Political Parties in the Middle East the Problems of the ³Establishment´ : Ωϭοϭϣϟ΍Ϥ΍ϭϧϋ Political Parties in the Middle East 21/11/2016 : Έηϧϟ΍Φϳέύη

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Political Parties in the Middle East the Problems of the ³Establishment´ : Ωϭοϭϣϟ΍Ϥ΍ϭϧϋ Political Parties in the Middle East 21/11/2016 : Έηϧϟ΍Φϳέύη The Problems of the ³Establishment´ : ωϭοϭϣϟ΍ϡγ΍ Political Parties in the Middle East The Problems of the ³Establishment´ : ωϭοϭϣϟ΍ϥ΍ϭϧϋ Political Parties in the Middle East 21/11/2016 : έηϧϟ΍ΦϳέΎΗ ΔϣΩϘΗϣϟ΍ΕΎγ΍έΩϟ΍ϭΙΎΣΑϸϟϝΑϘΗγϣϟ΍ίϛέϣ : ΏΗΎϛϟ΍ϡγ΍ : ωϭοϭϣϟ΍ Political parties and coalitions, often referred to as the ³establishment´parties or the parties sponsored by the regime and the president, face in the coming months escalating crises impacting their performance, their alliances, and their survival. These crises are evident in the current state of the dominant parties in the Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Djibouti, Syria, Iraq, and Turkey. These parties suffer from a legacy of repeated failure in attaining domestic achievements, the escalation of conflicts involving party leadership, and the formation of fluid institutional party alliances. In addition, there is increasing intersection between executive functions and party roles, conflicts on the fringes of party coalitions, the absence of ideological harmony between these ruling coalitions, and the purging of the party structure from dissenting elements. Furthermore, there are doubts being cast on the legitimacy of their social representation, as well as the incompetence of party leadership in confronting major crises and their alliances with armed militias. Mainstream literature on ruling parties and coalitions in the region seeks to explain their failure to carry out their political functions to the detriment of internal stability through the following factors:The Legacy of the Past:1- Repeated failures to attain domestic achievements: These failures are epitomized by the experience of Egyptian political parties. The regime¶s parties have failed over six decades, beginning with the July 23rd Revolution of 1952 until the June 30th Revolution of 2013, to attain domestic success. This was one of the main reasons behind the refusal of Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi to set up a new political party to enhance his popular backing, in addition to the stipulation in the Egyptian constitution that a president may not join a party, and must suspend any party membership prior to taking office.Vast segments of the Egyptian population participated in two uprisings within two and a half years, first to depose the ruling National Democratic Party under President Hosni Mubarak, then to depose the Freedom and Justice Party under President Mohamed Morsi. These uprisings express an undermining of the regime¶s legitimacy under two different administrations. Authoritarianism was also rampant under the ruling parties during the tenure of Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat, the Socialist Union under the former, and the Egypt Party (which later became the National Democratic Party) under the latter. Because of this history of failure, Sisi wishes to avoid the founding of a ³June 30th Party´an initiative proposed by Dr. Huda Abdel Nasser. Prior experiences of ruling parties in Egypt have strengthened the current president¶s convictions that the regime¶s parties, despite their differences in name and formation and the context of their function, presented more a burden upon the president than an asset to his political and popular appeal. In light of this, it would not be feasible to replicate old circumstances given new transformations, transformations which are resistant to the formation of regime-sponsored party with no vision or role in policy-making except for propagandistic support for the president¶s decisions. This was illustrated by the journalist Abdallah El-Sennaw who wrote: ³there is a different between a political ally which supports and one which simply pledges loyalty´Leaders of the Chinese Communist Party had suggested to President Sisi, during his visit to Chinain December 2014, the establishment of a political party to aid his rule. They offered support from the Communist Party in training the cadres of such a party, especially in communicating with support bases among the population. President Sisi replied that it was too early to consider such a move, and would later state his desire not to establish such a party during the National Youth Convention on the 27th of October 2016. This was significant, as it was rumored that the attendees of this conference would form the backbone of a political entity which the President would lead in the coming period. Factional Conflicts:2-The intensifying conflicts among political leadership: The National Liberation Front, the ruling party of Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, has suffered from repeated struggles over its leadership. The most prominent manifestation of this struggle occurred over the last two years, during which Abdelaziz Belkhadem was excluded from becoming the party¶s General Secretary, and the resignation of the incumbent Secretary, Amar Saidani, on the 