Book chapter in Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences, edited by Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 175-203 11 Rebalancing Indonesia's naval force Trends, nature, and drivers
Evan A. Laksmana
Jn reccnl years, the Indonesian Navy ( Teniara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut or TNI-AL) has been making the headlines wilh their purchase of new submarines, their testing of the Yakhont supersonic anti-ship missiles, th<'.commissioning of their brand-new SIGMA-rlass corveltes, and a whole hc,st of olher advanced platforms. A'i Indonesian walers are increasingly becoming a critical feature of the global economic architecture, regional military movements, and great power politics, these recent developments hm·c raised numerous questions. Is Indonesia getting ready to become a regional naval power lO balance India, China, and Australia? Why is the na\'y acguiring state-of-the-art complex platforms; some of which are con sidered offensive in nature, mightily expensive, and are unsuitable for it" day-to-day operations? How do we make sense of the navy's overall force development plans and projections? This chapter seeks to address these questions and explain why and how the Indonesian Navy has been modernizing in recent years the way it has. ,,\,-;the following sections will argue, the TNI-AL's force development can be better underswod by examining three inter-related conditions: (l) the historical context and legacy of the navy's development and how that has shaped or preconditioned its budgetary constraints, (2) the changing stra tegic environment under which the navy has had to operate in the past decade, and (3) the operational demands and institutional requirements manifested in the navy's Minimum Essential Force (MEF) plans. The fol lowin0C, will first !Rovide an overview of the recent trends in Indonesia's naval procurement and force development. The subsequent sections will examine the three main conditions and offer some conclusions at the end.
Recent trends in Indonesia's naval development In many ways, the TNI-AL's recent force development and weapons acqui sitions represent both a continuation of and a break from some of the plans proposed in the 1990s (some of which were scrapped due to the Asian financial crisis). During the 1990s, the procurement of 39 former East German Navy vessels (which included 16 Parchi111-classcorvettes) 176 ~E.il.Laksmaua dominated Indonesia's naval ctevelopment program. While this influx or new ships allowed the navy to expand its surface patrol capability on the cheap, the navy had to pay the long-term cost of these purchases. The ships (originally built for the cold "short" seas of the Baltic) had to be extensively modernized and actaptecl for use in Indonesia's extensive and diflicult tropical waters. 1 Thus, the refurbishing of these "new ships" (and extending their life cycle) formed the lion's share of the navy's force development plans in the late 1990s.~ Given how the milita1y leadership was reluctantly "pushed and shoved" to accept the former East German fleet by Suharto's protegc Habibie, one of the main priorities for the navy leadership in the early 2000s was to obtain new ships to replace them, while adding new submar ines and strategic missile systems to bolster its naval defense capabilities. Additionally, given Indonesia's changing strategic environment (discussed in the next section), the navy's recent principal requirements also include new maritime reconnaissance aircraft, additional fast patrol craft for mari time security operations, and an upgraded strategic sealift capability sup ported by an improved maritime radar system and C4ISR.:, A specific listing of the navy's force development plans in the early 2000s is given in Table 11.1. In the early 2000s, the navy announced it would acquire four Ship Integrated Geometrical Modularity Approach (SIGMA) corvettes from the Netherlands' Darnen Scheide Naval Shipbuilding. Several Chinese C-802 anti-ship missiles and additional Harpoon missiles were also put on the table. 1 The four SIGMA version 9113 corvettes arrived fairly quickly: KRI Diponegoro Uuly 2007), KR.I Hasanuddiu Uanua1y 2008), KRI Su/tau Jslwndar 1Vluda (December 2008), and KR.IFrans Kaisiepo (March 2009). Indonesia's cooperation with Darnen also continued with the purchase of new frigates. Obtaining a new fleet of frigates was a priority, although the navy's existing aging ships, especially the Van Speijk class, have been given life extensions to keep them in service beyond 20~0.''
Table 11.1 Key naval force development plans and requirements, 2001-4
Principal planned procurement of new /1latfom1s Submarines, corvettes, fast patrol boats (57 NAV V), personnel escort ships, patrol boat~ (KAL 28 and KAL 12), maritime patrol aircraft (CASA 212), ASW helicopters, tactical surveillance aircrafts, marine combat vehicles, as well as communications, radar, and sui-:cillance systems Principal planned nfurbish111ent,repowering, or overhaul of existing JJlatfon11s
Fatahilfah0 class and Patti1ml/"a-classcorvettes, KRl ivicu1daupatrol vessels, KRI Teluk La11gsa,KR.I Teluk Kau landing ship tanks (LSTs), marine combat vehicles, hydro oceanography survey and mapping systems, electronic comrnu11ications systems
Source: Adapted from Minister of Defense Decision Letter No. ,177 of 200 I, i11 2000-2004 /Jefi:nselJruelof1mnzl Stmle{!;ir Pim,.,. Rebalmu:iug Indonesia '.s-naval forr:e l 77 Beyond Lhc good rclaLionship with Darnen, navy officials claim Lhat they also wanLcd Lo furLhcr build on the SIGMA technology as their technolo gical "LransfonnaLional bridge" and "basic standard" for fuLure vessels and warships.'' This plan was particularly Lied Lo the idea in 2004 to establish a national consonium to launch and built a national corvette program. 7 In Augusl 20 I 0, Indonesia signed a $220 million contract (panly funded by l)uLch export credits) with Darnen for the construction of four 2,4OO-ton 105-mcLcrmulti-purpose frigaLes based on the SIGMA 10514 design. Offi cially classified as Guided Missile Escorts (Perusal< Kawai Ruda! or PKR), the new frigaLcs will be built in the PT PAL yard in Surabaya, and could crcnLmilly result in Lhc producLion of up to 20 frigates under a licensed producLion arrangcment. 8 In addiLion Lo these frigates, the navy is also set to boost it~ submarine fleet. Three new dicscl-clcctric Type 209 Chang Bogo-class submarines from Sollth Korea will join the navy's existing two refurbished Cakra-class Type ~(Jl)/1~00.'' The contract with Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Enginecr in~ (worth around $1 billion) stipulates that the first two subs will be builL in Soulh Korea (with the second jointly produced) and the third will be fully !mill in Indonesia. 10Analysts point out that quantitatively and qualita- 1i1cly,this purchase may noL significantly affect the regional naval balance of power, especially given Lhe lack of breakthrough capabilities, the navy's 01erstrctchcd operational capacity, and the lack of submarine rescue capa city.111--lowcrcr, more submarines may be in the pipeline. In late 2011, the navy's press chief' claimed that "Up unLil 2024, we will obtain eight subma rincs".1~ After all, Indonesia is considered the most experienced sub marine operator in SouLh-cast Asia, having continuously operated them since the l 96Os.1:1 As we can sec, Lhe procurement of these new complex platforms has also been tied to the development of the state-owned shipyard PT PAL. In fact, as we shall sec in Lhc section below on the navy's MEF plans, it is now a maucr of policy that fuLUre naval acquisitions include provisions for transfer of' technology and knowledge Lo domestic defense industries and, in some cases, for co-development and joint licensed-production. While the scale and scope of the naval platforms obtained may still be limited, this is a significalll departure from the past. Under Lhe New Order, as former Air Force Chief of' Staff Chappy Hakim said, "Since the Army was always a priority, we didn't expect companies like PT PAL and Dirgantara to get a lot of ordcrs". 11This may not be the case any more with the gov crnmcnL's "defense indusLrial revitalization" drive since 2009. While PT PAL's financial health has been in limbo for the past decade, they claim that they arc capable of producing lighL frigates, landing plat form docks (LPDs), fast missile boats, and others - as well as arming and imcgrating some of Lhem with Chinese C-8O2 anti-ship missiles. i,; This last capability Lo integrate various missile and weapon systems into different platforms has increasingly been a priority for the navy. In early 2010, PT 178 E.A. Laksmaua PAL installed Russian Yakhont supersonic anLi-ship missiles on the KR! Oswald ,\'iaharm frigate, which was successfully tested during a naval exer cise in the Indian Ocean in April 2011. It> Additional missiles have been purchased for installation on other ships. This "hybrid" systems integra tion could likely be one of PT PAL's chief values in future naval develop ment plans. Meanwhile, with regard to the patrolling force, there has been some progress with four domestically designed and built fast patrol boats FPB- 57s (NAV V 'Todak class) commissioned between 2000 and 2004. In January 2009 the navy launched two 40-meter locally built fiberglass patrol vesscls_li Four units of Trimaran Fast Missile Boats (KCR) have also been ordered from local defense company PT Lundin Industry (each worth around $1! 1 million), with 16 more to follow in the future. " Additionally, PT Palindo Marine has delivered two guided-missile f;1st boats, KRI Clurit and KRI Kujaug; to the navy and is working on a third. Each boat (wonh almost $8 million) has 45 percent local content and is equipped with Chinese C-705 1 1 anti-ship missiles. ' In early 2012, the navy announced that it intends to acquire 24 guided-missile fast boats to be deployed in shallow waters in the western part of the country, with 11 of these ships contracted to PT PAL as of micl-20 l 0. ~0 The navy has also been improving its sealift capabilities. South Korea's Dae Sun won a $150 million contract in late 2004 from the TNI-AL to build four 1\!Ialws.1·a1°classLPDs and one command and control ship. The first two were built in Busan and the other two were built at PT PAL. The four ships ( commissioned between 2007 and 2011), which can transport up to 562 personnel (roughly one army battalion) and accommodate two helicopters and 13 light tanks or armored personnel carriers, would be primarily used for scalift operations. Additionally, in March 20 l 0, the navy announced that PT PAL would provide seven new landing ship tanks (LSTs) to replace the existing fleet. The TNI-AL's aviation wing has also been set for a revamp. This is perhaps one of the positive legacies of the l 990s that witnessed improve ments to Indonesia's naval aviation wing, especially maritime reconnais sance and patrol aircraft, and the development of those aircraft by state-owned PT Dirgantara Indonesia (PT Dl).~ 1 Recently, the company has provided 16 locally built NC-212 medium transport aircraft (with half delivered to the navy). In late 2009, the navy ordered three CN-235 mari time patrol aircrafts from PT DI under an $80 million contract, which will be supported by a domestic loan from local bank BRI. The navy is expected to order a further three CN-235-220s before 2014. ~~ These recent developments in the navy's conventional surface capabil ities (see the sample list in Table l 1.2) could very well strengthen Indone sia's ability to patrol its waters. In addition to these platforms, the government is also set to improve its overall maritime surveillance capabil ity. In early 2010, the government announced that the procurement of Table 11.2 Sample ofTNI-AL's recent major con\'cntional pron1rcrncnt
