■ Forum
Female Marine searching Iraqi woman at control point outside Fallujah U.S. Marine Corps (Ryan B. Busse)
And when people are entering upon a war they do things the wrong way around. Ottoman Empire, immersing himself Action comes first, and it is only when they have already suffered that they deeply in local culture: “Geography, begin to think. tribal structure, religion, social cus- —Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War toms, language, appetites, standards were at my finger-ends. The enemy I knew almost like my own side. I risked myself among them many times, to The Military Utility learn.”1 Since then, countless soldiers have memorized Sun Tzu’s dictum: “If you know the enemy and know your- of Understanding self, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.” Although “know thy enemy” is Adversary Culture one of the first principles of warfare, our military operations and national security decisionmaking have consis- By MONTGOMERY M C FATE tently suffered due to lack of knowl- edge of foreign cultures. As former Sec- ultural knowledge and war- Herodotus studied his opponents’ con- retary of Defense Robert McNamara fare are inextricably bound. duct during the Persian Wars (490–479 noted, “I had never visited Indochina, Knowledge of one’s adver- BC). T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Ara- nor did I understand or appreciate its sary as a means to improve bia) embarked on a similar quest after history, language, culture, or values. Cmilitary prowess has been sought since the 1916 Arab rebellion against the When it came to Vietnam, we found ourselves setting policy for a region that Montgomery McFate is a cultural anthropologist and a defense policy fellow at the was terra incognita.”2 Our ethnocen- Office of Naval Research working on an initiative to promote social science research trism, biased assumptions, and mirror- in the national security area. imaging have had negative outcomes
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during the North Vietnamese offen- incorporate cultural and social knowl- replicating the Prophet Mohammed’s sives of 1968 and 1975, the Soviet-Af- edge of adversaries into training, ed- 7th-century process of political con- ghan war (1979–1989), India’s nuclear ucation, planning, intelligence, and solidation through jihad, including tests (1998), the Iraqi invasion of Ku- operations. Across the board, the na- opportunistic use of territories lacking wait (1990), and the Shi’ite transforma- tional security structure needs to be political rulers as a base, formation of tion of Iran (1979). infused with anthropology, a discipline a corps of believers as a precursor to Despite the fact that cultural invented to support warfighting in the mass recruiting, and an evolution in knowledge has not traditionally been tribal zone. targeting from specific, local targets a priority within the Department of (such as pagan caravans) to distant Defense (DOD), the ongoing insur- Changing Adversaries and powerful adversaries (for instance, the gency in Iraq has served as a wake- Operational Environments Byzantine Empire). To confront an up call to the military that adversary Cultural knowledge of adversar- enemy so deeply moored in history culture matters. Soldiers and Marines ies should be considered a national and theology, the U.S. Armed Forces Forum on the ground thoroughly understand security priority. An immediate trans- must adopt an ethnographer’s view of that. As a returning commander from formation in the military conceptual the world: it is not nation-states but paradigm is necessary cultures that provide the underlying the ongoing insurgency in Iraq has for two reasons: first, the structures of political life. served as a wake-up call to the military nature of the enemy has Not only our adversaries have changed since the end of changed. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense that adversary culture matters the Cold War, and second, Review predicted that smaller-scale the current operational en- contingencies—military operations 3d Infantry Division observed: “I had vironment has evolved fundamentally of smaller scale and intensity than perfect situational awareness. What I within the past 20 years as a result major theater or regional wars, such lacked was cultural awareness. I knew of globalization, failed states, and the as humanitarian, peacekeeping, peace where every enemy tank was dug in proliferation of both complex and light enforcement, noncombatant evacu- on the outskirts of Tallil. Only problem weapons. ation operations, and combating ter- was, my soldiers had to fight fanatics Although the United States armed rorism—will characterize the future charging on foot or in pickups and fir- and trained for 50 years to defeat a operational environment. The use of ing AK–47s and RPGs [rocket-propelled Cold