2 Los Alamos National Laboratory During the , in the 1950s and ’60s, the fear of nuclear war drove thousands of U.S. families to provide themselves with costly shelters (also called fallout shelters), either converting their basements or installing prefabricated shelters several feet underground in their backyards. The shelters were stocked with essential supplies, and even some amenities, against the possibility of the families’ having to shelter for many days or weeks. (Photo: Open Source)

RETHINKING THE UNTHINKABLE

The Cold War began in 1945 with the use of nuclear weapons to end World War II and officially ended in December 1989 with a joint declaration in Malta by Presidents George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. In retrospect, excepting the regional wars in places like and Vietnam, this 44-year period was remarkably stable. While many factors contributed to this stability, the contribution of nuclear weapons is undeniable.

Nowhere is this stability more obvious than in Europe. During the 3.5 centuries before 1945, a major war had erupted in Europe every 11.9 years, and each lasted an average of 6.6 years. As the weapons for conventional war improved, each new war was more vicious and cost more in human lives than the previous one. Yet for over 40 years following World War II, opposing U.S. and Soviet forces were poised for war in Europe but remained fixed in place. Why? Amassing adequate conventional forces in Western Europe to counter Soviet forces had been politically, economically, and geographically impossible. The peak size of the U.S. Army during the Cold War was 18 divisions. The Soviets had approximately 200 divisions. Western Europe could not have been protected from Soviet aggression without the balance of power brought by the omnipresent American nuclear weapons. The prospect that any untoward movement to the east or to the west would precipitate the nuclear annihilation of nations, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, resulted in the stalemate created by nuclear weapons. The certainty of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) reversed that centuries-old pattern of major European warfare and carnage. Europe has not had a major war for 69 years. So while a national security strategy based on MAD might not be Nirvana, history shows that as a deterrent, it worked.

How Deterrence Worked During the Cold War, much was written on specific factors necessary to achieve deterrence. These requisite factors always included the following: (1) maintaining an acceptable degree of strategic parity between the states involved, (2) having confidence that weapons involved in deterrence would function as designed if called upon to do so, (3) avoiding significant surprises regarding advancements in the nuclear capabilities of foreign nations, and (4) ensuring that intelligence for the U.S. decision makers would be of the highest caliber possible. Prompt and accurate detection of foreign launch preparations and/or actual launches was an important aspect of this latter paradigm. Distinguishing Soviet exercises from actual preparations for a preemptive attack was equally important. Let us examine each of these in turn.

National Security Science December 2014 3 Cold War’s Standoff NATO vs. Warsaw Pact

Nuclear weapons work without being detonated. They kept the Warsaw Pact’s armies at bay for almost 50 years.

Maintaining Parity This fact, and not concern over introducing radioisotopes Maintaining the evolving strategic parity with the Soviet into the environment, may well have constituted the most Union resulted in the . Ultimately, parity compelling impetus for underground testing. was arguably a non sequitur in that both the In any case, when the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty moved and the had more than sufficient numbers and all underground, its ratification by varieties of nuclear warheads and delivery systems to destroy the U.S. Senate was accompanied by robust safeguards that the other, even if a substantial fraction of these nuclear required the following: the maintenance of modern nuclear weapons had been destroyed in a preemptive attack. weapons laboratories and associated research; the establish- ment of the National Nuclear Test Readiness Program to enable a return to atmospheric testing if necessary for Confidence That Your Weapons Will Work “supreme national interests;”1 an active program to improve Confidence on both sides that their respective nuclear methods to detect, characterize, and monitor foreign nuclear weapons would function properly was achieved through 1 A proviso of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty authorized a resumption of U.S. well-funded nuclear weapons physics and engineering atmospheric nuclear testing if the safety or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile laboratories—staffed with scientists and engineers of could not be assured, with high confidence, without testing. The proviso grew out of the 1961 surprise Soviet withdrawal from the U.S.–Soviet mutual testing moratorium. From the highest caliber—and through well-planned nuclear September through December, the Soviets conducted 56 tests, including the October weapons testing programs. These tests were originally in the test of the world’s largest-ever (more than 50 megatons) , “Tsar Bomba.” They conducted more than 70 additional tests in 1962. The United States rushed to atmosphere and later underground. Ironically, radioactive reestablish its own tests, but took until April 1962 to conduct its first one. The treaty’s debris from the atmospheric tests provided the other party proviso is meant to ensure that the United States retains its nuclear testing capability with significant insights into the testing party’s technology. even during test moratoriums like the current one.

4 Los Alamos National Laboratory detonations; and a robust nuclear weapons intelligence those at the nuclear weapons laboratories, as analysts. The program. In the United States, similar safeguards were again value of using U.S. experts in nuclear weapons to review the appended to both the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and data on foreign nuclear weapons activities is obvious. the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). (The The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) established a Field provisions of the CTBT are de facto in effect. The treaty was Intelligence Element (FIE) at Lawrence Livermore National rejected by the U.S. Senate in 1999 by a vote of 51­­ to 48.) Laboratory, and the Defense Intelligence Agency formed FIEs at both Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories. No Big Surprises, Please! In 1976 George H. W. Bush Sr., then the director of the CIA, exempted the Department of Energy’s (DOE) FIEs from During the Cold War, avoiding being surprised by some “contractor” status, an action that provided these civilian FIEs advancement in the nuclear capability of a foreign nation with exceptional access to intelligence information. was considered essential, and this fact drove the development and use of many highly advanced technologies to gather information of the highest quality. This strategy gave rise How Deterrence Is Working Today: to many critical innovations, including the Atomic Energy Cold War Lessons Forgotten in a Hot, New World Detection System, which looked for nuclear weapon With the end of the Cold War, the world political landscape detonations; worldwide signal intelligence, including has become much more convoluted and unpredictable and communications intelligence and electronic intelligence; dangerous. Nowhere is this change more obvious than in reconnaissance systems, including the U-2 spy planes and the growing animus toward the United States as the world’s Corona photographic satellites; and missile-launch detection chief superpower and its major cultural bully. A concomitant systems. Of course, human-gathered intelligence was surge has also arisen in reemerging historical conflicts, critical too, and much of what are viewed as “classical” regional “warlordism,” lethal violence by nonstate actors, and espionage activities focused on gathering intelligence on international competition for resources, especially energy. nuclear capabilities. Against this new backdrop, terrorists with the declared goal of acquiring nuclear weapons are being supported directly Intelligence Analyses for Making Decisions by nations actively pursuing such capabilities themselves in direct violation of international agreements, for example, Capabilities dedicated to analyzing this type of information Hezbollah receiving support from Iran. Other jihadist for the government’s decision makers were well-funded and terrorists, some of them emboldened by “fatwas,” are looking diversified and included using nuclear scientists, particularly for opportunities to acquire nuclear weapon materials directly through theft or diversion.

