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IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

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Apmoved BY

ALIS8A J. CAMP

ADVISORi DR. J. BUCKLER

A SENIOR THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HI8TORY OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS

MAY, 1990 Introduction...... * tort It Violation* of tho Autonomy Ciouoo of tho Xing'a Baaea...... *• 3 Part lit Motivational Factor* Loading to Agaailaua' Blatant Diarogard for tho Autonomy Clausa...... F. 22 At tit* clot* of the Peloponnesian Htt la 494 S.C.,

Sparta found herself in a unique position. Athefcs hod boon dofoatod along with har naval empire and many Greeks

fait a naw ara of fraadora waa forthcoming for thair country. had baan tha daciaiva military forca causing Athana to fall and many Greeks lookad to Sparta to ptrotact tha paacaful atmosphere. Sparta had battlad againat Athana in tha nama of liberty and had triumphed.

Her influence in tha upcoming yeari would play a prominant role in tha political arenas of all Greek poleis. How

Sparta would handle this elevated position depended

largely on tha political figure who would work his way to

the forefront of Spartan politics, Agesilaus. After tha death of Agesilaus' half brother Xing Agis, tha death of

Lysandar, and tha exile of Pausanius, Ageailaua was able

to become tha moat influential Spartan leader, shaping

Spartan foreign policy.

Ageailaua* actual succession to tha throne was

surrounded by peculiar factors. One certainty concerning

tha episode is that Lysandar secured Agesilaus' Kingship.

At the close of the , it was Lysandar who

shaped many of Sparta's initial policies. (Hamilton, p.

72) Agesilaus would borrow many ideas from his predeces­

sor. One of the most significant beliefs which would be

carried ovmr from Lysandar's age of influence into

Agesilaus*, would be the idea that Sparta should go ftOAinst tgidtt lflftil Dfietict and lit#nd har inllutiiei out aid* tha Peloponnesus. Agesilaua was imperialistic.

In 3(7 B.C., an agreement with Persia was raachad.

Tha Xing's Peace was aignad and guarantaad tha autonomy of ail Greek city atatas. Sparta had bean aada guarantor of tha paaca and thua tha protector of the freedom which aha had wrested from Athen's control. Agesilaua, however, would choose to ignore his responsibility to maintain the individual polls' independence. Ha would Instead use the peace as an instrument of imperialism. Agaailaua would continue the policies of his predecessor, , and would choose not to honor the terms of the Xing's Peace.

By encroaching upon his allies and other Greek poleis,

Agesilaua would cause a common hostility to rise up against Sparta. Examination of specific instances in which Agesilaus either blatantly ignored or re-interpreted the autonomy clause of the peace, reveals his expansion- istic policies. From the very onset, Agesilaus would use this treaty to lessen the influence of Thebes and settle a personal grudge which he held against the city. Agesilaus' hostil­

ity towards the Thebans was a well-known fact in the ancient world. According to , Agesilaus exper­

ienced a drean in which he envisaged hinsel fa s the

successor of Agamemnon. (p. 715) For this reason,

Agesilaus chose to stop and make sacrifice in Aulis before

his Persian campaign. This is the same place Agamemnon

sacrificed before his voyage to Troy. Agesilaus chose to

use his own soothesayer to complete the ritual or. Boeotian territory. In simplistic terms, the Boeotians were angered because of Agesilaus' disregard for their coun­

try's sacrificial laws. There were political considera­

tions as well. Blundering the sacrifice of Agesilaus was part of a course of action designed to alert Sparta that

the Thebans no longer intended to accept Spartan control. (Hack, p. 212) Ismenias and his democratic

faction had come to power between 404 B.C. and 395 B.C.

The traditionally pro-Spartan oligarchy was out of favor

and the new leaders were proclaiming their independence.

The destruction of Agesilaus' sacrifice at Aulis was the

symbolic gesture indicating foreign policy change in fiibes. Thm ruined sacrifice caused Agesilaus to kail tb

Persia udder ill o m m and insulted hi* personally. 8* would never forgive tha Thebans for this disgraceful avant. This personal hatred, combined with tha fact that

Thebes was tha second most powerful land force in Greece after Sparta, account for Agesilaus' continued hostility towards Thebes.

At the vary conclusion of tha peace, both Agesilaus’ animosity towards the Thebans and his recognition of tha autonomy elausa ware obvious. At the peace conference, the Thebans claimed the right to take the oath on behalf of all of the Boeotian cities. reports that

Agesilaus refused to allow this. In accordance with the autonomy clause, Agesilaus demanded that each independent city take the oath.

Peloponnesian army so sent ambassadors to accept

Agesilaus ' terms before he and his army had left the

Peloponnesus. By buckling to Agesilaus' demands, the

Thebans surrendered their control over the Boeotian league. The Thebans lost more than one half of their armed strength with this concession. (Hack, p. 211) The autonomy clause had been interpreted by Agesilaus to Pipe 9 m m that the Boeotians itin met ^titleii tc set m hsgesxm over « league of allied state*. Agesilaus, howev­ er# did net feel the need to give eg power over hie elm

Peloponnesian league. When Agesilaua planned Military action against Thebes, he was clearly using allied forces.

Xenophon says that Agesilaua "sent mustering officers to the various cities of the allies." (Hellenics. BX. v.l.

33-4) Clearly, Agesilaus recognised the existence of the

autonomy clause and planned to use it as an instrument to

increase Sparta's power. Agesilaus employs similar

techniques in his treatment of Mantinea.

At the close of the the Spartans decided that the members of the who had been disloyal must be punished. They began with a campaign against Mantinea in 386 B.C. Xenophon states that they "sent to the Mantineans and ordered them to tear down their wall saying that they could not trust them in any other way to not take sides with their enemies."

