sign in sign up
<<
Home , Aleuadae, Amorges, Antalcidas, Artaphernes, Cythera (ancient town), Datames

University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository

Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations

2018-11-08 East Looking West: the Relationship between the Western and the Greeks

Ward, Megan Leigh Falconer

Ward, M. L. F. (2018). East Looking West: the Relationship between the and the Greeks (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/33255 http://hdl.handle.net/1880/109170 doctoral thesis

University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

“East Looking West: the Relationship between the Western Satraps and the Greeks.”

by

Megan Leigh Falconer Ward

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN GREEK AND ROMAN STUDIES

CALGARY, ALBERTA

NOVEMBER, 2018

© Megan Leigh Falconer Ward 2018

Abstract

The satraps of Persia played a significant role in many affairs of the European Greek poleis. This dissertation contains a discussion of the ways in which the treated the Hellenic states like subjects of the Persian empire, particularly following the expulsion of the Persian Invasion in 479 BCE. Chapter One looks at Persian authority both within the empire and among the

Greeks. Chapter Two focuses on political corruption and acculturation due to extended cohabitation. Chapter Three discusses financial corruption and the loss of Hellenic identity through money. Chapter Four looks at the treatment of the Greek states as Persian subjects by means of diplomatic intervention. A brief conclusion states that the stability of the Persian

Empire directly resulted in satrapal interest in expanding their borders and intervention in

Greece. The treatment of the Greeks as if they were subjects of the empire provided a stabilizing influence to the Hellenic states despite the image of often depicted in literary sources.

Keywords: Achaemenid satraps, Greco-Persian relations, Greek political corruption,

Persian intervention

i

Acknowledgements

This is the product of many long, hard years of work. I should thank the people who have gotten me through this, although so few have been there since the beginning. For their support when my original plan fell apart, my co-supervisors, Drs. Reyes Bertolin Cebrian and Frances

Pownall, deserve my profound gratitude. Neither of these professors had to take me on, especially Dr. Pownall, who works at a different university altogether. They both allowed me to develope my ideas, and helped me determine where they were lacking.

This work never could have come to fruition without the support of my family, both new and old. You know who you are, and I love you all. My husband, Nigel, kept me going on the worst days with his unwavering faith in my skills and his insistence that he would someday read this document. I’m still waiting for that day. Our children, Cyrus and Helen, whose names will commemorate my time as a Classicist, have been a great joy and distraction from this process.

In any case, thank you, reader. I hope you find something worthwhile in my undertaking.

ii

Dedication

In memoriam:

Francis J. Doyle

1925-2017

Erin K. Vance

1986-2012

Two of the most strong-willed people I’ve ever known.

iii

Table of Contents

Abstract ...... i Acknowledgements ...... ii Dedication ...... iii Table of Contents ...... iv List of Abbreviations ...... vi

Introduction ...... 1 Source Criticism ...... 2 Ancient Sources ...... 3 Achaemenid History ...... 11 Culture, Perception, and the “Other” ...... 14 Greco-Persian Political Relationships ...... 16 Panhellenism ...... 18

Chapter One: The authority of the Persians in ...... 22 1.1 Persia’s Power ...... 24 1.1.1 Positions of authority ...... 28 1.1.2 Persian Reach Outside the Empire: The Case of ...... 40 1.1.3 Satrapal Reach into Greece ...... 45 1.1.4 Satrapal Revolt and Satrapal Authority ...... 55 1.2 Employing Greeks as Persian Subjects ...... 61 1.3 Direct Interference in Greek Politics ...... 80 1.4 Conclusion ...... 91

Chapter Two: Medism, Corruption, and Cohabitation ...... 92 2.1 The Image of Acculturation ...... 96 2.2 Use and Abuse of Medism by Poleis and Satraps ...... 102 2.2.1 The Greeks in ...... 104 2.2.2 The Greeks in Europe ...... 109 2.2.2.1 Thebes ...... 110 2.2.2.2 ...... 115 2.3 Medism and Politicians ...... 121 2.3.1 and : Heroic Demise? ...... 125 2.3.2 and his Persian-Sympathizing Friends ...... 132 2.3.3 An attitude shift in Greece ...... 137 2.4 The Freedom of the Greeks ...... 141 2.5 Conclusion ...... 154

Chapter Three: Money’s De-Hellenizing Force ...... 156 3.1 What Does Bribery Mean? ...... 161 3.2 The Purchase of the Greeks ...... 168 3.2.1 Bribery’s Consequences in ...... 169 iv

3.2.2 Money, Corruption, and Context: the historic tradition ...... 174 3.2.3 Bribery of 5th and 4th Century Politicians ...... 181 3.2.4 Bribery of (gifts to) Ambassadors ...... 190 3.3 ...... 204 3.4 Conclusion ...... 214

Chapter Four: Diplomacy, , and Division ...... 217 4.1 What does Peace Mean? ...... 220 4.2 Diplomacy and the Divine ...... 228 4.3 Established Peaces and Their Consequences ...... 233 4.3.1 The Peace of Callias ...... 234 4.3.2 After Callias ...... 240 4.3.3 The Peace of (387/6) ...... 252 4.3.4 Common Peaces After the King’s Peace ...... 260 4.4 Persian Alliances with non-Greeks ...... 266 4.5 Conclusion ...... 272

Conclusion ...... 274

Bibliography ...... 279

v

List of Abbreviations

Unless otherwise indicated, all translations of Greek or Latin primary sources are my own.

Abbreviation Reference ABC A.K. Grayson. 1975. Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles (Texts from Cuneiform Sources 5). Locust Valley, NY: Eisenbrauns. BNJ I. Worthington, ed. 2007-2019. Brill’s New Jacoby. Leiden: Brill. DB Darius I’s inscription at Bisitun. DNa Darius I’s inscription at Naqsh-e-Rustam, item a. DSe Darius I’s inscription at , item e. Ep. Isocrates Letters FGrH F. Jacoby. 1923-1958. Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker. Leiden; New York: Brill. HO Oxyrhynchia IG Inscriptiones Graecae PFF Fortification Tablets PFT Persepolis Treasury Tablets RO P.J. and R. Osborne, eds. 2003. Greek Historical Inscriptions 404- 323 BC. Oxford: Oxford University Press. XPh Xerxes’ Persepolis inscription, item h.

vi

Introduction

Since Europe was peripheral to the Achaemenid Persian Empire’s core territory, but had been of interest since Darius’ Scythian expedition, the continued interest of the Persians, particularly the satraps, seems puzzling. The inclusion of the Greeks in Persian affairs remains even more opaque, although the Greeks claim that this interest was a result of Greek superiority

(Isocrates 4.135).1 Despite the nearly unlimited Persian financial and military resources, the empire never officially conquered Greece. Had the conquest of the Greeks in Europe been a realistic goal, a more concentrated concrete effort would have been made on the Persian part, especially after the failure of Xerxes’ expedition in 479.2 However, in light of the constant goading of the Hellenic poleis into impulsive and often poorly planned political actions, it is clear that the Persians, when it suited their interests, maintained a decisive attentiveness in the

Greeks and their political disunity.

In this dissertation, I demonstrate that Persian “intervention” was not random but part of an agenda intended to secure the peripheral boundaries of the Persian empire while dividing the

Greeks to prevent them from posing a threat to Persia’s security. Further, in this undertaking, I demonstrate that Persian intervention only appears even in the Greek-biased sources under circumstances that benefited the Persians and their Great King. Since the had incredibly vast resources,3 what would conquering Greece mean for them? If the Persians wanted a foothold in Europe, as they had established in Africa with the capture of , there

1 Briant 2002, 783-800 addresses the primary and secondary sources maintaining this theory. 2 Cf. the conquest and re-conquest of Egypt. 3 Persia’s empire had spread by the early fifth century to encompass 31 countries, and their resources. For a complete summary of the six extant “Empire Lists” see Briant 2002, 173.

1

were other options had the Hellenic poleis proved too resilient or formidable to conquer. Why would they bother with the Hellenic poleis when they certainly had the resources to try direct conquest again should they choose to? Instead they opted to undermine, coerce, and negotiate their way into their influence among the Greeks.

I demonstrate herein that the Greeks were aware of the exploitation of their tensions by the Persians, but were unable to overcome these frictions and unite under one banner. Further, in this work, I demonstrate that the Persians, whatever they may have wanted from the Greeks, never seriously wanted Greece itself but only interfered when doing so would be beneficial to

Persia or would help stabilize the borders of the Achaemenid king’s dynastic empire.

Source Criticism

Despite the frequent appearance of the Achaemenids in the primary sources, the significance of the Persians playing a role in Greek politics is often downplayed by modern scholarship. Largely, focus their works about the relationship, political or military, between Greeks and Persians on either the Spartan or Athenian perspective.4 Lewis discusses the relationship between in particular and Persia, beginning with the Persian court and the place of Greeks (as well as other non-Persians) within it and moving on to Persian records and

Xerxes’ inherited grudge against the Greeks in Europe. Then he turns to Sparta and its role in international (and inter-poleis) relationships and the development and eventual decline of

Sparta’s connections with the empire.5 One particular campaign that receives a good deal of

4 Ryder 1963; Perlman 1968; Lewis 1977; Hamilton 1971; Eddy 1973; Westlake 1985; Westlake 1986; Hamilton 1991; Miller 1997; Smith 1999; Sammons 1998; Allen 2003; Orsi 2004; Hyland 2004; Rauflaab 2009a. 5 Lewis 1977.

2

attention was that of to free Asia Minor from its non-Greek oppressors. The critical trend sees this failed campaign as a flimsy pretext to invade the western part of the Persian

Empire and often as one of the reasons for Persia’s interest in the .6 Asia Minor’s fluctuating relationship and value to the European Greeks has been less extensively addressed;7 however, the frequent reference to its liberation from Persian domination in favor of Athenian or

Lacedaemonian rule has been considered at length.8 The role of Asia Minor in Greco-Persian political interactions, as well as that of , rarely receives such scrutiny despite its position on the western coast of Persia’s empire and the Greek population residing therein.

Ancient Sources

Inscriptions and other archaeological evidence can provide proof of contact between the two cultures but unfortunately describe very little about political intervention and behind-the- scenes activity, which was obviously not broadcast on public inscriptions. Where material evidence fails, however, the written tradition, although often heavily biased and unreliable, provides vivid, sometimes incredible, details. For this reason, I focus predominantly on written evidence in this discussion.

On the Greek end, material evidence largely represents Greek superiority over the

Persians. For instance, the Eurymedon Vase depicts a Greek naked except for his cloak holding his erection on one side and on the obverse, a fully clothed Persian bent over, claiming that “I am

Eurymedon, I bend over” in Attic red figure. The message of this vase seems pretty clear. At

6 Lewis 1977; Seager 1977; Tuplin and Seager 1981; Westlake 1986; Devoto 1986; Hamilton 1991; Hamilton 1992. 7 J.M. Ba lcer provides the most exhaustive work on the subject; see especially Balcer 1991 and Balcer 1997. 8 Seager 1977; Westlake 1979; Balcer 1991; Hamilton 1991; Hamilton 1992; Gorman 2001.

3

Eurymedon, the cowardly and submissive Persians were defeated by the heroic, masculine

Greeks. The Stoa Poikile in Athens depicts the , complete with Theseus rising.

The place of pride was given to , who was urging the Greeks on against the Persians.

This was one of three, possibly four, paintings showing ’s familial victories (

Against Ctesiphon 186; Aelius Aristides On the Four 174; Nepos Miltiades 6.3)9 Moreover, the spoils from Eurymedon were likely used to fund the so-called Cimonian Building Program and defray some of the expenses of the monuments for Marathon.10 The statues dedicated at following major Athenian victories against Persians, namely Eurymedon and Marathon,11 also represented Greek superiority over the barbaric adversaries. In a similar vein, the sculptures and other statues from the Periclean building program, depict Greek victories over eastern figures, both human and monsters alike. The image seen in these works of art, then, is that of Greek superiority over a threat, although a weak one.

Many ancient authors reveal a Persian interest in the Greek political world. ’

Persae depicts the members of the Persian court receiving news of the Persian invasion of

Greece and the failure of Xerxes’ army at Salamis in 479. Aeschylus brings into his work the bias of an Athenian in 472, when the was quite actively waging war with the

Achaemenids in Persian territory and liberating its Ionian brethren where they could. focuses his attention on the great conflict between Greece and Persia. His portrait of the Persians, therefore, contrasts the Greeks with their non-Greek neighbors, demonstrating an understanding

9 Flower 2000, 86-88. 10 Miller 1997, 39. 11 For a more detailed description, see Miller 1997, 39.

4

of the grasp his contemporaries would have had on other cultures. shows limited interest in the Persians since his work focuses on the . As a result, Persian involvement often falls into one of the many silences Thucydides keeps in his work.12

However, where they do appear outside of the Pentecontaetia, it is usually interfering in the conflict between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, namely during the Ionian War or as an ominous looming threat. Already in the work of Herodotus there is evidence of Persian corruption of the Greeks. Herodotus gives the example of the Thebans’ advice to the Persian general, , that he could conquer Greece with money much more successfully than by force (9.2.3).

Xenophon, on the other hand, offers from the perspective of a follower of the troop employed by the Persians () as well as an Athenian soldier during the end of the

Peloponnesian War (Hellenica), a point of view very different from that of his predecessors. In

Xenophon’s historic documents, there is much less contrasting of the Greeks and Persians than seen in Herodotus. The focal point of Greek history, according to Xenophon, had shifted eastward and had marked a more obvious Persian presence13 in the early fourth century.

Xenophon’s perspective on the Persians seems to reflect his time among the empire, offering an alternate perspective through his fictitious .14 , in contrast, wrote his Persica from the perspective of a Greek physician working in the Achaemenid royal court, claiming the

12 Cf. Miller 1997; Boardman 2001; Sider 2001 on the counter-image offered through the archaeological record. 13 Cf. Tuplin 1996, 132-177; Pelling 2007, 37. 14 Sancisi-Weerdenberg 1985; Gera 1993; Tuplin 1994; Johnson 2005; Tuplin 2012.

5

privilege of access to the king as well as the queen. Details provided often seem unrealistic, however, thereby undermining his credibility as a source in places.15

The orators of fourth-century Athens also provide a broader picture of the political situation in Athens and among its allies or enemies contemporary to each speech. Isocrates especially tries to rally Greek support for the idea of unity against Persia as a common enemy who exploits the Greeks’ natural tendencies to divide, while , who was accused by

Aeschines (On the False Embassy 1-3) of accepting Persian bribes to sway Athenian opinion against war in Persia, advocates uniting against the Macedonians.

Further, the orators have a tendency to manipulate history to serve their own rhetorical purposes16. Demosthenes, Isocrates, and Aeschines, among others, should be granted limited trust due to their own goal of promoting their agenda in the assembly rather than reporting the truth honestly for future readers. However, they provide useful insight as to recent events, social memory of past events, and Athenian perceptions of Hellenic relationships to Persia. In these works, accusations of corruption, as well as vague definitions of political corruption and societal expectations become murky.

Historical details often differ from those found in other sources, rendering their version of events unreliable. The orators were writing in retrospect against the background of the renewal of the war with Persia, often tailoring their words to cater to their audience. The notion of profit became inseparable from revenge in Isocrates’s speeches, similarly to Thucydides’ history.