25,000,000

20,000,000

1945: Invention of nuclear weapons 15,000,000

10,000,000

5,000,000

0

Gulf War War of 1812 World War I Korean War RevolutionaryWar U.S. Civil War World War II Vietnam War War on Terror

Estimated military deaths from wars before and after MAD. In addition, there were up to 55 million civilian deaths during World War II. Europe has not had a major war for 69 years.

National Security Science December 2014 5 There is a reemergence of confrontational strategies by towards the United States. For example, during major strategic exercises in 2013, the Russians flew two Tu-160 Blackjack strategic bombers to Venezuela. In the Tu-160 shown here, Putin is the pilot launching the cruise missile. The Tu-160, which entered service in 1987, remains the largest supersonic aircraft in the world. The Tu-160 is designed to destroy strategic targets with nuclear or conventional weapons. Some of the Tu-160s are being modernized, but they will be replaced by a new-generation known as PAK-DA. (Photos: Open Source)

Tough Talk from the Bear . . . intend to attack anyone, but we consider it necessary for all our partners in the world community to clearly understand Russia’s recent actions to demonstrate its independence, . . . that to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of military prowess, and new economic power are troubling. Russia and its allies, military forces will be used preventively, These actions include probes by Russian strategic bombers including the use of nuclear weapons.”2 [Emphasis added.] of U.S. naval operations and air defenses around Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Great Britain; large joint exercises involving Russian and Chinese armed forces; Russia’s “Russia is the only country in the world continued support of Iran’s nuclear ambitions; explicit that is realistically capable of turning nuclear threats against Poland for accepting a missile defense base on Polish territory; the military incursions into the the United States into radioactive ash.” Republic of Georgia; and more recently, the illegal seizure of ~Russian spokesman Crimea from the . In March 2014, during Immediately, many Western policy analysts concluded the crisis in Crimea, that Baluyevsky’s remarks did not really constitute a Russian spokesman shift in Russian policy. However, even a casual observer Dmitry Kiselyov starkly must consider the policy in the context of the significant reminded the United modernization now on-going in Russian tactical and States that, “Russia strategic nuclear forces and the disturbing increases in is the only country Russian probing of Western defenses and resolve. in the world that is realistically capable of turning the United . . . While the Eagle Is Napping? States into radioactive While the Russian military holds a positive view of nuclear ash.” In December 2013 weapons, these weapons have lost support within elements President Putin had of U.S. armed forces assigned residual responsibility for named Kiselyov to head them. For example, in August 2007, six nuclear weapons a new state news agency charged with portraying Russia were accidentally loaded on a B-52 strategic bomber at Minot in the “most positive light.” Air Force Base (AFB), North Dakota, and flown to Barksdale Russian Chief of Staff General Yuri Baluyevsky bluntly stated AFB, Louisiana, where they sat on the tarmac unnoticed Russia’s policy on the use of nuclear weapons: “We do not Continued on p. 8 2General Baluyevsky made this statement in January 2008 at a military conference that was broadcast on Russia’s state-run cable Vest-24.

6 Los Alamos National Laboratory The Bear Comes Out of Hibernation

On August 17, 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russian heavy bombers were resuming regular air patrols outside Russian territory: “I have decided that flights of Russian strategic aircraft on a permanent basis should be resumed . . . .” Putin was reversing U.S.-Russia parallel and unilateral post–Cold War decisions to stop nuclear-capable bomber combat patrols into each other’s air defense identification zones. Nicknamed the “Bear,” Russian Tu-95 nuclear capable bombers are Since then there have been more than again practicing attacks against the United States. (Photo: Open Source) 50 instances of Russia’s ignoring the post–Cold War practice. On June 13, 2014, Russian Tu-95 bombers, which can carry nuclear weapons such as the Russian AS-15 Kent cruise missile, with a range of 1,800 miles, flew to within only 50 miles of the California coast, close enough to threaten large U.S. in states as far east as Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri. It was the closest a Russian aircraft had come to California since July 2012. Then in September 2014, Russian bombers flew a similarly aggressive mission off the northeast coast of Canada. They came close enough that their cruise missiles could have reached Chicago, New York , and Washington, D.C. It is not known if the Tu-95s were armed with nuclear weapons on either of these occasions. The Tu-95s can legally come inside the U.S. air defense identification zone, which extends 200 miles from the coastline and is part of international airspace. Foreign aircraft are required to identify themselves inside the zone. U.S. sovereign airspace, which foreign military aircraft may not enter without permission, extends 12 miles beyond the coast.

