches. The available literature often overlooks this multi-dimensional analysis while studying the un-governability of an area only from one perspective. Specifically, this dissertation evaluates and identifies factors of challenges to state governance from society-centric perspectives of the historical dynamics and modern dynamics of state-society relations. The main hypothesis is that societies, where state governance is absent, turn to informal governance and create informal institutions as a substitute for the weak central state governance thereby challenge domination and authority of the state.
The dissertation tests this contention with the help of factors pointed out in governance theories/approaches. This dissertation argues that underlying factors of strong society and the weak state can deter the exercise of state governance (authority). In the context of FATA, the factors linked with the strong tribal society include its long history of living outside state control, social formation and social autonomy. The Goliath (warrior nature) nature and heroic memories of the tribal society always resist the domination of outside invaders and states. In the absence of the state, the tribal society develops its own alternative informal governance, informal institutions and informal economy. The state overlooking behaviour increases the gap between tribal society and the state, resulting in the mistrust, social cleavages and inequalities in tribal society. These factors also hinder state governance in tribal areas.
v The factors linked with state weakness include lack of state’s capacity, will (commitment) to project its power, lack of the state power for political penetration and legitimacy, the presence of conflict, hard terrain or geography, weak infrastructural power, the presence of rival neighbouring state(s), geostrategic compulsions, and external interference. Due to weak capacity, the state relies on the policy of repression, indirect rule and co-optation in its relationship with tribal society through its co-opted Malaks under its patronage. Till date, state responsibility for the tribal society development, providing public goods and social services remained secondary concerns, which resulted in compartmentalised development, corruption of political administration and retention of status quo to serve vested interests of powerful stakeholders in FATA.
The study emphasises that solution of the governance crisis in FATA can be induced by ending state’s repressive policies, use of force and non-binding commitment to development. Further, strengthening local governments by ensuring the integrity of local elections and regulation of local administration’s conduct would also help in this regard.
vi LIST OF ACRONYMS
APA Assistant Political Agent
BHU Basic Health Unit
CH Civil Hospital
DAC Development Assistance Committee
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
NPT Naib Political Tehsildar
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PA Political Agent
PATA Provincially Administered Tribal Areas
PT Political Tehsildar
RH Reproductive Health
RHC Rural Health Center
T.B Tuberculosis
TRC Tribal Research Center
UNPOG United Nations Project of Governance
UNDP United Nations Development Program
vii GLOSSARY OF LOCAL (PAKHTO) WORDS
Malak Tribal Elder
Mullah Islamic Religious Leader, who also leads prayer at Mosque
Jirga Council of Elders
Taliban Knowledge seekers in an Islamic School
Starr Big
Pir Spiritual Leader
Khudae Khidmatgar Servant of the God
Khassadar Tribal Local Militia
viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks to Almighty Allah for blessing me knowledge and ability to complete this work. Prof. Taj Moharram Khan, my supervisor at the University of Peshawar and Prof. Kimberly Martin, my supervisor at Columbia University, both were of great help. Their sharp supervisory comments, efficiency and good cheer were a truly winning combination that inspired me. At Peshawar University, thanks are also due to Prof. Ghulam Mustafa, Prof. A.Z Hilali, Prof. Abdul Rauf, Dr. Muhammad Ayub Jan, and Dr. Sami Raza, for their guidance. I am thankful to the Institute for the Study of Human Rights (ISHR), Columbia University for providing a generous opportunity for one year under its visiting scholar program. Many thanks in particular to ISHR Director, Elazar Barkan, and Associate Director, Yasmine Ergas for their support. I am thankful to my colleagues, especially Dr. Mark Matner at ISHR for his friendship. Also thanks to Prof. George Clement Bond, Prof. Mahmood Mamdani, Prof. Robert Y. Shapiro, and other faculty members at Columbia University for their kind assistance and friendly environment. Special thanks to Dr. Steven Watson and Muhammad Islam for their generous hospitality, friendship and social support during my stay at New York. I am much indebted to all foreign professors who guided and commented on my work. Without their guidance, I would not have been able to move in a right direction. These include Prof. Joel S. Migdal, Prof. R. A. W. Rhodes, Prof. Shandana Mohmand, Prof. Joshua Forrest, and Prof. Anne Mette Kjær. Prof. Joel S. Migdal for his work on state-in-society approach and Prof. Joshua Forrest for his work on society-centric approach deserve my special gratitude. Both of them extended guidance and books on these approaches they have developed and which I have applied in my research. I am very grateful to everyone who helped and volunteered to be interviewed during field work. Thanks to Mr. Mutahir Zaib, PA Khyber Agency, Mr. Muhammad Tariq, APA Bajaur Agency, Dr. Amber Ali, PA Mohmand Agency and many other officials at FATA Secretariat for their support during the field work and data collection. Finally, I am grateful to my parents for their unwavering support over the years, to my children for hanging out without me, and to my wife.
ix TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ...... iv LIST OF ACRONYMS ...... viii GLOSSARY OF LOCAL (PAKHTO) WORDS ...... ix ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... x INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY ...... 1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ...... 5 FINDINGS ...... 7 CHAPTER OUTLINE ...... 9 CHPATER-1 ...... 12 STATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UNGOVERNED TERRITORIES OF DEVELOPING STATES: AN OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE ...... 12 INTRODUCTION ...... 12 1.2 UNGOVERNED TERRITORIES ...... 13 1.2.1 Governance in Ungoverned Territories ...... 16 1.3 THEORIES AND PARADIGMS OF STATE’S GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS IN DEVELOPING STATES ...... 19 1.4 STATE-CENTRIC APPROACH/MODEL ...... 25 1.4.2 Statehood: Capacity, Sovereignty and Territoriality ...... 26 1.5 SOCIETY-CENTRIC APPROACH/ MODEL ...... 33 1.5.1 Primordial (Historical) Dynamics of State-Society Relations and Interactions ...... 34 1.5.2 Modern (Current) Dynamics of State – Society Relations and Interactions 41 1.6 STATE-IN-SOCIETY APPROACH/ MODEL ...... 47 1.6.1 The State-in-Society Model ...... 49 CONCLUSION ...... 50 CHAPTER – 2 ...... 52 METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN OF THE STUDY ...... 52 2.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 52 2.2 THE RESEARCH DESIGN...... 53 2.2.1 FATA as an Ungoverned Territory ...... 54 2.3 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURE ...... 59 2.3.1 Universe and Population of the Study ...... 59 2.3.2 Sampling ...... 61
x 2.4 METHODS OF MEASUREMENT OF GOVERNANCE ...... 68 2.4.1 Operationalisation of Variables - Governance Indicators ...... 69 2.5 DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND TOOLS ...... 71 2.5.1 Desk Review - Secondary Data Collection ...... 72 2.5.2 Primary Data Collection Tools ...... 72 2.5.3 Field Survey and Fieldwork ...... 76 2.6 DATA MANAGEMENT: DATA CODING, ENTRY AND CLEANING ...... 80 2.7 DATA ANALYSIS APPROACHES: LAYERED APPROACH AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ...... 81 2.7.1 Layered Approach ...... 81 2.7.2 Univariate, Bivariate and Multivariate Statistical Analysis ...... 82 2.7.3 Triangulation ...... 82 2.8 LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS ...... 82 2.9 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY ...... 84 CONCLUSION ...... 84 CHAPTER – 3 ...... 85 GEOGRAPHY, SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SET UP OF FATA - AN OVERVIEW ...... 85 INTRODUCTION ...... 85 3.1 GEOGRAPHY ...... 85 3.2 THE TRIBAL SOCIETY ...... 87 3.3. POLITICS: PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION ...... 95 3.4. ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE ...... 98 3.4.1 The Political Administration – Political Agent and Sub-Officials ...... 98 3.4.2 The Malaki System ...... 99 3.4.3 The Jirga System ...... 100 3.4.4 The Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) ...... 100 3.5. THE ECONOMIC SET UP...... 101 3.6. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS AND ISSUES ...... 107 CONCLUSION ...... 118 CHAPTER - 4 ...... 120 CHALLENGES TO STATE GOVERNANCE IN FATA - SOCIETY-CENTRIC APPROACH ...... 120 4.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 120
xi 4.2 PRIMORDIAL (HISTORICAL) ORIGIN OF RESISTANCE TO STATE GOVERNANCE ...... 121 4.2.1 Pre-Colonial, Colonial and Post-Colonial Eras ...... 121 4.2.2 History of Political Penetration by State ...... 126 4.2.3 Pacification through Policy of Aggression and Repression ...... 128 4.2.4 Yaghistan (Land of the Free): Tribal Autonomy and Independence ...... 130 4.2.5 Goliath (Warrior and Heroic) Social Memory of Azad Qabayel ...... 131 4.2.6 Tribal Social Autonomy and Culture ...... 134 4.2.7 Internal versus External Perspective ...... 135 4.2.8 The Informal Peripheral Economic Structure ...... 136 4.2.9 Parallel Socioeconomic System and Structure ...... 137 4.2.10 Socio-Cultural Resistance to State ...... 141 4.3 MODERN (CURRENT) DYNAMICS OF STATE – SOCIETY RELATIONS AND INTERACTIONS ...... 144 4.3.1 Social Control and Strong Tribal Society ...... 145 4.3.2 Civic Trust and Citizens versus Subjects ...... 148 4.3.3 Social Cohesion, Social Exclusion and Marginalization ...... 150 4.3.4 State- Society Connectedness and Citizenship ...... 154 4.3.5 The Interactions between the State and Society ...... 154 CONCLUSION ...... 156 CHAPTER – 5 ...... 158 CHALLENGES TO STATE GOVERNANCE IN FATA – ‘STATE-IN- SOCIETY’APPROACH...... 158 5.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 158 5.2 STATE AND TRIBAL SOCIETY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN ...... 159 5.2.1 Constitutional and Legal Account ...... 161 5.2.2 Pakistani State Laws, Reforms and Interventions ...... 161 5.3 CAPABILITIES OF PAKISTANI STATE AND TRIBAL SOCIETY ...... 164 5.3.1 Penetration of Tribal Areas by State ...... 166 5.3.2 Extraction of Resources by State ...... 173 5.3.3 Regulation of Social Relationships by State ...... 177 5.3.4 Distribution of Resources by State in Determined Ways ...... 181 5.4 SOCIAL FORCES IN FATA ...... 184 5.4.1 Formal and Informal Social Forces ...... 187
xii CONCLUSION ...... 194 CHAPTER – 6 ...... 196 CHALLENGES TO STATE GOVERNANCE IN FATA - STATE-CENTRIC APPROACH ...... 196 6.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 196 6.2 WEAK POLITICAL PENETRATION OF PAKISTANI STATE IN FATA . 196 6.2.1. Presence of State Institutions and their Functions ...... 196 6.2.2 State Physical Infrastructure ...... 203 6.2.3 Prevalence of Corruption ...... 205 6.2.4 Prevalence of Parallel Economy ...... 206 6.2.5 Socio - Cultural Resistance to State Penetration ...... 210 6.2.6 Presence of Armed Groups outside State Control ...... 215 6.2.7 Presence of Criminal Networks ...... 216 6.2.8 Population with Access to Weapons ...... 216 6.3 LACK OF EFFECTIVE BORDER CONTROL ...... 217 6.4 EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE AND PRESENCE OF RIVAL NEIGHBOURING STATE ...... 219 6.5 STATE’S UNEVEN TERRITORIAL REACH BY WILL ...... 220 CONCLUSION ...... 221 CHAPTER – 7 ...... 222 EXTENSION OF STATE GOVERNANCE (AUTHORITY) IN FATA - PROSPECTS ...... 222 7.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 222 7.2 FUTURE OF FATA ...... 223 7.3 TANGIBLE DIMENSIONS OF PROSPECTS FOR THE STATE GOVERNANCE ...... 226 7.3.1 Aligning Informal and Formal Sources of Authority ...... 226 7.3.2 Aligning Formal and Informal State’s Security Apparatus ...... 226 7.3.3 Aligning Formal and Informal Political Authority ...... 227 7.3.4 Aligning Formal and Informal Economy ...... 227 7.3.5 Coopting and Aligning Formal and Informal Service Delivery ...... 228 7.3.6 Capacity Building of Indigenous Institutions ...... 228 7.3.7 Legitimacy through Catering Public Demands ...... 228
xiii 7.4 INTANGIBLE DIMENSIONS OF PROSPECTS FOR THE STATE GOVERNANCE ...... 230 7.4.1 Building and Restoration of Trust ...... 231 7.4.2 Local Resources: Local Processes, Norms and Values ...... 236 CONCLUSION ...... 240 CHAPTER – 8 ...... 241 CONCLUSION ...... 241 Specific Findings ...... 243 Broader Implications ...... 245 REFERENCE LIST ...... 247 ANNEXURE – A: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE ...... 277 ANNEXURE – B: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ...... 290 ANNEXURE – C: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS FORMAT ...... 293 ANNEXURE – D: DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS OF FATA ...... 295 ANNEXURE- E: FIELD SURVEY RESPONDENT’S BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFORMATION...... 305 ANNEXURE – F: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES ...... 318
xiv LIST OF FIGURES, MAPS AND TABLES
S. No Title Page No Figure 1.1 State-Centric Model 32 Figure 1.2 Society-Centric Model 46 Figure 1.3 State-in-Society Model 50 Map 2.1 Map of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 55 Figure 2.1 Classification Matrix of Ungoverned Areas 56 Table 2.1 Population of FATA 60 Map 2.2 Map of FATA Showing Survey Clusters 61 Table 2.2 Proportional Stratified Sample Size per Cluster/Agency 63 Table 2.3 Population and Housing Units in FATA (1998 Census) 64 Table 2.4 Sample Size for Each Zone 65 Table 2.5 Sample Design 66 Table 2.6 Selected Sample Size 67 Figure 2.2 Governance Measurement Model with Indicators 70 Table 2.7 List of Participants and Time Frame of Focus Group 76 Discussions (FGDs) Table 2.8 Name of Villages/Union Councils and Days Field Survey 80 Covered Map 3.1 Geographical Profile of FATA 86 Figure 3.1 Pashtun Tribal Organization 92 Table 3.1 Economic Indicators of FATA 101 Figure 4.1 Informal Versus Formal Justice System 139 Table 4.1 Parallel Socio-Economic Structures and Institutions in FATA 140 Table 4.2 Socio-Cultural Resistance to State Governance (Authority): 142 Normative and Organizational Factors Table 4.3 Social Control: State Authority and Control in FATA 148 Table 5.1 Broad Sector-wise Allocations - Federal PSDP 2013-14 in (Rs. 182 Billion) Table 6.1 State Survival/Core Functions & Institutions 199 Table 6.2 Expected Functions and Institutions of Pakistani State in FATA 200 Table 6.3 Informal Economy and Corruption 209 Table 6.4 Socio-Cultural Resistance to State Governance (Authority): 212 Tribal Society and State Relations
Table 6.5 Monopoly on the Use of Force 214 Table 6.6 Border Control and Interference by Rival Neighbouring State 218
xv INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY Many of the post-colonial developing states are facing the problem of consolidating the state’s domestic sovereignty across geographical bounderies especially in their peripheral areas. Though in the post-colonial states, the ‘nation-state’ was the principle to organise itself as a whole nation, however, especially within these states the peripheral border areas did not necessarily correspond to actual territorial control of the state. Coupled with this, the population within borders of these states did not necessarily acknowledge the centre’s legitimacy of the right to rule and resulting thus, in a gap between the state’s claim of international legal sovereignty and the state’s domestic sovereignty. The dilemma with all these post-colonial states of Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Pacific Island is the same that these states do have a strong political centre, their territorial reach into their hinterlands is often limited. Since independence, Pakistan as a sovereign state, has not yet been able to establish its governance (authority) across geographical boundaries and many of its territories still remain out of the ambit of state authority i.e., ungovernable.1 Studies have noted that such ungovernable areas comprised nearly 60% of the whole Pakistani state territory (Synnott 2009: 18 – 20). International analysts and policymakers are of the opinion that this lack of governance (authority) of Pakistani state over its entire territories has significant consequences for the stability of the region thus having effects on governance efforts in neighbouring countries, especially Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics, India, and Iran (Barthwal-Datta 2010, 59). The reasons of un-governability and challenges to governance2 are different across territories in Pakistan. Based on this variation, in some of these territories, besides state actors, non-state actors have established their own writ by replacing the Pakistani state. These areas include the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Southern Punjab, Balochistan and to some extent, the first capital of Pakistan, Karachi. Among these ungoverned areas, the most prominent are the Federally Administered Tribal
1 In this dissertation the terms and phrases like ‘governance voids,’ ‘ungoverned spaces, ‘lawless areas’, ‘areas with limited statehood’, ‘stateless societies’, ‘Hybrid Political Order’, etc., are used interchangeably. These have been increasingly used in reference to territories, where the State’s writ and control is weak or has been absent. 2 In this study governance is refer to “the general exercise of authority”. According to the developers of World Governance Indicator (WGI), governance refers to “[T]he traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised”.
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Areas (FATA). FATA has a long history of being not governed by any outside power or state. This sovereignty gap has had real and profound consequences for the people living in unconsolidated states of developing world. In the absence of central authority, these ungoverned spaces provide safe havens to violent non-state actors who use the area as bases for launching attacks against domestic state thus posing challenges not only to the state’s authority but also to its very existence. Insecurity and the absence of the state in an area have also meant that in that area the population does not receive the collective goods and services that other parts of the state receive. One important responsibility of a state is delivery of public goods and services to its population. These include social services like education, health, sanitation, water supply etc, security, law and order, economic opportunities, and the provision of infrastructure needs of transportation and communication. A state is considered weak or failed when it is not able or willing to perform these functions. Out of these, the most important ones for the state very survival is the functions related to state governance (authority) and the extension of its control to all parts, strengthening of state structures and security of all citizens. Service provision is needed to develop strong state-society relations. These services include: health, education, security etc. in order to deal with communal distrust, establish rule of law, obtain legitimacy, establish democratic governance structures (host regular free and fair elections, the need for establishment of accountability and a limited role for the military/ police in governance, guarantee of civil liberties: rights, responsibilities, freedoms, suppression of opposition and popular public opinion), and to create income generation opportunities. Among these needs and responsibilities of a state, the most important one is the extension of state governance (authority) to all parts especially the areas where state lacks authority or has lost it, as a result of some conflict (OECD 2008, 73). The excercise of state authority is a key element in the state territorial reach over all its territories and provision of collective goods and services. This study discusses challenges to Pakistani state governance (authority) in its tribal areas (FATA) in the light of preceding discussion.
FATA has a long history of being out of state governance (authority) and retaining its independent status. Though different empires that ruled India in the past had control
2 over the plain areas, but in mountainous areas of tribal society they had influence only over one or two of the passages. However, the tribal society persistently maintained its autonomy that remained the passage of countless invaders, like Alexander, Changez Khan, and Tamerlane. The Mughals attempted but failed to subjugate and bring the Pakhtun tribes under their sphere of domination and control. Even the moutains passages of the main route was affected via force over refractory tribes (IPRI 2005, 3).
The geostrategic location of Tribal Areas and its contiguity with the British India made it important for the defence of the subcontinent. The ensuing Great Game centred this region in the tussle between the Russian and the British in the colonial era (Wahid 2013, 603).
Even after Independence, the British strategy of indirect rule was followed by Pakistan in FATA. Both in the past as well as in the present, state loss of influence over border tribes rendered this control vulnerable as these tribal people resisted state domination. The weak authority of Pakistan was further aggravated in the post Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The US attack on Afghanistan in 2001 in response to the event of 9/11, forced the Taliban and Al Qaeda network to run off from Afghanistan and take refuge in the tribal areas of FATA. The international community claims that from FATA, the Al Qaeda and Taliban started cross-border attacks into Afghanistan on NATO forces. Various other events like suicide attacks and target killings insides Pakistan, the 7/7 London bombing, and the killing of Benazir Bhutto are linked with FATA carried out by Taliban, Al Qaeda and individuals trained by them (Carlton-Ford and Ender 2010, 207). With the passage of time, these militants started to challenge the authority of Pakistani state in FATA as well as in other adjacent areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the rest of Pakistan.
In response to these domestic and international threats emanating from FATA, Pakistan was compelled to adopt the policy of ‘Deterrence and Development’ in FATA (Haider 2009). To establish its writ and to defeat militants, Pakistan launched a number of military operations in FATA. These military operations faced fierce resistance and challenges due to various factors in FATA.
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Analysts and policy makers argue that flawed governance has produced various issue socio-economic and political issues in FATA (Haider 2009). This flawed governance in FATA must undergo reforms. They are of the opinion that the flimsy governance of FATA is because the Pakistani state deliberate policy to keep these areas as it is due to its strategic compulsions. Further, the tribal culture of resistance to state governance and also the existing repressive structures and denial of political rights to tribal people of FATA are the causes of the existing bad governance. Upon the special status given to FATA by 1973 Constitutions, every successive government (both civil and military) promised socio-economic and political integration of FATA, but such promises were not realised due to various domestic and geostrategic compulsions (Rubin 2013).
Against this backdrop, this dissertation becomes important to the stakeholders such as researchers, teachers, social service providers, clients, activists, and the citizens, in general. Difficult questions need to be addressed when state governance (authority) related issues in FATA are viewed from different perspectives. Understanding the problem of state governance in FATA in the broadest sense requires recognition of inequalities in its social, political, and economic structures. This research provides an appraisal of the existing governance system of FATA through various approaches of governance and politics to assess and identify the challenges faced by Pakistani state in the governance of these areas in the light of the views of the tribal people. In this context, this study helps in further strengthening the government of Pakistan policy decisions with respect to the extension of its governance (authority) in FATA.
Regarding the Pakistani state governance (authority) of FATA, in the subsequent chapters, this study has analysed the issue from three approaches. These are Society- centric Approach, State-in-Society (State-Society Relational Governance) Approach and State-centric Approach.
Literature suggests that solution to ungoverned areas or lack of governance in an area is state building. The literature on state resilience and state building shows that most of the interventions and efforts for restoring/extending state governance (authority) in an area are focussing on statist (Weberian) dimensions that are only stressing on effectiveness and capacity building of state formal institutions while the other perspectives (e.g. society-centric, intangible dimensions) are always ignored.
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Regarding prospects of the extension of state governance in FATA, this study emphasises both statist and society-centric (tangible and intangible) dimensions of state building.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS This dissertation analyses why some postcolonial states in the developing world are facing persistent challenges in projecting their governance (authority) over their territories (geographical bounderies), especially in their peripheral areas, while other states fail in doing so. Specifically, this research is focussed on why Pakistani state is facing persistent challenges in extending and consolidating its authority throughout its territories especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
In the context of FATA, it also finds why FATA remains as an ungoverned territory till date challenging Pakistani state authority? What are the factors that challenge state governance (authority) in FATA? What constitutes legitimate state authority? And how can Pakistani state governance (authority) be extended to FATA? The study also finds the prospects for the extension of Pakistani state governance (authority) to FATA.
The literature on ungoverned spaces is mostly written from a security perspective and thus ignores other aspects related to ungoverned spaces especially the subnational dynamics in the context of state formal governance. Therefore, from this perspective, a gap in existing scholarship is present. This dissertation seeks to fill the gap by focusing explicitly on state relations with tribal society from various approaches of governance and state politics in the developing world. These approaches of governance play an integral part in analysing Pakistani state and tribal society relations and have greater implications for the Pakistani state extension of its governance (authority) in the ungoverned tribal areas of FATA. In this vein, the Pakistani state has long attempted to dominate and govern these areas through the various tactics of indirect rule, co-opting tribal elders, Malaks, under its patronage in the tribal governance affairs. This has had disastrous consequences in terms of developing state contact (penetration) and trust (developing its image) with the tribal people because it created incentives for mistrust between a common tribesman and the Pakistani state’s legitimacy.
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In order to have an in-depth understanding and study of the challenges and prospects of the Pakistani state governance/consolidation in these tribal areas, this dissertation develops a multi-dimensional framework (analytical/theoretical) based on three major approaches of governance and state politics of developing states i.e. state-centric, society-centric and state-in-society approaches. Here the point of departure is that the state’s lack of governance in tribal society of FATA is the outcome of various factors. These are the state’s lack of capacity, will (political commitment), incapability of creating legitimacy in eyes of tribal people and also the independent nature of the tribal people and its culture and tribal society’s long history of living beyond any state control for centuries. By applying insights derived from reviewing the literature on the above mentioned three approaches of governance, the dissertation develops a set of theoretical propositions (variables/indicators of un-governability) that hinge on the way in which the state may foster the extension of its governance (authority), thereby compensating for the weak capacity and weak control in the tribal areas of FATA. Applying the theoretical framework, this logic has been tested through studying FATA as an example of ungoverned area. To sum up, in this introductory part of the study, based on two interrelated questions, further supplementary questions are raised. Firstly, why states (why some states have failed or persistently facing challenges in extending their governance) in developing world cannot extend its authority in all its territories especially the peripheral territories bordering another state thus leaving the area as ungoverned?, and secondly, What are the factors that challenge state governance (authority) in these ungoverned areas? Within the perspectives of these two questions, various concepts of statehood (state capacity, authority and legitimacy) and sovereignty including their essentiality in understanding the state governance have been reviewed. These also untangle discussion on the areas which remain outside state governance (authority) or are governed under its own customary system, also recently called as alternatively governed areas. Therefore, the discussion in this study on prospects for state governance (authority) amidst problematic sovereignty (lack of state governance) is directly relevant to ungoverned spaces and tribal areas of FATA, in particular, has been explored in detail in the proceeding chapters.
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FINDINGS The analysis suggests that the society-centric factors (society history, social formation, social autonomy, praetorian memories, state repressive policies informal economy and tribal socio-cultural norms), the state-centric factors (weak capacity, legitimacy and will, weak monopology on the use of forces and violence, weak penetration by the state, lack or weak physical infrastructure, prevalence of corruption, and external intervention by neighbouring rival state) and state-in-society factors (weak social penetration, lack of capability to extract resources, distribute resources in determined way and inability to regulate and influence social relationships and resistance by social forces) have negative effects on state consolidation in FATA. These factors are posing challenges to state governance in the tribal society of FATA. In a system where both the state and society derive large benefits from perpetuating the status quo, it is unlikely that relatively small development steps (provision of public goods and social services) on the part of state and its capacity and political commitment would make much difference to the overall extension of state governance in its territories, thus would not lead to any positive outcomes on the plight of common tribal people. The state continues to rely primarily on co- optation and repression in relationship to the tribal society of FATA. The Pakistani state’s overriding objective in tribal society of FATA is to keep the state governance through indirect means and through coercion when deemed necessary. In this way, till date and still, for Pakistani state the development of the tribal areas of FATA, the provision of collective public goods and services to tribal people and the state responsibility to merge these areas are matters of secondary concern.
The study outlines five sets of causal factors that explain why Pakistani state could not be consolidated so as to establish its governance in FATA.
The first is the state’s lack of capacity to govern these tribal areas. That’s why state relies on the indirect rule of co-optation of local leaders (Malaks) and as well as coercion and repression when deemed necessary by the Pakistani state to govern these tribal areas. In this respect, indirect governance of FATA does not represent a significant departure in terms of developing Pakistani state and tribal society relations
7 but rather an additional way of creating distrust between tribal people and the Pakistani state. This also reflects just channelling resources to co-opted local leaders in FATA and nothing more with regard to state’s consolidation.
The second factor is directly related to the state’s legitimacy. The legitimacy of the state can be ensured through state interaction with and penetration in the society through the provision of various services and public goods. In this way, the Pakistani state is less capable of providing these services and thus has failed to develop its legitimacy in the eyes of tribal people and have no trust of the tribal people. As a result, there is a general trust deficit between tribal people and the Pakistani state.
The third factor relates to will (political commitment) of the state, or the extent of state political commitment to carry out development works in a society. In the context of FATA, the Pakistani state’s commitment to developing tribal areas did not extend far beyond the realm of its policy pronouncements (expressed commitment). In reality, Pakistani state continues to "do what it has to do" in order to protect its interests in these tribal areas.
Fourth, the attributes of a segmentary society, its social, normative and organisational factors, have significant effects on the Pakistani State-tribal society relations thus hindering Pakistani state governance in FATA. The key dimension in this respect is whether the local tribal society is united or divided. In this regard, the unity among local tribal population matters. When the tribal society being independent of outside control, cooperate with the state apparatus, the likely outcome is high chances of the extension of state governance (authority), as the tribal society can be fully developed by keeping it in the government development work at par with rest of the country. Conversely, when this free and independent tribal society chooses resistance to the conduct and policies of the state, lack of state control and authority is the likely outcome. This is particularly be made more aggravated when the local population also cooperates and is co-opted by the international network of outlaws and terrorists to strengthen the resources they can bring to bear on the local conflict and resistance to state authority and control. Similarly, this challenges the state governance more when the local representatives of the state are hit by these outlaws and local community. Also, the international network of outlaws co-opts local people and local specific
8 rebels (in FATA local militants and Taliban), which further triggers active resistance from the tribal local population. Finally, the nature of repression (due the presence of conflict and state lack of legitimacy) has a significant effect on the extension of state governance (authority). In this vein, state Agencies concentrate on the repression of violence in locations that are particularly crucial for the continuation of the state rule. This system of repression through an indirect governance system of Malak's patronage and political administration is never far away and remains a fact of life across these tribal areas.
CHAPTER OUTLINE The dissertation is structured in a way that facilitates analysing the factors of challenges the state is facing in the consolidation of its authority in the tribal areas (FATA) of Pakistan. The introduction part of the dissertation provides a general overview of the whole study. It consists of the research questions; a quick overview of the main findings of the study and at the end gives an outline of the chapters.
The first chapter lays the conceptual groundwork in this respect. At the start, the chapter gives an introduction to the ungoverned areas and in the context of ungoverned spaces, it also gives a working definition of governance for this study. Various paradigms and theories of state governance and politics in developing states have been discussed. The chapter then focuses on developing a theoretical framework in the light of the discussion on various concepts and attributes of the statehood, state capacity, domestic sovereignty, and the territoriality (infrastructural power) that is the state territorial reach in all its parts, which is the central theme of this study. The chapter develops a theoretical framework for studying state governance (authority) in ungoverned areas from the perspective of theories discussed in the start of this chapter. The theories and concepts discussed in the analysis of un-governability or challenges to state governance (authority) in an area are grouped under three broad approaches to governance. These approaches are the State-centric, society-centric and state-in-society (state-society relational governance) approach. This framework hinges on the potential effects of these three approaches on ungoverned spaces on creating state capacity which can strengthen and ensure the consolidation of state governance (authority) in tribal areas of Pakistan. The chapter outlines a set of theoretical propositions which specify when this may be the case.
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The Second chapter gives details about the methodology employed to test the theoretical framework outlined in the first chapter. The methodology chapter outlines in detail the design of the study. The research design adopted includes the data collection tools (survey questionnaire, in-depth interview schedules, and focus group discussion format), sampling methods and the statistical methods used for data analysis.
The Third chapter provides a short discussion on the geography and society of FATA. The chapter then makes a comparative analysis of various socio-economic and political indicators of FATA, KP and Pakistan. The purpose of presenting a detailed comparative analysis of the indicators FATA, KP and Pakistan is to highlight the underdevelopment in FATA. This analysis provides a thought provoking for the proceeding chapters, where the main theme of the study has been discussed that how FATA has been kept underdeveloped and ignored by the successive governments of Pakistan.
Chapter Four gives a detailed account of challenges to state governance (authority) in tribal areas (FATA) from the Society-centric approach. This chapter presents a detailed analysis of various society-based factors from historical points of view which helped in resisting state authority in the tribal areas. The chapter also discusses the current dynamics of society, stressing on its importance for a state to integrate its society. These current dynamics are also important for a state to extend its presence through developing its relations and interactions with the society.
Chapter five presents an overview of the Pakistani state and tribal society relations in the context of state-in-society approach. These relations have been discussed by reviewing post-independence Pakistani state intervention in FATA and also discussing current perspectives of state intervention. It argues that how tribal society has been kept ignored and underdeveloped intentionally. The Pakistani state interaction with the tribal society has been discussed in detail and that how the various regimes in Pakistan have penetrated in the rest of Pakistani society while leaving the tribal society of FATA ignored. Further, the chapter provides detailed analysis on the Pakistani state strength and performance in the tribal society. This chapter provides a gateway to the main “state-centric analysis” to assess the Pakistani state capability and capacity, as a state, the level of the Pakistani state strength in asserting its claim
10 of legitimacy in these tribal areas, which has been thoroughly discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter Six presents a detailed analysis of un-governability factors from state-centric approach under the theoretical framework developed in Chapter one. Chapter six provides an in-depth analysis of the findings in the context of FATA resistance and challenges to Pakistani state governance (authority). These challenges have been thoroughly discussed from various dimensions under state-centric approach.
Chapter Seven examines prospects of the extension of state governance (authority) within the theoretical framework developed in chapter one. The chapter discusses in detail the prospects of the extension of state governance (authority) in FATA of Pakistan within the findings of governance approaches analysed in previous chapters. The chapter also gives thoughtful ideas and strategies, in the light of the views of experts, stakeholders, and common tribal people, for the extension of state governance in FATA.
Chapter Eight provides an overall conclusion of the study. The chapter also gives implications of the study findings in the light of the analysis given in the preceding chapters.
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CHAPTER-1 STATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UNGOVERNED TERRITORIES OF DEVELOPING STATES: AN OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE
INTRODUCTION This chapter develops a theoretical framework to study and identify challenges to state governance in ungoverned territories in developing states. In this context, it explores the issue of state governance (authority)3 from the perspectives of various paradigms and approaches of governance and state politics in the developing states. Weak states4 with significant problems of governance (authority), capacity and legitimacy often face persistent challenges in controlling their territories, leading to the emergence of ungoverned areas within their geographical bounderies (Brock, Holm, Sorensen and Stohl 2012).
The chapter consists of four sections. Section 1.2 introduces the concept of ungoverned areas within the general context of state governance. This section further gives details on governance in ungoverned areas. Section 1.3 discusses various prevailing paradigms and theories of state politics and governance in the context of developing states. Various approaches to state governance have been discussed in this section. Following this section, each of these approaches has been discussed in detail in a separate section. That is section 1.4 discusses the State-centric approach, mostly from the Weberian or statists perspectives. Section 1.5 presents the Society-centric approach, thus develops the conceptual relationship between state and society and presents a debate discussing the historical roots of the society that shape the socio- economic and political basis of a society independent of any state control. Section 1.6 presents a kind of mix approach based on the state-society relations, also called state- centric relational approach or state-in-society approach. By developing a conceptual
3 This study adopts for its use definition of governance given by the United Nations Project on Governance (UN-POG) that is “Governance is the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels, comprising the mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences.” 4 In this Dissertation the State lack of capacity or capability is connoted through various terms and concepts. These are state weakness, state fragility, limited statehood, statelessness, contested state, hybrid political order and other such terms identifying a state absence or weak writ & governance in a given area. In this dissertation these terms have been used interchangeably.
12 relationship, this section discusses the society and state relations by arguing that both state and society are pertinent for each other and shape each other. This part focuses on the state-in-society approach given by Migdal and others.
These approaches discuss the factors of un-governability that challenge state governance (authority) in an ungoverned territory by highlighting various aspects of the issue.
1.2 UNGOVERNED TERRITORIES After World War II there was a growing trend in literature and debates among scholars and policymakers about areas where states have weak control even in the presence of a functional government. But since 9/11 (2001), these “ungoverned spaces” has become the latest incarnation of a growing concern in governance debate. The main argument in this context is that poorly, under or missed governed areas results in instability in a state or could result in facilitating and providing shelter to non-state actors, outlaws, militants, who can then easily use these ungoverned areas as their launching pad for attacks or pursue criminal or other activities. The term “ungoverned spaces” itself is contested because of its misnomer nature, as there is a debate that calling these areas as “ungoverned” is not appropriate because they have always beeen ruled alternatively, through another type of rules, customary or informal rule by subnational indigenous authorities (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010, 1 – 10). Like the term ‘ungoverned spaces’, the true presence of these spaces is also contested and questionable. However, it remains a great question of concern to understand as to why ungoverned spaces exist today even in the 21st century, is a question that needs extensive research. The definition of ungoverned spaces provides a ground as to why be these areas called ungoverned? The Ungoverned space is defined as, "A place where the state or the central government is unable or unwilling to extend control, effectively govern or influence the local population, and where a provincial, local, tribal, or autonomous government does not fully or effectively govern, due to inadequate governance capacity, insufficient political will, gaps in legitimacy, the presence of conflict, or restrictive norms of behaviour” (Lamb 2008, 12). These ungoverned areas are categorized as exploitable areas, ill- governed, contested and under-governed (Lamb 2008). Thus an ungoverned space is a geographical area where the governance
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(authority) of the state is either limited or totally absent. In the context of this study, the term ungoverned area denotes a political condition along a range of state attributes of having, a weak states presence5, partial state collapse6 or a complete state collapse.7 Regarding the reasons of state weakness, lack of capacity or capability or state fragility, there are several theories. Broadly, states experiencing fragility, weakness, and lack of capacity or capability are the result of a vigorous interaction between external factors of regional and global insecurity and regional or global political economy and internal factors of economic and structure bad conditions, poverty, weak institutions and violent conflict.8 Some scholars categorize ungoverned spaces two broad categories. These are: physical and nonphysical spaces. Physical spaces or areas are those where the state control is not effective and are oftenv peripheral areas. While nonphysical are domains or spaces inside the the state where the functional government due to its capacity is unable or unwilling to extend its governance (authority) (Whelan 2005). Ungoverned space denotes the state weak or non-existent authority in a given geographical area. The term ungoverned space is a common label to represent state weakness by share description of the absence of capacity to make representation in certain locality within the state. It defines the degree of weakness of a state to the extent of non-physical presence of state apparatus or extremely weak and compromisable presence of state structures to alternative governance mechanism dominated by local native authorities and warlords more vulnerable to penetration and sometimes overwhelmed by illicit networks (Lamb 2008).
5 Which maintain only a cosmetic and ineffective presence in frontier zones or large urban slums that are essentially beyond the control of government authorities. 6 Wherein a state authority exists but has no writ in certain regions within its territory 7 Intermittent, predatory state presence, usually in the form of a garrison state. 8 The reasons for fragility are unique and different in different context and situations. Although from statist perspective, most common reasons of fragility include: state weak capacity, bad governance, lack will, and weak state legitimacy. Besides, the fragility factors that can be groups according to it nature and casual relationship include, “i).Economic & Structural factors (Poverty, low income and economic decline, violent conflict, presence of armed insurgents, natural resource wealth/lack of natural resource wealth, geography (‘bad neighbours’), demographic stress (including urbanisation); ii). Political and institutional factors (Crises of state legitimacy and authority, bad governance, repression of political competition, weak (formal) institutions, hybrid political orders, institutional multiplicity, political transitions, succession and reform crises in authoritarian states, state predation, neo- patrimonial politics) , iii). Social factors (Horizontal inequalities, severe identity fragmentation, social exclusion, gender inequality, lack of social cohesion (including lack of social capital), weak civil society), iv). And, International factors (Legacy of colonialism, international political economy, climate change, global economic shocks (including food prices)).”
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The term ungoverned space illustrates the extent of penetration by the state of a given society. This is measured in terms of the state physical infrastructure, absence or presence of state formal institutions, the existence of an informal economy, and degree of the state monopology on the use of force and violence and the presence or absence of state formal institutions (Rabasa 2007, 16). In this context, to establish its control, a state is faced with significant challenges. Thus factors that contribute to un- governability of an area include: weak monopoly of state on the use of coercsion and violdence, state weak penetration, weak physical infrastructure, lack of a defensible border, external interference by rival especially a neighbouring state, sociocultural resistance, and several other factors (Rabasa 2007, 82). Ungovernable areas of the world include: the Pakistan - Afghan border region (FATA); the south-eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula; East Africa (particularly the area of and surrounding Somalia); the north Caucasus; parts of Indonesia; West Africa; the Columbia, Chiapas border and Venezuela border and the Guatemala (Lamb 2008).
Statist scholars opine that state that lack capacity and will (commitment) to improve its performance especially in peripheral territories are facing most of the challenges to project its authority in all territories in its geographical bounderies. The lack of state capacity creates significant challenges for the projection of state authority in its territories. While in developing states the demonstration of state authority in all its territories has been affected by the persistence of issues such as conflict, civil war, state will, presence of rival state etc. These hurdles to project its authority are not completely explained by literature on lack of state capacity, which tends to be pre- occupied with the challenges to formal governance at the national level. The literature is also largely blind to other factors which are based on society-centric approach such as norms and social organization of society, structural factors (geographical and environment) and other factors related to local, regional and international level issues such as presence of rival state, foreign intervention, porous borders, war in neighbouring country. While, for some communities, state has to be a ubiquitous presence binding individuals in a structure that is largely abstract and ideological (Migdal 1988, 16 – 30). It is possible that sovereign state may not be the only participant in politics, leaving room for groups from society to partake in politics. It is this kind of state-society interaction that lies at the root of the problem of ‘stateness’ in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.
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1.2.1 Governance in Ungoverned Territories The meaning of governance varies from context to context. Most commonly, governance refers to “the general exercise of authority” (Michalski, Riel, and Barrie 2001, 9). Governance is also considerd the deliver of services, the provision of public goods and the institution through which these are provided (Lamb 2008). In this regard, compared to areas where state is providing these services through its institutions, in ungoverned areas these services are not provided by the state. This results in humanitarian consequences and crises, because people of ungoverned areas are having no access to basic amenities and necessities of life due to the lack of public goods and security in these areas. Without a capable strong state, the population of an ungoverned area remains less prosperous and underdeveloped (OECD/DAC 2008). In this way, it shows that a state is either unable or unwilling to provide its population the basic amenities and fundamental political goods, as deemed prerequisites of statehood, which include: security, social welfare, management of the economy, and political institutions. As per Galgano classification matrix, both physical and non- physical ungoverned spaces are areas where the state have weak or have partially or totally absence of its control and effective sovereignty. Also in these spaces the state rule of law and formal institutions perform little or no functions (Galgano and Palka 2012). In this context, governance relates to “what the state can do and how it does? What the state can do is determined by its capacity, legitimacy, and authority” (World Bank 2012a). Beside these three dimensions of governance: capacity, legitimacy and authority, following the definition of ungoverned spaces, this study focusses on two other dimensions of governance: political will and restrictive socio-cultural norms of the society. These dimensions vary across countries and also within the same country across the key domains such as security, political, economic and service delivery, where the state is expected to perform (OECD 2011b). Capacity is the ability and capability of a state to deliver goods and services, make and implement policies, develop infrastructure, extract revenue, and to provide justice, conducive environment for the blooming of the private sector. Legitimacy is the feeling among citizens regarding the state to accept the state governance from their heart, willingly and have trust in the government. Authority means the capability of a state to protect all its citizens from violence and exploitation without any discrimination, to governance and maintain law and order in all its territories. Also, it
16 includes the ability of the state to dominate all other rules and laws prevailing in the society and have the capacity to set and make for all its society the rules of the game. Political will (commitment) is the expressed9, institutional10 and budgetary11 will of the state for a particular policy or program implementation. Restrictive social and cultural norms are social and cultural factors of a society which facilitate or hurdle state intervention in the given society (Migdal 1988, 14). In the presence of conflict, the state sometimes totally disappears. Conflict and crisis make an area further difficult to govern. These conflicts and crises include: Civil unrest or active insurgency in the shape of local conflicts and social movements, regional conflict, tensions and disputed borders which keep the state too occupied in the conflict.
In the context of dimensions of governance, weak states with significant problems of capacity, authority and legitimacy are often unable to fully control their territories, leading to the emergence of ungoverned areas. Ungoverned territories exist not only in weak, fragile or failed states but also in states in which the central government lacks the capacity and will to extend its authority in all its parts.
The emergence of the ungoverned spaces is not a new phenomenon. These spaces always existed. Historically, this pattern was prevailing all over the world before the creation of large states. In the past, often the local people used to administer their own territories. The king or emperor, having the high political authority, used to have indirect control over them (Risse 2011, 68).
Today, in the world there are very few states which can be called consolidated. Ungoverned spaces persist in many developing states of the world, where state has either limited presence or lacks effective presence (Risse 2011). These areas, having no state control and presence, provide a conducive environment for non-state actors to have their control in these areas. This state sovereignty gap has had real and
9 Expressed commitment is the response of government regarding a program or issue. It is the count of how much early and how often the leaders of the state make public statements about a program or an issue. It is measured by: number of speeches by state leadership, the media text analysis, and to assess the general tune and mode of the government response towards the program or an issue. 10 Institutional Commitment is most often the verbal expression of commitment made by government. It is considered one of the critical step in many states to establish the basic “institutions” or bureaucratic infrastructure for the needed response. The government level of commitment in this context is the proper timing of each of these developments. 11 Budgetary Commitment is the actual dispersion of the expenditure rather than pledge made. It is the most concrete measure of a commitment. It is measured in terms of resource allocations and the actual delivery of services rendered by a state to its population.
17 profound consequences for the people living in unconsolidated states. In the ungoverned spaces from Afghanistan to Yemen and Mali and beyond, terrorists have established havens and bases from which to stage attacks or challenge the state’s authority (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010). Elsewhere, the centre’s lack of legitimacy as brought about violence in the peripheries of countries ranging from Indonesia to Georgia. Insecurity and the absence of the state have also meant that segments of the population do not receive the collective goods and services that other parts of the state do.
All of these variations (state absence, weakness or fragility) can be found in the Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan and for the past more than thirty six years remained an area of state collapse. Most parts of the Tribal Areas have been beyond the authority of Pakistani government despite claiming jurisdiction over them. Only a few areas in Tribal Areas (FATA) which is considered as Alaqa e Sarkar (Protected Areas, only 30% of whole tribal areas of FATA), where Pakistan government authorities have weak, or a very nonminal control. Besides, theser tribal areas of FATA, some districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa province e.g. Swat, Malakand, and Dir etc. and other parts remained also beyond the reach of effective government control.
In the context of FATA, the Pakistani state’s weak, predatory, sporadic and ineffective presence has resulted in local insecurity, warlordism, and criminality (Marten 2012, 33). The prevalence of weapons, resources scarcity, kidnapping for ransom, ethnic tensions, presence of militants and military operations, all these lead to the likelihood that FATA is an ungoverned area (Marten 2012, 62).
Historically speaking, among ungoverned territories, tribal societies are the most problematic. Because these societies have deeply embedded tribal customs and traditions, resist or mostly living outside state governance (authority). Situated within state borders, these ungoverned spaces/ territories often challenge and resist state authority and state legitimate right to violence. Therefore, the state fails to control violent conflicts in such ungoverned spaces, challenging state’s authority. Also, these ungoverned areas, lacking central state authority, provide safe havens to trans-national groups of terrorists and their network, the September 11, 2001 attacks, for instance, showed the continuing deadly outcome of such networks. For much of the developing world, the governance challenge has been the problem of extending and consolidating
18 the state’s domestic sovereignty in the post-colonial states. Although the nation-state was the organising principle, the borders of the post-colonial states did not necessarily correspond to actual territorial control, and the population within those borders did not necessarily acknowledge the centre’s right to rule. As a result, a gap emerged between the state’s international legal sovereignty and the state’s domestic sovereignty (Silva 2014, 106). While the African, Asian, Middle-Eastern and Pacific Island states that arose after decolonization may have been strong at the political centre, their geographic reach into their hinterlands was often limited (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 58). These hinterlands where the state has limited control are also termed as “areas of limited statehood” (David 2012, 709). Some scholars are of the opinion that with regard to governance, these ungoverned spaces are not totally anarchic, thus this word is misnomer for these areas. Because most of these areas are governed through a different kind of systems and local arrangments of “governance with a small g.” In these areas, the governance system is a kind of mix of customary law and traditional authorities. The tribal areas of Pakistan have its informal governance system based on its tribal customary law with traditional, religious and other civic authorities. Though, this informal governance system, also called alternatively governance, is fluid, overlapping, and often fragile, mostly vulnerable to exploitation by spoiler, non-state actors. However, this system does have its own informal arrangements of providing security, rules of law and social services to the residents.
With regard to FATA, the Pakistani government maintains a weak physical presence presence, which has resulted in the rise of “mediated state arrangements” in some parts of FATA. It means that the Pakistani state has ceded authority to either traditional authorities (Malaks) or more recently during the conflict, to the hybrid community governance structures, such as the “peace and development committees i.e. Lashkers” which have done much to improve public security in some parts of FATA.
1.3 THEORIES AND PARADIGMS OF STATE’S GOVERNANCE AND
POLITICS IN DEVELOPING STATES The scholars have immensely enriched and broadened the study of state in the developing, especially in the context of post-colonial states since the World War II.
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The new developments in this regard are the introduction of new paradigmatic assumptions that challenge the traditional state-centric approach especially in the context of state governance. The established dominant theories of state-centred paradigm have been now challenged by approaches, such as the society-centred, state- society, globalised, and historical approaches. That’s why today the prevailing approaches within the paradignms of governance and politics in the context of developing states are “state-centred”12, “society-centred”13, “state-society”,14 “historical” and “globalised” approaches (Bell and Hindmoor 2009, 22). Paradigms are equal in status to social sciences because of the nature of applicability and testability of the theories generated under these (Gerring 2001, 51). In the context of developing states, there is a shift in the scholarship that is treating them to methodologically social science instead of “theoretical areas studies” (Heimer and Thpgersen. 2006, 11). Thus, theories which ignore the approaches of social sciences, by using normative (Lin 2006, 60), interpretive (Wang 2003, 30), or postmodern (Zhang 2008, 80) paradigms, will be avoided here.
In developing states, the governance and politics is mostly defined by a confrontation of both society-centric and state-centric theories of policy making and execution or enforcement. In this context, as per the literature of the state-centric approach, governance gauges the capacity of the state i.e. the ability of the government to make and enforce rules. Statist scholars such as Skocpol (1979, 1985, 1988, 1992), Skowronek (1982), Orloff and Shefter (1994) and Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Finegold (1995) support and argue that “autonomous political actors, institutions, or opportunities have effects on the policy-making processes outcome and enforcement of rules (authority)”. While the society-centric scholars such as Dahl (1961), Moore Jr. (1966), Lipset (1963), Domhoff (1983), Baldwin (1990), Domhoff (1996), and Esping-Andersen (1990) “emphasise and focus in a civil society, on the motivation and interests of collective actors.” Though, both schools have contributed a lot by generating understanding regarding state and society in the field of research, currently, there is emerging scholarship suggesting that studying state and society in
12 By State-centred or state-centric governance means mainly steering by state. 13 By Society-centred or society-centric governance means mainly by non-statal actors 14 State-in-society or ‘state-centric relational’ account of governance argue that state has not only enhanced and developed its own governance capacity strengthening its legal capacities and institutional capacity but have has also developed closer ties with non-state actors. Thus the proponents of this approach, for better governance, not only believe and stress the importance of the state but too on state–society relations.
20 isolation and presenting a clear distinction between the two could be misleading (Somers 1995, 229-274). Ever more, the state-centred theorists have also acknowledged the significance of organised social interest in the context of state policy making and policy enforcement. Simultaneously, also the society-centred theorists have also acknowledged and felt the need of theory through which they could best explain the formal state political institutions. That’s why the real need and focus lies in the approach or model which can explain a mixed line of action of state- society relation and interaction. Both are inter-connected and interdependent because in society the political institutions have control on the power of social groups and similarly, through collective social mobilisation, opportunity often created by political institutions, the masses in a society influence policy making and execution. Structural Marxists such as Therborn (1970), Poulantzas (1973), O'Connor (1973), Offe (1984), Block (1987), and Flacks (1988), explain this in the debate over state autonomy but models based on Marxism are mostly devoted to class analysis, thus do not fully discuss the scope of the problem. However, to arrive at a sufficient and acceptable conceptualization, the political sociologists have failed up to the present time, the high degree ill-defined territory of the political field or the public sphere, where a given society and the state interact.
Against this backdrop, this study adopts the three broad approaches to governance or politics in developing states, which are the state-centric approach, society-centric approach and state-society approach (also called state-in-society approach or state- society relational approach). Each of these approaches has been briefly discussed below. Also, based on these three approaches to state governance, several variables and indicators have been developed (operationalised) for the assessment of state governance in ungoverned spaces which has been given in Section 2.4.1 of Chapter-2.
A). State-Centric Approach to Governance
Most of the leading theories of state-centric, related to Weberian perspective. The Weberian perspective the state is the dominent entity (ideologies, institutions, norms and symbols) within a given territory that holds sovereign power over all decision- making and over all indiviuals and associations and is the most dominent factor in all key outcomes (Weber 1918). Thus the state-centric approach is mostly stressing on
21 the dominant role of the state. It claims that there are rare spheres of places where genuine and innovative state-society dynamic has been generate by market. That’s why, as a result, the democratisation forces are underdeveloped. The proponents of state-centric tradition, due to state-led late industralization, mostly believe in the one way state-society relations thus consider society as totally dependent on the state (Wright 2010, 33 – 40). These scholars are of the opinion that in developing world, the state has got total domination in the form of totalitarianism over the society (Guo 2000, 67 – 71). From the state-centric perspective, governance arrangements are mostly coordinated and created by the state to help govern society. With this regard, governance can generally be explained as regulating, or shaping, or an attempt to control human behaviour for the achievement of collective ends. Thus, in most strategies of governance, the exercise of state authority remains of central importance. Statist’s scholars view governments and the broader set of agencies and public bodies that together constitute the state are, and should remain, central players in governance processes. Statist’s scholars commonly believe in the top-down, or hierarchical forms of governance, where states always remain busy struggling to expand their governing capacities only by developing and strengthening their central institutions. States are constantly choosing new policy goals and learning to pursue them in different ways. Though in the governance field it is claimed that much has changed, however still in the governance arrangements, the state remains a central actor. Today, there is a growing debate on changes and reforms in the prevailing traditional understanding of public policy. Governance, today, is considered an area and process having a variety of changing processes, strategies, and the involvement of a number of actors other than government. With this changing nature of the governance process, still the state relies on its traditional government processes of hierarchical order and authority for the implementation of policies. The statist’s scholars argue that if even the governments select to govern in alternate ways, still the state remains the dominant actor in the process of governance partnerships and strategies (Wallington, Lawrence, and Loechel 2005). These scholars believe that the changes in the government strategies and arrangements are actually extensively caused by the state’s choice of preferences and strategies. To sum up, most of the researches undertaken after Second World War have been concentrating on to complement and deepen the paradigm of state-centric. In the
22 context of state governance in the ungoverned spaces, the state-centric approach has been discussed later in this chapter in more detail.
B). Society-Centric Approach to Governance
In contrast to the state-centric, the society-centric paradigm focuses on societies having relatively autonomy, culture, social groups, individuals, class, idea and markets. Political research in the context of developing states, the society-centric interpretations and perspectives have historically an older origin. In this regard, the society-centric theories or approaches is the continuation of the existing long culture and struggle of scholarship, which were seeking their explanation of various processes or politics in the distinctive civilizational or social features of developing states. The work of various society-centric scholars, who worked on the moderations at grassroots level, mostly study the political change from bottom-up perspective, especially the reforms efforts launched by labour and peasants (Zhou 1996, 22). These scholars are of the opnion that the citizen struggle for freedom and rights, which remained mostly uncoordinated, was the fundamental factor for the change of key elements of the state’s material and moral content. In this struggle or process the people act and state reacts. Thus the reform movements led by the society has been remained the major theme for society-centric scholars to study the reform era, especially in developing world. Scholars have termed it, as ‘un-stately power’, to indicate the causes of such reforms (White 1998, 76). Regarding governance, the society-centric scholars argue that “a fundamental transformation has occurred not only in the scope and scale of government action, but in its basic forms in the last few decades” (Elliott 2002, 1 – 2). The neo-liberals policies have resulted in ‘hollowing out’ of the national governments in these states. They are also committed to minimize and rollback the frontiers of the state by the increase of international organizations as a result of globalization (Thatcher 1993, 744 – 746). The pressure from below that is social groups growing participation and demanding more and more say in policy and governance has driven the weakening of the state resulting in fiscal or legitimacy deficits and in institutional fragmentation. The society-centric scholars argue that these pressures have further resulted in the government's weakening ability of unilateral governance. They suggest that if the governments are to achieve their objectives, they must work with private firms, non-
23 governmental organisations (NGOs), interest-groups, supra-national organisations, charities, and a large number of other such bodies (Bell and Hindmoor 2009). That’s why today, states are trying to strengthen their governing capacities not only by developing their central institution expand their governing capacities but by developing partnerships with a large number of social actors in the society. Thus now, society has become a partner with the state in its governance (Thatcher 1993, 784). “The sovereign state . . . is losing its grip and is being replaced by new ideas about pluri-centric government based on interdependence, negotiation and trust” (Sorensen and Torfina 2008, 3). Today, the existing literature on governance is mostly society- centric which is emphasising and advocating on governance networks and the extension of complex horizontal forms of societal relations that are said to have not only marginalised but also have reduced the role of government. The main argument of the society-centric approach is that “states are being weakened by an array of forces and that, as a result, governments now govern less frequently through the unilateral application of top-down and hierarchical authority but govern more frequently in partnership with non-state actors through markets, network associations and other ‘new’ forms of governance” (Bell and Hindmoor 2009, 23). In the context of state governance in the ungoverned spaces, the society-centric approach has been discussed later in this chapter in more detail.
C). State-in-Society Approach to Governance
During the Cold War era, the debate over the politics of developing states, among the scholars of state-centric versus society-centric paradigms, was influenced by the ideological differences (Friedman and Selden 1971, 295 – 317). This generated a search for a more detached empiricism among the scholars in the reform era. To differentiate their approach and work from the existing divisions, subsequently the third way, a common struggle started among the scholars resulting in a more comprehensive state-society paradigm (Perry 1994, 704 - 713). This new state-society paradigm, which was a kind of mix of the first two paradigms, placed an emphasis on the process side instead of the structure thus arguing on the mutual interdependence of state and society and their constituting nature. This interdependence and mutual accommodation and transformation of state and society in developing states explain their post-reform political experience (Baum and Shevchenko 1999, 333 – 335).
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The proponents of state-society model argue that society have entwined and embedded relationship with the state and thus the uncoordinated actions and norms of the society have significant impacts on the state’s political outcomes (Hasmath and Hsu 2008, 88). In this context, the work of Tsai highlights the mutually interdependent nature of the relationship of ‘solidarity groups’ and local party leaders, which is resulting in the transformation of governance in the rural setup in most of the developing states (Tsai 2007, 20). Similarly, O’Brien and Li explain in their work on rural politics in developing states, where peasants not only challenge but also transform the state by accepting its policy and ideological claims (O’Brien and Li. 2006, 34). Compared with the state-centric approach of governance (where governments are deemed to operate above society or in isolation from the societies they govern, thus following a top-down approach of imposing their policy preferences), the state-in- society approach (also called here in this research ‘state-centric relational governance’ approach) claims that “states have enhanced their capacity to govern by not only strengthening their own institutional and legal capacities but also by developing closer relations with non-state actors”(Andersen 2004, 7). In this regard, whatever the governance arrangements are in place, the governance is the outcome and determined by the state - society relationships. To sum up, within the context of challenges faced by states in ungoverned spaces, this study has adopted the first three approaches of governance i.e. state-centric approach, society-centric approach, and the state-in-society approach to study and analyse governance in the developing states. After a brief introduction, each of these three approaches are discussed below in detail.
1.4 STATE-CENTRIC APPROACH/MODEL From statist’s perspective, ungoverned spaces are regarded as areas “where the state is absent as an authoritative allocator of value, a provider of collective goods, and as the holder of a monopoly of legitimate coercion” (Weber 1918). This superficially simple formulation muddles not only the inconsistency and complexity but also the causes of the creation or emergence of ungoverned spaces. Also this is a fact, government may not be present, but governance do present in one form or another in these ungoverned areas. Whatever the consequences of ungoverned spaces, the poor governance is the reason of its emergence, which stimulates the residents in these areas to declare
25 themselves ungovernable by resorting to tactics and strategies, they adopt to avoid state domination (Scott 2009). This section discusses the state-centric approach to governance. The state-centric approach to governance (authority) as applied in the modern world, demands a comprehensive study that could take volumes. However, here the aim is to shed light on the varying dimensions of the need, importance and scope of these concepts and explore the way these concepts continue to mark political science discourse. The section provides a brief theoretical reflection on the use and applicability of various concepts including statehood: capacity, authority, legitimacy, domestic sovereignty, will, and territoriality within the perspective of ungoverned spaces. As per the definition of an ungoverned space, given in Section 1.2 above, this section discusses all those aspects of an ungoverned area within the statist’s perspective/approach. These include discussion on state capacity, legitimacy, will, restrictive social norms and the presence of conflict that hinders a state to project its power and authority, thus leading to un-governability of an area.
1.4.2 Statehood: Capacity, Sovereignty and Territoriality
Statist scholars argue and stress on a state’s definition which, according to them, must contain state-centric features as a political association, having coercion and territory. Specifically, the statist scholars emphasize on the state defition given by Weber i.e., “State is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Gerth and Mills 1946, 97). Following this definition, the existence of the state and its needed characteristics of statehood is examined through the basic test of assessing whether the national government has a monopoly on the use of coercion or force or not? Following these de facto attributes of statehood given by Weber, it can be maintained that two parallel monopolies are not possible over one population in a given territory. If so, then under Weber’s definition such an area or situation would be termed as a “stateless” or a situation of “statelessness”. Further, if one of the several rival groups in that area claiming itself a state, fails in its attempt to have a permanent control in that area, then it will be treated as an area with limited statehood or an ungoverned area (Risse 2011).