(Hellenic*, BK. V.II. 1-4) The Spartans claimed that the

Mantineans had sent supplies to the Argives, had refrained from fighting due to religious pretexts, and had performed badly when they had fought. It is not unreasonable to suggest that these are mere excuses offered to enable

Sparta to secure her dominance. This is especially true if Sparta and Agesilaus could be expected to proceed in the same domineering fashion which they used to handle Thebes. Diodorus states not that tha action was ralatad to Mantinea'a past actions but that tha action was due to to Ageailaua * deaire to place pro-Spartan oligarchic factiona in aa Many citiaa of Qraaca aa possible. (Mice, p. if?) This ia probably ouch cloaar to tha nark, ha

K.J. Seager pointa out in hia Athenaeum art Id a , Sparta's treatment of tha aituation was both traditional and predictable. 8ho had weakened Mantinea's oppoaition by ridding of tho democratic faction ami frionda of Argos, ami had aatabliahad an oligarchy loyal to Sparta, (p.40}

Another predictable clement of thia aituation waa tha diapatch not of Ageailaua, but of King Ageaipolia.

Ageailaua refrained from taking command on tha pretext that tha Mantinaana had aided hia father earlier, teen Xenophon hinta that thia ia mere pretenae atating that Ageaipolia' father "was on exceedingly friendly terma with the leadera of the popular party in Mantinea."

(Hellenics, BX. V.II. l>4) Ageailaua emerged from the proceedings in a more positive light than he would had he been the actual aggressor. Not only did sending

Ageaipolia save face for Ageailaua, but it also could have harmed Ageaipolia' reputation with the other democrats in

Greece. Ageailaua hoped to "instigate a conflict between

Ageaipolia and the democratic factions in Mantinea and other Peloponnesian cities." (David, p.27) He also wanted Ageaipolia to become a faithful supporter of his

liilisissaissa Sails* own policies. Unfortunately for Agesilaus, Agesipolis'

father Pausanius interfered and prevented Agesipolis from

executing the democratic leaders. This strengthened

Agesipolis' popularity with the Spartan allies, gained the

support of democratic factions throughout the

Peloponnesus, and earned the support of anti-Agesilaus

factions in Sparta. (David, p. 27)

The Mantineans responded to the Spartan demand by

refusing to tear down their walls. They had been a city

since 460 B.C. and had come together of their own accord.

They had every right to refuse t>uch a demand by Sparta.

Agesilaus' interference here clearly goes against the autonomy clause. "This behavior violated the spirit, if not the letter of the Peace of Antalicidas." (Rice, p.

167) Rot only had Agesilaus blatantly affronted the autonomous decision-making of Mantinea by ordering her to tear down her walls, but also he ordered that the city be divided into its original four villages after it had been militarily pacified. This was no longer simply a viola*

tion of the King's Peace. It now constituted a violation of Greek tradition. The polls was a respected institution of Greek custom and its destruction was frowned upon by all Greeks. An interesting political consideration is that these individual cities were to be placed under the control of the big landowners, thus increasing the oligar­ chic factions loyalty to Agesilaus. (David, p. 27)

SSilliiliSifisiifil Ageailaus is eonaciously striving to crests a power base in Greek city states of oligarchies loyal to Sparta. The only possible way in which Agesilaus could have justified hia actiona according to the King's Peace would have been by claiming that he waa protecting the autonomy of the four original villagea. This is obviously absurd and is a clear misuse of the peace. Ageailaus is already beginning to alienate his allies by a disregard for both tradition and the autonomy clause. The ties of the Peloponnesian league along with the backbone of Spartan power were beginning to weaken.

Another instance in which Ageailaus abuses the autonomy clause appears in his dealings with Phlius. In

384 B.C., Phliasian exiles sought aid from Agesilaus.

They appeared before the board of requesting to be reinstated to Phliasian government. The exiles pointed to past instances of their loyalty to the spartan state.

They argued that when they had been an active part of the

Phliasian government, Phlius had fought loyally alongside the Spartans in the Corinthian War and that after they had been exiled, Phlius refused to follow Sparta's command.

(Xenophon, Hellenlca. v.n. 8-12) During the Corinthian

War Sparta could do little to rid of democratic rule in

Phlius. After the war, however, and after the subjection of Kantinea, no factors blocked Sparta's intervention in favor of the oligarchal faction in this area. The area Pag* 9 was significant because of its strategic location. "It lay on a thoroughfar* from Arkadia to Namaa, Klaonai and

Corinth, and commanded tha route froa Stymphalos to the

Argiva plain." (Cartledge, p. 228) Claarly both th* nacassity and timing coapallad Agasilaus to ignora tha autonoay clausa and to iaposa his will upon tha city.

Accordingly, Agasilaus ordarad tha city to ra-instata th* axilad oligarchic faction. For raasons of their own,

Phlius had chosen a democratic form of government. It was

Phlius' own right to decide tha method of rule for their . Again, Agasilaua is violating traditional Greek theology concerning th* polis, as wall as entirely ignor­ ing th* autonoay clause. Agesilaus justified his actions by claiming that ha had com* to th* aid of those who had been wronged. (Xenophon, Hellenic*. W . m . 14) This claim is a flimsy shield for his true intentions of creat­ ing another oligarchal ally. In addition, it is question­ able whether or not the exiles claims pointing towards

Phliasian disloyalty ware founded. In 391 B.C., Phlius refused to admit a Spartan garrison fearing that the oligarchic exiles would be restored. Like the Mantineans, th* Phliasians refused on religous grounds to fight in the

Settle of Msmea in 384 B.C. These are the only two times th* Phliasians refused to cooperate with Sparta. After

391 B.C., with the Phliasian loss to of Athens,

Phlius was a loyal ally to Sparta, fulfilling her troop commitments. Thar* waa little or no basis for tha axilas claim that Phliua had batrayad Sparta. (Rica, p. 172)

Tha axilas aiaply eapitalisad on tha knowledge that

Agaailaua was attempting to sat up a syatam of loyal oligarchias throughout nainland Qraaea.