15 Stronk 2010; Brosius 2011; Llewellyn-Jones 2012; Waters 2017. 16 Usher 1999, 353-354.

6

Namely, the Greeks will exact vengeance and enrich themselves at Persian expense.17Moreover, speeches delivered at the Olympics by (408) and Lysias (388) about a panhellenic expedition against Persia, neither of which survives intact, reflect growing desire for the cessation of Greek warfare and a transfer of hostilities from one another to Persia.18 Another example of this appears when Isocrates claims Panathenaecus 13-14 that the primary goal of his career had been to unite the Greeks into concord amongst themselves to wage war against the .19 In other words, a common, wealthy, foreign enemy suited the needs of both and audience in this situation.

One of the most common questions researchers ask before taking on any analysis is: what are the merits of any of these primary sources? After all, none of the Persian inscriptions mention meddling in Greek affairs; the contemporaries to the action who bring it up are Greek, or Greek- biased. Furthermore, one of the most common issues discussed is the value of our sources and their innate biases as well as the agenda of the author in question. Diodorus and Herodotus face much criticism for their story-telling and their seemingly erroneous or deliberately fallacious content.20 Thucydides and his themes receive a good deal of scrutiny not just for what they say, but for their silences as well.21 Some prefer to discuss trends in the sources’ writing, looking for a pattern to justify the author’s particular style and biases.22 Xenophon, an invaluable resource

17 Flower 2000, 69. 18 Flower 2000, 92-3. 19 Flower 2000, 95. 20 French 1972; Murray 1972; Raaflaub 1987; Gray 1987; Moysey 1992; Gygax 2006; Pelling 2007; Haubold 2007; Gehrke 2010. 21 Starr 1979; Bassi 2007; Pelling 2009. 22 Westlake 1983; Balcer 1987; Michelini 1998; Roskam 2006; Rowe 2007; Lanfranchi 2010; Worthington 2010; Raaflaub 2010.

7

for early fourth-century Greek history, particularly since he observed and participated in ’s revolt against Artaxerxes II has been reconsidered in light of his firsthand experience of Persia.23

Most Persian War poems are much older than their prose counter-parts; however the ones that survive are much less intact.24 Phrynichus, Choerilus, and Timotheus all commemorate the

Persian Wars through the eyes of Classical Greek poets, although most of their work only exists in pieces. In 2001, a new Simonides was published with notes and discussion, particularly concerning the glory of the Battle of Plataea.25 This poem glorifies the victory at Plataea, describing the gods’ favor as the Greeks drove the and from Greece,26 and demonstrates a dominant Spartan role in the conflict, thereby implying that the role of the

Athenians was exaggerated by other accounts, such as Herodotus.27 References to the Trojan

War, such as Priam and (POxy 2327 fr. 5+6+27 col. i +3965 fr. 1+2, 10-11)28, would have reminded the audience of a mythological Greek victory against a mighty eastern empire.

Plataea appears to have caught the attention of (Pythian Ode 1.77), Timotheus (Persae) and Aeschylus (Persae 817) as well.

Earlier parts of the conflict were also the subject of poetry. For example, Phrynichus’ rendering of the sack of is rumored to have caused him trouble legally and socially, nearly driving him to exile (Herodotus 6.21.2). The Sack of Miletus is now lost, and was

23 Bigwood 1980; Bigwood 1983; Krentz 1989; Dillery 1995; Seager 2000; Tuplin 2010; Laforse 2013. 24 See MacFarlane 2002, 101-105 for a more complete account for the lost Classical period plays regarding the Persian Wars. 25 Boedeker and Sider 2001. 26 Boedeker and Sider 2001, 13-29. 27 Rutherford 2001, 31. 28 Second century papyrus attributed to Simonides.

8

presented only a single time, the date of which is uncertain, but thought to be 493.29 Such a strong response indicates a strong sense of connection from the audience. The best documented is Aeschylus’ tragedy, The Persae, which presents the Persians as a strange and defeated people,30 with Xerxes taking the central role of a Greek tragic hero. Such representations reflect contemporary attitudes toward the Persians and demonstrate the ways in which war can impact one state’s perception of another. However, they do not reflect a Persian perspective nor offer any great insight into the of the relationship between the satraps and the Hellenic poleis.

One of the more problematic yet essential authors from the Greek world is Xenophon. He is problematic because he does not fit as a traditional since he covered many genres in his oeuvre. As a source of Persian history, he is invaluable since he covers an extensive period of time and a wide variety of topics, although he does so from a Greek perspective. As a result, there is a tendency to superimpose Greek structures and values to his non-historic works in particular. It is with caution that I approach these non-historical works, however, without them, many details of Greek and Persian history would be lost or indiscernible.

The Cyropaedia was created as what Christopher Tuplin calls an investigation of rather than a historical work.31 The bulk of the text focuses on a single year of ’s life, particularly his youth. There are distinctly Spartan features to Cyrus’ education, and his parentage in this work does not follow other extant traditions (cf. Justin, Herodotus,

29 MacFarlane 2002, 108. 30 Cf. Hall 1989; Hall 1996. 31 Tuplin 2013, 70.

9

Ctesias). Xenophon provides the later king a properly royal upbringing rather than the humble beginnings of the other . He also employs his philosophical education by imposing a

Socratic model to moral excellence on Cyrus’ education. It seems most likely that Xenophon was using Cyrus to comment on the political situation of his own day, and he even describes Persia in terms of a Greek , lending the Great King of Persia Greek magistracies and institutions.32 It is easy to interpret this work, problematic as a historic document, as an expression of its author’s desire to rehabilitate an elite and aristocratic lifestyle.

This trend appears in Xenophon’s philosophical and Spartan works as well. For instance, his Agesilaus was written as an encomium, meant to demonstrate virtues and achievements, rather than historical narrative. To this end, events appear in the order of their significance rather than chronologically. Xenophon frequently breaks the narrative to comment on Agesilaus’ actions and his character, and repeats almost verbatim events from his other works, such as the

Hellenica. Moreover, the subject matter had to be treated rather delicately since Agesilaus’ career rendered him what Tuplin calls a controversial figure to the fourth-century reader.33 But this work was written to praise Agesilaus, and often embellishes, exaggerates, or even ignores the truth. For instance, , among others, is strikingly absent from the narrative.34 The eponymous Agesilaus also exploited the propagandist powers of the notion of panhellenism, although his failed sacrifice at does not appear in the encomium (cf. Hellenica 3.4.3-4).35

32 Tamiolaki 2017, 178-179. 33 Tuplin 2013, 73. 34 Laforse 2013, 33-34. 35 Laforse 2013, 34.

10

Other such omissions also presented Agesilaus in an idealized light, justifying or disregarding his failures and flaws. As a result, the work should be consulted judiciously.

Achaemenid History

It is also necessary to consider the history of Achaemenid Persia and her interest in non-

Persians. Scholars such as Pierre Briant, Amélie Kuhrt, David Lewis, Christopher Tuplin, and

Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg in particular, and the rising field of Achaemenid scholarship, have dramatically altered the modern perception of the first consolidated Persian Empire. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a series of thirteen colloquia and their proceedings questioned the state of

Persian history and its sources.36 As a result, calls for new consideration of local evidence pulled from all over the Persian Empire were answered with more substantial and evidence-based analysis of both archaeological and literary evidence. The works of Percy Sykes,37 Albert

Olmstead,38 and even as late as Mohammed Dandamaev39 proved outdated in their approach to the history of the . Kuhrt’s corpus of primary source material combines the evidence from the Greeks and other cultures in organized categories providing a detailed account of the Achaemenids with minimal analysis. As a resource, this sourcebook has enormous value yet offers no analysis of the material. While the sources used are extensive, this work does not provide an exhaustive history of the Persian Empire, but instead insight into its infrastructure.40

36 Achaemenid History vol. 1-13 ed. Sancisi-Weerdenberg and Kuhrt. 37 Sykes 1930. 38 Olmstead 1948. 39 Dandamaev 1989. 40 Kuhrt 2007.

11

Several topics, such as Greco-Persian history from a less Hellenic-biased perspective, have been addressed to varying degrees of completion. The contentious issue is the reliability of sources on Persia from both within and outside the empire. Sancisi-Weerdenburg’s 2001 article on the Yauna, the Persian name for the Greeks, considers the Persian perception of the Greeks as evident in inscriptions and reliefs. She rightly claims that:

Persians on Greeks are really Greeks on Persians and therefore Greeks on Greeks. The

shaping of a Greek ethnic identity benefited from the struggle with Persia and from the

occasion it provided to create a Persian myth… The historiographical tradition

diametrically opposes Greek and Persian values.41

Here she addresses the issue, naming it precisely: there is very little historiographical evidence from the Persian Empire that is properly Persian. Historians are forced to rely on either epigraphic evidence or the writings of other cultures, usually under or opposed to the Persian rule.

What the Greeks have to offer is the perception of the Achaemenid Persians, often what

Sancisi-Weerdenburg calls, in Xenophon’s case, “more a literary product than the fruit of unprejudiced observations”42 and as such, Xenophon’s insight into the Persian empire seen in the

Cyropaedia does not merit its influence on modern work.43 She, along with Briant, rightly places the blame for this perception on Herodotus, who granted the Persians an Orientalized image in

41 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2001, 340. 42 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1987, 118. 43 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1987, 118.

12

his work.44 Briant propels this idea further by providing a thorough discussion of the traditional themes, the authors, and where exactly each perhaps deliberately misinterprets the Persians and their court.45The basic conclusion they and others46 who discuss the historiographical tradition concerning the Persians’ reach is that the Greek sources rarely show an accurate picture of

Persia; sometimes they flatter, but often they malign with their depiction of luxuriant effeminate men who have somehow accrued and held an empire.

The of Achaemenid Persia also warrants a degree of consideration. To that end, Briant also provides a strong analysis,47 but the most thorough and recent work on this subject comes from Thomas Harrison,48 who criticizes the approach and limitations to

Achaemenid history as lacking in understanding and a tendency to judge Persian history with a modern set of biases.49 While Harrison’s assessment may be unfair to the tradition and rather harsh, he is not entirely mistaken. The attribution of undue biases to sources does assume that the original author had, perhaps unwittingly, undertaken the work with a definite perspective in mind. However, he attributes many of the faults he finds in the more recent studies of

Achaemenid Persia to misreading of the sources rather than his simple disagreement with the basic premises of these works. Regardless of how biased or faulty these works on Persian history may be, they provide useful accounts and collections of primary sources, especially non-Greek

44 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1987, 119; Briant 1987, 2. 45 Briant 1987. 46 Lenfant 2007; Isaac 2007; Haywood 2016. 47 Briant 2003. 48 Harrison 2011. 49 Harrison 2011,29.

13

ones, and follow a more academic approach to presenting the Achaemenids, rather than what has passed for scholarship in the past.

Culture, Perception, and the “Other”

Cultural perception, especially of the “other,” receives significant attention in recent years. suggests that the Greeks experienced an upsurge in self-consciousness in the fifth century BCE, which resulted in a need to define the Hellenic self. She further claims that this need to belong to a wider Hellenic community only emerged when under immediate threat by Persia. As a result, the barbarian figure appears as a generic opponent to Greek civilization. She sees a pre-Classical era fixation with linguistic difference, which in the

Classical era developed into the polarization of Hellenes and barbaroi as a rhetorical topos. In her work, she considers the development and presentation of barbarian behavior, with emphasis on the effeminate and luxuriant imagery before discussing what she considers the emergence of the noble barbarian in the Greek literary tradition. Benjamin Isaac further explores these Hellenic prejudices and emergence of Greek military ambitions against Persia. Isaac sees an increase in the disparaging of the Persians as eastward ambitions flourished and questions the reality of such sentiments seen in literary tradition as he sees no evidence that fifth-century Greece considered the Persians inferior to them, even though they were barbarians.50 This view does not take into account imagery that appears in art, such as the Eurymedon Vase.

Jonathan C. Hall, on the other hand, looks within the Greeks’ image of themselves for the definition of what he calls Hellenicity, only turning to the image of the barbarian when looking

50 Isaac 2004 especially 276.

14

at culture.51 Here, again, Herodotus is used as a starting point. Hall considers the Persian general

Mardonius’ statement (according to Herodotus) that the Hellenes wage war by choosing the clearest and most level tract of land so that the victor experiences devastating losses; from this point Hall argues that it is difficult to believe based on such statements, and other communally

Greek customs, that the awareness of shared heritage only emerged as a basis for common political action during Xerxes’ invasion of Greece.52 He argues against the idea that shared heritage was only an image. He then looks to other forms of and art for the barbarian antitype, demonstrating the aggregative Hellenic self-definition from the archaic and classical periods.53

The idea of the “other”, naturally, has been exposed to a considerable amount of speculation and consideration. The “other” as it appears in the Greek sources has a nebulous definition. However, without the “other” how does one know what it means to be Greek? Many critics take on such a question, focusing predominantly on the Greek sources and the ideas of racial or ethnic origin.54 For instance, François Hartog’s discussion considers Herodotus’ use of the “other” to demonstrate the reflection of the Hellenic identity by inversion. That is, a Greek is everything that the “other” is not. His descriptions of the customs and habits of a variety of barbaroi rather than exclusively the Persians (e.g. Egyptians, , and Amazons) emphasize the differences between the other and the Greek.55 He further considers the role of the

51 Hall 2002. See especially 172-228. 52 Hall 2002, 173. 53 Hall 2002, 179. 54 Hall 1989; Green 1996; Cawkwell 1996; Tuplin 1999; Konstan 2001; Lissargue 2002; Briant 2002; Walbank 2002; Browning 2002; Isaac 2004; Cawkwell 2005; Llewellyn-Jones 2012. 55Hartog 1988.

15

traveler in Herodotus’ work, demonstrating again the contrast between the audience’s perceived

“here” and the traveler’s “there” through implied comparison.56 In other words, the self can be defined as an antithetical reflection of the other.

The concept of self-definition to achieve some understanding of the Hellenic identity, however, fails to hold water when it comes to instances of Medism, Persianizing, and even simple cultural contact. Acculturation, its significance, and the role of the Persians in this phenomenon have been considered through a few lenses. Specific instances, such as that of

Themistocles, have been examined but fail to provide a significant enough sample for a proper case study.57 The careers of other members of each culture who thrived in amongst the camp of the so-called enemy, such as , have received attention individually but never as a collective.58 Yet cultural identity particularly in the world remains a rather fluid concept. Erich Gruen’s volume on the subject includes a mere five chapters handling Persia at all, and only three of those discuss the Greeks and the effect of chronic exposure of each culture to the other due to proximity.59

Greco-Persian Political Relationships

The subject of the political interactions between the Greeks and the Persians as the relationship developed has rarely been taken on in full by modern critics. A.R. Burn’s 1962 work on Persia and the Greeks limits itself chronologically to the period leading up to the Peace of

56Hartog 1988, 225. 57 Cf. Keaveney 2003; Gera 2007. 58 Seager 1967; Strauss 1984; Westlake 1985; Westlake 1985a; Aidoso 1996; Hyland 2004; Brouchet 2007; Hyland 2007. 59Gruen 2011.

16

Callias. Lewis later revised this work including his own postscript.60 This work, while exhaustive for its subject matter, limits itself to military conflict and problematically relies strongly on

Herodotus. Margaret Miller’s 1997 book explores the relationship between the Athenians and the

Persians in the fifth century BCE, particularly once open warfare ceased and trade became a possibility. The end of war also allowed for more diplomatic relations between the states to develop. While there was never a cessation of individual Greeks traveling to the Persian empire, and often plying their own trades through it, the explosion of evidence for evolving cultural contact between the Athenians in particular and the Persians had yet to receive a proper cataloguing. Miller’s work successfully explores and discusses the evidence of cultural contact, starting with the spoils of war and ending with a discussion of Athens’ empire and its Persian influence – as well as the need for the Athenians to depict the Persians as effeminate luxury- lovers.