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If tested as per the Weber’s definition, only a few governments in the developing world would pass the test of statehood. The rest would not, at least, not all of the time because such states always lack effective control over violence in all territories under their jurisdiction. In some of the developing state, instead of national governments, other organisations have been able to establish an effective monopoly of force, even for extended period, over significant population and territories. Also, the governments are unable to monitor and control, even the most important public activities in their jurisdictions in many developing countries.
In some states of the developing world, the governments cannot enforce important regulations and law with confidence and even lack the capacity to sanction the population to comply these laws. If the states in the developing world are gauged within the attributes of ‘empirical statehood’, so many of the states would clearly fail to qualify as states, if not all but some of the time. However, it is clear that all of the states continue to be members of the international society. It is also clear from the above discussion that within the developing world none of the government, which is having de facto control over its large population and territory under its jurisdictions, have yet or ever have let the areas and its population to create new states. Even in areas where these states have limited or no control. Nor the groups that are claimant of exercising de facto control over a large territories or populations within the boundaries of existing states, have ever or yet succeeded in making new states in these areas.
In contrast to Weberian, the “Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933)” under Article 1 defines the state as, “a person in international law [possessing] ... (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States”(Brownhie 1979, 73-76). This definition given by Montevideo Convention (1933) stresses on the attributes of juridical instead of empirical statehood. However, studies on statehood in developing countries reveal that the attributes of empirical statehood have been of high changing nature (variable), while the juridical attributes have been of high constant nature. Further, applying purely legal approach to state cannot amply reflect empirical properties and attributes of statehood because "Once a state has been established,
27 extensive civil strife or the breakdown of order through foreign invasion or natural disasters are not considered to affect personality"(Brownhie 1979, 73-76).
In the context of ungoverned spaces, these two definitions given above (one given by public international law, reflecting the juridical and the other given by Weber, reflecting the empirical aspects of statehood) takes the discussion immediately on territoriality, especially by raising questions as to what are the consequences when a state loses its monopoly of legitimate use of violence in a particular territory, because territoriality is the dominant way in which political authority is organised today. In the context of territorial control, Statist scholars believe that in a territory, the claim on and the right to have legitimate authority belongs only and solely to the state. According to statist approach, it is not enough for a state just to have a claim of statehood, but it must demonstrate this claim by maintaining actual control on its territories and its borders. Secessions or the quasi-independent fiefdoms, also called ‘statelets’, are emerged or created, by groups or actors who are in conflict to the central government, as a result when a state loses control over a territory (Pavković and Radan, 2008, 51- 66). Usually linked with the state, the extent of territorial control defines the strength of the state and the capacity of its governance. That’s why ill-defined or blurred boundaries cause the emergence of ungoverned spaces (Wendt, 1999, 212). To be more specific, weak and fuzzy territorial control thus results in the creation of ungoverned spaces.
With regard to sovereignty, to quote from history, the dissolution of former empires resulted in many independent states. These states though retained geographical and juridical existence lacked central government control over its territories, thus resulting in the creation of ungoverned spaces. This trend shows an apprehensive concurrence between two kinds of competing sovereignty i.e., international legal sovereignty, and the domestic sovereignty (Lee 2012).
Domestic sovereignty is the state’s exercise of authority over its territory (Krasner 1999, 3-4). In principle, domestic sovereignty can refer to the exercise of authority over the territory, over sectors of government activity, or both. Within the context of territoriality, the domestic sovereignty in spatial terms means that a state actually exercises authority effectively not just in the capital but throughout its territory. In this regard, borders define a state and thus provide the benchmark, the potential
28 geographic extent of state authority. Besides, domestic sovereignty across different policy realms also would mean the extent to which state authority across those policy realms actually reach the people living throughout the state’s territory (Krasner 1999, 4).
The globe is divided into different states. These states interact with each other according to certain common principles and norms of domestic and international sovereignty. These principles and norms of sovereignty are: non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, respect and recognition of each other’s territorial spaces i.e. borders. All states are equal and no state is dominant in this international community of states. Despite this equality of states, however, not all states are equal with regard to their internal governance, power and effectiveness (Jackson 1990). This internal power and their effectiveness, which is also called territorial control, highlights the questions of the statehood. In the context of territoriality, statehood is the capacity of a state to have territorial control by the central government, as territory represents a physical manifestation of sovereignty (Walle 2004).
Coming back to the discussion on ungoverned spaces and capacity of state (statehood), governance is broadly understood as “collective regularisation of societal matters”, thus comprising all agents, be they government institutions or the private persons or associations (Risse 2011, 66). This concept of governance was originally applied in the context of modern nation states of Western origin in order to conceptually grasp the increasing adoption of classic state functions by private actors. In state-centric literature, governance gauges the ability of the government to make and enforce rules, also called capacity of the state. For state capacity different scholars use different terminology. These are state power (Mann 1996, 21), state strength (Migdal 2004, 76), state capacity (Fukuyama 2013), and government effectiveness (Rothstein 2011, 176), but all these concepts describe the same meaning, i.e. capacity of the state - the ability of state to implement policy.
As mentioned, state capacity is “the degree of control that the state agents exercise over persons, activities, and resources within their government’s territorial jurisdiction” (McAdam and Tilly 2001, 78). Capacity is a critical and an important aspect of the performance of a state. A state with high capabilities and abilities to provide public goods, services and physical and social infrastructure that result in
29 better human development, are high capacity states (Rotberg 2004, 2-4). States with low and limited ability to provide these goods and services, have low human development, and lack social trust (Rothstein 2008, 441 – 459), thereby known as low capacity states (Skocpol 1979, 27). For state to govern and control all its territories and to be consolidated over time requires a high capacity status (Skocpol 2003, 36 - 42).
Besides capacity, the physical geography also affects the state’s domestic sovereignty. The costs of state penetration in areas are determined by its topography. States have often developed in valley areas that are fertile and flat, or in forested areas that can be cleared - the low hanging fruit of state development. Consequently, such areas were the subject of later state penetration. In many cases, however, state penetration remains incomplete as states are less likely to maintain a physical presence (roads, post offices, local bureaucracies) in rough areas, which then weakens the authority and salience of the state in the eyes of the population. Rough terrain increases the cost of enforcing the state-society fiscal bargain, which weakens the state’s ability to threaten coercion and raise tax revenue (Khoury and Kostiner 1990, 66). The difficulties of using coercion in rough terrain are a second way in which bad geography harms domestic sovereignty. Unfavorable physical geography makes it easier for individuals to flee or evade the state’s attempts at expansion of its authority (Scott 2009).
Besides geography, interstate rivalry especially rivalry with a neighbour-bordering state has a direct effect on the state domestic authority or its territorial reach. A rival state at border creates situations of weak control in peripheral areas and thus leads into slow state-building or consolidation of state governance (authority) in those peripheral areas bordering the rival state. In contrast, states with friendly relations with their neighbours are less likely to suffer from either problem with respect to their territorial control (Krasner 2009, 47).
Thus the relationship among the states territory and control, emphasises that for a state to be consolidated it is mandatory to provide collective goods and to deliver services to its population. The state must have a minimal level of functions, to be able to have an effective government, the ability to maintain order, and demonstrate the ability to rule the contiguous territory which it claims under its jurisdiction. This
30 claim is often based on a state having both legitimacy and authority, having a monopoly on the use of force; and arguably having normative and institutional limitations on the exercise of government power (Risse 2011, 1 – 35). Further, for a consolidated statehood, the core assumption is that a fundamental condition for a state is the ability of making and enforcing its authoritative decisions (governance and control) throughout the territories under its jurisdiction. And if a state is incapable of doing so, the remedy for this is state building.
In the historical context, globally consolidated statehood is a new phenomenon. However, limited statehood has been common throughout the history. Inherently, within the limited statehood, the ungoverned spaces were a common feature, where the government was unable to extend its governance (authority) and control (Risse 2011).
The globalization has been further weakened the state authority and has thus contested by many processes and actors. As a result of globalisation, the authority of the state is disaggregating into an increasing number of centres at every level of community and across a wide range of non-state actors thus creating a "multi-centric world" alongside the state-centric world of traditional international politics (Palan 2003, 11-16).
The concept of politics and governance, from local to global level, is grounded in territorial demands. Historically, territoriality is inherent to a state’s claim of sovereign right over a geographical territory. As a result, the state sovereignty is equated with the control of a territory (Krasner 1999, 3 – 4). In this context, a state should resist challenges to its territorial sovereignty and if a state is incompetent to resist challenges to its sovereignty, then it should do consider how to respond a challenge (Bellamy 2011). To determine that a state is weak with regard to its capacity, leads to two conclusions: (i) if a state is not capable to effectively control an area, other actors (non-state actors) take control of that area questioning the state’s territorial right in that area, and, (ii) also, if any group, non-state actors effectively govern an area than a state could do, and that actor imposes its own order, ultimately gets territorial right on that area. This raises the prospects for a “might is right” argument, which is contrary to a state’s territorial rights in an area under international law (Hall 2013; Moore 2015, 95). Thus under the Charter of the United Nations, it is
31 illegal and inappropriate for a group or actor within a given territory to challenge the state, even if the group or actor is providing better governance in that area.
Thus, against this backdrop, Statist or Weberian model entails a binary understanding in which the state exists above civil society (Migdal and Kohli 1996, 28), institutionalised through the separation of the public and the private sphere. At the same time, the state through its institutionalised hierarchical tentacles reaches deep into society in order to project its order of norms, values and beliefs in the form of rule and decision making. As such, the state aims to exercise social control which Migdal defines as compliance, participation, and legitimation - the currency of social control (Migdal 1988, 52). Compliances are not only achieved through the monopoly of force but also through the provision of better services and distribution of resources. Participation implies that individuals are expected to utilise and work within the state- run and authorised institutions rather than informal institutions. Legitimation refers to the notion that individuals believe in the order of norms, values, and beliefs to be true and right and as such, legitimise the 'myth' of the state. This represents a traditional understanding of the state as a unitary, rational, bureaucratic actor, representing a normative consensus and thus the people feel themselves bound within its territory (Figure – 1.1: State-Centric Model).
Figure - 1.1: State-Centric Model
State domination: Projecting order of values and norms State through the exercise of social control
Society
Source: Developed by the Research Scholar
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1.5 SOCIETY-CENTRIC APPROACH/ MODEL
This section discusses the society-centric approach to governance by developing conceptual relationship between state and society. Further, it presents a detailed discussion and analysis of the historical roots that shape the socio-economic and political basis of a strong society, independent of state governance and control. There is a range of literature and scholarly research discussing the factors that contribute to the emergence of a strong society beyond the state control. However, scant attention has been paid to the state authority and domination with regard to tribal society, especially in the context of an alternative governance system, i.e. customary governance existing in these tribal societies, with continuing problematic state domestic sovereignty and state governance (authority). Therefore, it addresses the factors challenging state governance (authority) in the tribal society of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan that confronts problematic state governance (authority) and domestic sovereignty.
This section consists of two parts. Part one presents the factors of un-governability of a society of an ungoverned area from the historical perspective, while part two presents the factors of un-governability of a society from the perspective of dynamics of state-society relations and interactions.
Part one presents a unique perspective of the state’s inability to govern an area from the society-centric perspective. The society-centric approach demonstrates the origin of state-society relationship in historical perspectives, which led to the weak governance of state through an understanding of the patterns of social development, independence of the state throughout the history since precolonial, colonial and postcolonial periods. This historical account of the society-centred approach to resistance to state governance include: i) a review of the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial account of society resistance to state; ii) an assessment of the local society power and colonial power political capacity; iii) the various policies of state aggression against the local population; iv) the local society social formation and its heroic/warrior memory; v) the local society social autonomy, its ethnicity; vi) the informal governance and informal economic system (or economy) of the local society; vii) the domestic and international perspectives of colonial times; and, viii) the socio-cultural resistance (organisation and normative factors of the society under
33 the theory of segmentary) of society which causes resistance to state governance (authority) in a society (Forrest 2003, 3 – 20).
Part two discusses the dynamics of state-society relations. It includes: i) the state- society relations with respect to state’s social control in society, civic trust and citizenship and also the connectedness of the state with society; ii) the interaction(s) between the state and its society; and iii) Social cleavages and cohesion or inequality that are causing distrust in society on state thus making the society immune or strong enough to resist state governance (authority).
1.5.1 Primordial (Historical) Dynamics of State-Society Relations and Interactions A society presents resistance to state governance (authority) due to its history of anarchy or for remaining outside of the state control for a long period. In most of the developing states, it is significantly an overlooked aspect of political evolution, that there is always a relationship gap between central state and its society that is both are disconnected, especially the state and the rural or peripheral society. This continuous ignorance by the central state has resulted in the ability of the peripheral society to escape and impede state power, control and domination (Chabal 1986, 113). In the developing world, state’s weak capacity to govern its society can be understood by analysing the social context of the society in which these states have developed. In this way, an analysis of the origin of social, political, and military account of its society leads to the understanding of the creation of soft states or state ‘softness’ in these societies. Society-centric scholars are of the opinion that, embedded in its social structure, the intra-ethnic, military and social practices developed and evolved throughout the colonial period which enabled the society to resist state ravage (Forrest 2003, 81). Based on this argument, the proponents of society-centric approach uphold the view that tracing the historical account (of precolonial, colonial and postcolonial periods), a direct social link can be found by analysing the role of peripheral factors and actors which determined the political outcomes of the present-day (Chabal 1986, 113).
In this context, understanding the precolonial and colonial politics of a given society makes it easy to understand as to why there is a wide gap between the society and the state with regard to its governance. The colonial policies of occupation are also
34 considered one of the causes of the underdevelopment and marginalisation of the societies in developing states. Besides, for a clear understanding of the weak governance in developing states, it is necessary to investigate its origins within a given social attributes such as the society potency, adaptability, and persistent social formations (Rothchild and Chazan 1988, 121-148).
The Society-centric approach explains that the particular dynamics of the relations between a state and its society during the colonial and postcolonial periods have shaped and caused the emergence of weak governance. Further, this argument is traced by the society-centric scholars in the evolution of military, social and political aspects of the relations between civil society power arrangements and the central state. The central theme of this society-centric approach is that weak governance in peripheral societies is the result of historically a lengthy evolution that is “embedded” in the peripheral society strength (Chabal 1986, 109 – 121).
Strong Society and Weak State: Under this approach, to understand a society resistance to state governance (authority) and to get insight into the policy capacity of the state in its society, the concept of “low politics”15 has been adopted instead of ‘high politics’ for demonstrating statecraft and resistance (Chabal 1986, 109 – 125). That is the politics of civil society or popular politics, which is “to understand politics is … to understand relations of power in their historical settings”, instead of the “high politics” of the state central government (Chabal 1986, 138). The civil society, which is social institutions of clan or family, has its history of development over the course of centuries. It is always historically rooted in the lifeblood of the culture of a given society and its people. It can prove an enduring impediment to state governance (authority) or state building, and parallel to it, it provides autonomy and self- empowerment at local level (Chabal 1986, 144). This argument is also supported by Migdal’s concept of strong society and weak state. In the words of Migdal, weak or soft states emerge where the social structure of a given society is having characteristics of a “web-like” structure having political fragmentation at a high degree and is having pluralistic qualities. This leads to the “social organisations” to
15 The concept of low politics covers all matters that are not absolutely vital to the survival of the state as the economics and the social affairs. The low politics are the domain of the state's welfare. It concerns all things about social or human security. While, the concept of high politics covers all matters that are vital to the very survival of the state: namely national and international security concerns.
35 function in isolation from state institutions (Migdal 1988, 24 – 33). It is this nature of “tenacious and resilient” of the web-like social forces in a given society, which hinder the capacity and ability of state, especially weak state, to implement its policies (Migdal 1988, 34). This always results in the state debility to implement its policy agenda and state fails to engage its citizens in its formal institutions. Against this backdrop, the states with weak capacity cannot achieve in its national domain the status of a sovereign political authority, nor could extract resources, sufficient for its state’s institution-building needs, from the domestic market. In this context, among social organisations, the diffusion of power in a given society should be investigated with a focus on sources of state weakness (Migdal 1988, 35 – 36). This perspective most notably finds its parallel in post-colonial developing state literature explaining that national-scale policy failure in the post-colonial developing states reflects, partially, the capability of non-state circles in order to resist attempts at the hegemony of the state. For peasant activities, the non-state social spheres can provide bases, which provide persistent strength to it social formations in the rural societies (Rothchild and Chazan 1988, 121-128).
The literature on the post-colonial developing states focuses on “the non-state spheres”, to probe about the “political space” as a result of religious and social protests, movements for revitalization and liberation fronts (Doornbos 1990, 191). Most of this literature focuses on the grassroots level in the context of non-state infrastructure expansion. This is the “potentially autonomous institutions and many informal and traditional groups, in particular, which include: religious and cultural bodies, organisations of farmers, mutual-aid societies, kinship associations and fraternities” (Doornbos 1990, 191). Further, most of the society-centric literature highlights the regional and local group’s emergence and other such networks of “autonomous, ‘non-state’ forms of social organisations and, as a result the breakdown of state machinery in these post-colonial states” (Doornbos 1990, 191). The society- centric approach is further supported by other literature arguing that the scope of civil society can be expanded with the incorporation of other human associations in the society in-between the state and the household. These can be included associations based on ethnic affiliation and other such village based groups (Solomon and Lienbenberg 2000, 97). In the words of Chazan, these can be called non-state spheres, which have clear cut defined territory and are physically situated outside the central
36 government control. In these sphere, an indigenous socio-political informal instutions have been developed by the local communities with in their social norms and have control on local resources. Though these communities have independent roles in some spheres, however, they cannot operate fully independent of the central state (Chazan 1988, 198).
Other writers observe this from the other perspectives such as the level of “popular actions”. These popular actions weaken and resist the unipolar power of the state in the given territory. These include resisting actions and sabotage activities of the community, such as revolts, informal exchanges, denial by the rural community to cultivate certain crops, theocratic communities, religious revivals, and migrations, which are required as instruments of political control for a state. Further, Chabal argues that social forces in the given community never remains passive, and always remain active to challenge the ill-contaied domination of the state (Chabal 1986, 113). Coupled with this, the cultural diversity in the post-colonial states has always remained an agent of constraint on the power of the central state (Chabal 1986, 114). Migdal claims this through his thesis of “the ability of web-like social structures of a society which weaken the central states social control” (Migdal 1988). Bayart refers to this “strong local autonomy,” (Bayart 1986) like that of Chazan calling it “autonomous social forces” in a society (Chazan 1988).
In this regard, the society-centric approach develops a detailed assessment of the historical and social origin of autonomy in a polycentric society, having a social structure of the web-like form where the social patterns are local as well as dispersed.
Against this backdrop, it is argued that the historically persistent deep evolving social formations of a peripheral society’s sphere of strength have been reflected in the multi-dimensional diffusion of power centres that facilitate understanding of the social autonomy of a (peripheral) society. The various factors and indicators of the sphere of the strength of a (peripheral) society that challenge/resist state governance (authority) are discussed below.
Social Formation and Goliath (Heroic) Memories of the Society: According to the society-centric historians, such as Crowder (1978, 8), Mendy (1994, 82), and Forrest (2003, 90), there are a number of historical factors that are responsible for the strength of peripheral society posing challenges to state auhority. These historical factors
37 include: the existence of communities with their pre-colonial indigenous local social institutions, the presence of spirit deities, the historically evolved inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic cooperation and exchanges, and the military experiences and strength got by these communities under the leadership of local leaders against power invaders and colonial power. These attributes provide the historical backgrounds of a peripheral society strength and the origin of current day social formation of the given society. These precolonial time attributes also carved out the spheres of socio-economic and political activities at the time of emergence of the colonial state. Also, these attributes would remain as well outside the rulebook of the post-colonial state after independence.
Local Power and Central Government: To understand the allocation of power at the local level, Coleman argues that the pursual of central government’s efforts of political penetration by state institutions is important with regard to social forces in society (Coleman 1977, 3). By “political penetration”, Coleman denotes the extent of state’s reach or intervention in the society (Coleman 1977, 3). In this way, a powerful state having the capacity to determine and excercise control on the political relations at macro-level and at the micro-level of the society is able to shape the social power or social relations (Cliffe, Coleman, and Doorbos. 1977). Campbell and Peters name it the degree of a state “extensiveness” (Campbell and Peters 1988, 31), while Herbst, in terms of the geographic reach of the state calls it “state softness”. “State softness” means the state failure or weakness to have an administrative reach from its centre till remote peripheries (Rothchild and Chazan 1988, 233 – 264).
In this context, the Society-centric approach probes the various dynamics of the evolution of civil society by presenting various aspects of the presence of social activists, social structures, social alliances, and society based military power, that always pose challenges and resistance to the central state governance (authority). Hyden (1980), Young (1994), and Mamdani (1996) argue that due to the dynamics of the rural society, the colonial state remained unable to effectively incorporate its rural population into the central state’s economic, political and social policy spheres.
Social Autonomy and Ethnicity: To understand as to how the peripheral society retained its independence in colonial as well post-colonial periods and how it retained its status independent of the central state, it is important to understand the social
38 autonomy.16In most of the developing post-colonial states, the peripheral society got social strength mostly from sources of diverse historical nature. These sources include age-based social structures, interethnic and intra-ethnic alliances among the population of peripheral society, locally evolved village customary or informal authority system, religious-social formations, and a variety of other informal social institutions for conflict resolution and decision making. These characteristics have significantly contributed towards the autonomy of the peripheral/ rural society which has been demonstrated persistently time and again in various alternative forms. These changes also contributed to the strength of local community leaders to keep themselves away from the control of central authority.
Brooks (1993, 38 - 39) Menday (1994) and Forrest (2003) are of the opinion that the intra-ethnic and interethnic alliances have also contributed to the strength of peripheral society and resulted in its social autonomy. The durability and adaptability characteristics of the rural society have also promoted its social autonomy on one hand, and repealing the domination of the central state authority on the other.
State’s Policy of Aggression and Repression: Young (1994) argues that the colonial state, due to its weak infrastructure, mostly in the peripheral societies to fulfil its security function throughout the colony, adopted the policy of state terror due to its policy difficulties. Also due to the failure to extend its political authority in its peripheral areas, the colonial state relied on the use of terror and violence. Throughout its rule, the colonial state used ultra-violence against innocent and defenceless civilians to force them on state submission. This brutality of state aggression and suppressive policies clearly show the inability of state weakness in terms of excercising control over its peripheral societies.
The Informal Peripheral Economy: The informal economy of the peripheral society leads to its less dependence on state and thus always evades the central state authority
16 Social autonomy means the religious, socio-economic and political practices evolved throughout history in the society. The established social activity by local community also come under the sphere of this. The existing and changing structures of society in given locality determine the evolution of social autonomy and its interaction with the external forces. The independence in taking its political decision by a given local community, independent of government influence, determines the extent of its social autonomy. Communities with social autonomy create their own social units with little or fully independent of any external influence and also control their own resources. Achieving autonomy in all these aspects may be not possible, but strong societies may be having powerful seawall (bulwarks) against the state intervention, thus leading to a more community based governance.
39 in both pre-colonial and post-colonial periods. The informal economy include: economic activities that are not recorded and are unmeasured by state, trans-border trade activities, banned crops and banned items that have higher prices outside the producing country, income which is hidden from states’ official record and all other activities beyond the state control and activities which do not contribute to state revenue. Further it includess barter system, which is mutual trust, personal ties between merchants and producers, obligations of reciprocal nature, and is the main system of commodity exchange in these societies.
Hyden argues that most of the peripheral/rural societies maintained their own patterns of land-use and their patterns and direction of trade sales or exchange. That is why a significant chunk of peripheral economic activities remained and still remain outside state monitoring and control. That’s why a majority of the hidden trading circuits and resource gathering in the peripheral rural society resulted in the weak economic base of the state power throughout the precolonial and colonial periods (Hyden 1980, 80).
In this context, neither the colonial nor the postcolonial state came out of the weak- state’s status in order to have control on the economy in its rural society. That’s why the prevalence of informal economy and rural society determined production patterns and always prohibited the state from exploiting the indigenous resources in these peripheral societies. Also, both colonial and postcolonial state remained inefficient to properly exploit the agronomic production and commerce in these peripheral societies (Hyden 1980, 85 - 90).
In the peripheral societies, most of the peasants resisted and avoided state’s tax collection. The attributes of self-sufficiency in food crops, having hidden exchange of various commodities (barter) and sale in hidden markets, internal migration, refusal to and non-compliance of economic policies of state, as well as external trade, mostly across porous borders, all these attributes not only facilitated the peripheral society, through its independent financial sources, to have economic autonomy but also hindered the prospects for the development of state-centric economic development (Cortell and Peterson 2003, 73).
This historical sustenance of state inability to have access to rural/peripheral resources coincided with the state policy capacity of social and political limitations, in creating state formal effective institutions, which could incorporate the peripheral society
40 social formations into the state political domain. As a result, it led to the capacity of the rural/peripheral society to obtain and further sustain autonomy in spheres of socio- economic, political and military.
Internal versus External Perspective: The weakness of post-colonial state cannot be understood without reviewing the history of its social context in which the state evolved and functioned.
Richard stresses on the localised view and examines the state or international circumstances for the understanding of the processes of social change and the lack of capability of the colonial states to obtain their policy objectives in the rural or peripheral society of developing states (Richard 1996, 286 – 289).
In the intial periods of occupation by Colonial powers, some parts of the colonial state especially the peripheral areas remained economically and institutionally backward. This origin of the colonial state weakness in the peripheral societies can mostly be viewed and understood within the perspective of precolonial evolution of the rural or peripheral society. Even the post-colonial state policy failure can be understood in the historical analysis of the nature of precolonial societies, the peripheral society social formation, and state building in these societies during the colonial era. That’s why the roots of the contemporary post-colonial lack of capacity and capability to configure the peripheral society in the state direction, lies in the precolonial and colonial era history.
To sum up, though this section (part one) emphasises on the social strength of the peripheral society from the perspective of its internal evolution, however, it is also pertinent to understand the weak governance capability of the state, from the political penetration perspective, in proclaiming political hegemony.
1.5.2 Modern (Current) Dynamics of State – Society Relations and Interactions Society-centric scholars argue that both the state and its society are mutually inter- connected and interdependent on eachother. In this way, the state is neither above nor isolated from the society of autonomous authority. The state is rather a social actor which constantly evolves by having different kind of interactions with various groups and actors of its society. These interactions may include a total predation of the society by the state, productive collaboration between state and society, or the
41 provision of limited space to a society by the state to have a share in governance (as is done in the authoritarian state); and so on. In this context, it becomes clear that a good quality state-society relations and connectedness results in more effective state institutions.
Generally, the discussion on state relations with society has revolved around two key notions. The first notion argues that the state is omnipresent in multidimensional affairs of the society, however; this presence has not always created positive impacts. The second notion points to a shrinking state as the state is described as an absentee landlord that does not provide, and does not protect. The current complex relationship between the state and society in developing states is therefore often characterised by conflict but at times cooperation; still in some cases the lines are blurred.
This section departs from the dominant approach of Statist and views the weak state governance from the modern dynamics of state-society relations. Though some of the reasons of weak governance emanate from the state, however, many of the reasons are deeply rooted and thus could be traced in the dynamics of society. These dynamics are the ways groups and individuals interact in a society and the relationship as a result of these interactions. In this way, the extenstiveness (depth and richness of the social capital) and strength of the civil society also lead and causes the fragility and weakness of the state (OECD 2005, 12). The World Bank Development Report explains the weak state governance within the context of state-society relations, as “periods when states or institutions lack the capacity, accountability, or legitimacy to mediate relations between citizen groups and between the citizens and the state, making them vulnerable to violence” (World Bank 2011, xvi). These definitions make it clear that due to the embedded nature of the state in society, it is easy to understand governance in terms of state- society relations (Migdal 1988, 78).
The broader thematic theorizations which this section is covering include: discussion on state-society connectedness, citizenship (state-citizen relations), society inclusion and exclusion, state-society interactions and society cohesion. The purpose of this section is to highlight the state governance weaknesses from the perspective of current society dynamics, each one given below in detail.
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State- Society Connectedness: In a given society, the state is considered legitimate and its government effective, if it is not only providing basic services and public goods to its population but is also accountable to its citizens. Compared to society- centric approach, the Statist approach determines in clear boundaries between state and its society that is there will be a clear differentiation among civilian and military spheres, public and private spheres and state and social processes (Engberg-Pedersen et al. 2008, 23). While society-centric scholars believe in close connections between state and society, arguing that when the connection between state and society is weak, then state social reach will be limited and constrained (Woolcock 2007). The society- centric approach also contests the Weberian ideal model as appropriate for the proper functioning of the state. The proponents of Society-centric approach believe in the interdependent and dynamic relationship of state with the society. The governance ability and capacity of the state is affected and influenced by the state relationship with its society and as result this also effects the development of the society.
Citizenship: In reality, the state is considered to be omnipresent, that’s why today in the world every state has penetrated its society one way or the other. Even though, statist’s scholars are of the opinion that the state is unable to exert its control in a more complete and coherent way i.e. independent of the society. Migdal claims that “state may have unmistakable [administrative] strengths in penetrating society . . . [but they are] surprising[ly] weak in effecting goal oriented social changes” (Migdal 1988, 9). In this way, the state is considered to be knotted in a mutually dependent relationship with society. Thus the state’s capability and ability to direct change in a given society is determined by the quality of this relationship (Douglas, Wallis and Weingast 2009, 13 – 20).
Social science scholars believe that individuals and groups are the fundamental units of support to the state in a society, and in the same way, in a society, critical elements for a collective action is provided by the state (Migdal 1988). Even, the Statist scholars are of the opinion that the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its citizens is needed for its functions. In this way, the legitimacy of a state not only depends on the well functioning bureaucracy but more specifically it is rooted in its social infrastructure (Seabrook 2002, 34). Following this debate, it is maintained that the mutual interdependence of society and state gives birth to the concept of citizenship. Further, the relationship of the citizens with the state infers duties and responsibilities
43 of both to each other. Not only this, but further it determines the norms and rules for the interation and relationship within the citizens. The state, being custodian of the rights, is committed to provide legal protection to all rights and benefits of its citizens. In response, the citizens are deemed to show their loyalty to the state, to obey the state laws and work for the collective good of the society. The citizens are required to shoulder certain responsibilities. As a result, the state gets legitimacy through its interaction with the citizens in an active and organised civil society (Benequista 2010).
Among all the post-colonial states, the common problem is that the sense of citizenship and collective consciousness which is necessary for the social contract with the state, has not truly developed, especially in the context of micro-level of the society or more specifically in the peripheral society where the state presence is weak (Kymlicka 2010, 97 – 112).
State-Society Interactions: As mentioned above, the entwined nature of a state in its society generates a range of interactions in the form of a network, having a number of actors involved. The form of the state, its capabilities, strength and scope are determined by the interaction between these different groups and the state (Migdal 2004, 87 – 95). In this way, there are four main modes of the society-state relations and interaction. These are: i). The State Relationship with its Society Results in the Growth and Evolution of the State: The state obtains power from the tension of competition and compromises between its actors and social actors. The unconcisously and heterogeneously taken competition between these two shapes the form of the state (Berman and Lonsdale 1992, 122 – 127). The state-society relationship determines the different forms of governance, which results in opposing outcomes even under the similar conditions (Rodrik 2003, 23). To validate this claim, Tuong argues that society with coherent and articulate status groups and social classes have results in a cooperative state. While a fragmented society always results in predatory state, where the state capitalises on the presence of division inside the society (Tuong 2010, 148 – 175). ii). Power and Responsibilities are Shared by the State and Forces: Various actors compete for power and authority in a society. In this regard, the state struggles for exerting a monopoly on violence, to fulfil and serve its population needs, and to make
44 and set rules of behaviour, among other functions. Besides the state, other actors in society such as the religious authorities, civil society organisations, tribal leaders etc. are also exercise political power and influence the local populations through various actions. The sources of this informal power of the social actors mostly emanate from the culture, the structure of resource distribution, religion, or from the influence and ability of the actors providing social services to the population at the very basic level. These informal sources of power not only regulate the socio-economic aspect of life but also even regulate the market behaviour in a society. Social actor that holds or gets power in this way must negotiate the power with the population of a given society (World Bank 2011a, 41). With the changing dynamics of governance, in network governance where the non-state local actors have taken the responsibilities that were previously provided by or expected from the state. This has resulted in the limited reach of even the strongest state in its society (Ostrom 2007). Berman and Lonsdale argue that the indigenous authorities challenged the colonial powers to such an extent that they (Colonial powers) were compelled to co-opt these people (local authorities) and to rule through indirect means of distoration, and manipulation of the local elites (Berman and Lonsdale 1992, 79). iii). The Affects of Social Dynamics on State Officials (Individual Operating State): Within a state the individuals who operate state affairs and influence key decisions include civil servants, politicians, judges, and businessmen. Mostly, in developing states, these individuals follow their personal interests, rather than state interests even within the restriction of law over them. In this way, governments in these states are collection of bureaucrates, individuals, and politicians. All of these state representing individuals work for their interests, i.e. politicians struggle to win elections, local elites try to promote their own wealth and power, and bureaucrats work for the promotion of their careers. Further, like other institutions, the state is not a kind of homogenous institution operating in isolation from society. Instead, the state devise its objectives and processes through its interactions with the various actors within its society (Bates et al. 1998). These public servants are influenced by a variety of social elements such as the culture, identity conceptions, structures of the power, and belief system within society, affecting their official role as defined by the state rules and regulations (Bates et al. 1998).
45 iv). The State and Society Influences each other: Both the state and society affect and influence working of each other in a significant way. Migdal claims that “today almost all societies in the world exist under the influence of a state in some way either by the distribution and extraction of resources or through taxation” (Migdal 1988, 67). Likewise, the state regulates the behaviour of the community through its laws and statutes, both in public sphere, family and also in individual sphere” (Migdal 2004, 73).
Social Cohesion: Rodrik argues “more cohesive societies responded better to the global economic recession of 1974 than less cohesive societies” (Rodrik 1999, 23). Socially cohesive society institutions are strong with the ability to mediate the conflict. Social cohesion also creates a sense of oneness and the burden of adjusting and adaptability to shocks is equally distributed across all individuals. In this context, Ritzen and Woolcock (2006) are of the opinion that “the more cohesive societies always have higher growth rates…..an important element in the analysis is the extent to which wealth is shared in society, dubbed the middle-class consensus” (Easterly 2001, 317 – 352).
To sum up, social cohesion empowers the capable institutions, particularly the formal state institutions. Strong state-society relationship is developed as a result of social cohesion which leads to more institutional efficiency and efficacy in a given state, ultimately leading a more sustained development.
Figure - 1.2: Society-Centric Model
Stat Resisting State Domination e through Social Values and Norms
Society
Source: Developed by the Research Scholar
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1.6 STATE-IN-SOCIETY APPROACH/ MODEL This section presents a kind of mix of state-centric and society-centric approaches called state-centric relational governance (Bell and Hindmoor 2009) or state-in- society approach (Migdal 2001). The argument of this approach is that both state and society are pertinent for shaping each other.
One of the key arguments of the state-in-society approach (also called state-centric relational governance approach) is that still state governs through hierarchical control. The proponents of this approach argue that state hierarchical control is apparent from the fact that state does not consult anybody or any private sector in areas of monetary policy, security, and defence, etc., and thus have a hierarchical control. This approach further explains that even if the state chooses to govern through alternative ways, e.g. public-private partnership, networking with other actors etc., still state maintains a dominant position on account of having a critical role in governance. In any kind of governance arrangements, the main focus of governance is state-society relationship. Thus states and governments Agencies adopt various strategies of governance in order to boost their capacities without necessarily limiting their powers. Here the focus is that even opting alternative governance arrangements, of developing close relationships with non-state actors, the state actually does so for enhancing its capacity. Even, the existence of exchange relationship between the state and non-state actors does not mean that these relations are equal. In this relationship, states are often able to ‘dominate the exchange’ thus ‘modern governance places the state in a more complex relationship with other governmental and societal actors, but it doesn’t inevitably reduce its role or power’ (Hay and Marsh 2006, 255).
The proponents of state-in-society approach argue that both state and society are indispensable for each other because both are so much interconnected in nature that they cannot be separated. However, Migdal is of the opinion that “there is often a disjuncture between the state's rules of the game and the operative dictates of the society” (Migdal 1988, 10 – 50). With regard to governance in the developing states, to understand and analyse the state capabilities to govern, Migdal has developed a model which is a state-in-society model. The main arguments of the state-in-society model are that “the nature of the state cannot be separated from the nature of its societies and the emergence of a
47 strong, capable state can occur only with a tremendous concentration of social control (to the state).” The level of "social control" by the state can be divided into three categories, namely compliance, participation and legitimacy (Migdal 2001, 52). Compliance which is the lowest level of "social control" refers to a situation where people conform to the demands of the state. It is often compelled by the most basic sanction that is force. Participation is the level of "social control" in which the state demands more than people’s compliance. At this level of control, the state would organise the people to perform specialised tasks on the institutional components of the state. Legitimacy is the highest level of "social control". It refers to a situation where the people accept and believe that the ‘rules of the game’ of the state. In a given state, both state and society struggle for social control which often results in conflict between the state leaders, who want to impose a single set of rules, while other organisations operating in society applying a different kind of rules in parts of the society. In this compeitition for getting a share in social control, there always develops a conflict and race between the state and society. The distribution of social control in a given society determines the strength or weakness of a state (Migdal 1988, 10 – 50).
Migdal, a "state-in-society" theorist, however, opines that the state does not have absolute power over society primarily because it is not a coherent institution that has the same orientation (Migdal 2001). In other words, with a complex structure (departments, levels) and huge manpower, it is quite difficult for any state to act as an organised and coherent unit. With this complexity, the state would face an uphill battle in achieving its goals because of the constraints faced at many levels or branches of the state. Apart from this internal weakness, the state has to deal with various social forces which are capable of resisting the domination of state.
In this way, the basic tenets of State-in-Society approach are: (i). State, being a social organization is embedded in society; (ii). The presence of social forces within a state always have the capacity and ability to resist the power of the state; and, (iii). The conflict between social forces and the state would lead to change and order in society and also the state. The state-in-society approach provides an analytical framework to study Pakistani state relations with the tribal society of FATA on the basis of these three fundamental tenets.
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To sumup, the state-in-society approach argues the merging of the state and social forces for the change and order in society. In developing states, social forces are always having the power to challenge to state governance (authority). The weak states for their very existence accommodate these social forces in order to prevent their total collapse and to neutralize them. While in the strong states, where the society is considered weak, but still states’ authority could be contested at various spheres. Thus, irrpespective of states’s strength or weakness, both states and social forces equally play their role in influencing the change and order through their unending struggle over various domains or spheres in the given society. This broad analytical framework of state-in-society approach is thus useful to study the Pakistani state capabilities in influciing the tribal society of FATA.
1.6.1 The State-in-Society Model
Migdal's state-in-society approach problematizes and re-conceptualizes the Weberian state model. Migdal flips this traditional view of the state on its head by reframing the social realm. He defines the society as consisting of "arenas" in which social forces and movements pull in different directions, struggling for domination. Within this realm, "states are only one part" (Migdal 1988, 29) (Also see Figure – 1.3). Thus, the state is considered as an organisation amongst various other organisations, using the same currency of social control in order to establish preponderance.17 State-centric or society-centric approaches cannot account for the overall struggle for domination in which society (social forces) and the state are equally participating. This view consequently creates a spectrum of domination ranging from dispersed (partial) to integrated (absolute) domination. From a traditional point of view, the state is perceived as an image - unitary and goal-oriented in which civil society 'practices' (participates) within the realm of the state defined by the order of norms, values and beliefs (law). From Migdal's point of view, practices (resistance) within the social realm can limit or even destroy the image of the state by "neutralising the boundaries [territorial, and public and private sphere - and can] create their own new spatial configurations of meaning" (Migdal 1988, 24 – 33). Therefore, these social forces such as the tribal and clan relationships, define their own space transcending the
17 The notion of formal versus informal is determined against the benchmark of the traditional view of the state. The state in its hierarchical appearance is ascribed with a formal character (public) where as any other form of organization is separated (private) from the state and is thus informal.
49 hierarchical confines of the Weberian state. By adopting Migdal's state-in- society approach, it is possible to differentiate between different kinds of legitimacy - the liberal Weberian form (binary and hierarchical) in which the state has established its predominance and centralized its power while penetrating civil society based on a normative consensus and alternative forms (heterogeneous and horizontal) in which social forces, including the state, compete for domination and in which power is horizontalized. Figure - 1.3: State-in-Society Model
Social Social Forces
Social
Forces State
Integrated informal social forces domination
Integrated formal state domination
Dispersed Domination – state and social forces struggling for domination
Source: Developed by the Research Scholar
CONCLUSION This chapter has framed the challenges to state governance, especially in ungoverned spaces as an instance of state’s lack of governance. The resistance to state governance (authority) extension in its areas has been discussed from three theoretical
50 perspectives: state-centric, society-centric, and state-in-society approach. Having reviewed the pertinent literature, it has shown how little is known about the challenges to state governance in the consolidation of domestic sovereignty in all its territories in the developing world. The chapter has then proposed a conceptual framework to fill that gap. This chapter has sketched in more detail the analysis of various factors that challenge state governance in the perspective of ungoverned areas especially the rural or bordering peripheral areas. The subsequent chapters present an analysis of the findings of various factors in the light of theoretical framework developed in this chapter based on the above discussed three approaches to governance and politics in developing states. In this regard, FATA has been studied in the perspective of these approaches of governance by applying the theoretical framework. FATA offers an excellent opportunity, to test the validity of the framework developed in this chapter. The centrepiece of this study is FATA which presents a classic example of ungoverned areas, to test the propositions proffered in research questions discussed in the introduction part of this chapter. More specifically, the study design broadly follows the methods of structured survey, indepth interviews and group discussions.
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CHAPTER – 2
METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN OF THE STUDY
2.1 INTRODUCTION This chapter outlines the procedural formalities adopted for this study. FATA, a classical example of an ungoverned area, has been selected to test the theoretical framework/model developed in chapter - 1. For this purpose, both primary and secondary data was collected through various research techniques such as statistics from various documents, review of reports, books and other published sources and internet browsing. Keeping in view the nature of the study, both qualitative and quantitative primary data was collected, through detailed survey questionnaire, in- depth interviews and focussed group discussions along with other primary data collection tools explained later in this chapter. The methodological approach adopted for this study is termed as ‘mélange approach’.18 The mélange approach’ consists of methods: grounded theory19, empirical, qualitative, quantitative, dialectic (Plato method), descriptive and inferential statistical techniques, heuristic method and discourse analysis (Spitzmuller and Warnk 2011, 75 - 94). These methods were adopted to make the study authentic, attractive, and validated.
The chapter is structured as follows: First, FATA has been discussed as an example of ungoverned spaces. It has been justified by discussing and testifying FATA in the back drop of characteristics of an ungoverned area given by scholars especially Galgano (2007). The second part proposes and discusses the research design for this study. The research design explains the data collection techniques and methods, sampling and sample selection procedure and the study unit. Third, it gives a detailed description of both quantitative and qualitative data collection tools. After sampling,
18 Mélange Approach has been developed for this study by the researcher. Mélange Approach means a combination/ mixture of different incongruous research methods. 19 Grounded Theory is a research theory or method that is used by the research scholar to look upon and conceptualize the latent structure and patterns in this research study by applying constantly comparative processes. Following this method, initially an inductive approach was used to generate substantive codes from the given data. On the basis of these codes, later on the theory was developed which suggested and guided the direction to this research study for a more focused data collection (which is deductive phase of this process). For this study, based on the Grounded Theory, first field interviews (loose/unstructured interviews) with stakeholders were conducted in the initial phase of the study. Then on the information got through these loose/ unstructured interviews, observations, then a theory was built upon. Then that theory was tested for application in this study along other theories/techniques, which further helped in developing a theoretical framework for this study.
52 the fourth part is a discussion on data analysis approaches. The fifth part of the chapter discusses the limitations of the study and the hurdles faced during the study, especially during fieldwork.
2.2 THE RESEARCH DESIGN The research design is the overall strategy chosen to represent the design of the study. It is the blueprint of the study (Mitchell and Jolley 2007). It is the research problem on the basis of which the design for the study is chalked out. The research design works as a linchpin that keeps the research study together (Mitchell and Jolley 2007). The research design is a framework that has been created to seek answers to research questions (Creswell 2012). For this dissertation, a mixed method research approach has been adopted with further modifications by applying a mixture of several methods of incongruous nature termed as Mélange Approach, which combines quantitative and qualitative approaches. The research design discussed in this chapter include: data collection tools, methods of measurement, sampling procedure, data management, and data analysis approches.
More specifically, the design of this study broadly follows the method of structured questionnaire surveys, interviews and focused group discussions and critical discourse analysis, layered analysis, Reality Check Approach (RCA) and personal observations. This method has two specific advantages: First, it has “structured questionnaire” because it standardizes the questions asked across all Agencies of FATA (Creswell 2012). In doing so, it creates a set of some missing data points which can be qualitative or quantitative, and thereby allows for the validation or falsification of causal mechanisms asked through expert interviews. Second, it is “focused” because it limits questions to specific aspects of the FATA. Also, field interviews and focussed groups discussions were adopted in order to fill the gap in data gathered through questionnaires and also validate the information got from experts through interviews and focussed group discussions.
As one of the classical cases of ungoverned areas, FATA offers an excellent example of an ungoverned area to test the validity of the theoretical framework developed for this study based on the governance approaches discussed in chapter-1. The centrepiece of this study is to research and test the theoretical model at a subnational level that is FATA as an example of ungoverned area with a unique tribal culture and
53 borderland characteristics. In this context, its main utility is to ensure that theoretical inferences are based on structural observations which are verifiable across all the selected Agencies of FATA. The method also helps avoid undue attention to irrelevant historical or contemporary contextual details which do not carry explanatory import.
Employing a structured and focused study method as a research approach is amenable to theorising based on the empirical reality observed at the micro level while avoiding the pitfalls of over-aggregating observations commonly experienced in macro-level studies. The resulting mid-range theory provides a specific set of generalisations which help nuance macro theories and provide more specific guidance to policy makers. It is attempted here to chart a course for future work on state governance at the sub-national level, as compared to macro level work done by various international Agencies like UNDP, World Bank etc. The design adopted for this study encapsulates the theoretical objective of this dissertation.
2.2.1 FATA as an Ungoverned Territory As discussed in the introduction part of this study, FATA has been selected as an example of ungoverned territory to test the theoretical framework developed in chapter-1. FATA, being a rough inaccessible terrain and tribal Pakhtuns population presents an excellent and classical example/case of ungoverned area i.e. ungoverned both as a territory and as an ethnic group. The tribal Pakhtuns are strongly committed to their customs and traditions, called Pakthunwali. Pakhtunwali defines their socio-economic and political life. The Pakhtunwali also symbolises a form of legal and traditional authority in these tribal areas. Following their Pakhtun customs strictly, the tribal Pakhtuns seems a very “hard case” for any outside intervention (government), who ever attempted control over the tribal areas. Historically, the tribal Pakhtuns have always resisted efforts aimed at their subjugations by the outside powers. Paradoxically, the avoidance of outside subjugation does not mean that the Pakhtuns have always been a unified group. In reality, these tribal Pakhtuns typically remain in a continuous struggle i.e., an intra-ethnic conflict in the absence of an external threat. Pakthunwali also keeps them in an order to avoid their mutual conflicts which often result into destruction of each other and provide a mechanism for peaceful conflict resolution and settlement. The important things to focus on here is that due to Pakhtuns social organisation and
54 the respect for their customary laws makes it nearly impossible for any outside authority or government to control these tribal Pakhtuns. In addition, the geopolitical location i.e., being at the heart of state two states (Afghanistan and Pakistan), efforts on both sides of the Durand Line makes the case of tribal Pakhtuns empirically very sound and important. Due to a strong tribal social organisations based on the paternal lineage and respect for their long-standing code of Pakthunwali, binds the Pakhtun tribes into one distinctive ethnic group. The Pakthunwali in tribal areas constitute a strong social order and helps them to sustain their religious-ethnic identity (Kakar 2004). Pakthunwali continues to serve and is followed as an important and identifying trait by all Pakhtuns, even if they live in other parts of the country or abroad. That’s why several states have attempted to replace Pakthunwali with a legal system of their own, but still, Pakthunwali continues to be rule of law for Pakhtuns living in tribal areas (Kakar 2004). Map – 2.1: The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
Geographical Profile Khar Konar BAJAUR Newly Opened Area Ghanam Shah MOHMAND
Ghlanai Ningrahar Landikotal
Sarawela KURRAM KHYBER FR Peshawar P Chinar Tirah KHYBER HaiderK Toor Toot Kalaya A F G H A N I S T A N Daboori
ORAKZAI Hangu FR Kohat Paktia Thal N W F P
FR Bannu Mir Ali Bannu • FATA comprises 7 Agencies and MiramN WShah A FR Lakki 6 Frontier Regions. Razmak • Area: 27,220 sq-km.
FR Tank • Population: 3.2 million. Tank • Approx. 25% area recently made S W A accessible. Wana
GUL KACH FR DI Khan
However, variation can be found in the observance of Pakthunwali by those living in urbanised areas and those living in rural and mountainous areas especially those living in tribal areas. The rural and mountainous tribal Pakhtuns are more conservative in the following of Pakthunwali as compared to the urban and settled area Pakhtuns who follow progressive and relinquished way. With regard to the rural, mountainous Pakhtuns i.e. tribal people, since the 19th century, there has been little
55 change in the observance of Pakthunwali. There is also diversity in rural Pakhtuns from the point of observing Pakthunwali, but here in this study generalised characteristics and behaviour of rural Pakhtuns have been recognised in order to broadly encompass their efforts on government authority. The phenomena of ungoverned spaces and FATA as an ungoverned space are not a new concept because ungoverned spaces remained all over the history in various shapes (Thomas and Casebeer 2005). However, the tribal areas (FATA) present a typical example among the ungoverned spaces/areas due to its unique tribal culture, geography and unique informal customary governance system. The problem today is that these ungoverned spaces have got importance recently due to their potentiality to be used as a springboard by terrorists for their disastrous activities (Tallent 2005). Further, the advancement in technology & communication and facilities like the internet, easy transportation of men and money has made it much easier for outlaws, non-state violent actors to exploit these ungoverned spaces or peripheries, where the authority of the central state is weak or with governance devoid. Ungoverned spaces can be divided into various categories based on two broad characteristics, i.e. structure or genetics (origin) (physical and non-physical), and the function (based on government and other actors that is social forces, non-state actor) interaction in the territory/area. (See Figure - 2.1 below). Figure – 2.1: Classification Matrix of Ungoverned Areas CLASSIFICATION MATRIX BENIGN HOSTILE
UN-GOVERNED FRONTIER TERRITORIES
TERRITORIES OF COMPETING AUTHORITY
EXPLOITATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES
AREAS OF OPAGUE ACTIVITY
PHYSICAL PHYSICAL
-
GENETIC CLASSIFICATION FERAL CITIES NON
FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION Source: Galgano (2007) With regard to genetically (physical and non-physical) category, the FATA fulfils all
56 the attributes of a physical ungoverned space: it is a remote, undeveloped, and a frontier region (Galgano 2007). The Pakistani state is either unable or unwilling to develop its infrastructure or extend its governance (authority) in these tribal areas. Comparative development indicators support the claim that tribal people and its territory lag far behind in each sector of development when compared with rest of the country (for details see chapter-4). These poor development indicators result in making the position of FATA more vulnerable to shattering natural as well as humanitarian disasters. Coupled with this, FATA being a frontier region and having a rival neighbouring state of Afghanistan at the border, further makes it difficult for Pakistani state to extend its control in these tribal areas. With regard to functional categories, the following diagram shows that generally ungoverned spaces are of five types. These are, 1) ungoverned frontier territories; 2) territories of competing authority; 3) exploitation of legal principles; 4) areas of opaque activity; and 5) feral cities (Galgano 2007).20 Although the functional classification shows great overlap among its various categories due to FATA dynamic governance system, yet the dynamics of FATA governance clearly justify FATA being an area of competing authority, but also maintains conditions of a frontier territory having exploitation of legal principles. Frontier Territory: FATA qualifies all conditions of being a frontier ungoverned territory. That is, the region is remote, having rugged topography, and the provision of government infrastructure is very little (for example, airfields, roads, hospital, schools, the supply of water, electricity, and such other facilities which are provided by a modern day state to its citizens (Bajoria 2010). Due to lack of this infrastructure, often humanitarian disasters are more problematic in such region because a responding agency will be facing more difficulties while supplying the relief goods.21 Additionally, the poor infrastructure and the government absence in such indigenous areas (tribal areas), results in the people lack of trust in state and thus having much relied on their own informal institutions for day to day survival and also for their security (Galgano 2007).
20 It is important to note here that understanding human processes are difficult on the basis of functional basis of classification due to the complex nature of human nature. Thus placing ungoverned spaces into discrete categories is very difficult. 21 To note here as an example, during the earthquake of 2005 in Pakistan, especially due to harsh topography of northern areas coupled with its inaccessibility, remoteness and lack of infrastructure, it was difficult to supply relief goods by roads, therefore, all required relief goods were flown into the area through helicopters etc.
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Competing authority: FATA also qualifies the classification of a territory of competing authority. In such an area, a sovereign state willingly does not exercise or extend its authority (Whelan 2005). In this regard, Pakistani government has sustained colonial era laws and use of taxation to selective control FATA. Due to this, these tribal areas have become alienated, marginalised and vulnerable with regard to socio-economic and political development. The existing minimum or selective system of administration, due to its discriminatory outdated laws and massive corruption, have further developed alienation and distrust against the state. Besides, the repercussions of the Soviet attack on Afghanistan have further aggravated the fragile conditions of these tribal areas (FATA). That’s why after 2001, the militants exploited these vulnerable conditions by establishing a parallel (competing authority) in these areas, claiming they are providing state (government) like services i.e. a kind of security, basic health, force, and other such services (Siddique 2009). The militants have established their own brand of government, claiming that it is based on Shariah Law by having control of FATA and moving forward to expand its authority throughout the Pakhtun area i.e. the whole of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Siddique 2009). Exploitation of Legal Principles: The third functional attribute of an ungoverned area is exploitation of legal principles. Having established a competing authority, the militants in tribal areas tried to manipulate legitimate government process for their own purposes. In this regard, the militants’ assassinated a large number of tribal elders (Malaks), who were government representatives in these areas (Siddique 2009). To conclude, the militants skillfully exploited the power vacuum in FATA by establishing a “legitimate” parallel government structure. They did this through the assimilation of legal norms and the provision of health and education facilities, provided them legitimacy in the tribal population, which have been ignored by Pakistan state since independence (Sappenfield 2008). As mentioned in chapter-1, the focus of this study is on “ungoverned spaces”, that’s why an emphasis is made and placed on tribal Pakhtun people and their tribal areas and the responses of these tribal people towards government policies which the state devises for the consolidation of its governance (authority).
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2.3 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURE
2.3.1 Universe and Population of the Study FATA lies in a shape of narrow belt bordering Afghanistan stretching from North to South. (See Figure - 2.1: Map of FATA). All Agencies of FATA have homogeneous characteristics. The ‘General Universe’ (George and Nett 1986, 56 - 59) of the present study was considered to be all the seven Agencies and six Frontier Regions (FRs) of FATA (See Table - 2.1: Population and Housing Units in FATA (1998 Census). However, out of the whole ‘General Universe’ of the study; a representative sample was selected through proportional stratified random sampling method. Areas/villages were purposively selected for the present study as a ‘Working Universe’, on the basis of different characteristics to get a possible representative sample and due to the fear emanating from the current situations in FATA.
The “Working Universe’(Vanderstoep and Johnston 2009) was characterised by same tribal culture, traditions and development opportunities, however, the sample differed by the availability of facilities and geographical location i.e. distance from the capital city i.e., Peshawar of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (See Map - 2.2 Map of FATA Showing Sampled Clusters), accessibility, development and economic opportunities.
The reason for choosing these different clusters/areas was on the basis of geographical location and easy accessibility to the respondents.
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Table - 2.1: Population of FATA
Area Population 1998 Sex ratio 1998 Census 1981-98 Inter Censual (Male per Annual Growth Rate Both sexes Male Female hundred Average (%age) female) Household size
Pakistan 132352279 53% 47% 108.5 6.8 2.69
N.W.F.P 17743645 52% 48% 105 8 2.82
F.A.T.A 3175000 53% 47% 108 9.3 2.19
Bajaur Agency 595227 52% 48% 105 9.1 4.33
Mohmand Agency 334453 53% 47% 110 9.0 4.28
Khyber Agency 546730 53% 47% 109 9.9 3.92
Kurram Agency 448310 52% 48% 105 10.6 2.50
Aurakzai Agency 225441 51% 49% 100 8.8 -2.69
N.Wazirstan 361246 54% 46% 114 9.1 2.46 Agency
S.Waziristan 429841 54% 46% 116 8.5 1.95 Agency
F.R Peshawar 53841 51% 49% 101 8.8 2.22
F.R Kohat 88456 52% 48% 106 9.3 2.59
F.R Bannu 19593 53% 47% 113 9.6 -6.65
F.R Lakki 6987 50% 50% 98 7.5 -4.81
F.R D.I Khan 38990 53% 47% 111 7.1 -2.09
F.R Tank 27216 52% 48% 108 7.6 -0.61
Source: Population Census 1998, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
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Map – 2.2: Map of FATA Showing Survey Clusters
2.3.2 Sampling As mentioned above, the working universe of this study is the whole of FATA. For this purpose, all the residents of FATA are the population for this study. From this population, a representative sample was selected through Proportionate Stratified Random Sampling Technique (PSRS) on the basis of statistical formula N = z2 (P (1- P)/e2 (Thompson 2012). The overall population of FATA as per 1998 Population Census is 3175 000 persons.
2.3.2.1 Sample Design
Multistage cluster sampling was used with random process for the selection purpose. For this study, a sample size of 768 respondents was selected on the basis of the given statistical formula.
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Statistical Formula: (Lyman and Longnecker 2008)
N = z2 (P(1-P)/e2
Where:
N is total number/sample size;
Z is Confidence level i.e. 0.95 (95%). Its value is (1.96);
P represents the extent of variation in the entire population and is equal to (0.5) but usually P (1-P) is equal = (0.25);
E Margin of error i.e. 5% of error is allowed, so we have e = (0.05).
Based on this formula, the sample size calculated was as below: n = (1.96) square (0.5) (0.5)/ (0.05) = 384 (minimum sample size)
To adjust the sample size for the effect of clustering, we multiply the sample size with the Design Effect which is conventionally taken as 2.0. For Cluster sampling, we calculate Design Effect. After taking the design effect, the final sample size was calculated by following the formula:
Formula:
N = 2 (Z2*p (1-P)/2 OR
N = 2* (Sample size in simple random sampling);
Where 2 is universal value/figure for Design Effect in the case of cluster sampling.
Therefore, the requested sample size was: n = 2*384 = 768 (minimum).