War adversary, Soviet tanks will the military for humanitarian disaster grenades]. Great technical intelligence. never roll through the Fulda Gap. The relief, peacekeeping, and counterterror- Wrong enemy.”3 As this commander’s foe the United States faces today—and ism operations means that the military observation indicates, understanding is likely to face for years to come—is will be increasingly forward-deployed one’s enemy requires more than a sat- non-Western in orientation, transna- in hostile, non-Western environments ellite photo of an arms dump. Rather, tional in scope, non-hierarchical in “disconnected from the global econ- it requires an understanding of their structure, and clandestine in approach; omy.”6 According to Andy Hoehn, for- interests, habits, intentions, beliefs, and it operates outside of the context mer Deputy Assistant Secretary of De- social organizations, and political sym- of the nation-state. Neither al Qaeda fense for Strategy, “The unprecedented bols—in other words, their culture.4 nor insurgents in Iraq are fighting a destructive power of terrorists—and This article argues that new adver- Clausewitzian war, where armed con- the recognition that you will have to saries and operational environments flict is a rational extension of politics deal with them before they deal with necessitate a sharper focus on cultural by other means. These adversaries nei- you—means that we will have to be knowledge of the enemy. A lack of ther think nor act like nation-states. out acting in the world in places that this knowledge can have grave conse- Rather, their form of warfare, organi- are very unfamiliar to us. We will have quences. Conversely, understanding zational structure, and motivations are to make them familiar.”7 adversary culture can make a positive determined by the society and the cul- difference strategically, operationally, ture from which they come. Culture Matters Operationally and tactically. Although success in fu- Attacks on coalition troops in the and Strategically ture operations will depend on cultural Sunni triangle, for example, follow Culture has become something of a knowledge, the Department of Defense predictable patterns of tribal warfare: DOD buzzword, but does it really mat- currently lacks the programs, systems, avenging the blood of a relative (al ter? The examples below demonstrate models, personnel, and organizations tha’r); demonstrating manly courage three points: misunderstanding culture to deal with either the existing threat in battle (al-muruwwah); and uphold- at a strategic level can produce policies or the changing environment. A Fed- ing manly honor (al-sharaf).5 Similarly, that exacerbate an insurgency; a lack eral initiative is urgently needed to al Qaeda and its affiliated groups are of cultural knowledge at an operational
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hearts and minds. A related issue is our squelching of Iraqi freedom of speech. Many members of the Coalition Provi- sional Authority (CPA) and Combined Joint Task Force 7 felt that anticoali- tion and anti-American rhetoric was a threat to security and sought to stop its spread.10 Closing Muqtada al Sadr’s Al Hawza newspaper contributed to an Iraqi perception that Americans do not really support freedom of speech despite their claims to the contrary, reinforcing their view of Americans as Forum hypocrites. Failure to understand adversary culture can endanger both troops and civilians at a tactical level. Although it may not seem like a priority when bullets are flying, cultural ignorance Navy admiral discussing school can kill. Earlier this year, the Office of construction in Najaf, Iraq, with tribal Sheik Naval Research conducted a number of focus groups with Marines returning U.S. Marine Corps (Robert K. Blankenship) from Iraq. The Marines were quick to level can lead to negative public opin- Iraq, and the inner circle of the Ba’th acknowledge their misunderstanding ion; and ignorance of the culture at a Party itself was the purview of one of Iraqi culture, particularly pertaining tactical level endangers both civilians tribe, the Al Bu Nasir. Once the Sunni to physical culture and local symbols, and troops. There is no doubt that the Ba’thists lost their prestigious jobs, were and to point out the consequences of lack of adversary cultural knowledge humiliated in the conflict, and got fro- inadequate training. Most alarming can have grave consequences strategi- zen out through de-Ba’thification, the were the Iraqis’ use of vehement hand cally, operationally, and tactically. tribal network became the backbone of gestures, their tendency to move in At a strategic level, certain poli- the insurgency.9 The tribal insurgency one’s peripheral vision, and their toler- cymakers within the Bush adminis- is a direct result of our misunderstand- ance for physical closeness. One