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Aliftna J, Cmp Evtftt Pn Agenllauh Amt Htw. Trcatwent of the Kitig'ii Aliftna J, Cmp ;».*» **»*»» »*«»*»»* < t l l ( , EVTfTt pn AgenllauH amt Htw. Trcatwent of the Kitig'ii Pence IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF..i^VM?T..,??X..‘!'I.t.?........................................... ...................................................... Apmoved BY ALIS8A J. CAMP ADVISORi DR. J. BUCKLER A SENIOR THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HI8TORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS MAY, 1990 Introduction............ ................* tort It Violation* of tho Autonomy Ciouoo of tho Xing'a Baaea. ........... ........ *• 3 Part lit Motivational Factor* Loading to Agaailaua' Blatant Diarogard for tho Autonomy Clausa....... F. 22 At tit* clot* of the Peloponnesian Htt la 494 S.C., Sparta found herself in a unique position. Athefcs hod boon dofoatod along with har naval empire and many Greeks fait a naw ara of fraadora waa forthcoming for thair country. Sparta had baan tha daciaiva military forca causing Athana to fall and many Greeks lookad to Sparta to ptrotact tha paacaful atmosphere. Sparta had battlad againat Athana in tha nama of liberty and had triumphed. Her influence in tha upcoming yeari would play a prominant role in tha political arenas of all Greek poleis. How Sparta would handle this elevated position depended largely on tha political figure who would work his way to the forefront of Spartan politics, Agesilaus. After tha death of Agesilaus' half brother Xing Agis, tha death of Lysandar, and tha exile of Pausanius, Ageailaua was able to become tha moat influential Spartan leader, shaping Spartan foreign policy. Ageailaua* actual succession to tha throne was surrounded by peculiar factors. One certainty concerning tha episode is that Lysandar secured Agesilaus' Kingship. At the close of the Peloponnesian War, it was Lysandar who shaped many of Sparta's initial policies. (Hamilton, p. 72) Agesilaus would borrow many ideas from his predeces­ sor. One of the most significant beliefs which would be carried ovmr from Lysandar's age of influence into Agesilaus*, would be the idea that Sparta should go ftOAinst tgidtt lflftil Dfietict and lit#nd har inllutiiei out aid* tha Peloponnesus. Agesilaua was imperialistic. In 3(7 B.C., an agreement with Persia was raachad. Tha Xing's Peace was aignad and guarantaad tha autonomy of ail Greek city atatas. Sparta had bean aada guarantor of tha paaca and thua tha protector of the freedom which aha had wrested from Athen's control. Agesilaua, however, would choose to ignore his responsibility to maintain the individual polls' independence. Ha would Instead use the peace as an instrument of imperialism. Agaailaua would continue the policies of his predecessor, Lysander, and would choose not to honor the terms of the Xing's Peace. By encroaching upon his allies and other Greek poleis, Agesilaua would cause a common hostility to rise up against Sparta. Examination of specific instances in which Agesilaus either blatantly ignored or re-interpreted the autonomy clause of the peace, reveals his expansion- istic policies. From the very onset, Agesilaus would use this treaty to lessen the influence of Thebes and settle a personal grudge which he held against the city. Agesilaus' hostil­ ity towards the Thebans was a well-known fact in the ancient world. According to Plutarch, Agesilaus exper­ ienced a drean in which he envisaged hinsel fa s the successor of Agamemnon. (p. 715) For this reason, Agesilaus chose to stop and make sacrifice in Aulis before his Persian campaign. This is the same place Agamemnon sacrificed before his voyage to Troy. Agesilaus chose to use his own soothesayer to complete the ritual or. Boeotian territory. In simplistic terms, the Boeotians were angered because of Agesilaus' disregard for their coun­ try's sacrificial laws. There were political considera­ tions as well. Blundering the sacrifice of Agesilaus was part of a course of action designed to alert Sparta that the Thebans no longer intended to accept Spartan control. (Hack, p. 212) Ismenias and his democratic faction had come to power between 404 B.C. and 395 B.C. The traditionally pro-Spartan oligarchy was out of favor and the new leaders were proclaiming their independence. The destruction of Agesilaus' sacrifice at Aulis was the symbolic gesture indicating foreign policy change in fiibes. Thm ruined sacrifice caused Agesilaus to kail tb Persia udder ill o m m and insulted hi* personally. 