In order to be 95% confident (level of confidence) that the result should not differ from the true situations by more than 5% (margin of error), a sample size of 768 was calculated. The 768 is the minimum number of respondents/sample size allowed but statistics permit to select more than 768 sample if required but not less than 768. Therefore, total 1500 respondents were selected through proportional stratified
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random sampling techniques (Lyman and Longnecker 2008) from out of the total 3.17 million (3175000) population of FATA (Population Census 1998). A stratified random sample is a population sample that requires the population to be divided into smaller groups/areas, called 'strata' based on various characteristics. Random samples were taken from each stratum. In a proportional stratified sample, the size of each stratum in the sample is proportionate to the size of the stratum in the population. In this study, it is ensured that the proportion of the strata in the population is the same as the proportion in the sample. To get a proportional stratified random sample size for each Agency/cluster, the total population of each agency/cluster was multiplied with the total selected sample size (1500) and was then divided by the total population of the FATA. The following Table - 3.3 and Table - 3.4 shows Agency wise sample size obtained through proportional stratified sampling techniques: Table - 2.2: Proportional Stratified Sample Size per Cluster/Agency Total Population Agency Total Sample Agency Wise Agency Name of FATA Population Percentage Size Sample Size Bajaur 3175000 595000 19 1500 281 Khyber 3175000 334000 11 1500 158 Kurram 3175000 547000 17 1500 258 Mohmand 3175000 448000 14 1500 212 North Waziristan 3175000 225000 7 1500 106 Orakzai 3175000 361000 11 1500 171 S.Waziristan 3175000 430000 14 1500 203 FR Peshawar 3175000 54000 2 1500 26 FR Kohat 3175000 88000 3 1500 42 FR Bannu 3175000 20000 1 1500 9 FR Laki 3175000 7000 0 1500 3 FR D.I.Khan 3175000 39000 1 1500 18 FR Tank 3175000 27000 1 1500 13
To get a representative sample from each cluster/Agency, the following steps were taken:
Stage 1: In stage 1st, FATA was divided into the following three broad categories/ strata on the basis of geographical locations. These are:
1. Northern FATA: Khyber, Mohmand and Bajaur Agencies;
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2. Central FATA: Kurram, Orakzai Agencies and FR Kohat, FR Peshawar;
3. Southern FATA: North and South Waziristan Agencies and FRs Bannu, Lakki, Tank and DIK.
Stage 2nd: In stage 2nd, the overall sample size i.e. 1500 respondents were divided into each geographical division proportionally (according to its population) by below- given formula:
Formula:
N = Size of zone/Total Population of FATA * 1500
Sample size of Northern Zone/Cluster = 651 respondents
Sample Size of Southern Zone/Cluster = 496 respondents
Sample size of Central Zone/Cluster = 353 respondents
Table – 2.3: Population and Housing Units in FATA (1998 Census)
S. No. Sample Cluster Housing Units Per Unit Total Population Pop/Unit Agency Clusters 1 Bajaur Agency 65439 65439 595000 595000 2 Mohmand Agency 37123 37123 334000 334000 3 Khyber Agency 54416 54416 547000 547000 4 Kurram Agency 41732 41732 448000 448000 5 Orakzai Agency 25546 25546 225000 225000 6 N.Waziristan Agency 39188 39188 361000 361000 7 S.Waziristan Agency 50093 50093 430000 430000 FR Clusters 1 FR Peshawar 6113 54000 15587 142000 2 FR Kohat 9474 88000 3 FR Bannu 2001 20000 2931 27000 4 FR Laki 930 7000 5 FR D.I.Khan 5500 39000 9059 66000 6 FR Tank 3559 27000 Total = 341114 341114 3175000 3175000 Source: Population Census 1998, Government of Pakistan
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Table - 2.4: Sample Size for Each Zone
Population of Zone Wise Population of Zone Agency/Area Zone Sample Size Agency/Areas Bajaur 595000 Northern Zone Khyber 334000 1377000 651 Mohmand 448000 Kurram 547000 Orakzai 361000 Central 1050000 496 FR Peshawar 54000 FR Kohat 88000 North W 225000 S.Wazir 430000 FR Bannu 20000 Southern 748000 353 FR Laki 7000 FR D.I.Khan 39000 FR Tank 27000 Stage 3rd: In this stage, the selected sample size for each zone, obtained through above formula, was further divided to get a representative sample size for each individual Agency according to the following formula:
Formula:
Ni = Ni/N * n
Ni = Population size of the Agency
N= Total Population of the Zone
N = Total sample size from this zone (obtained above for each zone differently)
Ni = Obtained sample for this i(th) Agency
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Table – 2.5: Sample Design
Sample Design S.No. Zone Agency Agency Wise Agency/FR Name Population Sample Size 1 Northern Bajaur 595000 281 Khyber 334000 158 Mohmand 448000 212 2 Central Kurram 547000 258 Orakzai 361000 171 FR Peshawar 54000 26 FR Kohat 88000 42 3 Southern North W 225000 106 S.Wazir 430000 203 FR Bannu 20000 9 FR Laki 7000 3 FR D.I.Khan 39000 18 FR Tank 27000 13 Total Sample Size 1500
Stage 4th: At this stage, sample size obtained through the above formula for each individual Agency was equally selected from both strata/villages i.e. accessible and inaccessible villages. That is each Agency was further divided into two categories based on the availability of basic amenities i.e. Accessible Areas (areas near to Agency Headquarter having availability of basic amenities i.e. protected areas) and Inaccessible Areas (areas away from Agency Headquarter having less availability of basic amenities i.e. unprotected areas).
Strata1. Accessible areas: Areas rich with basic amenities such as schools, health facilities, roads, water supply, communication and the like. Accessible areas are those which are nearer to Agency Headquarters.
Strata2. Inaccessible areas: Areas lacking basic amenities such as schools, health facilities, roads, water supply, communication and the like. Inaccessible are areas away and at a distance from the Agency Headquarters.
Stage 5th: At this stage, respondents were randomly selected on equal allocation from each stratum (accessible and inaccessible areas) from various villages and Union Councils.
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The following table shows the overall sample obtained through multi-stage sampling.
Table – 2.6: Selected Sample Size
Sampled Cluster Name # Selected Respondents Total S.No. Respondent Cluster Agency/ FRs Accessible Inaccessible s
Bajaur 141 140 281 1 Northern Zone Khyber 79 79 158 Mohmmand 106 106 212 Kurram 129 129 258 Orakzai 86 85 171 2 Central Zone FR Kohat 21 21 42 FR Peshawar 13 13 26
North Waziristan 53 53 106 South Waziristan 102 101 203 3 Southern Zone FR Bannu 5 4 9 FR Lakki 2 1 3 FR Tank 7 6 13 FR DI Khan 9 9 18 Total Sample Size 750 747 1500
It is important to clarify at this point that the sample drawn for this study was 1500 respondents who had attained the age of 18 years and were the registered voters.
While for qualitative data collection i.e. interviews and Focussed Group Discussions (FGDs), a handsome sample size of people were interviewed from different fields: local elders, activists, journalists, academicians, government officials of FATA administration, staff members of development organisations and other community people with non-probability sampling techniques. Detail of qualitative data collection tools and respondents is given later in this chapter.
2.3.2.2 Selection of Respondents and Method of Selecting Starting Points
During the field work in FATA villages, the starting points were local landmarks such as the Hujra of a prominent Malak, famous shops, mosques, schools and health facilities, etc. Five respondents at each point were interviewed.
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After selecting starting points, a household on right-hand side was selected. Five respondents were interviewed by counting off every third door or compound. In some areas where the houses were scattered, a house convenient was selected.
2.3.2.3 Study Unit
Before selecting the respondents, it was ensured that the respondents were of 18 years or above, that they were Pakistanis belonging to FATA, and were from the Agency and from that particular village.
2.4 METHODS OF MEASUREMENT OF GOVERNANCE For the assessment of governance, generally, organizations, Agencies, and governments use different kinds of methodologies, indexes and tools especially in the context of the weak or fragile situation. Due to the multidimensional nature of the concept of governance, all the indices of governance vary significantly from narrow definition (that is limiting governance to just bureaucratic corruption) to broader definition (that is measuring the overall governance system of a country). There are few indicators that take a comprehensive view of governance thus addressing the multidimensional nature of governance.22 Besides, most of these governance measurements are based on the aggregate national level analysis rather than disaggregate subnational level.
To critically review the voluminous proliferation of the governance indicators and indexes in the past two decades, mostly used by foreign investors, donor countries and multilateral agencies, these indicators and indexes are mostly based on perception and mostly presenting country level an aggregated analysis. For a lower level i.e. subnational application necessitates a more focused and closer examination of these available governance indexes and indicators. Mostly, these indexes and indicators are for aid purposes and to identify the location of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). However, with regard to analysis and assessment of state governance (authority) at subnational level, these indicators do not provide any clear-cut criteria, indicators and variables.
22 The available governance indicators or assessment tools are: The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI), Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), Overseas Development Institute (ODI)’s, World Governance Assessment (WGA), Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s Ibrahim’s Index of African Governance (IIAG), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa’s (ECA) and African Governance Report (AGR).
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These indicators and indexes are criticised on the basis of various flaws and weaknesses that are flaws in measurement methodology, and also due to the lack of a sound conceptual framework for the operationalisation of an abstract idea of governance.
Scholars have identified a host of problems and flaws in the primary sources and survey questions of these governance indicators and indexes. These problems and flaws are ambiguous questions, lack of focus, and ideological and objective bias in the composition of respondents. Further, based on this criticism of having imprecise questions, when these primary sources and surveys are aggregated, these shortcomings also pass on to composite indicators. The methodology of time series and cross-country comparative analysis of these governance indicators are also criticised due to their diverse objectives, unbalanced sample size, and ideological difference of primary sources. Due to the ambiguous and questionable nature of these indicators, it is clear that any decision based on these indicators will remain objectionable.
Against this background, in the context of these limitations and criticism on the available and existing indicators and indexes of governance measurement, this study has adopted a different approach of measuring the governance. This study has assessed the state governance in a disaggregating form at the sub-national level, from three different perspectives or approaches. These approaches are state-centric, society-centric and state-in-society (state society governance relational) approaches, which have already been discussed in chapter-1.
2.4.1 Operationalisation of Variables - Governance Indicators On the basis of already discussed three approaches to governance, in this section indicators/variables have been developed to measure governance in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Under each governance approach, various indicators/variables have been developed. The following figure – 3.3 shows the Governance Measurement Model based on three approaches to governance adopted for this study. (For details see chapter-1)
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Figure – 2.2: Governance Measurement Model with Indicators
i). Variables of State-centric Approach: The literature on the un-governability of an area has identified various reasons and causes under the state-centric approach. Based on the discussion in chapter-1, various concepts discussed under state-centric approach, have been operationalized into measuring variables and indicators. These are 1). Lack of state penetration, which is further sub-divided into measuring variables, such as i). Lack of Physical Infrastructure (Communications facilities, a direct or indirect administrative system, an official Banking System, a transportation network), ii). Social resistance based on culture, iii). Informal economy and corruption. 2). Monopoly & control on violence and cocersion, which is further subdivided into variables such as i). The presence of organised armed groups, ii). The presence of criminal networks, and, iii). Population with access to weapons. 3). Control over borders, this can be measured through the actual strength of the state to have control over its international border; and, 4). External interference, this can be measured through the presence of a rival state at the border and the rival state intervention in the bordering province or area of the given state.
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Under the above four mentioned indicators, governance has been assessed by cross- cutting concepts of Capacity, Authority, and Legitimacy (ACL). For example, state capacity is measured through the indicators of state institutional capacity to deliver its functions, legitimacy of the institutions and the monopoly of violence (Hanson and Sigman 2011). ii). Variables of Society-Centric Approach: The literature on the un-governability of an area has identified various reasons and causes under the Society-centric approach. Based on the discussion in chapter-1, various concepts discussed under the Society-centric approach, have been operationalized into measuring variables and indicators. These variables and indicators include primoderial and modern dynamics of state society relations. The indicataors of primoderial dyamics include: history of local power, colonial state capacity, state terror and violence, social formation and social memory of living independence life, social autonomy and ethnicity, informal economy, domestic and international perspective. The indicators related to modern/current dynamics of state society relations include: state-society connectedness, citizenship, state-society interactions, socio-political cohesion, state legitimacy, the interaction of formal and informal institution, civic trust, citizenship and social cohesion. iii). Variables of State-in-Society Approach: In chapter-1, section on state-in- society approach has identified the attributes and causes of weak state and society relations, which provides details about power dynamics to understand and facilitate state-society relations and interactions. The discussion in chapter - 1 on state-society relations and interactions identify variables for assessment. These variables are: the nexus of state-society relations, social control (i.e. capabilities of state to penetrate society, extract resources, distribute in a determined way) and to regulate social relations in a given society.
2.5 DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND TOOLS Data for this study was collected both through primary and secondar sources. Secondary data was collected through a desk review of various published documents while quantitative and qualitative primary data was collected through survey interview schedule/questionnaire and focussed group discussion and in-depth interview from the selected number of respondents.
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The methods and tools used for data collection in this study are given below:
2.5.1 Desk Review - Secondary Data Collection Books, reports and other historical documents were reviewed regarding the historical background of FATA, its people, its other socio-economic and political conditions. The governance system of FATA and its history was also examined. For this purpose, various books, newspapers, reports, journals, research articles, etc., were also consulted and reviewed.
2.5.2 Primary Data Collection Tools As discussed above both quantitative and qualitative data was collected through various primary data collection tools.
2.5.2.1 Quantitative Data Collection
1. Survey Questionnaire
For quantitative primary data collection, a survey questionnaire was used. It took three months to develop the said survey questionnaire. The questionnaire was developed on the basis of pre-survey visits to FATA, informal discussions and unstructured interviews with various key informants, experts and through literature review about governance in general, especially state governance in post-colonial developing states, about various aspects of the tribal existing informal governance system, state theories with focus on state Authority, Capacity, and Legitimacy (ACL), State-society interaction and review of various historical documents related to the tribal areas. The questionnaire was then discussed with relevant experts, field administrators, and researchers. After incorporating the changes suggested by these experts, the questionnaire was pre-tested for amendments in its structure, questions and relevancy. Again amendments were made on the basis of its thematic and structural pre-testing. The final questionnaire was then translated into Urdu so that the respondents may better understand while giving a response.
As per international research ethics, the survey Questionnaire has a consent form at the start to get a prior willingness (consent) of a respondent before participating in the survey. However, it took a long time for completing the survey. Some of the respondents showed hesitation to take part in the survey due to various reasons such
72 as feeling of insecurity and the situations prevailing in FATA. Besides, one reason was the sensitive nature of the study especially in the wake of current wave of terrorism in FATA and the mistrust developed among the tribal people.
The questionnaires had both categorical (nominal and ordinal) and continuous (interval and ratio) scale variables. These variables include basic demographic and socio-economic information about respondents such as age, sex, marital status, education and information on various aspects of the issues under study (Creswell 2012). The main purpose of this section of the Questionnaire was to cross-examine the responses with the socio-economic variables. In addition, the Questionnaire collected information on the household/socio-economic background of the respondents, such as the sources of drinking water, type of toilet facilities, materials used in the construction of the house, and ownership of various durable consumer goods. Besides, the questionnaire contained questions on variables developed in the theoretical framework section of chapter-1. (For details See Annexure – A: Survey Questionnaire).
The survey questionnaire was lengthy and was completed in an average time of about 30-40 minutes. The actual mean time for the individual interview was 35 minutes.
2.5.2.2 Pre-testing of the Survey Questionnaire
The questionnaire was pre-tested in selected areas (convenient to the researcher). That is the finalised questionnaire was first put to pre-testing in the tribal areas adjacent to Peshawar. The purpose of the pre-testing was to test and verify the nature of questions given in the questionnaire and to determine whether the questions were serving the purpose of the study.
On the feedback of this pre-testing, some questions were modified, ambiguous questions were rephrased and made easy to understand. The pre-testing was also aimed to check and determine the length of time taken for covering one questionnaire. Further, the aim was also to check the suitability of wording of questions and also to check the skipping and coding patterns. Time intensive sections, extra detailed questions, questions having no direct relevance to the objectives of the study, were deleted. However, concerted efforts were made to include as many relevant questions as possible in order to collect more information, as there is a lack of first-hand
73 primary data/information regarding tribal society especially on issues related to state governance (authority) and state-society relations.
Besides pre-testing, the questionnaire was subjected to repeated scrutiny by experts such as those linked with FATA administration, political analysts, sociologists, anthropologists, survey experts and other such relevant experts. The purpose of this scrutiny was to make the questionnaire friendly and culturally sensitive. To serve this end, it was ensured that the questions posed in the questionnaire were not violating the tribal culture. The questions were rephrased in a manner to make them workable and applicable to the tribal culture. Hence, adhering to the suggestions given by experts, many culturally restrictive and sensitive questions were modified.
2.5.2.3 Qualitative Data Collection Tools
1. In-depth Interviews (IDI)
Qualitative primary data was collected through in-depth interviews and Focussed Group Discussions. In-depth interviews are intensive individual interviews with a small number of respondents in order to get their perspectives and opinion on ideas, problems, or situation. The interviews were conducted to get views and opinions of the participants, staff, and others stakeholders associated with the problem/issue. The interviews helped gathered information on the thoughts, behaviour and personal opinion of a respondent based on his/her experience with the issue under discussion. The significance of an interview is that it provides context to other data (such as outcome data), by providing a complete picture of the situation of what happened in the issue/program in the past, why does it happen and what are the future prospects. Compared to survey questionnaire as a primary data collection tool, interviews with key informants provide more information regarding an issue. As opposed to the filling out of a survey form, interviews gather more information in a relaxed and conducive environment where interviewees may feel comfortable while sharing their experiences on a particular issue. For this study, an interview format was developed for interviewing key informants’ i.e. relevant experts and stateholders, political experts and analysts, journalists, anthropologists, political administrators & bureaucrats, business class etc., to get their views regarding the issue under study. The interview structure contained questions
74 based on the variables adopted/obtained from the three approaches to governance in the theoretical framework developed for this study (For details See Annexure – B: Interview Schedule).
The interview has several roles: exploring the boundaries of a problem, obtaining the context for a problem or issue, evaluating potential solutions, managing the research process by supporting the interpretation of results from surveys and other quantitative methods. An overall 39 interviews were taken during field survey. All respondents were promised full confidentiality. (See Annexure – F: List of Interviewees/participants of Interview)
2. Focus Group Discussions
Originally, the term focus group was used to denote "focused interviews" or "group interviews". The focus group as a qualitative data collection technique was developed after the World War II. The purpose and use of this technique was to evaluate the listener’s responses to radio programs (Stewart and Shamdasani 1990). That onward, the focus groups came in use a useful technique by various fields of social science scholars and researchers and other program evaluators in order to understand people’s beliefs and views on a topic of interest or a program of interest.
To get more detailed in-depth perspective on issues of concern related to this study, Focus Groups Discussions (FGDs) were conducted with tribal people and other stakeholders in FATA through a semi-structured Focus format of FGD. (See Annexure – C)
The selection of the participants for FGD is done on the basis of common characteristics related to the topic of discussion. The end of FGD is that the participants could share their perceptions and points of views regarding an issue/topic freely, without pressing the participants to reach a certain consensus. That’s why in focus group the participants are given a conducive, free environment and are encouraged to share different views (Krueger 1988).
Furthermore, the use of FGD in this study helped in getting views of the respondents having diverse backgrounds: of different age groups, gender, tribes, economic status, disputants and observers of the federal and FATA relations and other issues of FATA
75 governance as described in this study. Whiel selecting participants, preference was given to those who would have knowledge and experience of the governance system of FATA. Furthermore, the Malaks, elders and Mullahs were also chosen to share their views they being stakeholders and respected people within their circles. The participants were provided with opportunity of expressing their viewpoints so as to have informed and representative perspectives on key issues related to the governance system of FATA. An average of 10 participants attended each FGD. A total of 13 FGDs were held i.e. one in each Agency and FR. For participation details and plan of these FGDs, see table – 2.9.
Table – 2.7: List of Participants and Time Frame of Focus Group Discussions
Focus Group Discussion Agency/FRs Number of Zone Agency/Area Gender Age Group Participants Bajaur Male 27-35 12 Northern Zone Khyber Female 36-46 9 Mohmand Male 18 - 30 10 Kurram Female 46 -55 11 Orakzai Male 30 - 44 10 Central FR Peshawar Male 22 - 38 10 FR Kohat Male 27-35 12 North Waziristan Male 36-46 13 South Waziristan Male 18 - 30 10 FR Bannu Male 46 -55 11 Southern FR Laki Male 30 - 44 10 FR D.I.Khan Female 22 - 38 9 FR Tank Male 33 - 47 10
2.5.3 Field Survey and Fieldwork As mentioned above in the pre-testing section, before going to the field for actual survey, a mock practice was conducted by interviewing respondents in Peshawar. During the mock excercise, few changes were observed which were modified to make the questionnaire more doable at the field. While doing field practice to get training on the survey questionnaire, the suggestions of the experts were kept in view and special attention was given on the “correct” and “culturally accepted” interpretation of the sensitive questions.
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The field survey in all Agencies and Frontier Regions was successfully conducted with the help of Malaks, influential people, personal friends. This enabled the researcher to have easy access to the selected areas and respondents. Getting the support of the local people/friends and their help to communicate in the local language (accent) proved extraordinarily useful. Among female respondents, only those were interviewed who were willing and on job outside the home, in a school, health facility or other such Government, Non- government or private office. The field survey was conducted on the cluster level in order to ensure that the researcher may get quiet acquaintance and was accustomed to local dialects and cultural norms and with localities in adjacent areas. The majority of respondents were either matriculate or intermediate level education or less. That’s why working with less educated respondents was a great challenge and hectic task.
The following points were underpinned during the initial visits and prior preparation for the survey.
To explain to the respondents and local Malaks the purpose of the survey and to get their support; To get their prior consent for the filling of questionnaire; To do necessary correction in the identification of field, areas and respondents to be surveyed; To look into the mechanism as how to approach a village/area, the respondents, obtain their permission and the required information; How to care for local culture and ask the culturally sensitive questions; To get the questionnaires completed in a smooth way. The questionnaire was thoroughly discussed, question by question, during the pre- testing exercise. The outcome of fieldwork in each geographical zone/cluster is discussed below.
1. Northern Zone
In Bajaur Agency, field survey, focus group discussion and interviews were conducted with the help of an Additional Political Agent (friend). He provided the
77 support of Khassadar whenever needed. He also provided generous support for stay during the fieldwork at Bajaur Agency. Educated tribal females were also interviewed. These were mostly health workers, school teachers and others working in government and non-governmental organisations. Because of the insecure situations and resistance from the local community, the fieldwork at certain places remained very hectic and challenging.
In Mohmand Agency, the field survey, focus group discussion and interviews were conducted with the help of friends and community elders (Malaks). Respondents working in colleges, schools and other places were interviewed. In Ghalanai area, the help of a friend who is running a local NGO was sought. In other areas of Mohmand Agency, the support of local health workers and a person running a private school was of great help.
In Khyber Agency, a friend who is running a private school, helped in conducting fieldwork, focus group discussion and interviews. He also made his school female teachers to collect data from the community women. A friend, a Food Inspector in Landi Kotal, helped in arranging focus group discussions.
It took almost one month (29 days) to complete fieldwork in the Northern zone.
2. Central Zone
Fieldwork in the central zone and the southern zone was really challenging. With the help of local administration and friends working in various organisations, the field work at central zone was completed. Due to the fear of Taliban and tense situations in Bara (Khyber Agency), field survey, interviews and FGDs could not be taken up despite several days of efforts. It was only with the support of Assistant Political Agent of Bara that the objectives could ultimately materialized.
In Kurram and Orakzai Agency, field survey, focus group discussion and interviews were conducted with the help of local administrators and with the help of Deputy Secretary Administration, FATA, who contacted community leaders in the two Agencies, to provide support during the fieldwork. He also requested the political administration to provide the support of Khassadar whenever needed. The local community elders (Malaks) not only supported at field work but also provided
78 generous hospitality along with accomodation. In Kurram and Orakzai Agency female school teachers were of great help. Females working in development organisations were also helpful not only for their willingness for interviews but also persuading other females for survey questionnaire. It took almost 39 days to complete the field work in the central zone. However, in few areas of the central zone, the fieldwork remained very hectic and challenging.
3. Southern Zone
The Waziristan crisis, the military operations and the displacement of population were some of the hurdles that adversely affected the fieldwork in the southern zone. The crises were taken as an opportunity for fieldwork because most of the people of the southern zone were displaced living in camps in southern parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa. Interviews, focus group discussions and field survey were conducted with the people of these areas in the camps established by the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa and other development organisations. The help of male and female staff of non-governmental (national and international) organisations was sought to complete fieldwork in these areas.
In FR Bannu, FR Lakki and FR DIK the fieldwork, focus group discussion and interviews were completed with the help of local people, elders and friends. It took about one month and one week to complete the fieldwork in the southern zone.
Field work conducted in the sampled areas took different amount of time. The following table shows details of the places (villages and UCs) and the duration of respective fieldwork.
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Table – 2.8: Name of Villages/Union Councils and Days Field Survey Covered
Place, Duration and Time of Survey Fieldwork
Agency Zone Name Agency/Area UCs/Villages Sample Size Days Covered Bajaur Barang, Charmang, Khar Bajaur, 281 10 Mamund, Nawagai, Salarzai, Utmankhel (Qzafi) Northern Khyber Bara, Jamrud, Landi Kotal, Mula Ghori 158 9 Zone Mohmand Halimzai, Pindiali, Pringhar, Safi, 212 10 Upper Mohmand, Utman Khel (Ambar), Yaka Ghund Kurram Tehsil Central, Upper and Lower 258 14 Kurram Orakzai Ismailzai, Central, Upper and Lower 171 12 Central Orakzai FR Peshawar Dara Adam Khel, Tor Sapar 42 6 FR Kohat Dara Adam Khel, Shinnay Kallay, 26 5 Zargonkhel and Akhourwal North Datta Khel, Dossalil, Garyum, Ghulam 106 14 Waziristan Khan, Mir Ali, Miran Shah, Razmak, Shewa, Spinwam S.Waziristan Birmal, Ladha, Makin (Charlai), 203 13 Sararogha, Sarwekai, Tiarza, Toi Khullah, Wana FR Bannu Upper Bakakhel, Kotka Khaliq 9 2 Nawaz, Malak Morad Bakakhel and Southern Malak Qasim Junai Bakakhel FR Lakki Musa Khel, Takhti Khel, Januzai and 3 2 Passani. Achu Khel, Begukhel, Isak Khel, Ahmed Khel, Khuda Khel. FR D.I.Khan Darazinda, Takht-i-Sulaiman, 13 2 FR Tank Kanazai Kalai, Chagaraghzay Mela, 18 2 Larzan, Bara Khan Manrai, Jandola, Shahur, Kirarwain Qala.
2.6 DATA MANAGEMENT: DATA CODING, ENTRY AND CLEANING
At the end of the field survey, to facilitate statistical analysis and improve the accuracy of the data entry, most of the closed-ended and semi-open questions were pre-coded. After careful consideration, the need to develop a special database was felt; hence, a computer software program was prepared in CS Pro 3.1. This is a window based program, for the data entry of the survey questionnaires. It took about one month to enter the data.
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Data was then cleaned and its quality was ensured by running frequency tables and checking it for errors and missing values. The errors were repeatedly checked in the filled hard copies of the questionnaire. After cleaning, the data was imported from CS Pro 3.1 into SPSS, a Windows database, for statistical analysis.
During data analysis in SPSS, various variables, with multiple options were dichotomized. Data was analysed as per the selected multivariate analysis scheme planned for this study. The responses were tested accordingly. For this purpose, both univariate and bivariate descriptive statistics (simple frequencies, cross tabulations and summary statistics) for various variables were generated. The statistically analysed data was then copied to MS Excel where, according to the needs of the research, graphs and tables were generated. The qualitative data was analysed through Atlas TI software.
2.7 DATA ANALYSIS APPROACHES: LAYERED APPROACH AND
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
A layered approach to comparative analysis was adopted for data analysis and discussion. In this regard, the actual primary data gathered through survey, interviews and focus group discussions was examined in the light of secondary data (Triangulation). Also the mainstream literature was reviewed accordingly and triangulation was conducted to ensure the reliability and verifiability of data, whereas the primary data was analysed through multivariate analysis.
2.7.1 Layered Approach
In order to ensure the highest quality of foresight, the layering analysis approach is used. The existance of multiple dimensions to social reality, which is operating in society at different level, for these layers approach is important. Through analysis, it can be found that these layers are of various intensity and levels. Here the focus was kept on the level of shallowness and depth as main descriptors instead of falsehood or truth (Galtung and Inayatullah 1997). More recent is the Causal Layered Analysis Theory and Methodology (Galtung and Inayatullah 1997, 97 - 102). For this, the purpose of using layered approach is that different levels of reality were addressed qualitatively, where each level was important for the prediction and foresight.
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2.7.2 Univariate, Bivariate and Multivariate Statistical Analysis As mentioned above, univariate, bivariate and multivariate analysis was undertaken for quantitative primary data. Association among categorical responses was determined through multi-way contingency tables (Azen and Walker 2011). Also, for qualitative data analysis, Atlas TI software was used. This multivariate analysis determines the process and method of how to measure and interpret the association between two and three categorical variables.
2.7.3 Triangulation In this study, various types of triangulation (Miles and Huberman 1994)23 were used according to its purpose of obtaining and then analysing data of both quantitative and qualitative nature through a strategy for combining the data collected from multiple data sources, i.e. secondary data review and primary data methods: survey questionnaire, in-depth interviews and focused group discussions, in order to examine the issue from multi-dimensions and to answer the complex questions related to governance (Karim 2013). The data was then triangulated as per the nature and purpose of the study, by giving quantitative data supported by the qualitative data.
2.8 LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS
The data collection activities generally went smooth with the exception of a few constraints and limitations as discussed below in detail: i). One of the main limitations of this study was the strict cultural and traditional constraints and staunch religious beliefs which hampered interviewing females. The support of local people/friends e.g. school administrator and the administrators of other offices made interaction with the female possible.The female interviewees were selected on voluntarily basis and were mostly consisted of working educated women who could be approached through the support of local assistant. In spite of having this edge, it was still difficult to interview female respondents mainly due to problems like
23 Miles and Huberman (1994) distinguished five kinds of triangulation research: Triangulation by data source (data collected from different persons, or at different times, or from different places); Triangulation by method (observation, interviews, documents, etc.); Triangulation by researcher (comparable to interpreter reliability in quantitative methods); Triangulation by theory (using different theories, for example, to explain results); and Triangulation by data type (e.g., combining quantitative and qualitative data).
82 their mobility, free movement, security and the social taboos to have face to face discussion with them. ii). Another limitation of this study was that although the sample was drawn by Multi- staged simple random sampling technique, it represented only a small proportion of the cluster zone/region and selection of respondents was also limited and was not open to many options as is done in survey in other areas. iii). A third limitation of the study was that the survey included only those areas where the researcher was welcome by the community respondents with local support. Though the researcher covered all those areas which were selected as sample, involving the local people and conducting survey through their support, the chances of bias was difficult to overcome. This bias was evident while collecting the information related to Malaks, Jirga, and political administration etc. iv). Two third of FATA is mountainous uneven land. There are no proper roads. Transportation and accessibility was thus, a big problem. It required hard efforts to visit rural areas to have prior contacts and support of local influential and administrators over there. v). There is a general fear of insecurity because of the presence of outlaws and militants in FATA. There was also fear of kidnapping for ransom and also activities like interviewing people is considered not good in FATA as the people consider it the work of NGOs gathering information for the hidden agenda of Western powers. vi). Majority of the people in FATA live in separate houses and isolated communities called Khels, away from each other having high protective walls around their houses. It was very difficult for the researcher to identify the respondents/households for survey because inside one boundary there happened to be 25 to 40 houses. This was so particularly in Khyber Agency. vii). Handling Malaks and the Mullah in FATA was a hectic problem. Nothing could be done without taking the Malaks and the Mullahs in confidence. During the field survey, it took long time to contact the Malaks for their permission to conduct survey in areas under their control. They had to be convinced by explaining that the survey was just an academic exercise for the fulfilment of an academic objective. viii). Having negative perceptions about NGOs, and its workers, the tribal people consider these surveys as acts of conspiracies against religion and, therefore, survey workers are not only discouraged but are sometime attacked as well.
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2.9 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
Various types of validity that is content, face, construct and criterion were ensured for this study (Dey 1993). The content validity was ensured by sharing the data collection tools with experts and also with educated tribal people, for their comments on it and suggestions to further improve it. The face validity, was ensured by face to face data collection interviews and observing the respondents views regarding the issue. The data collections tools and process was modified further for accuracy and user friendly through accomodating the comments and suggestions shared by the experts and educated respondents. Further, for construct and criterion validity (concurrent and predictive), literature was reviewed to develop the methodology and theoretical framework. Based on methodological and theoretical frameworks, the research instruments were finally designed using constructs of these methods and frameworks.
CONCLUSION This chapter contains details about the methodology and research design adopted for this study. FATA, being an ungoverned area, offers an excellent opportunity to test the validity of the framework developed in chapter-1. The design of this study analysis broadly follows the methods of unstructured interviews, group discussions, and survey questionnaires. Employing a structured (Questionnaire), unstructured (In-depth Interviews) and Focus Group Discussions as data collection techniques and study approach is amenable to theorizing based on the empirical reality observed at the micro level at FATA, while avoiding the pitfalls of over-aggregating observations commonly experienced by macro-level studies especially related to governance, mostly conducted by various international donor Agencies and organizations including banks. The resulting mid-range theory provides a specific set of generalizations which help nuance macro theories and provide more specific guidance to policy makers. The next chapter makes a comparative analysis of the existing socio-economic and development indicators and the legal and administrative setup of FATA.
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CHAPTER – 3
GEOGRAPHY, SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SET UP OF FATA - AN OVERVIEW
INTRODUCTION This chapter presents an overview of social, economic and political aspects of FATA. This provides a base and background for later on assessment by showing the dismal condition of socio-economic and political conditions of FATA as compared to the adjacent Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the rest of Pakistan. The overview also includes relevant discussion on geography. The chapter consists of four sections. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 outline the tribal geography and society respectively. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 discusses the political setup and administration. Section 3.5 discuss the economic setup of FATA and section 3.6 consists of details on the socio-economic and development indicators of the tribal areas.
3.1 GEOGRAPHY Geographers claim that differences in the earth surface, climate, landforms, soils and other physical phenomenon reflect differences in the nature of its people and culture. Also, in a state, the policies depend on its geography (Ostroysky 2007). Albrecht Penck summarised the point thus: “….land and nature are stronger than man” (Ostroysky 2007, 168). The geographical location of FATA (Pakistan) has historically remained prominent. Historically and even currently (after 9/11 event), the pulmonary veins of a political circulatory system of Mackinder’s “Heartland region” (Gregory, Johnston, Pratt, Watts, and Whatmore 2011, 344) pass through these tribal areas.
The existence of the Durand Line is not because of some physical features of its landscape but an ephemeral political phenomenon with a shifting zone of influence and assimilation disregards physical or cultural boundaries was driven by the struggle for space (Matinuddin 1991).
In Pakistan, Paskhtun land mainly consists of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Northwest), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and the Northern Pakhtunkhwa (Southwest).
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MAP- 3.1: Geographical Profile of FATA
Geographical Profile Khar Konar BAJAUR Newly Opened Area Ghanam Shah MOHMAND
Ghlanai Ningrahar Landikotal
Sarawela KURRAM KHYBER FR Peshawar P Chinar Tirah KHYBER HaiderK Toor Toot Kalaya A F G H A N I S T A N Daboori
ORAKZAI Hangu FR Kohat Paktia Thal N W F P
FR Bannu Mir Ali Bannu • FATA comprises 7 Agencies and MiramN WShah A FR Lakki 6 Frontier Regions. Razmak • Area: 27,220 sq-km.
FR Tank • Population: 3.2 million. Tank • Approx. 25% area recently made S W A accessible. Wana
GUL KACH FR DI Khan
FATA comprises of seven Tribal Agencies and six Frontier Regions. The Tribal Agencies are Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. FATA is situated along with Durand Line of Pak-Afghan border. FATA is laying in the east with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and in the south with Balochistan. FATA lies along River Indus and lies in Sulaiman and Hindukush ranges that are generally impassable. Historically, famous passes run through these areas connecting the highlands of Afghanistan with the Sub-continent, on the one hand, and the Central Asian Republics, on the other hand (Galgano and Palka 2012). Historically, the inaccessible terrain made political integration of FATA difficult for empires such as Moghuls and the British India. However, the plain areas were not so invincible, hence they were successfully controlled. Historians consider that FATA has a central role in the region due to its geopolitical centrality (Ahmed 1977).
The whole tribal belt is a combination of twist together difficult mountains crossed by a number of valleys of narrow size but long, and streams of water with various spots of cultivated lands. These include barren mountains of Khyber and Mohmand Agencies and uneven hill series of South Waziristan. The highest range of these
86 series of mountains is the Peak Sikaram, where the Pak-Afghan border is situated about 4755 metres above sea level (Population Census Organisation 2001).
Though there are numerous passes and passages along Pak-Afghan border, the most well-known of these passes and routes include: Gomal and Tochi pass through Waziristan, Paiwar route through Kurram Agency, Kohat route through Parachinar, Gandab route through Mohmand, and Khyber pass through Khyber Agency of FATA, the famous Bolan route which is at the South of Quetta Balochistan (Khan 2000). Historically, these were “corridors of invasion and commerce between the Indus Plains and Central Asia” (Caroe 1958, xxi). There are five rivers running through these areas. These rivers are Gomal, Tochi, Kurram, Kabul and Swat.
Geostratigically, FATA was important for the British India for the reason to concentrate on the control of this region as defence barrier against the Russian threat. The British defence perspective was responsible for the weaponisation of this region. The British policy, therefore, is responsible for the continuation of martial character, and independence. Pakistan as the successor of British India, in this region, continued the British policy of co-opting the friendly tribes to protect the western border. However, the indirect control of Pakistan allowed non-state and outside powers to exert themselves (Trench 1987).
These routes or passages are still being used extensively by Afghans both in the process of repatriation and rehabilitation as well as for commerce and trade purposes. Thus, these tribal areas provide the means of access for overland transport between the sub-continent, Afghanistan and for that matter with Central Asia in future. Its relative importance can hardly be denied in the years to come. The historical process of British Russia confrontation and then Pakistan opposition to Soviet presence in Afghanistan and recently the post-9/11 NATO presence have increased the strategic significance of this region.
3.2 THE TRIBAL SOCIETY
People living in the North West Frontier of Pakistan, including the tribal belt and the settled areas of KP are termed as Pakhtuns (in local Pashto language), Pashtuns, or Pathans (in Urdu, the national language of Pakistan). These Pakhtuns are,
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“…proud to a degree, self-reliant only as their life can make them hard beyond measure and absolutely tireless. Their physical fitness would be incomprehensible if one did not consider the climate and country they live in, which allows no weaklings to survive…Taken as a whole, the frontier tribes are unquestionably among the hardiest men on earth, and so much the more redoubtable foes when war is afoot” (Vincent 1922).
With regard to habitation, there are two types of Pakhtuns. Those who are living in the settled districts of plain valleys (lowlands) and those who are living in hilly areas or uplands. The Highlanders live in the west side of the settled plains areas of Pakistan and the east of the plateau of Afghanistan are called tribal Pakhtuns, also termed as ‘Nang’ society (Ahmed 1977). These dwellers of Nang society similar to “patriarchal society where concepts of modern law and liberty find no place” (Hussain 2000, 163). This Nang society Pakhtuns consist of a number of tribes. Most of these tribes are: Mahsuds in South and Wazirs in North Waziristan Agency; Khattak living in both side of district Kohat east and southeast, in Kurram Agency the Bangash, Masozai and Turis, Orakzais in Orakzai Agency, Afridis, Shilmani, Mulagori and Shinwaris in Khyber Agency, Peshawar and Kohat; Utmankhel, Safi & Mohmands in Mohmand Agency and Yusafzais, Mamond & Sarlzais in Bajaur Agency (Hussain 2000).
FATA society is remarkably tribal in their organisation and social usages. The Pakhtun code of honour also called Pakthunwali, is comprised of several traditions and unwritten laws. The prime maxims of this code of honour include hospitality (Melmastia), retaliation (Badal), and mediation or protection (Nanawati) (Khattak, Mohammad and Lee 2012). Pakhtuns are fierce fighters and love freedom and independent life (Population Census Organisation 2001). In this regard, they defied Greek, Persians, Mughals, Sikhs, Afghans, Turks, and the British, etc. To defend their territory and honour is the code of these tribes.
In the past the various empires claiming to have their authority and control over Frontier Pakhtuns actually had subjugated the plain valleys, the present day settled districts. With regard to hill tribes, these empires have had only limited authority and control, i.e. had control of one or maximum two passes through the mountains, e.g. Khyber Pass. The greater Mughals [1526-1707] made some serious attempts to
88 subjugate these hill tribes but failed. The noncompliant hill tribes even did not allow the passage of outsiders by main routes through mountains. The failure to impose taxation on these hill tribes by an empire, till date, shows their independent living and symbol of freedom. Due to these reasons, the tribal nature of the hill society persisted in the region from where a number of invaders crossed. These include, the great Alexander (356 BC –310/309), the cruel Chengaiz Khan (1162 A.D – 1227 A.D), Ameer Taimur or Tamerlane (1336 A.D - 1405 A.D), and other such famous conquerors in history (Caroe 1958).
The tribal Pakhtun society is based on segmentary lineage organisation.24 Generally, the segmentary lineage system has various characteristics. These are: 1) hierarchy of groupings based on kinship and cultural relatedness, 2) Segments unify at higher and higher levels, up to the level of a tribe, an ethnic group, or a language group, 3) segmentary lineage societies, higher levels of organisation exist only in opposition. That is, members of a lineage undertake concerted action only when they are opposing members of another lineage, 4) this hierarchical organization exists only during conflict otherwise segmentary lineage societies lack institutionalized leadership, 5) Kinship based society, 6) acephalous patrilineal segmentary system (Headless society), with organizational and normative structure, 7) Patrilineal and territorial basis of social organization, 8) egalitarian basis, 9) class division (Barth 1998). This section also includes discussion of the impact of these features on the tribal social organisation.
Today, Pakhtuns are divided into a number of different areas based on politico- administrative structure. Of this division, the majority are of those who are living in settled districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where the common law (both civil and criminal) are applicable. However, some Pakhtuns are living in tribal areas of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), where common Pakistani law is not applicable. While others are living in Malakand division of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and
24 Segmentary lineage theory, proposed by E.E. Evans-Pritchard, is here presented in the case of tribal social organization of FATA. This theory claims that due to state absence in tribal society of FATA, the tribal people must by relying on other structures, persons, groups in their society, during the times of crises or trouble. It is because that in the time of crises the tribes cannot rely or depend on any authority who can defend or ensure their rights and well-being. In the crisis it is often observed that the tribe subdivide into smaller groups on the basis of its genealogical ties. This theory is equally applicable in case of honour in tribal society. Feuds works as unifying force in groups against one another because of the groups concern to preserve their honour.
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Pakhtuns of Zhob Agency in Balochistan, come under the Provincially Administered Tribal Administration called Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). In both these FATA and PATA, tribal customary law is obeyed and have influence.
Based on the idea of segmentary tribal structure and the concept of having a common ancestor, Pakhtuns maintain their ethnic and cultural unity. Lindholm has identified two basic structures of a segmentary society which help in resisting state authority by a tribal society. These are organizational and normative structure of the society (Lindholm 1982).
Broadly, Pakhtun society is divided into two types based on its social organisation. These are nang (honour) and qalang (taxes or rent) society. Further, Ahmad (1977) is of the opinion that in nang society still, the people are stick to their traditions and cultural values and norms. In nang society, there is little space for social stratification and central political authority. These include the current day tribal areas of FATA. Compared to nang society, a qalang area, along with political centralization (mainly in the hands of the aristocracy), the land ownership has resulted in the social stratification of the society. Besides, in overall Pakhtun society, the artisans (Kasabgar), the Mullah, and the Sayyids (Miangaan) remain outside genealogy of Pakhtuns (Ahmed 1977).
With regard to the administrative structure of the areas in which Pakhtuns are living, they have assimilated to a varying degree. The relationship between the government and the tribal population is based on compromises and treaties of no interference by the former in the affairs of the latter. The Pakhtuns persistently resisted the British administration. However, in ‘qalang’ societies, which were plain fertile areas and where the society was agrarian, they voluntarily accepted the British rule while in Nang society of tribal areas, due to lack of economic opportunities, the British extended its limited administration through the use of subsidies and co-optation (Ahmed 1977).
Another factor of state resistance presented by Lindholm in a segmentary society is its normative structure. Traditionally, Pakthunwali maintains social control in a Pakhtun society. These norms include badal (revenge), nanawati (giving protection and defence whosoever asks for), melmastia (hospitality), ghairat (honour and respect) thor (blaming someone), and madad (helping those who are weak). When it comes to
90 practice, Pakthunwali often takes precedence over Islamic law. It is also in contrast with Islamic law in many areas. The sanction behind Pakhtunwali is the Pakhtun culture (social pressure). Any major deviance or violation to this code of life results in social punishment imposed and decided by Jirga (Lindholm 1996).
Following Migdal, the tribal society of FATA is structured on the pattern of a “web- like society”, which is a kind of local constituency having a nature of local organisations. The locally organised society of FATA is always headed by “strongmen” according to Migdal. These strongmen in FATA are clan leaders also called Malaks. A Malak is the main holder of authority in a tribe in this tribal framework of the social organisation (Migdal 1988).
Unity and cohesion in the tribal social system are based on their customs and traditions. In the process of day to day transactions, it tries to resolve the conflicts and bring harmony and order with a built-in social mechanism, e.g. rule of law is mostly dependent on kinship and tribal mythology. Its social structure forms a system with its striking features of inter-clan linking and tribal affinity which unite the tribesmen in the web of their kinship relationship. Meyer Fortes noted that social system “…is the integral result of the inner symmetry of all social transactions of the reciprocity of services, without which no primitive community could exist” (Malinowski 1961, 24 – 26). Lindholm describes the Pakhtun social structure as an “acephalous patrilineal segmentary system” (Lindholm 1982, xxiv). He thinks that traditionally Pakhtun lack the features of following a centralised authority, therefore, they are without a head. Competition among the social segments signifies their social structure. However, when in competition with members of another segment, they can form a transient alliance (Lindholm 1996).
The basic unit of organization in Pakhtun society is the lineage, which is a unilineal descent group i.e. composed of grandfather, father and son. These lineages are commonly known by the suffix word zai, which means “son of”. Going further, at a higher genealogical level this group of lineage unites into a clan, Khel. These decsent groups exist at inclusion level based on region, a village, or further sub-divisions within a village. At the broadest level, all Pakhtuns are member of the four highest descent groups i.e. Karlanri, Gurghusht, Durrani, and Ghilzai.
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Like kinship, the territoriality, in Pakhtun society is also hierarchically organized in subdivision. The territorial distance is linked and based on genealogical distance because close relatives live near each other and conversely (Barth 1959).
The genealogical distance also form the political and economic relations. Normally, in Pakhtuns, lineages are always in competition and opposition to each other but in times of crisis and conflict they may unit to compete and oppose those who are geneoligically and geographically distant. These relationships of hierarchical unity and opposition are beautifully summed up in the following words:
“I against my brother, my brother and me against our [patrilineal] cousin, my brother, my [patrilineal] cousin and me against the enemy (rest of the world)” (Lindholm 1982, xxvii).
With regard to the organizational structure of tribal society, typically a tribe has various subdivisions. At the top, it is a kind of loose confederation which consists of many tribes/Qaoms. Each Qaom consist of several clans called Khels. Below a Khel level, there are extended families, also called Kahols. Beneath the extended family the lowest subdivision, which is the building block of a tribe organisation, is called Koranay, which is an individual or nuclear family. (For details see below figure – 3.1)
Figure – 3.1 Pashtun Tribal Organization
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The Tribal Pakhtun social organisation is also based on patrilineal and territorial structure. In FATA, the family is a social organisation performing a number of purposes, which have greater influences on the socio-economic, educational, political and cultural aspects of its members. Its membership is limited and is often obtained on birth and which makes it a closed system. In these tribal areas, the joint family system still exists (Khan and Samina 2011). Authority of elders (based on old age) is acknowledged and respected by family members and the eldest one, being head of the family, represents his family both in internal and in external affairs of the family. Strictly following family traditions and their elders, the Pakhtuns always remain proud of their ancestors (Shaheen 2013, Bartlotti, Tair and Khattak 2009).
As stated above, a family is the building block of a larger tribal social organization which further gives a hierarchy to various layers of Pakhtun social organization. A family may either stand localized in a specific village or may also remain dispersed across many areas. This gives a Pakhtun group close connection making them a social and cultural entity. The basis of this relationship is blood relation. The fear of feud and faction always keep Pakhtuns in the form of extended families, thus binding them to have ties with each other at family, Khel and overall tribe level for their social and economic security. Besides, inter-clan marriages also preserve these inter- clan or inter-tribe ties. This inter-tribe affiliation strengthens the tribal social bonds. That is clan members are united in times of crises or conflict. Also the members of the clan get together on the occasions of happiness or hardship (Crothers 2013). Besides, the kinship system in tribal areas is having its own rules of succession, marriage and for other such relationships. (Crothers 2013). The factors that give solidarity and stability to the tribal Pakhtun social structure is their lineage and its connection with its larger tribe. At individual level the primary duty of a tribesman is to his own sub-tribe, include his obedience to the living, duties of respect to those who have died and also to the members of his family which are not yet born (Radcliffe 2010). However, among various tribes it is not always necessary that patrilineal or blood relationship is the only basis for a tribal formation. There are groups and sub-groups who, apparently don’t have any such blood relations but are closely amalgamated in the broader configuration of a tribe. One such example is that of Bangash and Turi
93 tribes in Kurram, who comprised different Pakhtun or even Non-Pakhtun groups without having any previous blood relationships. The tribal society is egalitarian and tribal people are therefore equal by birth. Leadership in this setup does not confer privileges and is ascribed on the basis of mediation skills as shown in settling feuds in Tribal Jirga. Popularity and respect of a leader is based on his conducting of successful mediations, especially when tribal leadership engages with the state. The decisions are not forced on the tribal society, they voluntarily accept them (Ahmed 1980).
The tribal ecology is responsible for egalitarian values in the society. There is scarcity of resources due to lack of arable land. Therefore, ownership of natural resources is collective and makes the economy subsistence based. Subsidies from the state play an important role in maintaining a balance between the imposition of authority and egalitarian structure in society (Lindholm 1980).
FATA society though egalitarian is not immune to the pressure of social stratification. The socio-economic and political forces are responsible for division of tribal society into classes with elite or non-elite status. The elite class comprises of aristocrats, business groups and educated intelligentsia while the non-elite comprises of common people. In elite class, prestige oriented aristocrats include traditional nobility such as Star (big) Malaks, land owners and influential Peers. The status conscious and politically motivated businesses class includes big merchants, wholesalers, contractors, transporters, smugglers and drug dealers. This class uses their economic position for further socio-economic and political gains. They normally support status quo in FATA. The educated intelligentsia include doctors, engineers, bureaucrats and technocrats who are not happy with status quo and want reforms in the existing administrative setup. The non-elite include the majority of tribal people who are oppressed by the local elite and administration. This vulnerable group does not maintain a direct contact with the political administration. While the elite reap the benefits of economic and political opportunities, the non-elite bear its burden in the form of collective punishments and taxes.
As compared to the rest of Pakistan, FATA lacks other social organizations such as political parties, pressure groups, trade unions, religious denominations, fraternal orders, schools and professional societies, typical of urban and industrial setting.
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Though the secondary organizations have their own significance, the patrilineal and territorial organizations still have profound social, political and administrative influence on the individual tribal people when they engage in internal/external affairs. In tribal setup, the organizational patterns do not reciprocal influence to the people when they deal with state as the state can influence them but they cannot change the negative official policy. In FATA the primary organisation links people with the state instead of the normal secondary organisation such political parties etc. The constructive democratic dialogue between the local tribal people and government, therefore, does exist. The state machinery is also not accountable to local people as secondary organisations do not exist. The expected functions of the state are therefore performed by the primary social organisations (World Bank 2012). Primary organisations such as family and tribe have to perform the functions ascribed to the secondary organisation.
3.3. POLITICS: PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION This section outlines the reasons and history of lack of political development in FATA. Various reasons have been mentioned by academicians and analysts for the lack of political organisation and political development in tribal areas (FATA). Firstly, the British occupation in 1848 of these Pakhtun lands and their administrative division of this land into different segments of ‘Lar Bar’ (upper and lower), played a vital role in the political insularity of these areas (Barth 1959, 30 – 50). Furthermore, these tribal areas were left over at the mercy of events and thus these areas failed to establish any political relationship and linkages with rest of the Pakhtun areas and their politics. Even the indigenous Pakhtun political movements, for instance, the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement, was also restrained by the British Government and then by Pakistani regimes to spread through these tribal areas. These discriminatory policies completely stopped the political transformation of tribal areas as compared to the rest of Pakistan. That’s why formally there is no encouragement from the official circle for party based politics in FATA. This has further isolated the tribal people from the mainstream governance system of the country. Besides, the British through their tactical diplomatic policies made the tribal chieftains and elders to believe that Russians were about to occupy them.
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Simultaneously, the British government extended its support to these tribal elders; they bribed them and thus made them corrupt. This trick of co-optation combined with the British policy of ‘divide and rule’ had worked excellently. The luring of tribal chieftains and elders to join them served dual advantage on the part of the British. Through these tactics, the British were able to achieve their great design to contain the Russian expansion southwards, on the one hand, and to break the united might of the Pakhtun nation on the other (Wadley 2014, 217). Besides, the British through the imposition of a political system in the responsibility of few of tribal leaders, devised an administrative control system in the form of Political Agent. This system of control administration provided not a single chance and stopped the tribesmen to evolve a system of their own. Even after independence, the rulers of Pakistan failed to create and design a changed system of administration and polity for the tribal people. Still, that old out-dated British installed administration is operative in FATA which does not fulfil the present day requirements of the tribal people. Though this system served well the alien rulers, it is unsuitable to achieve the objectives of free and independent people of the current day FATA.
Along with already discussed acrimonious facts, the division of tribal areas into various administrative divisions (Agencies and Frontier Regions) has further worsened the sense of Pakhtun unity. Today, all seven Agencies and Frontier Regions of FATA are suffering from inward looking, with complete indifference to each other. They don’t share a common platform where from they can raise a united, forceful voice for a collective cause.
The Simon Commission, in 1929, was sent by the British government to the sub- continent, to devise means of bringing India forward on the path of self- government (Trench 1987). The Commission recommended autonomy for other provinces but for the Pakhtun areas (which constitutes present day Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and tribal areas), they decided that Pakhtuns were neither capable of democratic self-government nor interested in it (Trench 1987). Like the British government, the Pakistani government also kept the tribal people deprived of political rights and representation. Till 1997, the Pakistani government did not extend the right to vote to tribal people, their right of conscience to elect their representatives for the highest national institutions to represent them (Haq, Khan
96 and Nuri 2005). Even after the grant of universal adult franchise to the tribal people, their representatives in the national legislature cannot legislate for them. Even after independence, subject to many-folded socio-economic and political discrimination, the people of FATA have been denied their constitutional rights and privileges. Along with others, on the top is the constitutional discrimination against tribal people. The 1973 Constitution guarantees basic ‘human rights’ as enshrined in the chapter on ‘Fundamental Rights’ (Articles 8 - 28) with their justiciability and enforcement through the superior courts. The Islamic principles have also been adopted and of late, through Article 2-A, the “Objectives Resolution” has been inserted in the constitution as substantive part and, thus, made enforceable through the courts. But the makers of the constitution have excluded FATA and its people from the domain of these rights and the normal civil laws. As a result, the tribal people are deprived of these fundamental human rights, privileges, statuses, given by the constitution to the citizens of Pakistan, are denied to the tribal people. Even the Pakistani law denies access to the formal justice system of the country. Besides, the tribal people also are not given representation at the local and provincial level (International Crisis Group 2006).
A review of the history of political representation in Pakistan would reveal that it was only in Ayub Khan Era that the system of basic democracy was introduced in Tribal Areas. But with the dissolution of One Unit, the basic democracy system was replaced with a parliamentary democracy based on the principle of adult franchise (Yusuf 1980). Other than Ayub’s system of basic democracy, though the successive governments of Pakistan have promulgated local government systems from time to time, no practical steps have been taken to implement local government system in the real sense in FATA. Today, the total number of registered voters, as per electoral list for 2013 general elections, is 1.751 million, who elect twelve (12) MNAs. But these twelve legislators from FATA cannot legislate for the tribal areas (Yusuf 1980).
The non-representation of FATA people in the adjacent province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is yet another major issue of deprivation. The 1956 Constitution provided for such representation and during the One Unit days (Sept. 1955 – July 1970), FATA was given representation in the erstwhile West Pakistan Assembly, but they were deprived of the right in Provincial Assembly (NWFP) after the dissolution of one unit (Yusuf 1980). Since then, the tribal areas are independent
97 of the provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, but for all practical purposes, they have inseparable administrative links and contacts with the provincial administration. Most of the personnel attached to different nation building departments in the tribal areas are under the control of the provincial administration. The Home and Tribal Affairs Department is under the direct control of the chief secretary, though for tribal affairs he is directly attached to the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
3.4. ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE This section outlines the main pillars of FATA administrative governance i.e. i). Political Administration i.e. office of Political Agent and his sub-officials; ii). Malaki System; and, iii). The Lego-judicial system i.e. Jirga and FCR.
The administrative governance system of FATA is comprised formal, informal and quasi-formal institutions. The formal institutions include the Political Agents, his sub-officials and the FCR. Quasi-formal includes Malaki system, whereas the informal includes Jirga (For details see Chapter 4). The tribal people are governed by a pattern of relationship and behaviour which is developed as a result of its socio- economic and geopolitical conditions. This system is continuously changing.
3.4.1 The Political Administration – Political Agent and Sub-Officials The tribal administration in the present shape was devised by the British government and is different from the settled areas. The historically tribal administration is of complex nature (White 2008). The people of FATA have traditionally enjoyed autonomy, making it hard for empires to control them (For details see Chapter – 4). The British could not peacefully and smoothly govern the tribal areas. The only mean left with them was to exercise their control and extract revenues through violence. Various conciliatory methods25 were adopted by the British to promote friendly relations with the tribesmen in order to ensure security against the frequent tribal raids.
After independence, the newborn state of Pakistan maintained the same colonial
25 These conciliatory method applied by the British were: i). Freedom of Trade, ii). The abolition of Tax and duties, iii). Increase in the Pavindah trade, iv). Establishment of steam communication and construction of roads, v). Establishment of hospitals and dispensaries at various places along frontier with the provision of free medical treatment, vi). Encouragement of Tribal Malaks and Jirga’s entrance in the British Territories for dispute resolution, and vii). An open policy of recruitment of local people in British Army and Police services.
98 legacy, ruthless strategies and callous tactics. It was believed by the British government and then by the Pakistani government that until the tribesmen acquire a minimum level of skills and knowledge necessary for administering their own affairs, they should be kept away from the path of political settlement and theright to rule themselves. The nature of the office of Political Agent allows corruption pervading all levels of hierarchy, which hinders the development and participation of people in it. The Political Agent is not accountable to local people and his office lacks the principle of separation of power. Local tribal institutions could not develop overtime due to the authoritarian rule of the Political Agent. The Malaki system and Jirga system, once noble heritage of tribal people, have weakened due to the undue interference of Political Agent. The Malaki system, once bridging local people and the state, has lost legitimacy in the eyes of tribal people as they conceive Malaks as the puppets of Political Administration. This system was designed to serve the purpose of colonial rule, therefore, it is not suited to present day. Ideally, the public servants have to remain politically neutral but FCR empowers Political Agent to become partial, even he is unaccountable to the elected representatives of FATA (MNAs).
3.4.2 The Malaki System Initially, the title of Malak was used by rulers for Pakhtun warriors in a way of showing respect, however, later on in 1890, the British assigned them political role by allowing them subsidiaries (Spain 1963). A Malak as an intermediary between local people and government also helps in the settlement of disputes among tribesmen and to represent them while dealing with the state. The Malak is also required to ensure the security of his assigned area through levies and help in the maintenance of law and order. The allowances given to Malaks are for the whole tribe instead of individually to Malak in order to deal with the tribe as a whole in case of offences. The Malak’s leadership skills determine his sphere of influence and effectiveness in performing his assigned role. This system is hereditary and remains in the same family. The Malaki system, along with the FCR, makes the core of political and administrative setup. The Malak remains the primary beneficiary of all developmental funds. Being non-elected representative, the Malak becomes dependent on the office of Political Agent (Trench 1987).
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3.4.3 The Jirga System Jirga, by nature, is an informal organization and successfully influence the tribal society. Pakhtun Jirga System in FATA follows democratic ethos that ensure the say of all tribal people in their affairs (Quddus 1987). Jirga follows customary law and has a customary judicial status. It settles disputes between individuals as well as tribes. Jirga plays a pivotal role in the restoration of peace. A meeting of Jirga allows equal status to all participants, and equal right to express themselves, although elderly are given preference. It does not discriminate on the basis of power, wealth and social status. Jirga plays political role as well when it mediates between locals and the state (Caroe 1958). As an organisation, Jirga has great potential but these are undermined by the novice members. Local people trust Jirga system as it ensures timely and affordable justice as compared to the formal judiciary. Jirga system is also attributed to the low crime rate, peace and order in tribal society. The customary law which is part of local culture and familiar to tribal people, makes the Jirga system efficient.
3.4.4 The Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) The Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) was introduced in 1901. It functions as a formal organisation in political administration. The British introduced FCR to maintain law and order so the area may be administered efficiently. The British India annexed the North-West Frontier Province in 1848 (Tripodi 2011). As the law operating in the settled areas was considered unsuitable for this area to reduce crimes, so the Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1871 was promulgated in NWFP. This authorised the Deputy Commissioner to enforce collective responsibility through the Council of Elders in case of a criminal offence (Tripodi 2011). In 1887, The Punjab Frontier Crimes Regulation was introduced, making the Council of Elders more powerful in order to deal with the rising crime rate. When these regulations failed to curb crimes, in 1901, a revised FCR was introduced which increased the judicial and executive powers of the administrator and the Council of Elders.
This system does not to provide for judicial review and combines the executive and judicial powers in one person. It is based on the customary law without due process, therefore, it is an underdeveloped legal system (Caroe 1958).26 It is based on
26 In the context of FATA, when the party is a tribal person, then these Regulations are applied as a complete substitute code. In these tribal territories adjudication is rather mainly on customs instead of
100 retributive justice and is, therefore, unsuitable to modern standards in civilised (such as lacking Habeas Corpus) world. This law lacks accountability of the administrator. It contravenes the spirit of justice in Islam and tribal traditions. It contravenes basic human rights (Caroe 1958). The essence of collective responsibility, which is in FCR often punishes the innocent along with the guilty.
3.5. THE ECONOMIC SET UP A comparative analysis of the economic indicators of FATA with the rest of Pakistan indicates that the former lags behind in economic development (Table - 3.1). Table 3.1: Economic Indicators of FATA Socio-Economic Indicators Pakistan NWFP FATA The geographical area in Sq. Km 796096 74521 27220 % Annual population growth 1981-1998 2.6 2.8 2.2 Average household size 6.6 8.0 9.3 Proportion of urban population 32.5 16.9 2.7 Population density per Sq. Km 166 238 117
Road density per Sq of area 0.32 0.14 0.17
Irrigated area as % of cultivated area 82.0 54.0 43.6
Persons per irrigated hectare 9 24 36
Cultivated as % of reported area 37.21 29.80 7.35
Production of Maize in (000) tones 1897 781 6.8
Production of Wheat (000) tones 19500 949 96
Production of Sugarcane (000) tones 53419 4763 53
Source: FATA Development Statistics 2005
Though the economy is pastoral, agriculture is practised in the fertile valleys of FATA. The physical and economic poverty is apparent from the lack of service infrastructure - the insufficient source of income and environmental impact. There is no tangible source of information to determine per capita income of the area. The only figures available were in the Statistical Abstract (2000-2001) of all regions in the Tribal Areas. As per earlier description of topography of the area, livelihood means for the tribal are very limited. Agriculture is at a subsistence level, almost nil in the mountains. Since the land owned is shared by the extended families, it hardly fulfils their basic food requirements.
on procedure enforcing the sanctions of the state. Thus in the criminal case penalties would ordinarily not exceed those imposed by custom, unless the crime had outraged both custom and the authority of the government.