National Security Science December 2014 7 In 2009 Russian resumed its Cold War–era nuclear submarine patrols off U.S. coastlines. Pictured here is a Russian Delta IV nuclear missile submarine. The Delta-class submarines are being replaced with the modern Borei-class submarines, armed with newly designed ballistic missiles carrying new nuclear warheads. Russia has increased its military spending by 100 percent since 2004. (Photo: Open Source)

Continued from p. 6 for 36 hours. The Defense Science Board, charged with Are Smaller Stockpiles Really Better? investigating the incident, concluded that commingling If Russian and U.S. deployed stockpiles are reduced below nuclear forces with nonnuclear organizations has led to several thousand to several hundred weapons, the relative “markedly reduced levels of leadership whose daily focus influence that other, smaller nuclear weapons arsenals could is the nuclear enterprise and a general devaluation of the have on international security and stability would increase nuclear mission and those who perform the mission.” significantly. The possibility of producing enough weapons to Obviously, the mishaps of a few should not be used to deni- reach parity would certainly be attractive to China and within grate the commitment of whole commands. However, nuclear its reach. weapons, which were designed to prevent war, arguably have As with Russia, China has embarked on a major initiative never been popular with the majority of military officers, to improve and modernize its nuclear weapons complex, whose careers are often defined by their execution of war beginning under Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 economic reforms. and not their maintenance of peace. Clearly, sitting in a silo More recently, this continuing initiative has greatly benefitted watching over a 30-something-year-old nuclear-tipped mis- from the industrial modernization that is occurring in China, sile under an aged banner declaring “Peace Is Our Profession” particularly from improvements in high-performance is not as exciting and ribbon-garnering as flying a new F-22 computing, precision manufacturing, and quality assurance. Raptor air-superiority fighter into combat. On the positive side, General Norton Schwartz, at that time the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, declared the reinvigoration of the Air Force’s Without very careful planning, nuclear enterprise his “number one priority.” disarmament would take us into Unfortunately, several recent widely publicized events, an even more unstable and such as one at Malmstrom AFB in Montana, suggest that this “reinvigoration” has not been realized. In January of this year, dangerous world. more than 90 Malmstrom missileers, officers in charge of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, were suspended for cheating If the downsizing of Russian and/or American nuclear or condoning cheating on monthly proficiency exams. The weapon inventories were to entice China to expand its cheating was revealed during an investigation of illegal drug nuclear weapons arsenal to parity with them, that expansion use and involved nearly half of the base’s missile launch crew. would not be constrained by a lack of technology or resources or by extant proscriptive treaties. Obviously, bringing China

8 Los Alamos National Laboratory Like Russia, China has embarked on a major push to improve and modernize its nuclear weapons complex and its military capabilities in general. China has increased its military spending by 170 percent since 2004. Shown here is the Chengdu J-20, a stealth, twin-engine fifth-generation fighter aircraft prototype. The J-20 is expected to be operational in 2017–2019. (Photo: Open Source)

into any nuclear arms reduction negotiations between Russia Whatever the actual status of Iranian nuclear weapon and the United States would become increasingly important. ambitions and capabilities, the rhetoric and ambitions expressed by Iran would one to conclude that nuclear As with Russia, China has a major weapons are an essential element in the reestablishment of Iran’s historical dominance within the Fertile Crescent. In initiative to improve and modernize that case, negotiated reductions of Russian, American, and its nuclear weapons complex. possibly Chinese arsenals must consider Iranian ambitions. Of course, lower U.S. and Russian force levels also could Smaller U.S. and Russian stockpiles could even encourage precipitate a switch in their targeting strategies. Specifically, the nuclear weapon ambitions of emerging nuclear weapon emphasis on “countervalue” targeting (the targeting of cities states such as Iran. The status of Iranian aspirations toward and civilian populations versus military assets) could supplant achieving a nuclear weapons capability is somewhat strategies based on “counterforce” targeting (military assets). confusing. For example, in 2008 one National Intelligence While any strategies involving nuclear weapons would hold Estimate (NIE) concluded that Iran had made the decision large populations at risk, at least indirectly, the change to to stop its nuclear weapons program. Other experts smaller nuclear arsenals could result in the change to direct disputed this estimate. Ironically, in another estimate, the targeting of population and industrial centers, thereby giving NIE concluded with moderate confidence that the earliest each nuclear warhead a larger “deterrent value.” possible data Iran would be technically capable of producing In the absence of very careful planning, the march toward enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon was late 2009. disarmament would take us backwards into an even more Even Director of National Intelligence Admiral Michael unstable and dangerous world. McConnell seemed to reconsider the NIE’s first estimate when he said, “I think I would change the way that we described [the Iranian] nuclear program.”3 Seeking Balance in a New and Unstable World

In this unstable world, or possibly because of the instability, almost everyone would agree that the nuclear arsenals of 3Admiral McConnell’s clarification came in testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 5, 2008. He added, “We remain concerned about Iran’s the United States and Russia exceed numbers required for intentions and assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is nuclear deterrence provided that a requisite balance is also keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.” achieved in the other defense elements that contribute to

National Security Science December 2014 9 45,000 The Soviet Union actually had about 45,000 testing, and enact specific limits on nuclear weapons in 1986 antiballistic systems and capabilities. Thus, 40,000 Underestimated Soviet Nuclear Weapons Stockpile the most referenced comparisons between the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals are Estimated Soviet 35,000 Nuclear Weapons The Soviet Union was estimated the relative numbers of strategic (but not Actual Soviet to have about 28,000 nuclear weapons in 1986 tactical) weapons in their active and reserve Nuclear Weapons stockpiles. 30,000 Estimated U.S. Nuclear Weapons However, generating an estimate of those 25,000 numbers of weapons and then verifying the estimates are problematic. Historically, the 20,000 estimates have not always been accurate. For example, the error in the estimated size of the Soviet nuclear stockpile during

