Suppression of Modern Piracy and the Role of the Navy
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
13. the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) / Japan Coast Guard (JCG)
13. The Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) / Japan Coast Guard (JCG) The Maritime Safety Agency (MSA), which was officially renamed the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) in April 2000, is effectively a fourth branch of the Japanese military. Originally established as the Maritime Safety Board in April 1948, it has been reorganised many times since then, and its roles and missions have expanded to include not only guarding Japan’s enormous coastline and providing search and rescue services, but also constabulary operations in the sea lanes and high seas.1 In May 1998, two MSA vessels were sent to Singapore ready to evacuate Japanese residents from Indonesia, where the political situation was ‘unstable’ and ‘unpredictable’.2 Since 1996, the MSA/JCG has been increasingly involved in protecting the Senkaku Islands and policing other disputed areas in the East China Sea.3 JCG patrol boats sank a suspected North Korean ‘spy ship’ near Amami–Oshima Island in December 2001.4 It is the primary Japanese agency in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which involves the interdiction of ships on the high seas suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction or related materials.5 In September 2003 the JSG represented Japan in the PSI exercise in the Coral Sea off the north-east coast of Australia.6 In January 2008, armed JCG officers accompanied Japanese whaling ships being confronted by protest boats in the Southern Ocean near Antarctica.7 Although part of the Ministry of Transportation, in reality the MSA functions as a quasi-autonomous and capable maritime defence force, with its own ships and aircraft. -
Arms Procurement Decision Making Volume II: Chile, Greece, Malaysia
4. Malaysia Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam* I. Introduction Malaysia has become one of the major political players in the South-East Asian region with increasing economic weight. Even after the economic crisis of 1997–98, despite defence budgets having been slashed, the country is still deter- mined to continue to modernize and upgrade its armed forces. Malaysia grappled with the communist insurgency between 1948 and 1962. It is a democracy with a strong government, marked by ethnic imbalances and affirmative policies, strict controls on public debate and a nascent civil society. Arms procurement is dominated by the military. Public apathy and indifference towards defence matters have been a noticeable feature of the society. Public opinion has disregarded the fact that arms procurement decision making is an element of public policy making as a whole, not only restricted to decisions relating to military security. An examination of the country’s defence policy- making processes is overdue. This chapter inquires into the role, methods and processes of arms procure- ment decision making as an element of Malaysian security policy and the public policy-making process. It emphasizes the need to focus on questions of public accountability rather than transparency, as transparency is not a neutral value: in many countries it is perceived as making a country more vulnerable.1 It is up 1 Ball, D., ‘Arms and affluence: military acquisitions in the Asia–Pacific region’, eds M. Brown et al., East Asian Security (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1996), p. 106. * The author gratefully acknowledges the help of a number of people in putting this study together. -
Smart Border Management: Indian Coastal and Maritime Security
Contents Foreword p2/ Preface p3/ Overview p4/ Current initiatives p12/ Challenges and way forward p25/ International examples p28/Sources p32/ Glossary p36/ FICCI Security Department p38 Smart border management: Indian coastal and maritime security September 2017 www.pwc.in Dr Sanjaya Baru Secretary General Foreword 1 FICCI India’s long coastline presents a variety of security challenges including illegal landing of arms and explosives at isolated spots on the coast, infiltration/ex-filtration of anti-national elements, use of the sea and off shore islands for criminal activities, and smuggling of consumer and intermediate goods through sea routes. Absence of physical barriers on the coast and presence of vital industrial and defence installations near the coast also enhance the vulnerability of the coasts to illegal cross-border activities. In addition, the Indian Ocean Region is of strategic importance to India’s security. A substantial part of India’s external trade and energy supplies pass through this region. The security of India’s island territories, in particular, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, remains an important priority. Drug trafficking, sea-piracy and other clandestine activities such as gun running are emerging as new challenges to security management in the Indian Ocean region. FICCI believes that industry has the technological capability to implement border management solutions. The government could consider exploring integrated solutions provided by industry for strengthening coastal security of the country. The FICCI-PwC report on ‘Smart border management: Indian coastal and maritime security’ highlights the initiatives being taken by the Central and state governments to strengthen coastal security measures in the country. -