T,jJe 1\1an11fart11rer Role Quantity Origin First dfiii1e1y
KCR-40 PT Pelinclo Fast attack craft JO Indonesia 2011 AAV7Al BAE Systems/Samsung Tech win Amphibious assault n·hicle JO South Korea 2009 C:\:-235'.\1PA Airtech Aircraft - maritime patrol 3 Spai11/Inclonesia 2008 Diponegoro (SIG'.\1A) Royal Sc hclclc C:orYette 4 Netherlands 2007 KAL-40 Fasharkan Patrol craft JO Indonesia 2006 C:\'-235M-220 Airtcch Aircraft - transport I Spain/Indonesia 2006 n/a Liirssen Werft/Meyer \Yerft Transport ship 7 Germany 2005 Curnt Singapore SBEC Patrol craft I Singapore 2005 KAL-36 Fasharkan/PT Pelinclo I'atrol craft 13 Indonesia 2003 Makassar Dae Sun Shipbuilders/PT Pal Landing platform - clock 5 South Korea 2003 Todak (PB 57 1\'AV V) PT Pal Surabaya Patrol craft 4 Indonesia 2000 Tanjung Kambani Sanuki Shipbuilding Transport ship I South Korea 2000
Source: Adapted from.Jane's Information Group, ''.Jane's Sentinel S~'curity Assessment - Southeast Asia",Janu.11-y 9, 2012. 180 E.Jl. /,alismana radars to monitor the waters from A.mbalat in East Kalimantan to Tahuna in North Sulawesi is a top priority. Concerns over illegal activities such as piracy anrl fish poaching, as well as the ongoing dispute with Malaysia over Arnbalat, loom large here. Indonesia has also acquired 12 marine radar systems in recent years for surveillance along the Makassar Strait.~:i In October 2011, the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta transferred the Integrated Mari time Surveillance System (IMSS) that was developed to detect, track, and monitor vessels passing through tenitorial and international waters. The IMSS is manned anrl operated by the TNI-AL, and consists of 18 coastal surveillance stations, 11 ship-based radars, 2 regional command centers, and 2 fleet command centers (Jakarta and Surabaya)/' Realizing the potential problems that may arise from over-reliance 011 foreign-sourced systems for maritime surveillance, Indonesia has also been developing an indigenous radar system. The Indonesian Institute of Sci ences (LIPI) has s:nce 2006 developed two versions of the country's first locally made maritime radar?' one for ship navigation and one for coastal smveillance (originally called INDRA land INDRA 2, respectively).~'; Both radars use frequency-modulated continuous wave (FMCW) technology. After a series of successful tests, INDRA l was renamed ISRA in 2008 and 1 the system was successfully tried out in the Sunda Straits in April 201 J. i The ISRA radars arc categorized as "quiet" radars or low probability inter cept because they do not disturb other radar systems and cannot be detected by radar scanners.l~ The extent to which the navy will utilize these radars in the future or whether they will complicate existing systems, however, remains in question. Aside from civilian local research relevant for maritime security, the navy's internal Research and Development Service has also been increas ingly receiving support from the navy leadership. Currently, they arc devel oping the Catamaran patrol boat, the composite armor for tactical vehicles, underwater acoustic jammers, and amphibious armed personnel carriers (APCs), as well as amphibious infantry fighting vehicles (in collab oration with the Ministry for Research and Technology) ? 1
Historical legacies and budgetary burdens Two historical contexts are salient for our discussion. First, the legacy of the navy's struggle to dominate maritime security governance dating back to 1949. Second, the legacy of the navy playing second fiddle to the army up until the end of the New Order. These historical legacies shape the navy's think.inub and recent force development in several inter-related ways., The efforts to boost the TNI-AL's patrolling capabilities, as cited above, for example , must be understood- within the context of the navv's·; stnwglcnt to establish dominance over maritime security governance. The navy's decaying fleet by the 1990s and the gradual effort to restore iL~ naval defense capabilities in the past decade arc both a function of Indonesia's Rebalaucing Indonesia's naval force 181 economic strength and the historical legacy of the army-dominated New Order.
Fromindependence to the New Order
Following Indonesia's declared independence 111 1945, the People's Security Forces-Navy (TKR-AL) was established with only four divisions in Java and Kalimantan. In.January 1946, in an attempt to further consolidate the military establishment, the navy was renamed the Naval Forces of the Republic or Indonesia (ALRI), and had 12 command bases. This was the embryo or today's navy, which maintained the ALRI name until 1970 when it was changed to TNI-Al,_:mThe organizational evolution notwithstanding, the navy's role during the independence war (1945-9) was meager, ad hoc, and designed to maintain security around ports, although they deployed small naval expeditions and were involved in minor battles_:i, Following full independence in 1949, the P:overnment issued an ordin c1nceto regulate maritime management and identified several government agencies in charge, including the navy, the marine police, customs, the Department of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, and the Directorate of Sea Communication. The lack of financial and human resources discouraged their functional specialization, however, and resulted in a confusing overlap of roles among these agencies_:;~ Thus was the beginning of the morass in Indonesia's maritime security governance that would last until today ( discussed further in the next section). A series of events in the 1950s and 1960s, however, allowed the navy to militarize maritime security gov crnance_:u These events were related to the government's effort to suppress a series of rebellions: (I) the Republic of South Moluccas revolt in the mid l 9S0s, (2) the 1958 PRRI/Permesta rebellion in Sumatra and Sulawesi, and (3) the 1962 campaign to liberate West Irian under Brig. Gen. Suharto's \fandala command. 11 While the navy mainly participated by providing logistical support for the army, the campaigns provided the navy leadership "an opportunity to legitimize the ascendancy of the navy over other mari 3 time agencies in dealing with war logistics and information control". '' The advent of Suharto's New Order in 1968, and the accompanying expansion or military rule via the Dual Function doctrine/ 6 further boosted the navy's expansion over maritime security governance. The practice or seconding navy officers to high-ranking posts in civilian agen cies related to maritime matters provided the navy leadership with a proxy or extension in influencing various maritime policies_:17 In addition, the New Order established the Maritime Security Coordinating Board, or Bakorkamla, in 1972, to coordinate the policies and activities of maritime related agencies under the direct control of the ABRI Commander.: 18 Fur thermore, the 1982 Law on National Defense and Security provided a legal basis for the navy to consolidate its authority in maritime security govern 3 ance by allowing it to subordinate the police and other civilian agencies. !' 182 EA. Lalwnana This law also mandated the further military professionalization of internal security management under the National Defense and Security doctrine. As such, the navy was allowed to develop and expand its maritime law enforcement role under the banner of Maritime Security Operations:'11 These operations became one of the centerpieces of the navy's raison d'etre when Indonesia ratified the UN Convention on the Law of' the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1985 (though it would only enter into force in 1994). According to one scholar, UNCLOS effectively provided "a new rationale and momentum" for the navy to invoke international responsibilities and demands as a pretext to bolster the counlty's maritime security capacity. 11 The periodic patrols under the command of the Western and Eastern Fleet Commands, supported by civilian institutions linked with Bakorkamla, also promoted the navy's image following several high-profile arrests. These beneficial developments for the navy under the New Order, however, only appl:ed within the narrow domain of' ma1itime governance. In other words, the navy was better off only vis-,'t-visthe Marine Police and other maritime secwity civilian agencies. Within the overall defense establishment however, the navy was heavily sidelined. They had no significant role in defense and national policy formulation, and given the regime's unswerving focus on internal security, naval developments took a back seat for much of 1 the 1960s through the I 980s.' ~ This was partly a consequence of' events sur rounding the 1965 coup attempt that implicated a small number of naval and air force ofiicers, the closeness of the Marines and key naval ofiicers with President Sukarno, and Lhe intense inter-service rivalry of' the 1950s and l 960s. u Suharto's ascenL also meant that the army, already the larg·est and most politically astute of the Lhrec services, got to set the rules for the oLhers. Indeed, it was only Lhe end of the Vietnam War and the flow of funds from the oil boom that gave the navy a larger share of the defense budget to rebuild its fleet.'' That said, while one study noted Lhat there were al least 15 mc~or military operations that the TNI-AL participated in from 1949 to 1998, they were only a fraction of the more than 200 operations conducted by the military in the same period - most of' which were focused on internal security issues.·"' Such operational outlook suggesLed that the navy could only focus on improving its patrolling assets and mari time security capabilities rather than significantly bolste,-ing its naval defense capabilities. On this front, the last decade of the New Order also saw the "forced" purchased of the former East German fleet, which, as dis cussed in the previous section, has had consequences for the navy's force developments up until today.