Numbers of Weapons 15,000 the Cold War was larger than the entire 10,000 stockpile Russia is estimated to have today. In 1993 the Russians revealed that the Soviet’s nuclear stockpile peaked in 1986 at 45,000 5,000 weapons. This number was 17,000 warheads above estimates from the U.S. intelligence 0 community (IC) at the time. Today, estimates 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1986 are that Russia has about 4,500 strategic In 1986 the United States underestimated the Soviets’ nuclear arsenal by about 17,000 weapons. weapons in its inventory. But how accurate are these new estimates? deterrence. From the perspectives of both sides, those other defense elements include the respective confidence in their capabilities to maintain and certify the safety and reliability The error in the estimated size of the of their nuclear weapons, their extant abilities to rapidly Soviets’ Cold War nuclear stockpile reconstitute larger and/or different arsenals should these become necessary, and the survivability and reliability of was larger than Russia’s entire their delivery systems. estimated stockpile today. For the United States, other essential defense elements include the possibility of resuming nuclear weapons tests The primary driver for why the Cold War assessment was under the “supreme national interest” clause of the CTBT. so wrong was a persistent belief on the part of the IC that Such tests would be to ensure nuclear weapon readiness and Soviet production of highly enriched uranium was achieved effectiveness and to remediate any major defects that might using gaseous-diffusion technology, which is considered to be discovered via our Stockpile Stewardship Program and be a relatively inefficient enrichment technology. As such, that are deemed a threat to U.S. security. the estimated quantities of uranium that could be produced, about 500 metric tons, were incapable of supporting any Often overlooked by proponents of disarmament who focus larger estimate of the Soviet nuclear weapons inventory. This on the relative numbers in active or reserve stockpiles, these view was defended in spite of contrary information that, by other defense elements are essential to the calculus of stability the mid-1980s, the Soviets had developed a large surplus in and must be maintained even as nuclear arsenals are reduced uranium enrichment capacity as evidenced by the fact they toward any bilateral goal of ultimate elimination. Then again, were strenuously trying to market excess enriched uranium even if the United States and Russia agree to lower levels, to Western Europe. We now know that the Soviet Union had what is the basis for establishing the new levels, and converted its entire enrichment process to the highly efficient can these levels be verified—given our prior record of gas-centrifuge technology and that the IC estimate of Russia’s inaccurately estimating the size and composition of foreign highly enriched uranium was low by at least 500 metric tons.4 nuclear arsenals? Therefore, our estimate was off by 100 percent.

4 An intelligence assessment prepared for the Starbird Study (1980) correctly assessed Maintaining Parity: Problems with the Numbers that Russia had converted its uranium enrichment process to gas centrifuges and estimated Russia’s nuclear weapon stockpile at 45,500. This assessment was harangued Since the end of the Cold War, maintaining parity with by arms control advocates as “wild speculation by war mongers” and by the U.S. Russia has resulted in extensive negotiations to reduce intelligence community as “misinformed.” (“Russian Says Soviet Atom Arsenal Was strategic nuclear weapon stockpiles, eliminate specific Larger Than West Estimated,” William J. Broad, , Sept. 26, 1993) weapons, enact specific limits or bans on nuclear weapon

10 Los Alamos National Laboratory Obviously, stability is best achieved within a framework Obviously, the most essential ingredient of any legacy- where estimates can be verified promptly and with an dependent program is the long-term retention of the requisite acceptable degree of certainty. Unfortunately, our history in knowledge base and the special facilities upon which such a formulating such estimates does not add to our confidence program must rely. But is this retention taking place? that such estimates will be valid. Moreover, at lower numbers of strategic weapons, the The number of U.S. nuclear facilities calculus of stability requires that tactical nuclear weapons must also be taken into account. This imperative arises that allow research on materials for because such categorizations as “tactical” and “strategic” nuclear weapons has been reduced are policy-driven differences without any significant military distinction. Tactical nuclear weapons are defined as those significantly. used on a battlefield whereas strategic weapons are used against cities and a nation’s military-industrial complex. The U.S. nuclear weapons science laboratories were the But a nuclear warhead is a nuclear warhead, and the “how” last bastions within the DOE to be “transformed,” that and “why” it might be used are nuances of no import to the is, converted from nonprofit to for-profit organizations. people targeted. Obviously, positive changes are always needed in any Thus, a disparity in the number of stockpiled tactical nuclear organization to preserve its vital capabilities. Such changes weapons is as significant as a disparity in strategic weapons. normally focus on cost savings, efficiencies, responsiveness, Their numbers should be combined when determining the improvement in the work environment, and opportunities calculus of stability. that will attract “the best and brightest” workforce. It remains to be seen whether or not the recent transforma- tions at both Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National At lower numbers of strategic weapons, Laboratories are successful. For example, have they retained the calculus of stability requires that benefits and hiring incentives sufficient to attract and retain a workforce with the requisite knowledge base capable of tactical nuclear weapons must also be maintaining the extant U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile or of taken into account. manufacturing replacement warheads? In fact, a number of the best mid-career contributors to whom the laboratories’

Without Testing: Confidence That the Weapons Will Work Arms control agendas must consider the United States’ 120,000 capabilities to maintain and certify the aging weapons in its reduced nuclear arsenals. In the absence of nuclear weapon testing, maintaining and certifying nuclear weapons have 100,000 defaulted to the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which is based on computer simulations, nonnuclear experiments, 80,000 and scientific observation of nuclear weapons materials and components. 60,000 A second part of this program entails fabricating replacement warheads using extant procedures to replicate, as accurately as possible, the legacy warheads being replaced. Both parts 40,000 of this program require the following: a significant reliance on legacy nuclear weapon designs and testing data; legacy 20,000 manufacturing techniques that have fabrication problems, including a lack of detailed documentation regarding manufacturing designs and their acceptable tolerances; U.S. Russia China and access to materials that can adequately replace those no longer available, including some adhesives, lubricants, Estimated staffing of nuclear weapons complexes in 2014. The differences in the staffing are due primarily to the fact that Russia and China are plastics, and materials (such as asbestos) that are now maintaining and expanding their nuclear weapons production capabilities, proscribed in the workplace. while the United States has largely dismantled its capabilities.