Although Phlius raalisad that Sparta had no tradi> tional right to intarfara with thair choica of a govern- aantal systan and was violating tha autonomy clausa of tha

Xing's Paaca, thay had littla choica. With tha axaapla of

Kantinaa aat before them, Phlius raalisad that Sparta would taka military action and thus votad to reinstate tha exiled oligarchal faction. This arranganent was, howavar, abort lived. Two years later, tha oligarchs ware again appealing to Sparta for help. Thay coaplainad that questions concerning thair property ware being settled by tha democratic faction. (Xenophon, Hellenics. V.III. 10)

Zt is probable that tha Democrats ware disregarding the interests of the oligarchs dua to tha fact that

Agasipolis, tha second Spartan King was campaigning in

Olynthus. Zt was against Spartan policy to sand both kings on a military venture at one time hence, Agesilaus supposedly would not invade. Zn addition, Phlius had recently donated a handsome sum to Agasipolis' war causa in Olynthos. This generous gift did not prove loyalty to tha Spartans in tha ayes of Agaailaua. As waa typical, ha

•aw it on more personal terms. Agaailaua saw this donation as a sign of Phliasian support in favor of

Agesipolis, Agasilaus' only raal contandar for control of

Spartan foreign policy. His assassmant of tha situation was probably corract. Agasilaus was aagar for any pretext to pacify Phlius. Tha axilas plaa for aid gava him this prataxt. Xanophon raports that Phlius was surprisad by

Agasilaus' military praparations and attamptad to briba him. (Xanophon, Hallanica. V.lll. 14) Tha democratic loaders refused Agasilaus' request that tha axilas be restored and Agasilaus besieged the city. Tha Phliasians withstood Agasilaus' siege tactics for an embarrassing two years. With the death of their ally, Agesipolis, in 380

B.C., they ware left without hope of survival. Thus,

Agasilaus ignored tha same autonomy clausa for which he had fervently fought in tha case of tha Boeotian league, the Phliasians' autonomy was violated and they ware forced to become subjects of an oligarchy which did not enjoy popular support.

The next time Agasilaus chose to ignore tha autonomy clause comes during tha course of Sparta's dealings with

Olynthus. Tha account of Sparta's interference hare appears in Xenophon's Hellenics, book five, chapter two.

Cleigenes of Acanthus appears as an ambassador in Sparta to request Spartan military aid against the Olynthians.

During this period, around 383 B.C., the Olynthian alli­ ance was the second most powerful land force since the Pag* 12 destruction of th* Boeotian Confederacy. Sparta had not interfered in this area because of its extreme northern geographic position. In addition, Olynthus had expressed little or no interest in mainland Greek territories under

Spartan dominance, and had been primarily concerned with northern Macedonian territory. This understanding of interests had, however, changed as Cleigenes shrewdly pointed out to the Spartans. As a bribe, Amnytas, King of th* Macedonians, had promised Cleigenes' city of Acanthus as well as the city of Pella to the Olynthians The two cities were adverse to Olynthian domination and appealed to Sparta to save their autonomy as was Sparta's duty under the King's Peace. As in the past, Sparta did not become involved because of enthusiastic concern over preserving the autonomy of individual Greek city states.

Cleigenes informed the Spartans that the Olynthians had sought to form an alliance with both Athens and

Thebes. (Xenophon. Hellenics. v.Il. 15-18) This drasti­ cally altered Agesilaus' interest in the situation. Since th* signing of the peace, Athens had remained relatively low key. She simply had remained independent and con­ cerned about coastal cities affecting her trad* routes.

Athens would naturally be interested in th* Olynthian situation, since Olynthus occupied an area of great economic importance in terms of Athenian trad* routes. Pag* 13

Spartan domination of thia tarritory would constitut* a throat to Athonian aconomie stability.

Th# Thebans also had raason to faar Spartan control of this araa. If Olynthus bacama a pro-Spartan forca,

Thabas would be surrounded by hostile political systems on either side as well as being isolated from Athens, who could offer no assistance. Sparta could simply not allow an alliance between her two old enemies, Athens and

Thebes, with th* up and coming strength of Olynthus. An alliance of this sort would most assuredly cause the end of Sparta and Agesilaus' domination over mainland Greece.

This is why Agesilaus became involved. He was not con­ cerned with the autonomy clause of the King's Peace.

Xenophon reports that the Spartans did not ask their allies how they should respond according to terms of the peace, but simply aaked the allies what they "deemed best for the Peloponnesus and for th* allies." (Hellenics.

V. II 18-21)

Hence, Agesilaus chose to interfere in the extreme north. This area was traditionally left alone by Sparta.

Again in this instance Agesilaus uses the peace as a means of expansion. Instead of taking the command himself,

Agesipolis was given the responsibility of executing th* campaign. Agesipolis badly needed a successful militexy campaign to enhance his reputation. Agesilaus could benefit through his absence by following his oligarchic

: : v : ■■■.m i ■ ■ Page 14 revival In Phliua aa mentioned above. Agesilaus also capitalised on the campaign and absence of Agesipolis by taking the opportunity to completely pacify Thebes.

The extreme northern positioning of Olynthus posed some military difficulties. After the Spartans questioned their allies on their opinion of their military involve* ment, it was accordingly decided that Sparta would send a force. Plans were immediately voiced concerning how the campaign would be carried out. Traditional arrangements were called for. Each ally was asked to send its propor­ tionate contingent for an army of ten thousand, and proposals were made for the donation of money as an alternative. (Xenophon, Hellenlca. V.II. 18-21) The

Acanthians suggested that there was not enough time for such preparations. As a result, a smaller force was sent under Budamidas with the idea that more troops would follow to strengthen this initial force. Budamidas' brother, Phoebidas, was chosen to follow with reinforce­ ment troops. On his way to Olynthus, Phoebidas camped on the outskirts of Thebes. While in this position, his troops entered the city and captured the Cadmea, the

Theban Acropolis, during a religous festival. As Xenophon relates this story, he makes a definite attempt to impli­ cate that Phoebidas' actions were independent of any higher Spartan command and due largely to Phoebidas' desires to enhance his personal glory. Pag* 15

Phoabidaa did not actually formulate the plan, according to Xenophon. Leontiades, leader of the pro-

-Spartan faction, approached Phoebidas and offered to lead him into the Acropolis. Xenophon states that when

Phoebidas heard the plan he was filled with "buoyant hopes" and with a great passion for "performing some brilliant achievement." Phoebidas is then described as a man with little practical wisdom. (Hellenics. V.II.

25-28) Thus we are led to believe that Phoebidas indepen­ dently made the decision to break the autonomy clause to gain fame. If this was, in fact, the case, then

Agesilaus' subsequent behavior is difficult to explain.

When Leontiades farced the ephors and an angry Spartan citisenship, Agesilaus came to his and Phoebidas' rescue.