The refonnasi period and beyond The collapse of the New Order affected the navy in several ways.·"; First. the abolishment of the Dual Function meant the end of the practice of dispatching active officers to civilian posts, and thus led to the withdrawal RPbalanciug IndouPsia '.s-uavalforce 183 of uniformed navy personnel from other maritime agencies. Second, as parl of the internal military reform process, the National Police was sepa rated from the ABRI (who would later change its name to Indonesian National Defense Forces or TNI). This separation meant that promotions would be harder as the large size of the officer corps remains intact amid shrinking posts and the shifting of domestic security functions to the policc.17 In the context of maritime security governance, the separation enhanced the marine police's role and intensified the rivalry with the navy,Bakorkamla, and others. We will discuss the implications of this rivalry for maritime security gov ernance in the next section. Sunice it to note here that in an initial effort to re-assert themselves in maritime security governance, the navy leadership proposed an "ideal" solution of expanding the fleet into nine Regional Mari time Commands under the pretext that the international community expected Indonesia to improve security and safety in iL~waters, and that a failure to do so could prompt foreign intervcntion: 18The budgetary con straints facing the government l
• 2010-2014 (1.8% to 2.1% of GDP) • 32% of procurement budget (of around US$ 4.9 billion)
• 2015-2019 (2.2% to 2.61% of GDP) • 31% of procurement budget (of around US$ 7.9 billion)
• 2020-2024 (2.74% to 3.14% of GDP) • 31 % of procurement budget (of around US$ 13.9 billion)
• 2024-2029 (3.28% to 3.9% of GDP) • 30% of procurement budget (of around US$ 25.33 billion)
Figure 11.1 Projection of TNI-AL's budgetary support for force dcvdopn1ent (source: data adapted from Postur Pertaha1w11Negara (Jakarta: Depart ment orOt'fcnsc, 2007)).
from the parliament helped explain the scope of procurement of advanced plat.forms in small numbers. But the decaying state of the fleet, the types of platforms procured, and the timing of those procurements can be tied to the historical legacy of the navy's role in maritime govern ance and within the military establishment as a whole.
Environmental drivers The TNI-AL's maritime domain is increasingly becoming more complex as the boundaries between traditional and non-traditional security, between political and economic conditions, and between milita1y and law enforcement measures all start to blur, if not vanish altogether. As the world's largest archipelagic state, Indonesia's territoty consists of l 7,S08 islands with 5.8 million km~ of marine area, about 300,000 km~ of territo rial sea, and 2.7 millionkm~ exclusive economic zone (EEZ).''" Effectively patrolling such a huge expanse of water is clearly no easy task, especially given the richness of the marine resources within it. Indonesia's internal waters, archipelagic waters, and territorial sea have a potential yield of 4.5 million tons of fish per year.'' 7 The fisheries sector also provides over six million people with direct employmem and plays an important role in national food security. ',H Curbing illegal fishing has therefore been a key priority frir ma1itimc senuity governance. For Indonesia, most of the illegal fishing activities appear to have taken place in the counuy's EEZ and arc carried out largely by foreign fishing vessels. By one account, there arc some 3,180 foreign fishing vessels thought to be operating illegally in Indonesian waters each year?' According to one study, the prevalence of illegal or unregulated Rebalancing Indouesia ~-naval Jin-re 185 lishing in Indonesia can be attributed to: (1) the absence of clearly defined maritime boundaries between Indonesia and iL-;closest neighbors; (2) the large maritime zone under Indonesia's jurisdiction, and the reality that iLs iast EEZ is open Lo the high seas; (3) the limited number of trained mari time enforcement stall; and (4) the inadequate enforcement and implemen tation of the existing fisheries laws and regulationsY 11 Although the government has recruited fishermen as pan of a com munity surveillance system, Indonesia only has 534 fisheries observers and ,158fisheries investigators in the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries as of 2007.';i The navy's capability meanwhile has also been declining, which we will discuss further in the next section_,;~ Suffice to note here that this has not only affected the scope and severity of illegal fishing in Indonesian waters, but also the level of regional maritime piracy. According to the International Maritime Bureau, the m~jority of pirates in the Malacca Strait arc Indonesian, and in 2004, one-third (94) of pirate attacks in the
1wrld occurred in Indonesian waters, althcwgh this trend is declining, as Figure 11.2 shows_,,:iThe drop can be explained by a confluence of factors, including the more extensive regional and national counter-piracy efforts such as joint patrols and surveillance, tighter government control, and the efforts LO improve living standards in coastal districts along the Malacca Strait and other regions near m,~jor sea lanes_,;, However, there arc several regional hotspots in Indonesia where mari time piracy still poses significant challenges. These are also areas where maritime boundaries have not been fully demarcated and maritime cnl<>rccmcnt is problematic: parts or the Malacca Strait, Riau Archipelago, the southern pan of the South China Sea, and the tri-border area in the Sulu and Sulawesi seas_,;:-,Some might argue that this is because the navy is
140
120 -
100-
f/) 80- -"'u Ill ~ 60- •47 40-
20-
0 +--~.----,----,--,c---c---r-,-.--,--r--,-~--r,---.,---.,----,---, 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Year
Figare 11.2 Actt1al and atlernpted attacks against ships in Indonesian waters (sot1rce: data adapted frorn variot1s reports or the International Mari t imc Bu1-c,w). 186 E.A. Laksmmw more concerned with Eastern Indonesian waters where illegal fishing is rampant.';li This argument, however, omits the different characters of the Western and Eastern waters: whereas most of the former supports small scale fishermen, the latter supports offshore commercial fisheries.'; 7 Aclcli tionally, such co1tjecture dismisses the importance of Indonesia's outermost islands in the military's strategic thinking and the navy's layered defense strategy (discussed in the next section). In total, Indonesia has 92 outermost islands, and the TNI has identi fied I 2 that could be potential conflict zones in the future, including the areas surrounding or near the South China Sea, Malacca Strait, South eastern Sulawesi, and others. These flashpoints have been incorporated as the basis for the MoD's Strategic Defense Review.'; 8 More importantly for our discussion, Indonesia's disputed waters with Malaysia since the early 2000s have figured prominently in the navy's planning and think ing. Indeed, the :1avy has designed its contingency plans and basic cap abilities planning under the MEF to focus and address the potential flashpoints in the waters surrounding Ainbahll.w Malaysia has also been singled out as being among the most frequent violators of Indonesia's maritime territory (sec Table 11.3). These wicle-rano-ino- maritime securit)' challeng·es - from illeg·al fishino b b ~ { b to piracy to maritime incursion - are arguably a consequence of both Indonesia's geopolitical architecture and the ramifications of the imple mentation of UNCLOS. For starters, Indonesia as an "archipclagic state" has to fulfill certain obligations, such as maintaining navigational safety, designating sea lanes for ships and aircraft traflic, and others.'" This requires that Indonesia develop a fully fi.mctioning set of maritime security governance institutions, operational capabilities (both hardware and
Table 11.3 Cases of maritin1c incursions by Malaysia into Indonesia
Year Total Cases Note Year Total Cases Note
200G 28 !) Warships 2008 39 18 Warships lS Marine police 4 Marine police vessels vessels 2 Helicopters (j Helicopters G Naval aircrafts 11 Naval aircraft 2007 94 41 v\'arships 2om12G 19 Warships 22 Marine police 2 Marine police vessels vessels 7 Helicopters I Helicopters 19 Naval aircraft 4 Naval aircraft :J Others Others
Source: Data adapted from Evan A. Laksmana, "The Enduring Strategic Trinitv: Explaining Indonesia's Geopolitical Architecture", _founu,/ of //,,, huli,w Orm11 N,p:io11,Vol. 7, No. 1 (2011). Rebalancing Indonesia's naval force 187 software), and a clear delineation of duties among different government agencies._We will discuss the capability requirements for the navy in the next secuon. Suffice it to note here that in addition to these specific institutional implications for the navy, UNCLOS has also complicated Indonesia's overall regional strategic environment. The various maritime flashpoints in Asia created by UNCLOS immediately come to mind. Indeed, accord ing to one scholar, as coastal states extend their jurisdiction and enforce ment seaward after UN CLOS,
they arc increasingly coming face to face with neighbors as well as extra-regional maritime powers that are competing for resources, showing the flag or collecting intelligence. Interpretations of law and conceptions of sovereignty clash, perceptions of threat diverge, and sensitivities arc sharpened. The resultant incident~, while seemingly innocuous, often bring to the surface deep-seated fears, unleashing surges of nationalism. 71
In South-cast A~ia (Indonesia's most immediate maritime environ ment), overlapping disputes involve baselines that do not conform to CNCLOS, claims to the EEZs and continental shelves that ended beyond an equidistant line with the opposite or acijacent state, and rival claims to islands and the maritime zones they may or may not be able to generate.n Consequently, possible disputes in the region include disagreements over the: exploitation of EEZs, access to fishing or seabed resources (such as oil .ind gas), the resurreelion of dormant island disputes, and the control of sea routes providing supplies of base metals, food, energy, and other traded goods.': 1 These fault lines arc exacerbated by the state of regional armament development. \•lost analysts agree that, sLrictly speaking, there is no "arms race" in South-cast Asia and that no state currently possesses the capabilities neces sary to dominate the core territ01y of its potential adversaries.'" 1 However, new regional security requirements, changes in military doctrines, linger ing regional suspicions, and the growing supply side of the international arms trade as well as China's growing assertiveness have all reinforced the 7 rearmament of South-cast Asia. '' This trend since the late 1990s is worry ing for several reasons.''; First, the weapons being purchased have an offensive orientation and, for some platforms, an operating preference for preemptive strategies. Second, the current trend - especially the procure ment of advanced warships, aircraft, submarines, mines, and strategic mis siles - makes "punitive war", in which costs are inflicted by the bombardment and blockading of a state, rather than the threat of con quest, the most likely form of conflict. Thus, while one assessment concludes that regional navies have been slow to develop effective new war-fighting capabilities,7 7 the proliferation 188 EA. Lalmnaua of advanced naval platforms, such as submarines, still poses significant challenges for the u11der-dcveloped TNI-AL.'H In addition to such "con ventional" challenges of naval defense, the complicated maritime security environment in which the TNI-AL operates, as discussed above, makes it almost impossible for the navy leadership to ignore developing a signi ficant maritime law enforcement capability. A~ a response, the navy's force development plans - epitomized in the MEF blueprint - incorporates two key institutional and operational drivers: naval defense and maritime security.