National Security Science December 2014 11 After only 74 years of experience with the element, how well do we really understand plutonium? We still have problems predicting the stability of steel structures under stress, despite our over 2,000 years experience with steel. Here, cars rest on the collapsed portion of the I-35W Mississippi River bridge in Minneapolis, MN, after the bridge’s August 1, 2007, collapse. (Photo: Open Source) accumulated knowledge might have been transferred have research necessary for maintaining the residual U.S. stockpile already left or are planning to do so.5 and for performing technical assessments of foreign nuclear For sure, in the absence of replacing these staff or providing weapons capabilities will be sustained. other types of succession planning, workforce reductions More important, the nonprofit university environment at at Los Alamos and Livermore have resulted in the loss of Los Alamos and Livermore, initially provided by the University thousands of person-years of corporate memory covering the of California, no longer exists. Ironically, it was that environ- period of time in which U.S. nuclear weapons were designed, ment, in which every idea and concept was challenged by built, and actually tested. This is memory that is critically the “clash of mind with mind,”6 that gave the United States important to the national security mission of DOE’s National intrinsically reliable and yet intrinsically safe nuclear weapons. Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Finally, although successful testing is the gold standard for having confidence our weapons will work as designed, the safeguards in the National Nuclear Test Readiness Program An essential ingredient of any legacy- are now ignored or not maintained. Under those safeguards, dependent strategy is the retention the United States should maintain the capabilities needed to resume nuclear testing if needed in the future—but is this of knowledgeable people and being done? special facilities. Nuclear Vigor: Russia and China In addition, the number of Category 1 nuclear facilities, the category that allows research on plutonium, uranium, After the end of the Cold War, the Russian federal nuclear and other materials for nuclear weapons, has been reduced centers VNIIEF and VNIITF and other nuclear weapon significantly. For example, at Los Alamos, the number of such research organizations were stabilized by an influx of facilities has decreased from 12 in the late 1980s to 1 today. It U.S. support to, for example, prevent the migration of is not obvious, given the situation, how the requisite materials Russian nuclear weapons expertise. Today, in contrast to what is happening at their American counterparts, these 5 From the end of the Cold War until 1996, the DOE/NNSA contractor workforce dropped from about 59,000 to less than 30,000. Possibly because of the position taken Russian institutes are seeing their benefits, compensation, by NNSA that “science-based stockpile stewardship” was essential to maintaining the 6 “A university… is a place where inquiry is pushed forward, and discoveries verified stockpile without testing, the Los Alamos and Livermore laboratories were the last and perfected, and rashness rendered innocuous, and error exposed, by the collision two organizations to be downsized and given new contractual configurations. This of mind with mind, and knowledge with knowledge.” (John Henry Cardinal Newman, downsizing of their workforces continues; in 2012, for example, Los Alamos offered “The Idea of a University,” 1852) incentives to leave the Lab that reduced its staff of about 10,000 by about 800: an 8 percent reduction.

12 Los Alamos National Laboratory appreciation, working conditions, facilities, Imagine then the challenges we face in understanding and meaningful research significantly plutonium. Plutonium is much more complex and unstable improve. Rigorous research—including than iron. Material scientists who work with plutonium know year-around experimentation at their that predicting its behavior has always been a careful balance Test Site, which is leading between empirical knowledge and informed guesswork. In to the development and deployment of an era when testing is banned, these plutonium ambiguities new Russian nuclear weapons for newly become even more problematic. designed delivery systems—continues Staying on the right side of the fulcrum today requires to be their top priority. rigorous, long-term experimental research programs in The improvements in Russia’s plutonium metallurgy, energetic materials, and weapons nuclear capabilities are leveraged physics. These programs are supported by supercomputer off the increased profits garnered modeling and simulation in lieu of the validation that testing from Russian exports of oil on would provide. Regardless of these efforts, because the the one hand and driven by new properties of plutonium continue to change with age, what confrontational trends in foreign we think we know now about the plutonium triggers inside The Soviets discovered policy on the other. The net result a surprisingly easy way our nuclear weapons could change, and this could surprise to defeat our warheads. is that, at a time when U.S. nuclear us in some very unwelcome ways. The Stockpile Stewardship (Photo: Defense Nuclear Agency) weapon budgets are being cut and Program, in its present form, might work for now, but U.S. nuclear weapon experts are being whether it will continue to be the best way to steward the offered early retirements or terminated, Russia’s 2014–2016 nuclear stockpile should be questioned at some point in defense program is planning a 50 percent spending increase the future. in its nuclear program, designed to fund a significant upgrade in Russian strategic nuclear forces in conjunction with more Russian nuclear weapons research. Just as we surprised our adversaries China’s nuclear weapon program is enjoying a similar in WWII with our technological economic vigor and is directly benefiting from the rapid infusion of foreign advanced technologies appurtenant to advances, our adversaries today China’s economic modernization. can do the same to us.

Russia’s 2014–2016 defense program is planning a 50 percent spending increase in its nuclear program.