Agesilaus suggested that Phoebidas only deserved punish­ ment if his actions were harmful to the Peloponnesus.

(Xenophon, Hellenics. V.II. 31-34) Agesilaus further claimed that it was Spartan tradition for a commander to act upon his own initiative when the well-being of the state was involved. Leontiades followed up Agesilaus' advice by persuading the Spartans to keep the Cadmea and punish the anti-Spartan faction. (Xenophon, Hellenic*.

V.II. 34-37) Agesilaus' eager defense of Phoebidas' illegal activities creates suspicion. His statement defending Phoebidas is not entirely implausible but suggests that it is simply a front for Agesilaus' true intention* and/or involvement. This idea ia supported by

Diodorus who claims that all commanders were given secret instruction to seise Thebes if an opportunity arose.

(Diodorus XV. 20. 2)

Xenophon places the responsibility of the attack upon

Leontiades, Phoebidas, and their individual scheming.

Both Diodorus and an overall view of Agesilaus and his recent actions suggest that Agesilaus was behind the plan and employing a scapegoat, which he typically did in such situations. At any rate, it cannot be denied that this action clearly disregarded the autonomy clause of the

Xing's Peace. Agesilaus. as he justified Phoebidas* actions, was guilty of an unprovoked attack in a time of peace upon a city upholding the Xing's Peace.

Agesilaus had interfered in the north using the autonomy clause as justification and then ignored the same clause during the same campaign in the case of Thebes.

There is no ethical explanation and accordingly,

Agesilaus' and Sparta's popularity plummeted throughout

Greece.

It is necessary to outline one of Agesilaus' last political moves which completely ignored the autonomy clause. This final episode differs in nature from the episodes mentioned above. It involves a raid on Athens by the Spartan commander Sphodrias. According to Xenophon,

Sphodriaf the Lacedaemonian governor at Thespiae, was persuaded by the Thebans to invada Attica provoking a war batwaan Sparta and Athana. Hence, ha decided to captora tha Piraeus, a major Athenian outpost, which still had no gates. (Xenophon, Hellenics. V.XV. 18-20) Tha invasion was a failure. Sphodrias had planned to taka tha area before daybreak catching tha Athenians entirely off guard.

Due to rough muddy territory, not only ware Sphodrias' troops caught red-handed on tha outskirts of Athens at daybraak, but also, tha Athenians had received warning and were waiting with a fully mobilised army. Instead of retreating at this point, Sphodrias foolishly ravished the countryside. The Athenians were accordingly outraged and first confronted the Spartan embassy present in Athens at the time of the attack. The embassy claimed complete ignorance of Sphodrias' actions and promised the Athenians that Sphodrias would be put to death for his actions.

(Xenophon, Hellenics, v.iv. 20-24) Sphodrias was, in fact, recalled by the ephors for trial. He chose not to appear and was acquitted. Xenophon states that this decision by the courts seemed to many to be the most unjust in the history of Lacedaemon. (Xenophon,

Hsllenica, V.IV. 24)

In light of Agesilaus' previous policies, in particu­ lar Phoebidaa' seisure of the Cadmea, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that Agesilaus had put this scheme into action. There is no certainty concerning Sphodrias' motives for the attack. As mentioned above, Xenophon suggests that the Thebans urged Sphodrias' military initiative. Plutarch accepts this idea and includes it in the life of Agesilaus. He also suggests that like

Phoebidas, Sphodrias was compelled by personal glory and even hoped to outshine Phoebidas. (p. 728) Diodorus uniquely suggests that Cleombrotus, leader of Agesilaus' rival faction, ordered Sphodrias to take action against

Athens in an attempt to make Agesilaus' subjugation of

Thebes more difficult, tDiodorus. XV. 5-6) At any rate, no ancient source suggests that Agesilaus inspired

Shodrias' attack.

This makes it difficult to justify Agesilaus' subse­ quent action at Sphodrias' trial. Earlier it was stated that Agesilaus' handling of this episode was considered a breach of the peace. This idea stems from Agesilaus' defense of Sphodrias. The Athenians, who had upheld the peace from the onset, had been attacked during a time of peace by a power supposedly protecting the peace. Athens had every right to be angry and demand Sphodrias' punish­ ment. Agesilaus, however, assured that 8phodrias was not punished and was the chief instrument of Sphodrias' acquittal. (Ryder, p. 54) What motivated Agesilaus to cosw to Sphodrias* defense? Xenophon states that

Agesilaus saved Sphodrias at the request of his son

Archidamus. Archidamus was involved in a relationship Pag* 19

with Sphodrlas' son, Cleonymus. Cleonymus approached

Archidamus asking him to persuade Agesilaus to save his

father. Archidamus reluctantly approached Agesilaus, who

was swayed by his son's emotions. Agesilaus subsequently

decided to defend Sphodrlas on the grounds that he had

been a true and faithful Spartan in his youth and Sparta

needed this type of citizen soldier. (Xenophon,

Hellenic*. V.ZV. 24-33) Plutarch cites the same reason in

the life of Agesilaus.

It seems questionable that Agesilaus was willing to

risk war with Athens in the narnt* of his son's current

lover. The decision tc acquit Sphodrlas had tremendous

military and political implications. Athens would most

assuredly take military action against Sparta. Agesilaus must have realised this and believed that Sparta had the

strength to combat both Thebes and Athens at the same time. Agesilaus rarely if ever mad* such monumental decisions without considering such foreign policy implica­ tions, and this was no exception.

Perhaps the most reasonable explanation is found in the realm of factional considerations as outlined by

Kphraim David. According to this idea Cleombrotus, as suggested by Diodorus, was responsible for Shodrias' attack. Cleombrotus felt Athens was the main threat to

Spartan power, unlike Agesilaus who concentrated on the

Theban threat. Any time Cleombrotus commanded a force Pag* 20 against Thebes, virtually nothing was accomplished. At th* tin* of Sphodrias’ attack in 370 B.C., there was a

Spartan aabaasy prasant in Ath*ns. At least on* of th*s* ambassadors, Etymocles, was a close associate of

Agesilaus. (Smith, p. 280) Th* presence of the embassy supports th* idea that Agesilaus did not instigate th* attack. In addition, it suggests that Cleombrotus was at­ tempting to undercut Agesilaus' attempts to com* to an agreement with Athens» an agreement which would simplify conditions for attack on Thebes. By defending Sphodrias* actions, Agesilaus may have planned to ease factional tension and gain allies in th* opposite camp.