Institutional and operational drivers Naval defense and maritime security, along with naval diplomacy, form a core task and identity for the TNI-AL - enshrined in the service's current doctrine of 1,'ka Sasmu1 Jaya (literally, "unified guidance to victmy at sea") and institutionalized in its organizational structure and operational mis sions.'\' For our purposes of understanding the nature and causes of the na,y's recent force development, however, naval diplomacy plays a less a salient role. The following will first describe how the MEF plans guided the navy's force development and planning in recent years and will continue to do so for the next decade or so. The second part of this section will con sider how recent developments in domestic maritime security governance helped shape the navy's force development ancl capability requirements.
The Minimum Essential Force and naval defense Two factors arc particularly salient in understanding the T:\'1-AL's naYal defense planning and thinking: the navy's strategic and doctrinal require ments and the corresponding MEF concept officiated in 2009. As far as naval defense goes, Elw Sasaua Jayastipulates that the TNI-AL's basic func tion will be sea control and force projection. This is further implemented through the navy's Archipelagic Sea Defense Strategy (Stmtegi Per/11/w11w1 Laut Nusantara or SPLN) based on three pillars: deterre11ce, layered defense, and sea control. The first generally revolves around naval diplomacy, naval presence, and deterrence-driven arms modernization. The second focuses on combined naval and air force deployment and employment to prevent an enemy's advance into Indonesia's territ01y (divided into Builer Zone, Primary Defense Zone, and Resistance Zone) _Ho A~ far as war fighting goes, this "forward layered defense" involves a combination of some form of "AirSea Battle", to borrow recent US milita1y terminology, for the first two outer zones and an integrated combined land and amphibious operations with a guenilla resistance model at it5 core. When facing a stronger fleet, the TNI-AL also has its own anti-access/area denial (A2/ AD) concept.s 1 Finally, the last pillar revolves around naval interdictions, combat, and day-to-clay Rebalanciug Indonesia '.suaval force 189 nianurnc security enforccmen t operations. In broad terms, these three pillars arc operationalized in two inter-related patterns: (1) preventive, the various naval activities to support the counuy's foreign policy goals, espe cially by strengthening confidence building measures; and (2) repressive, the deployment and employment of naval forces to prevent and destroy enemy invasion based on defense in-depth. Building on this broad strategic and doctrinal thinking, the navy leader ship decided that a combination of a threat-based and capability-based planning and pn~jection would guide the TNI-AL's future force develop menl.s~ Specifically, the navy envisioned that within the next two decades, its ideal posture calls for a "Large, Strong, and Professional" fleet under pinned by four Integrated Weapons System Fleet, or SSAT, as the main core component (each consist of warships (KR.I), patrol vessels (KAL), air craft, marines, and bases). These four SSATs will correspond with four numbered-fleet systems. While there appears to be some confusion (both within and outside the navy) on the exact blueprint of this ideal posture, most existing policy documents center on the need to build the navy's 'v!EF as a scaled-back version of such an ideal posture_x:i This MEF also builds on previous planning documents, including the TNI-AL Blueprint wn that envisioned a "green-water" navy. The navy defines its MEF generally as the "force designed based on the 11cre1.1m)' rnjmbilities to tackle all varianL5 of threaL~ to the counuy's sover eignty". Specifically, the MEF is designed to cover: (I) military threats coming from the north through two-threat axis or strategic funnels; (2) s( \'cral focal points or trouble areas with regard to maritime jurisdiction; ,ind (3) troubled territorial waters or hot spots near major naval bases. 84 Operationally, the MEF should allow the navy to project power inland inrnlving three landing team battalions into two trouble spots simultan eously, while maintaining the capability to execute maritime security oper ,ttions along with other Milita1y Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Furthermore, this "green-water navy" MEF will eventually consist prim arily of 274 ships, 137 aircraft, 3 marine forces ( division-equivalent) with 890 marine battle vehicles, and 11 prima1y naval bases_w, The 274-ship will divided into of striking force (110 ships), patrolling force (66 ships), and supporting force (98 ships). These assets will be integrated and operation alized under the SSATs and deployed within two main postures: perma nent deployment and operational cleployment.H 6 While the latter will depend on specific contingencies as ordered by the TNI Commander, the former is geared to tackle maritime security duties and provide opera tional support during crisis situations. This deployment will in the future replace the Eastern-Western Fleet designations into a numbered system - Fleet 1, Fleet 2, and Fleet 3 - each corresponding to Indonesia's major sea lines of communications (ALKI) .87 This posture was formulated with three basic approaches in mind. The first is the mission requirements of the navy, as outlined in 2004 by chapter 190 E.A. Laksuurua 9 of Law No. 34 on the Indonesian Defense Forces and TNI Commander Regulation No. 26 or 2008 on Naval Operations. A~ mentioned above, at the most basic level, the navy is entrusted with an over-arching mandate that includes naval defense, maritime security, naval diplomacy, and mari time territorial management. The wide range of missions and the corre sponding capabilities (sec Table 11.4 below) highlight the Herculean and burdensome character of the navy's duties. The second basic approach is the operational experience of the navy. The navy leadership considers three main operational experiences to be particularly salient for its naval defense planning: ( 1) Operation Mandala/ Trikora to retake West Irian in the late 1950s and early 1960s (which involved 126 naval ships, IO aircraft, and 3 marine landing team battal ions); (2) Operation Seroja to integrate East Timor in 1976 (where the navy formed an amphibious task force involving 26 ships, 5 aircraft, and 1 marine landing team battalion); and (3) the numerous combined naval exercises under the Glorious Fleet (Armada Jaya) banner. 88 The latest Armada Jaya of October-November 2011 gives us a glimpse of how the combined exercise helped shape the navy's force development plans. The 2011 Amwdrz jrzya was executed in the waters off Sangatta, East Kalimantan (roughly 3go nm south of Ambalat). The exercise, which involved over 4,000 naval personnel, 23 vessels, 11 aircraft, and 9g military vehicles, began with a scenario that an enemy seaborne task force had infringed Ambalat waters and cut through the TNI's Tarakan-Sangatta line of communications. In response, the navy mobilized its assets to retake Arnbalat by mounting an amphibious landing. The navy also con ducted sea control exercises en route to the area, such as anti-surface, anti-submarine, and anti-air warfare drills. This exercise emphasized the control of "strategic funnels" - the bodies of water located at both ends of Indonesia's three north-south ALKis. These strategic funnels are con sidered potential future flashpoints given their proximity to neighboring countries, abundant marine resources, and unresolved maritime boundary disputes.~\• Finally, the last approach is the state of the navy's fleet readiness. In particular, the need to upgrade the navy's existing sub-standard platfi:mns is seen as an immediate priority. Internal assessments suggest that of the navy's overall 146 ships, only 83 percent of the striking force is operation ally capable, over half (57 percent) of the supporting force is in decay, and only 68 percent of the patrolling force is currently functioning?' Nearly half (41 percent) of its weapons system is also between ~5 and 50 years old. The Van Speijk frigates have lost their capabilities and cost 60 tons of fuel a day just to travel no more than 16 knots with a soon-to-be obsolete Harpoon missile system. The corvettes are in similar condition, and the ex-East German Parchim class are suffering from serious problems with their propulsion systems and the lack of sufficient spare parts.' 11 A qualitative overview of the navy's basic capability assessment is provided in Rebalaru:ing Indonesia '.snaval forre 191
1iibleI J.4 TNI-AL's expected missions a11d operatio11al capability requirements
;\'a11aflllilitwy ojm"(l/ious }or war Na.val milita,)' ojJera.tions ot!ter titan war
• Annihilation operations • Cou11ter-i11surgcncy (against armed , Fuc111ynaval lines intcrdictio11s rebellions) • Sclf~protcctio11 of naval lines • Counter-terrorism (maritime)