Surprising Ourselves In the historical flow of science, nuclear weapons physics represents a relatively recent development. While nuclear weapons research has been rigorously pursued for over 70 years, it is naive to maintain that all possible technical discoveries that could lead to an advantage or all failure mechanisms that could lead to a disadvantage have been investigated and defined. For example, our knowledge of plutonium metallurgy is only 74 years old whereas our knowledge of steel metallurgy exceeds 2,000 years. But as we learned from the collapse of the World Trade Center’s Twin Towers in September 2001 and the I-35W bridge in Minneapolis in August 2007, we have problems predicting the stability of steel structures Surprise! Undetected by the U.S. intelligence community, by the mid-1980s under stress despite our long history of working with steel. the Soviet Union had converted its gaseous-diffusion technology for making highly enriched uranium to the highly efficient gas-centrifuge technology. The centrifuges (shown here) had doubled Soviet production capacity. (Photo: Open Source)

National Security Science December 2014 13 Surprised by Our Adversaries Just as we surprised our adversaries in World War II with technological advances such as the atomic bomb, our adversaries today can do the same to us. One important example of technological surprise from the Soviet nuclear weapons program occurred in the early 1960s. Soviet scientists had for years published numerous technical articles on the effects of x-rays on polymeric materials. Suddenly, they quit publishing. This aroused the interest of attentive U.S. IC experts. Nuclear detonations produce intense x-rays. The polymeric heat shields used to protect the warheads of U.S. nuclear Secretary of State Colin Powell’s February 5, 2003, presentation missiles were made of polymers that were reinforced slide to the United Nations Security Council showed an Iraqi- by asbestos or glass fibers. Subsequently, we conducted ordered aluminum tube allegedly meant for use in uranium underground nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site and enrichment. exposed these heat shields to the intense x-rays that the tests produced. Sure enough, the x-rays caused the protective heat As a result of a combination of systemic weak- shields to fail catastrophically. nesses, primarily in its nuclear weapons analytic capabilities, the U.S. intelligence community failed This discovery was a real shocker. The Soviets had discovered to accurately analyze and describe Iraq’s nuclear that if they detonated one of their nuclear weapons in space anywhere near our incoming warheads, the intense x-rays capabilities in 2002. For example, it claimed that would destroy the warheads’ heat shields. Unbeknownst to Iraq had made repeated attempts to acquire us, all of our warheads were fatally flawed. This prompted high-strength aluminum tubes for the purpose of the immediate development of new x-ray-resistant, graphite- enriching uranium to use in nuclear weapons. The reinforced heat shields for U.S. warheads, and these are still intelligence community tested the tubes without in use today. inviting DOE experts—the intelligence community’s nuclear experts—to participate. DOE, however, The x-rays caused the warheads’ heat after doing its own analysis, concluded that “a shields to fail catastrophically. This [conventional] rocket production application is the more likely end-use for these [aluminum] tubes.” discovery was a real shocker. DOE’s conclusion was eventually accepted as the correct one. Other examples of technological surprise from the Soviets include the rapid development of their first atomic bomb and their design and demonstration of the first thermonuclear bomb (a.k.a. hydrogen bomb). (Whereas the United States tested the first thermonuclear device, the Soviets were the first to make it a deliverable weapon.) They discovered that high-altitude electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) had catastrophically damaging effects on electronics, and they created special alloys for use in their nuclear weapons to counter those effects. The Soviets also were the first to deploy neutron (enhanced-radiation weapons). Without going into details, each of these developments gave the Soviets military advantages. Only because we learned of their work were we able to evaluate and counter it with our own developments, strategies, and/or new technologies. Given this prior record of important discoveries by our President George W. Bush announces the beginning of adversaries, any nuclear weapon reduction initiative must Operation Iraqi Freedom from the Oval Office, March 19, 2003. "The people of the United States and our friends and consider the possibility that other new-concept weapons or allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that defenses could be developed that would provide strategic threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder." and/or tacti­cal advantages. (Photos: Open Source)

14 Los Alamos National Laboratory It is also possible that while foreign nuclear weapon programs Unfortunately, one of the first causalities of the end of could develop new weapons, these might not meet political the Cold War was the IC’s highly focused and well-funded definitions of “strategic” or even “nuclear” weapons. The nuclear intelligence program. For example, the nuclear problem then—for nuclear arms control and for deter­ intelligence divisions in both the CIA and the Defense rence—is that such novel weapons may not be considered as Intelligence Agency were disestablished, and funding to candidates for reduction under the terms of extant negotiated the FIEs, charged with assessing foreign nuclear weapon reduction agreements concerning strategic nuclear weapons. developments, plummeted. Similarly, the Nuclear Intelligence Panel that consisted of senior nuclear weapons scientists and provided direct assessments to the director of the Has Foiling Surprises Been Foiled? CIA was abolished. Obviously, determining the existence of any such game- Arguably, the intelligence failures evident in the First Gulf changing weapons or defenses would require the IC to have War (1991), in which the nuclear program of Iraq was a robust and effective intelligence program. However, today, underestimated, and the Second Gulf War (2003), in which while remnants of technology-based intelligence collection the nuclear program of Iraq was overestimated, were directly systems remain in place, many have been reduced to the related to the aforementioned reductions in the IC nuclear point that coverage is inadequate for today’s potential threats. intelligence program. For example, if those reductions had In addition, capabilities dedicated to analyzing this type of not occurred, the widely publicized “aluminum tube” issue information for use by the government’s decision makers certainly would not have been given the weight it was given have also suffered. The most significant example is the in the debate leading up to the second war with Iraq.7 unfortunate steady decline—to near extinction—of using nuclear scientists, particularly those at the DOE’s national security science laboratories, as analysts. Out of Balance: Rapidly Rebuilding Nuclear Stockpiles As negotiated weapons levels are reduced, the calculus of With better nuclear intelligence, the deterrence becomes progressively more uncertain and

“aluminum tube” issue certainly 7 Assessments that Iraq had acquired export-controlled, high-strength, high- specification aluminum tubes for use as centrifuge rotors were in error. They were would not have been given weight in procured to produce 81-mm rockets. (Aluminum Tube Investigation; Global Security Organization; http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report/ the debate leading up to the second isg-final-report_vol2_nuclear-05.htm) war with Iraq.