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The tribal economic system is comprised of both the tangible components like various public and private institutions, including households and government concerns; and the intangible constituents, such as laws, regulations, customs and traditions, mores and norms and their mutual relationships to each. Further, the nature of the tribal economy and its development can be assessed from its historical development starting from self-contained state of the economy to full-swing market economy. Due to new developments in the cultural, material and technology bases, has brought changes in the tribal economy. Occupation and Livelihood: Due to low literacy, majority of the tribal people are engaged in primary activities such as agriculture, livestock, local business etc. while some people have proceeded to other parts of the country and also abroad in search of better earnings. Some of the FATA people particularly Wazirs and Mahsud have purchased landed properties in and around Bannu and D.I. Khan for practising farming, while others have purchased urban property where they are involved in business in major cities of Pakistan and abroad. Cross-border trade is also undertaken by some of them not only in the tribal belt but also to supply goods to the down country markets. Those who are well-off, practice trade not only in Pakistan but also abroad. A significant number are government employees in local forces and other sectors. The highly qualified are settled in the nearby settled areas particularly in Peshawar, Bannu, and D.I. Khan. They and their younger generation are not willing to go back to the tribal area leading to acute shortage of doctors, teachers and other skilled personnel particularly females. The women folk take an active part in the agricultural work, collection of fuel wood and fetching water apart from doing the household work and serving the males. During the British government, the people of selected areas within FATA received some social and economic benefits. On the one hand, they (the British) ensured the maintenance of peace and order and, on the other, connected different tribal areas/Agencies with the adjacent settled districts through metaled roads. Few health facilities/hospitals and schools were constructed and other developmental works were undertaken. Special emphasis was placed to the agricultural sector. In this regard, large areas were brought under cultivation. Though, the main bazaars’ of these tribal areas remained local markets for ages to which the people of the neighbouring hill tribes resorted to supplement their scanty produce, the people of tribal areas displayed little enterprise in marketing their produce in the down settled districts and
102 never attempted to find an outside market for their crops other than their local market itself. Inspite of having a linking road, though a kacha (unpaved or not shingled) one, the tribesmen established no system of cart conveyance. During the British time, the only additional source of income in almost all the tribal areas remained the service sector, mainly ‘the Militia or Scouts’. Whereas, along with this ‘Levies and Khassadar Force’ was also a source of employment available to a young and healthy tribesman.
Agriculture: As discussed above, with a change in the mode of production i.e. from pastoral to agricultural life, the land became the most precious and important form of property in the whole of tribal belt. It became a major source of contentions between family versus family, clan to clan and tribe versus tribe.27 Total cultivable land in FATA is about 7.35% of the total tribal area. There are hilly terrain, hard soil and deserts which also produce crops in unfavourable seasons. The cultivable land in FATA is 200,000 hectares but only less than half i.e. 82,000 hectares is under irrigation, while the rest is rainfed. In addition, 180,000 hectares, categorised as cultivable waste. In some areas of FATA, agriculture is the main occupation of tribesmen by extensively cultivating the land in some plain, riverbeds or mountainous areas. Though, two crops i.e. wheat and maize are cultivated, due to lack of irrigation and other facilities, alternative crops like mustard, paddy, barley, fruit orchards and even poppies are also cultivated. Due to the lack of modern agricultural machinery, conventional methods of agriculture are used in majority of the tribal areas. Livestock: Due to the subsistence agriculture and limited means of livelihood, the majority of tribal people, as an alternative livelihood source, have livestock as assets for their daily needs. Livestock goes hand in hand with agriculture as a source of food and livelihood is the livestock. Among the agriculture-based communities, cattle are more in number whereas communities living in Barani Areas find sheep and goat
27 In Pakhtun society, land is something more than a piece of earth only used for cultivation. Land is the basic unit and foundation of a Pakhtun family. In Pakhtun society, without the land a family cannot be settled and is therefore not called a family if the family has not its own home and Hujra. The family without a land has no sense of security. In this regard, the people and the land are the two important components of the tribal society. Land is the most worthy and precious possession in the whole tribal society. It is not only a ' source of livelihood but also a source of social prestige and strength. Though, most of the tribal areas in tribal belt have always been an entirely agricultural territory, yet there are tracts and plains which are fertile and produce a reasonable volume of agricultural produce but not necessarily sufficient for their own consumption.
103 more manageable. Livestock management is the sole responsibility of womenfolk in addition to other household responsibilities and a fair share of contribution to agricultural activities. Cattle breeding supplements it. Some tribal Agencies are famous for sheep breeding. Women are mainly dependent on livestock and poultry for food and to barter for small personal necessities. The women in houses in the rural areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA keep livestock and poultry to cater their daily needs. The eggs and chickens are sold in the local market or in their home streets to local vendors. The livestock also caters the needs of milk which is used in preparing tea. Livestock is also a kind of small business for females. Their milk is sold along with Desi Ghee (natural ghee obtained from milk). Livestock is an important part of the tribesmen agrarian life. These flock mainly include oxen, mules, donkeys, goats, sheep and cattle etc. Where mules and donkeys were mostly used to bring firewood, timber from their forests and thus remained a major facilitating source of their economic life. Fruits and Vegetables: In few areas of FATA, fruits are grown in abundance and vegetables also. In this regard, Kurram Agency is famous for its sweet and delicious golden apples, highly prized and high-quality orange (Malta) in Malakand and high- quality Chalghozas (plums and pine kernels) of North and South Waziristan are known. In other fertile valleys of FATA including Kurram and Tirah, various fruits of pears, peaches, apricots, walnut trees and pomegranates are grown. Forestry: FATA is rich in forest, having abundance in Timber: pine, Ilex, deodar and especially the blue edible pines are grown on mountains of various areas with above 6,000 feet altitude (GoP 2006). In various areas of FATA, the hills are covered with thick forest having trees of sloe gurgura, wild bushes (e.g. mazari, of which baskets, bed rope, bedsteads, chaplis, and mats are made) and olive trees (GoP 2006). Market and Trade: FATA is mainly rural in nature. Very few markets and bazaars are there. These include: Wana, Parachinar, Hangu, Bara, Landi Kotal, Jamrud (Karkhano), Ghalanai, Khar and Inayat Kalay bazar. All these markets are known for their invaluable imported goods of all kinds, available on cheap rates. The daily sale in these markets, which is the main source of income of the tribe, cannot be estimated. These markets are purely run on the smuggled goods from the trans-border areas of Afghanistan. Among all these, Barra market is a name synonymous with imported goods, where the market is flooded with cloth, electronic goods, textile, silver and
104 woollen products, watches, radios and televisions sets, crockery, cutlery, and all sorts of cosmetics are the main items of these markets. These markets present a fine example of laissez-faire principle of non-intervention of government in the economic affairs of FATA (International Crisis Group 2014). Industry: FATA has a reasonable presence of small enterprises in clusters that include dimensional stone, textile and gunsmiths. Additionally, there are scattered units of ghee manufacturing and others. The official number of Industrial Units operating in FATA is 1082 in private sector. Out of this 200 are in Darra Adam Khel (FR Peshawar), 120 operating in Bajaur, 130 operating in Mohmand, 207 Units in Khyber, 24 in Orakzai, 31 in North and 16 in South Waziristan, 237 in FR Kohat, and 89 operating in other FRs. Processing of stones units (marble industries) are located at Samanat, Michini, Ghundi, Jamrud and Molagori. Besides, around 300 small textile weaving units are working in Khyber and Bajaur. These are mostly small-scale operations and have limited capacity to expand. There is some expertise in the region in fabricating firearms, yet the production of firearms is not regulated and its export to the settled areas is illegal. There is a thriving trade in Dara Adam Khel which is known for the production of firearms, original and copies of original one, of both local and exported quality. In Khyber, there are about 200 light engineering units. Mostly, the arms factories are located at Kaniguram (S. Waziristan Agency), Illam Gudar (Khyber Agency), and Nawagai (Bajaur Agency). Mines and Minerals: FATA, being a mountainous region has a different types of minerals. These mines vary from granite, marble to other such related metallic minerals which include gold, etc. Mining activity is heavily dependent on labour for extraction and as such extraction of minerals has the potential to become an immediate way forward for economic development and provision of employment in the region. Although the figures given by the Directorates have a large variation, yet they are still indicative of the potential of mining as a major employer and economic engine for the area. These mineral resources include marbles and granite present in abundance in Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur, Orakzai, Kurram and Waziristan. The production of marble and granite in the area shows an incremental increase over the last 5 years (2001 – 2005), and this industry has employed about 2000 people (GoP 2006).
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Still unidentified and exploited, several geological findings have confirmed the presence of a large number of precious gems and semi-precious stones. These include emerald & tourmaline, which have been indicated in Bajaur Agency whereas the presence of garnet and quartz are confirmed in Bajaur and South Waziristan Agencies. With regard to copper, the North Waziristan Agency has an estimated 35 million tonnes reserve, with 8 million tonnes having content of 0.8% of copper. There is an abundance of the high quality of coal deposits in FATA. Of these deposits, the most prominent are coal deposits of FR Kohat (Dara Adam Khel), Kurram, Orakzai, and North Waziristan Agencies. A metamorphic rock, which is found rich in having both magnesium and iron called Soapstone, is found in huge deposits in FATA. This is mined at Ghandhao of Mohamad Agency presently and is exported to Europe (FATA Sustainable Development Plan 2006 - 2015). Informal and Black Economy: Due to rugged topography and uneven barren land, having no other proper alternative means of livelihood available to people in FATA, and the geostrategic position and proximity of the area with Afghanistan, especially the transit trade with Afghanistan facilitate cross-border business or smuggling. There is no banking system in FATA. The tribal informal economy consists of contraband items, smuggling of opium, and weapon trade.
The business in contraband items is done by tribal people on both sides of Pak- Afghan border, both sides are partners and facilitating each other in this cross-border smuggling. For further extending these items to other parts of the country (Pakistan), the local smugglers use small children, women and disabled persons to avoid custom officials. These band foreign goods are carried through various means to major markets of the country like Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Islamabad etc. (GoP 2006). The other major aspect of this informal economy is the drugs trade. Till 1980, there was no drug addiction nor opium or poppy cultivation in this region especially in tribal areas of FATA. In the wake of Soviet War, with the encouragement of the US help, the Mujahideen groups, mostly relied on poppy cultivation to support their activities and movement against the Soviet Union. This also led the tribal areas (FATA) to produce around 70% of the high-grade heroin, with the supervision of
106 around 40 international drug cartels (Haq 1991). As calculated, by the year 1987 - 88, this illegal drugs trade was earning more foreign exchange than all legal trade of Pakistan, which was $4billion a year. In this regard, in 1988 the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province had 100-200 heroin factories. The number of drug addicts was estimated from 124,000 to 450,000 people during 1982 to 1987, with 3.5 million people today in Pakistan (Haq 1991). To sum up, the new inventions and developments have also changed the economic setup of tribal areas. The traditional methods and use of the mule and donkey for carriage and plough driven by the oxen has now been replaced by the tractor (Anderson 1978). The isolated and insulated tribal areas are now well connected with the rest of Pakistan, although, exceptions are there. But one will find linking the remote villages well with the external markets through the paved roads and telecommunication network. With the passage of time, the gains of scientific innovations, technological advancement and the spread of modern methods in agricultural are also shared by the tribesmen (Anderson 1978). The introduction of tractors, pesticides, insecticides and fertilisers have proportionally increased the volume of agriculture produce. Although, the per capita income is still very low in FATA compared to the rest of Pakistan population, estimated as one-third of the rest of the country (Asian Development Bank 2003).
3.6. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS AND ISSUES This section assesses various development indicators and social services available and issues related to tribal society. In the context of FATA it includes: 1) population, 2) healthcare delivery system, 3) education, 4) electricity, 5) communication facilities, 6) poverty, 7) availability of water, 8) security, 9) lack of trust towards development, 10) role of women and 11) role of religion.
Development in tribal areas significantly lags behind the adjacent province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Pakistan. The lagging development in FATA can be attributed to the exogenous and endogenous factors. The endogenous factors are the limited presence of infrastructure, roads, communication and transportation, limited allocation of development funds; low local society participation, due to local administration control, in development activities, control of Malaks on development projects, corruption and local administration and Malaks mutual share and
107 correspondence in the development fund (Asian Development Bank 2003). While the exogenous factors are area remoteness due to rugged topography, difficult terrain and rough and tough ecology i.e. only one-sixth (1/6) of FATA comprises plains, the remainder is mountainous and predominantly barren (Asian Development Bank 2003).
Besides harsh topography and difficult mountainous terrain, the area was kept as a buffer zone with Afghanistan, first by the British and then by the Pakistani state for more than six decades, coupled with this, the war and unsettled conditions on a continuing basis across the border in Afghanistan during the last more than thirty- eight years (Rubin 2013).
As mentioned, the population of FATA is around three million. The overall population density in FATA is 117 persons per square. While at individual Agency and FR level, in FR D.I. Khan, the population density is 19 persons, while for Bajaur Agency this figure is 461 persons per square kilometre (Population Census Organization 1998). Compared to the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa and Pakistan, the annual population average growth for FATA is slightly lower than the provincial average of 2.8 percent and the national average of 2.7 percent. Compared to Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa, where it is 8 persons, and the rest of the country where it is 6.8 persons, the average household is 9.3 persons for FATA. In the gender ratio is 108 males for every 100 females. According to 1998 census, a total of 126,577 persons, most of whom are likely to be men, are recorded as migrants from FATA in other parts of Pakistan. (For details see, Table 3.2 Annexure – D)
According to the 1998 Census, the percentage of 5 & more rooms per housing unit is having more (20.56) in FATA as compared to Pakistan (6.92) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (8.67), that is FATA is having less number of persons per room (2.91 persons) as compared to the rest of Pakistan (3.13 persons) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (3.34 persons) per room. The percentage of Pucca housing units is less (36.73 percent) in FATA as compared with Pakistan (54.64 percent) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (56.15 percent). Majority of the people in FATA are living in rural areas that is why FATA has the highest (90.08 percent) percentage of owned housing units as compared to Pakistan (81.19 percent) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (80.61
108 percent). Due to tribal custom to disclose information about females, the probability is that the census in FATA is likely to have been partial.
In Pakistan and including FATA a mixed type of public and private healthcare delivery system is operating, which is consisted of different layers of service provision at different levels (Kansi 2003). At the Union Council level, there is Basic Health Unit (BHU) and Sub-Health Centre (SHC), then at a higher level from Union Council is Rural Health Centre (RHC), Mother and Child Health (MCH) Centres and dispensaries. Then at the Tehsil level, there is Tehsil Headquarter Hospital (THQ) and at the district level, District Headquarters Hospital (DHQ). Above these, there are tertiary and teaching hospitals. The preventive care services are also provided by the public sector through vertical programs (EPI, TB control program, national programme for family planning and primary health care, aids control programme, the malaria control programme etc.) (Ministry of Health, GoP 2003).
The overall health situation in Pakistan and specifically in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA is poor particularly for rural areas. Health services and infrastructure is mostly non-existent and sometimes insufficient. Rural areas suffer the most due to the absence of medical care facilities for them and the lack of awareness on health issues. Mostly, government health infrastructure is not adequately equipped to serve the population. In FATA, the health coverage suffers from considerable deficiencies. These include lack of sufficient human and financial resources, inaccessibility, unhealthy environment, and ignorance about healthcare. Comparing the health indicators of FATA with rest of the country, due to lack of proper health system in FATA, it is evident that any such data is not available for FATA. Only data on population, population growth is available, while no data on life expectancy, infant mortality and children and maternal mortality are available in FATA.
A comparative study of health institutions and facilities in Pakistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA reveals that FATA lacks health facilities as compared to the rest of Pakistan and adjoining Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It is due to this lack of health facilities that FATA has a high incidence of health issues: high maternal and infant mortality rate, the burden of disease, high incidence/rate of various diseases, which needs to be explored.A comparison of health facilities in Federally Administered
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Tribal Areas with rest of the country (Pakistan) shows that there is a lack of health facilities in FATA. Besides, there is also a lack of medical staff especially specialist and surgeon posts are lying vacant. (For details, see Table - 3.3 and Table – 3.4 Annexure – D). An overall ninety (90) percent of the doctors graduated from different medical colleges/universities in Pakistan prefer to work in urban areas rather than going to remote corners devoid of modern amenities (FATA Statistics Government of Pakistan 2002). The population per bed in the hospital is several times more than Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the rest of the Pakistan. Similarly, the population per hospital is more in FATA, as compared to the rest of the country. (For details, see Figure – 3.2 Annexure – D)
Health system, in general, is inadequate in Pakistan, more so in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA. The situation of rural infrastructure that includes Rural Health Centres, Basic Health Units, and dispensaries are even worse. In FATA, as shown above, not only are these facilities insufficient in number but are also made redundant due to all deficiencies and depilated conditions of the buildings. Those functional are not working into full capacity, as there is inadequate budget allocation. Many health facilities (health, education and others etc.) remain dysfunctional because of inadequate staffing and lack of essential supplies.
The overall literacy ratio in Pakistan for both sexes is 45 percent while for male this ratio is 65 percent and for female the ratio is 37 percent. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the overall literacy rate is 37.3 percent for both sexes, while for males this ratio is 52.8 percent and among female 21.2 percent. In FATA the overall literacy ratio is 17.42 percent, while for male this ratio is 29.5 percent and among female the ratio is only 3 percent. The table reflects that FATA has a poor literacy ratio as compared to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Pakistan. A comparative assessment of Agencies in FATA shows that that Khyber Agency has the highest literacy ratio compared to all Agencies but the female literacy ratio in Khyber Agency is very low, which is 0.67 percent, while Bajaur Agency has 1 percent female literacy ratio, which is the highest among all seven Agencies. While in F.R D.I.Khan, the female literacy ratio is very high, this is 3.48 percent as compared to the rest of FATA. (For details, see Table - 3.5 Annexure – D)
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A comparative analysis of school participation ratio at different levels in Pakistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA shows that the dropout rate is high in FATA as compared to the rest of Pakistan. Looking at the table, it is clear that the school participation rate is high for females at primary level, but this ratio comes down while looking at the middle and high level. (For details, see Table - 3.6 Annexure – D). Many causes can be attributed to this drop out in FATA. In male institutions, the high dropout rate at different schooling levels can be due to the child labour because of prevailing poverty in FATA. The parents in poor family prefer to send their children to places of work instead of school to earn the daily food. Looking at the table 3.6, it is clear that the participation rate is high at primary because at very early age the child being unable of earning/ labour and yet being too young, he is not asked/ compelled by his family to work. But at a later age that is after primary the poor family considers him able to work and earn. Beside this genuine cause, there are some other causes for high dropout rates in FATA (Khwendo Kor 2005).
For both male and female, FATA has a small number of education institutions as compared to Pakistan. The total number of primary schools in Pakistan is 162500 while in FATA this number is 3276, which means that FATA has 2.03% share of the total primary schools in Pakistan. Out of the total primary schools in Pakistan, those for males are 104900 and in FATA the total male primary schools are 2120, which makes 2.02% share of Pakistan. While the total primary schools in Pakistan for females are 57600 and in FATA this number is 1156, which comprises 2.01%, share of Pakistan total primary female schools. Similarly, FATA has 0.94% share of the total middle schools of Pakistan, in which 1.41% share is of Male middle schools while 0.22% is of female middle schools (Finance Division, Government of Pakistan 2001-2). Similarly, FATA has 0.84% share of total Pakistan high schools. For male high schools, FATA has 1.26% share and for female high schools share is 0.17% of the total high schools in Pakistan. Regarding Inter and Degree Colleges, FATA shares 0.38% of the total number in Pakistan. FATA has 0.69% share of male colleges of the total number in Pakistan. The data about female colleges, share of Pakistan is not available (Population Census Organization Government of Pakistan 1998).
According to 1998 census the electricity coverage is less (61.97 percent) in FATA as compared to Pakistan (70.46 percent) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (72.19 percent). The
111 overall consumers of electricity are 294636 households in FATA. Majority (253795) are domestic users while for industrial use it is only 4088 users. And overall 4059 villages are electrified in FATA. (For details, see Table 3.7 Annexure – D). An overall 61.97 percent households in FATA use electricity for lighting purpose. The highest percentage of the use of electricity for lighting purpose is in Khyber Agency (72%) and in FR Peshawar and FR Kohat (90%).(For details, see Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 Annexure – D)
Communication is very much necessary for bringing change and development in an area. A comparative data on the presence of Post Offices, Telegraphs, Tele Vision sets, and the conditions of Roads and percentage share of FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa and Pakistan, show that FATA lacks different communication facilities. In some areas, there are communication systems but their availability to people is limited as a small number of people have access to them. In some areas even the basic communication system like roads and post offices are not available. FATA has 1.5% share of the total post offices in Pakistan. 0.8% Telephone and 0.03% T.V sets or T.V availability and 1.8% road facilities as compared to the overall communication system of Pakistan. The exposure to media is less common (TV 28.10 percent, Radio 92.20 percent and Newspaper 15.00 percent) as compared to the rest of Pakistan. (For details, see Table 3.9 Annexure – D)
FATA has poor communication facilities. There are no link roads to connect FATA with other areas and big markets. Current statistics on the availability of various infrastructure facilities (roads) in FATA. Based on the data given in the table, it can be assessed that the people in FATA have less access to big cities of Pakistan for business due to poor infrastructural facilities. Similarly, access to markets is hard for tribal people to sell their products like local fruits, minerals, stones, and some other natural resources in some areas of FATA. (For details, see Table 3.10 Annexure – D)
FATA is the most impoverished region in Pakistan having 60% of households living below poverty line (Asian Development Bank 2003).28 Various reasons can be attributed to this underdevelopment and extreme poverty in FATA. Firstly, the very
28 According to the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), which was published in the Economic Survey of Pakistan 2015–2016 Report, in Pakistan, the highest rate of poverty is in FATA which is 73 percent, i.e. almost two-thirds of people are poor.
112 structure of administration put in place by the colonial power out of their strategic necessity has taken root in seeping through social and moral values of the tribal structure leading to utter social poverty, thus the system of buying a person way through violating all norms of universal justice, dignity and self-respect has become rule of the day. This has not only morally corrupted the Malaks and the Malaki system (no matter how democratic their ‘Rewaj’ or traditions are) but has also given the state the reason to absolve themselves of the responsibility of providing fundamental rights and services to the ordinary members of the tribal society. Secondly, the persistence at maintaining the old and obsolete governance structure of the tribal Agencies has further pushed the tribal communities into impoverished economies, entirely depending on outside influences, corrupting their mind and belief in their own self- worth. Whatever development budget is channelized towards them is misdirected and derives the least benefits for the larger interest of the whole community. Thirdly, the unattractive, hard, hilly and mainly barren terrain and isolated geographic setting of FATA provides little incentive for economic investment and development. Tribal areas are fundamentally poor (Thorburn 1999).
In FATA a mere 25% of the tribal population has access to clean drinking water as compared to 75% for the neighbouring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The piped water supply is less common (Inside 12.39, outside 6.92 percent) in FATA as compared to the rest of Pakistan (Inside 28.08, outside 4.18 percent) (Population Census Organization Pakistan 1998). Water scarcity both for drinking purpose and irrigation is an immediate and acute problem and an issue of concern in FATA. For drinking water, the government has provided many tube wells and dug well schemes but it has mostly fallen prey to political sabotage, 30-40% of these are non-functional (World Health Organisation 2001). (For details, see Table 3.11 Annexure – D). Under the new policy, maintenance of these tube wells has been transferred to the communities. Low electricity voltage is quoted as one of the reasons that make the use of tube wells very expensive (Khwendo Kor 2006). Communities also practice collection of rainwater in ponds and cemented pools made for the purpose. The water in these ponds is stagnant and polluted, most often the source of Malaria. Women fetch water from long distances and they have to make ten to fifteen trips to meet the demand of an extended family.
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Human rights activists and international development organisations claim that there is vast gender disparity prevailing in tribal society. They claim that the situation of women is even more difficult as they live under severe conservative socio-economic conditions (Asian Development Bank 2003). It can be very well understood from the tribal setup that the central figure and player in the tribal system is the male descendant of the tribes. The male offspring of the tribes bear the greater burden of keeping the legacy of valour, pride and honour of the tribes. They are the torchbearers of Pakhtunwali (Pashtun code of life) and thus most important ambassadors and future of the tribe. Women are but mere vessels of procreation. According to traditional concepts, “a true tribal (Pakhtun) woman is that who does ‘Ghairat’ by championing the cause of Pakthunwali - promoting the Pakhtun code of life amongst her off-springs, especially her sons. She inspires her son to be strong, brave and stand upright with pride and dignity upholding Pakthunwali and honour of his family. This is the imagery used for romanticising the role of Pakhtun woman. She is portrayed as the symbol of strength that coaxes her son to take revenge of his family member killed by the enemy. Her image as a symbol of honour or an instrument of man’s honour is portrayed much against her own freedom, rights, value and worth as an individual human being (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2012).
Besides underdevelopment, poverty, and geography proximity with Afghanistan, the government of Pakistan lacks control in FATA as a result the area is presenting safe haven to criminals and outlaws. These include car lifting, smuggling in banned goods, kidnapping for ransom, production of arms and drugs (Lamb 2008). Likewise, the perpetrators of crimes outside the tribal belt, for example in the settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, often flee into FATA to escape the law (Shah 1997). The tribal people refuse to pay electricity bills. The government of Pakistan hardly receives any revenues from FATA and, in turn, has less interest to spend funds for the development of the tribal area. In this regard, the resource allocation for FATA in the federal budget is extremely low. “The Annual Development Plan (ADP) allocation [is]…based on ad hoc arrangements rather than clearly thought out policy…in 1986-87 the ADP allocation was Rupees 609.353M. It slumped to Rupees 527.457M in the following year…it has plummeted to Rupees 520-500 million during 1991-92” (Shah 1997, 59).
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In addition, the distribution mechanism for resources in FATA is solely through the offices of the Political Agents whose main concern is keeping the law and order situation in place and functioning through the Malaks. Funds are rarely if ever, used for purposes of genuine development. Even the country mainstream political system has not yet reached the whole of FATA. About thirty percent of the FATA is still politically inaccessible (Shah 1997).
Another cause of lagging behind of FATA is the lack of trust of the tribal people on the government. The long-standing and ever-increasing feuds that typify tribal life lead to endemic distrust. There is a famous historic saying about this troublesome norm of Pashtun life,
“Me against my brother, my brother and me against our cousins, we and our cousins against the enemy” (Spain 1963, 57).
The tribals also gave mistrust towards the government, regarding their apprehension that the government will subdue them; abolishing their centuries old tribal system and subsequently will annex them with the settled areas.
The relationship between government and the tribal people is one of mutual threat and display of power rather than mutual respect and trust. “Quite often they would talk in a tone which could burn the skin off the sensitive…sangfroid is the hallmark of a Political Agent… In his heart of hearts, he may like to slap a tribal Malak sitting in the chair opposite to him threatening him on an issue but he would just laugh it away… You can call it a weakness but in this tolerance lies the greatness of the institution of Political Agent” (Shah 1997, 34). Another cause of development backwardness is that FATA lacks proper formal system and programs for Community Mobilization and Development. There is a need for a proper formal system which could contribute to development of FATA through the mobilisation of people. Jirga as an informal body is the only institution of deciding the affairs and dealings of FATA. Jirga plays a pivotal role in the development of FATA. For any developmental project, Jirga makes the decision and has to be taken into confidence. Jirga decides the fate of FATA and the tribal people.
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At the time of taking the decision about the undertaking of development projects, the Political Agent undertakes a consultative process of taking the Jirgas and Malaks into confidence about the implementation of development projects and the benefiting (sub) tribes. However, it may be noted that Jirga’s are not permanent bodies. These are not development forums nor do they interface with the government line departments. Their primary interface is either with the disputing individuals and parties or with the PA for the settlement of disputes.
The Political Agent in FATA is a king without a crown. He controls the affairs of FATA through his “carrot and stick policy”. The following statement reflects upon his standing:
“The Political Agent has a major role in the selection and award of development projects as part of his “carrot and stick policy” favouring or penalising local Malaks and tribes. Examples of such rewards are vividly depicted in the construction of tube wells, schools and hospital buildings many of which have no clients or output, with staff recruited from the tribes receiving salaries from the government. The government line departments in FATA have little say when projects are given out as rewards for areas/tribal softening” (Asian Development Bank 2003, 19).
An important determinant of project selection by the Political Agent is the Nikat system practised in the tribal areas. Under this system, tribes and sub-tribes are provided benefits based on the relative numerical strength of tribes and sub-tribes – a practice existing from times even prior to the subjugation of tribes by the British during the 19th and early 20th centuries. A negative implication of giving of projects under the Nikat system is that a powerful section or subsection of a tribe could get a project even if the deserving area is a different one or consists of poor subsections but have lesser numerical strength in the records.
Due to harsh barren un-cultivate-able land, lack of industries, lack of developmental works and lack of other sources of income, majority of the people in FATA go abroad for employment and also employment in big cities inside Pakistan (i.e. Karachi, Peshawar, Lahore, etc.). It is understood that if a Malak is requesting a school or a health centre, the share of jobs allocated with these facilities will go to the Malak. The
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Malak owns the land, therefore, the job and salary of the ‘Chowkidar’ (guard) will go to him. The compounder/dispenser or the teacher’s job will go to his next of kin, so that too will go to him. The requests for such public facilities are often for the benefit of the respective Malaks. The actual purpose of the facility is sidelined in the hope of getting additional means of income. Most often the employment opportunities provided by the state machinery are as per quota of each tribe or Malak which is most often shared with other shareholders in the communities. The tribal economy is so poor that often raids and robbery is used (as in the past), as means to snatch from their better-off brethren.
The lack of representation to poor segment of society is another cause of underdevelopment of FATA. The poor segments of society are represented by their Malaks, who have the right to negotiate collective tribal rewards and punishments with a pass as well as seek development interventions. Under this system, beneficiary participation in project selection and implementation is non-existent. It is important to note that the concept of poverty-focused developmental interventions in FATA does not exist.
The present system of resource allocation and priorities in the tribal areas is unsustainable. For any meaningful development of FATA that targets the poor and disadvantaged segments of society, interventions must pivot around organising communities. Government services now made available to the larger farmers and entrepreneurs are not accessible to the poor. The available government supported extension and social sector services (Agriculture, Livestock, Forest, Health, Education, Small infrastructure) will be more effectively and equitably provided at the grass roots level if the recipients are the organised communities rather than Malaks and other influential FATA residents. Under the present system where there is limited extension of services of staff in the field, this extension cannot reach the poor on a one-on-one basis.
To sum up, the factors that hurdle development in FATA are: poor resource bases, proximity of the region with Afghanistan [where conditions have remained unsettled during the last more than three decades of war], limited participation of civil society in development activities because of local administration managing the tribal affairs mostly through tribal Malaks, no involvement of the population in decision making,
117 weak capacities of the government line departments (working for planning, implementation, and monitoring development interventions), good governance-related factors i.e. no transparency, no accountability, no commitment, empathy, and equity, and the marginalization of tribal society are the main causes for the FATA lagging behind in development.
CONCLUSION The unfortunate conflict situations of the last more than three decades in the region have intensified the existing complexities of the FATA. Still, it is struggling to deal with the aftershocks of the worst period of its history that the areas has passed through. The situation, as well as the government ignorance of the area, has a clear reflection on the socio-economic and political life of the tribal society and the area.
Generally, FATA has been overlooked in development particularly the common man in this society because the existing intervention by the state in the shape of development activities have never reached to the common man but have benefited a limited and chosen tribal elite and few interest groups.
With regard to socio-economic development, the Malaks (tribal elders), enjoing state political patronage have remained the main beneficiaries of development projects through their influence to identify the development intervention, choose sites for these projects, have a share in the provision of services and service providers (contractors) and also jobs for their close relatives.
Along with Malaks, recently the newly emerging rich class, earning wealth through some unusual ways (from outside FATA and abroad business), have got to influence the decision making process in FATA.
The harsh ecology, difficult terrain and mostly barren mountainous land have a greater impact on the lives of tribal people. That’s why the common tribesmen have adapted themselves with these harsh realities. And thus always worked hard to earn their livelihood from small trade, odd jobs, and business in the big cities of Pakistan and have also moved to the Middle-East for work purposes. Most of the common tribal people are hard workers and make their living from their own developed enterprises like hotels, transport business and other such difficult work. In this regard,
118 transport and timber are the two main business, where the tribal people have developed their fortune.
To conclude, the overall economy of FATA is chiefly pastoral, with some agriculture practised in few fertile valleys. During the Afghanistan war, in FATA, there was a great production of opium and its trafficking. The transit trade with Afghanistan is another major source of livelihood in FATA. The tribal economy is informal in nature. There is neither state regulatory system nor formal state institutions to monitor the economy in FATA. The areas are still underdeveloped, though for the last several years due to international support a huge investment has been made to develop the area. The socio-economic indicators are still poor in FATA which explains the poor outreach of state institutions and services.
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CHAPTER – 4
CHALLENGES TO STATE GOVERNANCE IN FATA - SOCIETY-CENTRIC APPROACH
4.1 INTRODUCTION This chapter provides an analysis of the challenges to state governance (authority) in the context of society-centric approach/model as discussed in section 1.5 of chapter one. This chapter also consists of two parts. Part one discusses the un-governability of FATA from the society-centric approach in the context of primordial (historical) review of state governance in pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial perspectives by discussing various society-centric factors that hindered/resisted the projection of state governance (authority) in the tribal areas of FATA. The second part of this chapter consists of a discussion on the modern (current) dynamics of state-society relations and interactions of tribal society and the Pakistani state. This includes detailed discussion on, i). Pakistani State and Tribal society relations, ii), state-society connectedness and citizenship, ii). Social cohesion, iii). Inequalities, and iv). Civic Trust.
The society-centric approach is unique because it presents the society perspective (Forrest 2003), by analysing Pakistani state and tribal society relations in pre-colonial, colonial-era and contemporary Pakistan in particular. The society-centric approach emphasises on reviewing the historical genealogy of state un-governability of the tribal society by tracing the development of tribal society and state relations through the pre-colonial and colonial periods. Under the society-centric approach, this chapter analyses the centuries-long roots of tribal society social strength resisting state, which resulted in the failure of governmental policy. The society-centric approach explains interactions between the Pakistani state and tribal society in its historical perspective. By making a critical analysis of the historical basis of governance in the precolonial and colonial period, it helps in understanding the widening gap between Pakistani state and tribal society of FATA. The colonial policy of occupation is also considered one of the causes of underdevelopment and marginalisation of this tribal society but an understanding of Pakistani state’s weak governance in tribal society has been
120 obtained within the perspective of society-centred approach by analysing the tribal society origin of adaptability, potent and continuing social formations.
The primary data got through field survey, interviews and groups discussions has been analysed and triangulated and wherever needed has been given in this and the succeeding chapters. For this study, a representative sample of 1500 respondents was selected through Proportionate Stratified Radom Sampling Techniques (PSRS) (For details See chapter-2). Detailed demographic and socio-economic information of the surveyed respondents are given in Annexure- E.
4.2 PRIMORDIAL (HISTORICAL) ORIGIN OF RESISTANCE TO STATE
GOVERNANCE This section provides an analysis of the origin and historical account of the resistance posed by tribal society to invaders or would be occupants in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras. With regard to tribal society as a Non-State Space (Scott 2009), this section provides details about a range of political and social activities, institutions, organisations within the context of strong tribal society. This section supports the main theme of this chapter that the basis of weak governance of Pakistani state in FATA is a historical feature in precolonial and colonial genealogy. Further, the section reviews a number of patterns of political and social behaviours based on the nature of tribal society that passed from the precolonial and constantly reappeared during the colonial and postcolonial period, even with significant changes, strategic shifts in the region, which are based on “deep history,” approach that includes historical, anthropological, and sociological empirical evidence (Forrest 2003).29
4.2.1 Pre-Colonial, Colonial and Post-Colonial Eras Historically, the Pakhtun areas (both tribal and settled), situated between the Koh-e- Sufaid and the Indus River (also called the Pakhtun Borderland) remained a centre of attention due to the geostrategic position, for many Central Asian, Russian and British conquerors who passed through these areas. They include, the great Alexander, Chengaiz Khan, Ameer Taimor (Tamerlane) and others (Cope 2013). Their expeditions, trade caravans and the resulting political chaos greatly impacted the socio-economic and political spheres of tribal society of FATA. About the nature of
29 Joshua Forrest email to researcher dated November 23, 2013. Guided the researcher to use this approach.
121 the area and its society (people), Winston Churchill has vividly described this in his writing by remarking “… where every man is a soldier...every rock, and every hill has its story” (Churchill 1916, 273).
Due to the tough nature of its terrain and people, various empires who ruled the Frontier could extend their governance (authority) and control over plains and over one or two passages of these tribal mountainous areas only. This characteristic of the tribal society of remaining outside the subjugation of outside power/empire is among the main reasons behind the persistence of tribal form/nature of society in such a region which lay across the passage of countless invaders (Caroe 1958).
Pre-Colonial Period: The pre-colonial history of the Pak-Afghan bordering region, mostly Pakhtun areas were the epicentre of expeditions by invaders and trade caravans. All the invaders who occupied this area, established their governance (authority) and control in plain areas, but never extended their control into hilly areas and the tribal society. The hill tribes always defied, with strong resistance, the outside powers that endangered their independence (Europa Publications Limited 2010).
The recorded history of this area shows that at the beginning of the first millennium AD, those who invaded these areas include: the Parthians, then the Kushans also called the Sassanians, then the White Huns and later the Turks ruled this region (Christian 2008). But all these invaders did not actually occupy and subdue these tribal areas. And most often these areas remained a continuous headache for the occupants because of the tough resistance of locals.
From Alexander’s death till the spread of Islam, which is about one thousand years, this region was attacked by several invaders from the North. During this period, the frontier region came, sometimes, under the Iranian authority and, sometimes, under the rulers of Indus Valley. Mahmud of Ghazni conquered and incorporated areas of the subcontinent up to Lahore (Christian 2008).
The Turks, Sultan Muizzuddin Muhammad of Ghorid, occupied the Northern sub- continent in 1206 and established Muslim supremacy in Delhi (Christian 2008). However, the Ghorids established their government in the central areas of Punjab but did not remain at ease with the Pakhtun areas of the North Western Frontiers. After Ghorids, the Central Asian invaders including Ghengis Khan in 1221, and Tamerlane
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(Taimur) in 1398 invaded these areas but could not extend their authority to the North Western part (today Pakhtun tribal areas) of the sub-continent (Christian 2008).
After the Turks which included: Ghaznavids (1001-1186), Ghorids (1186-1290), and Tughlaqs (1321-1451), the Pakhtun dynasties which include, Khaljis (1290-1321), Lodhis (1451-1526) and Suris (1539-55) invaded the sub-continent and established their rule in India (Alikuzai 2013). Despite being Pakhtuns in blood, the authority of these rulers could not extend to the Pakhtun tribal areas of FATA (Christian 2008).
Though, for the sustainability of their rule, the Pakhtun dynasty devised policies to attract their Pakhtun fellows of the North-Western sub-continent, the present day tribal areas of FATA, to join and support their rule in Delhi (Christian 2008). However, these policies did not recruit much of the tribesmen in their rows of support. The support of Pakhtun warriors was further weakened soon after the death of Sher Shah in 1555 (Alikuzai 2013). This clearly shows the defying behaviour of tribal people to outside powers even if the ruler belonged to their ethnic group. The tribal people never compromised on their autonomy and independence.
In the sub-continent, the Mughal Dynasty (1526 – 1857) was founded by Babur (1526-1530), who was the descendent of Taimur. Babur conquered India with the support of Pakhtuns (Chaurasia 2002). Desipite being mercenaries of the Mughal rulers, the tribesmen never accepted the Mughal. The tribesmen always resisted and stood on the lines of communication. Historically, to secure these lines of communication was of great importance for any invader coming from the Central Asia to occupy India. Neither Babar, nor his Mughal dynasty was ever able to ensure the security and control of these lines of communication from Kabul to Jhelam (Chaurasia 2002). Though fought several wars against these Pakhtuns, neither Babur nor the rest of Mughal rulers could bring areas on the North by Koh-i-Sufaid down till Bannu, especially the areas that makes today the tribal areas of FATA under their subjugation (Chaurasia 2002).
In the sub-continent, the rule of Durrani Dynasty (1737 – 1800) was established by Nadir Shah of Iran in 1739. He was supported by Pakhtun/Afghan corps of horses commanded by Nur Muhammad Khan Abdali of Alizai clan. Even Ahmad Shah Abdali (1747-1773), with the support of Pakhtun tribesmen, defeated the powerful
123 army of Maratha in the famous Battle of Panipat in 1761, occupying north India (Chaurasia 2002). But on his return to Iran, even having the support of Afghan Abdalis, Nadir Shah faced greater resistance from mountain tribes and paid a huge tax to the Mountaineers to get a passage through their passes.
Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1799-1839), who was appointed as a representative by Shah Zaman (1793-1800), a Durrani ruler of Lahore, established Sikh rule in the Punjab. Ranjit Singh, being unable to expand his empire towards the east and south, due to fear of English, mostly concentrated towards the west. Having ambitions to establish his rule in Jalalabad and Kabul, first, he had to pass through the tribal belt where Sikh faced fierce resistance and battles with tribes in the hills around Jamrud. They got heavy defeat with a huge loss of army and thus retreated in 1837.
Like other invaders, the Sikh rule over the Pakhtun was also limited to the plain areas, having their compliance only in the limited areas of their forts (Killingray and Omissi 1999). The tribesmen also safeguarded their independence against the Sikhs, like they had in the past.
The Colonial Period: The British started their struggle towards the west after annexing Punjab in 1849 from Sikh, to checkmate the Russian expansion southwards, and further moved towards the west establishing its direct rule in the plain areas of Frontier (Tripodi 2011). Thus moving towards the west in Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa, the tribal belt and Afghanistan, the British faced several fierce battles. In 1839, for the first time in the history of these areas, a regular army (British Army) moved with all its strength. The tribes in the areas (current day FATA) sensed this as a permanent threat to their independence which they had historically retained and thus fought several wars with them. These wars with tribal people of FATA and Afghanistan include the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839 - 42), the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-79), the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), the British Operations in Waziristan (1919-20), and the British Operations (1936-37), which was fought as a result of the intense uprising in Waziristan tribal belt (Tripodi 2011). These Afghan Wars and the establishment of Political Agencies in tribal areas with its specific system of indirect administration were the results of the British policies of checkmating the Russian expansionism.
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The British maintained Afghanistan and the tribal Pakhtun belt as a buffer zone and kept this region under its sphere of influence through various tactics and policies during the Great Game. These policies included: “The Close Border Policy” or “Policy of Masterly Inactivity”30 and “The Forward Policy” (Majumdar 1963).
The British concern over the growing Russian influence southward and the tribes of these areas struggle of retaining their freedom concluded in the evolution of the existing tribal system which is prevailing in today’s FATA. In 1901, the North-West Frontier was separated from the Punjab and till 1931 it was given the status of a Province under the Chief Commissioner, later on, brought under the governor in 1932. These areas posed a great challenge to the British and as late as the 1930s, the number of troops in the Pakhtun areas was equal to the number of troops in rest of the occupied Indian sub-continent (Ahmed 2012). Posted in Miranshah (Waziristan) as D.C in 1945, Murray wrote: “Hardly a day passed but telegraphs wires were cut, bridges were blown up, convoys and camps sniped and murder committed... The place was a savage desert of gravel plains and cruel mountains... A parched and sparsely populated tract of inhospitable mountain desert... whose inhabitants were always armed to the teeth, ready to commit or suffer outrage, bold, brave, cruel and dangerous, ruled by the laws of the Quran and the blood feud” (Murray 1948). The Post-Colonial Period: For almost 100 years, the British had tried various policies to extend its governance (authority) over the Tribal Pakhtuns of FATA, but failed. The ultimate motive behind all these policies was to deal with the challenges posed by the tribal people and the desire to protect their interests in this region.
Pakistan, having an edge to identify itself with the tribal Pakhtuns on the common religious ground of Islam, has been trying to establish its governance (authority) in the tribal areas. Even Quaid –e- Azam wanted to integrate tribal people in the mainstream governance of Pakistan. Pakistan always stressed that it can extend it governance (authority) to tribal areas only through development rather than the policies of subjugations, but the strategic and national security concerns, mainly due to the threats from neighbouring India and Afghanistan, all the successive
30 The British Government adopted a policy having goals of non-interference and non-aggression with regard to frontier areas. The purpose was to minimize the tribal attacks and opposition and to guard the frontier. And if any attack, then in the response of attack to send easy military expedition for retaliation.
125 governments of Pakistan continued the same administrative system in tribal areas as the legacy of British government till 1976. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Pakistani state stressed on the merger of tribal areas due to the unrest caused by the tribal politics and due to the rise of Peoples Democratic Party in Afghanistan (Haq, Khan, and Nuri. 2005). But in 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan shattered the Pakistani state policies to integrate tribal areas into the mainstream governance system. During the Soviet invasion, the tribal areas once again became a buffer zone. Like the Great Game, this time to protect Pakistan from the Soviet expansionism (Haq, Khan, and Nuri. 2005).
Unfortunately, more than a decade of war damaged the progress made earlier by Pakistan’s government in the way of mainstreaming tribal areas (For details see section 5.2.1 of Chapter-5). After the Soviet threat was over, the process of development in the tribal areas again slowed down for two reasons i.e., the Pakistani state focus on investing heavily on arms due to the Indian threat and, the arms race between the two neighbouring rival states. Thus, the Pakistani government’s concentration towards eastwards totally threw the idea of tribal areas development to the backyard until the US attacks on Afghanistan in the wake of September 11 event. The US and the international community forced Pakistan to adopt a Forward Policy with regard to its tribal areas (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010). Thus, the focus to gain control and establish order in its tribal areas, engaged Pakistan as a central ally in the war on terror.
4.2.2 History of Political Penetration by State During the precolonial, colonial and the postcolonial periods, the tribal society never allowed any power to dominate it and resisted the state attempting to obtain the capacity to exert its sovereignty. Also, the Pakistani central state has never been able to mould the tribal local power structure of tribal indigenous authority in line with its interests. Pakistani state national policies have not been extended universally to the tribal areas (Green 2008). The state of Pakistan is persistently failing to consolidate itself in FATA. In this context, the Pakistani state can be called a soft state because it lacks the institutional and structural capacity to implement its policy decisions throughout FATA. Also, it lacks the capacity to successfully carry out its designed national plans (Herbst 2000). This fact has been explained by Forrest arguing that
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“Contemporary postcolonial state is a true reflection of the past history representing the past as storage of edifying experience” (Forrest 2003, 6).
Though, in FATA the colonial state tried to get control and consolidate itself through a fused kind of hierarchical system and mostly implemented its policies with the help of co-opted local Malaks (Mcclintock 2013). However, throughout the colonial period, the image of the state comprehensive domination does not match with the success of tribal society of FATA in always carrying a range of resistance activities against the British power. In this regard, Hazis argues that “the state softness in its peripheral societies was not only due to the weak development of colonial state, but also due to the patterns of social formations of its peripheral society” (Hazis 2012, 23). Specifically, in the tribal areas of FATA, the colonial state had its own limitation due to its weaknesses despite having the ability to extract and accumulate resources. That’s why the colonial state always used the policy of repression and aggression while dealing with the tribal society of FATA, in order to ensure its sovereignty and security (Slater 2010).
In the context of tribal society, the colonial state of Britain did not perform well the policy making and execution task. The British policy in this regard had dual purposes, of ensuring its own security and also to fufil her hegemonic designs of socio-political domination of the tribal society (Metelits 2010).
The dynamics of the tribal political and social sphere reflect that the British colonial state remained weak in this regard and had never achieved its presumed objectives. One reason for this weak domination was the adaptable nature and social structure of tribal society (Rothchild and Chazan 1988).
The British state never succeeded in the fully incorporation of peripheral society, especially tribal society in its economic and social spheres of policy. To counter the colonial power, the tribal society established and relied on its own political, social authority and informal economy (Hyden 2013).
To govern tribal areas, the Colonial administrators did this through its indirect rule involving the officially appointed civil servants and co-opted local chiefs (Malaks). But the British could never gain control of this region. This mixture form of governance by the British state enabled the tribal people to live their lives according
127 to their tribal code of life, Pakhtunwali. The British administrators held control of limited areas, mostly where state installations were available. Living a free life out of state influence, the tribal people sought various ways to resist and avoid the central state agenda. The tribal people developed their informal economy and relied on this and developed their own social institutions of Jirga (dispute resolution body), Rewaj (Act and code of deciding things), and the institution of Pakhtunwali, which is a complete code of tribal life.
With regard to other parts of the colonial state, the British government was able to accomplish its tasks. In most of the rural areas, except tribal areas, the British collected the annual taxes and also performed other state functions (Mamdani 1996).31
With regard to state transformation from its construction phase to institutionalisation, in the context of FATA, the British colonial state adopted a mixture of strategies of domination and administration. In this regard, the colonial government embarked an indirect rule through the Malaki system in the inaccessible “unprotected areas” of FATA, and also tried to implement direct control and rule in the accessible areas which were of geostrategic importance to them (Siddique 2014). Compared to other peripheral areas, where the British state had got some sort of deep hegemony and domination, in tribal areas it had only a superficial administrative presence (Young 1994).
Even today, in the postcolonial era, FATA presents the continuity of state softness and also state policy paralysis.
4.2.3 Pacification through Policy of Aggression and Repression The state dysfunctional policy often results in the distracted struggle for political domination. In British-India, in the context of FATA, this struggle for domination of the colonial state resulted in the introduction of the policy of aggression and repression (Forrest 2003).
31 Mamdani argues that the colonial state would send a tax-collection police force out throughout the countryside once a year and put together an occasional work party, which was not equivalent to establishing a tightly monitored hierarchy of control by the colonial state over indigenous, village-level production, trading flows, and the reorganization of labour, as occurred in the “fused power” village structures, by Mahmood Mamdani (1996), Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton University Press. NJ, USA.
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Historically, the British colonial state remained weak in extending its control to the peripheral territories especially the tribal areas of FATA. This weak infrastructural power32 (difficulty in policy and authority extension) in the peripheral areas led the British government to adopt the policy of coercion, in order to exert its political sovereignty throughout the British-India. In the context of FATA, an engineered system of governance was implemented to legitimise violence by the British government. The Russian expansionism and the strong opposition to acceptance of foreign rule by these people resulted in the adaptation, by the British, of various policies of terror and aggression against these tribesmen.
In this regard, to suppress the tribal people, a series of military expeditions and operations were launched by the British government against the tribal people (For details, see section 4.2.1 of this chapter).33 In all these wars, massive violence and state aggression were used against the innocent and defenceless tribal civilians to force them to submission. The Colonial administration also imposed a series of policies, aggressive and inhuman laws such as the Frontier Crimes Regulation in tribal areas (Leake 2016).
The British state policies of aggression and use of force against the tribal society clearly show the colonial government’s inability to peacefully carry out its functions of security and hegemony. The British state functionaries failed in tribal areas to extend their sovereignty to the whole of territory over which they had a claim. The heavy reliance on brutality and the use of violence against the tribal society further reflect the weaknesss of colonial state, on the one hand, and tribal society as a strong entity standing against the state aggression, on the other hand (Migdal 1988).
The British reliance on similar means of aggression and repressive policies assure the “pacification” of both the interior and peripheral in the Indian sub-continent. With regard to the tribal areas of FATA, these violent policies and the resultant tribal society resistance against the British continued in one form or the other till the independence of British India. In the weak regimes, even the government leaders
32 Michael Mann defines it as "the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm.” 33 The British state aggressions against these tribes include: British military operation in Mahsund areas in 1860 and again in 1894/95, several military operations in Wazirs areas of Waziristan including two great operations of 1919-20 and second during 1936-37 and many other such type of operations in other areas of North Western Frontier plain and tribal areas.
129 utilise strategies of terror and suppression as a survival mechanism when state formal institutions become weak (Crowder 1978). The heavy reliance on terror campaigns reflects a perception of the British state leaders that to them no alternative choices were available. This also reflects the inability of the British state to achieve domination in FATA. Failed in their efforts to dominate the tribal society, the British state was compelled to sign treaties of no interference, economic exchanges and relied on other such dealings with the tribal people (Crowder 1978).
4.2.4 Yaghistan (Land of the Free): Tribal Autonomy and Independence The state policies of aggression and suppression and violence during the pre-colonial and colonial period played a great role in the emergence of tribal society as a warrior and praetorian entity. Also, these policies led towards the tribal society strength to retain its autonomy and integrity in the social and political spheres. This further led to the social formation capability of the tribal society to repell the colonial state’s hegemonic designs.
In response of these state hegemonic, aggressive and policies of terror, the tribal people developed and relied on their own informal governance system and maintained their own control on the tribal areas. The tribal people retained their way of daily life activities, had their own land use system, their decision making and conflict resolution system. Even the tribal people developed their own informal economy and markets in order to counter and restrict the intensity of formal state institutional building and economic changes. Due to their clandestine markets, the tribal people always resist state tax collection. The tribal society has self-sufficiency in food crops cultivation and uses to cultivate poppy (opium). For mutual trade, they have always relied on barter system for the sale or exchange of items. They always rely on smuggling, drugs trade, and non-custom paid commodities and the trade in the tribal society is not controlled by the state. These tribal people have always refused and resisted the state officials with regard to the imposition of economic policies on them. These tribal people had trade relationship across the Durland Line, which is a porous border, which was out of the control and surveillance of the British Officials. The tribals’ reliance on the informal economic activities has provided them a sort of economic autonomy. This economic autonomy, beyond the British control, deprived the state of the needed resources, and also resulted in the failure of potential British state- controlled economic development and economic management in the tribal areas.
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At the community level, the informal tribal authorities (Malaks etc.) and political power structures were more influential and powerful than the state-appointed political authority in FATA. Though the colonial state co-opted some indigenous leaders, it did not prove effective. Due to the excessive use of coercive means by the state through its local political administration in FATA, the British state was unable to reinforce its decisions and policies on a constant basis.
During Pakistan movement, the tribal people provide an active and great support to the Muslim nationalist movement for independence due to its autonomy. Soon after independence, these autonomous tribal people of FATA fought against the Indian army in Kashmir in 1948 and occupied a major area of Kashmir (Amin 2000).
4.2.5 Goliath (Warrior and Heroic) Social Memory of Azad Qabayel Historically, the factors of the Pakhtuns Tribal societal strength and social formations include: tribal indigenous social institutions in precolonial times, the rootedness of the tribal local communities in these areas, military experiences of the tribal people, religious beliefs, and exchanges/cooperation among tribes, culture, informal governance and customary law. The already established socio-economic and political sphere of tribal society which were outside the control of the rulebook of the colonial state, have remained intact even after the independence.
The tribal society gets united and displays strong cohesion on the territorial basis whenever challenged by some external threat. In this context, then political mobilisation in tribal society often gets the fluid form. In this regard, throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century, the different sets of Pakhtun tribal ethnic backgrounds formed intra-ethnic alliances. In fact, the other ethnic groups like Sikhs, Hindus etc., have also undergone similar transformations depending upon the changing macro-political circumstances during the colonial period (Shah 2004).
Nationalism is a modern concept in the context of the sub-continent that developed in the Nineteenth Century when majority of the Indian communities started identifying themselves with their tribe, clan, religion or ethnic group. At the time of British arrival in the Pakhtun regions, the tribal people were accustomed to inter-tribal wars with each other. But for an outside power, these tribes get united when they face any threat to their independence. Thus tribes of FATA formed intra-tribal alliances spread over a large number of villages but consists of common ethnic origin. They also
131 formed multi-ethnic alliances with other ethnic groups of the Indian sub-continent such as the Punjabis, Hindus, Sikhs etc., as a regional level resistance against the colonial subjugation (Xaxa 2008, 55). Both the alliance i.e., intra-ethnic and the interethnic (based alliances at the national level) helped the Pakhtuns to push back the British attacks. The history of group alliance among tribal Pakhtuns in the pre- colonial era also shows that they made multiple groups in the form of Lashkars (an informal gathering of tribal troops), led by chiefs belonging to various hilly and plain Pakhtun areas. There are also intermarriages among Pakhtun tribes of FATA, and thus these alliances provided as a “decentralised hegemony” in which the Pakhtun leaders easily and effectively coordinated to mobilise their tribal forces (Poullada 1970).
Against this backdrop, the state weakness lies in the social origin of the strength of tribal heroic or warrior nature and military skills. The frequent fighting against the outside invaders made these Pakhtun tribes militarily better organised and trained than the British troops. These tribes also have an edge and experience of guerrilla warfare due to the familiarity with their rugged border terrains. The initial three decades of the twentieth-century show this fact. Thus, starting from 1879, the period when full-scale military operations in the North Western Frontier and tribal areas were launched by the British Army with the intent of occupying these areas, until 1913, most of these local tribes and allied forces fought the British troops and defeated them in many battles. For almost ten decades, from 1849 to 1947, the tribal people posed great military challenges to the British Colonial power in various forms (Nevill 1912, 21). Throughout this period, the tribal people repeatedly defeated, and retreated the colonial troops. These strong military skills of the tribal people and their success against the British armies is the reflection of the general patterns of resistance showned by the tribes against all the invaders who ruled the sub-continent before the invention of 1800s superior war technology (Boehm 2000, 1161).
Further, the weak colonial bureaucratic structure made the anti-British resistance in tribal areas successful. Likewise, within the tribal social formation, this established a memory of warrior and heroic success which kept re-emerging from time to time throughout the colonial period and also during the terminal phase of British rule. (Bose and Jalal 2004). Similarly, this memory was re-invoked several times later on. This happened: during the tribal march towards Kashmir independence (1948), during
132 the the Soviet attack on Afghanistan (1980) and most during US attack on Afghanistan and Pakistani military operations in FATA. The Pakistani state policy of coercion recently against the militants, Al Qaeda and Taliban in tribal areas partly remained unsuccessful and faced tough resistance. The tribal people posed substantial resistance and tough time to the Pakistan army by remobilizing their ancient military skills (Jones and Fair 2010).
Against this backdrop, it is pertinent to mention that the basis of current tribal resistance to Pakistani state governance (authority) in the shape of resistance to Pakistani military operations, does not lie in the current militant activities against Pakistani state, but the tribal people have an existing developed culture of resistance since sixteenth century or since more earlier against all those powers who invaded the Indian Sub-continent and came to pass through the passages of these tribal Pakhtun people and also during the anticolonial wars from 1857 till 1947 (Norell 2010, 16).
In the context of the precolonial and colonial resistance by these Pakhtun tribes against the foreign invaders, it is maintained that the memory of war and fighting of precolonial and colonial period remains active and alive, and that during the recent resistance against the Soviet (1979s) aggression, the local tribal leaders, (with the support of Pakistan and other western powers), openly urged the members of their tribal areas to cooperate and fight in a common front (Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad 2008, 67). Besides, as mentioned above, the current resistance against Pakistani state military operations is also one of the examples of these Pakhtuns tribal people representing a continuity of the historical tradition of resistance (Nawaz 2009, 31).
The heroic social memory and intra-tribal alliances can deemed to be one of the important social factors in the ability to cooperate and make alliances, with other ethnic groups, which resulted in the creation of conductive social conditions for the freedom movement during the British government (Banuazizi and Weiner 1988). In this context, the origin of the history of the Pakhtun resistance against the British colonial power lies in the social interchanges among them and their military alliances and cooperation of precolonial times.
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4.2.6 Tribal Social Autonomy and Culture Social autonomy means the already historically developed social activities and socio- economic-politico practices by local communities other than those of the government of the state (Chall 1998, 1011). A strong society is one which is fulfilling all the attributes of social autonomy. These include: independent decision making that is having their own political decision independent of state control, creation of social units beyond the control and influence of any external powers/forces, and control on their local social resources.34
Tribal society as a strong entity has certainly achieved these two attributes of social autonomy to a certain degree. The level of achievement of these attributes by tribal society of FATA shows the society power of resistance/strength in terms of its autonomy living an independent life out of the state and thus leads to its indifference towards, and minimum dependence on, a state governance (Migdal 1988, 108).
As mentioned earlier, strength of the tribal society of FATA can be found in various historical sources. These include: their tribal customs, traditions and informal customary governance system, locally selected tribal authority, strong intra-ethnic relations and alliances, dynamic religio-social formations, and their informal dispute resolution and decision making insitutions. These have added to the emergence of tribal social autonomy throughout the tribal history. The pre-colonial era existing indigenous socio-economic and political structure of tribal society had significantly reshaped through the twentieth century. The introduction of indirect rule by the British coloinial power through political administration and patronage of local chiefs (Malaks) and the introduction of a lego-juridical system of Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), which is mostly based on tribal customs i.e. Rewaj, did not alter the social autonomy of the tribal society of FATA (Tripodi 2011, 61).