David suggests that Agesilaus was attempting to pleas* middle-men who were anti-imperialistic, preferring to limit Sparta's sphere of interest to the Peloponnesus.

Pausanius, Agesipolis, and probably AntalcIdas were members of this conservative faction. Agesilaus may have felt that by condemning Sphodrias, he would antagonise this conservative faction into creating an alliance with the faction of Cleombrotus. This could considerably lessen Agesilaus’ power in the realm of foreign politics. By preserving his own dominant position,

Agesilaus had secured th* fate of his Spartan Empire.

Athen's autonomy had clearly been imposed upon by a

Spartan agent, instead of coming to Athens defense and punishing th* aggressor affronting her autonomy, Agesilaus chose to disregard the clausa and ignore Athens grievances. His motives for Sphodrias' defense are not certain but are unquestionably based on personal considerations. This decision would push Athens to the edge. Athens would ally with Thebes and become the champion of liberty for other

Greek states against Sparta's tyrannical rule. Thus, by a series of foolish foreign policy moves in which Agesilaus ignored his responsibility to uphold the Xing's Peace, he caused a common antagonism to rise throughout mainland

Greece against Sparta. The result would be Sparta's dramatic fall from power.

''MM v. mil Pag* 22

Part H i Motivational Factor* Laadino to Aaeaileus'

Blatant Di»r*aard for tha Autonomy Clauaa

Thar* must hava toaan some reasoning bahind Agasilaus'

blatant disragard for th* paac*. Although ha oftan moved

according to paraonal vangaanca, for inatanca in moat

relations with Thabaa, in a largar aana* h* acted aa ha did becauae h* did not baliav* in th* apirit of tha paac*

from tha onaat and bacaua* ha waa aimply following th*

practices of his political predecessors.

In addition to being called "The King's Paac*," tha peace of 38? B.C. was also called th* "Peace of

Antalcidas.* This second titl* has obvious connotations which are pertinent. Th* paac*, just as tha titl* sug-

gasts, was not mainly due to th* political maneuvering* of

Agasilaus. in 394 B.C., whan Agasilaus returned from

Asia, h* was in ill favor at home. Sparta was at war with

Persia as wall as a united Greece lad by Athens and

Thebes. Th* battle of Cnidus in 394 B.C. caused his

prestige to plummet. To command th* Spartan navy, h*

chose his inexperienced brother-in-law, Peisander. As

commander, Peisander received a crushing defeat at the

battle of Cnidus. The loss was largely Peisander's fault

and many blamed Agasilaus for choosing Peisander to

command. Agasilaus is even dropped from the sources Pag* 23 between th* battl* of , in 394 B.C. and his attack on

Argos in 391 B.C. (Smith, p. 274) During this tin* period, and th* period during which th* King's P*ac* was signed, Agesilaus was not the dominant fore* in polities.

It was Lysander who was the domineering force leading to

Spartan interference in Persia (Plutarch, Life of

Agesilaus). After Lysander's death in the Corinthian War, his faction was left without a leader. It subsequently

fell from power. Agesilaus became prominent for a period, but as mentioned above, he did not immediately gain secure control over th* political scene. Agesilaus and his

faction, concerned with Spartan dominance over mainland

Greece, could not effectively end the Corinthian War. As a result, Antalcidas moved to the forefront of Spartan politics and it was Antalcidas and his conservative party which secured the peace. (Rice, p. 165)

Antalcidas took a conservative position favoring the restriction of Spartan foreign interests to th*

Peloponnesus. The factional set up of ancient Sparta is not altogether obvious. At times, groups and their interests overlapped, which is typical of any governmental system. It has been suggested by some scholars that there were three main factions as opposed to two, which is th* widely accepted number. The main cause for this specula­ tion is a statement mad* by Xenophon during the Sphodrias episode. In book five, chapter four, verse twenty-five of the Hellenic*, Xenophon state* that Cleonhrotua,

Sphodrias, and their faction "feared Agesiiaus and his

friends, and those who stood between the two parties."

This fear of the middle-of-the-road ideology, briefly mentioned above during the discussion of Sphodrias, may

indicate that this third conservative faction existed. It

is certain that two factions, both imperialistic, were present during this time period, ca. 379 B.C. Cleombrotus wanted naval expansion and felt that Athens was Sparta's worst enemy, while Agesiiaus wanted expansion throughout mainland Greece and felt that Thebes was Sparta's greatest

enemy. (David, p. 34)

David G. Rice, in an article appearing in the journal

Hlatorla. speaks of this third faction in no uncertain

terms. Rice states that AntalcIdas' faction was first led by Pausanius. (p. 165) Pausanius and AntalcIdas are also

included as conservatives in a list by David, (p. 34), and

Hamilton suggests that Antalcidas was backed by a group of moderates during negotiations with Persia, (p. 76) In many instances, both men art level-headed diplomats and often appear to not possess imperialistic ideas.

Pausanius, for example, stepped into the Mantinean affair

in 386 B.C., as mentioned briefly above, and displayed tempered diplomatic prowess. Agesipolis took the command against Mantinea because of Agesiiaus' pretext, and

appeared to be the aggressor. Agesiiaus shrewdly used Pag* 25

Agesipolis. If th* young, fairly inexperienced Agesipolis blundered the expedition, Agesilaus could step in and save th* day enhancing his own military reputation. If

Agesipolis was successful, it would be a minor victory over one of the lesser military threats to Spartan power.

It would not result in immediate popularity, as might a successful campaign against a more formidable opponent.

In short, Agesilaus could not lose. Agesipolis, on the other hand, could lose and was saved by the diplomatic interference of his father. Pausanius had always handled political negotiations generously. He dealt respectfully with potential enemies maintaining a friendly co-existence with other governments in the Peloponnesus. His conserva­ tive policies calling for Spartan involvement only in the

Peloponnesus eventually led to his disfavor and subsequent exile at the onset of the Connthian Mar in 395 B.C.