800

600 Russia 400

Pits per Year 200 0

China United States

Plutonium pit production estimates for 2014. Russia has the ability today to produce at least 1,000 plutonium pits per year for use in building their new nuclear weapons. The United States, in contrast, has only one plutonium pit facility—an improvised one at Los Alamos— which has produced 29 certified pits since 1989.

National Security Science December 2014 15 By 2021 new nuclear missile systems, composed of new warheads and new delivery systems, will constitute 98 percent of Russia’s intercontinental ballistic missile forces. This modernization includes the new RS-24 Yars (which NATO calls the SS-27 Mod 2), shown here, which is a new road-mobile system designed to carry up to six warheads and to counter U.S. antiballistic missile defense technology. (Photo: Open Source)

dangerous, particularly given the large stockpiles of Arguably, this disarmament should have been a product plutonium and highly enriched uranium Russia has of bilateral negotiations to reduce both U.S. and Russian available for rapidly rebuilding its weapons inventories. stockpiles and the capacities and capabilities to reconstitute In robust, renovated nuclear weapons factories, Russia has them, with adequate verification protocols appended to the the ability today to produce at least 1,000 plutonium pits agreement. If increased stability at lower force levels is the per year for use in making new nuclear weapons. In an real goal, taking the production factor into consideration is emergency, the production capacity could be much greater.8 an absolute necessity. The United States, in contrast, has only one plutonium pit Any balanced arms control initiative to reduce nuclear facility—an improvised one at Los Alamos—which has weapons stockpiles must provide a balance in the comparable 9 abilities of the negotiating parties to modernize and/or produced 29 certified, “diamond-stamped” pits since 1989 (when the Rocky Flats plutonium facility was closed).10 reconstitute larger stockpiles. In this regard, an imbalance The last diamond-stamped pit was produced in 2009. between Russia and the United States probably already exists. While reconstituting new pit production was a significant Ironically, if this capacity is not taken into consideration, accomplishment, the fact that the United States unilaterally bilaterally reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons could disarmed itself with respect to being able to produce pits— result in greatly increased dangers to the very world stability and therefore produce new nuclear warheads or refurbish that arms control initiatives posit as their goal. its aging warheads with new pits—arguably represents the In addition to addressing production capacity, a particular largest nonnegotiated disarmament in history. interest of the United States should be to gain verification that closed or converted warhead-dismantlement plants in Russia are not being covertly used to produce new nuclear warheads.

8 During the peak of the Cold War, Russia produced plutonium and/or uranium There are also obvious but difficult questions to be answered parts for 2,500 to 4,000 warheads per year. Much of this production capacity has about how the refurbishment or remanufacture of extant been mothballed but is still available to be put back into production. weapons could be distinguished from the production of new 9 “Diamond stamped” signifies that a product has been manufactured to the warheads without classified information being revealed. highest standards required by the NNSA and the DoD. (National Nuclear Security Administration Newsletter, July 2007, Washington, D.C.)

10 In 1989, due to safety and environmental concerns, DOE closed the Rocky Flats pit facility, which was the only facility in the country that could serially produce pits. A replacement pit facility has never been built.

16 Los Alamos National Laboratory Something Old, Something New The average age of nuclear weapons Absent the capability to replace its aging nuclear weapons, in the U.S. stockpile is about 34 years, the United States will see the average age of its stockpiled weapons progressively increase. In 2005 our newest and the youngest U.S. warheads intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Peacekeeper, are about 23 years old. was decommissioned. In 2014 the average age of all nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile is about 34 years; the youngest In contrast, Russia is making significant progress in U.S. warheads are about 23 years old. From public statements, modernizing its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and it appears that the NNSA is preparing to accept weapons their delivery systems. By early 2021 newly designed missile approaching twice that age.11 systems—the Topol-M ICBM, which NATO calls the SS-27 In contrast, Russian production capacity, if our estimates are “Sickle”—will constitute 98 percent of Russian ICBMs. Russia accurate, will allow Russia to maintain a stockpile of nuclear is also deploying a newer road-mobile RS-24 Yars ballistic weapons with a constant average age of approximately missile, probably a variant of the Topal, capable of carrying 5 years. (The average age of China’s nuclear weapons is also up to six warheads and designed to counter U.S. antiballistic about 5 years.) Moreover, with further negotiated reductions missile technology. The Russians also have a new rail-mobile expected, the Russians could reduce the average age of ICBM. By 2020 the Russian navy will have eight new Borei- their weapons by retiring older systems while maintaining class nuclear submarines. The Borei can carry 16 to 20 production of new ones. new solid-fuel Bulava R-30 submarine-launched ballistic To a lesser extent, the age differential in favor of Russian missiles (SLBMs) with a range of over 6,000 miles. Each of warheads extends to their delivery systems. The most recent these Bulava SLBMs will carry 6 to 10 individually targeted U.S. strategic missile to enter the active inventory was the warheads for a total of up to 200 newly designed and newly U.S. Navy Trident II D-5, which was first deployed in 1990 manufactured warheads per submarine. and, under a proposed life-extension program, will remain On October 31, 2014, the Russian news agency TASS in service until 2042. Much of the U.S. land-based strategic reported that Putin announced, at a meeting with his top- capability is based on the Minuteman III missiles, which ranking military officers, that 55 percent of Russia’s strategic entered service in 1970 and were produced until 1978. nuclear forces were now modernized. (He also announced A refurbished Minuteman III could remain in service Russia had modernized about 35 percent of their air force, until 2040. over 50 percent of their navy, and close to 70 percent of their army’s armored vehicles.) 11 “Right now, our best estimates [for the lifespan of plutonium pit-based weapons] are somewhere between 45 and 60 years, and that sounds like a long time, but remember, the last pit we made was made in the 1980s. After that, the properties [of plutonium pits] have changed to the point where you lack confidence that what you saw when you were testing is what you’d see now.” (Linton Brooks, NNSA Administrator, Global Security Newswire, March 2, 2006)