34 Social Resources can be understood as, “the means through which interaction takes place, reaches out into every situation involving human behaviour.” It is the acceptance and recognition of that “all institutions, associations, social Agencies, and attitudes have certain common characteristics. These are resources embedded in one's social network and social ties. These are the resources in the possession of the other individuals to whom ego has either direct or indirect ties. A friend's car, for example, may be ego's social resources. Ego may borrow it for use and return it to the friend. Ego does not possess the car, and accesses and uses it only if the friend is willing to lend it. The friend retains the ownership. Similarly, a friend's social, economic, or political position may be seen as ego's social resources. Ego may seek the friend's help in exercising that resource in order for ego to obtain or achieve a specific goal.” by Martin J. Donenfeld, The Journal of Educational Sociology, American Sociological Association, Vol. 13, No. 9 (May, 1940), pp. 560-564. Retrieved from DOI: 10.2307/2261721.
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The internal structure of social formations in tribal society, though, has significantly changed over time but in such a way that it has kept holding or has resulted in a more deepening of the tribal autonomy. Similarly, the adoptability nature of the practices of social and political behaviour, e.g. the intra-ethnic exchange and cooperation, has resulted in a set of characteristics that are peculiar to tribal society, has thus evolved social autonomy in the tribal society. The overall consequence of this social adaptability is this that the tribal people have been able to accept significant self- autonomy which has resisted repeatedly the state domination (Cohen 2004).
4.2.7 Internal versus External Perspective The origin of the weak state governance in FATA can be understood by examining the domestic versus international situations historically in order within the context of the social change, especially in rural society, in various developing states (colonies) and the inability of colonial administrators to fulfil their goals (Saidul-Islam 2013, 99 - 120). Thus, understanding both the international and the colonial domestic situations are important for the evolution of colonial state and tribal society relations. It is also important to keep in focus the tribal indigenous actors, which kept control on key social processes in tribal society.
In this context, one of the reasons of the weak British colonial state can be partially found in its domestic economic weakness and the international situations of that time, mostly caused by economic depression, and world wars etc. The economic weaknesses of the British Empire as a result of international crises, London lacked the capability of the provision of sufficient economic resources and administrative capacity to sanction its officials to carry out their institution-building and hegemonic objectives (Smith 1999). In this context, the tribal areas of present day FATA, more generally, were somewhat unique within Indian sub-continent, reflecting the institutional and economic gap of the colonial British government across the 19th and to the middle of 20th century. Besides, the weak colonial state within the context of international, can also be found in the variations of precolonial states and tribal areas evolution of relations. The root causes of the contemporary (postcolonial) state inability to configure (“the tribal society in its preferred direction”) and the policy malaise can mostly be attributed to the precolonial states weakness, and the resultant tribal social formations, and the tribal society resistance to colonial state building.
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4.2.8 The Informal Peripheral Economic Structure Among others the most important factor that contributed to the strength of tribal society on the one hand, and weakening of central state governance (authority) in FATA in precolonial, colonial and post-colonial periods, on the other, is the emergence of informal economy. The tribal informal economy (Hart 2006), which is beyond state control or regulations include: the tribal managed-land use, unregistered weapon industry, cross-border illegal trade, and illegal crops cultivation (opium etc.) (Becker 2004). Hayes and Sedra have explained that the activities and items that come under the informal economy include: economic activities that are not recorded and are unmeasured by state, trans-border trade activities, banned items, such as crops and other commodities having expensive prices in countries other than where it is produced, income which is hidden from states’ official record and all other activities beyond the state control and activities which do not contribute to state revenue (Hayes and Sedra 2009, 91-93).
In the context of FATA, the informal economic practices prevailing since the colonial times represent a major hurdle to organize a centrally regulated economy. This informal economy is providing opportunity to those only who are engaged in it since centuries (Ahmed 1980).
In FATA, the tribal people have their own determined patterns of economic activities. Mostly, these include an independent land use, informal trade and exchange rules and patterns, mostly unwritten verbal contracts, exchange of goods for goods (barter), mutual trust based “reciprocal obligations”, personal ties and relationship among contractors, business partners, producers and merchants, which are often the central mechanisms for commodity exchange. A significant number of these economic activities remain outside the state control (Ahmed 1980).
In peripheral or tribal areas of the postcolonial developing states, the people still practice barter exchanges, long-distance trading and other informal intercommunity trade exchanges based on traditional way. These traditional bargaining, exchanges, trade and trading network have their origin in the precolonial times. The economic base upon which the state power rests include trading circuits and extraction and accumulation of resources. But during the colonial and postcolonial period, these
136 hidden trading circuits and the state weak capacity to extract resources led to the weak state governance in the tribal society of FATA.
The British colonial state had no capacity and was unable to extract resources, except by sheer force (aggression), trade and economic production was also not effectively controlled in tribal society till 20th century. In this regard, the colonial power of British remained a “weak state” in FATA during its rule in the sub-continent (Ahmed 1980).
In the economic sector also, the British colonial state never got its preponderance to intervene in economy of tribal society, rather the predominance of informal economic patterns always hindered the British state to exploit indigenous tribal resources. Also the contemporary Pakistani central government failed to effectively explore tribal resources. As a result in FATA “parallel informal economy and informal market” in foreign goods (mostly non-custom paid/duty free) has emerged, with no state regulations and control replacing state regulated markets in FATA. Few of these reputed markets are Karkhano market, Barra market, Dara Adam Khel weapon market etc.
Even in the contemporary Pakistani state, the tax system and tax collection is improving day by day. Also there are well established “formal” trading system which are registered and controlled under Pakistani state regulations, and also there are state approved companies working under Company Acts. But still in FATA, most of the economic activities are unmonitored and unregulated.
To sum up, since colonial and also in postcolonial era, the state had no access to the indigenous resources in tribal areas. This lack of economic capacity coincided with the social and political limitations of the central government’s failure and inability to establish effective institutions which could have streamlined the tribal social formations. As a result of this, the tribal society developed and evolved its ability to obtain and keep its social autonomy intact. The tribal society has thus remained autonomous in military as well as socio-political and economic domains throughout the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial periods.
4.2.9 Parallel Socioeconomic System and Structure In Pakistani society, in general, and in particular in FATA, there exist informal
137 structures and socio-economic systems that provide services to the people. Initially excluded socio-economically, politically and culturally by the British Raj and then by the Pakistani government, the tribal society has developed a parallel socio-economic system based on their tribal own culture and rewaj (Ante 2010, 295 - 296). For example, the tribal areas have a large number of informal structures of education (madrassas), of justice (jirgas), of economy (hundi, etc.) and other organizations (Taliban, Al Qaeda, outlaws). Neither all these socio-economic institutions are not registered with the relevant state authorities nor do they recognize and adopt the state formal rules of business. Most of these informal institutions and structures are functional in tribal areas where the mandate of federal government is non-existent (hundi system, black market, opium and cannabis business, small weaponry industry, smuggling, illegal trade etc.).
In tribal areas, an estimated 15 percent school age children attend informal educational institutions (Kalia 2015, 79). The literacy rate/enrolment in formal educational institutions (schools) is 56 percent for Pakistan and 17 percent for FATA (Pakistan Population Census Organization 1998). The bulk of these informal educational institutions (Madrassas) is located in tribal areas where the central state mandate is weak (Kalia 2015, 80). Field Survey in FATA also confirmed that the informal socio-economic structures are dominant as compared to state formal structures. Majority of the respondents (67.53%) were found of the opinion that they prefer to get services from the informal institutions and structures (family, tribe, qaom, etc.) present in their society instead of state institutions and structures. An overall 36.33% respondents told that they prefer to send their children to Madrassas instead of schools. A majority of respondents (60.47%) told that they get health services from private health facilities compared to others (34.20%) who get these services from the government facility. Likewise, a majority of respondents (57.07%) transfer their money and conduct business through hundi system as compared to a small number of respondents (7.60%) who make use of banking system in the adjacent settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa. Majority of the respondents (70.47%) confirmed that most of the tribal people are engaged in informal business and informal economic activities that is smuggling, illegal trade and weaponry industry (See below Table – 4.1, FATA Field Survey 2013).
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Legal pluralism is prevailing generally in Pakistan and especially in FATA, though not acknowledged and accepted by state law (Roseveare 2013, 15). Legal pluralism in Pakistan comprises the state law (formal justice system), the Islamic law, and the traditional law (informal justice system) (See below Figure – 4.1).
Figure – 4.1: The Informal Versus Formal Justice System
Due to the lack of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and the Provincial High Court in FATA, the informal justice system (Jirga) is operating, therefore, the tribal people of FATA rely on informal justice system. An overall 79.27% of respondents confirmed that due to the absence of formal state justice system, they take their disputes to non-state justice institutions (See below Table - 4.2, FATA Field Survey 2013).
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Table – 4.1: Parallel Socio-Economic Structures and Institutions in FATA
Parallel Socio-Economic Structures and Institutions
Q. What are those institutions which the people prefer to get services from in FATA?
Response Strongly Strongly Don't Question/ Indicator Rate Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree know Total a). Government Educational Frequency 773 208 15 455 48 1 1500 Institutions Percent 51.53 13.87 1.00 30.33 3.20 0.07 100 b). Private Educational Frequency 849 148 18 415 70 0 1500 Institutions Percent 56.60 9.87 1.20 27.67 4.67 0.00 100 c). Religious Educational Frequency 545 383 55 211 306 0 1500 Institutions (Madaris) Percent 36.33 25.53 3.67 14.07 20.40 0.00 100 d). Money Transaction Frequency 856 208 15 312 108 1 1500 (Hundi) and other informal economic system Percent 57.07 13.87 1.00 20.80 7.20 0.07 100 Frequency 114 211 18 858 299 0 1500 e). State Banking System Percent 7.60 14.07 1.20 57.20 19.93 0.00 100 f). Informal justice system Frequency 1189 121 12 120 47 11 1500 (Jirga) Percent 79.27 8.07 0.80 8.00 3.13 0.73 100 g). State Justice system Frequency 114 211 18 858 276 23 1500 (Courts) Percent 7.60 14.07 1.20 57.20 18.40 1.53 100 h). Government Health Frequency 513 159 18 652 154 4 1500 Facilities Percent 34.20 10.60 1.20 43.47 10.27 0.27 100 Frequency 907 211 55 312 12 3 1500 I). Private Health Facilities Percent 60.47 14.07 3.67 20.80 0.80 0.20 100 Frequency 339 39 25 879 213 5 1500 J). Social Services by State Percent 22.60 2.60 1.67 58.60 14.20 0.33 100 k). Social Services by Non- Frequency 1013 159 18 237 70 3 1500 State (Family, tribe, (Qaom) etc.) Percent 67.53 10.60 1.20 15.80 4.67 0.20 100 l). Culturally Managed Frequency 1057 65 55 211 112 0 1500 Economy and Market (Informal Business, Smuggling, Weaponry, poppy crop production) Percent 70.47 4.33 3.67 14.07 7.47 0.00 100
The people in tribal areas of FATA are living an independent life free of state control. Moreover, the state has also a weak presence or capacity in tribal society (Scott 2009). Narrating the tribal people living outside the state authority, the respondents confirmed that they prefer and have great trust in their customary informal socio- economic system rather than on state. During the field interview, a staff member of an international organization shared his views about informal laws (customary law) and Pakistani state law (formal law). He said:
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In FATA, the tribal people are more law abiding than the rest of Pakistan. We have our own informal law, mostly unwritten, based on our customs and traditions, which the tribal people follow wholeheartedly. Compared to state formal legal system, though FATA does not have formal judicial and police system, however, the crime rate in FATA was much lower than any other settled areas of Pakistan in the pre 9/11 era. Robberies, thefts and rape cases were and are still rare. This is not to assert that the tribal customs are perfect laws; on the contrary, I feel many are primitive. But my point is that our people have the capacity to abide by and accept laws. There is only one precondition: the laws must not be ‘imposed’ on us forcibly. Because any law that is implemented through a gradual system of evolution is respected and adhered to. So, taming the tribesmen requires some skill and affection. A Pashto saying explains this perfectly: ‘You can take a Pakhtun to hell by way of love but you can’t take him to heaven by way of force (Interview 33, FATA Field Survey 2013).
4.2.10 Socio-Cultural Resistance to State In tribal society of FATA, the people are always concerned about the preservation of their social organizations and norms. Tribal society, being segmentary in nature, always resist change in their social setup and believes in their tribal social status quo (Lindholm 1977, 60). Thus the state faces the tribal people in a more cohesive way as enemies when the state tries to extend its governance in these areas. Even the state’s offer of social and economic benefits and program of development are seen with doubt and are resisted (Scott 2009).
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Table – 4.2: Socio-Cultural Resistance to State Governance (Authority): Normative and Organizational Factors
Social and Cultural Resistance to State Governance (Authority) Q. There are possible options related to Social and Cultural Resistance to State Penetration in tribal area. Please select a relevant response against each question. A). Normative Factors (Pakthunwali and Norms) a). Pakthunwali (tribal culture Frequency 1267 76 30 76 47 4 1500 and norms) guides the tribes in social, political and economic spheres. Percent 84.47 5.07 2.00 5.07 3.13 0.93 101 b). Tribal culture and norms Frequency 955 409 76 57 2 1 1500 prevent government oriented institutions form gaining a foothold in tribal areas. Percent 63.67 27.27 5.07 3.80 0.13 0.07 100 c).Important tenets of Frequency 859 206 112 213 109 1 1500 Pakthunwali (Nang, Melmastia, Badal, Nanawati) resist state central authority to intervene in tribal affairs. Percent 57.27 13.73 7.47 14.20 7.27 0.07 100 d). Overlooking of Pakthunwali Frequency 1217 112 30 77 63 1 1500 causes loss of family ties, social ties and even to leave the village Percent 81.13 7.47 2.00 5.13 4.20 0.93 101 B). Organizational Factors (Social Organization) a).Tribal Pakhtuns live a life Frequency 856 178 56 89 312 9 1500 where fortunes and failures are collective. Percent 57.07 11.87 3.73 5.93 20.80 0.60 100 b).Pakhtun structure of organizational hierarchy is based Frequency 910 299 54 23 213 1 1500 on familial ties and roles rather than political affiliation. Percent 60.67 19.93 3.60 1.53 14.20 0.07 100 c).In Tribal society, allegiance is determined in closeness to Frequency 1027 59 97 77 239 1 1500 family order (family-sub family- external family-sub clan – clan – tribe) Percent 68.47 3.93 6.47 5.13 15.93 0.93 101 e).The very strong marksmanship and possessing of Frequency 946 99 112 123 219 1 1500 weapons plague attempts by the state to enforce its own rules. Percent 63.07 6.60 7.47 8.20 14.60 0.07 100 f).In time of crisis, for the survival, tribals unitedly fight Frequency 910 388 112 87 2 1 1500 against external threat setting aside internal differences Percent 60.67 25.87 7.47 5.80 0.13 0.07 100 g).Complex structure of levels within a tribe and independent Frequency 934 389 97 77 2 1 1500 nature increase the tribe’s ability to resist State Authority. Percent 62.27 25.93 6.47 5.13 0.13 0.93 101 h). The inaccessibility of Tribal Frequency 867 409 76 57 90 1 1500 Terrain gives them an edge to remain outside of state control. Percent 57.80 27.27 5.07 3.80 6.00 0.07 100
Coupled with the presence of parallel socio-economic structures which provide a strong foothold, the tribal norms and social organizations support the tribal people to resist the state control. This resistance of tribal people based on their socio-cultural
142 norms means that the tribal people strongly believe and follow their own norms, informal institutions, ethnic groups, clans, tribes, and extended families rather than trust and follow state’s formal institutions. A majority of the respondents (75.33%) were of the opinion that the tribal people lack trust on state’s formal institutions rather trust their informal institutions of family, tribe or qaom for various matters related to their daily life. These other non-state entities provide a basis for their social, judicial, and political organizations. The tribal society is socially organized (64.33%) living an independent and autonomous life. That’s why majority of the respondents (67.40%) were of the opinion that they refuse to accept state authority (See below Table – 4.2 FATA Field Survey 2013). Reviewing the history of British government policies towards the tribal people of FATA, similar challenges are faced by the Pakistani state in seeking control over the tribal areas. FATA, being a segmentary society, always resisted change but the tribal people would receive subsidies and benefits from the British government in exchange of law and order. Pakistan also adopted the same policy of subsidies and allowances in order to avoid conflict with the tribal people due to its weak state capacity and other strategic compulsions at the time of independence. The continuation of this policy of subsidies first by the British government and then by the Pakistani government, has resulted in a kind of tribal social norm. Taking away this norm of subsidies would, for sure, result in a cause of resistance.
Though the provision of these subsidies and payments could help in the extension of Pakistani state governance, however it failed to integrate FATA in the mainstream governance system. Thus, to avoid any conflict with the tribals, the Pakistani state has opted to isolate the tribal areas. Besides, like its predecessors, Pakistan has adopted the policy of indirect rule through Malaki System. From the organizational structure perspectives, the Malaki System is in contradiction to the tribal social organization having no hierarchical structure through a single individual. Thus, in FATA it is observed that the Malak often work for his personal interest rather than fulfilling the interest as expected by the state (Ahmed 1980).
The historical legacy of continuing the British policies despite having common grounds with FATA proved counterproductive for Pakistani state. That’s whenever, the Pakistani state wanted to bring policy changes in FATA, the tribal people always resisted, in similar way as they did towards the British policies (Ahmed 2004).
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4.3 MODERN (CURRENT) DYNAMICS OF STATE – SOCIETY RELATIONS
AND INTERACTIONS This section reviews the social factors of state-society relations that pose challenges to state authority in the tribal society. Some elements of state un-governability originate and lie in the weakness of the state, however, the society dynamics also cause un- governability or resistance to state governance. These society-based factors of resistance to state governance are rooted deeply in the dynamics of state and society interaction and the relationship which is based based on this interaction. These lies in the relationship and interaction between state and groups in a society. With regard to the dynamics of society, this section covers social control with in the context of state- society relations, centre-periphery relations, civic trust and lack of social capital, social cohesion and social exclusion of citizens by state. Further it discusses the state- society interaction focussing on the state evolution in relationship with society, social forces sharing power and responsibility with the state, the state influence on societal processes, the impact of social dynamics on the individuals who govern the state, and the social cohesion within the context of state-society relations.
State weakness is caused by dysfunctional relationships in society. Coupled with state capacity, it has become more evident that the central problem in the developing states, where state lacks its governance (authority) in all its areas/territories, can be understood as dynamics rooted in society. State-society relations, citizenship and socio-political cohesion are areas of great importance to extend state governance (authority) or state building in an area.
The society-centric scholars claim the existence of inseparable connection between state and society. They consider that a strong capable state which has monopolized on social control leads to conflict between state and various social organizations within a society. The conflict between both of these lies over getting the social control and imposition of ‘rules of the game’. The distribution of social control in society that emerges as a result of this conflict between societies and states determines whether states become strong or weak (Migdal 1988, 10 – 50). In two areas the state relates to society i.e. i) state is omnipresent and ii) state is presented as an absentee owner. With regard to developing states, the lines of the
144 relationship between the state and society are blurred, mostly characterized by conflict and seldom by cooperation.
4.3.1 Social Control and Strong Tribal Society The society-centric literature theorizes that in most the post-colonial states of developing world, weakness lies in the very structure of their societies. In these states, the societies are in the form of decentralized collections of social units having a central (national) system of symbols or values. These societies are mostly “web-like” composed of local organizations with local constituencies instead of being truly national in scope and are headed by local strongmen, e.g. “Chiefs, landlords (Choudhries), bosses, rich peasants (wadairas), religious figures (Pirs), and tribal clan leaders (Malaks). The people of these societies obey these strongmen as legitimate authority instead of the state (Migdal 1988, 39). One of the reasons for state weakness to achieve social control in its web-like society is the presence of a number of group diversities. In these states with web-like societies, the people are governed by state but the social control is fragmented and heterogeneous in these societies because the allocation of values and symbols are not centralized.
The tribal society of Pakistan is one of the examples of this web-like society strongly controlled by elders of each tribe. These tribal people obey tribal leaders and their informal customs, Pakthunwali, instead of state leaders and state law.
Social control is the ability to make the operative rules of the game for people in society. As mentioned that about 73 percent of the FATA territory is governed under informal customary law that’s why due to the absence of state formal institutions, the people in FATA obey informal institutions (for details see chapter-3). The non-state actors (Al Qaeda, local outlaws, militants) challenge state writ and therefore set the ‘rules of the game’ in majority of the areas and are widely accepted by the population instead of the state formal laws.35
35 The concept of “rules of the game” is commonly used in contemporary political science with different meanings. The common meaning taking from this concept is “widely shared beliefs about how the government, or various categories of political actors, ought to behave.” In this regard “Rules of the game” are therefore become fundamentally normative and procedural phenomena. The concept is very often refers to attitudes, expectations i.e. mostly informal and unwritten rules instead of constitution, statutes, court decisions that is written and formal rules. Regarding the function, its content and its common usage and sharing, there is little consensus among the scholars.
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In the absence of Pakistani state presence, social control in FATA is excercised by the non-state actors. Across all Agencies in FATA, majority of the respondents (88.07%) confirmed that the tribal people follow the informal customary law and institutions which, collectively, constitute the rule of the game.36 (See below Table – 4.3 FATA Field Survey 2013).
During the group discussion, most of the respondents shared that one of the reasons for the tribal people to obey their informal customary law and institution is that Pakistani state has not provided till date any significant relief to them in terms of basic amenities, provision of basic services and public goods. They added that the state administration in tribal areas i.e. the Political Administration (Political Agent and his officials) harsh behavior of treating them as subjects (slaves) rather than citizens is also one of the reasons of trust deficit and the defiance shown to the state as a legitimate authority in their eyes (FGD 12, FATA Field Survey 2013).
The basic responsibility of a state is to provide public goods to its people (Anton, Fisk, and Holmström 2000). The respondents expressed concern about their security, lack of basic facilities, human rights and desired to be treated at par with rest of the people of the country. The respondents narrated that the tribal people make their own arrangements for security and arrange other services by themselves (FGD 1, FATA Field Survey 2013).
The problems which the tribal people face include: lack of basic facilities, provision of basic amenities and delivery of social services by the state. The respondents narrated that the state is not providing basic facilities in FATA like the facilities enjoyed by people of other parts of the country. The tribal people even lack basic human rights. It was in 1997 that the tribal people were given right to vote by the then president of Pakistan Farooq Leghari, but still they do not have a political party of their own. Even they do not have local government system in FATA, which is prevailing in other parts of the country (FGD 10, FATA Field Survey 2013).
Since independence in 1947, the tribal people have been deprived of their real representation in the state legislature and in the decision-making. Though, presently
36 In most of the tribal areas, the Non State Actors, Taliban and militants orders and do state like functions i.e. ordering prices of daily used commodities, ban on the use of certain goods and control many other day to day activities.
146 the tribal areas are represented by 12 members in the National Assembly and 08 in the Senate. Despite this reasonable respresentation, the tribal parliamentarians cannot legislate for FATa. Further, the tribal people have no representation in the Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa province. Likewise, due to the lack of organized local government system, the tribals cannot elect members at the local level. With regard to development, FATA presents a dismal picture of being the most neglected, underdeveloped, and backward region of Pakistan, clearly showing the state’s inability in performing functions (FGD 12, FATA Field Survey 2013).
During Bhutto era, to integrate FATA into the mainstream system, policies of socio- economic and political changes were initiated. But these policies did not bring real change due to their shortcomings (Rubin 2013, 368).
Within this context during field interview, a senior journalist hailing from FATA shared his views thus:
For the first time in the post-independent history of FATA, the Bhutto government initiated programs of socio-economic development that had their political implications as well. These reforms required constitutional amendments as well as administrative overhauling. It also required extension of the party system to FATA. But these important reforms and adjustments were not extended to FATA. With the passage of time, this lack of administrative and political changes created a kind of vacuum in FATA which, at a later stage, was exploited by the militants (Interview 34, FATA Field Survey 2013).
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Table – 4.3: State Authority and Control in FATA
Social Control: State Authority and Control Q). I am going to read you a list of possible things/options. Please click an appropriate answer for each question as per the given options.
Response Strongly Strongly Don't Question/Indicator Rate Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Know Total a). In your area, Government (formal Frequency 412 201 28 627 227 5 1500 institutions) has more controls on daily lives of the people and makes ‘rules of the game’. Percent 27.47 13.40 1.87 41.80 15.13 0.33 100 b). In your area, informal/customary Frequency 959 57 11 370 101 2 1500 institutions have more controls on daily lives of the people and set ‘rules of the game’. Percent 63.93 3.80 0.73 24.67 6.73 0.13 100 Frequency 298 98 28 988 85 3 1500 c). State Law is accepted and obeyed. Percent 19.87 6.53 1.87 65.87 5.67 0.20 100 d). Customary Law is accepted and Frequency 1321 122 35 14 5 3 1500 obeyed. Percent 88.07 8.13 2.33 0.93 0.33 0.93 101 e). Do you think it should be the Frequency 376 80 433 455 155 1 1500 responsibility and moral obligation of the tribal people to obey the state law instead of customary law? Percent 25.07 5.33 28.87 30.33 10.33 0.07 100 f). The state law and authority is Frequency 321 111 89 832 137 10 1500 legitimate and, therefore, finding. Percent 21.40 7.40 5.93 55.47 9.13 0.67 100 g). People take their disputes to state Frequency 123 57 98 988 227 6 1499 institutions. Percent 8.20 3.80 6.53 65.87 15.13 0.40 99.9 h). People take their disputes to the Frequency 1189 121 12 120 47 11 1500 local informal institutions (Mullah, Taliban, Jirga, etc.) Percent 79.27 8.07 0.80 8.00 3.13 0.73 100
4.3.2 Civic Trust and Citizens versus Subjects Social trust37is not only necessary for interpersonal and inter-group level, but at community/society level also in terms of shared norms and values as well as trust in the state and its institutions (‘civic trust’) (Berman, Eyoh, and Kymlicka 2004, 44). Among others, social trust is one of the important factors in the strength or weakness of state governance in a society because the people in those societies which are
37 Social trust is a feeling of trust, belief or faith in the reliability, honesty or integrity of other people.
148 ignored or marginalized by state, develop or attach their loyalties with other actors (non-state actors, e.g. family, ethnic group etc.) lacking trust on state. Social trust is very much linked with consensus and political cohesion, both being important factors for a strong state (Larsen 2013, 273).
Though under Articles 1 and 2 of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, FATA is a part of Pakistan, however, according to Articles 51, 59 and 247, the area is governed through the President of Pakistan as its direct executive. Further, with regard to citizenship, the tribal people are considered as secondary citizens or subjects (like British Colonial rule) because Articles 8 to 28 guarantee fundamental rights to Pakistani citizens, the people of FATA stand deprived while the FCR completely denies these rights to the people tribal areas (Mamdani 1996).
Tribal society of FATA, due to the absence of Pakistani state institutions (lack of formal state institutions, lack of development programs based on civil society engagement and lack of people-centred programs) and continuous marginalization by the successive Pakistani governments, lacks trust on Pakistan and its leaders.
During interview, an official of the Political Administration said:
There has always been a trust deficit between the tribal people and the federal government. These tribal people feel perceptible reluctance when they deal with the state machinery. The tribal people consider the federal government and its bureaucracy, as something an outsider, a body unknown to them and having no influence on their lives in a meaningful way. The central government is regarded a strange entity having conflict with the interests of the tribes. That’s why the local population always supports local Malaks and their customs first; without caring for any kind of offer/benefits given or offered by the federal government of Pakistan. Since the British Raj, the Pakistani government also ruled in an indirect way which has further strengthened these local stakeholders (Malaks), with state patronage (Interview 33: FATA Field Survey 2013).
Social or civic trust encourages a minority or the marginalized communities within a state to participate in state activities, to trust state institutions, to own state and have loyalties with state and its institutions and to accept the government as a legitimate entity to rule over them (Rotberg 2010, 243). Civic trust is built when a state (elected government) works for the development of all communities within its jurisdiction.
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Social trust not only promotes peace and reduces sense of deprivation and resistance to state but also leads to the economic development of a state.
The people not only trust and follow their informal institutions but also lack trust on state formal institutions due to the state’s discriminatory behaviour towards them. The tribal people always trust deficit on Pakistani state by arguing that they have made great sacrifices for Pakistan in the past as well as in current times but they claim that in return they have always been discriminated by the Pakistani state.
Recently, as a result of military operations in FATA, the tribal people got displaced from their houses for the first time in history. They experienced and passed through miseries and sorrows. They were discriminated and ignored by the state and also mistreated as against their culture. This resulted in a further loss of trust and increased grievances against Pakistani state.
“We belong to Pakistan, but today, we do not feel Pakistani at all because we are living in camps, a life of exile. Not only that we were left hapless and helpless during the war on terror by the rest of Pakistan, but the governments of other provinces prohibited the entry of tribal IDPs. This shocked our trust and feeling to be Pakistanis. Even, the history is replete that how much the tribal people scarified for Pakistan. We sacrificed during independence movement, during USSR attack on Afghanistan, and even recently in War against terrorism” (Daily Express Tribune blog, Mohmand 2014). Under Pakistani constitution, begin a federal state, where not only all provinces and people have equal rights but every citizen enjoys the right to settle in any part of the country. But the discriminatory attitude meted out to the tribal IDPs, clearly shows the marginalization and social exclusion of tribal people by Pakistani state.
4.3.3 Social Cohesion, Social Exclusion and Marginalization Scholars associate two principle goals with regard to achievement of high degree of social cohesion. The first depends on reducing disparities, inequalities and social exclusion. These can be operationalized in the context of analytical frameworks that demonstrates the thrust towards greater equality and greater equity pertaining to accessing conditions and opportunities. The second includes strengthening social relations, interactions and ties between individuals, between networks, and between the networks and individuals, with all such relationships contributing to facilitate
150 individuals' attitudes and behaviours about sustaining group membership (Berger- Schmitt and Noll 2000). In this context, state-society relations are key to effective state governance. Better state governance includes at its core “an effective political process for citizens and states to negotiate mutual demands, obligations and expectations” (OECD 2008). In a weakly governed state, this process is absent. Among others, state resilience or building or governance (authority) depends on social cohesion of its society. Social cohesion means “the connectedness among individuals and social groups that facilitates collaboration and equitable resource distribution at the household, community and state level” (Migdal 1988, 21). It is the characteristics of a society with regard to relations among the members and the founding effects of these relations. Characteristics of social cohesion include shared values, feeling of common identity, interpretation, trust and sense of belonging among members, and a feeling in the community to have minimum disparities among the members. (Woolley 1998) During field survey, to understand the social cohesion in tribal society, the people shared: “Historically, the tribal society was socially very cohesive with regard to its internal structure and organization. But with regard to other than its tribal institutions, in these areas historically and also currently, due to inequity among the tribal households, civil society and its relations with state institutions, there is a growing increase in social fragmentation, which is further leading to the decline of social cohesion. The decline in social cohesion further resulted in the social exclusion of tribal society” (FGD 3, FATA Field Survey 2013). Till date, the tribal people have not benefited from socio-economic and political restructuring and, as a result, the newly created opportunities. Further, the current displacement of tribal people in the wake of war on terror and military operations in FATA, especially, in the wake of war on terror their displacement has resulted in the weakening bonds of kinship and community. This weakening social cohesion has further resulted in increased corruption, crime and lawlessness in tribal areas.
Social Exclusion and Marginalization: Social exclusion is defined as “a process by which certain groups are systematically disadvantaged and discriminated on the basis of their ethnicity, race, religion, sexual orientation, caste, descent, gender, age, disability, HIV status, migrant status and the place of living” (Khan, and Fraser 2015, 4). In this way, it is a concept of multidimensional nature operating on all levels of
151 society comprising socio-economic, political and cultural dimensions. The tribal society has been discriminated by the state in all aspects of social (education, health, social institutions level of family, household etc.), legal (no state legal institution is there), economically and politically (Khan, and Fraser 2015). Society-centric scholars claim that discrimination based on identity has often remained a fundamental cause of state society conflict thus resulting in state weakness. The basis of this identity discrimination includes religion, class, ethnicity, gender and also denial of socio- economic and political rights. Regarding the social cleavages caused by the social exclusion in FATA, the respondents shared their views thus:
“Historically, the tribal people in FATA have been deprived socio-economically and politically i.e. totally excluded by the Pakistani state. This has led to a gap in the relations between Pakistani state and the tribal society, thus resulting in distrust of tribal people on Pakistani state. The Pakistani state never tried to fill this gap nor tried to get the trust of tribal people through political negotiation and the extension of rights. This not only led the tribal people to involve in violent opposition against the state but is also one of the major causes of resistance to state governance in FATA” (Interview 7, 8, 13, 18: FATA Field Survey 2013).
The exclusion of FATA by the Pakistani state has played a major role in the tribal resistance to state governance. The distrust of tribal people due to weak state-society relations in FATA, has further led to the weakening of state legitimacy in the eyes of tribal people. In the long term, this lack of legitimacy further resulted in issues of conflict between Pakistani state and the tribal society (FGD 2, FATA Field Survey 2013).
Relations between the state and society have been unacceptable, paving the way for inequality and the perception of marginalization among the inhabitants of FATA which, in turn, provides the non-state actors an opportunity to gain legitimacy among the masses of FATA. Many studies suggest a strong correlation between resistance to state and inequality (United Nations Publications 2010, 279). Social exclusion in Pakistan is prevailing at all level, thus affecting its governance and stability (Castillejo 2012). In the context of FATA, the exclusion related grievances are felt in the shape of insurgency and resistance against the Pakistani state. Generally
152 in Pakistan, the existence of historically deep rooted exclusion based on social, economic and political grounds has resulted in the weakness of state in most of its peripheries. In the context of FATA, four major types of exclusions are existing, which include the economic and political exclusion; violence; access to land; and the exclusion of tribal people especially youth, men and women (Castillejo 2012). These exclusions further lead to marginalization of a society.
Marginalization of tribal people has resulted in their trust deficit in Pakistani state. Citizenship is a social contract between the state and its citizens. In this contract, the citizens are supposed to get rights and also to fulfil obligations. The violation of this contract by any of the contractual parties would lead to the trust deficit between the two. According to this contract, the citizens pledge their acceptance to be ruled by the state security and all kinds of rights of protection.
In the context of FATA, a retired bureaucrat, who has also worked as a Political Agent, told:
“Tribal society of FATA has been continuously ignored and marginalized by the Pakistani state since independence. The state also failed to provide protection to its citizens. This ignorance has led to the trust deficit between tribal society and Pakistani state. This has provided space to non-state actors (the militants, Al Qaeda, Taliban etc.), not only to emerge as powerful groups but also win the trust of tribal people. Initially, to get goodwill of the people, these non-state groups of militants and Taliban acted like state by providing protection from the miscreants (smugglers, robbers, thieves etc.). But, later on, they tried to impose their own version of law, by executing all those who opposed them and created their own regime of terror” (Interview 36, FATA Field Survey 2013).
To sum up, it is argued that the social exclusion and marginalization by the state has resulted in trust deficit on state in tribal society. It has fostered the feelings of deprivations in FATA. Conversely, the state presence at the tribal can develop trust and de-marginalization. The government, if perform its functions and responsibilities well, may certainly lead to trust development in tribal society, thus resulting in the state control in FATA.
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4.3.4 State- Society Connectedness and Citizenship The proponents of society-centric approach argue that for the better governance of a society, understanding the state-society dynamics and interdependent relationship is important. In FATA, due to the weak state-society relationship, the Pakistani state’s reach in tribal society is limited and constrained. The very concept of citizenship is that both the society and the state are interdependent on each other. The relationship between citizens and the state determines the responsibilities of the two and also sets norms for citizen’s interaction with each other (Engberg-Pedersen et al. 2008)
During field interviews, the respondents were asked about the relationship between the Pakistani state and tribal society. The answer given was:
“Under the Constitution of Pakistan, though FATA is part Pakistan but in real sense and true spirit the rights of citizenship to tribal people are denied. Unlike, the rest of Pakistani citizens, the tribal people in FATA are not enjoying rights of various forms in a true sense” (Interview 3, 14, 38, FATA Field Survey 2013).
4.3.5 The Interactions between the State and Society The state and society are entwined in various relations and interactions. These interactions are mainly of four kinds. In the context of FATA, there four modes of interactions are dicussed below: i). The State Grows from its Relationship with the Society: The state’s interaction with the tribal society was diagnosed by asking from the respondents about state presence in their life. Interviewees who work in development projects put it thus:
“In FATA, only tribal Malaks have frequent interaction with state through Political Agent. The rest of the people never interact directly with state. The Malaks only have access to economic and political resources. However, these Malaks, along their counterparts, Political Agents, do not allow change in the tribal society, thus keeping people out of the state reach” (Interview 12, 32, 33 and 37 FATA Field Survey 2013). ii). The State and Social Forces Share Duties, Responsibilities and Power: In FATA, due to weak state-society relations, the authority of the state stands fragmented and contested. In FATA, the power emanate from the informal indigenous authorities
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(Malaks), religious leaders (Mullah), militants, culture and civil society organizations, thus religious, resources, culture and the personal traits of the indigenous authorities (Malaks) are the major sources of this power and each one works as a social force in the tribal society. These informal social forces regulate the behaviour of people with regard to every aspect of life, even the market (FGD 11, FATA Field Survey 2013). iii). The affects of social dynamics on the behaviour of individuals who govern the state: The state is governed by individuals of its society. The social relations and the very society from which these individuals belong have influence on the behaviour of them. The society influence the behaviour of these individuals through its culture, belief system, power structure and the conceptions of the society regarding identity (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2003, 225 – 282). These influences shape the behaviour of these individuals, bureaucrats or civil servants, who govern the society.
About this social influence on the behaviour of individuals, the respondents shared:
“Though in modern day world, favouring family members in various sectors e.g. in employment or given contract etc. is not viewed proper as per modern state concept. But in our tribal society, supporting family members or same tribe members is mandatory as per tribal culture. Thus supporting your cousins in a conflict or other competition is a part of tribe culture. Even in a conflict, though one knows that your family or tribe member is at fault or is not entitled to a benefit. Even for a job, though one knows that your family or tribe member is not eligible or is on merit” (Interview 12, 33, and 37 FATA Field Survey 2013). iv). Societal Processes is influenced by the State: Though, due to the growing role and intervention by the state in its society, today in the modern world the term “stateless” society is obsolete. However, the societal dynamics pose challenges to the various functions of the modern state. Similarly, the society is also influenced by the state in various but significant ways (Migdal 2004, 59).
The state always influences and struggles to penetrate a society through various tactics and means of policies (Gorski 1993, 265 – 316). A respondent shared his views during field interview about the Pakistani state’s influence in the tribal society. He said:
“The Pakistani state cannot extract of revenue in FATA. Even the state distribution of resources is not in a just and a meaningful way. Also the Pakistani state has no
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control to regulate social behaviour of the tribal people as the state common laws and statutes are not applicable to FATA. The state infrastructure like its media (news etc.) and other contacts are absent in FATA and thus have no effects on the behaviour of tribal people.” (Interview 1, 14, 36, and 39 FATA Field Survey 2013).
CONCLUSION To sum up, an analysis of the state- tribal society relations with various states/empires since pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial period show that the tribes never surrendered to the central authority of any foreign power and persistently posed challenges to all authorities whoever tried to subjugate them.
The historical analysis of the genealogy of the state governance of tribal society has brought forth certain lesson, which need a brief reference before moving to the contemporary state and tribal society relations in the next chapter.
The tribal society has passed through numerous wars and invasions throughout the history. Throughout the precolonial, and dynastic eras, these tribal areas enjoyed and maintained their independence. Free of any superfluous influence, these tribes administered themselves independent of any external pressure.
These tribes developed their own separate and unique socio-culture and judicial system which is suited to their peculiarity having principles of self-respect and equality. Independent of any formal institutions, the tribal people have developed their own informal institutions and rules which are embodied in their social norms. Pakhtunwali is a complete code of life, also called Rewaj. The Rewaj is embedded in their soul.
During the dynastic era, their relationship with the state was only limited to the accepting of remunerations in the form of subsidies, allowances, favours and concessions. The tribal people accepted a kind of irregular and lose control only for allowing the marching armies or trading caravans through their areas. With regard to political relationship with the tribal people, a state had only limited interaction with the tribes through their elders (Malaks or Masharan). This interaction through the intermediaries Malaks, was institutionalized and formalized during the British colonial era. Throughout the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial period, the state never got itself integrated with the tribal areas.
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The contemporary dynamics of tribal society and Pakistani state relations show a clear picture of Pakistani state’s ignorance and marginalization of tribal society in all aspects of socio-economic and political spheres of life, which has resulted in a society that is totally distrusting state, lack social cohesion, having no connection, independent of Pakistani state, thus today posing a great challenge to the state to extend its governance (authority) in the tribal areas.
In the macro-level context of Pakistan’s overall relatively weak governance in FATA, it is argued that the peculiar dynamics of tribal society and state relationships through the history had significant influence on the emergence of weak state in the tribal areas. Thus the independent evolution of tribal society, beyond the state control, of the political, social, and military aspects resulted in the emergence of weak state governance. The loose control of state in tribal society shows the historically embedded evolution of tribal societal strength throughout the history.
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CHAPTER – 5
CHALLENGES TO STATE GOVERNANCE IN FATA – ‘STATE-IN-SOCIETY’APPROACH
5.1 INTRODUCTION This chapter attempts to locate the tribal society within the larger context of Pakistan in order to capture relationship between the two. The chapter analyses challenges to state governance in the perspective of state-in-society approach by assessing Pakistani state capabilities to perform four tasks: penetrate society, extract resources, regulate social relationships, and distribute resources in determined ways. The state-in-society model explains the dynamics of actions and reactions of both the state and society in shaping and posing challenges to eachother. Within this model, the discussion provides details on the role of tribal society in affecting the central state's agenda of dominating the former. From the tribal society perspective, the chapter identifies several social forces that are influential in mobilizing the populace hence posing a threat to the state. Through this analysis of state and social forces in tribal society, this chapter provides the basis for an understanding of the role of both entities in establishing political domination FATA. This analysis of state-society relations in FATA provides a background to determine whether Pakistan is a strong state to dominate tribal society or not?
As a point of departure, the chapter takes Migdals’ observation that state and tribal society relations have historically taken three basic forms: co-optation through tactical concessions, manipulation through public relations and repression through the deployment of state-centred political administration. The chapter shows that these responses continue to be applied today. This is the context in which recent innovations in state-society relations approaches should be understood. From this perspective, the state-in-society approach represents a state response to extending state authority by providing additional resources for co-optation and by improving the states’ image in tribal society. It is not the drastic departure from historical patterns of state-society relations that the state presents it to be. This chapter consists of three main parts. Part one begins with discussion on historical review of tracing the evolution of Pakistani state and tribal society relations. It also
158 discusses in detail the constitutional and legal reform efforts by various regimes to bring FATA to the mainstream system of the state by reviewing all laws, reforms or acts extended to FATA till date. Part two examines the application of state-in-society approach to Pakistani state and tribal society. Part two then moves the discussion towards detailed state-society analysis in FATA within the context of state-in-society approach. It finds that most of the regimes did not directly assert their authority in the tribal areas but extended governance (authority) indirectly through various tactics of co-optation, manipulation and repression. Part three presents a discussion on various social forces operating in the tribal society. These include both formal and informal social forces that are a continuous struggle and competition with the state to get domination in tribal society. The whole discussion in this chapter is structured in such a way to provide a baseline for the analysis of challenges to state governance in the tribal areas from statist perspective in the subsequent chapters.
5.2 STATE AND TRIBAL SOCIETY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN In the wake of independence in 1947, Pakistan being a new state had a little capacity as it relied mostly on friendly diplomacy to deal with tribal Pakhtuns than military force or money. At the time of independence, Jinnah assured the tribal people of respecting their traditions and autonomy. The newly Pakistani state recognized these tribal areas as their parts and treaties were signed with tribes to keep the British policies, privileges and incentives intact (Cheeema and Naqvi 2005, 30 - 40). The famous ‘Instrument of Accession’ signed by Quaid-e-Azam at the Bannu Tribal Jirga in January 1948, accepted the autonomous status of FATA. The same principle was enshrined in all the constitutions of Pakistan. Addressing a Tribal Jirga on April 17, 1948, Jinnah said: “…Pakistan has no desire to unduly interfere with your internal freedom...You have also expressed your desire to get the benefits... Neither my Government nor I have any desire to modify the existing arrangements…” (Rafique 1966).
Analysts are of the opinion that at the time of independence, the Pakistani state due to structural reasons and strategic compulsions of having rival state of India at border and to keep the tribal areas as buffer zone along the disputed border with Afghanistan,
159 left the tribal areas’ informal governance undisturbed (Rakisits 2008). The Pakistani state framed policies to keep tribal areas governed by continuing the minimal interference policy of British. This ultimately resulted in the tribal areas socio- economic and political underdevelopment as compared to the rest of Pakistan. (For details about comparative development analysis see chapter-3). In order to get the loyalty of local tribes, the Pakistani state continued the provision of subsidies and allowances to Malaks. In 1951-1952, the government of Pakistan signed agreements with the tribal chiefs to acquire greater control (Cheeema and Naqvi 2005, 27 - 28). With the existing tribal Agencies of South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Kurram and Khyber, new Agencies of Mohmand Agency in 1951, and Bajaur and Orakzai in 1973 were added (Cheeema and Naqvi 2005, 27 - 28).
This newly acquired status brought tremendous change to tribal areas especially with regard to its autonomy. Although physically isolated from the centre of power, this isolation foils to deter the central state from imposing its authority in the tribal areas that is as narrow stretched belt (geographically-speaking) but the most important part of the country (geo-strategically speaking) bordering Afghanistan, and was always served as buffer zone (Cheeema and Naqvi 2005, 34 - 40).
The tribal areas were also negatively affected due to the Soviet occupation on Afghanistan in 1979 till 1989. As the tribal areas served as a support ground for the Mujahideen campaign, it resulted in the complete transformation of the tribal social fabric into religious fundamentalism. The Malaks and the Mullah, the two indigenous local authorities were replaced by the Mujahidden commanders. The commanders got control and power over the tribal people and resources (Cheeema and Naqvi 2005, 27 - 28).
Again, due to the global war on terror, with regard to geostrategic importance, FATA emerged as one of the most important regions. The history is replete of examples where mere military intervention in FATA did not bring strategic long-term success. Thus, for the extension of state governance and control, understanding the complex history of state-society relations in the tribal areas is important.
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5.2.1 Constitutional and Legal Account At the time of independence, the voluntary annexation of tribal areas with Pakistan set the de Jure foundation of FATA replacing the British rule and made fresh commitments towards each other (Siddique 2014, 230 – 240). The FCR, a law for tribal society devised by the British, was protected and acknowledged by the Pakistani state in all the three constitutions it has had till date i.e. In the 1956 Constitution38 through Articles 103 and 104, in 1962 Constitution39 through Article 223, and in 1973 Constitution under Articles 1 and 2, the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) are defined as a part of Pakistan. However, according to Articles 51, 59 and 247 of the 1973 constitution, it is under the executive control of the president.40 However, till date FATA is governed through the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) of 1901, which contradicts the Pakistani constitution in protecting the fundamental rights of tribal people. Further, several of the FCR clauses41 are in violation of the 1973 Pakistani Constitution (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan Peshawar Chapter, 2005).
5.2.2 Pakistani State Laws, Reforms and Interventions Article 247 of the 1973 Constitution empowers only the president of Pakistan to issue a decree/order of his choice. Even the laws passed by the parliament of Pakistan cannot be extended to FATA unless signed by the president. The president also has the right to modify or alter any law passed by the parliament before extending it to FATA (The Constitutions of Pakistan 1973).
There is a general misconception that the laws of Pakistani state are not applied FATA nor Pakistani laws have been extended to FATA. Likewise no reform efforts have been made by the successive governments to extend its laws to FATA. However,
38 The two Articles provided for the administration of “Excluded Areas” and “Special Areas”, referring to the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas and Federally Administered Tribal Areas, respectively. Article 104 empowered the President of Pakistan with administrative control. The governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa then called the NWFP, was the representative of the president and exercised the executive powers in FATA. 39 In this constitution, the jurisdiction of Supreme Court of Pakistan was initially not denied to FATA, which were done later on through a constitutional amendment, thus giving special powers to the Governor of West Pakistan of doing legislation for FATA. 40 Articles 8 to 28 of the 1973 Constitutions of Pakistan ensure fundamental rights to the citizens of Pakistan. Under these Articles, if any right of the citizens is violated, the judiciary, being custodian of the constitution, will protect the right. However, with regard to Tribal people, FATA being a part of Pakistan, and tribal people being citizens of Pakistan, are deprived of these fundamental rights ensured in Articles 8-28 of the 1973 Constitution. 41 Clause 21 deals with collective punishment and under Sections 22-23, fines are imposed on the entire tribe/family for the crime of a single person and FCR 40 is always misused against tribal people in FATA.
161 the fact is that many laws, acts, reforms and ordinances have been extended by Pakistani government to FATA since independence. Some of these Acts are: “the Passport Act 1913”, “the Trade Mark Act 1940”, “Pakistan Control of Entry Act 1952”, and “the Public Debt Act 1944”. (Government of Pakistan FATA Secretariat 2012)
Similarly since independence, the Pakistani state has undertaken and is still making efforts to bring reforms and extend its governance to FATA. Some of these efforts proved successful while many failed due to various reasons.
To review the overall reforms history, the first important Act extended to FATA was the ‘Pakistan’s Army Act, 1952’ in 1965 (under this Act, no military action can be challenged in any court of law). Another Act (regulation) which was extended to FATA in 1967 was ‘The Administration of the Basic Democracies (Tribal Areas) Regulation, 1967’.42 For the development of FATA, in 1970, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto established FATA Development Corporation (FATA DC). FATA DC has performed well in bringing development in FATA since its inception. In 1975, ‘The Agriculture Development Bank Ordinance, 1961 (IV of 1961)’43 as well ‘The Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961 (XXXI of 1961)’ were extended to the tribal areas of FATA.44 The ‘National Disaster Management Ordinance (No. LIII of 2007)’ was extended on March 03, 2008, the ‘FATA Disaster Management Commission 2007 (Ord.No.LIII of 2007)’ was extended on August 24, 2008, and the same year in October 2008 was established the FATA Disaster Management Authority (GoP 2008).
Regarding Lego-administrative system, the Pakistani state kept the British Lego- administrative system i.e. FCR in FATA. However in 1979, the ‘Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) (Amendment) Ordinance 1979’ was also promulgated in FATA,45
42 Local leaders/representatives were elected under this Regulation 1967. These representatives were to work under the Political Agent and thus did not hold much real authority. 43 The purpose of the extension of this Ordinance was to bring agriculture development in FATA, but still only a small number of agricultural banks are operating in some parts of FATA. 44 The aim of this Ordinance was to provide loans to tribal people for setting up medium and small- sized industrial units in FATA. However, this ordinance was not implemented. 45 The Pakistan Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) is a general law for dealing with criminal cases in the rest of Pakistan. While FATA, FCR is practices. However the extension of CCP was mean to consult CCP, when FCR does not provide clear rules in particular cases. It was meant to guide special courts set up by Pas and Assistant Pas. But in practice the CCP does not apply nor consulted by PAs or Assistant PAs in FATA.
162 with the provision that it would cover the gap when relevant rules are missing in FCR. But it could not be applied till date.
Regarding political and governance reforms, in 1976 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto formed a committee under Gen (Rtd.) Naseerullah Babar, to create a framework to make FATA part of NWFP for general elections 1977. The committee would have succeeded had the military coup of 1977 not occurred. Most recently in December 1996, Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari, the President and the chief executive of FATA gave the right to vote to the tribal people by extending the Adult Franchise Act to FATA. In 2002, ‘Local Government Regulations 2002’ were extended to FATA by the government of General Pervaiz Musharraf.46
President Asif Ali Zardari announced the FATA Reforms Package on Pakistan Independence Day in 2009, but most of these reforms were not notified at the time of announcement. Later, President Zardari announced two more changes for FATA on 12 August 2011. One was about amendments in the tribal draconian law (FCR) and second was regarding the extension of ‘Political Parties Ordinance (PPO) 2002’ to FATA.47The Zardari government established various committees to submit reports suggesting reforms in FATA. These include: the Sahibzada Imtiaz Ahmad 2006 committee report, the Fata sustainable development plan of 2006; retired justice Ajmal Mian`s report of 2008; a report by the Shaheed Bhutto Foundation of 2008 and the Political Parties` Joint Commission of 2013; and the report of the governor`s FATA Reform Commission of 2015. All these efforts sought to reform the FCR.
The government of Nawaz Sharif (2013 – 2017), in November 2015, assigned a task to the FATA Reforms Committee (FRC) to suggest reforms in the tribal system. The committee presented its report in August 2016, proposing restricted integration of FATA with the adjacent province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), under a special law, called “Tribal Areas Rewaj Act” replacing FCR in FATA. The report also proposed the extension of Supreme Court of Pakistan and the Peshawar High Court jurisdiction into FATA and the retention of Jirga system for both civil and criminal matters, where
46 Under 2002 Local Government Regulations, local government elections were held in 2004 in FATA. In which local-tier were elected i.e. Agency Nazim (mayor), Tehsil Nazim and councilor. However, this regulation were also not be implemented in FATA in real spirit. The people, media and civil society criticized the elections in FATA termed the process as a "selection" process not election process, due to the local authorities overwhelming involvement in the election. 47 However, the elected FATA parliamentarians could not as yet legislate for FATA.
163 a council of elders will be appointed by a judge, who would decide under the tribal rewaj. The judge will pass judgment under the relevant law to settle civil or criminal cases.48
Till date, in various forms about 193 laws have been extended by Pakistani state to FATA. This low number of laws extension into FATA, represents a low focus and slow speed of the application of Pakistani laws in FATA.49 Coupled with this, there is an overall lack of mechanism of implementation of reforms and laws in FATA. The most important aspect of lack of reforms or laws is the general lack of interest and resistance among various agents, stakeholders and beneficiaries of the existing system of FATA, who are not in favour and resist these reforms due to their vested interests. These include, Malaks, Political Agents and those who are getting large income due to the absence of state laws in FATA i.e. smugglers and outlaws, most recently the militants and Pakistan military.50 Besides, the local administrators do not bother much to implement the extended laws in FATA due to various reasons. These include: the lack of interest in supporting the introduction of new laws by the stakeholders, lack of accountability mechanism in the administrative system of FATA, limited access due to bad law and order situation, corrupt political administration, and the lack of judicial oversight.
5.3 CAPABILITIES OF PAKISTANI STATE AND TRIBAL SOCIETY This section presents an account of the relations between Pakistani state and the tribal society relations within the framework of State-in-Society Approach/Model (For details see Section-1.6 of Chapter-1), by assessing capabilities of the former to intervene and penetrate in the later. Mann calls it infrastructural capacity of a state, defining it as "the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm” (Mann 1993, 189). The first kind of power of a state is to take action or practically fulfil a goal. In this regard, the decision making ability of a state is different from the ability to implement the decision. Within the domain of infrastructural capacity, the second type of power
48 There is a growing criticism on these proposals from various strata of the society, with regard to the proposal council of elders under a judge and also with regard to FATA integration with KP. 49 For detail list of Legislative Acts extended to FATA See Government of FATA Website https://fata.gov.pk/Global.php?iId=439&fId=2&pId=355&mId=15. Accessed April 24, 2013. 50 Joel S. Migdal, email message to Research Scholar of this study, August 23, 2012. Migdal advised to discuss different actors separately in FATA, because in FATA everyone has its own interest and some of them will be supporting status quo.
164 is social control, the power of a state by which a state converts its goals into actions. Also it reflects the sources of a state capacity to implement its decisions or goals (Hazis 2012, 23 – 40).
Migdal argues that “the ability of the state to actually take goal-oriented action rests upon maintaining a political, legal, and normative order” (Migdal 1988, 53). According to Migdal, there are three major sources of social control. These are: the state penetration in society, extraction of resources, and the state regulation of social relations in a given society.
During its formative years, Pakistan was governed by a fairly democratic government that was adapted from the British parliamentary system suited to the local environment and a democratic constitution was promulgated in 1956 (Khan 2013). However, the new state gradually became authoritarian after the military coup in 1958 that made it almost impossible for the ruling political elites to be forced out of office (Jalal 1995, 10 - 15). Despite the government's authoritarian power by a military dictator, it still maintained some features of a democratic model such as frequent elections and some degree of political freedom. This mixture of democratic and authoritarian models led scholars to characterize Pakistani political system as quasi democracy, semi democracy, modified democracy and pseudo- democracy (Levitsky and Way 2010). Pakistan’s ambiguous regime is best described as "responsive and repressive" to describe Pakistan’s hybrid political system (Goldstein 2010, 15 – 30). In essence, a responsive regime is one with a high degree of responsiveness to the demands of its citizens whereas a repressive regime is one in which the ruling elite resorts to the strategies of manipulation, control, and repression to maintain power (Frankel, Pines, and Swilling 1988, 30 - 40). In the context of Pakistan, these two different measures, responsive and repressive, do not contradict each other; instead the Pakistan regime uses them strategically to maintain its political dominance for the last sixty eight years over its population.
Pakistan, being a hybrid regime, holds a total control over the entire population within its territory. Contrary to this general belief, some scholars suggest that even powerful states actually do not have total control over their population; instead they have dispersed domination, having control over some aspects of society while not having control over others (Scott 1998). This section argues that despite being a strong state,
165 having all capabilities to govern its population, Pakistan has limited control over its population especially in its peripheries such as the tribal areas. This limitations of a state’s control has been analysed by assessing the capabilities of Pakistani state in tribal areas of FATA in the context of four functions, namely to penetrate society, to extract resources, to regulate social relationships, and to distribute resources in determined ways (Almond and Powell 1966, 195). However, these functions overlap each other.
Strong states have high capabilities to complete these tasks, while weak states are on the low end of the spectrum of capabilities (Migdal 1988, 6 – 10). By analysing the capabilities of the Pakistani regime in performing these functions in tribal areas, it becomes easy to determine whether Pakistan is a strong or weak state with regard to its penetration to assert its authority in tribal areas. More importantly, this analysis allows us to identify the arenas that pose serious challenge to the states’ capabilities to exercise authority in peripheries.
5.3.1 Penetration of Tribal Areas by State In this section, the Pakistani state’s penetration of tribal society has been assessed through: Pakistani state economic intervention/transformation, policies and programs of social and political change.
The ability to penetrate society refers to the states capability to make its presence felt in society and subsequently affect their livelihood. By penetrating society, "the state would be able to change the very nature of institutional life even in distant villages and towns" (Migdal 1988, 5). In achieving this goal, the state could use various measures such as implementing certain policies, carrying out propaganda, enforcing repressive laws and applying physical force. A strong state has impressive capabilities in igniting sweeping changes in the lives of its people, irrespective of their class, race or religion (Dennis and Cheema 2013, 23 - 50).
Soon after her emergence as an independent state in 1947, Pakistan developed as a “bureaucratic-authoritarian” state. While moving towards nation and state building, this new state faced enormous challenges due to large number of refugees flow, pressing defence requirements, low resources, territorial issues with India and other such issues. Pakistan got financial assets of about 17.5 percent, 18 percent of the overall population, about 7 percent facilities for employment of its population, and a
166 very nominal industrial base of about 10 percent as a share out of the resources of undivided India. These issues further weakened the state survival domain that is to extend its authority over all its territories especially the newly acquired. This was further hindered by an inadequate organizational machinery, mostly made of migrant leadership, who had little acquaintance with the indigenous local population, to fulfil their demands (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1988, 150 – 153). Besides these issue, the military always dominated the Pakistani politics (Rizvi 1974).
With regard to penetrate in society through various socio-economic and political interventions, Pakistani state tried to successfully penetrated into the lives of its people especially tribal people by introducing massive socio-economic and political changes. In this regard, the economic and social outcomes in Pakistan over the last sixty eight (68) years are a mixture of paradoxes.
Important socio-economic and political developments were initiated in the Pakhtun areas of NWFP by the British. These changes were accelerated with the patronage of Pakistani government after 1947 in tribal areas. Having a static socio-economic, political and lego-administrative system, FATA remained susceptible to these changes due to various forces of commerce, employment opportunities and increase in population. The Pakistani government, through these programs, further integrated the Pakhtun tribes of FATA with the Pakhtuns of settled districts. With this, the government administration also changed. These changes in tribal areas caused crack in its tribal social system, between those getting benefits of state patronage Malaki system and those who are not getting these benefits. The stakeholders i.e. the tribal Malaks, other tribal elders e.g. the lungi holders and also the Political Administration in FATA still support the status quo resisting change in the system, allowing limited social, economic and political development, with the hope that these changes do not challenge their power base (Christensen 1987).
This selective state patronage based on tribal lines, has not only developed ways for serving personal interests of these stakeholders instead of state interests but also hurdled prospects for reforms. This has also resulted in blatant inequities in tribal society, which is also against the concept of Pakthunwali which treats all persons equal. The tribal informal governance system, which claims its legitimacy on the basis of local tribal customs, has also been damaged by this system of selective patronage.
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The socio-economic system of FATA changed with the migration and population growth like other administrative districts of the British era. With the passage of time the population of these tribal areas increased to double.
