9 IPRIS Maghreb Review MARCH 2011 Mauritania 2010: between individual willpower and institutional inertia CÉDRIC JOURDE Associate Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, Canada In 2010, Mauritania confirmed its status as a semi- opposition groups. As in other highly presidentialist authoritarian regime. The country is dominated by the political systems in Africa and the Middle East, his party, military, which acts as a dominant veto-player and the Union pour la République (UPR, or Al Itihâd man Ajl makes impossible any alternation in power between al-Jumhûriyya), controls a large majority of seats in the elected civilian political actors. The general political National Assembly and in the Senate. This echoes a atmosphere, however, was probably less oppressive than dominant pattern in Mauritania whereby the President in other countries, such as Tunisia or Egypt (before the is supported by a powerful political machine, his party, ousting of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak), which dominates elected assemblies at the national and as the freedom of expression is relatively high and the local levels. Today’s UPR is reminiscent of Ould Taya’s overall state repression is comparatively low. Parti Républicain, Démocratique et Social, PRDS (1991- General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz consolidated his 2005) and Ould Daddah’s Parti du Peuple Mauritanien, rule after a contested electoral victory in July 2009. The PPM (1960-1978). The UPR, like its predecessors, is a main opposition parties refused to acknowledge Ould composite coalition of various groups and individuals, Abdel Aziz’s victory in a context in which the ‘transitional often with contradictory interests, all of which however government’, which was supposed to administer the unite behind the head of the state of the moment. country before the election, had been in place for only The President attempted to break with past practices 21 days – too short a time to ensure that the presidential by launching vast anti-corruption operations in 2009- election would take place in a neutral environment. 2010. The goal was to convey the impression that Ould Abdel Aziz’s civilian predecessor, Sidi Ould Cheikh the clientelistic (or ‘neopatrimonial’) system that Abdellahi, whom the General had ousted through a characterized the previous regimes could be eradicated. bloodless coup in August of 2008, has retreated from the In so doing, the majority of the population, hitherto political scene since then. excluded from these clientelistic networks, would finally In political terms, Ould Abdel Aziz is in control and faced benefit from the country’s wealth. For one and a half year, no strong opposition in 2010, at least not from moderate the Inspecteur Général de l’État (IGE), the main auditing IPRIS Maghreb Review | 2 agency, launched inspections in dozens of state agencies undertaken to survey all the land illegally occupied. The and state-owned enterprises, which eventually led to goal was to provide poor families with official land titles the arrests of some of these agencies’ chairpersons and and to guarantee more transparency in land transactions. CEOs, including those of the National AIDS Agency and For instance, about 9000 families in the districts of Arafat of the National Human Rights Commission. Many others and Toujounine, in Nouakchott, were granted new titles. were eventually fired, though without formal accusations However, Interior Ministry agents who have the power being made against them, such as, recently, the CEO of to officialize the distribution, selling, and purchasing of the state-owned SOMAGAZ. These operations seemed land, mainly the Wali (Governors) and Hakem (prefects), to indicate a clear change of direction in how the new are involved in complex corruption and clientelist regime wants to lead the country. schemes which derail the program’s objectives. Hence, However, the situation may not be as positive as it may in Nouakchott, where the value of land has skyrocketed seem at first glance. First, the General Inspector, who in recent years, media have reported cases where heads the IGE, is appointed by the President himself, pieces of land were taken away from poor families and which keeps alive the suspicion of the IGE’s submission to sold to wealthy buyers, usually people with political the executive power. This could be confirmed by the fact connections. Thousands of poor families, most of whom that the last two General Inspectors were high-ranking are from the low-caste Haratin, are being ejected from officials in the President’s the ‘gazra’. Their land, the party, the UPR. Also, local value of which is very high media and political parties The new regime has sought around Nouakchott, is then have argued that many of to distance itself from its bought by connected people the chairpersons and CEOs who can buy members of who were either arrested or predecessors by seeking the survey commission. In fired, following accusations 2010, in Nouakchott, three of corruption, had direct or constructive