, 1\rnphibio11s landing • Maritime border security , Adniinistrative landi11g • Protection of strategic and vital • C:o,istal or i>cach dcf"cnsc objects • tvlinc warfare • ll11ernatio11al peacekeeping • Mariti111c security • Presidential and foreign VIP • Military scalilt protectio11 • Special warfare • Support or local governn1e11ts • Na\'al combat support • Territorial defense a11d management • Internal security support to the J)(Jlice • Hurnanitarian ,lssistancc and disaster relief • Scarc11 and rescue operations • Counter piracy, armed robbery, and illicit trafficking /."11nPsjJ01uli11gbasic ojJl'mlio1w/ rnpabi/ity Ships required under 1v!EF {//Id /"i'i/lliJFll/1'111 Capable of executing C:olllbi11cd Naval 38 ships of various types for two task Operations and .Sea Control al l\\'O forces ( 19 cacl1) diffne111 locations Cap,tliil' of executing all amphibious '.24ships of 1·arious types oper,1tirn1 with
Source: Adapted frolll Navy Chief of Staff Order No. :\CJof 2009; Pos/11r Per/a/u11111n1\'1'{!.U/"il. Note Under the 11,ny's MEF, each mission has diffc.'.rent force requirements. The table only i11ch1des 11111nbcrof ships required and olllits other requirements (e.g. aircraft, personnel, conibar vehiclt-s, etc.). 192 E.A Laksmana
Appendix 11.1, while the basic readiness of the navy's prima1y assets is provided in Figure 11.3 below. A~ far as weapon systems development goes, the MEF policy essentially centers on: ( 1) the procurement of the necessary platforms that prioritize domestic defense industries; (2) basic capability improvements and upgrade of existing viable platforms; and (3) functional shilb or disposal of aging platforms to reduce maintenance cost. We have discussed the first two components in the ilrst section of this chapter. The last component includes in total: 12 landing ship tanks, 3 fast troop transport ships, 3 tankers, and 3 fast patrol boats. In June 2010, the navy announced it would scrap at least 12 aging warships and 16 aircraft by 20 I 4Y~ The focus on domestic shipyards and arms disposal is also related to the navy's concern with reducing the degree of dependence on foreign-based systems and platfonns. It is not just a matter of policy independence, but also a matter of cost and inter-operability. As mentioned above, the SIGMA technology and sustained cooperation with Darnen, or the multiple con tracts with South Korea, for example, arc all part of the navy's effort to cut maintenance and training costs, while standardizing its fleet and improv ing operational integration and jointness. As or 2004, Indonesia possessed 173 main weapons armament systems from 17 different states, with the United States, Germany, France, Russia, and the United K.ingdom supply ing the majority (approximately 77 percent combined). About 31 percent of the navy's platforms arc from the United States, and 73 percent arc from NATO countries_,,:, To complement and prepare the way for this MEF posture, the TNI AL's Leadership Meeting in early '.2012 announced that the navy was pre paring to restructure and perform organizational validation to eventually establish the Sea Territory Command of the Republic of Indonesia
160 140 □ SEWACO ■ Platform 120 Q) Ol
Figure 11.3 Basic readiness of primary naval assets, 2009 (sot1rcc: data adapted TNI-AL A~sistant for Planning Office papers st1bmittcd in Collllllission I V,'orking Meeting,june 2009, cited in Yt1sron lhza, 'Tmgedi dan Stmtegi Pertahanan Nasional Qakarta: La Tofi Enterprise, 200'.l), p. I 09). Rebalancing Indonesia's naval force 193 (Kouwudo Wilayah Laut Republik Indonesia or Kowila RI) consisting of three primary fleets, Sea Territ01y Exercise Command, Sea Territory Material Maintenance Command, as well as the formation of three marine forces and the retooling of the Marine Corps as a Prima1y Operational Command?' In addition, the Maritime Potential Service and the Hydro Oceanographic Service will be upgraded along with a Center for Naval Jntclligcnce.'''•
Maritime security governance and the navy's role As described in the previous section on the historical legacy of maritime security guvernance, the end of the New Order intensified the competi tion between the navy and the marine police. Yet, as we can see from the navy's doctrine, the constabula1y function (i.e. maritime security and law enforcement) remains enshrined and institutionalized within the navy's current posture. Furthermore, the consiclerable self-autonomy given to the navy to support its day-to-day operations over the years has provided the navy with the flexibility and incentive to engage in self~financing to supplement its budget?; A~ such, it might be difficult to expect the navy to rnluntarily liquidate its maritime sectffity functions. If anything, as we can sec from the MEF plans, maritime security enforcement would be one of the key centerpieces of the navy's future plans. Today, anti-illegal logging, anti-illegal fishing, and counter-piracy operations already constitute the bulk of the navy's activitiesY 7 Therefore, institutionally, the need for the navy to expand its control over maritime governance remains a priority, even more so in the past decade. Today there arc 11 different arms of the government involved in various maritime security and law enforcement activities whose duties and mandates arc based on I b cliflcrcnt laws and regulations.' 18 Additionally, beyond st1ictly maritime security, there are more than 14 agencies involved in governing Indonesia's coastal resources - some of which clearly overlap with those of strictly maritime security authorities - and arc managed under approximately ~~ statutes and hundreds of regulations. These agencies do not share intelli gence or resources, often fail to communicate with each other, and also compete with one another.'''' Local authorities complicate the picture further, where as a result of the various regional autonomy laws passed since 1999, provincial governments now have the authority for up to 12nm of sea, whereas regencies arc responsible for up to 3 nm. While the MEF plans provided the navy with the operational and institu tional requirement to rebuild its naval defense capabilities, bureaucratic politics and political savvy often determine the navy's ability to improve it~ position within Indonesia's overall ma1itime security governance. The gov ernment's initial response to this morass, however, seemed to further under mine the navy's goals. This was particularly the case when the Yudhoyono administration empowered the existing Bakorkamla by transferring its 194 F.il. Lalmna,w authority out of the military headquarters to the Coordinating Minist 1y of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs. The new Bakorkamla was charged with formulating national maritime policy and coordinating the activities of the different maritime-related institutions mentioned above. Actual law enforce ment activities, however, were still under the prnview of the different agcnCies. While the navy initially resisted this move, it soon realized that it has few political resources and less experience in political bargaining to fight its turf battles. 100 The navy's solution was to propose in late 2006 the estab lishment of the Sea and Coast Guard of Indonesia (SCGI), which would be based on a revamped Bakorkamla. The role or the business sector was significant in this regard. Indonesia's Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) was concerned about a new ISPS Code 101 and the worsening safety of Indonesia's waters resulting from the growing number or piracy and armed robberies. KADIN then lobbied the navy to address this problem, which provided the navy leadership a window of opportunity to expand its maritime security duties and revamp its patrolling force. The navy's SCGI proposal argued that to meet global expectations, it is time for Indonesia to streamline its maritime authority and establish a unified representative in the global community of coastguarcis. The navy also insists that the SCGI be given a clear legal status as the maritime law enforcement agency uncier the Department of Transporta tion in accordance with international standards, and be staffed \Vith former Kl'LP members and navy officers. The SCGI should have the fol lowing roles: maritime law enforcement, customs, aid to navigation (ATON) and shipping safety, fishery protection, search and rescue (SAR) 10 at sea, and assistance to the navy in times of war. ~ A~ far as institutional 1 1 interests u\.?.'O, the new SCGI also offered additional benefits frir the navv., " First, the new organization can absorb some or the officers in the top- heavy navy and encourage the promotion of younger olliccrs within the navy. Second, emphasizing the global trend of international coastguard cooperation is a ve1y effective way for the navy to neutralize the role of the police. If a significant number or SCGI personnel were drawn from former navy officers, then the role of the police in maritime security governance would be undermined as well. In summary, both the operational and institutional drivers for the navy to develop its naval defense and maritime security capabilities help explain why the navy modernized in the manner, pace, and scope it has in the past decade, as we can manifestly see with the details of its MEF plans and the institutional rivalry within Indonesia's maritime security governance.