8* would never forgive tha Thebans for this disgraceful avant. This personal hatred, combined with tha fact that Thebes was tha second most powerful land force in Greece after Sparta, account for Agesilaus' continued hostility towards Thebes. At the vary conclusion of tha peace, both Agesilaus’ animosity towards the Thebans and his recognition of tha autonomy elausa ware obvious. At the peace conference, the Thebans claimed the right to take the oath on behalf of all of the Boeotian cities. Xenophon reports that Agesilaus refused to allow this. In accordance with the autonomy clause, Agesilaus demanded that each independent city take the oath. <Hellenic*. BK. v.l. 32-34) Instead of waiting for a response from the rebuked Theban ambassa­ dors, Agesilaus immediately instigated military operations against Thebes. The Thebans were not willing to face a Peloponnesian army so sent ambassadors to accept Agesilaus ' terms before he and his army had left the Peloponnesus. By buckling to Agesilaus' demands, the Thebans surrendered their control over the Boeotian league. The Thebans lost more than one half of their armed strength with this concession. (Hack, p. 211) The autonomy clause had been interpreted by Agesilaus to Pipe 9 m m that the Boeotians itin met ^titleii tc set m hsgesxm over « league of allied state*. Agesilaus, howev­ er# did net feel the need to give eg power over hie elm Peloponnesian league. When Agesilaua planned Military action against Thebes, he was clearly using allied forces. Xenophon says that Agesilaua "sent mustering officers to the various cities of the allies." (Hellenics. BX. v.l. 33-4) Clearly, Agesilaus recognised the existence of the autonomy clause and planned to use it as an instrument to increase Sparta's power. Agesilaus employs similar techniques in his treatment of Mantinea. At the close of the Corinthian War the Spartans decided that the members of the Peloponnesian league who had been disloyal must be punished. They began with a campaign against Mantinea in 386 B.C. Xenophon states that they "sent to the Mantineans and ordered them to tear down their wall saying that they could not trust them in any other way to not take sides with their enemies." (Hellenic*, BK. V.II. 1-4) The Spartans claimed that the Mantineans had sent supplies to the Argives, had refrained from fighting due to religious pretexts, and had performed badly when they had fought. It is not unreasonable to suggest that these are mere excuses offered to enable Sparta to secure her dominance. This is especially true if Sparta and Agesilaus could be expected to proceed in the same domineering fashion which they used to handle Thebes. Diodorus states not that tha action was ralatad to Mantinea'a past actions but that tha action was due to to Ageailaua * deaire to place pro-Spartan oligarchic factiona in aa Many citiaa of Qraaca aa possible. (Mice, p. if?) This ia probably ouch cloaar to tha nark, ha K.J. Seager pointa out in hia Athenaeum art Id a , Sparta's treatment of tha aituation was both traditional and predictable. 8ho had weakened Mantinea's oppoaition by ridding of tho democratic faction ami frionda of Argos, ami had aatabliahad an oligarchy loyal to Sparta, (p.40} Another predictable clement of thia aituation waa tha diapatch not of Ageailaua, but of King Ageaipolia. Ageailaua refrained from taking command on tha pretext that tha Mantinaana had aided hia father earlier, teen Xenophon hinta that thia ia mere pretenae atating that Ageaipolia' father "was on exceedingly friendly terma with the leadera of the popular party in Mantinea." (Hellenics, BX. V.II. l>4) Ageailaua emerged from the proceedings in a more positive light than he would had he been the actual aggressor. Not only did sending Ageaipolia save face for Ageailaua, but it also could have harmed Ageaipolia' reputation with the other democrats in Greece. Ageailaua hoped to "instigate a conflict between Ageaipolia and the democratic factions in Mantinea and other Peloponnesian cities." (David, p.27) He also wanted Ageaipolia to become a faithful supporter of his liilisissaissa Sails* own policies. Unfortunately for Agesilaus, Agesipolis' father Pausanius interfered and prevented Agesipolis from executing the democratic leaders. This strengthened Agesipolis' popularity with the Spartan allies, gained the support of democratic factions throughout the Peloponnesus, and earned the support of anti-Agesilaus factions in Sparta. (David, p. 27) The Mantineans responded to the Spartan demand by refusing to tear down their walls. They had been a city since 460 B.C. and had come together of their own accord. They had every right to refuse t>uch a demand by Sparta. Agesilaus' interference here clearly goes against the autonomy clause. "This behavior violated the spirit, if not the letter of the Peace of Antalicidas." (Rice, p. 167) Rot only had Agesilaus blatantly affronted the autonomous decision-making of Mantinea by ordering her to tear down her walls, but also he ordered that the city be divided into its original four villages after it had been militarily pacified. This was no longer simply a viola* tion of the King's Peace. It now constituted a violation of Greek tradition. The polls was a respected institution of Greek custom and its destruction was frowned upon by all Greeks. An interesting political consideration is that these individual cities were to be placed under the control of the big landowners, thus increasing the oligar­ chic factions loyalty to Agesilaus.
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