Marine tration apparently misunderstood the ing the Iraqi culture. noted, “We had to train ourselves that tribal nature of Iraqi culture and so- At the operational level, the this was not threatening. But we had ciety. They assumed that the civilian military misunderstood the system our fingers on the trigger all the time apparatus of the government would of information transmission in Iraqi because they were yelling.” A lack of remain intact after the regime was society and consequently lost oppor- familiarity with local cultural symbols decapitated by an aerial strike, an in- tunities to influence public opinion. also created problems. For example, in One Marine back from the Western European tradition, a white when the United States cut off the Iraq noted, “We were flag means surrender. Many Marines as- hydra’s Ba’thist head, power reverted to focused on broadcast sumed a black flag was the opposite of media and metrics. But surrender—“a big sign that said shoot its most basic and stable form—the tribe this had no impact be- here!” as one officer pointed out. As cause Iraqis spread in- a result, many Shia who traditionally ternal coup, or a military defeat. In formation through rumor. Instead of fly black flags from their homes as a fact, when the United States cut off the tapping into their networks, we should religious symbol were identified as the hydra’s Ba’thist head, power reverted have visited their coffee shops.” Unfor- enemy and shot at unnecessarily. There to its most basic and stable form—the tunately, the emphasis on force protec- were also problems at roadblocks. The tribe. As a tribal leader observed, “We tion prevented Soldiers from visiting American gesture for stop (arm straight, follow the central government. . . . But coffee shops and buying items on the palm out) means welcome in Iraq, while of course if communications are cut economy. Soldiers and Marines were the gesture for go means stop to Iraqis between us and the center, all author- unable to establish one-to-one relation- (arm straight, palm down). This and ity will revert to our sheik.”8 Tribes are ships with Iraqis, which are key to both similar misunderstandings have had the basic organizing social fact of life in intelligence collection and winning deadly consequences.
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On the other hand, understanding based in Basra, identified a core lesson what exists. In the five months we’ve adversary culture can make a positive learned during their history of empire: been here, we’re not going to change difference strategically, operationally, the importance of adjusting to local the culture of Iraq. We have to work and tactically. The examples below il- cultures and of not imposing alien so- with what there is.”14 luminate three key points: using preex- lutions.11 In Iraq, the most important The structure of any insurgency isting indigenous systems creates legiti- element of local culture is the tribe will reflect the indigenous social orga- macy for the actions of the occupying and the associated patronage system. nization of the geographical region. power, indigenous social organization The majority of the population be- Thus, charting the Iraqi tribal and long to one of the kinship system allowed 4th Infantry postconflict reconstruction is most effective 150 major tribes, the Division to capture Saddam Hussein. when the rebuilt institutions do not impose largest containing Although most U.S. forces were preoc- more than a million cupied with locating the 55 high-value external concepts of social organization members and the targets on the Bush administration’s Forum smallest a few thou- list, Major General Raymond Odierno, (including tribal and kinship relation- sand.12 Tribes are invariably patron- USA, understood that relationships of ships) determines the structure of the age systems in which powerful sheiks blood and tribe were the key to finding insurgency, and avoiding the imposi- dispense riches and rewards to sub- Saddam Hussein.15 Two total novices, tion of foreign norms will generate sheiks, who in turn distribute resources Lieutenant Angela Santana and Corpo- public cooperation. to the tribal community. Sheiks always ral Harold Engstrom of 104th Military Recognizing and utilizing pre- need money to generate loyalty from Intelligence Battalion, were assigned to existing social structures are the key sub-sheiks. There is a saying in Iraq: build a chart to help 4th Infantry Divi- to political stabilization in Iraq. While you cannot buy a tribe, but you can sion figure out who was hiding Sad- U.S. policymakers often seemed per- certainly hire one.13 In Amara, the Brit- dam. According to Santana, a former plexed by the sub rosa tribal structure ish did just that. They appointed tribal executive secretary, their first thought in Iraq, the British understood the in- leaders