However, Miller, who splits her focus equally between the material and literary evidence, leaves several aspects unexamined.61 What she does provide, however, is an analysis of the trends towards Persian luxury as a status symbol as contact with the Persians, be it mercantile or diplomatic, increased. John Boardman’s work similarly explores material culture as an expression of the cultural connection between the Greeks and the Persians, focusing more on

Asia Minor and Persia’s western satrapies than on mainland Greece, which he does discuss briefly.62 Christopher Tuplin’s works on Persian contact with the Greeks addresses several of

60 Burn 1984. 61 Miller 1997. 62 Boardman 2000.

17

these gaps Miller leaves open,63 as do the recent works of both Robert Rollinger64 and Maria

Brosius.65

Panhellenism

One recurrent topic, and theme, inherent in a discussion of the Greeks and Persians' political relationship, is Panhellenism, the idea of Greece as a whole rather than divided conglomeration of poleis. Jonathan Hall makes room for a brief discussion of the fourth-century orators who promoted this ideal, namely Isocrates; however, Hall falls short of the mark in his analysis. Lynette Mitchell’s 2007 work on the topic considers the origin of the term, and the spirit behind it shown by our Greek sources. The themes she claims sprawl across this now accepted idea of Hellenic consciousness are unity, barbarism, and war.66 All of which while relevant, raise much more questions than Mitchell answers. Panhellenism, whether it should be considered a modern concept or an ancient rhetorical value, becomes a question of the perspective of the rhetoricians of fourth-century Athens, especially Isocrates67 and

Demosthenes.68 When this idea appears in these orations, how realistic is it? Or have Isocrates and Demosthenes in particular perpetuated a construct? Mitchell’s questions lack definite answers, though they do warrant further study. Other such works on the idea of Panhellenism confine themselves to the Hellenic identity and the circumstantial merits of a united Hellas.69

63 Tuplin 1983; Tuplin 1993; Tuplin 1994; Tuplin 1996; Tuplin 1999; Tuplin 2003; Tuplin 2004. 64 Rollinger 2000; Rollinger 2006. 65 Brosius 2003; Brosius 2006; Brosius 2011; Brosius 2011a. 66 Mitchell 2007. See especially xviii. 67 Hamilton 1980; Thompson 1983a; Michelini 1998; Flower 2000. 68 Sealey 1993; Burke 2002; MacDowell 2009; Hunt 2010. 69 Flower 2000; Hall 2002; Mitchell 2006; Mitchell 2007.

18

Most recently, John Hyland published a book bearing the title of Persian Interventions.

In this work, he assesses Persian motivations for intervening in Greek politics, with a specific focus on what he calls the “interventionist period,”70 namely following the Peace of Callias in

449 and prior to the Peace of Antalcidas in 386.71 Hyland especially pays attention to the actions of the satraps and Pharnabazus during the Peloponnesian War, crediting financial problems and royal pressure to perform as motivating factors for these potentates.72

The ancient sources for the Pentecontaetia are sparse, but the work of later biographers, such as , on this period indicate sources from this time that today only exist in fragments if at all (e.g., Ion of Chios; Stesimbrotus of Thasos). Plutarch in particular seems to use traces of these works to personalize what Stadter considers Thucydides’ excessively political account.73 Stesimbrotus’ account of events seems to have been very personalized, to the extent that Stadter calls him a scandalmonger.74 Moreover, the discussion of the role of generals has been minimal.75 Several other topics rarely occur, such as bribery,76 exiles,77 the influence of

Greeks in Persian political decisions,78 and the role the Persian king played in Greek political action. Moreover, there has been a distinct lack of interest in the Persians’ motivation for continued interest in Greek affairs even though the Greeks had proven themselves troublesome adversaries.

70 Hyland 2018, 4-5. 71 Hyland 2018. 72 Hyland 2018, 14, 30. 73 Stadter 1989, lxii. 74 Stadter 1989, lxii-lxiii. 75 Hamel 1998; Flower 2000. 76 cf. Perlman 1986; Hamilton 1972; Taylor 2000; Taylor 2000a. 77 cf. Rollinger 2006. 78 cf. Brosius 2011.

19

In the first chapter, I discuss the state of the Persian Empire, namely the operations of authority figures and the extent to which they reached beyond their boundaries, particularly considering the power held by the satraps of the northwestern front. I then examine the employment of the Greeks by the empire’s potentates as though the Hellenic citizens were participants of the empire. Next I look at direct interference in Greek affairs by the Persians in order to demonstrate that the satraps treated the European Greeks as though they were denizens of the empire rather than neighbors.

I address medism and cohabitation as a form of political corruption according to the

Greeks in Chapter Two. Here, I first discuss the image of acculturation among the who lived in Persia as well as the Greeks in Europe. I then examine the corruption of poleis, both in

Asia and in Europe, in light of the representation by Greek sources. From there, I focus on medism of individuals and the change in attitude before discussing the slogan of the freedom of the Greeks of Asia, ostensibly from Persian oppression.

In Chapter Three, I discuss the use of financial corruption to de-Hellenize the Greeks of

Europe. Having discussed the representation of bribery and its significance among the Greek poleis, I move to considering the ways in which Hellenic politicians were apparently purchased by would-be corrupters, particularly the satraps of Persia. I include sections on bribery cases within the European poleis and as ambassadors to the Persian satrapies. Next I examine the employment of Hellenic mercenary forces as though an easily accessible Persian resource rather than armies of foreign soldiers.

Finally, I consider the use of diplomacy in Chapter Four in order to demonstrate the similarities between the treatment of the Hellenic poleis and that of Persian subject-states. I start

20

by discussing established Greek peace treaties in order to establish an understanding of the Greek norm. Then I examine the role of the divine in Greco-Persian diplomatic contact before moving on to discuss the established Greco-Persian peaces as the empire’s interest in Europe changed due to internal developments. Finally, I use cases of diplomatic contact with non-Greek states as a basis of comparison to the treatment of the Greeks to conclude that the satraps often treated

Greece as though it were subject to their authority, despite having failed to directly conquer the

European poleis.

21

Chapter One: The authority of the Persians in Greece

Persia never conquered the European Greeks. As a result, the Greeks had no reason to respond as though the Persians held authority over them. Yet, despite this fact, often the powerful men of Persia exercised their power outside their own sphere of influence. Within the

Persian Empire, royal authority was absolute. Control over the Greeks both by and across the sea, whom the Persians called the Yauna, was assumed. Naturally, they attempted to extend this jurisdiction to include all the Greeks, in Europe as well as in Asia. When that failed, the Persians turned to more manipulative means, stretching the bounds of diplomacy in order to gain power in

Greece.

As the fourth century progressed, the boundaries between the mainland Greeks and non-

Greeks shrank considerably. Although the representation of the Persians is in no way consistent, during this period the Athenians documented their distrust of the Persians in orations and plays, ridiculing them through comic slander, tragic failure, and anti-barbarian rhetoric (cf.

Aristophanes Wasps 220; Acharnians 62-100; Demosthenes 9.36-40; 10.33; 14.3.36; Lysias

12.59).79 The need for external intervention in inter-state political affairs up to and including diplomatic relations demonstrates the animosity among the Greek poleis since they were unable to settle matters without an external power intervening. It also exhibits the degree of authority gained by the Persians through the form of arbitration.

In this chapter, I explore the ways in which Persia's authorities reached into Europe, beyond their own peripheral boundaries in order to extend their own power. The argument here

79 Hunt 2010, 83-84; Missiou 1999, 65.

22

is that the Persians especially in the adjacent territories naturally extended their authority to the

Greeks as it suited their interests. For the sake of stability on their own frontiers, satraps interfered in political negotiations and stirred up political tensions between powerful poleis.

Persian officials brokered the peace treaties of the 370s and 360s, but to what end? Did it serve the Persians to make peace among the Greeks?

This chapter is divided into four main sections, the first of which has been subdivided into three parts. In the first section, I discuss the nature of power in Persia, looking at first the positions of power that the Greeks were most aware of, and occasionally adapted for their own . From there, I move on to discuss the extension of Persian power into a non-Greek state outside their boundaries, namely Thrace, which bordered on both cultural groups while maintaining its identity as a partially independent entity. Thrace serves as a point of comparison to the influence of the Persians in Greece, especially in light of its familiarity to both the Greeks and the Persians. Moving on from Thrace, I look at Persia’s satraps in the northwest most familiar to the Greek authors, predominantly from the states of Daskylion (Hellespontine

Phrygia), and Sparda (Lydia). How did the satraps secure their positions in the ? Did they manage to extend their power into the Greek mainland? Whom did they chose as allies and to what end?

I continue to focus on the security of the empire’s authority in the Aegean as well as in its own borders. In the next section, I discuss Persian use of European Greeks as though they were subjects of the empire. Specific examples have been chosen based on their contribution to the security of the empire and the portrayal of their influence with Persian leaders. Each figure, usually an exile from his own territory, exercised his expertise to secure his future in Persia and

23

in so doing became valuable to his new leader. Their worth having been proven, they each in some way demonstrated Persia’s power by acting as subjects to Persia’s authority. Conon, for instance, served as a navarch (admiral) to the royal fleet, helping to strengthen Persia's navy. He also aided them at removing Sparta’s from their periphery.

Lastly, I turn to the cases of Persia’s direct interference in Greek political matters. I use this section to explore the idea of Persia as a form of authority in Greece. As fear of the Persians waxed and waned in Greece, so did the power exercised by them. Respect for the power of the

Persians declined with the loss of stability in the Persian west. As the actions of Philip in Thrace and demonstrate, the Greeks began to think of the empire as vulnerable. When Philip was driven back from the edges of the empire, the Greeks expressed a new respect and desire for

Persian interference, particularly in the form of an alliance against Philip.

1.1 Persia’s Power

The potency of Persia outside the empire and its reflection in Greek sources focuses less on

Persian expansion and exercising regal power and more on the instability of the fringes of its empire and agreements with the Greeks. There is a reason that represents the Persian regime as an excess of servitude and an excess of despotism ( 694a) and that sees certain barbarian monarchies as hereditary tyrannies (Politics 1285a 20). Power in Persia, while it was relegated by the authority of the Persian king, permitted hereditary succession, the growth of despotism, and the development of a sense of ownership on the satraps’ parts.

The orators of the fourth century demonstrate that Persia was perceived as a powerful influence in Europe even though it did not belong to the empire. In his attempt to make clear exactly what threat Philip II of Macedon posed to the Athenians, Demosthenes states:

24

ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅταν τιν' ἴδω τὸν μὲν ἐν Σούσοις καὶ Ἐγβατάνοις δεδοικότα καὶ κακόνουν εἶναι

τῇ πόλει φάσκοντα, ὃς καὶ πρότερον συνεπηνώρθωσε τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα καὶ νῦν

ἐπηγγέλλετο (εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐδέχεσθ' ὑμεῖς, ἀλλ' ἀπεψηφίζεσθε, οὐ τἀκείνου αἴτια), ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ

ἐπὶ ταῖς θύραις ἐγγὺς οὑτωσὶ ἐν μέσῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι αὐξανομένου λῃστοῦ τῶν Ἑλλήνων

ἄλλο τι λέγοντα, θαυμάζω, καὶ δέδοικα τοῦτον, ὅστις ἂν ᾖ ποτ', ἔγωγε, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οὗτος

Φίλιππον. (Demosthenes. 10.34)

For I, whenever I see someone who fears the one who lives in Susa and , and

says that he is ill-disposed toward our polis, and who earlier restored the affairs of the

city and offers to do so now (if you do not welcome it, but you vote against it, the blame

is not his), and the same person says something else glorifying the plunderer of the

Greeks at the gates nearly in the middle of Greece, I am stunned, and I fear him, whoever

he may be, since he does not fear Philp.

This statement indicates that the Greeks should rightly fear Philip as the closer, more imminent threat to Greek stability in Europe, both due to proximity and apparent intentions toward the

Greeks. He compares Philip to the Persians, listing the reasons to respect the Persians, especially as restorers of the polis. Here he demonstrates the perception that the king of Persia had the ability to not necessarily threaten but save Athens as he deemed fit.

However, absolute power within Persia was certainly not absolute. The sources indicate that the great king was answerable to his court, at least to some degree. For example, the influence of royal women is debatable, but the queen mother appears to have had some influence

25

over her son, or so Herodotus (3.134.1; 7.3.4) and Ctesias claimed.80 Atossa and Parysatis famously intervened during their sons’ rules (cf. Ctesias Persica FGrH 688 F 15 (55-56, 66);

Plutarch Artaxerxes 18; Plutarch Artaxerxes 6.9; Plutarch Artaxerxes 19). The influence of the queen and the king’s concubines is similarly uncertain. While the historicity of such accounts is dubious,81 as is the Book of Esther’s claim that the queen was able to gain an audience with the king at a moment’s notice and request a banquet for her people (Esther 4-5:9), these examples demonstrate the perception of royal women as influential over the king, capable of changing his actions. Moreover, the king relied on a bureaucracy to manage the empire’s resources, especially its finances. The organization of this bureaucracy is attributed to Darius I (Herodotus 3.89.1-3;

3.97; 3.96). Within this structure, ranking fell out subjectively, with identical positions accompanying varying degrees of authority (Xenophon Anabasis 2.2.1).

Sources from outside the Achaemenid empire interpreted the satrapies in a manner similar to the way the satraps themselves had begun to (see Herodotus 7.224; Curtius Rufus 10.1.22-3): hereditary territory, reined in by a certain set of rules mandated by an external force, one they rarely encountered directly but had the ability to intervene with limited or no advanced warning.

Examples of inherited positions of power include those of Mania, who took her husband’s position with the support of Pharnabazus (Xenophon Hellenica 3.1.10-13, 26), and Amorges, who inherited his father’s position before leading a rebellion against the empire (8.5, 28).

François Hartog interprets these analyses of the nature of power relations as a double mirror of

80 See Brosius 1996, 106-109 on the influence and conflation of the roles of women in the Persian royal court, particularly that of Atossa. On the representation of Atossa in Herodotus and Aeschylus, see Dominick 2007, 434- 437. 81 Note arguments put forward by Brosius 1996, 107-8; Stronk 2004/5; Dominick 2007, 441-443.

26

power through mastery and slavery, with measures made possible to preserve power over the powerless masses.82

Persian authority varied greatly on the western edges of the highlands, doubly so with reluctant subjects. In these places, the satraps and other such representatives of royal power served as the Persian officers with whom Greeks had most frequent dealings.83 Thucydides remains neutral, failing to describe the elaborate, extravagant scenes shown by Herodotus during diplomatic contact between the Greeks and Persians (8.81.3); he instead chooses to show these officials as executives concerned with their Hellenic investments and subsequent revenues

(8.5.6; 8.37.4; 8.43.4). Xenophon shows an envoy from the king turned away by Agesilaus, demonstrating the extension of royal hospitality to a commander actively attempting to claim parts of the Persian empire for Sparta (Xenophon Agesilaus 8.4). Other attempts at diplomacy to

Agesilaus arrived from the , Pharnabazus, with whom he met (cf. Diodorus 13.73;

Xenophon Hellenica 4.1.29-40). Seeing as the diplomats dispatched in 397 were executed by the

Spartans (Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 10.2; Isaeus 11.8),84 the decision to dispatch Timocrates of

Rhodes as the representative of the satrap (whether Pharnabazus (Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 10.2) or Tithraustes (Xenophon Hellenica 3.5.1)) seems prudent. Through Timocrates’ diplomacy, the

Persians seem to have manipulated the Greeks into the Corinthian War. Thus without official authority in any Greek state, the satraps were able to ply the Greeks to their bidding.