Conclusions Our preceding discussion has shown how historical legacies, budgetary constraints, strategic environment, and operational and institutional Rebalancing lndouesia \ naval force 195 rcquircmcnL~ all coalesced to explain why and how the Indonesian navy niodcrnized the way it has in the past decade. This chapter further shows ]lowthe nature orcivil-militaq 1 relations, strategic assessment, institutional development, and bureaucratic politics as well as the health of the domestic defense industrial base and the economy all influence and shape the navy's thinking and force development plans. These broad conclu sions suggest that achieving regional naval dominance is thus far not a part of the navy's agenda, and that day-to-day concerns of rebuilding its fleet and maintaining strategic relevance has oriented the navy to focus more on strengthening its "fleet in being". While the current chapter has answered several key questions surround ing the Indonesian navy's recent force development, there are additional policy areas in need of further investigation. First, as far as the defense economy goes, we need a deeper and more systematic analysis on the sLate and long-term capability of local shipyards, and a serious treatment of the navy's ''informal" or "oH~budget" economic activities. It is also less clear how the navy's MEF plans intend to integrate the national and local economy with the broader defense economy. Second, as far as institutional development goes, there needs to be more in-depth analysis on the navy's personnel management policies as well as its education and training. Argu ably, building and expanding the fleet, while equipping it with state-of-the art weapon systems, requires more qualified and highly educated naval personnel. Yet today, we know very little of the TNI-AL's personnel man agement policies and its education and training system. Finally, as far as maritime security governance goes, it is less clear what would transpire should the SCCI be fully established. \,Vould the TNI-AL follow the example of the Malaysian navy and transfer most of their patrolling assets to the coastguard? Would a fully functioning coastguard force the navy to re-assess its doctrinal and institutional development? These questions will loom large in the next decade or so. AjJJ){'J1r/ixII.I Qualitative O\'er\'iew ofTl\'I-AL's O\'erall capability assessment
Basir rajJ(lbifity Sjxrifir missions orf1111ctions Overa11F(lfing
T\aval intelligence Handle, preYent, and counter: acts of military espionage, sabotage, and Require improvement armed terrorism Na\'al defense Surface, sub-surface, and electro11ir warfare (incl. readiness and capability of Not sufficiently capable SEWACO, mines, missiles, and torpedoes) Amphibious warfare a11d beach defense (incl. force projection of two J-..:otsufficiently capable Landing Team Battalions) Special warfare (terrorism, nuclear. biological, chemical, and sabotage) Require impro\'ement Naval transport for troop and logistic movements Sufficiently capable Maritime security Maritime law enforcement and traffic control (primarily involving patrolling '.\:ot sufficiently capable ships) Support for ~1ilitary Operations Other Than War, and other ci\'ilian or Sufficiently capable policy duties for domestic security Counter piracy, armed robbery, and other illegal trafficking activities Sufficiently capable l\'aval defense area De\'elopment and management of maritime potential and strategic maritime :\'ot sufficiently capable management ci\'ilian assets a11d scr\'iccs ;'\aval support Hydro-oceanography survey and mapping of naval operational areas ?\ot sufficie11tly capable Logistical support and base facilities (incl. maintenance, personnel, and Not sufficiently capable logistics) Management and operation of C4ISR T\ot sufficie11tly capable Overall personnel education and training system Require improYement Na\'al weapons research and dnelopment Require improvement Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as search and rescue Sufficiently capable Maintenance and sen'ice of ships, aircraft, and combat vehicles Sufficiently capable but limited Personnel health facility, training facility, maintenance and repair facility Require impron°ment
Source: Adapted from ~m,· Chief of Staff Order No. 39 of 2009. Rebalanciug hidouesia 's uaval JorcP l ~7
Notes Once tile full rnodcr11izatio11 costs were taken into account, new modern
1·csscls would have been cheaper. Tile additional cosL~ apparcnily led to the dclcl"l"al or plans for the local construction of 23 2,:i00-tonnc frigates. Sec "South-east Asia's Naval B11ild-11p: A Lack of' Regional Cooperation", Strategic (11111mrnls, Vol.:), No. G (11197): I. '.2 A progr;11n 10 re-engine the 1G ex-Parrltilll corvettes has progressed slowly sinrc 2003, lmt as or 201 l, there is no interest in further repairs. Sec Jane's J11fonnati0t1 Croup, "l'roci11-crncnt: Indonesia", in/aue'.1-Sentillel Serurity Assess- 111e1//- Suullwasl Asia, .January 12, 20 l l. 3 Sec, for example, Ristian A. S11priyanto, "Indonesia's Naval Modernization: A Sea Change", RSJS Co11111w11/aries,.January27, 2012, p. 2 . .f Sec •·srn1thcast Asia's Naval Forces: Aligning Capabilities with Threats", Strr, tegic Co111111e11ts,Vol. 12, No. 1 (200G): l. :J Tlw Van SjH'ijk-class suffers from reliability issues connected to iL, propulsion layout. The upgrades were completed in 2007 and 2008. See "Painful Pro gn:ss: l11cloncsia Country Briefing", Jaue's JJefrmu: Weeldy, October Ui, 2009; .Ja11c's l11l "'Indonesia's Anti-ship Missiles: New lk\'clopmcnt in Naval Capabilities", 11.SJS Co111111e11t111y,May 24, 2011. 17 Sec.Jane's Information Croup, "Procurclllcnt: Indonesia". 18 Gema Tresna Yudha, "Mc11gganti Alu1sista Uzur, TN! AL Borong Alt11sista Barn" lRcpiacing Ageing l'latfonns, TNI AL Buys New Yl'eaponsJ, }ul'lia/ J\'asio11al,March l(i, 2012. EJ Fadii, "Navy 10 Procure 24 Fast Boats to Patrol Shallow v\'aters", The Jakarta Post,January :i, 2012. 20 Ibid.; "TN! Pcrcayakan Kapa! LST kc PT PAL" ITNI entrusts LST Ships lo JYJ' PALI, Aldm TVNr'ws, March 2:), 2010. 21 This corresponded with the government's plans al the time lo develop its domestic aviation industry led by PT. Dirga11tara I11cloncsia (DI). For more· cliscussio11, sec "South-cast A~ia's Naval Build-up", p. 2. 22 See.Jane's Information Group, "Procurcn1e11t: !11do11csia". 2'.~ Most of these systems were purchased from US-based Tcclrno-Scic11ccs under a $lti.2 million deal signed in 200(i. Sec ibid. 24 Fro1n 200(i to 200K, the US go\'ernlllcnt provided approximately $:i7 million to the system, strategically located to cover the Malacca Strait, Sulawesi Sea, and Moluccas Strait. The IMSS is a tightly integrated network or ship- and shore-based sensors, colllnH1nications devices, and con1puting 1·csourccs 11Ia1 collect, tra11slllit, analyze, and display a broad array of maritime data. Sec "Fact Sheet: DoD-fu11ded Integrated Marilillle Surveillance System", U.S. Dejlar/111ui/ ofStale'.s-Burmu u/lntem11tio11al lnfonnalio11 Programs. Online: http:// ii pdigital. uscmhassy.go\'/ st/ c11glish/ texllrans/20 I I/ I l /20 111120 I (j 124 ls 110.1Gli280 I .html#axzzl zyfiwHbj. 2:"i Despite claims made by politicians, the ""local contem" or the !SRA is said 10 be only around 40 percent, with the resl or the lecllllology still imported from various sources. 2li An ovcT\'icw or the radar's dcvclop1ne11t is in Mashury, ""Building Radar fro111 Scratch: ISRA UPI Radar Experience". Paper available frolll LIPJ's Center for Elenronics and Comm1111icat ions. Online: http://radar.ppct.lipi.go.id/at1ach- 111e11ts/008_BU ILDING%20A %20RADAR% 20FROM'X20TI IE%20 SCRATCII%20ISI~\%20LIPI'fc20RADAR%,20EXPERIENCE.pclf. 27 Technical details of the JSR.A radar arc in Mashury Rahaii l'I al., ":'lfrasurc ment and Evaluation of ISRA LIi'! Radar's A11tc1llla Radiation Pattern", paper presented at the :ith lntcr11ational Conference uf Tclcmatics Syste,n, Sc1YiCl'S, and Application, Bandung, Indonesia, NOYember 20-21, 2009. Online: http:// radar. ppeL.li pi.go. id/ au achme11 ts/ 008_Measureme11t%20a11d 'X20 Eva Iu ation %20of% 20 ISRA % 20LIPI %20Raclar 's '½;20An te1111a% 20Radiat ion %20 Pattern.pelf. 111the test, !SRA rotated 40 times per minute in every direction and it optimally identified object~ along 22 km. See "LIP! Ready to Produce Radars", Tftejakar/a Post, April 22, 2011. 28 Anita Rachman and Putri PramC'shwari, "Radar System for Su11cla Strait to Be Complete by 2011 ", The jalwrta Globe, Fcbrnary 3, 20 J 0. 29 '"Dislitbangal Laksa11aka11 Pe11ditia11 Bcrbagai Peraiatan Tempur" !Naval Research and Development Conducts Various Combat Vehicle Development! Indonesian Xavy Press Service, October 31, 2011. 