to local councils and gave the was “Is he joking? This is impos- digenous system and used it to their councils large sums to distribute, rein- sible. We can’t even pronounce these advantage. Brigadier Andrew Kennett, forcing the sheiks’ political standing. names.” Despite the challenges, they commander of the British battlegroup As one officer noted, “We deal with created a huge chart called “Mongo Link” depicting key figures with their interrelationships, social status, and General Tommy Franks meeting with Ismail last-known locations. Eventually, pat- Khan, leader of the Tajiks ethnic group, in western Afghanistan, May 2002 terns emerged showing the extensive tribal and family ties to the six main tribes of the Sunni triangle: the Hus- seins, al-Douris, Hadouthis, Masliyats, Hassans, and Harimyths, which led directly to Saddam Hussein.16 Postconflict reconstruction is most effective when the rebuilt institutions reflect local interests and do not im- pose external concepts of social orga- nization. For example, Iraqis tend to think of the central government as the enemy. The longstanding disconnect between the center and the periphery meant that Baghdad did not commu- nicate down and city councils could not communicate up. The CPA mis- understood the relationship between Baghdad and the rest of the coun- try and imposed a U.S. model based on central government control. Yet many Marine Corps units intuitively
U.S. Air Force (Joe Springfield) U.S. Air Force had the right approach and began po-
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litical development at the local level. Religious leaders talk to military chaplain regarding A Marine captain was assigned to build male soldiers searching Iraqi women at checkpoint a judicial system from the ground up. He refurbished the courthouse, ap- pointed judges, and found the 1950 Iraqi constitution on the Internet. Be- cause he used their system and their law, the Iraqis perceived the court as legitimate. Unfortunately, he was in- structed to stop employing Ba’thists. It appears that we are often our own worst enemy. Forum An Inadequate System Countering insurgency and com- bating terrorism in the current opera- tional environment demand timely cultural and social knowledge of the adversary. As Andy Marshall, Director of the Office of Net Assessment, has noted, future operations will require an “anthropology-level knowledge of a wide range of cultures.” Currently, however, DOD lacks the right pro- grams, systems, models, personnel, and organizations to deal with either the existing threat or the changing environment. Socio-cultural analysis shops, such as the Strategic Studies Detachment 55th Signal Company (Olga Steiert) of 4th Psychological Operations Group and the Behavioral Influences Analysis all offer some form of predeployment decades, and there were relatively few Division of the National Air and Space cultural training, their programs are pious Muslims. Intelligence Center, are underfunded, generally rushed, oversimplified, or Even though all services now have marginalized, and dispersed. Because unavailable to all Soldiers and Marines a foreign area officer (FAO) program, they lack resources, their information who need them. Much so-called cul- the military still lacks advisers who can base is often out of date. Task Force tural awareness training focuses on do’s provide local knowledge to command- 121, for example, was using 19th-cen- and don’ts and language basics and ers on the ground. The FAO program tury British anthropology to prepare for tends to be geared toward Baghdad. is intended to develop officers with a Afghanistan. With no central resource As one Army colonel noted, “In West- combination of regional expertise, po- for cultural analysis, military and policy ern Iraq, it’s like it was six centuries litical-military awareness, and language players who need the information most ago with the Bedouins in their goat qualification to act as a cross-cultural are left to their own devices. Accord- hair tents. It’s useless to get cultural linkage among foreign and U.S. politi- ing to a Special Forces colonel assigned briefings on Baghdad.” Troops rely on cal and military organizations. Because to the Under Secretary of Defense for personal reading to make up for the few FAOs are ever subjected to deep Intelligence, “We literally don’t know lack of formal training. Inadequate cultural immersion totally outside the where to go for information on what training leads to misperceptions that military structure, most do not develop makes other societies tick, so we use can complicate operations. For exam- real cultural and social expertise. Fur- Google to make policy.” ple, Marines who were instructed that thermore, most do not work as cultural Although the Army Intelligence Muslims were highly pious and prayed advisers to commanders on the ground Center at Fort Huachuca, 82d Airborne five times a day lost respect for Iraqis but serve as military attachés, security Division, Joint Readiness Training Cen- when they found a brewery in Baghdad assistance officers, or instructors. The ter, Naval Postgraduate School, and and men with mistresses. In actuality, result is that commanders must fend John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School Iraq has been a secular society for six for themselves. One Marine general