82 Hartog 1988, 339. 83 Sealey 1993, 41. 84 Bruce 1966, 272, 276-277.

27

1.1.1 Positions of authority

Within the empire, Persian political and legal authority was usually a straightforward and structured matter. The satrapal court, ruled by the satrap and his bureaucratic support staff, reigned over the local government. The final say, of course, went to the Persians, but the image of Persian oppressors has been greatly exaggerated by predominantly Greek sources. While there is debate over how involved the king was with his satraps or even how aware of their actions he would have been, central authority belonged to him. While it was typical for Achaemenid rulers to adopt the titles eagerly and status of some of the monarchs whom they displaced (e.g.

Cambyses in Egypt and Artaxerxes in ), it is more important to discuss Persian titles since they imposed these roles throughout their empire.85 What happened on the periphery, however, shows that the power exercised by the Persians was not always what had been granted by the king, nor was it exclusively reserved for citizens of the Persian Empire.

The positions of authority and their importance to the running of the empire as well as securing Persian authority within a particular region varied depending on location, affiliation with the empire, and importance to the empire. The king created a system of royal favor and patronage under constant royal scrutiny; the achievement of courtiers gave them a chance to increase wealth and status, and enhance their official position.86 As a result, an ethos of a service formed based on personal ambition and fear of loss of status among the Persian elite.87 While several states had both a king and a satrap, or often a king acting as a satrap, all

85 Tuplin 1987, 111. 86 Brosius 2007, 55. 87 Brosius 2007, 55.

28

authorities were subject to royal approval by the king of Persia. The Persians represented this submission to imperial authority in several ways. The most common of these came in the form of their tribute.

Depictions of the king as a seated figure to whom his subjects bowed or provided offerings also display the manner in which the king ruled over his territory. Inscriptions list the accomplishments of the king and repetitive claim that “by the favor of Auramazda, I am king.

Auramazda bestowed kingship on me.”88 This claim appears in the among others erected by Darius all over the empire.89 The Persian king was considered almost divine and better connected to Ahuramazda than ordinary Persian citizens, and by the grace of his royal authority, which was strengthened by the support of the remaining royal brothers and the aristocrats of the Persian royal court.90

The inscriptions claim that the empire operated under the auspices of Ahuramazda, making what modern historians call the Pax Persica a divinely sanctioned concept. Further, it implied that each people existed in its proper place (DSe 4) as allotted by Ahuramazda, thereby reflecting a Zoroastrian understanding of cosmic ordering of the many civilizations under Persian control.91 Tuplin remarks that under these auspices, the royal duty was to render order to the newly conquered states. Darius’ inscriptions in particular suggest that the way to restore order is through war.92 In other words, from this perspective, war was “essentially a response to

88 Leccoq 1997,187-217. 89 Cf. Granerod 2013, 465. 90 Briant 2002, 183-6. 91 Granerod 2013, 467. 92 Tuplin 2017, 32-33.

29

disorder.”93 Further, Root notes a blurring of the distinctions of the Mazdaistic framework of the

Achaemenid court’s apparent ideology of kinship.94 In this interpretation, the king represented the Persians to the gods, and inversely represented the gods to the Persians.95 As a result, the authority of the king was above questioning. Therefore, within the empire all power was borrowed from the king, empowered by Ahuramazda himself.

A Greek interpretation of this structure can be found through the Cyropaedia. In his fictitious work on Cyrus the Great, Xenophon explains the divine basis of kingship in the Persian empire using a Greek framework rather than demonstrating an understanding of Persian culture.

While the description is probably not wholly accurate, it is a product of Xenophon’s understanding of the Persian empire and his exposure to the younger Cyrus. In this interpretation,

Cyrus imposed sacrifices to Zeus Basileus (comparable to Ahuramazda), , and the other gods as named by the , and set out regulations about the magi’s power. He also decreed a sacrifice to occur after the royal procession (Cyropaedia 7.5.57; 8.1.23).96 This action suggests that the king had a religious role significant enough to dictate rituals performed in honor of the divine, and power over the religious leaders. As with much of the Greek sources below, the physical evidence of these rituals does not necessarily agree with the written tradition. In this case, Xenophon adapted the information offered to him to suit either his or his audience’s familiarity. However, these regulations successfully connected the divine and secular nature of the Great King’s rule.

93 Tuplin 2017, 33. 94 Root 2010, 175. 95 Herrenschmidt 1991, 17. 96 Tuplin 2013, 83.

30

Persia’s infrastructure changed drastically with the great kings that followed Cyrus. The structure of a satrapal court as established by Darius I maintained the Persian authority figure as the titular head of government for the territory designated to that particular satrapy.97 The infrastructure of the satrapy allowed local authorities and local traditions to carry on with little interruption. Tuplin describes the murky distinction between civil and military authority in the administration, since satraps often acted in a military capacity during unrest.98 A satrap was answerable for his (or, very rarely, her) region financially as well as politically (Xenophon

Cyropaedia 8.6.10-15; Hellenica 3.1.14; cf. Herodotus 3.89-97). These duties are demonstrated through the Greek interpretations of the actions of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, among others.

The obligations of Persian subjects, including military aid and unquestionable loyalty echo medieval lieges’ expectations of their vassals.99 While the king had the right to replace his satraps as he saw fit, he rarely did so without good reason, such as the threat of collusion or treason against the empire. For example, in the wake of Cyrus’ rebellion and the actions of

Agesilaus in Asia, several of the satraps on the western frontier, particularly those from Greek adjacent satrapies were replaced. Changing political leadership near the Greeks meant more ambassadors between the states, and necessitated that they develop new relationships within the courts.

It is not necessary at this point to consider all the positions in the courts or even all the ones which are presented by Greek sources. In general, patterns of rule varied through the

97 For a discussion on the use of the term “satrap” in Greek and Persian sources, see Tuplin 2011a. 98 Tuplin 2011a, 40. 99 Petit 2004, 189.

31

empire. This variation was not an indication of imperial weakness, but a positive element since it made the central government more elastic, and sensitive to local needs and conditions.100

However, royal authority in Persia and its extension into non-Persian states appears to have been done with the aid of a select few types of official. These positions are not always clearly defined by the Greek testimonies, and sources from within the Persian Empire assume their meaning was common knowledge.

A satrap governed a territory designated by the Persian king with relative independence of royal influence. Herodotus (1.153) uses the term epitropoi, the “trusted ones” in reference to the governors who administered the provinces in Persia. While the term satrapeie only appears twice in Herodotus, 101 the use of the Greek term expanded as the relationship with Persia developed. According to Xenophon’s , Cyrus’ satraps were valued for their chariots and horses (8.6.10) rather than their loyalty or administration of territory; kinship to king granted granter prominence.

Satraps were known for using generosity to establish dependency among their courts 102in imitation of the royal court. In this system, the basis of their power was not from hoarding their resources but from services and countermeasures among the powerful.103 Satrapal control of their provinces was extremely effective. The rule of exclusively appointing Persians/Iranians to high positions became the general norm. This was later reinforced by Iranians always holding the

100 Kuhrt 2014, 119. 101 Tuplin 2011a, 51. 102 Kistler 2010, 415. 103 Kistler 2010, 416.

32

highest military commands and most important posts.104 The long-term appointments allowed individuals and their courts to develop links with local cults and to form local alliances, both of which enabled them to root their power and to create an identity of interest in local customs.105

Satraps also maintained the Persian road system as indicated by ostraca from Idumaea,106 and provided water for routes through desert regions in the name of the great king (Herodotus 5.3-

7.1).107 In these duties, the satraps served in place of the king, by providing for their regional inhabitants and maintaining access to the royal courts by means of the roads.

The satrap officially represented the empire’s king in the provinces, executed the king’s law, collected royal taxes, levied troops for the royal army, observed the celebration of royal ceremonies at local level, and observed the cult of Ahuramazda throughout the empire. All their major political and military ventures were subject to king’s approval,108 since they were agents of the royal will. Often a satrap would serve as the intermediary between the Persian king and local officials and dynasts throughout the empire.109 This duty is seen during ’ negotiations on behalf of of Miletus during the revolt of (Herodotus 5.31-2).

The satrapal authority to act on behalf of the Persian king can be seen during the Persian support of the Peloponnesian War, through the combined actions of Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus, and

Cyrus.110

104 Kuhrt 2014, 119. 105 Kuhrt 2014, 119. 106 Kuhrt 2007, 748-751 no.15 107 Kuhrt 2014, 125-6. 108 Brosius 2007, 36. 109 Brosius 2007, 36. 110 Brosius 2007, 36.

33

There were other ways that the satraps borrowed the king’s authority over their subjects.

For instance, Pharnabazus acted as he saw fit to quell the rebellion of Evagoras of Salamis

(Diodorus 15.2.2). In this way, he aided to secure the empire by borrowing the king’s power. A satrap also imposed arbitration and tribute re-assessment in the region without first consulting the king.111 This role also becomes evident considering the example of Artaphernes in , who summoned ambassadors from the Ionians and compelled them to pay a fixed tribute while obeying the king’s law (Herodotus 6.42). Throughout the empire, the law appears to have remained uniform, as did the expectation that the satraps reinforced it in the great king’s name.112

Further, in his inscriptions, Darius speaks of people obeying his laws (DB8, DNa 3, DSe 4, XPh

3) but does not disclose how they would have been enforced or even what these laws entailed.

Moreover, Ezra was told to punish those who violated the king’s law (Ezra 7.25). The penalty seems to have been at the discretion of the satrap in question since none is specified in the non-

Greek sources. In performing this duty, the satrap strengthened his own as well as the king’s authority in his region.

The chief duty of a satrap was to collect tribute and send designated sums to the king in

Susa.113 Good, loyal satraps stayed within the relatively loose bounds of royal policy. Any change in policy without royal approval would be perceived as tantamount to revolt against the empire, and there would be serious consequences for doing so, including removal of the satrap

111 Tuplin 2011, 51. 112 Tuplin 1987a, 112. 113 Briant 2002, 65-66.

34

from office or even execution.114 Further, only with royal authorization could a Persian satrap gain access to the royal storehouses and provisions along Royal Road, rendering communication necessary between the king and his officials.115 In such ways, the distant central authority controlled the relatively autonomous potentates at the peripheries of his domain. Even with such restraints, the king seemed to encourage his satraps to expand their realms, recruiting those with skills or connections that could help them realize such ambitions. Examples of such connections include the ties between Cyrus the Younger and the Spartans, which later resulted in Cyrus’ employment of a Spartan band of mercenaries in his revolt, and Pharnabazus’ relationship with

Conon. In these ways, the satraps grasped, even if only temporarily, control of some of the islands in the Aegean, and further extended their reach.

Greek references to the king’s eyes (episkopoi) (IG I2, 10: 10-16; Thucydides 1.98.4,

137.2; Wasps 335; Herodotus 1.144.2) and ears (gauskayya)(Elephantine Papyri C

27.9; Daniel 3:2-3; Herodotus. 1.100.2) are unsure of exactly what the scope of each position entails. Aristophanes’ reference to the episkopoi as an ambassador in the Acharnians (100) suggests an international presence as part of this magistracy that was familiar enough for the reference to be humorous.

Most frequently, modern scholars interpret the role of the episkopoi as some sort of satrapal overseer.116 An episkopos never remained in one place, rotating through the provinces of the empire instead, nor did the appointment seem permanent. As for information, there seems to

114 Waters 2010, 818. 115 Waters 2010, 819. 116 Balcer 1977;Hirsch 1985; Brosius 2007; Tuplin 2011.

35

be not much available beyond the roles of provincial and city governors.117 Their roles included intelligence gathering, likely as a chief informant who reported directly to the king.118 As such the episkopos would gather information on signs of seditious activity, threats to Persian peace, and promote stability within the empire.119

He would occupy the role of a legal adviser who advised the empire’s subjects on government. There was probably at least one Eye per satrapy120 even though their function in a court was unclear. Some sources regarded this official as a high personage (Xenophon

Cyropaedia 8.2.10-12; Plutarch Artaxerxes 12.1),121 making him a noteworthy magistrate within a court, yet the absence of this King’s Eye from surviving Persian records122 undermines the significance of this role. Even more ambiguous and almost unattested by Greek evidence is the role of gauskayya. Unlike the episkopos, the Athenians did not adopt a similar magistracy. The king’s ears appear to have assisted king’s eyes in the supervision of his satrapies and to have served as a type of state’s attorney.123 These officials would have reported to the king at some point regarding occurrences and visitors of interest, making their cooperation or at least corroboration necessary for the satraps on the northwestern frontier to properly interact and influence the neighboring Greeks.

The role of the chiliarch is less ambiguous and much more personal than that of the episkopos. One of the most famous holders of this position was Bagoas, known for having been

117 Tuplin 2011, 52. 118 Brosius 2007,30-31. 119 Brosius 2007, 31. 120 Balcer 1977, 261. 121 Hirsch 1985, 112. 122 Hirsch 1985, 115. 123 Balcer 1977, 256-257.

36

involved in the assassination of Artaxerxes IV in 336 ( 2.14.5), making Darius III’s claim to the throne of the Persian Empire, demonstrating the importance of the role itself. The chiliarch served as the chief bodyguard and personal attendant of the king. No source gives the exact scope of this position’s duties. However, Xenophon gives credible details of Tithraustes’ execution of Tissaphernes (Hellenica 3.4.25)124 while holding this office. These examples demonstrate that at least two of the holders of this title were capable of lethal activities at the king’s command and appear to have secured the king’s position against threat or for the next chosen successor (cf. Xenophon Cyropaedia 7.5.66-68). Another position, the hazarnaptis, of

“Commander of a Thousand”, is testified in Ctesias’ Persica (FGrH 688 F15.48-50), which

Kuhrt has interpreted as the chiliarch125, although Stronk leaves the term untranslated as the

Greek azarbites,126 suggesting ambiguity as to the position’s definition.

Diodorus claims that Alexander III of Macedon adopted the office of chiliarch from the

Achaemenid empire by assigning it first to Hephaestion (18.48.5). The powers granted to the chiliarch extended to the entire state machinery, with power second only to the king, much like a prime minister according to older traditions, although more recent views claim that this function had no administrative responsibilities under Alexander, although the Achaemenids had a court chiliarch and a chiliarch.127 Further, Alexander Meeus observes that based on the functions performed by Alexander III’s chiliarchs in (Arrian Succ. F1.38; Diodorus

124 Sealey 1993, 40. 125 Kuhrt 2007, 332, 540, 583. 126 Stronk 2010, 349. 127 Meeus 2009, 302-303.

37

18.39.7; FGrH 155 F1.4), these officers served only military functions, such as the command of the cavalry.128

There is little evidence for non-militant duties suggested by the Greeks, such as that of a grand vizier.129 Other duties seen include accompanying king on campaign (Polyaenus 7.12).

This would be fitting for the leader of the king’s bodyguard,130 although limiting the role of chiliarch to the duties of a bodyguard seems short-sighted. For example, Herodotus calls

Hydarnes the general of sea-coast of Asia under Xerxes (7.135.1), as well as the leader of athanatoi (the Immortals) at (7.211.1). While Herodotus could be mistaken in identifying as the leader of Immortals instead of the melophoroi (the royal bodyguard), it renders the exact nature of role unclear.131 A final role assigned to the chiliarch is that of a gate-keeper, seen in Themistocles’ arrival at the court in Persia (Plutarch Themistocles 29.1).