(Rice, p. 168) Pausanius exercised significant influence in foreign policy considerations. His exile was brought about directly by followers of Lysander after Pausanius failed to arrive at Haliartus in time to rescue Lysander and his forces. (Xenophon, Hellinlca. V.III. 23-25)

Although Agesilaus and Lysander's personal relationship had suffered considerably at this point, it is presumable that they still shared the same basic factional interests.

Agesilaus and his supporters no doubt felt that was threatening enough to merit exile. Pausanius' interference in Nantinea was designed to prevent Agesipolis' fall from favor due to the manipula­ tive practices of Agesilaus; the same practices Pausanius himself had fallen victim to. After Mantinea fell to

Agesipolis, the democratic faction feared for their safety. Understandably so, since Sparta under Agesilaus was in the process of establishing as many loyal oligar­ chies as possible throughout Greece, tDiodorus XV.5. 1-4)

Pausanius appeared in Mantinea and advised his son to save the democrats allowing them safe conduct into exile. By destroying the democratic regime, Agesipolis would damage his reputation with democratic factions throughout Greece.

Whether or not he crushed the democrats, the oligarchal government of Mantinea would ally with the more powerful and traditionally pro-oligarchic Agesilaus. Agesipolis had nothing to gain by the democrats execution. By showing the democrats benevolence, however, Agesipolis could strengthen his reputation with other democratic factions in Greece, thus counter-balancing Agesilaus' policy. (Mice, p. 170) Hence, by interfering and coach­ ing his son into a shrewd diplomatic move, Pausanius exercised his conservative influence, and traditional practice of maintaining friendly relations with as many

Peloponnesian groups as possible.

Antalcidas made political moves in a similar fashion

i'MUallftfte W k i m m m fen n m y in kin negotiations with Persia, which lad to the King's Peace.

Recognising that Sparta was unable to maintain military

fronts on both mainland Greece and in Persia, Antalcidas

first tried for a peace agreement which would pacify all

of Greece and provide for the autonomy of Greek city

states. (Ryder, p. 28) The first peace was not signed

due to various points of disagreement on both sides.

After the failure in Asia, another attempt at a peace

conference took place a year later. The second confer­

ence, held in Sparta, was an entirely different peace

initiative negotiated by Andocides. Not until 387 B.C.

was a peace actually agreed upon. Like the first attempt,

it was aimed at creating a peaceful co-existence between

Greek city states# (Ryder, p. 323) Aside from the fact

that the terms are almost exactly the same as the terms

independently negotiated by Antalcidas in 392 B.C., and

that the peace in also called the "Peace of Antalcidas," the Thebans are favorably treated. If Agesilaus had been a dominant force in these negotiations, Thebes would not have been handled so positively. (Smith, p. 278)

The terms of the peace were clearly not imperialis­ tic. Agesilaus, however, as we have seen above would reinterpret the autonomy clause to use the peace as an instrument of expansion. Agesilaus did not honor this peace largely because it was not a peace with terms Pag* 28

force had maneuvered ita main clauaes. Ageailaua' feel­ ings towards AntaleIdas are not expressly stated in the writings of Xenophon. Their relationship is, however, mentioned by Plutarch in his life of Agesilaus. Plutarch calls Antaicidas a "bitter enemy" of Agesilaus who only strove for peace in 392 B.C. to prevent Agesilaus from improving his military reputation, (p. 727) David Rice feels that the two men did, in fact, represent different spheres of political ideology. Agesilaus eventually comes to dominate Spartan foreign policy because the contest was unequal, according to Rice. Agesilaus was a king and after the exile of Pausanius there was no able political figure capable of leading Antaicidas' conservative fac­ tion. (p. 185) Agesipolis showed signs of supporting an eventual leadership of this faction. He worked in a sensible and neutral fashion in Mantinea. Also, the democratic goveriunent of Phlius donated large sums of aonay to the war chest of Agesipolis. As mentioned previously, this donation was probably designed to show their support for Agesipolis' conservative tendencies as opposed to the imperialistic tendencies of Agesilaus.

Agesipolis' untimely death in the Olynthian campaign prevented him from becoming the champion of the conserva­ tive movement. Antaicidas and his faction no doubt di sspproved ojf jLXatis * £oxaJ»0fi policy that* argument*, Agesilaus' aisuaa of tha peace is more understandable. Agasilaus was not securely recognised as the dominant foreign policy-maker at the outset of the peace negotiations in 392 B.C. Although he steadily gained influence, the peace was not dictated according to his terms. Agasilaus had always been concerned with expansion outside of the Peloponnesus. Before he firmly established his domineering political power, the peace was signed Agasilaus was forced to recognise it, and did so on his own terms.

Rarely in the historical process are rulers guilty of a complete break from their predecessors. Generally, policies follow some type of continuum. Often there are original innovations or drastic unexpected forward move­ ments but these changes usually find their basis in past practices. This is the case with Agesilaus and his foreign policy. Although Sparta is most often thought of as a power limiting its interests to the Peloponnesus, imperialistic trends were beginning before Agesilaus came to power. The tradition of hegemony existed in Sparta long before Agesilaus, and tha Peloponnesian War decided for Sparta the particular type of dominance which they would exercise over mainland Greece. Originally, the

Spartans entered the Peloponnesian War to break the oppressive Athenian empire. The idea of autonomy appear- incompatible with the concept of a subject empire. The

Peloponnesian War forced Sparta to reorganise her institu­

tions to make them capable of dealing with powers outside

of the Peloponnesus. Sparta switched from her policy of

incorporating conquered Peloponnesian powers, to a policy

of creating a league of allied autonomous states who

followed her leadership in foreign policy matters.

(Parke, p. 37) Through subjection, Sparta attempted to create an empire.

Spartan tradition allowed only for Kings to lead military campaigns. This is partially the reason for

their two King syatem. In case of military maneuvers,

rule would still be secure in Sparta itself. This prac­

tice changes during the Peloponnesian War. In addition, a

system of control for far away territories had to be

created. As a result, Lysanaer developed a system of

harmosts and these harmosts formed a power base for the

Spartan empire. The first time this type of system occurs

is in 426 B.C., in Hereclea, when Sparta responded to

appeals from Trachis and to aid them against the

Octaeans. It was decided that Sparta would assist them by

founding a colony in this territory which was strategical­

ly important according to . (Parke, p.38)

Hereclea was thus crested and run by Spartan officers.