30 011 the navy's organizational evolution and modernization, sec Alman H. Ali, "Armada Republik Indonesia: Kini da11 Masa Depan" [!11doncsia11 Fleet: Today and in the Future], in Security Sector RefonrtA/111anac, eel. Beni Sukadis Uakarta: Geneva Center for the Democratic Control or the Armed Forces and Indonesian Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, 2009), pp. 104-li. 31 For more details 011 the navy's activities and operational experience in this period, see Pusat Sejarah clan Traclisi TN!, Srjara!t TN! Jilid 1 (1945-1949), Rebalancing Indonesia's naval force 199 iTNI Ilistory Vol. I (1945-11)4\)) I (Jakarta: TN! Headquarters and TNI Center {or I Jistory), pp. 20-8, 133-G, 288-9. 3~ Jun I Jonna, "Instru1nentalizing Pressures, Reinveming Mission: Indonesian N,ivy Battles for Turf" in the Age or Rcformasi", Indonesia, 8G (October 2008): ()!"'). :{l JIJid., pp. {i:i-!i. 34 For these cliffcrclll. conflicts, sec Richard Chauvcl, Nationalists, Soldien and Sep aratists: The Ambo111!seIslands Jimn Colonialism lo Revolt 1880-1950 (Leiden: KITLV Press, I '.)90); Barbara S. Harvey, Pennesta: Haff a Rebellion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1977); John Saltford, The United Nations a11d the hulonesian Talwover of West Pafma, 1962-1969: Tlte AnatomJ rif JMmytl (London: RoutlcdgeCurzon, 2003). 3:i I lonna, "l11stn1mc11talizing Pressures", p. GG. % Under this doctrine, first outlined by Nasution in the late 1900s, and solidi fied in an Army Seminar in 19GG, the Indonesian military is essentially a clcf'cnsc and security force as well as a socio-economic-political force. For more details, sec Jan MacFarling, T!te Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed fonn: 1Wi!ilm)' Folitirs in Indonesia (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Crntre, J\l9G). ,17 Hy 1\)77, in fact, the navy sent 92(i officers to such posts. Nugroho Notosu santo, eel., Pej1w11g dan Pmjurit: KuusejJsi dan hnfJLementasi Dwi/iwgsi ABIU (Jakarta: Pencrbit Sinar Ilarapan, 1984), p. 379, cited in Honna, "l11strumc11- tali-1.ing Pressures", p. (i7. '.l8 In fact, the navy's Eastern and \'\'cstern Fleet commanders chaired the regional divisions of Bakorkamla. Sec Honna, "Instrumcntalizing Pressures", P· G7. :I\} TIH' National Police (POLRI) was then merged under the four-service struc- ll!IT of tlH· Anned Forces of the Republic or Indonesia (ABRI) with the navy, army, and air force. But the police w;1s always seen as the "little brother" an1ong the services and was merely operating under the direction of the ABRI leadcrsltip stacked with generals from the other services. 40 Ilrnma, "Instrunwntalizing Pressures", p. G7. -!l Ibid., p. ti8. -!'.ZFor a discussion on the importance of internal security in Indonesia's defense tlli11king and policy rormulatio11, see Leonard C. Sebastian, R.eaLJ;olitiliIdeology: lndo11esi11\· Use A. Laks1nana, '"Reform Recrnit1nellt Policy to Aid RI's Military Budget", :n,e .Jalwrta Post, Dccernbcr 9, 2009. 48 Honna, "l11strumentalizi11g Pressures", p. 71. 49 T!ieT~l had_ its !irst commander l'rolll the navy, Admiral_ Widodo, during V1al11d s presidency. In the decade smce, 111any key pos111011s wllhin the ddi_·11sc establishment have gone to naval oniccrs. This docs not 111e,mtlrot the navy is now the domi11a11t service, 011ly that there is 110wa greater "sharin,,. of power" amo11g the three services. For more details, sec The Editor: •·curre11t Data 011 the I11do11esia11 Military Elite, Scptcrnber 2005-1\farch 2008", Indonesia, 85 (April 2008): 7'.l-121. 50 For more detail, see Ali, "Arrnada Rcpublik Incloncsia", p. 111. 51 Details of this blueprint are cited i11 Ho1ma, "Instrnmcntalizing Pressures", p. 71; arnl Ridqi Muna, "IndonC'sia Aims for 'Green \<\\11cr Navy' Capability", .Jane's JJejr,nceWeek(y,Ju11e 29, 2005, p. 15. 52 Figures cited i11slides presented by Jon Grevau and Paul Burton at the "Navig ating the Elllcrging Markets: Indonesia" wcbinar, July 18, 2011, IHS Jane's Inforrnation Group. 5'.) Yuli Tri Suwarni, '"Back 011 Target: \,\'capo11s Budget to Reach Rp (i'.) T over 5 years", Tlu'.fakarla Pust, Ja1111ary 14, '.W10. Although the overall budget for the TNI's mai11 wcapo11s platform bcyo11d procurcrnc11t was esti111atcd to be around $14 billion for 2010-4. Sccjawahan Pe111eiintah.alas P!'l"la11Jam1Tertul,s j)//t/11Raj)/// Keija hlenha11 FU da11Pa11gfi111a 'f,\'J denga11Ko111isi I JJPH !U l Govcr11- mc11t Response to \<\'rittc11 Questions during v\'orking Mccti11g between Min ister of Defe11se a11d TNI Commamler with Commission l of the National Parliamentl,Jakarta, February 22, 2010, p. 5. 54 I11tcrnal MoD clocumc11ts show that bctwee11 2007 a11d 200'.J, the parliament 0111\' fulfilled on average 22.5 percent of what the navy leadership actual!\' requested. 55 For lllore details 011 the overall defe11se budgct,ll)' gap between what the T?\l requested a11d what the parliamc11t approved, sec E\'all A. Laksllla11a, "Indo nesia's Rising Regio11al and Global Pro!ilc: Docs Size Really M,rncr?", Co11- le111pom1ySoutheasl Asia, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2011): l (i8; Leonard C. Scbastia11 and Iis Ginclarsah, Assessi11gi2-Year Milita1y Refrm11in indunesia: Major Stmtegir G11j1s fur the Next Stage of Re/on 11,RSIS \,\'orking Paper No. 227 (Si11gaporc: S. Rajarat rnu11 School of I11tcr11atio11al Studies, 2011), pp. lli--28. :"i(i Cited i11 Dikdik Mohamad Sodik, Combating illegal, lh,iejJOrted and U11m1.;11l11ted Fishing in h1douesian Wate,s: The Need Jin· Fishe1ies LPgislative Reform (U11iversitl' of Wollongong, PhD dissertation, 2007), pp. l:>0-1. 57 Figures from Indonesia's Departme11t of Mari11e Affairs cited i11ibid., p. 153. 58 Poor households a11d other communities generally co11stm1c fishc11' produns. From 1999 to 2003 an11ual per capita fish co11st1111ptio11rose from 19.Gkg to 21.3 kg. Figures are from "Fishe11• a11d Aquaculture Cou11u1· Profiles I11do- 11esia", Food aud 1\g1iculture (hganizatio11 of lite United Natiuus. 011line: www.fao. org/ fishery/ cou11 trysector/FI-Cl' _ID/ en. 59 Djoko Sumaq,0110, "The l11do11esia11Maritime Security Coordi11ati11g Board", in Ind011esiaBeyond lite Water's Edge: ivlanaging m1 J\1d1ij1dagicState, ed. Robert Cribb a11clMichelle Ford (Singapore: Institute of Sot1the,L~tA~ia11 Studies, 2009), p. l,\8. GO Soclik, Combating illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. GI See Jaso11 Pat Iis, "Indonesia's New Fisheries Law: Will It Encourage Sustain able Ma11agcment or Exacerbate Ovcr-Exploitatio11?", Bulletin of Indo11esi1111 Economic Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2 (2007): 21 \l; Sodik, Cu111hatingIllf'gal, Unreported and Unregulated Fis/ting, p. 170. G2 See "Going for the Jugular", Tite Economist, June 10, 2004; Abdul K.halik. "Blame Game Erupts 011 Aging Weapo11s", Tltejalwrta Post, Februa1)' 8, 2008. Rebala11ci11gIudonesia '.s·11a11al force 20 l (j;l Fig11rcs as cited by Y1111Y1111 Teo, 'Target Malacca Straits: Maritime Terrorism ill Southeast Asia", Studies in Conflict and Terrrnism, Vol. 30, No. {j (2007): :350. ti4 For lllorc details 011 these efforts, see the discussion in Evan A. Laksmana, "The Enduring Strategic Trinity: Explaining I11do11esia's Geopolitical Archi tecture", .fo1ir11aloftlte Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 7, No. l (2011): 105;Jolm F. Bradford, "Shifting the Tides against Piracy in Southeast Asian v\'aters", Asian Sumey, Vol. 48, No. 3 (2008): 473-91. 05 Salli Bateman, "Piracy and Anned Robbery against Ships in Indonesian Waters", i11Cribb and Ford, op. cit., p. 127. (j(j This view is attributed to Marcus Mietzner of ANU in an interview with Bronson Percival. See his lrulonesia and lite United Stutes: S!tared Interests in Mari ti11u:Sr:cwity (Washington, DC: The United States-Indonesia Society, 2005), p. 33, f11. l 08. G7 Sodik, Combating Illegal, UnreJ;orted and Unregulated Fis/ting, pp. 152-3. Also, according to the FAO, i112004, a liulc over half (51.79 percent) oflndonesia's 111ari11ecapture fisheries landings were in the eastern part of Indonesia. See Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles Indonesia. G8 A list of these flash points a!ld how they influe11ce the MoD's thillking i11their formulation of the TNI's MEF can be se<'n in Laksmana, "The Enduring Stra tegic Trinity", pp. 101-4. W In 200:i, a special Ambalat Desk was set. up comprising the three services and the MoD, while the TN! Commander issued new Rules of Engagement under Peace Time. Many of the navy's ship rotation plans have also consistently factored in Ambalat, and many of the Eastern Fleet Command ships and naval bases haYc also been upgraded. The army and air force have also expanded their combat tlllits in the eastern pan of the country, and the TNI Head quarters built the new TNI Combined Exercises Command Headquarters in Eastern Kalimantan. 