Often there were sub-satraps and hyparchs appointed as satraps’ representatives, lieutenants, and sub-rulers, although the distinction between a sub-satrap and a hyparch is not made clear by Greek or Persian sources. For instance, hyparchs were given territories or fortresses to govern in a satrapy, or in a territory which the Persians held part of but not the whole as seen in the cases of Thrace and the Balkans. One example of a sub-satrap comes from

Xenophon, who tells the story of Mania, the sub-satrap of territory of following the death of the previous title holder, Zenis, her late husband (Hellenica 3.1.10). From this account, her activities in this role included acting as a satrap in her designated territory, including such as

128 Meeus 2009, 306. 129 Cf. Meeus 2009, 304-305. 130 Charles 2015, 283. 131 Charles 2015, 286.

38

collecting tribute (3.1.11), providing gifts to the satrap (3.1.12), keeping the territories secure, and expanding the territory where possible (3.1.13). Xenophon claims Mania even accompanied her satrap, Pharnabazus, in the field, acting occasionally as his counsellor (3.1.13). Her territory and wealth, and other such possessions clearly belonged to the satrap as well as the sub-satrap, demonstrated by Pharnabazus’ repossession of the territory from Meidias, her son-in-law, whom he executed following her murder (3.1.26).

The hyparch on the other hand appears to have had a more militant role, making them more familiar to the Greeks documenting events along the North-western regions of the empire.

Arrian includes Mithrobuzanes, hyparch of , in his list of Persian commanders slain at Granicus (1.16.3). He includes Arsites, the hyparch of , among the leaders discussing tactics at Zeleia (1.12.8), claiming Aristes would not tolerate a single house belonging to his people to be burnt, garnering support from his fellow commanders (1.12.8).

Other positions named in inscriptions, such as the Elephantine Inscription (AP) lack description or Greek interpretation, including fratarak, rab hayla and sgn.132 The fratarak appears at Saqqara and Elephantine (Saqqara 27.5; AP 20.4, 27.4, 30.7), named as a member of a

Tribunal of Nefa, apparently superior to the office of rab hayla. For this reason, Tuplin interprets the role to be one of a provincial governor.133 Without further description, such positions are open to interpretation, however. The shortage of Greek evidence for them suggests that the

Greeks did not encounter, or at least lacked awareness of, men in such posts. Whatever these

132 Tuplin 1987a, 125. 133 Tuplin 1987a, 125.

39

other types of positions may have entailed, they do not seem to have exerted authority in the

Hellenic sources.9?

All the positions discussed above appear relevant to the below discussion; however, the satrap occurs most frequently as a point of contact rather than a curiosity to the Greeks. The satrap as well as the military commanders expanded the influence of the Achaemenid Empire as opportunity allowed, in ways which varied depending on the state in question. Before reaching into the Hellenic poleis to their northwest, the Persians expanded (and partially retracted) into

Thrace. Evidence also suggests the empire reached into the Balkans, and even as far as Russia.134

Since discussion of Thrace appears in Greek texts as well as Persian inscriptions, it provides the best example of a non-Greek neighbor where the Persians intermittently extended their influence.

1.1.2 Persian Reach Outside the Empire: The Case of Thrace

Achaemenid generals led armies to conquer and reconquer a considerable empire. Many nations and their inhabitants were consequently subjected to Persian rule, which allowed them to thrive and maintain their original cultural identity to a high degree, as testified by the works of the Jews living in the , the Phoenicians’ inscriptions from the Achaemenid period, and the

Greeks inhabiting Asia Minor among others. The peripheral regions including Nubian groups in

Egypt, Scythians beyond Oxus, Caucasus, Georgia, and demonstrate regular contact with Persian empire, where local dynastic residences were architecturally modeled on royal centers, among other such indications of close links with the Achaemenid empire.135Anatolia and

134 Oleg Deripask Velnoe Delo Foundation 2016: A stele inscribed in Darius I’s name was discovered in , which makes mention of Marathon. The full text of this stele has not yet been published. 135 Kuhrt 2014, 117.

40

Lydia are both examples of major states which thrived under Persian rule. Non-Persians in contact with Persia often established peaceful relations either as subjects or allies. Expressing

Persia’s authority over its subjects would be redundant here. Non-Greek states that were not under Persian domination, other than Egypt with its intermittent periods of liberation and re- subjugation due to infrequent revolts,136 are rarely well documented. Herodotus’ list of territories in the empire is not an accurate reflection of satrapal units, and should not be used to conclusively identify the extent of the empire.137

The territory of Thrace, sometimes part of the Persian Empire, others an independent state, exemplifies the reach of Persian authority. No one source talks about a satrap residing in

Thrace. The common suggestion derived from this shortage is that the Persians established military districts in the region instead.138 Thrace’s geographic location makes it an excellent case study for the overextension of satrapal power as well as the type of relationship that developed between the Greeks, the Persians, and a population that was technically neither of these groups as well as under neither’s control. Over all, the political status of Thrace in Persian administration remains unclear. As Brosius notes, it appears to have been under Persian control at the same time as the region was;139 however, control wavered during the fifth and fourth centuries.

136 See Ruzicka 2012 regarding Persian difficulties controlling Egypt. 137 Brosius 2010, 31. 138 Zahrnt 2015, 38. 139 Brosius 2010, 32.

41

Persian documents refer to non-specific Yauna as subjects to the empire along the northern Aegean Sea. While it is very possible that the term applies to a number of others, since the term seems to apply to all Greeks,140 there is additional material evidence to consider here.

The Persepolis Fortification Tablets refer to Skudrians, who appear to have been a significant (in size) ethnic group noted in service of Persian King (PFa 11; PF 2055; PFa 18).141 On the staircase relief at Persepolis, these Skudrians wear the Scythian hat with tasseled capes and long beltless coats.142 Wearing an outfit so similar to their neighbors, the Scythians, whom the

Persians failed to conquer, the Skudrians seem to refer to specifically Thrace. A series of hyparchs were selected to act as sub-governors for non-satrapal Persian territory. Darius installed these officials at , Cyme, and Thracian Doriscus.143 The possibility of Thrace as a non- satrapy sub-state of the Persian Empire would explain how the population was absent from

Persepolis Treasury Tablets, as was its tribute.144

Thucydides (2.29.2) says that Teres, a king of Thrace, founded the kingdom of Odrysians in the fertile valleys in Thrace after the retreat of Persians, leaving the Persians to establish fortifications on the outskirts of this territory and in the Thracian highlands. With additional support from the rebellious satrap, Ariobarzanes, Teres’ son Sitalces made significant territorial gains,145 showing the benefits open to a non-Persian ally of the Persians. A of Sestus in the

Chersonese occurred in 362 supported by Ariobarzanes in conjunction with Cotys, the king of

140 Balcer 1988, 4. 141 Balcer 1988, 3; Cf. Briant 2002, 173. 142 Balcer 1988, 7. 143 Hallock, PFT . 144 Cameron PTT 145 Zahrnt 2015, 40.

42

the (Xenophon Agesilaus 2.26).146 Cotys’ collaboration with Ariobarzanes and

Autophradates suggests that the Thracian relationship with western fringes of empire was amicable, yet they appear to have remained independent of the empire. For this reason, Thrace was seen as a source of refuge for Greeks.147 Even though this state was not technically part of the empire, Persian involvement was still heavy in the region, especially due to the proximity of

Pharnabazus’ domination of , which the Greeks call Phrygia.

Xenophon’s experience in Thrace stirred his aspirations to found a city. 148 His description of Thracian customs (Anabasis 1.1.9, 3.4, 2.6.2,5) bears a striking similarity to the early Greek descriptions of Persia: lavish feasts, extravagant gift exchange, elite hunting, and the consumption of skewers of meat (Anabasis 6.1-3), also features of a Macedonian feast.149 These similarities may be coincidental, but due to the constant contact, positive relationship, and

Persian presence within Thrace, such a theory seems unlikely. Thrace supported Artabazus’ revolt against Artaxerxes in 356. In fact, on account of the relationship between the states, this revolt was led by Chares of Thrace.150 The Persians even installed 2 or 3 hyparchs as their agents in Thrace (Herodotus 7.105-6; Herodotus 9.116; Xenophon Anabasis 6.4.24), demonstrating their continued authority in the region despite the inconsistency of Persia’s role as the region’s leader. Taxes were collected from the Asiatic part of Thrace, which belonged to the satrapy of

Dascylium, held by Pharnabazus in 400 (Xenophon Anabasis 6.5.30).

146 Heskel 1997, 79. 147 Sears 2013, 94. 148 Sears 2013, 113. 149 Sears 2013, 208-211. 150 Sears 2013, 294.

43

The Greeks’ relationship with the Thracians, in contrast, was much more ambiguous than that of the Persians and Thracians. Due to its proximity to both, Thrace developed a relationship with each.151 Demosthenes contrasts Thracian with the Greek polis, comparing the examples of Charidemus, who committed many crimes (23.138) and Iphicrates (23.130). As established, parts of Thrace hosted semi-permanent Persian settlements. There were also several

Greek colonies established along the Thracian coast. The Thracians themselves, however, remained under control of neither group. Naturally, the defeat in Greece led to a significant reversal of Achaemenid control of Thrace in 479.152 After the Persian withdrawal from Greece, the hyparch at Sestus was crucified by Xanthippus and his men (Herodotus 9.120.4).153

Nevertheless the Persians maintained a presence in Thrace and developed a productive relationship with the inhabitants. Control over Thrace was never completely secure due to the lack of urban center under Persian control in this territory.

In many ways, Thrace, even still a non-satrapy, remained a remote nation on the peripheral edges of the empire. The Persians were able to set down a degree of nomos and establish several fortresses in the region.154 Because of the relationship between the Thracians and the Persians, during the Macedonian conquest of the 340s, Philip set up a new to rule over their newly acquired Thracian territory.155 While strictly speaking, the Thracians were independent of the Persians, a Persian presence in Thrace maintained a degree of security. They

151 Gorgova 2015, 78 notes a particular blending of Greek and Persian styles in Thracian grave goods. 152 Balcer 1988, 16. 153 Balcer 1988, 3. 154 Balcer 1988, 19-20. 155 Delev 2015, 54.

44

were as foreign to the Hellenic presence as the Persians initially, yet responded in a much more positive way. There was no official treaty or degree of control established between the Thracians and the Persians, but the presence of the Persians benefitted the subjects of the Thracian kings, and the Persians were able to maintain fortresses, a degree of influence, and an access way to

Europe from Asia by land. To the Greeks, Thrace seemed a gateway to Asia. The relationship of the empire to the Hellenic poleis provides a basis of comparison of Persian reach into a familiar yet non-Hellenic state. In light of the treatment of Thrace, the intervention and influence in the

European Hellenic states becomes clearer. Motivations for conquest and contact in Thrace may not have been identical to those for Greece; however, they were similar in many ways, discussed below.

1.1.3 Satrapal Reach into Greece

Influence in places such as Thrace often led to increased exposure to the Greeks in

Europe. Thrace’s proximity to Greece as well as the Persian Empire meant that treatment of one could easily be compared to the handling of the other. While Persia’s influence in each location remained intermittent throughout the relationship with each, what became common after the mid-fifth century was the apparent extension of satrapal reach. Even though no satrap had official jurisdiction over any Hellenic state outside the Persian Empire, they began to exercise a high degree of influence over the Greeks, particularly during times of war. The limited power of a satrap, discussed above, may have been acknowledged by Greek authors. Herodotus considered them inferiors to the king, although he does not exactly define the role of a satrap (3.89-97).

Thucydides shows them as authority figures answerable to the Persian king but with the autonomy to act independently (8.56). Xenophon demonstrates the most thorough although

45

biased understanding of the powers of a satrap due to his exposure through Cyrus the Younger’s uprising against Artaxerxes (Xenophon Anabasis 4.4.21, 7.8.8; Hellenica 4.1.15-17, 4.1.24,

4.1.33; cf. 3.4.13; Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 21). Nonetheless, a satrap would have appeared to have the strength of the Persian Empire and the power of its king behind his actions.

While the examples of satrapal ambition and flexing of political muscle are plentiful, only a few will be discussed here. It seems to have been part of the satrapal imperative to extend the limits of their power by taking nearby territory.156 For this reason, I do not consider the influence of the central satraps, particularly in regard to their impact or interest in Europe. The focus of this section will be the very well documented actions of the satraps Tissaphernes and

Pharnabazus, supplemented by noteworthy actions of other satraps while they were not in revolt against the Persian king. These particular satrapies merit such attention because the satrapies of western were linked firmly to the king in Persia, an essential element to maintaining authority in frontier regions.157 Further, these particular satraps maintained regular, frequent contact with the Greeks and were consequently more likely to appear in the works produced by

Greek commentators, such as Xenophon and Thucydides. Through their contact with the Greeks, often through taking advantage of Greek resources or conflicts, these figures each expanded their influence within Persia as well as securing or expanding their own boundaries.

Pissuthnes represents the first of these satraps to intervene in the affairs of the European

Greeks on his own initiative, specifically the affairs of the Athenian empire. Pissuthnes, for instance, considered longest reigning satrap of Sparda, was appointed to his seat in the mid-fifth

156 Briant 2002, 65. 157 Dusinberre 2013, 45.

46

century until 415 or 414. Due to his proximity to the Aegean, he involved himself and the

Persians in revolt of against Athens, by forming an alliance to restore Samians to the government of their own polis. He gathered 700 mercenaries and with their help reinstalled non-

Athenian Samian government (Thucydides 1.115-116),158 extending Persia’s influence through this alliance while undermining Athenian authority and prolonging a revolt against the Athenian empire in 440. He likewise supported the revolt of Colophon in 430 (Thucydides 3.34.1-2),159 again flexing Persia’s policy of restoring dominance by in the Aegean by taking advantage of

Athenian struggles.160

His example would be emulated by other satraps, who intervened during the

Peloponnesian War, who arguably started the Corinthian War, and who mediated common peaces. Pissuthnes’ activities in Ionia and enhanced his reputation as a source of aid against Athens. As a result, Lesbian and Ionian exiles believed that Pissuthnes would support a

Spartan landing and larger Ionian uprisings against the Athenians.161 However, this satrap demonstrated his lack of interest in the wider Greek war and the vulnerability of his coastal acquisitions when the rebellion of Lesbos failed.162 Such actions suggest that this satrap’s interest lay predominantly not in aiding Greek forces against Athens, but instead in securing and expanding his own boundaries.

158 Waters 2010, 822. 159 Roosevelt 2009, 29. 160 Waters 2010, 823. 161 Hyland 2018, 39. 162 Hyland 2018, 39-40.

47

Chronologically not the next of the satraps, though next in significance to this discussion is Tiribazus, who was so favored by Artaxerxes II that he replaced Tissaphernes after Tithraustes executed the overly powerful satrap in 395. His appointment to the satrapy was short-lived, lasting only three years. During this time, the satrap arrested Conon, dramatically altering previous policy. Tiribazus’ significance lies more in his actions toward his fellow Persians than his interactions with the Greeks. Tiribazus’ loyalty to the king resulted in the execution of

Tissaphernes, a man in a position of power who at one point represented the Great King

(Xenophon Hellenica 3.1), due to complaints of neglect and treachery following the withdrawal of the Lacedaemonian forces from Sparda (Xenophon Hellenica 3.4-3.5). Tiribazus first appears at Cunaxa, having advised Artaxerxes to do battle with Cyrus the Younger, and having provided a new horse for the king during battle (Plutarch Artaxerxes 7.3, 10.1).163 This role demonstrates a high degree of influence with the king as well as the satrapal obligation to provide as the king saw fit. However, his significance stems from the role he played in securing the north-western edges of the empire, and from the ways in which he demonstrates the instability of the position of satrap. Tiribazus’ appointment also demonstrates the satrapy as a reward for service.