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explained that his unit had no local the expansion and consolidation of insurgency operations. The Director of experts when it deployed to Afghani- British power during the era of em- the Defense Department’s Advanced stan. The Pastoo-speaking cook on the pire. In the United States, the Depart- Research Projects Agency, R.L. Sproul, ship, who happened to be born in Af- ment of Defense and its predecessors testified before Congress in 1965 that ghanistan, became the “most valuable first recognized culture as a factor in “remote area warfare is controlled in player” of the mission. warfare during the Indian Wars of a major way by the environment in The current intelligence system is 1865–1885, resulting in the formation which the warfare occurs, by the so- also not up to the task of providing the of the Bureau of American Ethnol- ciological and anthropological charac- required level of cultural intelligence. ogy under Major John Wesley Powell. teristics of the people involved in the Retired Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, USN, During World War II, anthropologists war, and by the nature of the conflict such as Gregory Bateson itself.” To win hearts and minds, coun- during the Vietnam era, anthropologists served the war effort terinsurgency forces must understand directly, first conduct- and employ local culture as part of a excelled at bridging the gap between Forum ing intelligence opera- larger political solution. As General Sir the military and tribes tions in Burma for the Gerald Templer explained during the Office of Strategic Ser- Malayan Emergency, “The answer lies Director of the Office of Force Transfor- vices, and later advising on how to not with putting more boots into the mation, noted that “the value of mili- generate political instability in target jungle, but in winning the hearts and tary intelligence is exceeded by that of countries through a process known as minds of the Malayan people.” Thus, social and cultural intelligence. We need schizmogenesis. American anthropolo- the U.S. defense community deter- the ability to look, understand, and op- gists produced ethnographies on the mined that it must recruit cultural and erate deeply into the fault lines of so- Axis powers that facilitated behavioral social experts. Seymour Deitchman, cieties where, increasingly, we find the prediction based on national charac- DOD Special Assistant for Counterin- frontiers of national security.”17 Rather ter. While Ruth Benedict’s 1946 study surgency, explained to a congressional than a geopolitical perspective, threat of Japanese national character, The subcommittee in 1965: analysis must be much more concrete Chrysanthemum and the Sword, is the The Defense Department has . . . recog- and specific. According to Lieutenant best known, studies such as Ladislas nized that part of its research and develop- General James Clapper, Jr., USAF, the Farago’s German Psychological Warfare ment efforts to support counterinsurgency former director of the Defense Intel- (1942) collect dust on library shelves. operations must be oriented toward the ligence Agency, “Of course we still pro- Their predictions were often highly people . . . involved in this type of war; vide in-depth orders of battle, targeting accurate: following recommendations and the DOD has called on the types of data, and traditional military capabili- from anthropologists at the Office of scientists—anthropologists, psychologists, ties analysis. But we must also provide War Information, President Franklin sociologists, political scientists, econo- the commanders on the ground with Roosevelt left the Japanese emperor mists—whose professional orientation to detailed information regarding local out of conditions of surrender.19 human behavior would enable them to make useful contributions in this area.20 customs, ethnicity, biographic data, The legacy of World War II an- military geography, and infectious dis- thropology survives in the form of the During the Vietnam era, the spe- eases.” Producing intelligence on these Human Relation Area Files at Yale Uni- cial warfare community understood factors can be challenging. As Clapper versity. Established by the Carnegie that success in unconventional war- noted, “We provided detailed analysis Foundation, the Office of Naval Re- fare depended on