Historically speaking, it was the tribal ecology that helped in the development of tribal areas. The ecological factors did not allow state penetration and thus this society remained isolated i.e. out of state reach and intervention. The Pakhtun society (‘Nang society’) always traded only with their Pakhtuns ethnic groups/tribes living in agriculturaly fertile valleys of settled areas of the NWF province (‘Qalang society’) on both sides of Pak-Afghan border. Not only for trade and economic activities, the tribal people also have had regular seasonal migration to these settled/plain valleys along their cattle’s in winter and returned back to their hilly areas during summer. This migration trend of hill tribes also continued during the British rule (Christensen 1987, 182 -184). Compared to the Sikh rulers, the British adopted an open/liberal economic policy of ‘laissez-faire’ for the Pakhtun region, which resulted in an increased cultivation and trade in settled districts. However, this policy did not bring any direct change in the hill tribal areas. But the British were having hopes that the increased cultivation and production in settled areas will definitely result in an increased commercial activities between the settled administrative areas (Qalang society) and the hill tribes (Nang Society), would thus help and lead to integration of hill tribes into the British State through the influence of “Self-interest and civilization” (Christensen 1987, 183). Not only this the British as a bargaining card in negotiation, used to encourage the hill tribes to have access to markets in Peshawar (settled district). However, all these tactics proved useless and insufficient to pacify the hill tribes (Christensen 1987). Persistently resisting their rule and fiercely attacking their garrisons and settlements compelled the British to focus on the security implications of this large number of tribesmen having no economic opportunities. The British begun to recruit tribal Pakhtuns into India Army, thus created the Frontier Corps, as local militia, placing them under the authority of Political Administration (Political Agent) based in tribal areas (Christensen 1987, 185). This pacification of tribal people through military recruitments also did not prove substantial with regard to its sustainability, because during World War 1, expressing their sympathies with Ottoman Empire (Turkey), many Pakhtuns revolted against British.
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The Tribal people voluntarily joining of Pakistan after independence resulted in the decrease of political violence in these tribal areas of FATA. Also the increase in tribal population further speeded up the spontaneous integration process of tribal areas with the rest of Pakistan, especially with the adjoining settled district of the then NWFP province. The population of Tribal Areas increased by 85% from 1951-1972. In term of numbers it increase from 1.3 to 2.4 million during this period (Population Census Organisation Government of Pakistan 1998). As a result of agreements and having trust in Pakistani government, having no more fear of forced corvee, conscription etc. (Scott 2009, 23), as these tribal people feared during the Colonial British, the increase in population of tribal areas initially led to an increased migration of tribal people into the adjacent settled districts of the then NWFP and rest of the Pakistan.51 A large number of tribal people, especially the men, moved to the adjacent settled areas, to other urban centres of Pakistan major cities, e.g. the port city of Karachi for livelihood and economic opportunities. Also a handsome number of men, to earn income and get economic opportunities, which they sent as remittances to their families, moved to the Gulf States (Hasan and Raza 2009, 20 – 40). The existence evidences support the claim that the impact of these migration remained substantial. Due to state patronage of and connections with the Malaks in tribal areas, the Political Administration allocated the migrant work opportunities, mostly the lucrative one, for the relative of Malaks (Ahmed 2004). One of the respondent shared his views of the tribal people concerns about the growing wealth of Malaks. He told, “The tribal Malaks, due to their expanding wealth got through having share in the development projects of building new schools, road and other such facilities. Besides, having wealth, these influential Malaks, also send their children to schools, colleges and Universities in Peshawar. While for a common tribesman, still there is dearth of opportunities of livelihood, college and universities to get education in the tribal areas” (Interview 37, FATA Field Survey 2013). The major challenge to the tribal unique geographic positioning/uniqueness or distinction is the tribal society economic linkages with the settled areas. But the sporadic periodic growth of Pakistan economy and as a result of this the unequal economic development due to disproportionate defence spending and political
51 To quote an estimate of Wazir tribal migration mentioned by Akbar S. Ahmad, in South Waziristan alone, by the 1979, about 20,000 - 30,000 men moved to the settled areas, to other urban centers e.g. Karachi and also to Gulf States.
169 instability, made the process of economic development slow and difficult not only for tribal areas but for entire nation (Siddiqa 2005, 134). To review various economic and political reforms introduced by successive governments of Pakistan, both military and civilian governments, all these reforms remained controversial and challenging thus did not yield the required results in entire country especially in tribal areas of FATA (McCartney 2011). During President Muhammad Ayub Khan rule (1958 – 1969), land reforms were his prominent step but his efforts failed because it only help big landlords and army officers by taking advantage of numerous exemptions for the protection of their large scale property (Ziring 1971, 10). Much of the land that was redistributed was uncultivable (Ziring 1971, 19). With regard to tribal areas, few of these reforms initiated by President Ayub Khan has had impact on FATA, while the political and administrative reforms of Basic Democracies plan, which was aimed to introduce a more response system at local needs, further reinforced the existing administrative system in FATA. From this party-less system of representation he also aimed to have had easy control of it. This system of Basic Democracies consisted of councils of high levels with appointed government officials, serving as electrical college and also serving as a link of interaction between the people and the government administration (bureaucracy), with assigned of addressing the local development issues (Rafique 2001, 231). With regard to tribal areas, this BDs system was nothing more than creating a new generation of Malaks, which were appointed in each Tribal Agency by its concerned Political Agents (Traditional Structures in Local Governance, World Bank 2010). Thus with regard to any government reforms, this was the tribal administrative system through selected Malaks, to allow and implement these reforms. During field interview with a retired bureaucrat and other officials of the FATA administration shared their views, “In the post-independence years, the dramatic increase in migration of tribal Pakhtuns of hill society (Nang Society) to settled districts of plan areas (Qalang society) and the growing interaction between the two with the passage of time, has resulted in a low importance of tribal identity. This is clearly seen in the diversity of tribes today living in settled districts. However, the clear distinction between the two Pakhtun societies can be found in their administrative framework. The FATA has totally different administration while the settled Pakhtuns are totally living under the
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mainstream administrative system” (Interview 28, 36 and 38: FATA Field Survey 2013). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto gave great attention to the development of FATA during his rule (1972-1977). Through his popular slogan of Rotti, Kaprra, and Makkan (Bread, Clothes and House) and his promise to “override the authority of influential people in society, i.e. the Tribal Sardars in Balochistan, the Waderas in Sindh and Punjab, and the Malaks in Tribal areas of FATA)”, in 1977 rumours spread that the extension of universal adult franchise has been announced by Bhutto government (Herring 1979, 519 – 557). Yet, this rumour was untrue but the tribal Malaks played a greater role to get maximum personal benefits out of the development programs started by Bhutto government. The Bhutto government showed its eagerness to open up the tribal areas with the introduction of new development project. Regarding the Bhutto development project, Ahmad has mentioned, “That the government is ready to pacify the Malaks. But unfortunately, work on the projects is shoddy but its benefits are large” (Ahmed 2004, 98). Since independence, Pakistani state tried to integrate tribal people through various interventions of giving quota to tribal people in jobs, in education institution, in army, in other such government positions, etc. and also representation in national assembly (Ahmed 1997, 133 – 157). With the passage of time, over succeeding generation, the federal government of Pakistan through its system of tribal administration not only co-opted many tribal leaders but also sometime the administration merged with them in various occasion and various points of tribal informal governance system. These developments, showing flexibility to tribal people, instead of integrating the tribal people, unfortunately, resulted creating new gaps between the central government and the tribal people, which proved difficult over time, to resolve or fill these gaps. The current tribal situations clearly shows these fissures, where the central government many times bow down to the tribal demands in the shape of truce with tribes in many parts of FATA (Waziristan 2006, Bajaur, Mohmand and Khyber Agency). Though bearing no true fruits, the Pakistani army at last started military operation in these tribal areas – which is against the agreements and treaties made between the founder of Pakistan (Quaid-e-Azam) and tribal elders at the time of independence. The contesting factors such as development and participation in government between Pakistani state and tribal society have played a balancing role in shaping social
171 relations, economic policies and political decisions. The transformation of tribal society arguably has started since the un-controlling militancy in the wake of war on terror and the resulting military operations by Pakistani state in these tribal areas. The Pakistani state has introduced a large number of development projects (with support and aid of foreign donor Agencies: UN, USAID etc.) under FATA sustainable development plan/program (2005- 2015). Being a tribal society, the importance of its norms and culture will not be totally replaced but it will surely be balanced up by other competing factors. Right to vote was also denied to tribal people till 1996. In FATA, under the "Preparation of Electoral Rolls (FATA) of President Order No.1 of 1975”, only Malaks and lungi holders were registered as voters by the PA. These elections were used to be held not on party basis till the extension of Political Parties Order in 2011 (Taj 2011).
The current governance system is fundamentally based on FATA's peculiar constitutional standing, and is a continuation of the colonial governance system to manage the tribal belt. The Ministry of State and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) in Islamabad reports to the Prime Minister of Pakistan and looks after the development activities and other interventions in the area introduced/ directed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The Governor of KP acts as agent to the President, representing the federal government and administering the tribal areas through the FATA Secretariat, which was established in 2002.
To sum up, the state penetration in the tribal society of FATA, for the last more than six decades (sixty seven years (67) the Pakistani regime has shown great capability in penetrating in Pakistani society and with little bit in tribal society of FATA, by transforming its economic, social and political fabrics. Although certain groups have resisted the state-led transformation, a large section of the population could not avoid the state's intrusion into their lives; generating significant changes to their livelihood. The Pakistani regime has definitely faced little resistance in performing the first function of the state that is to penetrate tribal society. Although the Pakistani regime has a high capability in executing this task, it is still premature to categorize it as a strong state with regard to penetration in Pakistani society in general and in particular in tribal society of FATA. Further analysis on the regimes capability to perform the three remaining tasks need to be carried out, beginning with the states capability to
172 extract resources, which further determines the overall strength of the Pakistani regime.
5.3.2 Extraction of Resources by State To measure the strength of the state, the second yardstick is the capability of a state to extract resources for the collective benefits of its people and state. This can be assessed through three types of extractions: i). natural resources, ii). Human capital and, iii). Taxes.
Generally, the state claim ownership on all resources within boundaries, but sometime society also claim ownership, which results in conflicts between state and society (USIP 2007). Sometimes, state requires private land for development purposes, in case of road construction or other public building construction, but the state often or might face resistance from the local community or owners, who may not willing to give away their land to the state. With regard to human capital (labour) extraction, the ability of the state is measured by its capability of the acquisition of human capital for the achievement of its agenda (Turner 2003). Besides these two mentioned capabilities, the third capability of state extraction of resources is through the collection of taxes (It include a long list of taxes, such as sales tax, company tax, personal income tax, association tax, petroleum tax, cooperative tax, withholding tax, estate duty, and property tax) (Malak 2010). To provide goods and services to its citizens, a state is required to collection different type of taxes. Tax collection capability of a state can hindered by various factors. These could be the inefficient tax system, corruption and other social factors which resist to pay taxes in a given society. However a strong state always try to resolve these factors hampering tax collection, and collect a sizeable tax to fund its programs and development schemes. In context of Pakistani state capability of extraction of resources in tribal society can be measured through the extraction of these three mentioned major resources that government seeks to attain. i). Natural Resources: Diverse natural resources are found in abundance in FATA. In FATA various natural resources include agriculture, livestock, forests and fisheries, industrial and mineral resources. These resources have potential to contribute positively to the economic development and uplift of the tribal society, if these are equitably and properly managed (For details see chapter-3).
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Agriculture and land settlement in FATA is regulated through tribal informal customary system of governance. The Pakistani state agriculture regulations has not been extended to FATA, except Kurram Agency, till date. The Pakistani under its Annual Development Programs (ADPs) have initiated various agriculture development and strengthening programs. On the invitation of government, in FATA various international donor Agencies have also initiated agriculture development programs. With regard to agriculture development various other projects that are in pipeline include: Agribusiness Development and Diversification Project; Strengthening of Crop Reporting Services in FATA; Agriculture Sector Linkages Programme Phase-II; Land leveling and reclamation in FATA; and conversion of un- productive land into productive land in FATA.
Mines and Industries: Since the colonial period, Pakistan has continuously extracted its rich mineral resources such as coal, oil and gas, forestry, mining (gold, copper, ore, rock salt, gypsum, limestone, chromite, iron ore, silver, precious stones, gems, marbles, tiles, sulphur, fire clay, and silica sand), land, uranium and water. Based on the Federal List, Article 161 of 1973 constitution of Pakistan, almost all natural resources except for gas and hydropower are under the purview of the central government, empowering it to make decisions or enact laws regarding the development of mineral resources, its sale and purchase and the regulation of labour and safety in mines and oilfields. However, in the State List, FATA, being controlled by Federal Government, are given power to issue permits and licenses to individuals or companies who are interested to prospect for mines. Sales of these resources would be taxed by the Federal government, hence allowing it to benefit from the mining industry. Apart from that, the central state could also appoint government-linked companies such as Petroleum, to venture into the mining industry which would enable the state to have more control over the sales of the resources.
Mines: In the field of mineral resources, Pakistani state has positively intervened in FATA by: i). construction of road about 45km by the Directorate of Mineral’s in areas bearing minerals in various Tribal Agencies. In this regard the Pakistani state has allocated a total budget or Rs.100 million, ii).Establishment of Model Quarry is in the planning stage, iii). A joint venture has been signed between Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation and Civil Secretariat FATA for exploration of soapstone in Kurram agency.
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Industries: There are a number of industries52 operating in FATA. However, the Pakistani state has not extended any legal framework for industrial development in FATA till date. That’s why the industrial infrastructure is very weak in these areas. For industrial development, the land ownership is limited only to tribal people. Due to lack of Pakistani state’s codified legal framework, even the lease agreements needs to pass through informal codes and rules of tribal customary law. This further intensify the problem when one has required to get credits from Banks or other financial institutions, for the establishment of an enterprise. Besides, the causes of low industrial development include: Low voltage and electricity outrage due to government subsidy, lack of roads, further hamper the movement of raw materials because the FATA a tax free zone, where government has little incentive for investment, trade in illegal items and “cross border” trade is much more profitable than setting up an industry, lack of credit lending organizations and the inter-tribal conflicts. These intertribal conflict creates further destabilizing effect by deterring and attracting possible investors. Recently, Pakistani state has initiated and moved plans for establishment of industrial zones at Bara, Khyber Agency, Darra Adam Khel (FR Kohat) and a Marble city at Mohmand (Pakistan FATA Sustainable Development Plan 2006). ii). Human Capital: The second type of resource that the state has to extra from its society is human capital or labour through which the capability of the state is measured. It is based on the analysis of the state ability of offering employment opportunities to its population. FATA has mostly semi-skilled and unskilled work force due to lack of skills development institutions.53 There is high potential in tribal population for skilled labours. The population variation shows that an overall 73%
52 FATA has a reasonable presence of small enterprises in clusters that include dimensional stone, textile and gunsmiths. Additionally there are scattered units of ghee manufacturing and others. The official number of Industrial Units operating in FATA is 1082 in private sector. Out of this 200 are in Darra Adam Khel (FR Kohat), 120 operating in Bajaur, 130 operating in Mohmand, 207 Units in Khyber, 24 in Orakzai, 31 in North and 16 in South Waziristan 237 in FR Kohat, and 89 operating in other F.RS, around 300 small textiles weaving units working in Khyber and Bajaur and about 200 Units of light engineering in FATA. There is some expertise in the region in fabricating firearms, yet the production of firearms is not regulated and its export to the settled areas is illegal there is a thriving trade in Dara Adam Khel which is known for production of firearms. 53 For skills development in FATA, till date, the Pakistani state has established 9 vocational/technical institutes, 5 Commerce/Management Sciences, and 57 WSDCs along with buildings of closed units, provides a good, already available infrastructure for future development. Except for the WSDCs, all others are housed in quite spacious buildings. Further, two new courses have just been introduced. One is of instrumentation in Darra Adam Khel Metal Centre, and other about Electronics and Tele Communication at TTC Wana South Waziristan.
175 population is under employable age i.e. under 44 years of age. The review of unemployment record of Pakistan show an average of 5.46 percent from 1985 till 2015, the highest of this reached to 7.89 percent in 2002 and the lowest was 3.10 percent in 1987 (Bureau of Statistics Government of Pakistan 2010).
The statistics pertaining to employment is an important data for the planning and policy purposes of a country. With regard to the labour force size, Pakistan is ranked 10th largest country in the world. There is a growing increase in the labour force. Statistics shows that in 2005-06 the total labour force of Pakistan was 50.0 million which reached to 59.7 million in 2012-13, which is an increase of 9 million. During this period, the employed labour force also increased from 46.95 million to 56.0 million, which indicate that this increase in labour force could not get employment and thus during this period there was a general increase in unemployed people from 3.10 million to 3.73 million (Government of Pakistan Finance Division 2012).
Regarding employment in tribal areas, the exact date is not available due absence of state institutions in these areas. However, generally, the literature with regard to terrorism claims that the current wave of terrorism and militancy has also been linked with lack of employment opportunities, that’s why most of the tribal young people joined these militant groups (Khawaja 2016).
Recently, the Pakistani state has established FATA Development Authority (FDA) with the purpose to plan and execute sustainable development projects in tribal areas in the assigned sectors. Further, the FDA also aim to harness the tribal abundant human resource and exploit and add value to equally abundant natural resources of FATA in hope to create economic and employment opportunities for tribal people (FATA Development Authority 2015). iii). Tax: The third indicator for the measurement of state's capability with regard to extraction of resources is state’s ability to collect taxes (all form of tax mentioned above). Generally, the Pakistani state capability to collect taxes has grown and is further growing stronger over the years. In this regard, the last measured Tax Revenue (% of GDP) in 2013 was 11.13 percent. The average value for Pakistan Tax revenue (as % of GDP) remained 11.16% for the period from 1990 to 2013 (World Bank 2010).
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For tribal areas, the exact figure of tax revenue is unknown due to its informal economy and informal economic management out of state control. Above all, the tribal areas (FATA) is mostly tax free zone. Pakistani state does not collect any direct tax from tribal areas nor there any documented record of the revenue collected from these tribal areas of FATA. The tribal areas substantial avoidance of taxes and duty incurs a huge loss to the government because of non-custom paid goods trading, smuggling and other informal economic activities are prevailing in these areas. According to an estimate, for a year this loss is about $2.63 billion worth of revenue, which is mostly due to smuggling of 11 different goods/commodities which are smuggled through the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Rana 2016).
To sum up, similar to the first function, the Pakistani regime has also shown strong capability to extract resources, which is the second function. However, the state's effort to extract resources, particularly minerals and other such natural resources, does not void of resistance from the affected tribal areas. In FATA, for example, the tribal are not allowing outsider to trespass into their land. Recently the Pakistani Army is taking part in and share in the extraction of resources, e.g. coal and other such resources from FATA. Despite the Pakistani state has launched a comprehensive policy, with the name of sustainable development policy (2006 – 2016), under which the state has pledged to bring new developments in these tribal areas (FATA).
5.3.3 Regulation of Social Relationships by State Regulating social relationships refers to the state's capability of dictating various forms of social relationships within society. The state regulates social relationships mainly to protect the individual rights of its citizens, to preserve certain norms and culture, and to shape social behaviour which correspond to the state's ideology. Although states have the capabilities to regulate social relationships, their capabilities are not wide-ranging. Usually, the state's ability to regulate social relationships would be strong within a society which is located close to the center of power, but its capability would be limited at the periphery of the state. To look into Pakistani regime's capability to regulate social relationships in tribal society of FATA, here focus is given to two types of social relationships that the state aims to regulate: i). Social relationships which concern the fundamental rights of its citizens; and, ii). Social relationships which constitute the norms and culture of the people.
177 i). Fundamental Rights: It refers to the way individuals or groups in society interact with one another in accordance to preserving their fundamental rights as citizens. The Pakistani regime regulates this type of relationships in order to preserve the country's political ideals, peace and stability. The protection of the fundamentals rights of every Pakistani is stipulated in the Pakistani Constitution which is also the country's supreme law. The fundamental rights are protected by the Pakistan Federal Constitution 1973 under Article 8 – 28 (The Pakistan Constitution 1973). In order to protect these rights, the state has taken various measures such as legislating various laws and policies, enforcing them through various state Agencies and penalizing the offenders or the non-conformists. By taking these measures, the state ensures that society would interact accordingly without encroaching into the fundamental rights of others. Unfortunately, the fundamental rights in FATA of Pakistan are not fully protected by parliament and the executive. There are certain provisions in the Pakistani Constitution which limit political and social freedom in FATA. Even clauses ensuring the protection of fundamental rights not applicable in tribal areas. Articles 8 to 28 of Pakistani constitution of 1973, ensures fundamental rights and its protection, in case of violation, of the citizens of the Pakistan. However, tribal people constitutionally being the ‘citizen’ of Pakistan, these fundamental rights are not extended to them and their tribal areas. Also, the state judiciary have no jurisdiction to protect the violation of Articles 8 – 28, fundamental rights in FATA. These tribal areas are still treated and governed under the outdated system of Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR) of 1901. The FCR is total negation of these Articles 8 – 28 of the Pakistani Constitution. Further, FCR restricts the three basic rights to tribal people i.e. the right to appeal, wakeel and daleel. Parallel to this, FCR also violates other fundamental rights the tribal people. These include the clause 21, which justify collective punishment, and sections 22-23, empowers the state to imposed fine on the whole tribe or family for the crime committed by a single member of the family or tribe (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan Peshawar Chapter 2005).
Several clauses of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, gives the state the power to impose restrictions on the freedom of movement (Art-15), assembly (Article 16) and association (Article 17), freedom of speech (Article 19), right to information (19A), and provision as to property (Article 25) (The Constitution of Pakistan 1973). Apart from these restrictions, the Pakistani state has enacted various repressive laws such as,
178 first anti-terrorism legislation on February 1, 1975 titled suppressing of terrorist activities act 1975. Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 (as amended), Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance 1998, Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance 2002, Anti- Terrorism Court (ATC) 2009, Protection of Pakistan Act 2014, National Action Plan 2014, and such other acts, mostly are criticized by human rights activists due to its inhuman nature which restricts the fundamental human rights in Pakistan in general and in particular in tribal areas of FATA, calling these acts or laws that threatens basic rights and freedoms in violation of Pakistan’s international legal obligations (Human Rights Watch Pakistan 2015). However, the state does not have hegemonic power to regulate the behaviour of individuals and groups within tribal society especially in relation to the protection of their fundamental rights. There are several trends in tribal society which show that the state's ability to regulate social relationships are actually impaired. Among the trends are the alarming increase of criminal activities such as murder, snatch thieves, robbery, kidnapping, drug and human trafficking and above all insecurity, militancy and terrorism. Despite the existence of these divergent trends, the Pakistani regime could still dominate society and regulate the behaviour of majority of the population, if the state have seriously penetrated in the tribal society. The tribal society has its own culture with its own social control for the social deviance. The Pakistani state has no real penetration in tribal society thus have minimum or less control in tribal society. ii). Norms and Culture: It comprises of certain norms or cultures that are embedded in society. In Pakistan, the state regulates certain norms or cultures in order to preserve the country's unique identity, to resolve social issues, to bring peace and stability, or to attain political mileage. In terms of preserving the norms of Pakistan's multi-ethnic society, the state regulates many types of behaviour or relationship which are commonly accepted by society. Among the norms that have been regulated by the state are personal relationships, ethnic and family relations. To regulate these relationships, the state has enacted various laws and policies, carried out various campaigns and propagandas, and curbed open discussion on issues that might offend the sensitivity of Pakistan's multi-ethnic society.
Since the Pakistani regime is not dominated by any one national party, but have many parties, most of the culture or norms promoted by the state are basically based on
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Pakistani values and worldview. Thus, when the state wanted to establish a national identity, it adopted Pakistani culture and Islam as a basis (Crouch 1996). The decision to establish a national identity based on the Pakistani culture was prompted by the widening gap between Pakistan's multi-ethnic societies. Flense, to resolve this cleavage, the regime introduced several policies that intended to promote a sense of solidarity and tolerance among Pakistanis. In Pakistan no one is bothering to formulate a national culture policy. The Pakistan first National Culture Policy was formulated and promulgated on 13 August 1995 (The News 2015). With the introduction of this policy, the regime hoped to instil a sense of national identity which can help to bridge the differences among the multi-ethnic society in Pakistan. Although in this regard, various other policies have been formulated and numerous programs have been organized, the state has not fully attained the elusive national identity that it seeks to establish. The symbols of national identity such as the national custom and the national language are only being observed during the state’s official functions especially on Independence Day of 14 August each year. In the everyday life of Pakistan's multi-ethnic society, ethnic relations always seem to be superficial. Although there are a growing number of Pakistani’s especially the urban middle class who are becoming more tolerant and accommodative of others' belief, culture and religion, majority of the population is still dominated by parochial sentiments.
Generally, the Pakistani regime has shown strong capability in regulating the way society interacts with one another. Although the state has succeeded in preserving the norms and cultures of Pakistani society, it could not regulate all types of social relationships that exist within society. Thus, the state's capability in regulating social relationship is much more difficult to achieve compared to the first two functions discussed earlier. Despite this limitation, it is believed that the Pakistani regime has an enormous power to regulate the way people interact with one another, hence validating its status as a strong state.
In the context FATA, the tribal people according with their customary rules have their own system of regulating their affairs, mostly through unwritten codes based on “collective responsibility” – for an individual action, and “territorial responsibility”- for the area they have control of and are living in. Tribal society has its unique culture or norms that is embedded in their tribal society. The tribal society has its independent culture and norms since centuries. No state or no power till date has
180 dictated or regulated tribal culture and norms. There is no state regulation of the behavior of the tribal people. The behavior and life of the tribal people is regulated by an informal code of life called, Pukhtunwali. The Pakistani state do not have control on the social life and social relationship in tribal society. This Pukhtunwali, being a complete code of tribal life, regulate personal relationships, ethnic and family relations. The state laws and policies regarding the regulation of social relations in tribal society are not applicable nor obeyed by tribal people.
5.3.4 Distribution of Resources by State in Determined Ways The final yardstick for the measurement of state power in assessing the Pakistani state capability in FATA, is the distribution of resources in determined ways. The distribution of resources capability of state means the ability to allocate goods, services, status and other such valuable opportunities to groups or individuals in a given society. These include, the security, basic social services of health and education, various development projects and the state honors. For the allocation of these resources in determined ways, the state is supposed to use various methods and tools such as legislative laws, state policies and tax structure. Analyzing the Pakistani state’s capabilities with regard to appropriating resources, the analysis of public sectors expenditures with regard to development and the redistributive policies is important. This analysis of reflects the state distribution of various important opportunities to its people.
In Pakistan, the public sector's development expenditures are made up with regard to various projects aimed at promoting economic growth and uplifting the quality of living through the Public Sector Development Program (PSDP), which provides as an instrument for budgetary resources utilized for the development programs and projects (Finance Division Government of Pakistan 2015). These projects are divided into three broad categories, namely infrastructure (power, Transport and communication, water, and Physical Planning and Housing (PP&H), social development (education, health, etc.), and others (Science and information technology, governance, special areas development, special programs, production sector, etc.) (Pasha, Imran, and Iqbal 2011).
Table – 5.1 shows the current PSDP (2013-14) allocation to various project, which reflects the picture of the overall development. The amount allocated to the
181 infrastructure sector is 64% of PSDP, 33% share to Social sector and the rest of 3% was allocated to other sectors including ERRA in 2013-14 PSDP (Finance Division Government of Pakistan 2015).
Table – 5.1: Broad Sector-wise Allocations - Federal PSDP 2013-14 in (Rs. Billion) Sector No. of projects Allocation %share Infrastructure 364 271 64 Social 693 140 33 Others 72 14 3 Sub total 1129 425 100 New Development Initiatives - 115 - Total - 540 - Source: Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey 2014-15 Islamabad.
In the context of FATA, to maximize benefits of PSDP, some special priorities have been given, in the allocation of funds, to the underdeveloped areas of FATA, AJ&K, Gilgit-Baltistan, and also Balochistan province. For the speedy development of these areas, Rs. 43 billion extra special fund, as block allocations, has been allocated for the ADPs of these underdeveloped areas (Finance Division Government of Pakistan 2015).
In the context of FATA with regard to distribution of resources and allocation of funds by the federal government, since independence, FATA has been kept and remained one of the most isolated and deprived periphery of Pakistan. During field interviews, the respondents working in various development projects, FATA administration and FATA secretariat shared, “As compared to the rest of Pakistan, the tribal people FATA lags far behind from the rest of the Pakistan. The benefits of the development schemes and projects have also not reached to all the tribal people at grassroots level, except few influential individuals and stakeholders. Coupled with the outdated and discriminatory administrative arrangements, the weak planning and the compartmentalized fashion of development are also blamed for the tribal backwardness. The development approach in FATA resulted in benefiting a small strata of tribal society while ignoring the large population of social and economic uplift. That’s why, these development projects in FATA has no real impact on the society at large nor are these projects sustainable”(Interview 5, 10, 15 and 21, FATA Field Survey 2013). As discussed earlier, FATA lags far behind with respect to development as compared with the rest of the country (For details see section 3.6 of chapter-3).
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Even, FATA lacks the institutional capacity for the planning and the execution of development funds and project. FATA gets funds from the federal government for its resource allocation. In this regard, the federal government has responded very poorly to the needs because FATA has been on low priority list of the federal government. Till date the federal government has provided funds for only minimal socio-economic development. The federal government till 2001, allocated less than 1 billion rupees per year to FATA (Government of Pakistan FATA Sustainable Development Plan 2006. 146). The federal government increased FATA’s development by the year 2008, to 12.9 billion rupees, which is 905rupees per capita government funded development investment in FATA. As compared to the rest of the country, which is of 2,044 rupees, the FATA per capita development investment is less than half (FATA Secretariat Planning and Development Department 2009, 2).
The FATA’s dependency for its development funds on the federal government further strengthen the clientelism and patronage networks, already prevailing in FATA since centuries. On one hand FATA is not given an appropriate development fund and on the other hand the implementation of the Development projects is through the influential Malaks, which benefits only a particular strata of the society, while the rest of the population at large remained deprived of the socio-economic progress in FATA. These projects also lacks sustainability and therefore have no real impact at all (Nawaz 2009, 29).
To sum up, although having limited power to distribute resources in determined ways, the Pakistani state can still be considered a strong state of having high capability in performing the other three functions, namely to penetrate society, to extract resources and to regulate social relationships. This may be true for the rest of Pakistan, but in the context of tribal areas of FATA, being a strong state, Pakistani state have limited capability to perform these functions. As a strong state, it has the capability to exercise its domination over various arenas in society in the rest of Pakistan, ranging from economic to political and social activities but in FATA the Pakistani state is unable or less concerned to control these arenas.
Also in FATA, the Pakistani state does not have hegemonic power over tribal society because there are certain forces in tribal society that are capable of contesting the state, making these forces dominant over certain arenas. Hence, regarding distribution
183 of resources, the Pakistani state has limited power to exercise control over society. Compared to urban areas or capital cities, the power of the Pakistani state is further weekend going farther towards the peripheries especially the Tribal society of FATA bordering Afghanistan. In these peripheral areas, social forces pose stronger resistance to the state agenda of extending its governance (authority) by dominating the society. The next section discusses these social forces, in the context of tribal society of FATA in a more detailed way.
5.4 SOCIAL FORCES IN FATA
In a given territory the state rule over a society (also called civil society). Society is composed of several organizations and actors (common individuals, ethnic groups, religious groups, stakeholders or strong individuals, and villages). In a society, the state continuously struggling to get exclusive power (social control) over all other organizations and actors, to impose its own "rules of the game". These ‘rules of the game’ “involve much more than broad constitutional principles; they include the written and unwritten laws, regulations, decrees, and the like, which state officials indicate they are willing to enforce through the coercive means at their disposal. [The] rules encompass everything from living up to contractual commitments to driving on the right side of the road to paying alimony on time. They involve the entire array of property rights and countless definitions of the boundaries of acceptable behaviour for people” (Migdal 1988, 19).
Further, Migdal claims the society will resist struggle of imposing its ‘rules of the game’ if the state is weak. In such conditions, the state would be lacking the capability to implement the type of social control, which culminates in the "the successful subordination of people's own inclinations of social behaviour or behaviour sought by other social organizations in favour of the behaviour prescribed by national rules" (Migdal 1988, 22).
A weak state with inability to impose its social control will be engaged in a constant struggle and conflict with other actors in society for the dominance in rule making. In fact, these struggles would not be primarily on the nature of the law making or its interpretation, but would be on the state ability to displace or harness societal actors like social organizations, clans, families, tribes, patron-client dyads, domestic
184 enterprises or multinational corporations, which makes their own rules beyond the control of the state. In a society, the nature of these struggles remains at very fundamental level reaching beyond marginal deviance and beyond the formal roles of any existing political institutions. Migdal 1988, 31). This chemistry of state and society interaction is important for their relationship in a society (Hazis 2012).
The "state-in-society" theory argues that influential and powerful forces in society could pose a threat to state power hence distorting its agenda of domination/extending authority. These forces are known as social forces which refer to powerful individuals, formal organizations and informal groups that have the capability to rally the support of their members and the general public towards achieving certain goals or purposes (Migdal 2001, 107). These goals or purposes might be in harmony with the state or it might be in conflict with it. When social forces are adamant in pursuing certain goals or purposes that are in conflict with the state, this would definitely challenge the authority of the state. Through the concept of social forces, the "state-in- society" theorists rebuke state theorists who argue that state organization is very powerful and cohesive thus allowing it to easily dominate society. The former rejects this line of argument by asserting that in reality the authority of the state is compounded by various forces in society.
Social forces do not operate in a vacuum. They are constantly "competing with one another over material and symbolic matters, vying for supremacy through struggles and accommodations, clashes and coalitions" (Migdal 2001, 108). Some social forces attempt to extract as much surplus or revenue as possible, some look for respect and others simply want to rule other people’s behaviour as an end by itself. Whatever the motivation and aims, attempts to dominate will invariably met with opposition from other social forces. Rarely can any social force achieve its goals without finding allies, creating coalitions, and accepting accommodations. Coalitions and accommodations may not only enhance the social forces ability to attain its goals, it may also transform those very goals (Migdal 2001, 109). The coalitions and accommodations between social forces do not take place only within the policy arenas but also in basic moral order and the structure within which the rights and wrongs of everyday social behaviour should be determined. Among the contested arenas are
185 affirmative actions, moral policing, women rights, environmental issues, resource allocation, culture, religion and politics.
Before discussing the social forces in tribal society of FATA in greater detail, it is important to note that the concept of social forces and civil society are not synonymous. Although this study looks at formal and informal groups, the study analysis is not based on the framework of civil society. According to Migdal, civil society undertakes "the existence of a normative consensus or hegemony of fundamental ideas among social forces, even among contending groups" (Migdal 2001, 132). In the context of FATA, this discussion reflect an existing moral or social order, i.e., a common struggle for the status quo of the current system or for reforms and extension of state governance (authority) in FATA.
Both the state and civil society are "mutually reinforcing, even when differences prevail between them" (Migdal 2001, 132). Mostly, the legal framework of the state determine the limits of autonomy for civil society which is composed of various activities and associations. In the society multiple arenas, the heterogeneity of the struggles for domination, in which the social actors their forces multiple direction also have great consequences and effects on state. As Harbeson, Rothchild and Chazan (1994) has pointed out, that "civil society encompasses only one portion of what has become a complex and diverse associational scene. What distinguishes the groups incorporated in civil society from other associations is their partial nature: they are separate from but address the state" (Harbeson, Rothchild, and Chazan 1994, 278). The concept of social forces, therefore, aims to capture the dynamics of associational scene which civil society inclines to ignore.
The following discussion on social forces in FATA, various actors in tribal society have been treated and discussed as a separate social force. This section have looked and discussed the interest of various stakeholders i.e. those who benefit from the status quo and those who are opposing status quo. This clearly tells about the fault- lines for conflict, open and hidden, that have developed in FATA.54
54 Joel S. Migdal, email message to the Research Scholar of this study, August 23, 2012. (Email: [email protected]). Professor Migdal suggested that it might be best not to treat the various actors, the state, the tribal population, the Taliban, etc., as single homogeneous actors. Instead, this study have looked for the alliances across these groupings. The different elements of the tribal population are aligned with
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5.4.1 Formal and Informal Social Forces This section discusses social forces (formal and informal) that can influence a particular process or policy. The section also develops an understanding of the interests, constraints and ability of these social forces to influence the outcome of a given process or policy. Stakeholders can be individuals, organizations, government officials, civil-society or faith-based organizations, interests groups and citizens in general.
In context of FATA, the stakeholders include both formal and informal or state and non-state forces. The state formal forces (actors or institutions) include the officials representing the government in FATA. These are President, Governor KP, Political Agent, recently the Pakistan Army, FCR and Malaks (representing both society and state). The non-state or informal forces (actors or institutions) include: the Jirga (council of elders), the Rewaj (Pakthunwali), the New Middle class, Mullah (Religious leaders) and the Militants.
The role of these social forces/stakeholders is evaluated in the overall political and administrative governance processes in the tribal society of FATA. The capacity of informal stakeholders (civil society, informal leadership structures, etc.) which influence the tribal governance has also been discussed.
5.4.1.1 Formal Forces
Formal forces (institutions, actors, and organizations) are organized groups of people who pursue certain interests or issues mainly through legal framework. In the context of tribal society of FATA, formal organizations or institutions, also called here as formal forces include President of Pakistan, Governor KP, Political Agent, FCR, official Malaks, Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs), which are non-profit bodies and are registered with the State and also recently the Pakistan Army has got prominence in the affairs of FATA.
Due to lack of political parties in FATA, almost there is non-existence of any such formal organization to play important roles in the political development and other such development activities in FATA. The Malaki system established by the British
various outside actors, which may explain a lot about who gets what and why development efforts consistently fail.
187 government to represent British Government in tribal areas was the only semi-formal institution representing state. Besides, Malaki system, no other formal organization was ever established in FATA, which could work for the promotion of tribal people’s interest in all fields including religion, language, culture, education and economy. In its early formative years, the Malaki system played an active political role, especially in the controlling anti-cession movement. However, the FCR which is the special law for tribal people in FATA does not allow any kind of political gathering and political activity in FATA. The Malaks political role, to represent it tribe in state affairs, was severely eroded, hence shifting its activities to promoting religious, educational and social interests of the tribal people. In the late 1980s, in the wake of Soviet attack on Afghanistan and the establishment and empowering of Mullah, further diminished the influence of the Malaks in tribal community. In the late 1990s, after the diminished support of UN, the US and other international actors support to local Mullah and Jihadi groups (Taliban), again empowered the local Malaks. But in 2000, the militants got control of tribal affairs, executed hundreds of Malaks and challenging the state writ severely affected the Malaki system. To make matters worse, the Malaki system is being marginalized first by the Taliban and now by the Pakistani military.
The government of Pakistan has also established a number of organizations, Agencies working under the umbrella of FATA Secretariat. These include: FATA Development Authority (FDA), and many other development projects mostly supported by international donors and the USAID.
Compared to the rest of Pakistan and adjacent Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces, the establishment of formal organizations as a medium to pursue development in FATA is very late on the part of Pakistan government. This was mainly due to their displacement from mainstream development and the state system. Most recently, when FATA became the central piece of discussion in international community and the international community pressure on Pakistan to mainstream FATA into mainstream governance system of the country, then the Pakistani government adopted some practical and serious steps to focus on FATA development. The first formal organization to be established was establishment of FATA Development Corporation (FATA-DC) (1970) which has been upgraded to FATA Secretariat (2002) and was given the full Civil Secretariat FATA status in 2006. Besides the first formal institutional in FATA in response of justice to counter the outdated FCR system was
188 the establishment of FATA Tribunal during 1997. (FATA Reforms Organization 2012). These developments took place due to international pressure and foreign support especially $7.5 billion aid from the US (The US Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009), to develop FATA, which is a hiding place or safe haven for most of the Al Qaeda network - targeting the NATO forces across the border. These new initiatives are in true sense the Pakistani state first direct contact with the tribal (FATA) society.
The Non-Governmental Organizations existed in Pakistan since independence in 1947, mostly were involved in providing humanitarian aid to refugees pouring into the newly independent state of Pakistan. The second phase of the surge of NGOs was when in late 1970s, the then military government raised its slogan of welfare and social work. During 1990s the number of NGOs further increased due to People’s Work Program. In 2000, the number of NGO increased in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, due to US attack on Afghanistan and military operations against Taliban in the adjacent KP and Tribal Areas of FATA. Most of these NGOs are still providing humanitarian services of clean water, health, education and other services to the conflict affected population of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In FATA all major UN Agencies like UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP and international Relief and Development Organizations, like International Rescue Committee, MSF International, USAID and many other such organizations are providing humanitarian and development services.
Today, there are some community based local organizations (CBOs) has been established by various people belonging from FATA, especially the educated people and are busy in humanitarian services in FATA. There is a network of formal Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs) called Tribal NGO Network.
5.4.1.2 Informal Forces
Though the informal customary based social system govern and maintains order in tribal society of FATA. However, recently this system has been demolished first by the militants and later by the Pakistani military, destroying social fabric and social network of the society, by displacing millions of the tribal people. Thus a kind of vacuum has been emerged in this existing informal social system of FATA (Ali, The Dawn 2015).
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Informal groups are collection of people that are bound together by a common interest or concern. These groups may simply meet and discuss issues of their concern and carry out their activities without any formal structure. Most informal groups are community based and are formed in the villages and the cities by groups of men and women who share the same interests. An informal group is organized based on a consensus (written or oral) between its members without any legal obligation. It has no legal personality and cannot enter into legal relations with other bodies. Therefore, informal groups tend to operate outside of legal framework, making them even more effective as a platform to present various concerns and interests of society. In FATA, informal groups and institution including Malaki system, Jirga and other institutions like, Hujra (place for social gatherings), mosque, and tribes/families are more influential and powerful compared to formal organizations mainly because the tribal society has strong belief in following their culture (customs and traditions) of living an independent and free life instead of formal organization and formal rules. These informal institutions have been embedded within FATA's society since the pre- colonial period whereas the formal is a recent phenomenon, gaining currency only after the British Empire and then continued by after the formation of Pakistani state. In order to better understand the structure and operation of informal groups and informal institutions in FATA and their roles in society, this study focuses on three informal groups/institutions, patron-client (Malaki System), the code of life (Pakhtunwali or Rewaj), the middle class, and the dispute resolutions system (Jirga), Mullah (Religious Leaders) and Militants.
Traditionally social control in a Pakhtun society is maintained by Pakhtunwali. Pakthunwali is a complete code of life, which regulate the socio-economic, legal and political affairs of the Pakhtun tribal people (Misdaq 2006, 37). Pakhtunwali is a strong social force in the tribal society. Anything contradictory to Pakhtunwali, is resisted or totally rejected. Pakhtunwali also include Rewaj (customs and traditions). Under Rewaj, the Jirga decides and settle both civil and criminal matters.
The tribal Jirga is a kind of social gathering or assembly, in which decisions are taken and also disputes are settled down among the tribal people. The decisions are backed and enforced through the collective sanction of tribal centuries old conventions and customs. Apart from this, Jirga also regulates everyday life and interaction among tribal people. It also works an intermediary between the tribal people and the state.
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The Malaki system worked as Patron-client relation between state and tribal society. But with the passage of time the client has become strong by getting more and more power and wealth. Having support base in the local society, the Malaks no more work for state but for their vested interest, now supporting the status quo and resisting any expected change or reforms (Scott, and Kerkvliet 1986). In FATA, the colonial times patron-client system gradually phased out and transformed to a new form of social network, known as patronage, was formed. As a powerful force in society, these tribal Malaks are capable of resisting the states attempt to dominate tribal society (Howell 1931, 1979). In fact, the Malaks and their network of clients has been the most influential social forces in FATA, surpassing formal organizations and the middle class (newly emerged education class, who wants change in the traditional system). The influence of these tribal Malaks has been very formidable that central state leaders have to co-opt them in order to ensure the state’s survival (Migdal 1988, 51 – 60).
Based on the new developments, technology, globalization the opening up of tribal people with the new development, the occupation of the work force in FATA, there has now emerged a new class called a new middle class. This new middle class include a number of (senior officials especially in civil and military bureaucracy, managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals, clerical workers, service workers and shop and market sales workers and educated people) had increased since independence (Government of Pakistan, Committee on FATA Reforms 2016). The type of the middle class which experienced the most significant growth is the new middle class comprising of professionals, educated people, especially educated youth, who are the real opponent of the existing system of FATA and who want real or total change in the existing system of FATA.
In debating the role of the new middle class, stressed is made on the fluidity of any collective identities which are always forming and fragmenting. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, social forces represent differing interests and goals of society. In FATA, like other societies of developing world, the new middle class, has dualistic roles with some of them support the status quo of the existing system (include elite class and a small proportion of middle class business holders, government officials, bureaucrats etc.) while others are more critical towards it and want complete replacing of the old system (include professionals (doctors, engineers etc.), educated people,
191 especially educated youth) (Kessler 2001, 31 – 45). "Unified social classes and wide ranging social struggles for dominance, class struggles, have often been easier to find in imaginative theorizing than in real societies" (Migdal, Kohli, and Shue 1994, 19).
The "state-in-society" theory suggests that society is an arena of domination and contestation, hence, the idea of a unified social class working towards some large class-project that can reshape society may be an "elegant metaphorical device" (Migdal, Kohli, and Shue 1994, 23 - 30). The role of the new middle class in becoming an influential force in society cannot be ignored in FATA. As an important segment of society, the new middle class definitely has the capabilities to influence social change and alter the prevailing states’ structure in FATA. With their superior economic and social status, the new middle class is certainly a potent force in society. If this heterogeneous group could unite to further a shared interest which does not necessarily conform to that of the state supported elites in FATA i.e. Star Malaks, Political Agents, etc., the new middle class would surely capable of inflicting change in society, making it an extremely powerful social force.
Presently, the new middle class in FATA has not shown that capability with most of them inclined to oppose the status quo by voicing for reforms and change in the existing tribal system. This new middle class include all those tribal people who are against status quo and thus are not satisfied with the existing system. This class support changes in the existing system and are in favour of the system of self- administration by the tribal people This group comprised of newly educated people, include school, college and university teachers, engineers, doctors, professionals and both retired and in service bureaucrats, etc. This class may be termed as opinion makers and agents of social change.
Their power lies in their political and social organization. Sometimes they express themselves through inter and intra tribal organization and welfare associations. The members of this class are opportunity conscious and employment oriented. In certain ways they also believe in maintaining the status quo, but, there is rising discontentment among this class for a variety of reasons. The inadequate quota system and lack of employment opportunities, along with the overall indifferent attitude of the Federal Government towards the pathetic situation confronting the tribal people, has proportionately increased the anxiety and restlessness among the
192 members of this class. Mostly the government policies and development schemes like schemes for youth employment or other such policies of loan, businesses etc. (especially for youth) are not extended to the unfortunate tribal areas. Not a single unemployed individual shared the benefits of the economic policies of previous and present Government. The uneven development between the settled districts and tribal areas, the rising expectations and desire for better quality of life among the educated tribal youth have brought into sharp focus the deprivation of the tribal life style. Besides that the political representation in National Assembly based on Malaki system and no representation in the Provincial Assembly have multiplied the flight of the tribal youths. The myth of a hermit and closed society has lost ground in the face of the overall changes in communication. This has brought them into sharp conflict with the former two classes, for whom they have become a potential threat. Politically speaking, this class has greater ability so for as political organization and activities are concerned. These factors are pushing them toward having more sympathies with politics and political parties in the rest of Pakistan. To sum up, as a powerful force in society, the newly educated class (also called as middle class) is capable of resisting the state’s and state’s sponsored/patron Malaks’ attempt to dominant society and maintain status quo denying basic rights to the tribal people. In fact, the newly educated middle class and their network of clients has been the most influential social forces in FATA, surpassing formal organizations and the elite class (Malaks and other influential people, state owned Political Representatives). The influence of FATA's new educated middle class has been very formidable that central state leaders have to co-opt them in order to ensure the states survival in FATA, if the state does not really want to bring reforms in these tribal areas. While the elite class, is totally supporting the status quo along with the local political administration. They want to have hold on FATA along with the support of local political administration of the state. To sum up, at first sight the tribal system may seem very loose, but in fact deeply looked into it, reflects that tribal society is well knitted and coordinated which rests on strong tribal informal institutions. It is tailored in such a way that deals with the tides of the current changing environment which are emerging day by day from this unique land and its geostrategic location of bordering Afghanistan. Some of the trends and
193 system of the tribal society may be incongruous, bizarre and out of this world, with particularly with the new millennium, but these have proved their efficacy and consistency even in the 21st century (Migdal 2001, 88 – 95).
CONCLUSION In a strong state like Pakistan, social forces are generally perceived as weak because they are powerless to resist the state's domination. However, this chapter argues that the power of the Pakistani regime could be significantly curtailed by influential forces in society, hence expunging the image of a weak society, as show in the case of FATA, as an ungoverned and uncontrolled territory where Pakistani state has no domination. The social forces, discussed in chapter in detail in tribal society of FATA, would be in constant struggle with the state over various arenas, prompting the latter to either engage or ignore the former. A weak state would have no choice but to engage the social forces in order to avoid it from collapsing but a strong state would have the choice to either engage or ignore the influential forces in society without seriously jeopardizing its existence. When a strong state like Pakistan decides to ignore the social forces, it could face various obstacles in implementing its policies or binding the population together. To resolve this quandary, the state would resort to using coercive and repressive measures which could forcibly bring order and stability back in society. This strategy could be effective or it could backfire, leading to the emergence of new groups of social forces which are equally or even stronger and more influential than the old ones. The other option that a strong state has is to engage the social forces by resorting to the strategy of accommodation. According to Migdal, accommodation refers to a situation where there is no single group not the implementers, not the local politicos, and not the social forces, in society who could monopolize power.
When various arenas in society are not being dominated by a single group, social forces including the state have to compromise and accommodate each other. Such accommodation takes place at least on two levels. First, accommodation takes place at the local or regional level where politicians, social forces and implementers accommodate each other in a web of political, economic and social exchanges. The accommodation between these actors will determine how resources are being distributed, how policies are being formulated and how electoral supports are being
194 won. Second, accommodation takes place beyond the local or regional interest. If local or regional stability can be maintained, this will lead to the stability of the whole regime. In Pakistan, this study argues that the central state would engage with the social forces in FATA provided its authority as the ruling government is not in danger. The same strategy is adopted by the central state in extending its power in FATA, accommodating the social forces and subsequently dominating the multi- ethnic society of the tribal society.
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CHAPTER – 6
CHALLENGES TO STATE GOVERNANCE IN FATA - STATE-CENTRIC APPROACH
6.1 INTRODUCTION This chapter presents the factors of challenges to Pakistani state governance (authority) in tribal areas (FATA) in the context of State-centric approach. The chapter covers the degree of functional and geopolitical order in the tribal areas. Further, the chapter presents an assessment of the state governance in FATA by reviewing the dimensions of the un-governability. The un-governability indicators include: the weak penetration of state, weak control and monopoloy on the use of force and violence, weak control on border and the interference by an external especially by a bordering rival state. Each of these broader indicators of un- governability has been further assessed through sub-variables.
6.2 WEAK POLITICAL PENETRATION OF PAKISTANI STATE IN FATA The very first and basic feature of the governabilibility of an area or society is the penetration by state formal institutions of the society in general (Migdal 2004, 78 – 85). In this way, the state presence can be measured through: the presence and functioning of state formal institutions in a society, performance of state basic functions, and other such attributes. In FATA the Pakistani state penetration has been measured through four broad variables or attributes. These are: presence of Pakistani state formal institutions, informal economy of the tribal society, pyhsical infrastructure of the state, prevailing degree of corruption, and the tribal norms of resistance based on its culture. Other indicators of un-governability include: i).The existence of parallel socioeconomic systems and structures; ii). Monopoly on the use of force; and, iii). Compromised sovereignty and border control by the state. The following section elaborates these four attributes of state penetration in FATA.
6.2.1. Presence of State Institutions and their Functions Not only the presence but also the function of state formal state institutions are very much important for the penetration of any state in a society. In a society, formal state institutions perform various functions. From functional perspective, state penetration
196 can be measured from various functions. State functions can be grouped into two broad categories, discussed below in the context of tribal areas (FATA) of Pakistan. i). Survival or Core Functions Survival or Core functions include: the political settlement; security – monopoly of violence, justice, and the rule of law; and basic administrative and fiscal capacity. These survival functions help to consolidate the authority of the state in a society. The survival functions are core functions essential to the survival and strength of the institutional framework of the state.55 During the field survey, majority of the respondents (52.60%) were of the view that state is not providing its basic survival functions in FATA. The tribal people were of the opinion that there is lack of Pakistani state security apparatus, no monopoly of Pakistani state on the control of violence (72.46%), the state formal justice institutions are absent (75.33%), absence of state law enforcement institutions/Agencies (88.07%), Pakistani state weak administrative capacity and control (87.53%), and state fiscal capacity and control is also weak (65.33%) (Table – 6.1 FATA Field Survey 2013).
During a group discussion, majority of the respondents expressed their concern over the insecurity they were facing. They told that security trumps all other needs they are in need of in FATA. They expressed that there was no law and order56 in FATA. The state has lost its credibility for eliminating external and internal threats in their areas. That’s why the people in FATA do not feel at peace for lack of state protection. The tribal areas have no state security apparatus. State formal judicial institutions and law enforcing Agencies are totally absent. The state also lacks administrative control in these areas. The writ of the state is only applicable in protected areas (32% areas) or in areas where government has its installations. Most of the people showed their concern over the limited presence of state meant only for state own purpose to protect
55 Survival functions are not exclusive, in some contexts states will face other ‘survival’ issues (e.g. addressing a humanitarian crisis), but as a minimum all responsive state-building processes must develop capacity in relation to: Political Settlement – reflects the implicit or explicit agreement (among elites principally) on the “rules of the game”, power distribution and the political process through which state and society are connected, Security – to be able to control, if not monopolize, the use of violence, Revenue – the ability to raise funds sustainably, particularly through taxation, Law – the capability to rule through laws; and to be seen to do this. 56 According to Michael Man order comprises two forms of security: enforcing security (establishing credibility eliminating external and internal threats) and protective (the people have confidence that, provided they do not threaten the state; they will come under its aegis (protection) and be left in peace).
197 its installations not the common tribal people. However, the respondents gave cold shoulder when they were asked whether they pay taxes to the state. The respondents shared that they do not pay any taxes to the government of Pakistan (FGD 13, FATA Field Survey 2013).
For effective governance, state penetration in a society is necessary. The survival functions provide an opportunity to the state to engage with society at multiple levels. Scott argues that “strengthening survival functions makes a society legible, to count, map, register and study their societies to gather tax, enforce laws, and raise armies”. In this way, the legibility of a society creates a conducive environment for increased contacts between the state and its society. The state always tries to make its society legible, which leads to the creation of potential opportunities for the articulation of social expectations and influence the state to respond to its people (Scott 2009, 79).
A retired civil servant who had also served as Political Agent in Khyber Agency, expressed his views about the importance of state formal institutions for state presence and governance in tribal society. He said:
“Pakistani state has not conducted its census since long. And the one conducted in 1998 Census is not authentic with regard to the tribal society today because the dynamics of tribal society have changed. Pakistani state must gather latest information about the demography of FATA, its geography, and should register all its tribal population. These informations are necessary for state security, and also to understand the current socio-economic trends in tribal society. These information are important for both the Pakistani state to understand the needs of the tribal society and also for the tribal people that the state understands their expectations. Through these information, Pakistani state can look into the real development perspectives of tribal society, which could result in improvement in delivery of services such as health, education, transportation and the like. Having information about its population can also help the state in dealing with security related matters” (Interview 36, FATA Field Survey 2013).
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Table – 6.1: State Survival/Core Functions and Institutions
Q. Do you think the State exists in your area in terms of formal institutions peforming basic functions? Response Strongly Strongly Don't Question/ Indicator Rate Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree know Total a). Presence and performance of Frequency 208 118 344 789 40 1 1500 state Security Apparatus Percent 13.87 7.87 22.93 52.60 2.67 0.07 100 b). Pakistani State has Monopoly Frequency 33 39 339 1087 0 2 1500 over handling of Violence Percent 2.20 2.60 22.60 72.47 0.00 0.13 100 c). Presence of State formal Frequency 21 56 289 1130 2 2 1500 Justice/ Adjudication Institutions Percent 1.40 3.73 19.27 75.33 0.13 0.13 100 d). State Law (Rule of Law/Law Frequency 19 39 119 1321 0 2 1500 Enforcement) in FATA Percent 1.27 2.60 7.93 88.07 0.00 0.93 101 e). State Administrative Frequency 30 45 110 1313 0 2 1500 Capacity and Control Percent 2.00 3.00 7.33 87.53 0.00 0.13 100 f). State Fiscal Capacity (state’s Frequency 110 187 121 980 11 91 1500 ability to raise revenues through Percent 7.33 12.47 8.07 65.33 0.73 6.07 100 taxes) in FATA Source: FATA Field Survey 2013 B). The State Expected Functions The state expected functions are mostly public services that the state is supposed to provide. Expected functions57if performed adequately, lead to the strengthening of state legitimacy. For any kind of development and progress, an `expected’ level of functionality for a state is essentially required. These include expectations of state performance on issues related to its own citizens as well as to the external actors. This expected functionality aspect of a responsive government always keep up with and trying to fulfil the demands of its people for the provision of various social services, including roads, policing, health, hygiene, sanitation and such related services. For state stability, taking actions to meet the public expectations is mandatory. Even, authoritarian states also try to deliver some expectations for reducing differences and minimizing further opposition. However, the degree and level of this expected functionality of states varies from political commitment/will or capacity of a state. The nature of expectations also varies from state to state.58
57 The expected functions include: economic management; service delivery (health, education, water) and infrastructure; employment programs and job creation; personal safety and access to justice (beyond the basic level provided in state survival); social protection/safety nets; anti-corruption measures; and voice and accountability (e.g. fair elections, free media). 58 The distinction between survival and expected functions should not be viewed too dogmatically
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Table – 6.2: Expected Functions and Institutions of Pakistani State in FATA
Q. Do you think Pakistani State has been attending to the expected functions through its formal institutions?
Strongly Don't Question/ Indicator Response Rate Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree know Total a).Economic Management, and price Frequency 208 238 112 897 2 43 1500 stability etc. Percent 13.87 15.87 7.47 59.80 0.13 2.87 100 b). Provision of Social Services Frequency 344 39 25 1087 0 5 1500 Percent 22.93 2.60 1.67 72.47 0.00 0.33 100 C). Employment Programs Frequency 73 211 77 1132 0 7 1500 Percent 4.87 14.07 5.13 75.47 0.00 0.47 100 d). Provision of Personal Safety and Frequency 21 39 113 1321 0 6 1500 Security Percent 1.40 2.60 7.53 88.07 0.00 0.93 101 e). Access to Justice/ Adjudication Frequency 30 45 110 1308 0 7 1500 (State Judiciary) Percent 2.00 3.00 7.33 87.20 0.00 0.47 100 f). Provision of Social Frequency 110 187 121 980 11 91 1500 Protection/Safety nets (welfare, unemployment benefit, universal healthcare, shelters, and sometimes subsidized services) Benazir Card, Watan Card Percent 7.33 12.47 8.07 65.33 0.73 6.07 100 g). Anti-Corruption Measures Frequency 50 62 87 1267 11 23 1500 (building transparent, accountable system of governance and strengthening the capacity of civil society and the media) Percent 3.33 4.13 5.80 84.47 0.73 1.53 100 h). Voice and Accountability Frequency 181 318 89 878 23 11 1500 (Participation in fair elections, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media) Percent 12.07 21.20 5.93 58.53 1.53 0.73 100 * IDPs card was excluded as a social protection facility in this survey.
In FATA, state is not performing its expected functions. Majority of the respondents (59.80%) were of the opinion that tribal economy is not managed by state but is a self-managed economy. Most of the economic activities in FATA are undertaken through informal procedure. In the words of Scott (1998), tribal people are living outside state legibility.59 Neither there is state control economic management system
(each has elements linked to the other - expectations will exist in relation to security and states see a healthy population as security related etc.). But, survival functions are qualitatively different in maintaining a minimum level of control, they are the areas that those dominant within the political settlement must attend to first, and most effectively, if they want the instruments of the state to be their vehicle for policy. 59 In the Book “Seeing like a State 1998”, James Scott develops the central theme of “legibility,” which is here mentioned with regard to tribal society of FATA. Legibility refers to a state's attempt to
200 or state owned banking system nor currency system and currency exchange facilities. The state does not provide economic opportunities in FATA. A majority of respondents (72.47%) confirmed that state is not providing social services (healthcare and education, piped water, road, sanitation, etc.) in FATA. Some respondents (22.93%) confirmed that areas with reasonable distance from Agency headquarters, have relatively greater access to these services. With regard to other social services, e.g. formal or state sponsored sewerage and sanitation, majority of the households/areas lack the availability or access to sewerage and sanitation services. Sanitation system is partially available in limited areas nearest to the Agency headquarters in each Tribal Agency of FATA. The respondents also expressed their lack of satisfaction on other services provided by the Pakistani state in their areas. The availability of these services was found very low: Employment programs/Job opportunities (4.87%), provision of personal safety and security (1.27%), access to Justice/ State judiciary (2.00%), provision of social protection/safety nets (2.27%), anti-Corruption measures (3.33%) and voice and accountability (2.40%) (Table – 6.2: FATA Field Survey 2013).