solutions to a governors have succeeded indirect ties with opposition major problem that seriously one another in less than a parties, thereby suggesting year; the first two have been that the investigation could affects both rural and urban appointed to other positions be politically-driven. Some areas, namely access to land. because their corrupt also denounced the fact that actions in land transactions none of the state agencies The problem is particularly had become too widely led by men and women acute in Nouakchott, but also known. close to the ruling circles Although the regime is not have been investigated, and in other urban centers, where delivering on the promises even less those that are thousands of poor families that were made, it does not under the chairmanship of face a strong opposition. In military officers. live in unregulated and effect, opposition forces are The new regime has also underserviced shantytowns. divided into small formal sought to distance itself and informal groups and from its predecessors by networks. First, one of the seeking constructive solutions to a major problem that main political parties, the Rassemblement des Forces seriously affects both rural and urban areas, namely Démocratiques, RFD, made a move that helped the access to land. The problem is particularly acute in president, by defecting from the coalition of opposition Nouakchott, but also in other urban centers, where parties in September of 2010 and officially recognizing thousands of poor families live in unregulated and Ould Aziz’s election. In doing so, RFD, and its leader, underserviced shantytowns. One must recall that the long-time opposition figure Ahmed Ould Daddah, broke capital-city was originally built in 1958, and the planners with the opposition’s main platform, which states that expected the city to host a few thousand people; today Ould Aziz’s victory was the result of unfree and unfair there are up to a million people living in the greater elections in 2009. Ould Daddah, who was already the main Nouakchott area (though, obviously, numbers are opposition figure in the first multi-party election of 1992, difficult to obtain and are approximate). The shantytowns was betting on a cooperative strategy with the President, that have mushroomed in large cities like Nouakchott, though it has not translated into any tangible results for without any official delimitation of properties, have been him or his party yet. The only Islamist party with elected frequent targets of violent and sudden eviction by state representatives, Tawasoul (at-Tajma’a al-wataniyya li-l- officials. In 2010, the Ould Abdel Aziz administration Islâh wa at-Tanmiyya), has also swayed back and forth, at ordered the end of squatter districts in and around times positioning itself clearly as an opposition party, at Nouakchott (called ‘gazra’ in local parlance) and has other times making moves towards the regime. IPRIS Maghreb Review | 3 Informal groupings and networks, however, constitute front of the French Embassy in Nouakchott. In both cases, significant sources of political support and opposition, the suicidal bombers missed their targets. Interestingly, probably more so than official political parties. Within the the two kamikazes were Haratin and thus belonged to the Bidhân community (often called the ‘Moors’ in French or largest community in Mauritania, defined as the former English), clan and tribal affiliations, though much more servants of the ‘White’ Moors. Some have suggested that fluid and fluctuating than is often admitted, are important the social hierarchy among Moors had been reproduced cards used by political actors to mobilize political within this radical group, with the Haratin doing the worst support and to obtain financial support from the state, jobs. Then, in early 2011, security forces intercepted or to oppose the regime, at least some of the regime’s and destroyed AQIM vehicles which aimed at launching policies. Informal networks with some ideological suicidal attacks in Nouakchott. One of the vehicles was foundations can also act as opposition or supporting in fact intercepted in Nouakchott, in what was probably forces for the regime, be they Islamists (largely defined) the most dangerous attack ever attempted in the capital- or pan-Arabists (such as the ‘Nasserists’ and ‘Baathists’). city (or at least, the most obvious one, since it cannot be Finally, factions within the military form perhaps the ruled out that other attempts were made before but are most important type of political organizations which the unheard of). Whether the threat emanating from radical head of state has to look after. In effect, the numerous armed groups is seen as a plight or an opportunity for coup d’états the country has witnessed, making it the the Mauritanian military is another question, however. only mechanism of The latter should not be leadership change, have automatically excluded, as all been organized by the AQIM does not have a clear the level of international head of state’s closest financial, training, and collaborators.