This colony was the wsbryonic form of the garrison system Page 31

which would later be employed by Sparta to stabilize her

control.

Another early example of a harmost appears with

Brasidas. In 424 B.C., the Spartans planned a mission to

Thrace which would be led by Brasidas, not a Spartan Xing.

In addition, Brasidas was supported by an entirely new

type of army* a mercenary group of soldiers. He led this

army on varying military maneuvers at his own discretion.

Brasidas' only power check was carried out annually by a

board of Spartan commissioners. This is the exact same check system imposed later on Dercyllidas, who was a harmost in no uncertain terms. (Parke, p. 42) Thus, it

is obvious that a system designed for handling imperialis­ tic expansion began long before Agesilaus would become the

forerunner of Spartan foreign policy.

To gain further insight into Agesilaus' motivation

for his expansionist policies, it is necessary to examine his immediate predecessor, Lysander. Lysander exercised considerable influence on foreign policy during the

Peloponnesian war. So much so, that Parke refers to the military set-up Of Spartan power as "Lysander'a Empire."

(p. SO) Lysander's influence is not considered a point for debate. Only his motives for obtaining and maintain­ ing such an influential power base are discussed. In book

XIV of Diodorus. Lysander is simply portrayed as the ihSfruiiffit for Spartan foreign policy.._ other hand, writes that Lysander is motivated by personal

ambition in his life of Lysander. Either way, Lysander is

at the forefront of Spartan foreign policy-making during

his lifetime and is clearly imperialistic. He used his

power as treasurer to dominate foreign policy and planned

to take over the role of the Athenian empire. He first

weakened Athens by blocking the Bosphorus, reducing her to

starvation, and by overtaking all of her main outposts.

He then began to establish his system of harmosts, garri­

sons, and tribute which would enhance and maintain

Sparta's influence, as well as his own. Lysander planned

to secure the support of each individual polio by main­

taining a pro-Spartan oligarchy in power. In the life of

Lysander, Plutarch attributes extreme acts of violence

against democrats by Lysander. (p. 536-537)

The island of and Lysander's handling of the situation is exemplary of his method. Lysander seised the city in 404 B.C., and than placed a dearchy in power.

(Xenophon, Hellenic a. l l . m . 7-11) Thorax was empowered as harmost and left with a garrison to maintain control.

Lysander did not actually attack the island. According to

Xenophon, Lysander was preparing to attack when an agree­ ment was reached. The agreement stated that "every free person should depart from the city with but one cloak and that ail else should be surrendered; and on these terms they withdraw.* (Xenophon, Hellenics, II.III. 6-7) Presumably, these "free” people resisting Lysander were the democrats, which he was trying to remove throughout his sphere of interest. Later, in 402 B.C., Thorax was put to death by the ephors. The ephors in Sparta were antagonistic towards Lysander, fearing his growing power and used Thorax to make this point. (Plutarch, p. 537)

The dearchies were subsequently removed. In spite of the absence of the harmost, dearchy, and presumably the garrison, Samos remained on friendly terms with Sparta.

This is probably due to the fact that Lysander had removed the democrats replacing them with a loyal oligarchy.

(Parka, p. 60) Thus we see an area historically insignif­ icant to Spartan policy become pacified, fortified, and run by officials loyal to Sparta. This is exactly the same thing Agesilaus did when he came to power and began his imperialistic policies. Agesilaus used the peace to further his goals and continue expanding Lysander'a system.

Lysander was undoubtedly respected by Agesilaus and heavily influenced Agesilaus* beliefs and policies.

Although Lysander exercised considerable influence in

Spartan foreign interests, he was limited by his heredi­ tary position. Lysander was not eligible for Kingship.

This fact was the only factor blocking him from a position of complete dominance. To tackle this barrier, Lysander planned to assure a Kingship, namely Agesilaus*, which Pag* 34 could be used a* an instrument for furthering his own plans. After the death of King Agis, there was some dispute over who should become King. The apparently rightful heir, Leotychides, was suspected not to be King

Agis' son, but the bastard son of Alcibiades. According to Plutarch, Lysander who was at the time one of the greatest powers in Sparta, attempted to block Leotychides accession to the throne. (Plutarch, p. 713) Lysander instead championed Agesilaus' cause. An expert on ancient oracles, Diopethes, claimed that there had been an ancient oracle stating that it was unlawful to make a lame man

King. Lysander simply interpreted this "lameness'' to mean the bastard status of Leotychides and not the club foot of

Agesilaus. As a result, Agesilaus became King.

Lysander's promotion of Agesilaus' career did not stop at this point. Zn the life of Lysander Agesilaus makes the following statesient t

"And he (Lysander) wrote to his friends in Asia, bidding them request to have Agesilaus appointed to command them in the war against the barbarians... ibid this would seem to be a second favour don* Agesilaus by Lysander, not inferior to his first in obtaining him the Kingdom.” (p. 540)

When Plutarch speaks of this episode in Agesilaus' life, he says that Agesilaus saw Lysander's obtaining this command for him as a more prestigious obligation than the obtaining of the Kingdom, (p. 715) It is also apparent in this description that Lysander is still very much in

liiil ills Si Page 35

charge. Agesilaus agreed to command and requested thirty

Spartans for captains and counsellors. Lysander was

immediately placed in charge of these men. (p. 715)

Also, after Agesilaus' arrival in Persia, no political

questions were directed to M m . All political considera>

tions and honors were directed towards Lysander. This

situation eventually led Agesilaus to become envious of

Lysander. Agesilaus used his iafluence as King to de­

crease Lysander's preecige and actually replaced him in

the realm of Spartan politics. (Plutarch, Life of

Agesilaus, p. 716) Thus, Agesilaus was the successor to

Lysander's policies. A peace treaty drafted by political

figures with markedly different interests, was hardly

likely to cause him to change his beliefs. Agesilaus was

determined to prove to Lysander and the rest of Greece

that he was no political puppet. Ha was the King of

Sparta and would misuse this position to maneuver his

disastrous policies following the examples set by his

Agesilaus established firm control over Sparta at the

height of Sparta's power. A peace had just been signed

establishing Sparta a#the hegemon over Greek peace,

backed by Persian power. Instead of using this position

to keep Greece peaceful end prosperous, Agesilaus warped

its meaning end either used it as a tool or ignored it

entirely to forge his empire. The Peloponnesian allies

. vsisaudis. taLSidu ■ lr 1* -*■ # . m Pag* 36 became subjects. Agesilaua had thus alienated Sparta's power base and Sparta's tyranny eventually surpassed the

Athenians. Sparta oppressively demanded manpower while

Athens had sore tolerably demanded money. (Smith, p. 276)

Eventually Greece was forced to unit* against Sparta and

Sparta would be utterly destroyed. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ancient Sources!