His earlier position, officially commander-in-chief of Persian armies in Asia in 392, led to his promotion to a position of higher trust and power. In this original position, he could receive ambassadors but not come to agreement without the king’s approval, and even had the power to arrest Conon (Xenophon Hellenica 4.8.12-16).164 His change in positions also displays the importance of the king’s trust following the insecurity on the western frontier in the . He

163 Briant 2002, 321. 164 Briant 2002, 321.

48

was replaced by Struthras after only a few years as satrap (Xenophon Hellenica 5.1.6), yet read the royal proclamation at Susa in 387 (Xenophon Hellenica 5.1.30), demonstrating continued importance to the Persian-Hellenic relationship despite the loss of his western posting.165

His alliance with Sparta demonstrated his ambitions to expand his influence beyond the traditional boundaries of Lydia. This alliance was supposed to be cemented through the intended marriage with Glos and Tiribazus’ daughter in exchange for giving up freedom of Greeks in Asia

Minor. This marriage never came to pass because Tiribazus’ alliance with Sparta was considered too dangerous. Evagoras’ envoys sent to Sparta possibly to counterbalance Tiribazus’ actions

(Xenophon Hellenica 4.8.24).166 An alliance too dangerous to formalize would threaten Persian security since the Spartans were still attempting domination of the Aegean Sea, which they had in 411 conceded to Tissaphernes. His demise came at the hands of Orontes, a fellow general who wrote the Great King that Tiribazus had betrayed the empire’s interests. As a result, Struthras replaced Tiribazus as satrap of Lydia in 392 (Diodorus 15.8.2-5).

Tiribazus was later put on trial and cleared by the judges for his record of service to

Artaxerxes (Diodorus 15.10-11). This figure’s rise and fall can be attributed to his behavior, the employment of the royal hero motif, and the abuse of royal propaganda in the tales of

Tiribazus.167 Instead of life as a royal hero and receiving an appropriately royal reward, namely the seat of power held temporarily, he was removed from his position on the northwestern front in order to secure the interests of the great king. Considering Tiribazus as a royal hero explains

165 Briant 2002, 321. 166 Weiskopf 1989, 20-21. 167 Briant 2002, 323

49

his re-appearance in the royal court, reading the royal proclamation in 387 (Xenophon Hellenica

5.1.30). In this way, Tiribazus’ rise and fall demonstrate how an individual destiny, tied to the sovereign’s favor, received promotions and demotions as a result of his merit as recognized by the king, and as defined by the king.168

Tissaphernes, whose limited involvement in the Peloponnesian War aided the Spartans to bring the war into the Aegean Sea, flexed his boundaries more than most satraps appear to have been comfortable doing. The introduction of Achaemenid intervention in war makes it clear that the Persian quarrel with Athens could not easily be resolved. Due to Athenian intervention in the revolt of Amorges, Tissaphernes formed a Spartan alliance (Thucydides 8.5.5) in a way similar to Spartan-Macedonian relationship.169 Tissaphernes’ motivation for claiming the friendship of

Sparta stemmed from the need to put down revolt of Amorges.170 Although with the resources at his disposal, this satrap had the power to end the Peloponnesian War decisively, he elected not to. The fleet he had at his disposal could have easily altered the course of the war. 171

Moreover, the overly harsh terms of Persian support presented to Pisander seem intended to force an end to the talks between Tissaphernes and Athens (Thucydides 8.56).172 Instead,

Tissaphernes employed a policy of remaining on both sides of the Peloponnesian War in 411, making it very likely that the Phoenician fleet was never meant to participate in this conflict.173

168 Briant 2002, 323. 169 Hyland 2007, 3. 170 Hyland 2007, 4; Hyland 2018, 49. 171 Lateiner 1976, 283. 172 Hyland 2007, 7. 173 Lateiner 1976, 277.

50

Further, this indecisive intervention may reflect other concerns than the war in the Aegean,174 such as the revolt of Pissuthnes’ son, Amorges, or the frequent trouble in Egypt. Despite the ambitions of a Lydian satrap pursued by two sides of a Hellenic war, imperial power, especially that exercised by a satrap had its limits, and the embassies sent by each side could have easily left Tissaphernes feeling ambivalent about his position in the empire. At the time, 412 and 411, the outcome of the Peloponnesian War depended on action, which each side required an influx of money in order to achieve. Hyland claims that Tissaphernes began to fund his Peloponnesian allies from his own resources rather than imperial funds, rendering the payments shorter and later as time progressed.175 The Milesians accused Tissaphernes of violating his alliance with the

Spartans, despite his apparent interest in providing the Persian fleet to support them against the

Athenians.176

It is possible that Tissaphernes used his decision to interfere in the Peloponnesian War to defeat Pharnabazus diplomatically in the manner of a skillful, and intelligent satrap.177 Having been supplanted by Cyrus the Younger in 408, Tissaphernes remained in his former court as a loyal agent of the king with no reason to be loyal to Cyrus, his immediate political superior. It seems as though Tissaphernes had no incentive in Lydia to conceal Cyrus’ plot from the king.

Xenophon’s representation of the Tissaphernes’ betrayal (Anabasis 3.2.8) makes a point: the

Persians were in no way outmatched by the invading Greek forces. Tissaphernes’ role in the

174 Lateiner 1976, 280. 175 Hyland 2018, 79. 176 Hyland 2018, 85 stipulates that Tissaphernes kept Darius informed of these circumstances, making the king more involved than the evidence suggests. 177 Aidonis 1996, 100.

51

outcome of this revolt was aggressively more heroic in Ctesias (FGrH 688 T 14a) than in

Xenophon (Anabasis 2.3.19).178 Since Ctesias served as a court physician to Artaxerxes during the , his perspective differs greatly from that of a mercenary supporting the rebellious prince.

Xenophon’s representation shows that Tissaphernes exploited pre-existing factional feuding among the , and manipulated Menon and Clearchus’ ambitions (Anabasis

2.5.1-25, 31)179 to achieve his own goals. To this satrap, the rivalling Greeks demonstrated their willingness to put everyone in the power of the barbaros in exchange for decisive support and recognition.180Tissaphernes subsequently paid insufficient wages to the Spartans (Hellenica

Oxyrhynchia 22.2) possibly due to insufficient funds at the start of his campaigns,181 or due to the unexpected duration of the conflict in the Aegean.

The rivalry between Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes recurred with the employment of

Conon as well. While Tissaphernes ignored the Spartan embassy warning not to demand surrender of Ionian cities to Persia, it served his own interests to do so. In his assessment,

Sparta’s finances remained as weak as the day he started dealing with them in 400, by which point Tissaphernes had reclaimed his Lydian satrapy (cf. Diodorus 14.26).182 In this case,

Tissaphernes meant to threaten, not defeat the Spartans and used the resources at his disposal to do so. He planned to reduce the strength and determination of the with a

178 Tuplin 2006, 33. 179 Laforse 2000, 83. 180 Laforse 2000, 85. 181 Hyland 2007, 13. 182 Aidonis 1996, 103.

52

protracted and indecisive war focused on maintaining their small empire.183 His tactic succeeded against the Spartans for the most part, but his dealings with them ultimately led to his demise.

Although there are other theories, his failure to prevent Agesilaus from burning down in

395 contributed if not led to his execution by Tithraustes.184 The goals of remaining neutral, pitting one force against the other, and weakening the Spartan forces threatening his territory, allowed him to exercise his authority and judgment to serve his king as he deemed appropriate in the circumstances.

Tissaphernes’ rival Pharnabazus also declined Spartan friendship in the 390s after

Sparta’s betrayal of the original agreement with Pharnabazus, who helped them re-establish a fleet after while providing the with much-needed financial aid.

His earlier actions echo his rivalry with Tissaphernes. When the Lydian satrap failed to provide the support the Spartans desire for the Peloponnesian War’s final segment, Pharnabazus opened

Phrygia and its resources to the Greek forces. He hosted the Peloponnesian fleet in Phrygia, stationing it up to the Hellespont.

His apparently wholehearted devotion to Peloponnesian War should have had the result of more control in Greece and the end of the campaign to free the Hellenic poleis under Persian control. He was deprived of his gains from the war when he was replaced by Cyrus along with

Tissaphernes.185 When approached, he reminded Agesilaus of his previous friendship and alliance with Spartans, and compared their honesty and trustworthiness with those of

183 Aidonis 1996, 103. 184 Roosevelt 2009, 29. 185 Sealey 1993, 41.

53

Tissaphernes (Xenophon Hellenica 4.1.29-39). Essentially, he considered the Spartans faithless as a friend.186 A xenia was later formed between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus’ son, which gave a satisfactory conclusion to the story of Pharnabazus refusing the offer of philia with Agesilaus

(Xenophon Hellenica 4.1.29-39).187 As anti-Lacedaemonian actions go, Pharnabazus’ probable funding of Timocrates of Rhodes’ bribery campaign on the Greek mainland, whose use of gold sparked the Corinthian War,188 exceeds even his blunt refusal to form any type of alliance with the Spartans.

He is certainly credited with dispatching Timocrates to Europe with the intention of rousing the other Greek poleis against their nominal leader.189 By employing Conon, he strengthened the Persian fleet and consolidated military power in the Aegean. In conjunction with Conon, Pharnabazus successfully drove out the Spartans from the Aegean (Xenophon

Hellenica 4). Clearly, Pharnabazus gained too much power for a Persian subject. When he was removed in 393, he formed an alliance with the king through marriage (Xenophon Hellenica

5.1.28). Artaxerxes replaced him with Ariobarzanes as satrap of Dascylium190 and placed him where he had no extant contacts or influence: as a commander leading the forces against Egypt

(Isocrates 4.140).191 It may simply have been that he had proven useful in regaining revolting or lost territories, but this move and Pharnabazus’ immediate replacement with not only his son, but also two other satraps, suggest that he possessed more power than many others of his rank.

186 Mitchell 1997, 123. 187 Mitchell 1997, 123. 188 Mitchell 1997, 121. 189 Sealey 1993, 104. 190 Sealey 1993, 43. 191 Ruzicka 2012, 61 sees the marriage of Pharnabazus (and his removal from Phrygia) to Artaxerxes’ daughter as a reward for his successes in 394/3.

54

Further, such alliances often were used and abused as additional clout. Any alliance formed between a Persian satrap and Sparta would only have reinforced Sparta’s will across the Greek mainland.

The cases discussed above all establish a satrapal need to maintain influence, and extend it when possible in order to keep their positions of power in the empire. Loyalty to the king was a central characteristic of a good satrap, and part of that seems to have been extending that power and authority as circumstances allowed. Removing a threat or undermining its power without the need of Persian bloodshed optimized their performance. The careers of Pharnabazus and

Tissaphernes reflect not the instability of the empire or its satrapies but instead the crafty use of a satrap’s power to reassert Persian authority.

1.1.4 Satrapal Revolt and Satrapal Authority

The power exercised by the Persians also appears to have been diminished after the satrapal revolt (accepted dates vary, but the traditional range is 367-362), as evidenced by the triviality with which the of 362 was treated and by the exclusion of the Persians from the Peace of Philocrates in 346. The noticeable decline in the acceptance of Persian power in Greece shows that the converse was once true. At some point, the Greeks viewed the Persians as their superiors, having an undefined degree of authority over them despite never having been conquered. Fear of Persian retribution for Greek actions in Europe is shown in the King’s Peace

(387/6) and efforts made to uphold it (See 4.3.3). Prior to the weakening of the western frontier of the Persian empire through a series of revolts, the threat of Persian intervention held the Greek poleis in check from attacking each other and, more importantly, the Persians closest to them.

55

The revolts began as strictly Persian affairs, and initially the Greeks seemed content to allow them to remain such. A fragment of a stele from Argos (IG IV 556) describes the Greek refusal to make war against the Persian King in what is assumed to be the revolt of the satraps,192 demonstrating the Argives’ resistance of any proposal to break the peace. In many cases, a satrap’s personal ambition overruled his loyalty to the central authority in the royal court. Before the great Satraps’ Revolt, there were several satraps, especially in the northwestern regions of the empire, who revolted against the king, including: Pissuthnes, Amorges, and Cyrus the Younger.

Each of these revolts impacted the region in question, resulting in new leadership and retaliation against the rebellion’s supporters.

The distinction between the earlier revolts of several satraps and the Great Satraps’

Revolt appears to rely on timing. Cyrus’ revolt united many satraps and other influential Persian leaders against the king under one banner only to fall apart after Cyrus’ death at Cunaxa

(Xenophon Anabasis 1.8.17ff). The revolt demonstrated to Artaxerxes some flaws inherent in the administrative system, namely the excessive borrowed authority possessed by the more remote satraps. The vulnerability of the throne to a united force under a stronger leader employing local and foreign soldiers became apparent.

In contrast, the exact cause of the Great Satraps’ Revolt remains uncertain.193 During this period, the line separating rebel from loyal grew hazy and depended on how information was

192 Rhodes and Osborne, 214-5 suggests other dates, such as 349 and 387/6 since there is no established date for this particular stele. 193 Moysey 1991, 158.

56

interpreted at Susa, especially from those of high enough status.194 demonstrates this fluidity clearly. This satrap had a strong record of military service for the king’s cause. Datames’ intervention against those who revolted (Nepos Datames 2.1) and his military action in Egypt

(Nepos Datames 3.5-4.5) demonstrate his loyalty and value to the king. He also enforced the king’s authority over Thuys in (Nepos Datames 2.2.5), again exhibiting his military prowess. Datames was dispatched to attack Aspis in Cataonia to penalize Aspis’ seizure of royal property as well as rebelling against the king. The image of this rebel prior to his revolt seems like a favored military leader, serving the king’s purpose and receiving his due rewards.