22nd of October 2016. This occurred despite the latter¶s instrumental role in the removal of the head of Algerian intelligence, known as the Department of Intelligence and Security, Lieutenant General Mohamed Mediene. Mediene, often referred to as ³General Toufik´was known as Algeria¶s ³kingmaker´(or president maker in this case), to the extent that he would be referred to as the ³lord of Algeria´Due to the increase of Saidani¶s power, influential elements within the military and the office of the presidency sought to either dismiss him or have him resign due to health concerns. The ruling party¶s central committee approved of the appointment of Djamel Ould Abbes as Saidani¶s successor, in recognition of his seniority, an indication of the existence of a µcorrective¶campaign taking place within the party, which maintains the balance of power within the small groups charged with decision making in Algeria. Fluid Alliances:3-The formation of new institutional party alliances: Studies reveal new alliances being formed with an eye on the future of the rulership of Algeria after 2019, the year in which the current term of President Bouteflika ends. Certain civilian groups seek to nominate the president for a fifth term despite him having not addressed the Algerian public since May 7th, 2012. The pro-Bouteflika camp is led by Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal, the incumbent General Secretary of the ruling party Damel Ould Abbes, and the former Minister of 9/29/2021 2:55:30 PM 1 / 3 Trade Amara Benyounès. In this context, the General Secretary stated the following in an interview with the newspaper ³Al-Hayaa´ on November 5th, 2016: ³whoever stands behind Bouteflika¶s program is with us´In contrast, the former General Secretary Amar Saidani is at the head of the faction backing the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Ahmed Gaid Salah. Though Saidani had made public his support for a fifth-term for Bouteflika upon his election as General Secretary in 2015, he received a note of congratulation from General Gaid during that time, an act of decorum that the General had not displayed with any other party leader. This would suggest an understanding between the two men and a desire on General Gaid¶s part to run for the presidency. Such a run would require the backing of a political party with widespread popularity among the populace and a strong presence in municipal councils and the parliament. The Gaid-Saidani alliance has irked the pro-Bouteflika powers, which either support his election for a new term or him choosing his own successor. This faction is known as the ³President¶s clique´a group that is convinced that Bouteflika will appoint the man who succeeds him. This may explain the ruling party¶s support for Bouteflika, and his appearance at certain grand openings such as the Algerian Opera, the µInternational Conference Palace¶and the µGreat Mosque Workshop¶in the capital¶s eastern suburb, which sends a clear message that the President is physically able to rule for another term. What amplifies this message is a constitutional amendment carried out by the President at the beginning of this year: the annulment of an article which allowed the incumbent to the presidency to remain so for life. The constitution now holds that a president can only rule for two terms, which would effectively have Bouteflika starting at term zero as opposed to his fifth, allowing him to stay on for two more. It is in this context that the ruling party¶s General Secretary Abbes expressed the party¶s support for another Bouteflika term. Yet the President does not appear to share this sentiment, especially when one considers his initial refusal to run for a fourth term after suddenly falling ill.Political Overreach:4-Increasing overlap between executive functions and party roles: This phenomenon is most apparent in the experience of the Nidaa Tounes (Call of Tunisia) Party. It was founded by current Tunisian President Beji Caid Essebsiin the middle of 2012, and was the most successful party in the parliamentary elections held on the 26th of October, 2014. The party has since been the stage of a conflict between two blocs, with each sideplaying its cards in the media and external backing and support from powerful players within the state and society. One bloc seeks to support President Essebsi¶s son Hafedh, whereas the other backs the former General Secretary of the party Mohsen Marzouk for the presidency, and seeks to curtail the power of Essebsi¶s family.The pro-Essebsibloc succeeded in allocating the premiership of the government to Youssef Chahed, while simultaneously occupying the leadership of Nidaa Tounes. This situation has led the party to resemble what may be termed a sick man, as it simultaneously reflects both a crisis within the party and a crisis within the ruling regime. The party leadership has sought to monopolize vital roles within the state, with Chahed as prime minister, Essenbsi as president, while party member Mohamed Ennaceur heads the parliament. Nidaa Tounes appears oblivious to the example of the Ennahda Party, which proved the inability of a single political faction to shoulder the burden of rule alone.
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