During focus group discussion, the respondents expressed their views on the delivery of services by various institutions under the central government. That stated:
“We need schools for our children, hospitals for our ill and playgrounds for exertion. We need industrial activity, agriculture and business growth to earn our bread. We need roads, bridges and other development infrastructure which could facilitate our mobility. We need electricity, water, sanitation, waste disposal and other services and programs of social uplift. We need telephones, mobile phones services and the internet to keep abreast with the latest developments in the world. Our needs, today, are not different from those living in the settled urban areas” (FGD 6, FATA Field Survey 2013).
make society legible, to arrange the population in ways that simplified the classic state functions of taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion. Having begun to think in these terms, legibility has been seen as a central problem in statecraft. The pre-modern state was, in many crucial respects, partially blind; it knew precious little about its subjects, their wealth, their landholdings and yields, their location, their very identity. It lacked anything like a detailed “map” of its terrain and its people. It lacked, for the most part, a measure, a metric, that would allow it to “translate” what it knew into a common standard necessary for a synoptic view. As a result, its interventions were often crude and self-defeating.
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From the perspective of juridical statehood, constitutionally, FATA is an integral part of Pakistani State, but in reality, looking from the perspective of empirical statehood, Pakistan’s formal state institutions, are either missing or marginally operating in these tribal areas. In this context, the tribal areas reflect a situation of ‘a state-within state’ (Kingston and Spears 2004, 15 – 34) due to its unique and ungoverned nature standing beyond the control of Pakistani state capacity. During field survey, interviewees shared views on the existing Lego-judicial situation of tribal areas thus: “No central government or provincial government law is applicable nor legal institutions exist nor does the jurisdiction of Pakistani state courts extend to the tribal areas. The Ministry of State and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) of the central government releases the administrative and development funds for FATA. The utilization of these funds is decided at Agency level in the office of the Political Agent. This particular chain of command creates the sort of administration and governance system, where Pakistani state cannot interfere as it does in rest of the country. This lack of Pakistani state interference with regard to tribal funds further creates under-development in the shape of compartmentalized development in the tribal areas” (Interview 3, 7, 14 and 38: FATA Field Survey 2013).
Due to the lack of formal state institutions, the Pakistani state like its predecessor, the British government, also relies on indirect rule in the tribal areas. This has widened the gap creating further distrust between the tribal people and the central government in Islamabad. This weak state direct penetration in the shape of its formal institutions is also one of the causes that the tribal people are still stuck to their customary institutions and the tribal people still distrust the central government bureaucracy as an alien body, which is beyond their spirit of social life and alien to their culture, which they consider beyond their meaningful influence and understanding. The tribal people always find and look at this colonial administrative set-up as an entity which is contrary to their interests. This is one of the reasons that the tribal people still look to their local elders, Malaks, local informal institutions, their family ties, lineage system, social network and their tribal customs first; without actually concentrating to the offers and prospects provided or offered by the Pakistan government. The local stakeholders i.e. the Malaks, Mullah etc., who were strengthened first by the British government and later by the Pakistani government, with patronage, are now in support of status quo, because of their personal benefits obtained from state
202 development projects (FGD – 1, 2, 7 and 13: FATA Field Survey 2013). To sum up, the more significant presence of the state in an individual’s life or in a community, the less likely the individual or the community is to engage in acts against state or will resist state’ (Herbst 2000, 9). In this way, the presence of the state can be ensured through the presence of formal state institutions and infrastructure of services delivery (electricity, piped water supply, and sewage system). This could lead to less resistance against the state governance extension (authority) in the tribal areas. Delivery of essential services improves state legitimacy, which is the citizens belief of the state right to rule over them, through service delivery capability and capacity (Mcloughlin 2000).
6.2.2 State Physical Infrastructure In peripheral territories of developing states, the crisis of governance is always equally visible. In these areas, the state does not provide necessary collective public goods, such as physical infrastructure, the rule of law, or legitimate symbols of state authority and political community. Among these, the physical infrastructure indicates physical dimension of a state presence in an area under its jurisdiction. Because the physical infrastructure links up an area to the heart of central state political and economic spheres. Broadly, the physical infrastructure includes communication, financial transactions, and transportation sectors. Inaccessibility of an area leads to un-governability of that area mostly due to lack of road and other such facilities. That’s why scholars are of the opinion that surveying the world map, one can find majority of the ungoverned territories in difficult terrain: mountains, jungles, or desert. That’s why these areas are negligible with regard to economic importance and are thinly populated. Due to these conditions, the economic development in these areas is at the lowest level and therefore the state is least concerned with the infrastructural development of these areas – thus state presence in these areas remains frail. Scott has termed such localities as "non-state space, difficult and inaccessible terrains - locations where, owing largely to geographical obstacles, the state faces difficulty in establishing and maintaining its authority" (Scott 2009, 127 – 177). These places often provide refuge for people involved in anti-social or anti-state activieis. In tribal areas (FATA), there is an overall lack of physical infrastructure facilities: communication facilities, transportation, roads, electricity and other such facilities.
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The data on these facilities shows a dismal picture in FATA as compared to the rest part of Pakistan. During field survey, the respondents were asked about the possession of various durable goods present at their houses. A variety of goods used by tribal people were reported. These included: electricity, radio, TV, mobile phone, bicycle, motorcycle, car, truck and tractor. Mobility of household members, being an important aspect, was assessed and analyzed through the presence of bicycle, motorcycle and car. The analysis of these goods show a dismal picture of the facilities available to tribal people in FATA60 (See Annexure- E: Field Survey Respondent’s Basic Demographic and Socio-Economic Information).
The respondents confirmed that in FATA the basic economic institutions i.e. banking system is absent. Majority of the respondents (80%) shared that due to the absence of state formal financial institution, they are completed to avail services of informal financial institutions (e.g. Hundi or hawala) (See chapter-4 Table – 4.1: FATA Field Survey 2013). Though majority of the tribal people are engaged in trade and transport business as a source of their livelihood, in FATA the transportation infrastructure i.e. roads, bridges etc. are equal to zero. For movement of the inhabitants the number of roads in FATA are less as compared to the other parts of the country (See Section – 3.6, chapter-2: Development Indicators of FATA). The existing roads have been closed by the army due to security reasons. Recently, in the post conflict rehabilitation situation, the Pakistan Army (through its corporate organization – FWO) has started and completed some development projects, mostly roads construction etc. where a large number of areas have been linked for trade and transport purposes with the rest of the country.
60 The data in this study found that almost all households in four Agencies (Bajour, Mohmand, Kurram, and Khyber) had electricity. However, in Orakzai agency about 11 percent households were reported without electricity connection. The use of radio was found fairly common; 92 percent households had radio in Kurram agency followed by 2/3rd households in Khyber and Bajour Agencies, 3/5th in Orakzai and nearly half in Mohmand Agency. Television ownership was relatively lower in most of the Agencies with Kurram agency households reporting highest proportion of TV ownership (92%) followed by those in Khyber agency (64%), Mohmand and Orakzai Agencies (36%) and lowest in Bajour agency (26)60. It is apparent from data that radio ownership was quite popular, an affordable item and socially acceptable. Cell phone possession was reported in the range of 1/3rd to 2/3rd households in various Agencies, reported highest in Khyber agency (65%), indicating affordability and communications needs of the household members. With respect to ownership of transport for mobility, the survey found Bajour Agency reporting the highest ownership of bicycle (45%), motorbikes (14%), and car (13%) compared to other Agencies.
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During field interviews, the respondents shared their views regarding the development works initiated by the government of Pakistan in FATA. “Today, the government has its focus on the development of FATA. A large number of infrastructure projects have been initiated by the government with the help of Army engineering corps. The construction of these roads has won the hearts and minds of local residents by reducing the travel distances and getting them rid of the local feuds over road usage. The roads will not only establish the writ of the state in an erstwhile inaccessible area but will also bring lot of facilities to the residents of FATA” (Interview 32, 33, and 37: FATA Field Survey 2013). The respondents also stated: “The development work undertaken in Waziristan (both North and South Agencies) has provided great relief to the local residents. The volume of transportation of vegetables, fruits etc. from Waziristan to other parts of the country has increased due to the construction of new roads and renovation of the old ones” (Interview 22, 23, 24, 25 and 37, FATA Field Survey 2013). A respondent, working in a development project in FATA, said: “The construction of new roads with the help of foreign support has had a positive impact on the lives of the local farmers, by reducing the time of travel from farms to markets. The time will be further reduced if there are no army check posts on the way. A link road from South Waziristan to Bajaur Agency be developed to provide travel and communication within FATA. It will provide better socio-economic opportunities and would lead to development and eradication of militancy from the grassroots level” (Interview 12, FATA Field Survey 2013). Statist scholars believe that nevertheless, especially in states with weak administrative structures, such limited infrastructure might actually worsen governability problems because the anti-state forces can use the poor infrastructure for their own purposes. That’s why physical infrastructure in the ungoverned spaces can be both facilitating and frustrating factors for the extension of state presence and control in the peripheral tribal areas (Patrick and Binger 2014). However, the availability of infrastructural facilities can ensure Pakistani state presence in the tribal areas which could result in the extension of state governance (authority) in these areas.
6.2.3 Prevalence of Corruption According to Corruption Perception Index, Pakistan is the 116 least corrupt nation out of 175 countries (according to Transparency International Corruption Rank,
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Pakistan averaged 108.29 from 1995 until 2016, reaching an all-time high of 144 in 2005 and a record low of 39 in 1995) and for the past ten years, has regularly remained in the top 10 percent, with score ranging from 2.1 to 2.7.61 Within country variation of corruption in Pakistan varies from organization to organization and from area to area (Transparency International 2003a, 8 – 15).
Like the rest of Pakistan, in the tribal areas especially border region of Durand Line, where informal trade is prevailing, there is an endemic culture of corruption in which local political administration and members of the security forces and custom officials are involved. This corruption has intensified and institutionalized (in an informal way) the informal economy (smuggling, illegal trade, drugs, etc.) on the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Majority of the survey respondents (73.53%) confirmed the prevalence of corruption in the administrative system of FATA (See Table – 6.3, FATA Field Survey 2013). Majority of the respondents expressed their disappointment over the growing corruption as an unending and unavoidable fact of life (FGD 7, FATA Field Survey 2013). Majority of the people in Pakistan, in general, and in FATA, in particular, are so dishearted with the prevailing corruption in their areas, that most of them have left themselves at the mercy of God completely handing over themselves to this system of corruption which, they believe, is unfixable and is incurable for short of an effective legal remedy (Transparency International 2003a, 27).
6.2.4 Prevalence of Parallel Economy FATA has a self-contained, and self-controlled economy. The state has even no control on the tribal economy. The two broad enterprises where tribal people have excelled is transport sector and the timber trade. Besides these two, cross-border trade is the domain of majority of the tribesmen. Mostly, this trade is illegal and in the form of smuggling and trade of banned or non-custom paid items. State has no control on this (Transparency International 2003a, 8 – 15). Regarding livelihood there are few opportunities available to tribal people. As mentioned ealier, the tribal local economy is mostly pastoral, while agriculture is practiced in a few fertile valleys (For details, see section – 3.5 of chapter-3). In the words of Scot, the tribal people have a kind of
61 Scores of 2 or less generally reflect a pervasive problem that is not being met with any concerted countermeasures.
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“escape livelihood” or “Swidden agriculture”62 and production of crops: forms of cultivation designed to thwart state appropriation” (Scott 2009, 99). In most of the tribal areas, poppy is cultivated. These banned crop remains outside of state ambit. Regarding economic management, the state interference is minimal. In 2010, compared to the rest of Pakistan, a major portion of this banned crop, i.e. poppy was cultivated in Khyber Agency of FATA, making up approximately 1,538 hectares of the total 1,721 hectares cultivated nationwide that year (Global Security Organisation 2010).63 Due to the absence of state’s formal economic management system and institutions (banking and other such financial management institutions), mostly the tribal economy and economic matters are regulated through informal unwritten verbal contract under the code of Pukhtunwali. The economic management and contracts (mostly without any documentary record and currency) is through verbal (unwritten) agreements between the two parties (Berea 2010). That’s why the tribal economy largely remains outside the state measurement. In the words of Scott, the absence of state economic management system, and tribal people unwritten and informal economic dealings make it less legible and less accessible to Pakistani state control (Scott 1998).
The overall size of informal economy of Pakistan, in 2008, was between 74 percent to 91 percent of the overall formal economy (dealing from the perspective of the darker side of the informal economy, like human smuggling, drug trade, arms trade and other hard-core crimes). The estimated total size of Pakistan’s GDP is about $180 billion, this indicates that the informal economy is easily $160 billion. This also implies that the total size of Pakistan’s economy is almost $350 billion. The untaxed shadow economy as a share of Pakistan GDP is 36 percent (Kemal and Qasim 2008).
Due to Afghan Transit Trade (ATT) Agreement, there is a booming black market in consumer goods and other non-custom paid items with tax evasion (Hussain, Khan and Khilji 2013). Majority of the respondents (82.20%) confirmed that in tribal and adjacent areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, there are many black markets laden with
62 Swidden agriculture is also known as shifting cultivation, refers to a technique of rotational farming in which land is cleared for cultivation (normally by fire) and then left to regenerate after a few years. 63 There have also been low levels of poppy cultivation in Kala Dhaka area of Malakand division, Buner district of KPK, Loralai area of Balochistan and Shahdadkot region of Sindh.
207 non-custom paid. A significant number of respondents (65.93%) agreed that almost all these items of daily use are without tax (See Table – 6.3, FATA Filed Survey 2013). The World Bank has estimated that the informal or shadow economy measure in Pakistan is approaximately $30 billion (Schneider and Enste 2013, 49). Majority of the respondents (75.53%) expressed strong agreement with the statement that the corrupt border forces, police officials and corrupt custom officials has institutionalized this informal economy of FATA (See Table – 6.3 FATA Field Survey 2013). The national kitty is being deprived of Rupees 5 to 6 billion per month due to the undocumented economy at the Torkham border, Bara and the Hundi (hawala) market. Goods worth millions of dollars are seized on Torkham border every month, but no record maintained. Pakistan loses Rs. 5 to 6 billions a month due to the illegal trade at Torkham, which is between Rs100m and Rs150m per day (The Dawn 2015). It is estimated by the federal ministry of Pakistan that an average $4.8 billion of the total $6 billions remittances sent to Pakistan are handled by hundi system every year (Reuter 2002). The major reason behind this hundi system (informal remittances system) is its invisibility due to its paperless transaction or mechanism, which is impossible for formal authorities to trace and monitory, and provide security and anonymity to both remitter and remitee (Rabasa 2007, 49 - 60). During the field survey, the tribal journalists, shared their views thus: “The Asian Development Bank’s Integrated Border Immigration System is still in the pipeline since 2002 and only one or two meetings have taken place so far. The stakeholder, the formal and informal i.e. both the government departments officials and non-state actors who profit from the loopholes, continued to fight for status quo at Torkham border at the expense of the people of Pakistan” (Interview 1 and 34: FATA Field Survey 2013).
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Table – 6.3: Informal Economy and Corruption Q. Choose your responses about the following statements? Response Strongly Strongly Don't Question/ Indicator Rate Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree know Total a). Corruption in FATA in Frequency 1103 211 37 97 45 7 1500 security forces and border regions Percent 73.53 14.07 2.47 6.47 3.00 0.47 100 b). Development projects are Frequency 1051 213 112 87 34 3 1500 given through Malaks. Percent 70.07 14.20 7.47 5.80 2.27 0.20 100 c).Political Administration Frequency 1103 102 154 77 59 5 1500 (Officials) and Malaks are corrupt Percent 73.53 6.80 10.27 5.13 3.93 0.93 101 g).FATA has informal economy Frequency 1233 34 42 55 133 3 1500 beyond state control (hundi system), smuggling, and Percent 82.20 2.27 2.80 3.67 8.87 0.20 100 weaponry industry. g). Tribal people pay no Taxes. Frequency 989 210 97 78 119 7 1500 Percent 65.93 14.00 6.47 5.20 7.93 0.93 100 i). Black Market with Non-Tax Frequency 1307 97 37 11 45 3 1500 goods in FATA (foreign goods, weapons) Percent 87.13 6.47 2.47 0.73 3.00 0.20 100
In the informal economy, Hundi system64 is very famous in peripheral or rural areas of Pakistan especially in the tribal areas. The flow of money through Hundi is so strong in Pakistan as compared to other formal systems. The support provided to informal economy by hundi system is so strong that this system even challenge “fiscal gravity” within the context of hostile foreign capital exchange rates and of general inflationary pressures (Behar 2002, 84). In FATA, majority of the respondents (82.20%) agreed that on account of its efficiency, cheapnes and convenience, the tribal people prefer and like the hundi system for transferring and receiving money (See Table – 6.3, FATA Field Survey 2013). During the field interviews, the respondents belonging to various walks of life, when asked about the benefit of hundi system, and its transaction and that why the people prefer it over the banking system. They shared, “This system is prevailing in Tribal areas due to its cash nature and due to the non- availability of other financial institutions. As majority of the tribal people are uneducated, they prefer to hundi networks for transfer and receiving of money instead
64 The hundi system is a kind of finance brokers and lenders’ network in Pakistan, where remitter and remittee transfer money, within and outside country, without following proper paper trail or formal rules.
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of documentary procedures followed in state controlled financial institutions. The people like the hundi system due to: (i) It has cheap transaction fee of the broker, which is usually around 2–5 percent as compared to the standard rate claimed by other recognised and standard institutions; (ii) Its system of money delivery to people at their homes in even remote rural areas, in the form of cash, makes it more convenient and suitable; and, (iii) It is effective and efficient, because this system avoids the interference by the normal bureaucratic, which is usually required for any international money transfers” (Interview 6, 7, 8, 13, 20, 31 and 35: FATA Field Survey 2013). A large number of unorganized, unregulated and unregistered privately owned small arms manufacturing factories and shops are present in FATA. According to SDPI report, only in Darra Adam Khel of Khyber Agency, there are about 2600 small arms manufacturing workshops. The rough estimate of the production capacity of these arms outlets per day is estimated to about, more or less, 100 Kalashnikov (AK 47) rifles (SDPI and UNODC 2011).
6.2.5 Socio - Cultural Resistance to State Penetration The socio-cultural factors of tribal area resist the state penetration and governance in these areas. Being a segmentary society, the two factors of tribal culture i.e. normative and organizational structure resist state governance and penetration in a tribal society. The socio-cultural resistance to state penetration usually means that the people often do not recognize the legitimacy of state and its formal institutions, for various reasons. As a result, the people in that society prefer to and turn their loyalties towards other informal institutions, e.g. ethnic groups, clans, tribes, and families, in case of tribal people of FATA. These informal institutions serve as a basis for their political, social or judicial organization due to the absence or weakness of state formal institutions. Due to their tribal culture, the people of FATA have been resisting outside authority since pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial times (For details see Section - 4.2 of Chapter-4).
Besides the lack of formal state institutions and also due to tribal cultural norms and organizational structure, the presence of parallel socio-economic structure provides a strong foothold to the people of an area to remain outside state control (For details see Chapter – 4: Society-Centred Approach). The historical legacy of independence and their social memories of living an independent life of state control, further strengthens
210 these cultural factors to resist state penetration. The socio-cultural system of these people provides a backup to resist state. The tribal people, generally, doubt and do not trust the federal state and its formal institutions of local political administration due its weakness, corruption and other such various reasons mentioned in this study, on one hand, and, on the other hand they mostly rely on their informal institutions and informal setup of daily life. To confirm the claim by most of the literature of state-citizens relations, majority of the respondents (65.93%) were of the opinion that they lack trust on Pakistani state formal institutions rather trust (75.33%) their informal cultural institutions. They look at their family, tribe or qaom for various matters related to their daily socio-economic life. Also the non-state entities and their informal institutions provide them platform for judicial, socio-economic and political organization. The tribal society is highly organized (64.33%) and tribal people live an independent and autonomous life. That’s why majority of the respondents (67.40%) refuse to concede to state governance (authority) (Table – 6.4 FATA Field Survey 2013). The Theory of Segmentary Society is supported by the organizational structure prevailing in tribal areas of FATA. This social organizational structure of the tribal society impedes the establishment of state authority in FATA. “A segmentary society is the further division of “acephelous” or headless societies” (Lindholm 1977, 41 – 66) (For details see Section: 3.2 of Chapter-3). In the context of Segmentary Theory, Pakhtuns society differs from societies that are purely “acephelous” or headless. The tribal society has some kind of its own internal organization and stratification, with leadership positions being hereditary (Spain 1963). These leaders enjoy the support of people and could lead as long as they serve the common interests of tribes at large. Against the backdrop of these characteristics of Tribal Pakhtuns society of FATA, for any outside force or for a state, it is second to impossible to engage or dominate a tribe through one person (Spain 1963). And it remains difficult for a state to deal with each male member of the tribe individually due to the time and resource constraints. FATA, being a segmentary society, possesses normative and organisational factors which prevent the state from establishing its authority over it. The tribal society unites in times when it feels or sense a threat to its independent life. In this way, preserving their existing social structure and organization remains the primary concern of the whole society. That’s why the tribal society as segmentary society has
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goals of maintaining the social status and preventing change in its tribal setup (Lindholm 1977). These two characteristics resist the state with society as a powerful cohesive enemy when the state tries to implement on them its authority or rule of law. A civil servant, shared his experiences of serving previously at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and currently in Bajaur Agency as a Political Agent, thus: “Compared to Pakhtuns living in plain areas who are less capable of resisting state due to various vulnerabilities of accessible residence, having sedentary agriculture, family, the sedentary Pakhtuns tribes living in the hills, in tribal areas of FATA, are more isolated, more inaccessible and less exposed to the outside influences thus resist more to state authority. With this, geography also aids the sedentary hill tribes. Beside these normative factors which are also responsible for determining these tribe’s dedication and adherence to their tribal customary law instead of state formal law or governance (authority)” (Interview 30: FATA Survey 2013).
Table – 6.4: Socio-Cultural Resistance to State Governance (Authority): Tribal Society and State Relations Q. Please select a relevant response against each question.
A). Tribal Society and State Relations
Strongly Strongly Don't Response Rate Question/ Indicator Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree know Total a). Tribal people lack Frequency 989 113 81 97 213 7 1500 trust in Pakistani State. Percent 65.93 7.53 5.40 6.47 14.20 0.47 100 b). Tribal people trust Frequency 1130 89 78 137 65 1 1500 their ethnic groups, clans, tribes and extended families and Percent Jirga. 75.33 5.93 5.20 9.13 4.33 0.07 100 c). Tribal people prefer Frequency 955 409 76 57 2 1 1500 informal institutions over state formal Percent institutions. 63.67 27.27 5.07 3.80 0.13 0.07 100 d). Tribal Society is Frequency 965 377 93 53 1 11 1500 highly organized. Percent 64.33 25.13 6.20 3.53 0.07 0.73 100 h). Tribal people like Frequency 1011 433 42 11 2 1 1500 and live an independent and autonomous life Percent 67.40 28.87 2.80 0.73 0.13 0.07 100
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To sum up, from normative perspectives, these tribal people are accustomed to subsidies in exchange for order from the British and then from Pakistani government. Looking from prospect perspective, these subsidies have been incorporated as a social tribal norm. Thus, taking back this would be deemed as a loss and would then lead to resistance to state policies. Payment of these subsidies, provided a temporary relief to Pakistani state of maintain peace and controlling violence in the tribal areas but these payments never allowed integration and extension of its authority in the tribal areas.
6.3 Lack/Weak Monopoly on the Use of Force
Monopoly on of the use of forece and control on violence is identified by Max Weber as the central foundation of the modern state, and thus a capacity to govern effectively (Gerth and Mills 1946). Today, due to various factors such as lack of capacity, many states lack monopoly of force and its legitimate use in some territories under its jurisdiction. The state capacity to govern is multifaceted (Weber 2013, 78). States vary greatly in their capacities and the extent to which they monopolize violence and these differences are often viewed as key enablers of economic and political development (Evans 2012, 13 – 30). However, scholars argue that establishing a monopoly of violence is a prerequisite for other things to happen (Braddick 2000, 14 - 20). Many factors, such as militancy, conflict, civil war, difficult geography (Herbst 2000), rough terrain and poverty (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75 – 90), or interstate competition and warfare (Tilly 1975) impede the establishment of state monopoly in an area. Here in this study, the state monopoly on the use of violence in tribal areas of Pakistan has been assessed under three major indicators: the presence of criminal networks, armed and militant groups and easy access to arms by population in general. During the field survey, a small number of respondents (7.47%) expressed their satisfaction over the Pakistani state control in FATA and the presence of the state security apparatus/agencies. Though a sizeable number of respondents (30.33%) believed that the Pakistani state has control on violence in FATA, the belief was based on the current military operation in response to the ongoing conflict in FATA for the restoration of order and peace, otherwise majority of the people (80.60%) were found of the opinion that generally the Pakistani state lacks control on violence in FATA (Table – 6.5 FATA Field Survey 2013).
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Table – 6.5: Monopoly on the Use of Force Q. What are your views about the following Statements? Response Strongly Strongly Don't Question/ Indicator Rate Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree know Total Monopoly on the Use of Force a). Pakistani State Control in Frequency 112 78 20 1209 78 3 1500 FATA Percent 7.47 5.20 1.33 80.60 5.20 0.20 100 b). Pakistani state control on Frequency 455 78 20 876 68 3 1500 violence in FATA Percent 30.33 5.20 1.33 58.40 4.53 0.20 100 c). Function of State institutions Frequency 112 78 20 1209 78 3 1500 (Police, Army, Judiciary) Percent 7.47 5.20 1.33 80.60 5.20 0.93 101 A). Presence of Organized Armed Groups outside the State Control d). Presence of armed groups (Al Frequency 859 429 112 97 2 1 1500 Qaeda group, Taliban groups, etc.) Percent 57.27 28.60 7.47 6.47 0.13 0.07 100 e). Local tribal people support Frequency 910 388 112 87 2 1 1500 these armed groups Percent 60.67 25.87 7.47 5.80 0.13 0.07 100 f). Control of these armed groups Frequency 965 377 93 53 1 11 1500 in localities. Percent 64.33 25.13 6.20 3.53 0.07 0.73 100 g).These armed groups receive Frequency 1011 433 42 11 2 1 1500 financial support from local people in the form of tax, protection money, charity etc. Percent 67.40 28.87 2.80 0.73 0.13 0.07 100 h). For various purposes, people Frequency 934 389 97 77 2 1 1500 bribe political and social institutions (PA and Malaks)? Percent 62.27 25.93 6.47 5.13 0.13 0.93 100 B). Presence of Criminal Networks Linked to Terrorist or Insurgent Groups g). Presence of criminal networks Frequency 955 409 76 57 2 1 1500 in FATA due to state absence Percent 63.67 27.27 5.07 3.80 0.13 0.07 100 h). Presence of Organized Crime Frequency 1011 433 42 11 2 1 1500 groups in FATA Percent 67.40 28.87 2.80 0.73 0.13 0.07 100 C). Population with Access to Weapons i). Free and easy access to Frequency 1213 23 112 97 54 1 1500 weapons Percent 80.87 1.53 7.47 6.47 3.60 0.07 100
During field interview, respondents shared their views regarding the state control in FATA. They said:
“Pakistani state has lost its control in tribal areas of FATA. Before militancy (Taliban), the people used to call our areas as FATA (Federally Administered Tribal
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Areas). I am of the opinion that today we have no such area to be called as FATA. The better word today to represent tribal areas is TATA i.e. Taliban Administered Tribal Areas” (Interview 24, 26, 28, 31 and 35: FATA Field Survey 2013).
6.2.6 Presence of Armed Groups outside State Control The tribal areas of FATA have been in control of armed groups, Al Qaeda, Taliban and other such criminal networks. Pakistani state has no control on these groups. Many of these militants are living in tribal areas of FATA since the Soviet War, and have been fully integrated into local tribal society mostly by marrying with the local women. Due to the international community pressure, these armed groups are being doubted for cross border attacks on international forces in Afghanistan. Due to international pressure the Pakistani state was compelled to take action against them. In an attempt to subdue and eliminate these groups, the Pakistani military, during its various military operations, faced unexpected resistance and loss (Centre for Security Studies (CSS) Switzerland 2011).
Beside these armed groups (mostly foreigners), there are some internal arms groups (Taliban), which are operating in FATA and launching attacks against Pakistani state due to her support to the western powers in Afghanistan and FATA. The attacks launched by these groups against Pakistani state clearly reflect that the state has no control on these groups (Watkin 2016). Majority of the respondents (83.87%) confirmed the presence of armed groups (Al Qaeda, Taliban and other such outlaws) in FATA. The respondent (85.54%) also showed their agreement with the claim that these armed groups were supported by the locals in one form or the other, providing shelter to them, place for residence, and also having social and family relations with them (Table – 6.5 FATA Field Survey 2013). These groups were also financially supported by the local tribal population, confirmed by a significant percentage of respondents (67.40%). This support was in the form of charity or in the form of protection money, as in many areas and in many cases (Table – 6.5 FATA Field Survey 2013).
A significant number of respondents (64.33%) supported the claim that these armed groups, enjoyed strong hold and control in their areas for reasons such as power, influence and money (Table – 6.5 FATA Field Survey 2013).
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During group discussion, respondents of various tribal areas shared their views that the tribal people (due to their code of life, Pakthunwali) provide shelter, food, and hospitality to everyone, who asks for it. They shared that they were unaware of the later on drastic consequences of giving shelter, refuge and hospitality to the Taliban or Al Qaeda operatives (FGD 9, FATA Field Survey 2013).
6.2.7 Presence of Criminal Networks Since long, especially from the Soviet War onward, there has been persistent presence of various criminal networks, like organized drug groups, local outlaws, criminals who were wanted in settled areas and who had fled to the tribal areas, and other such outlaws. The drug groups having been active since the Soviet War, most of these drugs and other such related substances are smuggled from Afghanistan, passing through FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan entering Iran (Global Security Organization, 2014). The presence of these criminal groups/network was confirmed by majority of the respondents (93.27%). Majority of the respondents (89.46%) shared that due to the absence of state control on violence, these drug and criminal groups enjoyed a free life in FATA to conduct and operate its work (Table – 6.5 FATA Field Survey 2013).
During field interviews, the respondents said: “Ransom, kidnapping, smuggling of opium, heroin, extortion, and other such acts have become the routine activities of these criminal groups in FATA” (Interview 6, 7, 8, 19, 27 and 36: FATA Field Survey 2013). The people shared that they were fed up and wanted to get rid of these groups. These groups had made the life difficult for tribal people. They argued that they were displaced from their homes and areas due to the criminal and Taliban groups. Because Pakistani military started its operation against these groups in FATA (FGD 5, 6, FATA Survey 2013).
6.2.8 Population with Access to Weapons Tribal people have a long history of keeping weapons. Anthropologists, who have worked on Pakhtuns consider keeping weapons by Pakhtuns, as part of their culture. Also, the tribal culture considers the weapon as the only jewellery for men (Shukla 2015).
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The rough geography and tough and rough life style and living conditions of the tribal people, it is considered necessary for everyone in FATA to have guns and the knowledge of using it at the time of need. There are weaponry industries in tribal areas and also the Soviet War increased the proliferation of weapons in these areas. This availability of weapons to the outlaws, criminal groups, Taliban etc., and also to the local people further restricts the Pakistani state control on violence in the tribal areas. Not only had this, but the easy and free availability of weapons also caused huge losses on government forces during operation against these groups in FATA (The Telegraph 2009). In the context of state governance, the availability of weapons in tribal areas has not only empowered the criminal and militant groups, but the tribal people (having weapons as a culture symbol) have helped develop martial culture in the tribal areas. The Soviet War legacy has further entrenched and worsened the phenomenon called “Kalashnikov culture" (The Telegraph 2009). Majority of the respondents (85.87%) confirmed that in FATA almost every person or household possesses a kind of weapon (Table – 6.5 FATA Field Survey 2013). The culture of free movement of weapon is common in FATA. “Due to lack of state control and regulations for arms control, every person owns a weapon in tribal areas” (Interview 23, FATA Field Survey 2013).
6.3 LACK OF EFFECTIVE BORDER CONTROL Effective border control is considered as an attribute of strong statehood. In this study, the effective border control by Pakistani state has been selected as an indicator of un-governability because the tribal areas of FATA fall at the margin of Pak- Afghan border, called Pak-Afghan borderland. Pakistani state lacks effective control overa areas bordering with Afghanistan due to various reasons: lack of roads, communications and other infrastructure required for border control. That’s why on this side of Pak-Afghan border there is free movement of people and goods due to non-existence of immigration and customs procedures. The existing set-up of border control is either under resources or the officials are corrupt (Hilal (English) 2014). The effective border control is also difficult due to social and family ties between same Pakhtun ethnic tribes living on both sides of the border (Hayes and Sedra 2009).
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Table – 6.6: Border Control and Interference by Rival Neighbouring State
Q. What are your views about the following Statements?
Response Strongly Strongly Don't Questions/ Indicators Rate Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree know Total a). There is effective Frequency 314 89 58 989 45 5 1500 Infrastructure for the deployment of security forces, custom and border officials at Percent 20.93 5.93 3.87 65.93 3.00 0.33 100 Durand Line b).Presence of effective Frequency 264 211 101 910 11 3 1500 immigration and custom procedure at Durand Line (Visa, etc.) and other regulations for movement of Percent 17.60 14.07 6.73 60.67 0.73 0.20 100 goods and people c). Non State Actors are Frequency 955 409 76 57 2 1 1500 providing basic services in your society instead of state formal Percent 63.67 27.27 5.07 3.80 0.13 0.07 100 institution d). Interference by foreign Frequency 965 377 93 53 1 11 1500 states in internal affairs of FATA Percent 64.33 25.13 6.20 3.53 0.07 0.73 100
A significant number of the respondents (68.93%) held the opinion that there is no effective border control due to lack of necessary infrastructure to control free movement of goods and people. About 61.30% respondents confirmed that there is no effective immigration and custom procedure at the Durand Line. A significant number of respondents (90.94%) also confirmed the claim that non state actors are providing basic services instead of state formal institutions even with regard to custom and security duties in the border areas (Table 6.6: FATA Field Survey 2013). This supports the claim that the Pakistani state lacks strong control on its border areas. Besides, there is a growing tension between Pakistan and India relations. Because the Pakistani authorities doubt that the Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) has various training camps, in the Afghan side region bordering Pakistan, providing training and support to outlaws (Taliban, Al Qaeda, militants) against Pakistan (Shukla and Bhat 2015). The Indian interference in the border region of Pakistan presents an additional perspectives on the Pakistani state weak governance in FATA. This further worsens the existing weak governance of Pakistani state in the tribal areas.
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6.4 EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE AND PRESENCE OF RIVAL NEIGHBOURING STATE One of the characteristics of an ungoverned area is the external interference especially by a rival bordering state, which further impedes or shrinks the state ability to effectively control its border region. In this context, usually, a neighbouring rival state interference in domestic, political and economic space within the border region of a given state thus preventing that state from excercising sovereignty or control in that peripheral border area. The external rival state tactics in the border territories of a given state include: supporting preferred local candidates, officials or ethnic groups at the expense of other such groups (Douglas 2010). At the time of independence, Pakistan did not posses the needed paraphernalia to effectively exercise its domestic sovereignty in the tribal areas. The tribal areas announced their solidarity with Pakistani state and the later got international legal sovereignty over the tribal areas. Soon after the independence, Pakistan faced rivals in its eastern (India) and western (Afghanistan) fronts of its borders. Afghanistan was the only state which strongly opposed Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations in 1948. This rivalry continues even today between Pakistan and Afghanistan, mainly due to differences on Durand line as an international border. The core issue between these two countries is the issue of Pakhtunistan (Firdous 2002, 48).
Beside other factors, Pakistan’s rivalry with the bordering states of India and Afghanistan has remained a major strategic concern for Pakistan preventing the latter to extend its authority in the tribal areas of FATA. And this has also been one of the fears of Pakistani state regarding her strategic encirclement by the two rival neighbouring countries of India and Afghanistan.
Majority of the respondents (89.46%) confirmed that for the last several years there is growing foreign interference in the shape of various influences and actors operating in FATA (Table – 6.6, FATA Field Survey 2013).
A senior ex-Pakistan civil servant shared his views regarding the regional strategic considerations and compulsions of Pakistan having rival states at borders. He told that “this strategic fear of Pakistan has always remained a major factor in the domestic policy of Pakistani for extending its authority in the tribal areas of FATA
219 during the seven decades since independence” (Interview 33: FATA Field Survey 2013).
6.5 STATE’S UNEVEN TERRITORIAL REACH BY WILL One of the dimensions of state capacity is its territorial reach. Mann has termed this as “infrastructural power”. Infrastructure power of the state means “its institutional capability to exercise control and implement policy choices within the territory it claims to govern” (Mann 1993, 10 – 20). This infrastructural power varies from state to state. States with weak infrastructural power mostly lack the ability to collect taxes or carry out census at national level. The scholars working on state-building argue that projection of state authority by a state throughout its territories is very expensive and costly. They argue that rational state leaders always calculate the expenses, costs incurred and risks involved against benefits in the projection of authority in all its territories (Herbst 2000). In the words of Ahmad, the British Colonial rulers always distinguished between ‘Qalang’ Pakhtuns areas, where the building of administrative infrastructure was deemed to be worth, and ‘Nang’ Pakhtuns area, the parts of the continent deemed useless because they produced less than the cost to administer them (Ahmed 2011). This argument supports the claim made by respondents during field interviews that “due to its weak economy, and due to its vested geostrategic interests, the Pakistani state by design kept the tribal areas of FATA ungoverned” (Interview 23, 29, 35 and 38: FATA Field Survey 2013).
Unevenness in territorial reach of a state is also mirrored in its economic and political localisms (Moore 2014).65 Chhibber and Kolman explain localism as “an approach which believes in the retention of local autonomy instead of centralized governance. Central state provision of social services and unification of the national regulatory apparatus helps to bind peripheral regions and social groups more tightly to the central state” (Chhibber and Kollman 2009, 198 – 207). These effects are not unidirectional.
Officials of the political administration and also workers of the development projects in FATA shared their views on the matter thus:
65 The concept of Localism is the production and consumption of goods, local control of government, and promotion of local history, local culture and local identity. Localism can be contrasted with regionalism and centralized government, with its opposite being found in the unitary state.
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“The tribal areas were ignored in national development plans, first by the British colonial power and then by the Pakistani state. That is why, mostly the tribal people relied on their own local governance set-up based on their customs and traditions” (Interview 11, 12, 32, 36, and 37: FATA Field Survey 2013).
To sum up, the uneven territorial reach of Pakistani state with respect to tribal areas of FATA, is due to various reasons: economic and strategic compulsions, interference by the neighbouring rival states, and the adaptation of neoliberal reforms leading to the erosion of its infrastructural power.
CONCLUSION Against this backdrop, while discussing various factors of resistance to state governance in the context of state-centric approach, it is argued that Pakistani state decisions regarding FATA remains a choice between to extend its authority through integration and maintenance of its national security. This choice is no more a domestic concern after September 11, 2011. The concerns of the west now suggest that Pakistani state intentionally (by will) or due to its lack of capacity has left the tribal areas ungoverned. Now, the international community especially the United States is pushing Pakistan hard to integrate these tribal areas in the mainstream governance system of the country.
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CHAPTER – 7
EXTENSION OF STATE GOVERNANCE (AUTHORITY) IN FATA - PROSPECTS
7.1 INTRODUCTION Since 1990, spaces that are ungoverned have become a tangible origin of concern for state domestic governance, internal security and for the international community. The ultimate solution for an ungoverned space is the extension of state governance by establishing new institutions or strengthening the existing ones which is a prerequisite for the economic, social, and political development of an area that is state building.
Literature on state resilience and state building shows that most of the interventions in post-conflict situations is with regard to the restoration of state governance. In this context, the statist scholars stress on the tangible dimension of governance that jumping straight to Weberian ideals of state structure and functions. These scholars mainly stress on the effectiveness and capacity building of state institutions. While the society-centric scholars consider this an inappropriate action and solution and they argue that with tangible dimensions the intangible dimensions also need to be focussed. Society-centric scholars claim that an understanding of the dynamics of state-society relationship is pertinent in this regard. Based on the analysis of various factors, un-governability with the perspectives of governance approaches discussed in previous chapters, this chapter describes prospects for the extension of Pakistani state governance (authority) in the context of FATA.
This chapter consists of three parts. Part one deals with the future of FATA and the proposed reforms which are under discussion these days in both policy and academic circles. Part two discusses the prospects of state governance from the statist’s perspectives, focussing on tangible dimensions of state building and state resilience. Part three discusses the prospects of state governance in FATA from the society- centric perspectives focussing on intangible dimensions of state resilience and state building.
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The literature on state building in the post conflict situations or in situations when state governance has failed or totally disappeared, argue that among other things,66 the most important is the need for restoring state governance (authority).
7.2 FUTURE OF FATA Before going into the analysis of prospects for the extension of state governance, this section presents a short commentary and analysis on the future of FATA in the current post conflict situation. Zia Ur Rahman, a journalist and researcher, put it thus:
“Once the guns fall silent, there is a debate that needs to take place and a historical question that needs to be addressed: What will be the fate of FATA?” (Dawn 2015).
The question about the future of FATA has been a continuous debate in both policy and academic circles since independence of Pakistan but more specifically since Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Currently, in the post conflict FATA, the Pakistani government has been under immense pressure from international community, pushing Pakistan to act decisively to bring the region into the mainstream governance of the country, a move that they see as key for curbing militancy in the wider region and to make special provisions to end underdevelopment, backwardness and violence in the tribal areas. A foreign diplomat said:
“Tribal people need a new social contract and a new economic and power structure because Taliban militancy and the continuous military operation in the tribal region have caused irremediable damage to the existing administrative and legal governing system” (A Western diplomat at Islamabad requesting Anonymity).
As mentioned, the question of the future of FATA is not a new one. It is a historical debate in the context of its outdated system of governance and lack of effective public authority since centuries and particularly after the inception of Pakistan. In this
66 Post conflict needs include: i). Strengthen state structures & provide governance, ii). the state needs to protect its citizens from violence, iii). State authority needs extend to all parts of the country or areas where state have lost its authority, iv). to strengthen the State to make it able to protect the fragile peace and deal with the violent legacies of the conflict such as communal distrust, v). there is legitimacy failure, so need to establish the Rule of Law to obtain legitimacy, vi). to establish democratic governance structures & institutions: host regular free and fair elections, vii). extend the rule of law to all territories, viii). establish accountability and a limited role for the military/ police in governance, ix). re-establish civil liberties: rights, responsibilities, freedoms, suppression of opposition and popular public opinion, x). service failure: need to deliver key services to the population, these include: a). Essential services: health, primary education, water and sanitation, b). Protection: Police, Justice system, c). Basic transportation and energy infrastructure, xi). Income generation opportunities, and, xii). Development of state’s mutually constructive relation with society.
223 context, stakeholders such as civil society organizations, political parties, political administration, tribal leaders (Malaks), all demand a change in the existing system of FATA, in one way or the other. Presently, there are four proposed approaches or models regarding the future of FATA, each one has its own proponents presenting their opinion and arguments about. These four schools and their arguments in support of their respective view points are discussed below:
1). Merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP): The Awami National Party (ANP) and the Qaumi Watan Party (QWP) are the major supporters of this approach to the settlement of FATA. The ANP emphasises on making FATA as part of KP province, which is the pivot of its party policy. In fact, ANP had proposed to repeal the concerned Articles of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan to realise the party ambition.
The ANP stand on the question is based on its argument of taking Pakhtun areas including KP and FATA as a single area. Akbar Watanyar, a poet, highlights the benefits of unification i.e. emergence of a vast province, and increase the power of Pakhtuns in national and international affairs. He lamented a conspiracy of the division of Pakhtuns as the vested interest behind imposing colonial era control over Pakhtuns and their land.
This school also argues that in practice, people of FATA are connected with cities in the settled areas of KP in order to participate and benefit from medical, educational and commercial opportunities. Many tribal people live in the settled areas of KP while they also participate in the social, economic and political affairs in FATA. Peshawar, Bannu, Kohat and D.I. Khan Districts are a second home to a significant portion of tribal people, Peshawar houses FATA Secretariat, Hangu and Tank in settled areas are the historical locations for political administration of Orakzai, South Waziristan and Khyber Agencies. ii). FATA as a Separate Province: In contrast to the approach of amalgamation of FATA in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the popular position of tribal leaders is the formation of a new province comprising of the tribal areas termed as FATA. Many emerging political leaders of FATA, political parties and new middles class argue that the provincial administration of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa would not be able to solve the problems of FATA more efficiently than FATA as a separate province having
224 financial and administrative autonomy. Among others, the proponents of this school of thought include politicians who win elections from FATA. iii). FATA Council – Gilgit-Baltistan Model: In contrast to the first two (mutually conflicting) approaches of absorption vs autonomy of FATA, the third proposal is the formation of a FATA Council based on the pattern of Gilgit-Baltistan-Council. This approach, centred on the argument of making a decision at the local level, is a pragmatic option. Chattan, a PPP leader from Bajaur Agency, argued that this position represents finding of committee headed by Justice (retired) Mian Mohammad Ajmal and Farooq H. Naek, All FATA Siasi Ittihad, Political Parties Joint Committee on FATA Reforms, and a committee formed by Shaheed Bhutto Foundation which found Gilgit-Baltistan-like FATA Council as the best available option under the existing circumstances. iv). Status Quo: And lastly, a significant portion of stakeholders consider status quo as the best political dispensation. The supporters of this approach include mostly the people who have been and are still benefiting from the current state of affairs related to FATA i.e. the Malak’s (tribal chieftains), the Political Agents, officials of the FATA Secretariat and the rich business class of this region. Even a significant portion of activists fear that the new global order allows international players an opportunity to further deteriorate the state of affairs in FATA by supporting the idea of new FATA province. Local tribal leaders also consider the national and international support for changing the status of FATA a conspiracy for furthering vested interests of national and international players who are not sincere in improving the fortune of FATA.
Against this backdrop, it is argued that whatever model is adopted for the future of FATA, the real question will remain unresolved that how Pakistani state governance can be extended to the areas of FATA.
In this context, in the light of the findings and analysis of the challenges to Pakistani state governance in the preceding chapters provides enough background for the prospects of state governance extension in the tribal areas of FATA. The next two sections provide an analysis of the tangible and intangible dimensions of prospects, based on the findings of the previous chapters.
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7.3 TANGIBLE DIMENSIONS OF PROSPECTS FOR THE STATE
GOVERNANCE This section focusses on the tangible or visible and quantitative dimensions of prospects for state governance (authority). The tangible67 dimensions of prospects of state governance are discussed in state-centric perspective, also called Top-Down approach. Under the tangible aspects, the focus is given on Authority, Capacity and Legitimacy (ACL), to establish priorities for action, under a multi-diagnostic approach to present a possible solution for the state governance in FATA.
7.3.1 Aligning Informal and Formal Sources of Authority In a society, where the state governance (authority) is low, the best remedy for the state governance and authority extension lies in aligning informal sources of authority with formal. Through this way state can reach common people. In the context of FATA, an important task for Pakistani state and policy makers remains the alignment of the legal and practiced forms of authority. It would result in formal and informal institutions supporting each other instead of challenging each other in FATA. Key condition for realizing this ambition is the thorough comprehension of the local context of the tribal society and culture (including historical cultural roots of authority). This indicates the significance of gradualism in the introduction of legal reforms that underpin an inclusive process of deliberation. It is important to note that all informal sources of authority cannot be aligned, as some essentially further deteriorate weakness of the state (Brinkerhoff 2005, 3 – 14). Subsequently, the solution lies in striking a balance between control and co-option, particularly in the constitutive domains of the state. These are security, political, economic and service delivery domains which are discussed below:
7.3.2 Aligning Formal and Informal State’s Security Apparatus The domain of security stands as the first victim of a state with weak and divided authority in a society as security is handled by the non-state apparatus. In case of FATA, the militants and other outlaws undermine the state’s monopoly of force by taking authority in their hands (OECD 2007a, 40).
67 The list of tangible dimensions include, the number of soldier demobilized and weapons destroyed, the number of judges trained, new laws drafted, infrastructure built or rehabilitate e.g. roads, schools, hospitals, and others etc.
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Though, in FATA these non-state actors and their legal structures apparently fill in the legal vacuum, but in the long term these actors and their system also weaken and challenge the judicial and security apparatus of state (OECD 2007, 71). Modifying the process and structures of security and justice into multiple layers would provide a mechanism of exchange that would prove beneficial to the establishment of state authority in security domain (OECD 2007b, 81). Focusing only on the capacity building of security apparatus is likely to prove ineffective. Therefore, co-opting and gradually centring the civilian control happens to be a better way of establishing state’s legitimacy.
7.3.3 Aligning Formal and Informal Political Authority Extreme division of political authority in FATA (dispersed among actors of formal and informal traditional authorities) hinders the state in fulfilling its core (survival) functions in the constitutive domains. It is therefore pertinent for Pakistan to provide basic security and then extend its authority by installing an effective form of public administration in FATA. This strategy would strengthen the ability of Pakistani state to procure the required revenue and provide services to the people of tribal areas. As Walle argues that public services are an effective tool of spreading symbols and inculcate political loyalty to state among the citizen (Walle 2009, 39). Reconstitution of organizational infrastructure in FATA becomes a significant first step for Pakistani state to re-establish its territorial access. Strong relations between centre and the local leadership is also necessary for establishing cooperation between the formal and informal political authority in FATA. In the context of FATA, decentralization offers dubious benefits presently as it can either lead to strengthening of state’s authority, and with equal chance of further deterioration. The best way forward is to observe caution and pursue a line of allowing piecemeal decentralisation that offers the best chance to enhance state’s authority (Siegle and Mahony 2007, 57).
7.3.4 Aligning Formal and Informal Economy Economy becomes the direct victim of weakened state’s authority when the line between public and private blurs (as public institution engages in private business) and illegal informal economy dominates (Peschka 2011, 28). When illegal trade is not curbed by the state, it is interpreted as the sign of weak authority of the state. Such economy then supports and spawns parallel security forces (that challenge the writ of
227 state) resulting in violence and conflict (Weingast 2009). Such a situation makes it hard to curb rent-searching economic process and promotes distribution of economic rents that is the prerequisite for the settlement of political solution in an informal way. In the context of FATA, therefore, agreements between local and centre should ensure availability and sharing of resources to all on the basis of their needs. Further, in the tribal society of FATA ensuring a conducive environment through accountability, fairness and guaranteeing human rights is also important (Bannon and Collier 2003).
7.3.5 Coopting and Aligning Formal and Informal Service Delivery Service delivery (social) offers the best change to co-opt formal and informal practices and organizations as such provision contains the least possible risk of promoting challenge to the authority of state. In the context of FATA, state’s policy making bodies can provide opportunities of inclusiveness to the informal and private bodies of FATA in policy making and implementation and perform the role of regulator (Batley and Mcloughlin.2010, 131 – 154).
7.3.6 Capacity Building of Indigenous Institutions In areas where state governance is weak, effective capacity building of the existing defective institutions is indispensable rather relying on short term ad hoc solutions of delivering temporary services (Baird 2010, 31). Therefore, all policies and planning need to focus on the component of indigenous capacity building, so that long-term goal of capacity building is realized even when demand for allocating resources to short-term emergencies remains high (OECD 2008). For the state organizations to function efficiently, provision of a conductive environment is necessary. The environment of the organization or institution determines its success in terms of achieving the goals (Teskey 2005). However, in the absence of legitimacy of the state, even the state organizations cannot attain legitimacy of the public and thus remain weak. Thus, for the capacity of state and its organizations, the legitimacy in eyes of its public is necessary.
7.3.7 Legitimacy through Catering Public Demands For legitimacy, it is necessary that the state should cater the public demands. Getting their demands fulfiled by the state, the people accept the state legitimacy, which ultimately leads to the state reach to its population.
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In this regard, the central state always needs to accommodate the expectations of all sections of the society, thereby it can expect to win the approval of both the elites and commoners. Identification of different kinds of legitimacy is essential. If lack of efficacy of certain state institution has resulted in grievances and deprivation, the restoration of legitimacy would depend, in this situation, on the improvement of efficiency of the state institutions in question, also called state’s performance legitimacy. Provision of security and basic services remain key factors of state performance legitimacy. Therefore, state’s participation/ownership in these areas is considered mandatory. Moreover, taxation and revenue generation of state derive justification from these aspects of legitimacy. Availability of services alone does not suffice in a state where inequalities are present; as such inequalities generate tensions among different sections of the society. Therefore, equitable distribution becomes important in provision of services (Baird 2010, 20- 21). In weak states, the priorities for legitimacy differ from those of a strong state. The weak state often pursues wasteful short-term programs because of her visibility and immediate translation into legitimacy (Keefer 2008). Corruption is a key challenge to the establishment of political legitimacy in fragile states where overlapping bodies for countering corruption usually do not deliver (Spector 2008, 11). Despite this dark reality, anti-corruption drive benefits from transparency in financial activities, reforms in judiciary, overhauling the structure of civil bureaucracy and strengthening of legislative (UNDP 2010). Inclusion of grass- root level input into anti-corruption drive also helps (Baird 2010). As patronage politics maintains socio-political cohesion at local level, its eradication would result in lack of stability (Hameiri 2007, 409 - 441). Construction of a shared national identity results from improvement in the state’s legitimacy. Activities where participation of citizens is greater help in the exchanges between centre and the people (elite and common people) that promotes shared values and beliefs that are necessary for the emergence of a common national identity. Top- down approach in the form of imposing a state-sanctioned narrative and identity through media and education often produce resentment and resistance among the disenfranchised and marginalized population.
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To sum up, Authority, Capacity and Legitimacy are mutually dependent and hence their balance is essential for state-building. An imbalance in them weakens instead of strengthening a state, for instance, focusing on legitimacy cannot help in state- building unless the state does not prove its capacity of delivering services. Vice versa a capacity-building drive of state organizations and institutions would not yield result unless it enjoys legitimacy in popular perception. Therefore, only focusing on improving capacity is not sufficient. Normally, in a state with weak governance all these three dimensions i.e. capacity, authority and legitimacy are missing. Supplementing capacity building along strengthening of legitimacy and authority is therefore necessary.
7.4 INTANGIBLE DIMENSIONS OF PROSPECTS FOR THE STATE
GOVERNANCE This section explains the prospects for state governance in the light of the analysis of both society-centric and state-in-society approaches. These are also called intangible or invisible and qualitative dimensions of state governance (authority). These intangible elements help in understanding the relationship between the state and its society in a sense (Hart 2008). To support this argument, the OCED defines state building as, "an endogenous process to develop capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relationships … the absence of a careful understanding of the way in which the political and social fabric of a society is expressed institutionally, investment in recreating or building new institutions that mimic the ideal Weberian form is often bound to fail. Rather, an open mind with respect to institutional arrangements and honest acknowledgement of the social foundations of existing forms of organisation is essential" (OECD 2008, 39).
The literature further stresses existence of collusion between formal and informal political institutions, especially in an ever-changing socio-political environment. (Eisenstadt 1964, 235). For key agents in policy formation, it is essential to consider the complexity of the governance process while working state-building (Pouligny 2000, 1735). In this sense, support for primacy of legitimacy or effectiveness exist among scholars. It is, therefore, important to view sociocultural elements as fundamentals of the institutions of the state. The
230 intangible aspects such as collective values system and popular perceptions make a complete understanding of resilience of state. In the context of FATA, these intangible factors are discussed below:
7.4.1 Building and Restoration of Trust In the context of FATA, it is pertinent for key players in policy to go beyond conventional elements i.e. constitution, governance and electoral reforms. Instead, they need to centralize “civic trust in a political community” in their effort of building state, as it is essential for political/economic progress through cooperation. Trust plays key role in the formation of relations between individuals and community. It also strengthens relations between state and society. Through compromises and other development programs, the central government of Pakistan can develop trust of tribal population in Pakistani state and its institutions. Distrust of the tribal society and the feelings of deprivation and powerlessness which has been developed during the last several decades and especially as a result of ongoing conflict in FATA, hs served as a key barrier in the way of state governance. Therefore, adoption of measures focusing on promoting sense of affinity along restoration of social relations is the need of the time. The loss of social networks and social relations as a result of conflict and displacement, can be bridged and re- established through brining the tribal people together across these divides. Local associations and nongovernmental organizations can be helpful in this regard to restore and promote trust in the tribal society. The central government’s development initiatives and programs can also bridge the gaps. By allowing inclusion in activities related to FATA, the tribal people would become willing to participate in state’s formal institutions. The state can do this through various interventions and activities proposed as below: i). Reforming Local Governance Structures from Tribal Perspectives
In the post-conflict situation in FATA, now focussing on extending and strengthening state governance (authority) is central to the themes of peace, stability and stable development. Recently, the key role of state is evaluated against multiple indicators not just complete control over the use of force and coercion (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan 2005). In this context, the Pakistai state inability to perform these functions results in loss of its legitimacy in the tribal
231 areas of FATA. Such a weakness gradually deteriorates the basis of social contract between tribal people and the Pakistani state (Castillo 2003). For Pakistani state governance to be rooted in the tribal society, it is necessary to keep in perspective the historical and cultural context of tribal norms and the tribal indigenous authorities. That’s why, Pakistani state should not keep any differenciation with regard to formal and informal institutions in context of the tribal society. ii). Focussing on Tribal Socio-Political Context in Electoral Systems and Processes
Elections, being a powerful tool for accountability and legitimation of the state are important way of extending participation and of legitimatization in tribal society. Elections provide an opportunity with legitimacy to a weak state to develop its capacity in a given society. But a given electoral system will not produce same results in different polities and different areas and cultures, because it is founded on a specific social and political context. This context comprises of varying social and political ideologies, perceptions and practices of the people for whom it works the best (UNDP. 2007). For instance, registering a voter not only defines territoriality but sometimes underpins a definition of “nationality” that may not be applicable in the same sense in all polities, areas and cultures (Pouligny 2009, 244). iii). Tribal 'Civic' Trust and Political Community in Constitutional Processes and Reforms
While drafting a new or reforming the old constitution, should take care that it should portray and ensure the essentional value-system of a society, form rights and also have the framework for improving the institutions of the state. In order to build trust, these should include rules for the allocation and exercise of power and also in particular focussing on separation of and relationship of powers aiming at building political community and thus establishing basis for state legitimacy (Ghai and Galli 2006). The key element of constitutions normally is how a citizen is defined. This definition implies an identity construct that is ideally bestowed on all inhabitants without discrimination.
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Constitutional process derives from commonality of values and trust in a community. This process either results in a new constitution or changes in the existing one. Participatory constitution-making (or reform) holds universal approval of experts as it underpins the process of integration and reconciliation essential for the nation and state building. Modern experts now conclude that a bottom-up process is more important than the traditional (top-down) approach of drafting a constitution. Incorporation of bottom-up process requires a room for inclusion of the popular say in the constitutional write and re-write process. In the context of FATA, the agenda for reforms should be set after consulting the tribal people. In this regard, an awareness campaign is necessary to prepare tribal people for their effective role in this process.
During field interviews, the respondents said:
“The constitutional reforms with regard to FATA are pertinent. This could help in restoring political community in FATA. Faith in the possibility of community to enable them to understand the past fault-lines on the part of state and tribal society is important. Participation of tribal people in this process is necessary. The focus should also be on developing trust and confidence of the tribal people in the state and its institutions through their participation and the provision of services and equal opportunities and due share in decision making” (Interview 1, 3, 14, 34 and 38: FATA Field Survey 2013).
During field interviews respondents stressed on and shared views:
"In the context of FATA, the first thing is trust building between the tribal people and the state. In the absence of trust on state, the tribal people will not accept new reforms and will hesitate to merge in the mainstream governance system of the country. Trust building is a long process, as it is broken in an instant but can be built in years. In the context of tribal society, 'Civic' trust is not just a feeling or state of mind but is a combination of various conditions and environment which make and develop institutions trustworthy. These are normally deep rooted in the existing realities and cultures of a given society. So that it could make the local people convinced and empowered. That’s why these activities
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should be internal not external to a society” (Interview 1, 8, 21, 22, 23, 32, and 39: FATA Field Survey 2013). iv). Tribal Shared Identity, Shared Social Memories, and History
History and collective social memories are important “intangible” factors in the process of building a state (Naidu 2006). Notable scholars acknowledge collective memory and identity (of citizenship) play key role in the recovery after conflicts. Common history and roots in identity are important in the formation of new national identities.
In this regard, during field interview senior community elders expressed thus:
“The tribal people played a great role during various crises and events, the Pakistan’s movement, Kashmir issue, Soviet attack on Afghanistan and the recent war on terror. The role played by tribal people throughout the history in these events saved the very existence of Pakistan. The Pakistani state and the rest of the nation should acknowledge the sacrifices made by the tribal people for Pakistan. We have shared religion, shared nationality, and same culture with the rest of Pakistan. We have shared history, shared heroes and shared values. These collective memories if really pursued and highlighted by the state, can help the tribal people to integrate with the rest of the country” (Interview 20, 22, 23, 29, 31 and 35: FATA Field Survey 2013).
Experts opine that the important role of teaching history in educational institution is to inculcate in citizens a doctored version of the past, thereby form in them a sense of current citizenship and converge their future inspiration. Assimilation of the incongruent, therefore, remains an important aspect of teaching history. v). Local Tribal Conception about Justice and the Rule of Law
Change in common beliefs and perception decide how and why law of the land is obeyed or challenged. According to Thomas Carothers, law besides being represented through police, court and judges etc. is actually rooted in norms that society trusts. Law is therefore a collective agreement on the idea of state, justice and the institutions representing them.
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During field interviews, a senior advocate belonging to FATA shared his views thus:
“For any reform in the tribal society, focusing on the weakness in social, political and cultural aspects of legal code will be central. In some situations, the laws are imposed on a community, which is mostly drafted or copied from foreign or Western countries. These type of borrowed laws from abroad have been merely symbolic, so the Pakistani state need to include the culture and tradition of the tribal people of FATA while formulating laws for them” (Interview 38, FATA Field Survey 2013).