30

25

The average age of U.S., Russian, and 20 Chinese nuclear weapons. Unlike the United States, Russia and China continually replace their aging weapons with newly 15 built weapons. United States

10 Average Age (years) Age Average

5

Russia China 0 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015

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Rethinking the Unthinkable The end of the Cold War brought many changes. These changes included the unification of Germany, the expansion of democracy into Eastern Europe, and the integration of Russia into the global economy. It also removed the worry about a nuclear war. “Thinking about the unthinkable,” that is, seriously contemplating nuclear war, has all but vanished from the minds of most people.12

Another change that occurred was the substitution of informal “hand-shake” agreements for extensively negotiated treaties involving nuclear weapons. Verification protocols or safeguard provisions seldom accompanied these new informal agreements. Even as active stockpiles were reduced, agreements to reduce the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons were never in vogue for a number of reasons, one of the most significant being mutual concerns over the secrecy inherent in such manufacturing processes. Russia’s warhead production capacity will allow it to maintain a stockpile of nuclear weapons with an average age of approximately 5 years.

While this imbalance should have raised concerns in the United States, it has not. Even Russia’s modernization of its strategic nuclear forces and its touting of these forces as the President John F. Kennedy’s address to the nation most important element of the Russian military have been regarding the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty little more than passing news items. ~July 26, 1963~ Similar apathy is being shown over the revival of incursions of Russian nuclear-capable aircraft to test the defenses and resolve of the United States and its allies. These probes, “I ask you to stop and think for a moment what echoing the Cold War, are disturbing. it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large Significantly, these military incursions are being conducted and small, stable and unstable, responsible at a time when Russian officials have continued to make substantial investments toward modernizing Russian nuclear and irresponsible, scattered throughout the weapon production and research capacities, while also world. There would be no rest for anyone then, supporting a robust testing program at Novaya Zemlya, in no stability, no real security, and no chance of part to develop new nuclear weapons. (Within the limits of effective disarmament. There would only be our detection capabilities, no evidence suggests that these the increased chance of accidental war, and tests are generating proscribed nuclear yields.) an increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be Major imbalances have arisen between local conflicts.”

the nuclear weapon research Since president Kennedy’s speech in 1963, the number of and production capacities of Russia declared nuclear weapons states has doubled to eight. and the United States.

12 Thinking about the Unthinkable is the title of Herman Kahn’s infamous and widely read 1962 book that explores the consequences resulting from a nuclear war. Kahn is one of the founders of the Hudson Institute.

18 Los Alamos National Laboratory In stark contrast, the nuclear weapons research, testing, and production infrastructures of the United States have continued their rapid erosion through elimination and restructuring of organizations and reductions of workforces and budgets. This erosion has been accelerated by funds being diverted away from nuclear weapons research, surveillance, and manufacturing to address burgeoning environmental and security requirements. Ironically, the latter, spawned largely by those who inveigh against hypothetical security threats, are leaving the United States less secure internationally. Former Los Alamos director Sig Hecker, now at Stanford University, argues that this problem is further exacerbated by “a risk-averse federal bureaucracy that has layered so many checks on the folks trying to do the actual nuclear weapons work at Los Alamos and elsewhere that a signifi- cant fraction of the work simply doesn’t get done.” 13

The undeniable fact is that stability between the United States and Russia is now being maintained by Mutually “Assumed”

Destruction. The author, Houston T. Hawkins, is shown here with a model of a nuclear warhead from an ICBM. The warhead is coated with a graphite-based x-ray–resistant heat shield he helped to develop. Obviously, no one is advocating a return (Photo: Los Alamos) to the Cold War or an abrogation of environment or An outcome of the extant situation is that major imbalances security regulations. However, the undeniable fact is that have arisen between the nuclear weapons research and stability between the United States and Russia is now being production capacities of Russia and the United States. maintained by Mutually “Assumed” Destruction. “Assured” Given these realities, it is easy to understand Russian no longer is the operative adjective, given the robustness of President Putin’s statement in his 2013 end-of-year address the Russian nuclear weapons program and the demise of to the Russian Parliament: “In our efforts to upgrade our similar emphasis, capacities, and capabilities in the United nuclear arsenal, we are reaching new milestones successfully States. If the international stability everyone wants is to be and on schedule. Some of our partners will have to maintained, this potentially destabilizing imbalance cannot catch up.” be allowed to continue. ~ Houston T. Hawkins Our lack of capabilities for rapidly reconstituting large Hawkins is a retired USAF colonel and a senior fellow of numbers of nuclear weapons and our virtual abandonment of Los Alamos National Laboratory vital nuclear programs must be evaluated in the calculus of defense and of arms reduction diplomacy.

13 http://www.nti.org/gsn/articleregulators-squelching-U.S.-nuke-reliability-tests-ex-los-alamos-chief/

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