The China Coast Guard: Shifting from Civilian to Military Control in the Era
FEATURE The China Coast Guard Shifting from Civilian to Military Control in the Era of Regional Uncertainty ULISES GRANADOS Abstract As part of the restructuring of state organizations announced in March 2018, it is known that the China Coast Guard (CCG), previously controlled by the State Oceanic Administration, is coming under the administration of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) from the Central Military Commission (CMC). As a para- digmatic shift from a joint civilian–military control (State Council–CMC) to a purely military one, the reorganization of the CCG, only five years from the latest reshuffling, seems to reveal an the party’s increasing control over the military as outlined in the September 2017 CCP Central Committee and also the intention by the Chinese central government to provide the CCG with more flexibility and authority to act decisively in disputed waters in the East and South China Seas if needed. This article inquiries into the causes, logic, and likely regional conse- quences of such a decision. Amid the upgrading of insular features in the Spratlys, the deployment of bombers in the Paracels, and overall modernization of China’s naval capabilities, the article also explores plausible developments in which the PAP- led CCG, irregular maritime militias, and People’s Liberation Army Navy forces might coordinate more effectively efforts to safeguard self-proclaimed rights in littoral and blue- water areas in dispute. Introduction During the last eight years, East China Sea (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS) waters have been the setting of increased Chinese civil and naval activity that have altered the balance of power among Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian states, trying to cope with a more robust projection of Chinese maritime power. -
Applying a Framework to Assess Deterrence of Gray Zone Aggression for More Information on This Publication, Visit
C O R P O R A T I O N MICHAEL J. MAZARR, JOE CHERAVITCH, JEFFREY W. HORNUNG, STEPHANIE PEZARD What Deters and Why Applying a Framework to Assess Deterrence of Gray Zone Aggression For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR3142 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0397-1 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © 2021 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: REUTERS/Kyodo Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled What Deters and Why: North Korea and Russia, sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. -
Dictionary on Comprehensive Security in Indonesia: Acronym and Abbreviations
Dictionary on Comprehensive Security in Indonesia: Acronym and Abbreviations Kamus Keamanan Komprehensif Indonesia: Akronim dan Singkatan Dr. Ingo Wandelt Kamus Keamanan Komprehensif Indonesia : Akronim dan Singkatan 1 Dictionary on Comprehensive Security in Indonesia: Acronym and Abbreviations Kamus Keamanan Komprehensif Indonesia: Akronim dan Singkatan Dr. Ingo Wandelt November 2009 2 Dictionary on Comprehensive Security in Indonesia : Acronym and Abbreviations Kamus Keamanan Komprehensif Indonesia : Akronim dan Singkatan 1 Dictionary on Comprehensive Security in Indonesia: Kamus Keamanan Komprehensif Indonesia: Acronym and Abbreviations Akronim dan Singkatan By: Disusun Oleh: Dr. Ingo Wandelt Dr. Ingo Wandelt Published by: Diterbitkan oleh : Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Indonesia Office Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Indonesia Office Cover Design & Printing: Design & Percetakan: German-Indonesian Chamber of Industry and Commerce (EKONID) Perkumpulan Ekonomi Indonesia-Jerman (EKONID) All rights reserved. Hak cipta dilindungi Undang-undang. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Dilarang memperbanyak sebagian atau seluruh isi terbitan ini dalam bentuk apapun tanpa izin tertulis dari FES Indonesia. Tidak untuk diperjualbelikan. Second Edition Edisi Kedua Jakarta, November 2009 Jakarta, November 2009 ISBN: 978-979-19998-5-4 ISBN: 978-979-19998-5-4 2 Dictionary on Comprehensive Security in Indonesia : Acronym and Abbreviations Kamus Keamanan Komprehensif Indonesia : Akronim dan Singkatan 3 Content I Daftar Isi Foreword ........................................................................................... -
The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles
The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles The Chinese Navy Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles Saunders, EDITED BY Yung, Swaine, PhILLIP C. SAUNderS, ChrISToPher YUNG, and Yang MIChAeL Swaine, ANd ANdreW NIeN-dzU YANG CeNTer For The STUdY oF ChINeSe MilitarY AffairS INSTITUTe For NATIoNAL STrATeGIC STUdIeS NatioNAL deFeNSe UNIverSITY COVER 4 SPINE 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY COVER.indd 3 COVER 1 11/29/11 12:35 PM The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 1 11/29/11 12:37 PM 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 2 11/29/11 12:37 PM The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles Edited by Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang Published by National Defense University Press for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National Strategic Studies Washington, D.C. 2011 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 3 11/29/11 12:37 PM Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. Chapter 5 was originally published as an article of the same title in Asian Security 5, no. 2 (2009), 144–169. Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. Used by permission. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Chinese Navy : expanding capabilities, evolving roles / edited by Phillip C. Saunders ... [et al.]. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. -
8 – 14 March 2014 (Vol. 3; No.11/14)
8 – 14 March 2014 (Vol. 3; No.11/14) This Week's Newsletter : New Sponsors required - Click Ask us how you can be a sponsor of this newsletter in 2014 - click here. Feedback on the newsletter is welcomed too. Kidnaps Up; Rampant oil theft costs billions; Puntland IUU Fishing order; EU funding for Caribbean - Africa or SE Asia, which has the greater maritime piracy problem? Nigerian waters has seen a surge on seafarer kidnapping recently despite the regional forces efforts to disrupt oil theft at sea and on land. Call for collaboration continues to be made, but has yet to be effective established. a Nigerian supply vessel is delated to have been hijacked almost a week after the fact. The loss of billions in crude oil theft made it a challenging 2013 for oil companies. The boarding of three vessels underway near Singapore demonstrates that it is not just petty theft at anchor that is the threat. Increased security surveillance and patrols does not mean freedom from attacks. In East Africa, the state of Puntland officially banned IUU fishing, terminating all licenses previously granted, making all foreign fishing vessels illegal - two weeks to comply. After the EU announcing a new maritime strategy, it is now providing Euro 2.5 million towards the fight against drug trafficking and criminal networks in the Caribbean. Yemen upholds the 10-year jail term for 11 convicted Somali pirates; the validity of the EU-Mauritius pirate transfer agreement is challenged. The Italian marines held in India filed a petition against the authorities, and petition for the release of the British crew of Seaman Guard Ohio held in India is delivered to the UK PM. -
Naval Modernisation in Southeast Asia: Nature, Causes, Consequences
NAVAL MODERNISATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: NATURE, CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES 26 – 27 JANUARY 2011 SINGAPORE Naval Modernisation in Southeast Asia: Nature, Causes, Consequences REPORT OF A CONFERENCE ORGANISED BY S.RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (RSIS) NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, SINGAPORE 26-27 JANUARY 2011 SINGAPORE Contents PAGE 1. Overview 3 2. Opening Remarks 3 3. Session I — Introduction 4 4. Session II — Common Themes 6 5. Session III — Southeast Asia Case Studies I 9 6. Session IV — Southeast Asia Case Studies II 12 7. Session V — Naval Modernisation: Alternative Perspectives 15 8. Session VI — Naval Modernisation and Southeast Asia’s Security 18 9. Concluding Remarks 20 10. Programme 21 11. Presenters & Discussants 23 12. Participants 25 13. About RSIS 27 This report summarizes the proceedings of the conference as interpreted by the assigned rapporteurs and editors of the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report. The conference adheres to variations of the Chatham House rule. Accordingly, beyond the points expressed in the prepared papers, no attributions have been included in this conference report. 2 NAVAL MODERNISATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA OvervieW The conference was an extension of an ongoing research strategic and technological. The conference addressed project conducted by the maritime security programme such key questions as whether a naval arms race or arms of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), dynamic is taking place, and whether contemporary naval to explore the nature, causes and consequences of naval developments are enhancing or undermining regional modernisation in Southeast Asia. Experts and practitioners security. Constraints and challenges facing regional from government, industry and academia discussed the navies were also identified, as well as policy implications drivers and enablers of naval modernisation: political, for Southeast Asia and the wider region. -