Mostly imposed, these borrowed laws focus merely on cosmetic reforms rather that fundamental changes at the grassroots level to eliminate the causes of the problem. Therefore, the basic fact is ignored that legal reforms succeed through cultural and political transformation instead of the practised norms of institutional changes. These borrowed laws, as told earlier, are less reflective of the real picture of the local norms and practices. Likewise, a member of the FATA Tribunal said: “While framing new law or reforming the existing one, the state should focus on the local culture, knowledge and historical specificities of the tribal people. It should engage the local tribal society in such programs. Including local knowledge of collective history and memories of the tribal people can help in understanding the diverse local conceptions with in the tribal society about justice, power and politics. The success of new laws and reforms is impossible without taking the local actors into confidence, their different frames of organisation and reference along their historical realities and the way of their relation and dealings with other cultures and people (Interview 39, FATA Field Survey 2013). vi). Local Tribal Perception about Safety and Security
Cock aruges that the perception of insecurity in a society results in propensity to violence, keeping guns and resistance to legislation seeking prohibition of display and possession of arms. The ownership of arms, if culturally considered a sign of valour and manliness, is considered a right and restrictive/prohibitive legislation is often individually or collectively resisted and neglected (Cock 1997, 70 – 81).
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In focual group discussion, the participants expressed thus:
“Weapon is considered an ornament or the sign of manhood by the tribesmen. Not only this, we keep weapons for self-protection. Look there is no security apparatus in FATA. The state has left us without providing any security to us. These are our weapons through which we guard ourselves. Even during militancy in FATA, a large number of people have been killed and tortured by the militants. The state did not provide any security to us; we were left at the mercy of outlaws. We, later on, ensured our own security through making lashkers (Informal security arrangements in the shape of a group by the community people) to guard our persons and properties” (FGD 1, 3, 6, and 13: FATA Survey 2013).
7.4.2 Local Resources: Local Processes, Norms and Values Local values and conceptions and local culture can be a great source of coping with the existing crisis. The local culture may be of great importance to ensure the togetherness of local people (Duncan and Arntson 2004). These local processes, norms and values of collective responsibility and collective oneness can help in the transformation of the society. These local resources and mechanisms can bypass the impression of governance vacuum created by the conflict or due to lack of state governance for a long period in a given society. Focusing on local mechanism and informal institutions is very important. Even in the more devastating and total anarchic situations, when the state is totally absent in a society, "no such vacuum exists”, even when the state structures have collapsed completely, and formal ways or institutions are totally absent, people develop ways of settling their disputes through other means" (Thorne 2005, 11). Baker and Scheye concluded that security and justice after the termination of conflict is dominated by non-state actors (Baker and Scheye 2007, 512). Similarly, for the provision of other services the post-conflict society instead of relying on state, improvises their own solutions (informed through tradition and culture) (Baines 2007, 114). A senior government official stated thus: “While devising a strategy for reforms or state governance in tribal areas of FATA, it is pertinent to keep in mind and give full concentration to the existing informal mechanisms. The new system or reforms should be according to the
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needs of the people, and the local informal institutions to develop a more functioning and supportive state/society relationship. The existing local mechanisms of security, justice and dispute resolution, local values and local culture need to be keept in focus for the sustainable institutional reforms” (Interview 4, 12, 19, 21, 26 and 36: FATA Field Survey 2013). The simplistic interpretation of law that “it is a collection of rules for the manifestation of power cannot explain the rule of law in a modern state.” An explanation that that takes into account the socio-cultural practices and lego- judicial history would offer better tools for the analysis of law and justice in a given state (Merry 1988).
The traditional informal legal systems in society reflect an older, unrefined form many of the current formal laws. Such collective memories of traditional laws are affected by mass migration and large scale calamities. However, in contrast to formal laws, in most cases large body of such traditions remain resilient to such catastrophes (Dexter and Ntahombaye 2005, 21). Further, the informal laws due to their accessibility to the disadvantaged gain favour with the poor and citizens without special privileges (Wojkowska 2006).
A tribal elder (Malak) expressed his views thus:
“The informal law helps to unite tribal community. Though for individual, this system in many cases fails but it offers a comparative collective good that is better than formal system in our case. In our area (FATA), Jirga has social pressure at its disposal for the implementation of its decision. Such decisions are ingrained in our traditions, therefore, they appear to us more natural and guarantee the continuation of our traditions, as the simplistic mixture of retributive and restorative justice reinforce the moral values we live by. The formal laws, due to their roots in Western traditions, do not appeal to us as they oppose our cultural essence (Interview 6, 7, 8 and 17, FATA Field Survey 2013).
From the human rights, gender and individual perspective, the informal local laws appear as an anomaly that need fixing, though, they contain some good that would imprudent to ignore. Their complete dismissal like throwing baby with the bathe water offer the risk of bringing instability through hurriedly introduced
237 formal laws that do not match with local ethos (Scharf 2003, 16). Participation of local people in the introduction of formal laws is therefore, vital. Further, the formal laws need to offer some relaxations to accommodate traditional laws that find wider acceptance in local community. Such steps would promote stability and rule of law in the post conflict tribal society. It would also help in mitigating the problem of resistance to formal law and its abuse by implementers (Thorne 2005). Thereby the issue of legitimacy would also be solved, as taking advantage of the informal legal system in post-conflict situation offers a more stable political solution. (Wojkowska 2006) The development of customary law is not consistent with all sections of society, therefore, such laws are not accepted in the same manner by all members (Mani 2002, 81). In essence, the traditional laws remain always dynamic and prone to unregulated changes. The senior staff members of the FATA political administration explained the matter thus: “The tribal traditional justice practices are rooted in the past but are constantly changing. Their primary concern is to solve the present day problems. As cultural products such laws are susceptible to change. Therefore, these practices as cultural product, rely on copying from other cultures. As historical process, the traditional laws are also influenced by the demands of present time. Coming under the influence of a state with formal laws also changes them if there they contradict each other. Pragmatism dominates in recourse to such laws. Glorification of these laws becomes an evil if such laws become part of the problem instead of offering solution. Therefore, such traditions that complement the effort for solving social and political problems offer a better chance of surviving the test of history. A complete disregard for the traditional law would be tantamount to neglecting the wisdom learnt through historical process” (Interview 15, 16, 19, and 28: FATA Field Survey 2013). The hybridation of informal and traditional mechanism in reforms and merging the tribal system in the mainstream governance system of Pakistan is therefore the ultimate solution.
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A retired staff member of the political administration shared his views in this regard in the following words:
“In FATA extending or imposing western styled governance system is not a pragmatic approach, rather to address the deficiencies and pitfalls of the existing informal governance system to reform it in a way reflecting the tribal people aspirations is necessary. It can help to fill the existing gap and vacuum, and would result in the improvement of strength and legitimacy of the state” (Interview 36, FATA Field Survey 2013).
An advocate hailing from FATA, shared his views about the mixed legal system thus: “An innovative access to justice initiative in the tribal society would result in a better justice system by accommodation of parallel legal means in the legal system of FATA. Due to better outreach of associates of this system to far flung areas of FATA, it offers a better mechanism of mediation between Malaks, local tribal people and the government. By accommodating paralegal law for reforming the traditional justice system would become easy and it would help in increasing the effectiveness of Jirga and political administration in FATA. This dualism would help in the enrichment of legal tradition and act as a tool of removing the pitfalls of the informal justice system in FATA. (Interview 38, FATA Field Survey 2013) A local government system in FATA could help common tribesman to get their say in the local administration and also decrease the centralization/concentration of power of a Malak and a political agent. During interview with government officials at FATA Secretariat, they told, “The local government system or decentralization program for FATA should be kept in focus: First, attention should be given to develop liaison between the local and central authority to reverse the negative effect of conflict on local leadership. Currently, a resistance against Malaks is on the rise. The dual system of councils and Malaks needs to be made accountable to local tribal people” (Interview 21, 26 and 32: FATA Field Survey 2013). To sum up, it is assessed that imposing formal and neglecting the informal system of FATA is not a pragmatic approach because the informal system assists the tribal community to govern their daily life and deal with everyday matters. Giving
239 proper consideration to them would make a lucid picture of current justice system on FATA. It appears the best scenario to include local traditional customs in the dispensation of law in FATA to garner support of the local people for the initiatives of the centre. Decision makers at policy formulation level need to give due weight to the way the local people cope with their routine issues.
CONCLUSION The resilience of state forms a structure where government as policy maker consider authority, capacity and legitimacy as essential factors of for its control. All of these need equal weightage in policy decision related to every domain of the state. In their development, the earlier states relied only on force to legitimise their existence. In modern times where raw force fails to earn legitimacy, service provision in multiple domains becomes necessary. Increasingly provision of conducive environment and delivery of assortment of services has been included in the repertoire that bestows legitimacy. As building a resilient state is a long term process, a top-down approch is not sufficient in producing desired effect of state-building, therefore, a bottom-up process beginning with the grassroot level of population should also be included in policy making.
In this context, the government development projects and interventions in FATA largely suffer from the defect of being focused on short term goals, which do not foster an environment in which authority, legitimacy and capacity would have balanced opportunity for development. It is concluded that for the consolidation of state governance, besides tangible, addressing the intangible dimensions more effectively ensures the extension of state governance (state building) with focussing on the contextual and socio-culture perspectives of tribal society.
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CHAPTER – 8
CONCLUSION
This dissertation investigates why some states have been relatively more successful than others at closing sovereignty (domestic) gaps or consolidating its authority to its peripheries while other states remain unable to exercise authority over some or all parts of their territory. The study specifically has sought to explain why FATA in Pakistan remains outside state governance and control? Why Pakistani state failed in facing persistent challenges to bring FATA in the mainstream governance system? How state governance (authority/control) can be established in the tribal ungoverned areas and what are the prospects of extending state governance (state authority/control) in the tribal areas?
The ungoverned spaces literature and the literature on state and politics in developing states has mostly focussed on the state-centric approach to the state’s lack of governance (authority) in its peripheries especially in the case of this study, the tribal areas. This insight is derived from the voluminous literature on the state capacity and state weakness, legitimacy and state-society related literature, which explains the state weaknesses and state’s lack of capacity, depends on the state indirect rule/governance in the tribal areas of FATA. That literature has a blind spot in the sense that it does not adequately analyse challenges to state authority from society-centred approach and other social outcomes in the developing states. The point of departure in this study was that the state’s lack of capacity to project its power in peripheries, (here tribal society of FATA) has always been viewed by scholars from security perspectives, while this study has analysed the issue from various approaches of state governance and politics, i.e. society-centric, state-centric and state-in-society centric approaches. This is an important oversight because understanding such perspectives from these three approaches of governance can help identify casual factors and challenges in the context of the extension of state governance (Authority) itself. Specifying those causes, however, is a key to identifying solutions to state extension of authority and the FATA governance crisis more broadly. In addition, the literature does not adequately incorporate the role of other factors such as the presence of rival
241 state on border, and cultural resistance, thereby excluding an important set of actors from the analysis altogether.
The dissertation seeks to close these gaps by focusing directly on the social norms and the cultural aspects of challenges to state authority extension and state building. These approaches vary significantly between state authority extension in normal (settled areas) and state bordering areas in the developing world, especially the tribal bordering areas in the context of Pakistan. In recent years, the focus of developing states is to counter the threat of rising resistance to state authority especially in the ungoverned spaces and to extend their domestic sovereignty by expanding the scope of state presence in a society or by developing state-society relations. As such, the latest policy innovation is the society-centred perspective which states use to look at development programs in ungoverned areas (uncontrolled areas) through state intervention to extend its authority and state building process. Now, states are expected to ensure that funds are allocated to projects designed for particular areas. In addition, they are also expected to play the role as development agents especially in expanding their authority and presence through specifically designed programs such as the provision of public goods of security and justice in these areas for resolving disputes and addressing grievances.
This dissertation developed a theoretical framework to understand the challenges faced to state extension of its governance through the above mentioned three approaches of governance. It did so by applying the insights derived from the literature on state capacity, capabilities, strength, and state-society relations from the perspective of legitimatising state authority. Specifically, the central proposition was that the society-centred approach could help understand the state authority extension by strengthening state capacity and developing state-society relations and interaction in tribal society, not only to ensure state presence in the tribal society by fostering/ strengthen the local informal institutions which could substitute for the weak local institutions of the state (Grounded Legitimacy and Relational Governance Approach). This analysis implies that in the tribal ungoverned areas of FATA, the state-centric relations approach/hybrid governance approach (also called state-in-society approach) would have less resistance to state authority extension or have more extended state authority and control than the state-centric or top-down approach of direct state governance and control by applying coercion in order to have control over violence.
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The framework developed in chapter one was tested in FATA. FATA presents a typical example of an ungoverned area having a unique informal trbial governance system of its own. FATA, being having already an existing functional informal governance system, having a unique history, its own unique politics and society living outside state writ for almost unknown history. It provides insights into unexplored and a unique perspective with different dynamics of its own within developing state like Pakistan and thereby contributes to closing an important gap in the existing literature on the subject.
Specific Findings The main conclusion of this study is that the statist approach cannot alone explain the factors of un-governability or challenges to state governance (authority). At the level of basic empirical observation, that for extending state governance, it is important to look from all perspectives/approaches of governance as explained and applied in this study. Against this background, the analysis presented suggests that factors of un- governability and the challenge to state governance (authority) in tribal areas of FATA, since independence can be explained with reference to the three approaches of governance explained in the theoretical framework of this study. The first set of factors that poses resistance/challenges to state governance (authority) relates to the historical evolution of strong tribal society and its dynamics of interaction with the state. The analysis suggests that the society-centric approach does not mark a significant departure from the past approaches that various states represent it to be. Continuing a pattern of alternative form of governance of many decades in the tribal areas, the states in the past (historically in pre-colonial, colonial and post- colonial time) has relied primarily on a mix of co-optation and repression in their relationship with tribal society of FATA. In this context, the society-centric approach presents primarily a more comprehensive strategy in order to co-opt the tribal people. While fostering the development of informal institutions would require a long term commitment of respecting the rules and procedures implicit in the society-centric approach. The objective is to ensure smooth relationship between Pakistani state and the tribal society, rather than former’s domination of the latter. The second set of factors that challenges state governance (authority) in the tribal areas, relates to the extent to which local tribal society (elites and tribal people) and state have interaction and relationship in various day to day activities and rules of the
243 game. The analysis based on state-in-society approach of state-society interaction in tribal areas suggests that divisions among tribal society and state are likely to result in challenging and resisting state governance (authority) by local tribal society. In addition, the struggle for domination among social forces of tribal society and the Pakistani state remains a continuous process. This is because Pakistani state is likely to find local partners to co-opt who, in turn, ensure that violence does not reach a level where state governance (authority) and control would no longer be possible. When local elites are strong and co-opted by the state, by contrast, they either cooperate with the state, or oppose it. Where cooperation is chosen, the result is likely to be low resistance because the resulting tribal elites/Malaks and state alliance will exert effective control over the tribal society. Such cooperation could be the result of particularly sustained state efforts at co-optation or individual linkages between state authorities (bureaucracy) and the local state holder (Malaks and Political Administration officials). Where elites choose resistance, the result is likely to be high resistance. The reasons for choosing resistance can include a history of conflictual interactions in the past or links with culture can support tribal resistance. In this context, it should also be noted that state has often stoked divisions in tribal society in the past through various means in order to prevent the emergence of unified opposition/resistance. The third set of factors that poses resistance or challenges to state governance (authority) in tribal areas is based on the state-centric approach. The analysis based on state-centric approach illustrates that state in tribal society of FATA lacks presence and physical infrastructure and control on the use of violence. The state generally fails to provide security, social services and other such public goods thus paving the way for non-state actors to intervene in tribal areas of FATA. This means that either due to the lack of its capacity or by design, state does not want to extend its governance and has kept the tribal areas intentionally underdeveloped or ungoverned. Due to these factors today the tribal people lack trust in state and thus resist state governance (authority). This inattention has further created a big cleavage in the tribal areas in the context of socio-economic and political development and deprivation. With regard to FATA, the factors outlined in this study regarding the developing states, the FATA being a tribal society having closed tribal culture, presents a unique case of having characteristics of physical harsh geography and inaccessibility and having past historical memories of living an independent life free of any state,
244 remaining outside state control and thus resisting state authority still in twenty first century. The state infrastructure is also absent in these areas thus making the area more difficult to govern and mainstream. Besides the long drawn tradition of living an independent life out of state control, the interest of various stakeholders has further strengthened resistance to the extension of state authority.
Broader Implications These findings have three broad theoretical and policy implications as enumerated below: The first theoretical implication is the relevance of international factors to explaining the socio-economic outcomes in developing states. As such, the study has demonstrated that Pakistani state should fulfil key functions of local governance in FATA, particularly related the service delivery and a minimum infrastructure provision. Conversely, the state’s formal institutions in FATA are weak and local officials (Political Administration) play only a negligible role in local governance because mostly the tribal daily life is operated through their informal customs and institutions. This finding contradicts a key tenet of the state governance literature which focuses on state presence and state control in an area. More broadly, the influential “state-centric” approach has increasingly lost sight of the way in which the structure of governance in tribal society of FATA is existing. Incidentally, Pakistani state itself uses state-centred arguments to have full control on tribal affairs and the state control and extension of governance (authority) remains a crisis. Seen in this context, a second implication is the society-centred approach, has also shown that the tribal society presents a picture of exclusion and deprivation by the state. The tribal society and the state has no relations and there is limited or absent interaction between the two, which further leads to mistrust of the tribal people in the state. A more promising avenue would be to focus on regulating the tribal governance from the state-centric perspective, which is state hierarchical rule. This is the most current approach which targets the state level governance, based on the logic of network governance. This analysis underlines the importance of strengthening accountable local government and regulating the local society through a set of shared governance and shared sovereignty. Strengthening the integrity of local elections would be a
245 promising step towards the first objective. FATA is in a somewhat, privileged position compared to many other ungoverned spaces because of its relatively frequent interaction with the adjacent settled areas and the fact that most tribal people already have some experience with voting, in other parts of the country. Meaningful accountability on the part of local political administration level may help local governments that are able and willing to speak out for the rights of tribal people. A good number of successful lawsuits against state and state political administration in FATA Tribunal and other courts of common law, have underlined the potential of ensuring the tribal people rights and their interaction with the mainstream governance system. This type of interaction with the mainstream governance system raises significant issues of monitoring and accountability of the local tribal political administration enjoying unchecked authority since the colonial times. Furthermore, the local civil society organisations, in collaboration with the international advocacy groups, have also been raising voice for the socio-economic and political rights and development of the tribal people. In recent years, these groups have shown their ability to face up to international community and their growing capacity to support advocacy objectives with rigid monitoring and analysis. The third broad implication of the analysis presented in this dissertation is that the tribal people now want merging with the mainstream governance system or want to live at par with the twenty first century development with rights and privileges enjoyed by people in the rest of Pakistan. In this respect, they now want to get rid of the traditional colonial system of administration and the Malaks. Unfortunately, in the shadow of state extension of governance, persistent insecurity, and crippling poverty remain common experience for the people of FATA.
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ANNEXURE – A: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FATA FIELD SURVEY 2013
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR
Research study on “Streamlining Governance System of FATA (Pakistan): A Study into the Challenges, Prospects and Responses of the Tribal People”.
Dear Respondent:
I am a Ph.D. scholar at the Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar. I am conducting a research study to assess your views about the governance system of FATA, and the Pakistani state and tribal society relations. Further, my research focuses on the causes and factors of un-governability of tribal areas (society), that why Pakistani state is unable to mainstream these areas in the state governance system prevailing in rest of the country. This research study is not sponsored by any government or non-governmental organisation. This is just an academic excercise. I want to know the views of the tribal people regarding matters of interest to them. Your answers to the queries raised in this questionnaire will be kept confidential and will not be disclosed to anyone. Your candid responses to questions that I am going to ask will be of great help for the completion of my research work.
Questionnaire ID No.______Name of village/ constituency/UC & Agency: ______
Name of Respondent: ______
Date: ______2013
______Signature
277
SECTION (A) – RESPONDENT’S PERSONAL DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Name of Respondent: ______
1. Gender: Male Female 2. Age: 16-21 22-30 31-50 50 and Above 3. Religion: Muslim (Sunni) Muslim (Shia) Other_ 4. Marital Status:Single Married Engaged Divorced Widowed, Other______5. Family Size: ______(Number of members of household) 6. Family Structure: Nuclear Joint Extended 7. Level of Education:Illiterate Primary Middle Secondary Graduation Masters M.Phil./PhD Madrassa Any Other______8. Occupation: Unemployed Student Private Sector Government employed Self-employed Any other______9. Monthly Income (In Rupees)______10. Ethnic Affiliation: (Name of Khel)______11. Place of Residence: Living in FATA Living outside FATA
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SECTION (B) – RESPONDENT’S VIEWS REGARDING GOVERNANCE IN FATA
Note: There are statements given below. For each statement, there are six options such as: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Don't know? Please apply tick (√) in front of each of the options to the questions. Q.1). State Survival/Core Functions & Institutions: Q. What is your opinion about the working of state institutions in your area?
Strongly Strongly Question/ Indicator Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Don't know a). Presence and well- functioning of state security apparatus b). Pakistani state has monopoly on violence c). Presence of state formal justice/adjudication institutions d). State Law (Rule of Law/Law enforcement) in FATA e). State Administrative Capacity and Control f). State Fiscal Capacity (state’s ability to raise revenues through taxes) in FATA
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Q. 2). Expected Functions and Institutions of Pakistani State in FATA
Q. Do you think Pakistani State is providing these services in FATA?
Strongly Strongly Question/ Indicator Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Don't know a).Economic Management, full employment, and price stability etc. b). Social Services
C). Employment Programs d). Personal Safety and Security e). Justice/ adjudication (State Judiciary) f). Social Protection/Safety nets (welfare, unemployment benefit, universal health care, shelters, and sometimes subsidised services) Benazir Card, Watan Card g). Anti-Corruption Measures ( building transparent, accountable systems of governance and strengthening the capacity of civil society and the media) h). Voice and Accountability (Participation in fair elections, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media)
* IDPs card is excluded as a social protection facility in this survey.
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Q.3). Informal Economy and Corruption Q. What is your answer to the following statements?
Strongly Strongly Question/ Indicator Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Don't know a). Corruption in FATA in security forces and border regions b). Development projects are given through Malaks c).Political administration (Officials) and Malaks are corrupt d).FATA has informal economy which is beyond state control (hundi system), smuggling, weaponry industry e). Tribals pay no taxes f). Black market with Non- Tax goods in FATA (foreign goods, weapons)
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Q. 4. Socio-Culture Resistance to State Governance (Authority): Tribal Society and State Relations
Q. Please select a relevant anwser to each of the following statements.
A). Tribal Society and State Relations
Strongly Strongly Question/ Indicator Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Don't know a). Tribal people lack trust on Pakistani State b). Tribals trust their ethnic groups, clans, tribes and extended families and Jirga c). Tribals prefer informal institutions instead of state formal institutions d). Tribal society is highly organised e). Tribal people prefer to live an independent and autonomous life
282
Q 5). Monopoly on the Use of Force, A). The presence of Organised Armed Groups outside the State's Control, B). The presence of Criminal Networks Linked to Terrorist or Insurgent Groups, and C). Population with Access to Weapons
Q. What are your views about the following Statements?
Strongly Strongly Question/ Indicator Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Don't know
Monopoly on the Use of Force a). Pakistani State Controls FATA affairs. b). Pakistani state controls violence in FATA c). Working of State institutions (Police, Army, Judiciary) is satisfactory.
A). The Presence of Organised Armed Groups outside the State's Control d). Presence of armed groups (Al Qaeda group, Taliban groups, etc.) e). Local tribal people support these armed groups f). Control of these armed groups by the local society g).These armed groups receive financial support from local people in the form of tax, protection money, and charity. h). For various purposes, the people bribe political and social institutions (PA and Malaks).
B). Presence of Criminal Networks Linked to Terrorist or Insurgent Groups g). Presence of criminal networks in FATA due to state absence h). Presence of Organised Crime groups in FATA
C). Population having Access to Weapons i). Free and easy access to weapons
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Q.6). Border Control and External Interference by Rival Neighbouring State Q. What are your views about the following statements?
Strongly Strongly Questions/ Indicators Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Don't know a). Effective Infrastructure for the deployment of security forces, custom and border officials at the Durand Line b).Presence of effective immigration and custom procedure at the Durand Line (Visa, etc.) and other regulations for the movement of goods and people c). Non-State actors are providing basic services in your society instead of state formal institutions. d). Interference by foreign states in internal affairs of FATA
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Q. 7). Parallel Socio-Economic Structures and Institutions in FATA Q. Do you think informal institutions are more active in providing services to the people in FATA?
Strongly Strongly Question/ Indicator Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Don't know a). Government Education Institutions b). Private Education Institutions c). Religious Education Institutions (Madrassa) d). Hawala System and other informal economic system e). State’s Banking System f). Jirga g). State Courts h). Government Health Facilities
I). Private Health Facilities
J). Social Services by State k). Social Services by Non- State (Family, tribe, (Qaom) etc.) l). Culturally Managed Economy and Market (Informal Business, Smuggling, Weaponry, poppy crop production)
285
Q 8. Socio-Cultural Resistance to State Governance (Authority): Normative and Organizational Factors Q. I am going to read you a list of possible options related to Social and Cultural Resistance to State Penetration in your area. Please select a relevant response to each question. Strongly Strongly Question/ Indicator Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Don't know Normative Factors a). Pakthunwali (tribal culture and norms) guides the Tribals in social, political and economic affairs. b). Tribal Culture and Norms prevent government oriented institutions from gaining a foothold in tribal areas c).Important tenets of Pakthunwali (Nang, Melmastia, Badal, Nanawati) resist state central authority to intervene in tribal affairs or tribal areas d). Overlooking of Pakthunwali causes loss of family ties, social ties and even expulsion from the village Organizational Factors a).Tribal Pakhtuns live a life collectively (fortunes and failures are faced collectively) b).Pakhtun structure of organisational hierarchy is based on familial ties and roles rather than political affiliation.
286
Q. 9). Social Control: State Authority and Control
Q). I am going to read you a list of possible things/options. Please click an appropriate answer for each question as per given options. Strongly Strongly Question/Indicator Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Don't Know a). In your area, government (formal institutions) has more control on daily lives of the people. b). In your area, informal/customary institutions have more control on daily lives of the people. c). State laws are accepted and obeyed. d). Customary laws are accepted and obeyed. e). Do you think the tribal people should obey the state laws instead of customary laws? f). Do you think obeying and accepting the state laws and authority is mandatory. g). People take their disputes to state institutions h). People take their disputes to other than state institutions (Non State actors, such as Mullah, Taliban, Jirga, etc.)
287
SECTION (C) HOUSEHOLD SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFORMATION
NOTE: Exposure to TV, Newspaper, Internet, Cable, Dish, Mobile etc
Do you have access to the following facilities at home? 1. Electricity 2. Gas 3. Telephone 4. Mobile 5. Any other (Give detail)………………………….
Do you have the following apparatus at home? 1. Radio 2. Television 3. Refrigerator 4. Bi-Cycle 5. Motor Cycle 6. Car/Truck / Tractor/ Trailer 7. Sewing Machine 8. Any other (Give detail)………………………….. Do you have any of the following animals at home? 1. Weight carrying animals (Donkey, Camel, Horse) 2. Milk giving animals (Sheep, Goat, Cow, Buffalo) 3. Eggs giving animals (hen, duck) 4. Any other (Give detail)………………………….
What is the structure of the walls of your home? 1. Mud (Kachi) 2. Mud & Bricks / Stones (Kachi-Pucci) 3. Bricks & Mortar (Pucci) 4. Any other (Give detail)………………………….. What is the source of drinking water at your home? 1. Piped water (through government water supply scheme) 2. Well 1. Hand pump 2. River/Pond/Canal
288
3. Mashaki or buy through any other source 4. Mineral water (In bottles) 5. Any other (Give detail)……………………….. Which type of latrine do you have at home? 1. Flush system 2. Basket or Balti 3. Gutter latrine 4. Open place in house 5. No facility 6. Any other (Give detail)…………………………..
…End of Questionnaire
289
ANNEXURE – B: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE Interview Schedule for Experts and Stakeholders
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR
Research study on “Streamlining Governance System of FATA (Pakistan): A Study into the Challenges, Prospects and Responses of the Tribal People”.
Dear Respondent:
I am a Ph.D. scholar at the Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar. I am conducting a research study to assess your views about the governance system of FATA, and the Pakistani state and tribal society relations. Further, my research focuses on the causes and factors of un-governability of tribal areas (society), that why Pakistani state is unable to mainstream these areas in the state governance system prevailing in rest of the country. This research study is not sponsored by any government or non-governmental organisation. This is just an academic excercise. I want to know the views of various experts and stakeholders regarding the issue mentioned above. Your answers to the queries raised in this interview schedule will be kept confidential and will not be disclosed to anyone. Your expert and candid views on the questions that I am going to ask will be of great help for the completion of my research work.
Inteview Schedule ID No.______Name of village/ constituency/UC & Agency: ______
Name of Interviewee: ______
Date of interview: ______2013
______Signature
290
Broad Areas for Interview
1. Tribal customary and informal governance socio-economic and political system. 2. Tribal people’s trust and compliance of Pakistani state laws, informal laws, legal system and, institutions. 3. The militancy, dominance and control of non-state actors and the vacuum in the centuries old existing governance system of FATA. 4. Tribal people perceptions about Pakistani central state rule through Malaks, its functions, its relations with tribal society. 5. Tribal people views and perceptions about Malaki system. 6. Pakistani state and tribal society relations and interactions. Socio-economic and political inclusion and opportunities from the Pakistani state to the tribal people. 7. Central State development projects and tribal people at the grassroots level. 8. Pakistani state presence in tribal society, Non-State Actor’s (NSAs) presence and the extent of NSA dominance and acceptance in tribal society. 9. Tribal people and Pakistani Constitutions, Fundamental and other rights of tribal people. 10. Malaks and their role in the development. Role of state-society relations in the development. 11. Pakistani state development projects and strategies in FATA. 12. Pakistani state dominance and socio-economic and political control in tribal areas of FATA. Revenue and resources extraction. 13. Tribal Pakhtun society and settled Pakhtun society – relations, migrations and tribal identity. 14. Tribal society and State legibility. 15. State indirect intervention and governance through Malaks and tribal society lack of trust, lack of development and balanced development policies. 16. Post 9/11 development projects in FATA, foreign aid, and other international assistance and grants. 17. State control on the border (Durand Line) in FATA, border management, monitoring and control of goods and smuggling. 18. State formal institutions (Banks etc.) in FATA and informal institutions of hundi, hawala.
291
19. Tribal culture (norms and customs) of living outside a state control (Azad Qabayel), and post 9/11 international pressure on Pakistani state. 20. Non-State Actors and militant’s control due to state absence and consequences, ransom kidnapping, crimes etc. 21. State control of weapons in tribal society. 22. Pakistan geostrategic compulsions and choices. 23. State capacity and FATA governance. 24. Prospects for extension of state governance in FATA and basic reforms. Reforms but taking tribal people views and aspirations in limelight. 25. What kind of legal reforms. Historical and social realities should reflect in these reforms. 26. State extension of formal governance in FATA and the merger of formal and informal institutions. 27. Local government and FATA.
……End of Interview Schedule
292
ANNEXURE – C: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS FORMAT DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR
Research study on “Streamlining Governance System of FATA (Pakistan): A Study into the Challenges, Prospects and Responses of the Tribal People”.
Dear Respondents:
I am a Ph.D. scholar at the Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar. I am conducting a research study to assess your views about the governance system of FATA, and the Pakistani state and tribal society relations. Further, my research focuses on the causes and factors of un-governability of tribal areas (society), that why Pakistani state is unable to mainstream these areas in the state governance system prevailing in rest of the country. This research study is not sponsored by any government or non-governmental organisation. This is just an academic excercise. I want to know the views of various experts and stakeholders regarding the issue mentioned above. Your answers to the queries raised in this focussed group discussion will be kept confidential and will not be disclosed to anyone. Sharing your expert and candid views during this discussion session will be of great help for the completion of my research work.
Focussed Group Discussion ID No.______Name of village/ constituency/UC & Agency: ______
Date: ______2013
______Signature of Facilitator
293
Broad Thematic Areas for Focussed Group Discussion
1. Tribal people’s views about acceptance and trust on Pakistani state formal institutions and formal governance. 2. The provision of public goods (security, social services, health, education, transportation, water, sanitation etc.) and basic amenities in FATA. By Whom? 3. State functions in FATA? 4. Social Cohesion in Tribal Society. 5. Pakistani state legitimacy (to govern) in the eyes of tribal people. 6. Pakistani state and tribal society relations and interactions. 7. Tribal Society Constitutional rights (Fundamental and other rights). 8. Social Exclusion and Tribal Society – Comparison with rest of the country 9. Who regulates daily affairs and set ‘rule of the game’ in FATA? 10. Do Tribal people obey and prefer Pakistani law or their informal tribal non- customary law? 11. Pakistani state presence in the tribal areas, Extraction of Resources, Revenue (Taxes) etc. 12. Tribal people expectations and demands from the Pakistani State 13. Tribal people views about the existing Government indirect rule or governance system in FATA, The Political Administration, the Malaki system, the Development programs through Malaks and Political Administration 14. Corruption and flaws in the existing governance system of FATA – Flaws in the Political Administration, the Malaki system, Development projects 15. Pakhtunwali (tribal culture and code of life) and Non-state actors (militants, Taliban and Al Qaeda etc.)
…End of FGD Format
294
ANNEXURE – D: DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS OF FATA Table - 3.2: Population of FATA Area Population 1998 Sex ratio (Male per 1998 Census Both sexes Male Female hundred female) Average Household size
Pakistan 132352279 53% 47% 108.5 6.8 N.W.F.P 17743645 52% 48% 105 8 F.A.T.A 3175000 53% 47% 108 9.3 Bajaur Agency 595227 52% 48% 105 9.1 Mohmand Agency 334453 53% 47% 110 9.0 Khyber Agency 546730 53% 47% 109 9.9 Kurram Agency 448310 52% 48% 105 10.6 Aurakzai Agency 225441 51% 49% 100 8.8 N.Wazirstan Agency 361246 54% 46% 114 9.1 S.Waziristan Agency 429841 54% 46% 116 8.5 F.R Peshawar 53841 51% 49% 101 8.8 F.R Kohat 88456 52% 48% 106 9.3 F.R Bannu 19593 53% 47% 113 9.6 F.R Lakki 6987 50% 50% 98 7.5 F.R D.I Khan 38990 53% 47% 111 7.1 F.R Tank 27216 52% 48% 108 7.6 Source: Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Population Census 1998
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Table – 3.3: Comparison of Health Facilities in FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Pakistan Hospital Dispensary R.H T.B B.H.U Sub Leprosy M.C.H centres clinic Health clinics centers Centres Pakistan 876 4583 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 853 Khyber 185 514 102 N.A N.A N.A N.A 102 Pakhtunkhwa FATA 42 170 5 6 156 3 17 4 Bajaur 2 10 1 1 16 - - 2 Mohmand 3 4 1 1 23 - - -
Khyber 4 16 1 11 - 1 1 F.R Peshawar 1 - - - 8 - - - F.R Kohat 2 3 - - 9 - 1 - Orakzai 3 10 2 - 21 - 1 - Kurram 5 25 - 1 19 - 3 1 N.Wazirstan 9 29 1 1 13 3 7 - F.R Bannu 3 18 - 11 - - - F.R Laki - 4 - 3 - - - F.R Tank 3 13 - 4 - 1 - S.Waziristan 5 30 11 1 16 - 2 -
F.R D.I. Khan 2 8 - - 2 - 1 - Sources: (1). Directorate of FATA (2002) Peshawar (2). Directorate of Education (Secondary), Peshawar (3). Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bureau of Statistics 2002 (4).Federal Bureau of Statistics 2002.
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Table - 3.4: FATA: Posts in Different Health Institutions
Total Filled Female Filled Medical Officer 459 451 47 37
Dental Surgeon 23 13 1 -
Nurses 81 - - -
Health Technicians 447 432 5-6 -
LHV 238 238 - -
Dispensers 629 (male) 629 - -
Immunization 24 10-15 - -
Malaria (staff) 169 (male) - - -
Leprosy 8 (male) - - -
TB control 16 (male) - - -
Tonitary 47 (male) - - -
Mid wives 68 (male) - - -
Source: FATA Directorate of Health, FATA Secretariat, Peshawar and FATA Development Statistics, 2000 Figure - 3.2: Number and Population per Bed in Hospitals in FATA
3000
2500
2000 Pakistan NWFP FATA
1500
Number 1000
500
0 No. of Hospitals Population Per Bed in Hospital
297
Table - 3.5: Gender Based Literacy Ratio (%) of Population in Pakistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA in 1998 Census
Both Sexes Male Female
Pakistan 45 65 37
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 37.3 52.8 21.2
FATA 17.42 29.51 3
Bajaur Agency 3.80 6.18 1.00
Mohmand Agency 3.61 6.07 0.64
Khyber Agency 10.94 20.18 0.67
Kurram Agency 6.25 11.04 0.85
Aurakzai Agency 3.03 4.71 0.69
N.Waziristan Agency 7.39 13.00 0.49
S.Waziristan Agency 7.04 11.76 0.60
F.R Peshawar 17.91 32.51 1.88
F.R Kohat 15.65 27.88 1.04
F.R Bannu 4.75 8.00 0.50
F.R Lakki NA NA NA
F.R D.I.Khan 3.83 13.50 3.48
F.R Tank 8.95 6.02 1.21
Sources:
1). FATA Development Statistics, 2000
(2). Federal Bureau of Statistics, 2000.
298
Table - 3.6: Gender Wise Participation Rate at Primary, Middle & High Level in Pakistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA (1998-99)
Primary Middle High
Both Male Female Both Male Female Both Male Female sexes sexes sexes
Pakistan 30.14 20.90 17.29 20.90 22.05 18.74 17.29 18.20 15.58
Khyber 29.64 28.01 33.0 19.94 21.00 16.90 18.61 20.06 14.41 Pakhtunkhwa
FATA 35.34 68.86 16.62 10.51 17.52 1.89 7.64 13.00 1.05
Bajaur Agency 36.80 66.48 13.08 6.45 11.45 0.56 5.66 10.06 0.48
Mohmand Agency 32.64 65.83 9.94 11.26 18.07 3.09 8.60 14.37 1.69
Khyber Agency 51.24 80.12 26.14 13.92 25.11 1.49 10.22 18.90 0.57
FR Peshawar 70.40 100.00 30.12 33.79 59.74 5.30 25.80 45.70 3.95
FR Kohat 73.58 100.00 52.12 38.07 61.20 10.42 33.43 60.10 1.54
Aurakzai Agency 31.51 58.82 6.96 7.89 12.92 0.88 5.18 8.49 0.57
Kurram Agency 40.76 70.49 16.26 14.52 23.00 4.96 10.55 16.66 3.65
N/Waziristan 34.63 64.24 11.20 6.52 11.50 0.40 5.41 9.38 0.53 Agency
FR Bannu 100.00 100.00 100.00 63.68 100.00 1.73 37.50 66.13
S/Waziristan Agency 26.45 46.25 7.06 4.44 7.35 0.48 2.94 4.77 0.44
FR D.I.Khan 38.80 72.36 10.72 6.84 12.46 0.10 4.14 5.59
FR Tank 73.26 100.00 43.68 13.95 22.26 3.98 5.90 10.01 0.96
Sources: 1). FATA Development Statistics, 2000. (2). Federal Bureau of Statistics, 2000.
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Table – 3.7: Agency/F.R wise Electricity Consumers and Villages Electrified (2008-09)
Number of Consumers Villages Electrified Total Domestic Commercial Industrial Irrigation Bulk (Cumulative) Agency/F.R (2008-09) FATA 294636 253795 28353 4088 8343 57 4059 Bajour 33807 28466 3633 994 710 4 419 Khyber 73204 65511 5864 1253 561 15 643 Kurram 23654 19568 3717 280 75 14 424 Mohmand 24760 20275 1110 554 2817 4 534
North Waziristan 47226 39929 6452 420 417 8 386
Orakzai 14183 13395 642 88 58 0 455
South Waziristan 39035 31144 4254 144 3481 12 311
F.R Bannu 12157 12155 1 0 1 0 149
F.R D.I.Khan 4812 4520 291 1 0 0 68
F.R Kohat 15320 12356 2387 354 223 0 383 F.R Lakki 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
F.R Peshawar 6478 6476 2 0 0 0 275
F.R Tank 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Note:- The figures of F.R Tank and F.R Lakki are included in their respective Agencies. Source: Chairman, TESCO, Peshawar.
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Table – 3.8: Agency/FR Region Wise Number of Housing Units by Source of Lighting
Agencies/ F.Rs Total Housing Electricity Kerosene Oil Other Source Units No.s %age No.s %age No.s %age FATA 341114 211373 61.97 123287 36.14 6454 1.89 Bajaur 65439 37071 56.65 28095 42.93 273 0.42 Khyber 54416 39310 72.24 13954 25.64 1152 2.12 Kurram 41732 26757 64.12 14551 34.87 424 1.02 Mohmand 37123 21882 58.94 13928 37.52 1313 3.54 North Waziristan 39188 23424 59.77 15251 38.92 513 1.31 Orakzai 25546 13864 54.27 10389 40.67 1293 5.06 South Waziristan 50093 29383 58.66 19606 39.14 1104 2.20 F.R Bannu 2001 556 27.79 1434 71.66 11 0.55 F.R D.I.Khan 5500 2846 51.75 2616 47.56 38 0.69 F.R Kohat 9474 8560 90.35 888 9.37 26 0.27 F.R Lakki 930 77 8.28 844 90.75 9 0.97 F.R Peshawar 6113 5534 90.53 506 8.28 73 1.19 F.R Tank 3559 2109 59.26 1225 34.42 225 6.32 Note:- Total may not add up due to independent rounding. Source:- Agency/FR Census Reports 1998 of FATA
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Table - 3.9: Communication System in FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Pakistan
Statistics of Communications in FATA Item Year Unit Pakistan Khyber FATA FATA as Pakhtunkhwa % Share of Pakistan
Communication
Post Offices 1999-2000 Number 12854 1990 195 1.5
Telegraph Offices 1999-2000 -do- 384 44 4 1.04
Telephones -do- -do- 3124000 316820 24283 0.8
TV Sets 1998 -do- 273620 60665 76 0.03
Population Per Telephone -do- 000 Persons 44 59 136 -
Population Per Post Office -do- -do- 10 9 17 -
ROADS
Total 1999-2000 Km. 248340 10134 4417 1.8
High Type -do- -do- 138200 7431 2592 1.9
Low Type -do- -do- 110140 2703 1825 1.7
Road per Sq: Km of Area -do- -do- 0.31 0.13 0.16 - Source: (1). General Manager Northern Telecommunication Region, Peshawar & D.I.Khan. (2). Post Master General, North Western Circle, Peshawar. (3). Pakistan Television Corporation, Islamabad. (4). Chief Engineer, C.D.O. Office C&W Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
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Table – 3.10: Agency/F.R Wise Roads, Postal and Telecommunication Services (2008-09)
ROADS TELECOMMUNICATION & POSTAL SERVICES Road Agencies/ per Population Population Area Black Population Post F.Rs Shingled Total Sq.Km Telephones per per Post Topped (2008-09) Offices of Telephone Office Area Units Sq.Km K.M K.M K.M K.M Persons Nos. Persons Nos. Persons FATA 27220 3978 2248 6226 0.23 4016495 32789 122 158 25421 Bajour 1290 436 317 753 0.58 942140 2791 338 13 72472 Khyber 2576 573 222 795 0.31 829210 4829 172 18 46067 Kurram 3380 490 332 822 0.24 585805 3877 151 21 27895 Mohmand 2296 364 114 478 0.21 526638 1161 454 15 35109 North 4707 512 220 732 0.16 470048 8617 55 15 31337 Waziristan Orakzai 1538 389 357 745 0.48 285073 1949 146 7 40725 South 6620 544 473 1017 0.15 529871 3702 143 16 33117 Waziristan F.R Bannu 745 197 52 249 0.33 24775 200 124 9 2753 F.R 2008 98 55 153 0.08 49304 170 290 5 9861 D.I.Khan F.R Kohat 446 85 14 99 0.22 116689 4214 28 5 23338 F.R Lakki 132 43 19 62 0.47 8836 12 736 17 520 F.R 261 129 5 134 0.51 68299 1069 64 5 13660 Peshawar F.R Tank 1221 117 70 187 0.15 34414 198 174 12 2868 Source:- 1. Chief Engineer, Works & Services Deptt: NWFP, Peshawar, 2. Northern Telecom. Region-I Peshawar, 3. Post Master General, NWFP, Peshawar
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Table – 3.11: Agency/Frontier Region Wise Position of Drinking Water Supply Schemes (2008-09) Agencies/ F.Rs Drinking Water Supply Schemes Completed Population Served Total Tube Well Base Gravity Base (%) FATA 1420 1096 324 58.90 Bajour 189 119 70 54.16 Khyber 192 164 28 66.58 Kurram 147 72 75 58.71 Mohmand 169 134 35 45.04 North Waziristan 199 186 13 63.65 Orakzai 110 56 54 53.15 South Waziristan 158 120 38 65.77 F.R Bannu 61 59 2 31.94 F.R D.I.Khan 36 35 1 74.64 F.R Kohat 48 44 4 62.02 F.R Lakki 17 17 0 22.58 F.R Peshawar 38 36 2 67.69 F.R Tank 56 54 2 76.18 Source: Chief Engineer FATA Works & Services Deptt. Peshawar, Census 1998
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ANNEXURE- E: FIELD SURVEY RESPONDENT’S BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC
AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFORMATION
In chapter -2: Methodology of the Study, the process of the selection of sample size has been discussed in detail in the sample framework section, where statistically a sample size of 1200 respondents has been selected for this survey through Proportionate Stratified Random Sampling Techniques (PSRS).
5.2.1 Demographic Information of the Respondents
Sex of the Respondents: Out of 1500 surveyed respondents, the women constituted 36.67 percent and men were 63.33 percent (Figure – 5.1). The low participation of the female respondents in the survey was due to cultural restrictions on women’s participation and interaction with outside people.
Figure – 5.1: Gender of the Respondents
Age Group: The survey aimed to interview respondents of age 18 years and above, preferably a registered voter. Figure – 5.2 shows that variation in age group of respondents interviewed for the survey. Majority of the respondents (32.72%) were of age group 18-25, followed by 23.40% of the respondents belonged to the age group 26-35-year-olds, while 12.87% were from the age group of 36-45 years and the respondents of age group 56 and above were very nominal (8.87%).
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Figure - 5.2: Age of the Respondents
Education Level: Figure – 5.3 below shows statistics for the educational level of the respondents. The survey results show that nearly 32.33% of the respondents had not attended school as compared to Census Report data of 1998 for FATA, where only 17.42% in FATA were literate. While only 14.47% have primary level education. The figure shows that only 11.33% of the respondents received Middle level schooling, while 12.87% of the respondents had Secondary Certificate level education. The respondents received religious education were 9.00%.
Figure - 5.3: Education Status
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Occupation: Figure – 5.4 shows that majority of the respondents identified themselves as 'unemployed' (26%), followed by 'own business' (17.40%) and 'unskilled labor' at 11.00%. If we compare figure 3.5 with the education level of the respondents, it shows that most of the respondents were educated or otherwise skilled.
Figure - 5.4: Occupation of the Respondents
Marital Status: Figure – 5.5 shows that three quarters (73.33%) of respondents were found to be married, as opposed to just 21.93% who were single. This shows that the trend of early marriages in FATA. The number of widows among the survey respondents was low (4.20%).
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Figure - 5.5: Marital Status of the Respondents
Family Size of a Household: Because of the extended family structure in FATA, and the custom of living in compounds, the concept of household in FATA includes the head of the family, his sons (married and unmarried) and daughters (un-married), daughters in law, and grandchildren. This makes for a large- sized household.
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Table – 5.1: Family Size of a Household
Family Size of a Household Total No. of Agency Members in North South Bajour Mohmand Orakzai Kurram Khyber Household Waziristan Waziristan 3 4.7 8.4 0.7 5.3 7.7 4 4.9 4 13 12.5 3.2 11.7 8 12 12.9 5 15.9 15 6.8 9.7 9.5 10 9.5 6 24.4 16 9.8 15.5 12.7 16 12.7 7 23.2 14 13.7 15.9 12 16 12 8 10.2 11.4 15.8 16.9 14.7 18 16.5 9 5.7 8.9 12.8 8.5 9.3 9 9.3 10 or 3 13.8 37.2 16.5 26.2 17 22.2 more Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Mean number 6.2 6.7 9.1 7.2 7.8 8.3 8.5
Table – 5.1 shows that the household size was quite large ranging from an average maximum of 9.1 members in Orakzai Agency to minimum members 6.2 in Bajaur Agency. In Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies, nearly 1/3rd households had a family size in the range of 5-7 persons while in Kurram and Khyber Agencies about 1/4th households had 5-7 members. Orakzai Agency was an outlier where only 30 percent households had 5-7 family members’ size and the average family size was 9.1 members. It is assumed that when asked the size of the family, the respondents referred to the number of people in the compound.
Respondents Ethnic Affiliation: Figure – 5.6 shows the ethnic variation of the respondents interviewed during the survey at various Agencies in FATA. Respondents belonged to various Khels or tribal ethnic groups.
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Figure - 5.6: Respondents Ethnic Affiliation
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Family Income (Household) Total Income: Respondents were asked to share their family income so to assess their status of income. Figure – 5.7 shows the income status/trend that majority (46.13%) of the respondents surveyed in FATA are living below 10,000 rupees per month.
Figure - 5.7: Family Income of the Respondents
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5.2.2 Socio -Economic Indicators of the Respondents
The respondent’s opinions were sought on various socio-economic indicators and social services available in their area. The overall data shows poor availability of various social services in FATA. This reflects a detrimental effect on the overall situation of state presence in the surveyed tribal areas. Information collected on the availability of various social services include: Sources of drinking water, type of toilet facility used and the quality of house structure, possession of durable goods and sources of information provided insight into the household’s affordability, security, and other related factors of state-society relations in FATA. The level of availability and use of these facilities is also indicative of social development of a community and state presence in these areas. These are described below in detail.
Drinking Water: In the surveyed areas of FATA; around 40 percent households had piped water (Table 5.2). The second most common source was dug well across various Agencies especially in Bajaur (30 percent), Mohmand (38 percent), and Orakzai (28 percent). Tube-well and borehole was another main source of drinking water in Khyber (35 percent), Mohmand (28 percent), and Kurram and Bajour Agencies (20 percent each). About a quarter of sample households in Orakzai used surface water for drinking and another 12 percent spring water. Hand /shallow pumps were reported mostly used in two Agencies namely (Mohmand (16 percent) and
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Kurram (12 percent). Overall, households in Orakzai Agency had least acceptable sources of drinking water as 53 percent were dependent either on surface water or dug well and were at higher risk of contracting water borne diseases. Khyber Agency, on the other hand, had the best available sources of drinking water.
Table – 5.2: Proportion of Households with Main Sources of Drinking Water Proportion of Households with Main Source of Drinking Water Agency Sources of North South Bajour Mohmand Orakzai Kurram Khyber Drinking Water Waziristan Waziristan Piped water 38.4 12.2 22.1 44.5 40.9 26.3 25.8 Tube well or 19.8 28.1 4.7 20.2 35.3 22.5 24.4 borehole Dug well 29.7 37.7 28 8.4 16.9 15.8 16.7 Hand pump 9.1 15.6 8.2 11.9 5.2 11.9 11.9 Water from Spring 2.1 2.6 11.7 12.2 15.2 14.7 Surface water (river/ dam/ lake/ 0.9 3.6 25.1 2.8 0.2 5.1 5.3 pond/stream/canal/ irrigation channels Bottled water 0.2 1.3 Other 0.2 0.2 3.2 1.2 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Number 243 136 92 183 223 147 175
Material of House Structure: Tribal areas normally have large dwelling structures – high surrounding walls encompassing several houses of the tribe or extended family members. Quality of dwelling structure indicates social status and affordability of the family. Outer walls are normally made of mud while houses within the compound are constructed with bricks and other refined material. On the quality of housing structures, two distinct characteristics were observed for each house visited in the survey: material of main walls and material of floors. Strong walls reflect better roofing material while mud walls support either mud or thatched wood and mud roofs. All houses with mud walls may be categorised as ‘katcha’ meaning not strong enough to bear concrete roof or heavy top structure.
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In all Agencies except Orakzai, 3/4th houses the walls were made of mud/stone while in Orakzai Agency much higher percent of houses (nearly 97%) had mud cum stone walls. The main floor material also generally consisted of mud, in more than 90 percent houses in three Agencies (Mohmand, Orakzai and Kurram), 76 percent in Bajour and 56 percent in Khyber Agency.The use of higher quality material for constructing walls and floor was found very uncommon. The housing structure of these areas was suggestive of low socio-economic status of the resident population. More details appear in text Table – 5.3. Table – 5.3: Percentage of Households by Materials Used in House Structure Percentage of households by materials used in house structure Agency North South Bajour Mohmand Orakzai Kurram Khyber Sources of Drinking Water Waziristan Waziristan Mud/Stone 76.8 76 76.3 96.8 75 76.3 96.8
Unbaked Bricks/Mud 3.8 18.9 19.4 0.2 2.7 19.4 0.2 Main Finished walls-stone walls 3 0.3 0.7 1.2 12.2 0.7 1.2 material blocks Baked bricks 16.2 4.7 3.7 1.9 10 3.7 1.9 Other 0.2 0.2 Earth, sand/mud 76.1 97.1 94.7 97.5 55.9 94.7 97.5 Finished floor chips/ Main 4.3 0.3 1.7 1.2 1.7 Terrazzo Ceramic tiles material of Bricks 14 2.4 3.3 2.2 17.6 3.3 2.2 floor Mats / carpets 5.5 0.2 0.3 0.3 25 0.3 0.3 Other 0.3 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Number 243 136 92 183 223 147 175
Possession of Durable Goods: To assess the economic status of the households in the community, enquiries on possession of durable goods with a variety of combinations have been used by a number of surveys in Pakistan. Those included in the baseline survey for FATA comprised availability of: electricity, radio, TV, mobile phone, room cooler, air conditioner, water pump, washing machine, sewing machine, bicycle, motorcycle, and car/truck/tractor. A number of items related to the presence of electricity in the household comprised radio and TV to assess the electronic media
314 outreach, while sewing and washing machines judged woman’s use of technology for household chores. Mobility of household members is an important aspect and was assessed through bicycle, motorcycle and car.
Table – 5.4: Agency Wise Use of Electricity and Possession of Durable Goods Percentage of households by Agency: Use of Electricity and Possession of Durable Goods Agency North South Bajour Mohmand Orakzai Kurram Khyber Item Waziristan Waziristan Electricity 93.7 92.3 88.7 99.7 99 88.7 88.7 Radio 67.3 49.5 60.3 92 67.8 60.3 60.3 Television 26 36 36.3 92.3 64 36.3 36.3 Mobile 31.1 46.3 31 44.7 64.7 31 31 Telephone Room cooler 2 7.2 1 2.7 11.3 1 1 Air conditioner 2.3 14.3 0.3 1.2 30.2 0.3 0.3 Water pump 8 13.6 2 26.5 12.7 2 2 Washing 15.5 22.2 13.8 17.4 44 13.8 13.8 machine Sewing 37.2 32.8 43.8 56.1 43.7 43.8 43.8 machine Bicycle 44.6 29.8 9.7 21.7 16.8 9.7 9.7 Motorcycle or 13.9 9.3 6 6.5 3.8 6 6 Scooter Car or Truck / 12.5 12.8 4 5.7 6.3 12.5 12.8 tractor Percentage of households possessing various items asked separately.
Table – 5.4 shows that almost all households in four Agencies (Bajour, Mohmand, Kurram, and Khyber) had electricity. However, in Orakzai Agency, about 11 percent households were reported without electricity connection. The use of radio was found fairly common; 92 percent households had radio in Kurram Agency followed by 2/3rd households in Khyber and Bajour Agencies, 3/5th in Orakzai and nearly half in Mohmand Agency. Television ownership was relatively lower in most of the Agencies with Kurram agency households reporting highest proportion of TV ownership (92%) followed by those in Khyber Agency (64%), Mohmand and Orakzai
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Agencies (36%) and lowest in Bajour Agency (26).68 It is apparent from data that radio ownership was quite popular, an affordable item and socially acceptable. Cell phone possession was reported in the range of 1/3rd to 2/3rd households in various Agencies, reported the highest in Khyber Agency (65%), indicating affordability and communications needs of the household members.
Possession of room cooler and air conditioner was found uncommon except households in Khyber Agency reported having either item with higher frequency (11% and 30% respectively). Water pump in the household was also found uncommon ranging from 2 percent in Orakzai to 26 percent in Kurram Agency. Sewing machine possession was reported by fairly a large proportion of households in various Agencies with more than half of the Kurram households (56 percent) having one while only a third (33 percent) in Mohmand Agency. Washing machine possession implies the use of modern technology by women. In Khyber agency a fair proportion of households (44 percent) reported having washing machine, while a much smaller proportion of households reported in all other Agencies. With respect to ownership of transport for mobility, the survey found Bajour Agency reporting the highest ownership of bicycle (45%), motorbikes (14%), and car (13%) compared to other Agencies. Agency wise details of possession of durable goods are given in the Table - 5.4.
Sources of information: Multiple response questions were administered to get the respondents views on access to information from various sources. Generally, more people of FATA have access to Pakistan radio, friends and family, neighbors, press and TV as compared to foreign and private media channels.
Figure – 5.8 shows that some 56.00% respondents have access to and get information from Radio Pakistan. This increase in radio listening may be due to the tribal people curiosity to know the daily situations caused by the ongoing conflict in these areas. Beside these days most of the people have access to radio services through cell phones.
The second largest source of information is friends and family members in FATA where 52.07% respondents confirmed they get information through this source. The
68 Viewing of television needs to be further explored due to rise in extremist view declaring its viewing as un-Islamic.
316 reason for this might be linked with the prevailing situation in FATA where millions of people were forced to leave their houses and to take refuge in adjacent areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and in the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, where they were required to have close contacts with friends, relatives and neighbors.
Figure - 5.8: Sources of Information
Due to the lack of other services, Pakistan Television was confirmed as another major source of information by a large number of respondents (45.33%). This may be due to absence of other TV channels broadcasting and cable operators. A handsome number of respondents (38.20%) confirmed that they get information from 'Friday sermons'. Majority of respondents attend and listen to the Friday Sermons every week. The other sources of information confirmed by the respondents were: communal gatherings (21.80%), interaction with work colleagues (20.80%), and meetings with tribal leaders (19.67%).
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ANNEXURE – F: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES All respondents were promised full confidentiality. No. Respondent Description Interview Location Interview Date
1 Journalist, Tribal Union of Journalists (TUJ) Peshawar 15 October 2013 2 Staff Member, Development NGO FATA Khyber Agency 26 October 2013 3 Staff Member, Human Rights NGO, Peshawar Peshawar December 2013 4 Project Director, Government Development Project FATA Secretariat 29 October 2013 5 Staff member, Political Administration Bajaur Agency 30 October 2013 6 Malak, Community Elder Bajaur Agency 1 November 2013 7 Community Member Bajaur Agency 2 November 2013 8 Community Member Bajaur Agency 2 November 2013 9 Staff Member, International NGO Bajaur Agency 3 November 2013 10 Staff Member, Political Administration Mohmand Agency 4 November 2013 11 Staff Member, Local NGO Mohmand Agency 5 November 2013 12 Project Director, Government Development Project FATA Secretariat 10 November 2013 13 Malak, Community Elder Mohmand Agency 11 November 2013 14 Human Rights Activist, Local NGO Khyber Agency 12 November 2013 15 Staff Member, Political Administration Khyber Agency 13 November 2013 16 Senior Officer, Security Agency Khyber Agency 16 November 2013 17 Community Leader/Elder (Malak) Khyber Agency 20 November 2013 18 Community Leader, Malak Kurram Agency 20 November 2013 19 Staff Member, Political Administration Kurram Agency 20 November 2013 20 Community Member Kurram Agency 20 November 2013 21 Senior Official, Government Project Kurram Agency 20 November 2013 22 GovernmentCommunity Leader, Malak Orakzai Agency 20 November 2013 23 Community Leader Orakzai Agency 20 November 2013 24 Former Staff Member, Political Administration Orakzai Agency 21 November 2013 25 Director, Community Development Project FR Peshawar 22 November 2013 26 Official, FATA Secretariat, Peshawar Peshawar 22 November 2013 27 Staff Member, Human Rights NGO FR Kohat 22 November 2013 28 Staff Member, Political Administration FR Peshawar 22 November 2013 29 Community Leader, Malak FR Bannu 23 November 2013 30 Staff Member, Political Administration FR Bannu 23 November 2013 31 Community Leader, Malak North Waziristan 23 November 2013 32 Senior Staff Member, Development Project North Waziristan 25 November 2013 Sustainable Development Agency 33 Staff Member, International Organization Bannu, North Waziristan 25 November 2013 Development Project 34 Journalist North Waziristan 29 November 2013 35 Religious Leader, Mullah North Waziristan 29 November 2015 36 Former Official, Political Administration South Waziristan 30 November 2013 37 Senior Project Manager, National NGO FR Tank 7 December 2013 38 Advocate, Tribal Peshawar High Court 11 December 2013 39 Member, FATA Tribunal Peshawar 12 December 2013
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