011 how the 2005 Ambalat incident influenced the TNI, sec S1cvia, .\'/mtegi Pertalwnan Laut, pp. 92-5. 70 For details, see Kresno Buntoro, An Analysis of Legal Issues Relating lo Naviga tior111IHights and fi,:edo111st!t.roug!t and over Indonesian Waters (University or Wol longo11g, PhD dissertation, 2010), pp. 2-4. 71 Mark J. Valencia, T!te Proliferation Security Initiative: i'vlaking Waves in Asia, Adelphi Paper No. 37G (London: Routledge for IISS, 2004), p. 9. 7'2 Details 011 these claims are in ibid., p. 11. 7'.l Julian Schofield, "\,\'ar and Punishment: The Implication of Arms Purchases in Maritime Southeast A.,ia",joumal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 ( 1998): 80. 74 Sec the discussion in Bernard Fook v\'eng Loo, "Transforming the Strategic Landscape or Southeast Asia", Contempormy Southeast Asia, Vol. 27, No. 3 (200:'i): 388-40:i; Richard A. Bitzinger, "A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast A,ian Military Acquisitions", Contemj;orary Sout!teast Asia, Vol. 32, No. I (2010): 50-W; Schofield, "War and Punishment". 75 For more details, see Richard Bitzinger, 'The China Syndrome: Chinese Military Modernization and the Rearming of Southeast Asia", RSJS Working Paper l\'o. 126 (Singapme: S. R,tjaratnam School of International Studies, 2007). 7(i Schofield, "V1'ar and Punishment". 77 Sec "Southeast Asia's Naval Forces: Aligning Capabilities with Threats", Stra tegir Co111me11ts,Vol. 12, No. l (200G): 2. 78 South-cast Asian countries are projected to obtain up to 13 submarines by 2020. Sec "Underwater Aspirations Break the Surface in SE Asia". 79 The doctrine envisions the TNI-AL having three basic roles: military or defense, constabulary, and diplomacy. See Doktrin TN/ AL Eka Sasana Jaya (Jakaria: Markas Besar Angkatan Laut, 2001). 202 E.A. Laks111a11.a 80 The Buffer Zone is roughly beyond 200 nm of the coast or beyond Indonesia's EEZ (and beyond GCl radar), the Primary Defense Zone is ro11ghly no further than 200 NM (EEZ and territorial waters), and Resistance Zone encompasses all internal waters. 81 This concept envisages a substantial deploymc1Jl of naval mines and, in deeper waters, submarines, in and around the stra1cgic funnels to interdict an enemy's SLOCs in Indonesian waters and prevent their seaborne forces frolll n10111lling amphibious landings. See Ristian A. Supriyanto,. "Annada Jaya XXX/ 11 Naval Exercise: Indonesia's Naval Strategy", RSIS Co1111111mtaries Novcn1ber 2'.J, 2011, p. 2. ' 82 Sec Markas Besar Angkatan Laut, Peraturan Kepala Staf Angkatan Laut Nornor: Pcrkasal/39/V /2009 ten tang Kebijakan Dasar Pcmbangunan TN! Angkatan Lam Menuju Kekuatan Pokok Minimum I Navy Chief of Staff Order No. 39 of 200\J on the Basic Policy of Naval Dcvclopmcm towards Minimum Essential Force]. 8,l So1ne consider the navy's MEF as an ideal posture for the next decade, bu1 many naval officers and internal docun1cnts insisl that the MEF remains nothing more than a stopgap meas11re. 84 The basic definition and formula lion of the navy's MEF is from Navy Chief of Staff Order No. 39 of 2009. For a more detailed discussion, sec Stcvia, Stmtegi Pertalw111111Laut, pp. 88-92. 85 The navy secs the "green-water navy" as ·•a level of sea power lligllcr than that of a brown water (coastal) navy, but below that of a fully operational, go anywhere blue-water navy". See Muna, ''Indonesia Aims f"or 'Green Water Navy' Capability", p. 15. 8G For details, sec Pustur Perlaha11a11Xl'gam I State Defense Posture I (Jakarta: Dcpar11nent of Defense, 2007). 87 Fleet l will be based in Tanjung Pinang (in charge of the western w,llers of Su mat era un1il ALKI I), Fleet 2 will be based in Makassar (in charge ol Java11esc waters until ALKI II), and Flee! '.l will be based in Sorong (in charge of ALKI Ill until Papua's outermost wains). As of early 20l2, this pb11 would cominue u11dcr the navy's 2024 Strategic Plan. Sec "Pengemba11gan Armada RI Selesai 2014" [Fleet Development to be Completed in 20141, Kom11.fakar/11, January 25, 2012. 88 According to 11avydocuments, these three operational experiences as well as the overall capability and mission requirements pn~cctcd by the TNI-AL were analyzed with the assistance of two basic Lexis: P.H. Liotta and Richmond M. Loyd, "From Here to There: The Strategy and Force Planning Framework", Naval War CoUegeReview, Vol. 58, No. 2 (2005): 121-37, a11d Henry Bariletl, G, Paul Holman, and Timothy E. Somes, "The Art of Strategy· and Force Planning", in Strategy and ForcePlanning, 4th edn. (Newport, RI: Naval \,Var College Press, 2004). For a discussion of how these texts were applied to TNI-AL, sec Alman Helvas Ali, "Pembangunan Kekuatan TN! Angkatan Laut: Antisipasi Disparitas Ends dengan Means" [TNI AL Force Development: Anticipating 1he Dispari1y between Ends a11d Means], Qu.mtenu:rk,Vol. 3, No. G (December 2009): 8-11. 89 Apart from Ambalat, TNI-AL is equally wary about 1he Naluna Sea where China's "nine-clash" line claim overlaps with Indonesia's EEZ. The Natrn1a and Sulawesi Seas were the main TNI-AL deployment areas in the TN! quad rennial Yuclha Siaga tri-service exercise in 2008. This discussion of the latest Armaclajaya exercise draws from Supriyanto, "Armaclajaya XXX/ 11 ". 90 For more details, see Stevia, Strategi Pertalwnan Laut, p. 92. 91 Cited in Danang \,Vidyoko et al., Bisnis ivliliter ivlenwri Legitimasi [Military Busi ness in Search of Legitimacy] Uakarta: Indonesia Corruption Watch and National Dcrnocra1ic Institute, 2003), pp. 43-4. Rcba/a,u:iug Indonesia '.s'naval force 203 112Sct·.Ja1w's Inforrnation c;roup, "Proc11rc1ncnt: Indonesia". ir~ Figmcs 011 origins or the 1nilitary's and navy's platfor!lls arc frolll Andi \-\'id jaja11to ;111dMak111ur Kcliat, fnrlon11sia'sDefense Fw1w111yRejimn (Jakarta: Inter nati011,d NGO Fon1111 on Indonesian Dcveloplllcnt and University of Indonesia's Centre ror GloiJal Civil Society Studies, 200G), pp. 21-2. <)4 In late 201 J, the navy's lc,1dcrship annou!lccd that the position of Marillc C:on1111,11Hlantwould lit· upgraded lo a three-star post, and the Marine Divi sion C:hids will !Jc a two-star post, while the Co!llnlandcr of Primary Naval Bases \\'ill Ile a one-star post. \f> "KASAL: Satu Kowil RI: Tiga Annada, clan Tiga Divisi Marinir" !Navy Chief of Staff: One Kowil, Three Fleets, and Three Marine Divisions!, Indu11esiff11Navy /'ins nelew1'. Online: www.t nial.rnil.icl/Ncws/Sercmonial/tahid/79/art i cle'J'y1ic/ Art ic lcVicw /art iclcld/!'/J74/ Defaul t.aspx. % Jl011na, "l11stn1111e1llalizing Pressures", p. G4. (17 Sec The Jndo!lesia Prograrnlllc, Indonesia's Xmml Demdojmu:11!and l\llariliJlle C:oojwmlio11,RSIS Policy Report (Singapore: S. Rajaratnalll School or Inter- 11,llional St11dies, 2002), p. :l. '18 The l l agencies arc: National Coordinating Body for Ocean Safety, Ministry oi' Marine Affairs and Fi:,hcrics, Ministr:· or Forestry, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Ministry or National Education, Ministry of Transporta tion a11d Co111nH1nication, State Ministry for Environment, Navy, Air Force, Mari11c Police, Directorate General of Immigracio11, Directorntc Gc11cnd of Customs. On the specific roles and !llandates of these agencies, see Dirha111- syah, "1vlaritirne Law Enforcement and Cornpliance in Indonesia: Problems a11d Rccon111wndations", 1vlariti111eStudies, l 44 (September 2005): 3. (19 For example, the Sea Conununications Guard and Rescue Directorate, (Kl'Ll') is in charge of port security and Indonesia's main point of contact 011 piracy issues, such as with the IMO; whereas the marine police, KPLP, and the na\'y all shar(: 1naritime law enforcement duties. Sec Teo, "Target Malacca St r:1its", p. !>!ll; Percival, h11lo11esiaa1u! tlte United States, p. 28. JOO I 101111a,"l11stni1nentalizing Press11res", p. 75. IUI The new !SI'S Code had two key revisions: (I) all countries that signed the JD74 lnternatio11al Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, including Indo nesia, must pro\'ide appropriate security measures in their ports, and (2) those countries arc allowed formally to exercise control over foreign ships in their territorial waters. Cited in I-lonna, "lnstrumentalizing Pressures", p. 71. For a discussion or rhe ISPS Code and other maritime legal instruments, see Y;mn-1 Iuei Song, "Maritime Security and International Maritime lnstru nw11ts", T/1ef//(/onesia11 Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2003): 450-83. 102 Markas Bcsar Angkatan Laul, "Pemlirian Sea and Coast Guard Indonesia (SCGI) Scllagai Upaya Pen,uan1an Fungsi Penegakan Keamanan di Laut", cited in ibid. l(J:l Honna, "lnstru1rn:ntalizing Pressures", p. 7G.