Diodorus Siculus. Diodorus of Sicily. Trans. C.H. Old Father Vol. 6. Loeb Classical Ser. London> William Hsinsaann Ltd., 1982.

This was a valuable source because it provided an ancient perspective without a bias in favor of Agesilaus. It was useful in specific instances, adding facts which Xenophon failed to Mention. Diodorus' writing is creative and interesting, but little work has been done on him personally. It is therefore somewhat difficult to rate his credibil­ ity. In terms of his writings referring to Agesilus, Diodorus seemed to be right on the mark.

Plutarch. Plutarch's Lives. Trans. John Dryden. New Yorki Random House, Inc.

I relied heavily on this source. Its worth lay in the many different perspectives which Plutarch offers. Plutarch evaluated numerous ancient sources at his disposal and related discrepancies between them. Specifically concerning Agesilaus, Xenophon's bias in favor or of Agesilaus occasionally enters into his writings, but over all, Plutarch presents a well-rounded, informative picture.

Xenophon. Hollenica. Trans. Carleton L. Brownson. Vol« I. Loeb Classical Ser. Londont William Heinemann Ltd., 1930. This was ay primary source. Although the account was written after Agesilaus' death, Xenophon was a conter orary of Agesilaus' and his writings are thus invaluable. Xenophon's reports should, however, be read critically due to the fact that he was a patron of Agesilaus and often writes prejudice accounts in AgasiLlaus' favor. SSS&fti Cartledge, Paul. Aoesllaos. Londont Duckworth. 198? Aoesllaos is a broad, in depth study. It provides valuable tactual information concerning not only Agesilaus, but also military statistics, the Spartan political system, racial issues in the Peloponnesus etc. In specific instances such as Mantinea, fhlius etc., it provided helpful insight and statistics. This book is a rsvissd edition of a doctoral dissertation. David offered sane original ideas. In particular, he elaborated on Spartan factional politics, which I found useful for my research. The rest of the book was interesting but irrelevant to my topic.

Ryder, T.T.B. Koine Eirene. London* Oxford University Press, 1965.

Ryder provided a thorough discussion of the King's Peace, its clauses, and negotiations leading to it. The account took into consideration all major ancient sources and served as a valuable subjective resource.

Periodicals*

Cawkwell, 6.L. "Agesilaus and Sparta." Classical Quarterly. 70. (1966)t 62-04.

Cawkwell is clearly a well-read, respected scholar. His writings are thorough and deserve attention and consideration. His conclusions concerning Agesilaus' actions and their consequences for Sparta are incomputable with my thesis, however, so X did not rely heavily on his information.

— . "The King's Peace." Classical Quarterly. 31. (i;U)t 69-83.

This is an interesting factual article discussing the actual terms of the King's Peace. It is important in that it clearly establishes the existence of the autonomy clause. Over-all, it was a minor source.

•fljeOeclineof Sparta." SlAIilM 33* (1983). 385-400.

Again, Cawkwell provides a thorough, factual account. This time, he deals with the military factors which he feels lead to Sparta's decline, this is a significant source because it offers a differing view point from my thesis. I did not, however, rely on it heavily. Hack, H.M. ’ Thebes and tha , 386-382 B.C. ■ Arerlcan Journal of Philology. «■■■* MHMMHanW NMMRMaiMMMmMMaiMHaMnaMHMiaMrMMMaMMiaaMMHMI 99. (1978)< 210-227.

Tha relationship between Agesilaus and Thebes is covered in depth in this article. It proved to be a highly significant source adding insight by illuminating the Theban's reaction to Agesilaus.

Hamilton, C.D. "Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony." The Ancient World. 5. (1982) i 67-78.

Hamilton offers a concise account of the period of Agesilaus' domination. This article is not an in depth study but important because it re-enforced my basic beliefs concerning Agesilaus and hie policies.

Parks, H.W. "The Development of the Second Spartan Empire." (405-371 B.C.)." Journal of Hellenic Studies. 50. (1930)« 37-7^

For my arguments concerning Lysander's influence on Agesilaus' policies, this article was of inestimable value. As well as being a major source, this is highly interesting, well-written, and thorough.

Rice, D.G. "Agesilaus, Agesipolis, and Spartan Politics, 386-379 B.C." Historla. 23. (1974)« 164-182.

When formulating Agesilaus' violations of the Xing's Peace, this article proved to be an important source. It is well organised and adequately deals with available ancient sources.

Seager, R.J. "The Xing's Peace and the Balance of Power in Greece, 386-362 B.C," Athenaeum. 52. (1974)t 36-63.

Seager offers an interesting perspective on the King's Peace and its implications for Greek city states and Agesilaus. The article was a significant source, offering an objective interpretation of the facts.

Sinclair, R.X. "The Xing's Peace and the Employment of Military and Naval forces, 387*378 B.C." Chiron. 8. (1978)t 29-54.

This article dealt primarily with military consid­ erations as opposed to political. It was helpful because it helped create a complete picture of Agesilaus' situation after the Xing's Peace. It was worth reading but not a primary source. Saith, R.B. "The Opposition to Agesilaus' Foreign Policy, 394-371 B.C." Hiatoria. 2. (1953/4)i 274-288.

For diacuaaiona concarning Agaailaua' factional conaiderationa, thia article was a aajor source, in coatbination with the book by Ephraia David, it established a relatively complete picture of Spartan political auneuvers. Smith's interpretation was well supported and highly beneficial for ay thesis.