It is necessary then to discuss Datames’ transition from loyal satrap to rebelling against the great king. If Nepos is reliable on this event, it was the courtiers who conspired to ruin him

(Nepos Datames 5.2), providing a contrasting example of being rewarded for good service, strengthening empire.195 Pandates, the custodian of royal treasury, wrote a letter informing

Datames of his enemies, which precipitated the revolt of 369/8 as shown in coins as well as in texts.196 A combination of the geographical location and Datames’ military ability helps to explain the duration of his revolt. Efforts to quell this revolt escalated as it endured. He withstood major assault in Cappadocia. was only able to fight Datames to stalemate 197 before he crossed the Euphrates to make war on the king. Mithradates pretended to join the rebellion in order to assassinate Datames (Polyaenus 7.29.1). Diodorus suggests that the acclaim for Datames’ actions as a general led to Artaxerxes’ decision to assassinate Datames

194 Wieskopf 1989, 37. 195 Briant 2002, 321. 196 Bing 1988, 55. 197 Bing 1988, 56.

57

(Diodorus 15.91.7). Nepos supports this claim by stating that the king conceived a hatred of

Datames. The royal plots were foiled quickly by Datames (Nepos Datames 9.1), thereby prolonging the rebellion.198

The failed attempts to quell Datames’ revolt inspired other western provinces to express their own dissatisfaction. For instance, Autophradates became annoyed by Ariobarzanes’ possession of the and Ariobarzanes’ deeds outside Asia. Further, the flexing of

Ariobarzanes’ diplomatic muscle in 368 in Philiscus’ mission to recruit Spartan mercenaries to expand Ariobarzanes’ control of Asia Minor (Diodorus 15.90.1) was galling to Autophradates, as was the failure to suppress revolt of Datames.199 The resultant urging for immediate action against Ariobarzanes based on what Weiskopf calls Autophradates’ misinformation led to appeals to the king.200 Royal failure to put down Datames’ revolt in 360s also contributed to centrifugal tendencies of western satraps and client rules, and culminated in the revolt in 362.201

Overall, the motivations for revolt were not made clear by the ancient sources including

Aristotle, Diodorus, Nepos, and Justin, who present it as a series of revolts that eventually united.202 One apparent cause is the abuse of authority and disloyalty to the great king, as was the case for Mausolaus of Caria. Aristotle claims Mausolaus abused citizens in the name of tribute to the king, charged for rights to the dead, collected undue contributions for security, and refused to build walls (Aristotle 2.1348a). One other reason alleged for the rebellion is tension

198 Bing 1988, 48. 199 Weiskopf 1989, 41-2. 200 Weiskopf 1989, 43. 201 Bing 1988, 57. 202 Moysey 1991, 158.

58

among local satraps over territory. The conflict between Ariobarzanes and Autophradates, for instance, was likely due to the amount of territory over which they each exerted control and influence. The intersection of their spheres may have become an object of tension.203

Autophradates’ troops in Dascylium fought those of Ariobarzanes in 366. Autophradates was permitted his own naval forces, and the resources of his own satrapy were used and squandered at his discretion, such as in the war against Datames, then Ariobarzanes.204 The excess of power in this instance demonstrates royal favoritism, allowing conflict to fester among these satraps. A third motivation not necessarily connected to disloyalty to Artaxerxes is to neutralize an external conflict. Mausolaus apparently hoped to buy Agesilaus or neutralize him.205 Further, Orontes, formerly a general to the king and later the chosen general to the rebellion in Armenia (cf.

Diodorus 15.9), seemed motivated by opportunism rather than personal conflict with Greeks or conflict with another (Diodorus 15.90.3).206 These causes demonstrate a general disunity within a once-united administrative system, indicating that the northwestern territories in particular were less stable than previously perceived. The large numbers of unemployed Greek mercenaries easily available to the satraps of the northwestern regions of the empire certainly did not facilitate stability by providing armies for hire. Nevertheless, these conflicts appear to have been driven by both internal political strife and by opportunity.

One crucial factor in the longevity of the revolt was the employment of mercenaries on all sides. Coinage in Sinope and Tarsus testifies the cost of military operations, including the

203 Weiskopf 1989, 41. 204 Weiskopf 1989, 46-47. 205 Weiskopf 1989, 67. 206 Weiskopf 1989, 69.

59

employment of Greek mercenary armies of numbers ranging from 3000 to 20 000.207 The use of mercenaries by Tachos in Egypt and Orontes and other barbarians is attested to by Demosthenes, who claims doing so was against Greek beliefs (Demosthenes 14.31). Orontes was mentioned specifically to demonstrate the limited availability of armies on the western coast willing and able to fight against the satraps in what Demosthenes interprets as a generic rebellion.208 The value of Greek mercenaries to this revolt is also seen in the recruitment of Greek forces on the king’s behalf, to serve the royal cause both in Egypt and in Asia. This reliance on external military forces demonstrates a degree of distrust toward local forces from the leadership of each as well as a reliance on financial means to resolve significant conflicts.

These revolts, both before and after 362, demonstrate the flaws in Persia’s system of authority.209 Often a satrap developed excessive authority or attachment to his territory, perceiving it as his own rather than one ruled in the king’s name. Further, insecurity of position led to rebellion against the king, either to handle an external threat or a conflict with a neighboring satrap. In this position, the importance of the great king was undermined, and even the most loyal and valuable satraps revolted. This rebellion altered the perception of the Persian

Empire as a mighty force, effectively removing the fear of the Persian king from his Hellenic neighbors. Moreover, it inspired the rebellions of others and weakened the Persian hold on the western empire, rendering these territories vulnerable to later attacks.

207 Bing 1988, 66. 208 Facella 2006, 117. 209 While it is quite possible this problem existed elsewhere in the empire, there is little evidence to suggest it would be as prevalent during this period.

60

1.2 Employing Greeks as Persian Subjects

There was also a long string of Greek doctors, like Democedes, and Ctesias in both satrapal and royal courts, as well as writers, and artists.210 The motivation for joining the court, especially when already living in the Persian Empire, is obvious: Persian royal service is accompanied by prestige, gifts, favors, exalted status (for example, Themistocles as described in

Thucydides 1.138).211 Although non-Persians whose skills benefitted the king personally could be granted similar privileges to Persian nobles, they appear to have been esteemed lower than their Persian counterparts in the court hierarchy.212 The court simply poached the extremely skilled regardless of ethnicity. They chose to employ the most skilled and talented people at their disposal since they could afford them. This became so common that it extended as far as the

Greek poleis in Europe, which was technically not under Persia’s authority. Xenophon’s even asks: “And how many others, do you suppose, have been kidnapped on account of their , and hauled off to the great King's court, and live in slavery there?”( 4.2.33)

This image as presented by Xenophon suggests that service and submission to the great king were perceived as involuntary, and the Greeks were particularly valued by foreigners.

Despite Xenophon’s image, the Greeks within Persia’s royal court were usually neither prisoners nor slaves. Instead, a valued professional could acquire some degree of both access and influence with the King. Plutarch demonstrates the ability of the variety of Greek masters who could have access to the great king in his life of Artaxerxes II, when he claims:

210 Brosius 2011, 72. 211 Brosius 2011, 73; cf. Plutarch Artaxerxes 14.1 212 Brosius 2007, 35; Ruzicka 2012, 69.

61

ὁρῶν δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ λογισμοὺς δυνάμεως καὶ τὴν βασιλέως δύναμιν ἀνδρὸς

ἔμφρονος δεομένην, ἔπεμψεν ἐπιστολὴν βασιλεῖ περὶ ὧν διενοεῖτο. καὶ ταύτην ἐκέλευσε

τὸν κομίζοντα μάλιστα μὲν ἀποδοῦναι διὰ Ζήνωνος τοῦ Κρητὸς ἢ Πολυκρίτου τοῦ

Μενδαίου· τούτων δ' ἦν ὁ μὲν Ζήνων ὀρχηστής, ὁ δὲ Πολύκριτος ἰατρός· ἂν δ' οὗτοι μὴ

παρῶσι, διὰ Κτησίου τοῦ ἰατροῦ. (Plutarch Artaxerxes 21.2-4)

Seeing both the need for an army in their own plans and the need for a man of reason in

the king’s army, he sent a letter to the king about his plans. And he ordered the bearer to

give, if possible, this letter to Zeno the dance-master, or Polycritus the doctor, and if they

were not around, through Ctesias the doctor.

He has Conon using the influence of not one but three Greeks to deliver a letter to Artaxerxes, for whom Conon himself was a navarch under Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia.

Xenophon places Ctesias at Artaxerxes’ side on the battlefield at Cunaxa in 401 (Anabasis 1.26), as does the physician himself, showing the importance of this particular doctor to the king.

Ctesias’ own account suggests he had access to the higher echelons of the court, including the king and royal harems (FGrH 688 F 28; F 42; F 54). Other examples include the physician

Democedes. Herodotus credits Democedes with curing Queen Atossa of breast cancer (3.134.22) suggesting a high degree of trust in this particular physician, to be allowed the access necessary treat the queen’s illness. From appearances, these Hellenic employees were privileged with access to the court, much like specialists from the empire would have been.

The case of the exiles dwelling in Persia differs greatly from that of the free Greek traveling to broaden his horizons and professional experience or trained as an interpreter for the courts. There are several exiles who took refuge in Persia’s courts, some of whom were given

62

positions of influence within that court. An exile’s intelligence would quickly expire, so the value in sheltering someone exiled from one of the mainland poleis was limited. It has been accepted as a fact that Greek exiles often found shelter in the Persian Empire. Greeks without home poleis often demonstrated their use to local governors (satraps, kings, and other ruling officials), and became as valuable as subjects to the Persians. This does not exclude the great king, with whom Greek sources seem fascinated. Even skilled Greeks with homes were deemed desirable within certain pockets of the empire. At what point, however, were these Greeks considered less like employees and more like subjects to the Persian Empire? Where on this spectrum do politicians in Persian employ fall? Several examples of political figures whose exile resulted in them living as subjects to Persian potentates, including subject kings, satraps, and the great king, will be discussed to demonstrate the sense of extended authority displayed by the

Persian empire, and the implied power wielded over the Greeks.

This apparent favoring occurs before any significant conflict between the Greeks and

Persians, including the sheltering of the Athenian Pisistratids after their exile from Athens in 510

BCE. Herodotus claims that , who would have been gone from Athens for twenty years at that point, directed the Persians to attack Athens at Marathon after a prophetic dream (6.107-

108), where Pisistratus originally drew his support. While this incident seems like a Herodotean construct, it demonstrates the believed influence of Hippias to Darius (or his general Mardonius in any event). His value demonstrates that the royal court valued him, despite his removal from his Athenian political resources. Moreover, the decision to invade at Marathon, credited by

Herodotus to Hippias (Herodotus 6.102) exemplifies that the Greeks in Susa considered themselves influential enough to select an attack point. Herodotus even suggests that Hippias

63

was to be established as a sole in Athens with the aid of the Persian Empire (6.108). The claim shows that Hippias was trusted enough to represent and serve the king in such a capacity.

Another exile whose value as a subject to Persia is demonstrated predominantly by

Herodotus is , a deposed king of Sparta. Demaratus’ exile from Sparta to Persia and his employment among the Persians demonstrates the utility of Greeks to the Persians and the treatment of at least that particular Greek as a subject.213 Herodotus places him in the royal court during the ascension of Xerxes. The timing indicates that the Persians accepted the loyalty of

Greeks despite the pending invasion. The treatment of this exiled king as a royal adviser extended so far that Greek sources not only insist that Demaratus accompanied Xerxes to Greece in 480, he also advised the Persians on tactics to defeat the Spartans in their own territory by occupying (Herodotus 7.235). This piece of advice demonstrates the loyalty of

Demaratus to the Persians during the Persian attempt to conquer his own home polis of which he was once a king. Even though Demaratus warned the Spartans of his betrayal after the fact, and

Xerxes declined to follow his advice, the event shows the transmission of Herodotus’ contrast between Greek and the other.214 Moreover, Herodotus puts profound words into the mouth of

Demaratus not only regarding Cythera but also regarding Xerxes’ ascension. He credits him with the insight that the Greeks’ despotes is not a tyrant or a king but nomos.215

213 Boedeker 1987, 191-2 discusses this as a Herodotean narrative pattern, describing seven individuals or groups of individuals whose exiles in Persia Herodotus narrates in this way. I have chosen to explore the exiles and employment of non-Herodotean heroes as well for the sake of my discussion on the treatment of exiles as Persian citizens. 214 Boedeker 1987, 197. 215 Hartog 1988, 334.

64

His continued value to the Persians is demonstrated by the assignment of territory as an award, which would be inherited by his descendants (Xenophon Hellenica 3.1.6). He was awarded with Persian dress and his counsel was so valued that the king himself allowed him to choose his own reward from Xerxes. Plutarch claims that his choice was to ride in state in Sardis.

ἐπεὶ δὲ Δημάρατος ὁ Σπαρτιάτης αἰτήσασθαι δωρεὰν κελευσθεὶς ᾐτήσατο τὴν κίταριν

ὥσπερ οἱ βασιλεῖς ἐπαράμενος εἰσελάσαι διὰ Σάρδεων, Μιθροπαύστης μὲν ἀνεψιὸς ὢν

βασιλέως εἶπε τοῦ Δημαράτου τῆς τιάρας ἁψάμενος· ‘αὕτη μὲν ἡ κίταρις οὐκ ἔχει

ἐγκέφαλον ὃν ἐπικαλύψει· σὺ δ' οὐκ ἔσῃ Ζεὺς ἐὰν λάβῃς κεραυνόν·’ ἀπωσαμένου δὲ τὸν

Δημάρατον ὀργῇ διὰ τὸ αἴτημα τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ δοκοῦντος ἀπαραιτήτως ἔχειν πρὸς

αὐτόν, ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς δεηθεὶς ἔπεισε καὶ διήλλαξε. (Plutarch Themistocles 29.6-8 cf.

Plutarch Artaxerxes 2.3)

When Demaratus the Spartiate was commanded to pick a reward he asked to ride in

through Sardis wearing his tiara as the kings do, the king’s cousin Mithraupastes said,

touching Demaratus’ tiara: “that which your tiara covers does not contain a brain. And

you will not become Zeus, even if you take a thunderbolt.” When the king thrust

Demaratus away in anger on account of his audacity and decided that he was

unpardonable, Themistocles persuaded him, begging for mercy, and changed his mind.

As seen, Demaratus’ misstep, which demonstrated his failure to completely understand the political atmosphere of the Persian Empire, nearly cost him his life, as it would have a natural citizen of the empire. To claim that his life was saved by the pleas of Themistocles displays the perceived value of their advice to the king as well as their value to one another. While this anecdote is of questionable historicity, the romanticism of the adviser figures implies that each

65

exiled Greek achieved some degree of elevated status within the Persian court despite having non-Persian origins.

Despite the hostility between the Persian invaders and the Greeks, Demaratus was influential enough in the court, wearing a tiara as though a native Persian, to spend time with the king of Persia. Herodotus’ perspective may have been slightly skewed in the interest of demonstrating Persian intelligence about the strengths and weaknesses of the poleis during

Xerxes’ invasion of Greece, but it was nonetheless believable to his Greek audience that

Herodotus could claim:

Δαρείου δὲ οὐκ ἀποδεικνυμένου κω γνώμην ἐτύγχανε κατὰ τὠυτὸ τούτοισι καὶ

Δημάρητος ὁ Ἀρίστωνος ἀναβεβηκὼς ἐς Σοῦσα, ἐστερημένος τε τῆς ἐν Σπάρτῃ

βασιληίης καὶ φυγὴν ἐπιβαλὼν ἑωυτῷ ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος. Οὗτος ὡνὴρ πυθόμενος τῶν

Δαρείου παίδων τὴν διαφορήν, ἐλθών, ὡς ἡ φάτις μιν ἔχει, Ξέρξῃ συνεβούλευε λέγειν

πρὸς τοῖσι ἔλεγε ἔπεσι ὡς αὐτὸς μὲν γένοιτο Δαρείῳ ἤδη βασιλεύοντι καὶ ἔχοντι τὸ

Περσέων κράτος, Ἀρτοβαζάνης δὲ ἔτι ἰδιώτῃ ἐόντι Δαρείῳ· οὐκ ὦν οὔτε οἰκὸς εἴη οὔτε

δίκαιον ἄλλον τινὰ τὸ γέρας ἔχειν πρὸ ἑωυτοῦ, ἐπεί γε καὶ ἐν Σπάρτῃ, ἔφη ὁ Δημάρητος

ὑποτιθέμενος, οὕτω νομίζεσθαι, ἢν οἱ μὲν προγεγονότες ἔωσι πρὶν ἢ τὸν πατέρα σφέων

βασιλεῦσαι, ὁ δὲ βασιλεύοντι ὀψίγονος ἐπιγένηται, τοῦ ἐπιγενομένου τὴν ἔκδεξιν τῆς

βασιληίης γίνεσθαι. Χρησαμένου δὲ Ξέρξεω τῇ Δημαρήτου ὑποθήκῃ, γνοὺς ὁ Δαρεῖος

ὡς λέγοι δίκαια βασιλέα μιν ἀπέδεξε. Δοκέειν δέ μοι, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθήκης

βασιλεῦσαι ἂν Ξέρξης· ἡ γὰρ Ἄτοσσα εἶχε τὸ πᾶν κράτος. (Herodotus 7.3)

Darius not making his plan clear, it happened that Demaratus the son of Ariston came

inland to Susa at this very time, having been deprived of the kingship in Sparta and

66

casting himself into exile from Sparta. This man, hearing about the disagreement of the

sons of Darius, arriving, so the story goes, he advised Xerxes to say in addition to the

words he spoke, that he was born when Darius was already king and held the leadership

of the Persians, but Artobazanes when Darius was still a private citizen. Therefore it was

neither reasonable nor just that any other held the privilege instead of him, and when he

was in Sparta, Demaratus said, he made it a policy, as was customary, that if sons were

born before the father was king, and another was born while he was king, the reception of

kingship would come to the one born after. Xerxes following the advice of Demaratus,

Darius decided that he spoke justly and chose him. It seems to me that Xerxes would

have become king even without this advice. For Atossa held all the power.