Piracy – It's Everyone's Problem
Corporate Magazine Wilhelmsen Ship Management | Issue 2 - 2016 SPECIAL FEATURE: PIRACy – IT’S EVERYONE’S PROBLEM NAMING CEREMONY DRy-DOCKING VIKING SEA Aurora LPG Entrusts Make It A Great Experience Goes To Sea 4 New Vessels To Us Professional. Like you. CONTENTS pg 20 PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE Piracy – It’s Everyone’s Problem 2 Hello readers, WSM Joins SIGTTO As Full Member 7 Change is inevitable especially during A Grand Naming Ceremony 8 Aurora LPG challenging times. A recent decision to Organisational Changes In WSM Malaysia 10 split our Malaysia vessel management into Two Vessel Groups two groups, dry cargo group and LNG/LPG WSM Wins NYK Car Carrier Of The Year 2015 11 group, proved to be a good move. 25 Years With InterManager 12 WSM Shapes The Maritime Industry The new structure allows greater efficiency Viking Sea Goes To Sea 14 for managers to have better control over asset types and streamline the growing fleet under pg 24 our management. In recent months, the LNG/ At Wilhelmsen, we are proud to be a shaper LPG group has taken over several vessels in of the maritime industry and WSM has News And Stories... swift succession and more are expected for done so from our Barber times. 25 years Norway Maritime Conference the remainder of 2016. ago, we were among the Group of Five that At Cebu, Philippines 16 laid the foundation for ISMA (International Speaking of which, read more about the A Trainee’s Tale On Ship Management 18 Ship Manager Association), now known naming ceremony of the four Aurora LPG From Ship To Shore 19 as InterManager. -
Bridging Asia and Europe Through Maritime Connectivity China’S Maritime Silk Road and Indonesia’S Maritime Axis March 2015
Bridging Asia and Europe Through Maritime Connectivity China’s Maritime Silk Road and Indonesia’s Maritime Axis March 2015 Antoine Duquennoy Robert Zielonka 1 In 2013, in front of the Indonesian Parliament, China’s President Xi Jinping announced the launch of a Maritime Silk Road. This massive connectivity project linking Asia and Europe encompasses the building and upgrading of maritime infrastructures. One year later, the newly-elected Indonesian President, Joko Widodo announced the project to make Indonesia a “maritime axis”. This policy, which has received strong support from Beijing, involves a boost of Indonesia’s infrastructure and maritime connectivity, fisheries, maritime diplomacy and maritime defence power. This paper analyzes these two dawning strategies. The authors address the challenges that lie ahead, and argue that a more proactive engagement from the European Union, including the European Commission and European companies, would benefit to all three actors. EU-Asia at a Glance is a publication series about the current state of affairs in Asia and EU-Asia relations This paper expresses the view of the authors and not the European Institute for Asian Studies 1 Antoine Duquennoy and Robert Zielonka are Junior Researchers at the European Institute for Asian Studies European Institute for Asian Studies, rue de la Loi 67, B-1040 Brussels, Belgium www.eias.org, Tel. +32 (0) 230 81 22 European Institute for Asian Studies, rue de la Loi 67, B-1040 Brussels, Belgium www.eias.org, Tel. +32 (0) 230 81 22 Introduction China and Indonesia have both presented ambitious projects to improve their maritime infrastructure and broader maritime connectivity. -
Indonesia Maritime Hotspot Final Report
Indonesia Maritime Hotspot Final Report Coen van Dijk Pieter van de Mheen Martin Bloem High Tech, Hands On July 2015 Figure 1: Indonesia's marine resource map 8 Figure 2 Indonesia's investment priority sectors 10 Figure 3: Five pillars of the Global Maritime Fulcrum 11 Figure 4: Indonesian Ports' expansion plan value 12 Figure 5: The development of container traffic carried by domestic vessels (in million tonnes) 17 Figure 6: Revised Cabotage exemption deadlines 17 Figure 7: The 22 ministries/government agencies involved in PTSP 20 Figure 8: Pelindo managed commercial ports 23 Figure 9: Examples of non-commercial ports 24 Figure 10: Examples of special purpose ports 25 Figure 11: Market share of Pelindo I-IV 27 Figure 12: Jurisdiction of Pelindo I 28 Figure 13:: Port of Tanjung Priok 29 Figure 14: Pelindo II Operational Areas 30 Figure 15: Jurisdiction of Pelindo III 31 Figure 16:: Jurisdiction of Pelindo IV 33 Figure 17: Kalibaru Port 34 Figure 18: Teluk Lamong Port 35 Figure 19: Vessels in Indonesia 40 Figure 20: The growth of cargo handled in Indonesian flag fleet and Indonesian owned fleet 41 Figure 21: Indonesia’s sea highway architecture design 43 Figure 22: Immediate effects of the Cabotage Principles on Freight Demand 44 Figure 23: LHS Asia Average % y-o-y Container throughput growth (2005-2010). RHS: 2010 Container Throughput (TEUs) 46 Figure 24: Predicted export growth in 2016-2019 47 Figure 25: Indonesia's new shipyards in 2013 49 Figure 26: Supply and demand gap for ship repair (GT) 52 Figure 27: Indonesia Oil Infrastructure