understanding in- on more than 40 clans and subclans search, and the Rockefeller Foundation, digenous, non-Western societies, and operating in Somalia—far more difficult this database provided information on they turned to anthropologists. U.S. than counting tanks and planes.”18 Japanese-occupied former German ter- Special Operations Command’s Special ritories of Micronesia. Although the da- Operations in Peace and War defines un- Back to the Future tabase was maintained for decades after conventional warfare as “military and A Federal effort is needed to infuse the war with Army, Navy, Air Force, paramilitary operations conducted by the national security structure with and Central Intelligence Agency funds, indigenous or surrogate forces who anthropology across the board. While U.S. Government agencies seeking “an are organized, trained, equipped, this idea may seem novel, anthropol- anthropological-level of knowledge” and directed by an external source.” ogy was developed largely to support have sadly now forgotten its existence. To conduct operations “by, with, and the military enterprise. During the Vietnam era, the de- through,” Special Forces units must Frequently called “the hand- fense community recognized that have the support of the local popula- maiden of colonialism,” anthro- familiarity with indigenous, non- tion, which can be decidedly difficult pological knowledge contributed to Western cultures was vital for counter- to secure. While he was acting as an
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9 Ibid. adviser to U.S. troops in Vietnam in transnational in scope, nonhierarchical 10 Christopher Varhola, “The U.S. 1965, British expert Sir Robert Thomp- in structure, clandestine in approach, Military in Iraq: Are We Our Own Worst son suggested that anthropologists be and who operate outside the context of Enemy?” Practicing Anthropology 26, no. 4 used to recruit aboriginal tribesmen nation-states, we need to improve our (2004), 40. 11 as partisans. Indeed, anthropologists capacity to understand foreign cultures. John F. Burns, “The Reach of War: The Occupation,” The New York Times, Oc- excelled at bridging the gap between The danger is that we assume that tober 17, 2004. the military and tribes. Special Forces technical solutions are sufficient and 12 Neil MacFarquhar, “In Iraq’s Tribes, in Vietnam, for example, were assisted that we therefore fail to delve deeply U.S. Faces a Wild Card,” The New York Times, by Gerald Hickey in working with the enough into the complexity of other January 7, 2003. 13 Montagnards. societies. As Robert Tilman pointed out Baram. 14 Charles Clover, “Amid Tribal Feuds, So where are the anthropologists in a seminal article in Military Review Fear of Ambush and the Traces of the Colo- now that the Government needs them? in 1966, British counterinsurgency in nial Past, UK Troops Face up to Basra’s Frus- Although the discipline’s roots are Malaya succeeded because it took ac- trations,” Financial Times (UK), September Forum deeply entwined with the military, few count of tribal and ethnic distinctions, 6, 2004, 11. 15 anthropologists are interested in na- while similar U.S. efforts in Vietnam Vernon Loeb, “Clan, Family Ties Called Key to Army’s Capture of Hussein,” tional security. Their suspicion of mili- were bound to fail because they lacked The Washington Post, December 16, 2003. tary activity stems from a question of anthropological finesse.22 JFQ 16 Farnaz Fassihi, “Charting the Capture ethics: if professional anthropologists of Saddam,” The Wall Street Journal, Decem- are morally obliged to protect those ber 23, 2003. 17 Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director of they study, does their cooperation with N O T E S Force Transformation, Office of the Secre- military and intelligence operations tary of Defense, statement before the Sub- 1 violate the prime directive? They be- T.E. Lawrence, quoted in B.H. Liddell committee on Terrorism, Unconventional lieve it does. This conclusion was based Hart, Lawrence of Arabia (New York: DeCapo, Treats, and Capabilities, Armed Services 1989), 399. Committee, United States House of Repre- on a number of defense projects that 2 Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect sought to use anthropological tools in sentatives, February 26, 2004. (New York: Random House, 1995), 32. 18 Lieutenant General James R. Clapper, 3 potentially harmful ways. In 1964, the Steve Israel and Robert Scales, “Iraq Jr., “The Worldwide Threat to the United Army launched Project Camelot, a mul- Proves It: Military Needs Better Intel,” New States and Its Interests Abroad,” statement tinational social science research proj- York Daily News, January 7, 2004. to the Senate Committee on Armed Ser- 4 Culture is “those norms, values, in- vices, January 17, 1995:
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