According to Herodotus’s account, Demaratus was able to influence the manner in which Darius selected his successor and convince the king of Persia to follow a Spartan tradition. Further, his advice was valued as much as Xerxes’ mother’s in the decision about succession according to

Herodotus’ account.216 Even if Herodotus does not credit the decision entirely to Demaratus by claiming that Xerxes would have been Darius’ most likely successor, it suggests to his audience that this former king had influence with the great king of the empire where he dwelled during his exile. The deposed royalty seen in Herodotus’ anecdotes seem like little tragedies incorporated into the greater narrative of Herodotus’ , depicting these kings as tragic heroes217 despite the historicity of these events. Framing these particular former sovereigns in a way that

216 Boedeker 1987, 185-187 casts considerable doubt on Herodotus’ narrative, complaining of a paucity of details and an inconsistency in the narrative which makes such stories difficult to credit. 217 Hartog 1988, 335.

67

resembles those seen on stage lends a note of fiction to Herodotus’ work; however, it also demonstrates the attempt to ground his work in something more familiar to his audience.

The next Greek employee of the Persians had a much shorter, less influential career, but was also a Spartan king and general. Pausanias, remembered best for his efforts during the

Persian War, and leading the united Greek army’s fleet to eradicate the Persian presence in the

Aegean in 479, is also remembered for his corruption, specifically his decision to medize.

Pausanias’ medism will be discussed elsewhere in this work. However, it weighs into this part of the discussion as well. His employment by the Persians despite having led a war effort against them either shows that the Persians were extremely forgiving or valued his military expertise as a skill they might use for their own devices, much like Themistocles.

It is clear that the Lacedaemonian leader expected he was of some value to the Persians since he demanded a marriage to one of Xerxes’ daughters, a highly sought after prize among the

Persians. His Persian behavior so shortly after the failed Persian invasion of Greece indicates that the Persians were not as resentful of the Greek victory or the ousting of Persian power in Thrace as would be natural had their invasion been critical to the empire. If the Persians were threatened by their defeat in Greece, it would have resulted in political unrest in Susa, but Xerxes’ assassination only took place fifteen years later rather than immediately following the Greek campaign. Pausanias’ value to the Persians, then, appears to have been unaffected by the Greek invasion of , where he evidently began to act Persian. Both of these deposed Spartan despots in exile demonstrate the reception of Greek exiles before extended Helleno-Persian interactions through trade or diplomacy or warfare.

68

One Athenian admiral whose reputation appears undamaged by his role among the

Persians is Conon. The exact date of his service as an admiral to the king of Persia is unclear.

The Athenians saw him as a rival to for prominence in Athens in the late 390s, but the value of his naval experience to the Persian king exceeds the opinions of his contemporary fellow Athenians. Exiled after the battle of Aegospotami, Conon took shelter in at the court of Evagoras, king of Salamis. Through Evagoras, Conon came to the attention of first

Pharnabazus, then Artaxerxes II. Christian Brouchet raises the question of whether Conon assumed the role of a mercenary general, or a navarch, or possibly a hegemon of the sea.218 Yet, he observes that by assuming this role, Conon became the king’s instrument, an expert without the power of decision.219 Conon, while serving as a Persian admiral by the authority of the king, re-established his reputation as a navarch after the loss to Lysander at Aegospotami.

The money from the Persian Empire was permitted to be channeled into the re- fortification of Athens. As a result of Conon’s actions, Athenian sources praise his activities on

Rhodes, specifically at Caunus, and erect statues to him as they did the tyrannicides, Aristigeton and Harmodius, whom the Athenians commemorated for the death of (Dinarchus

3.17; Isocrates 9.52-57; Plato Menexenus 245a; Xenophon Hellenica 2.1, 4.3, 4.8). To

Demosthenes, Conon’s service confirmed the Persians as Athenian allies (an idea he tries to promote throughout several speeches) (10.34; 20.68-71, 74; 22.72; 40.76). The king of Persia was not a figure to be feared, but someone to be respected because through Conon’s employment, Artaxerxes II restored the Athenians’ . Even if Demosthenes’ claim

218 Brouchet 2007, 237. 219 Brouchet 2007, 238.

69

oversimplifies the Athenian understanding of Persia’s contributions via Conon, it is evident through his speeches that the Athenians lauded Conon’s enterprise. He used Persian resources to resuscitate Athenian power temporarily, and appropriated a degree of the authority Persia exercised in the Aegean through his Athenian acquired and honed skills.220 In many ways, the

Athenians appear to have hailed Conon as a greater hero to Athens than even the great

Themistocles, whose life ended in the Persian Empire after being credited with defending Athens from the Persian invasion. After all, Conon’s victory was jointly held with his Persian employer as well.221

In addition to Conon’s contemporaries, Plutarch praises the joint Athenian-Persian fleet’s success. His exact words display a sense of mastery and the Spartan admission of defeat at

Conon’s hands. He shows Athens’ sense of triumph with the claim that:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ Κόνων καὶ Φαρνάβαζος τῷ βασιλέως ναυτικῷ θαλαττοκρατοῦντες ἐπόρθουν τὰ

παράλια τῆς Λακωνικῆς, ἐτειχίσθη δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄστυ τῶν Ἀθηναίων Φαρναβάζου χρήματα

δόντος, ἔδοξε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς βασιλέα· καὶ πέμπουσιν

Ἀνταλκίδαν πρὸς Τιρίβαζον, αἴσχιστα καὶ παρανομώτατα τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας

Ἕλληνας, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐπολέμησεν Ἀγησίλαος, βασιλεῖ παραδιδόντες (Plutarch Agesilaus

23.1).

When Conon and Pharnabazus ruled the sea with the king’s fleet, they laid siege to the

sea holdings of the Spartans, and Pharnabazus gave money to the town of the Athenians

so that it would be fortified, the Spartans decided to make peace with the king; they even

220 Sealey 1993, 11. 221 Brouchet 2007, 234.

70

send Antalcidas to Tiribazus, betraying the Greeks dwelling in Asia most shamefully and

illegally, on behalf of whom Agesilaus made war, to the king.

Here he displays the obvious sense of triumph and the reversal of Athenian fortunes to their pre-

Peloponnesian War state. Plutarch is not alone in crediting the triumph over the Athenian enemy of the early 390s, Sparta. Philochorus makes it seem like Conon was sole victor over Pisander

(FGrH 328 F 146). Conon’s triumph over Sparta with Persia’s ships meets praise in Athenian sources.222 Clearly the short period for which Conon was serving the Persian navy had a significant impact on the development of events that followed.

Exactly how useful and when Conon gained his impressive role as a Persian admiral deserves some scrutiny. Diodorus gives the least praise-filled account of all the ancient versions of his career. Credit is granted partially to Pharnabazus’ persuasive rhetoric, negotiating with the king (Artaxerxes II) to justify the expense of a fleet and a new navarch. Diodorus’ exact statement claims:

Φαρνάβαζος δὲ τῶν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀνοχῶν γενομένων ἀνέβη πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα,

καὶ συνέπεισεν αὐτὸν στόλον ἑτοιμάσαι καὶ ναύαρχον ἐπιστῆσαι Κόνωνα τὸν Ἀθηναῖον·

οὗτος γὰρ ἦν ἔμπειρος τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἀγώνων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν πολεμίων·

πολεμικώτατος δ' ὢν ἐν Κύπρῳ διέτριβε παρ' Εὐαγόρᾳ τῷ βασιλεῖ. πεισθέντος δὲ τοῦ

βασιλέως, Φαρνάβαζος λαβὼν ἀργυρίου τάλαντα πεντακόσια παρεσκευάζετο

κατασκευάζειν ναυτικόν. διαπλεύσας οὖν εἰς Κύπρον τοῖς μὲν ἐκεῖ βασιλεῦσι

παρήγγειλεν ἑκατὸν τριήρεις ἑτοιμάζειν, τῷ δὲ Κόνωνι περὶ τῆς ναυαρχίας διαλεχθεὶς

222 Brouchet 2007, 233.

71

ἐπέστησεν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλατταν ἡγεμόνα, μεγάλας ὑποφαίνων παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως

ἐλπίδας. ὁ δὲ Κόνων ἅμα μὲν ἐλπίζων ἀνακτήσεσθαι τῇ πατρίδι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, εἰ

Λακεδαιμόνιοι καταπολεμηθεῖεν, ἅμα δ' αὐτὸς μεγάλης τεύξεσθαι δόξης, προσεδέξατο

τὴν ναυαρχίαν. οὔπω δὲ τοῦ στόλου παντὸς παρεσκευασμένου, τὰς ἑτοίμους ναῦς

τετταράκοντα λαβὼν διέπλευσεν εἰς Κιλικίαν, κἀκεῖ τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἡτοιμάζετο.

(Diodorus. 14.39)

Pharnabazus went to the king when he made peace with the Spartans, and persuaded him

to make preparations for his mission and to make Conon the Athenian a navarch. For, he

was experienced at the struggles of war and very experienced against the enemy.

According to Evagoras, the king in Cyprus, he was most skilled at war. The king having

been persuaded, Pharnabazus took 500 talents of silver and prepared to furnish the fleet.

Then he sailed to Cyprus where he announced that the king made arrangements for 100

triremes, but established with Conon concerning the navarchy that he was chosen as ruler

on the sea, demonstrating the very great hope from the king. And Conon on the one hand

hoping to revive the leadership of his homeland, if the Spartans were defeated, while at

the same time hoping he would make great honor for himself, accepted the navarchy. But

when the enterprise was not yet wholly prepared, taking the forty prepared ships, he

sailed to , and there he made ready for war.

The command of Pharnabazus and Conon together and the grand title given to the freshly appointed Greek navarch by Diodorus’ account also suggest the importance of this commander assuming this role to the Persians. Conon’s employment demonstrates the vested interest in not necessarily restoring Athens, but in the potential of the Athenians to weaken the Spartan

72

hegemony in Greece, perhaps with the early intent to force a Spartan withdrawal from Asia

Minor.

When considered as a whole, Conon’s activities in Persia serve as a model for mercenary forces as well as showing the value of Conon as an employee of the Persians. Such a role would usually be reserved for a subject, and at times there was even the suggestion of a Persian co- commander to supervise the Athenian’s command in Rhodes.223 Pharnabazus was instrumental to

Conon’s appointment, which Duane March has calculated must have occurred between 398 and

397.224 Based on this timing, Conon’s employment by the Persians could be seen as response to the Spartan threat to Phrygia since Agesilaus’ armies had been in Asia since 399. March’s observation that “two seasons of campaigning vs. Agesilaus had failed, and the Persians may have realized the need for a new strategy (sic)”225 provides one of Pharnabazus’ reasons for supporting and encouraging the employment of an Athenian exile as an admiral against an unwelcome Spartan fleet.

The beginning of this auspicious new career for Conon bears some consideration here.

Exactly why Conon was present at Caunus with the Cilician and Phoenician fleet, namely in order to expel the Spartan fleet at Rhodes,226 may seem obvious to a modern audience. However, ancient authors differ on the subject. Isocrates gives credit to Conon’s desire to rid the Aegean of the Spartans, describing Conon’s career as follows:

223 March 1997, 267. 224 March 1997, 259. 225 March 1997, 264. 226 March 1997, 260.

73

Ἀτυχήσας γὰρ ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τῇ περὶ Ἑλλήσποντον οὐ δι' αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τοὺς

συνάρχοντας οἴκαδε μὲν ἀφικέσθαι κατῃσχύνθη, πλεύσας δ' εἰς Κύπρον χρόνον μέν τινα

περὶ τὴν τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλειαν διέτριβεν, αἰσθόμενος δ' Ἀγησίλαον μετὰ πολλῆς

δυνάμεως εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν διαβεβηκότα καὶ πορθοῦντα τὴν χώραν οὕτω μεγ' ἐφρόνησεν,

ὥστ' ἀφορμὴν οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην ἔχων πλὴν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἤλπισεν

Λακεδαιμονίους καταπολεμήσειν ἄρχοντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ

θάλατταν, καὶ ταῦτα πέμπων ὡς τοὺς βασιλέως στρατηγοὺς ὑπισχνεῖτο ποιήσειν. Καὶ τί

δεῖ τὰ πλείω λέγειν; Συστάντος γὰρ αὐτῷ ναυτικοῦ περὶ Ῥόδον καὶ νικήσας τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ

Λακεδαιμονίους μὲν ἐξέβαλεν ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς, τοὺς δ' Ἕλληνας λευθέρωσεν, οὐ μόνον δὲ

τὰ τείχη τῆς πατρίδος ἀνώρθωσεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν προήγαγεν ἐξ

ἧσπερ ἐξέπεσεν (Isocrates 5.62-4).

For, having failed in the sea battle around the Hellespont, not because of him, but on account of his co-leaders, he felt too ashamed to go home. Sailing to Cyprus, he passed time concerning the pursuits of private citizens. But having learned that Agesilaus had gone to Asia with a great army and was destroying the land, he knew that he had no other resource so great other than his body and mind. He expected that the Spartans, rulers of the Greeks, would be destroyed at war both by land and sea, and sent this information to the generals of the king, so that they would begin to act. And what more is it necessary to say? Appointing himself to the navy at Rhodes, and defeating the Spartans at sea, he threw them out of power, and freed the Greeks, and not only did he rebuild the walls of his homeland, but he also increased the polis its previous reputation from which it had fallen.

74

The repetition of the idea of Conon as a national hero and liberator of the Greeks in this context almost removes the reality of Persia’s allowance of these activities, as well as the Persian financing of the endeavor. It is also significant that Conon’s initial force was so weak that without Pharnabazus’ assistance, the Peloponnesian fleet may have crushed his meager 40 triremes.227 Yet sources view Conon as the instigator of this Rhodian revolt against Sparta’s hegemony,228 despite his exiled status and that until this point he had been dwelling on Cyprus under the protection of Evagoras, a position which would not have granted him access to the resources to cause a revolt (Ctesias FGrH 688 F30 (72-4) Photius Bibl. 7.44 B20).

Moreover, at first the Persian support failed Conon. Not for the last time, the Greeks claim that the Persians neglected to pay these soldiers and sailors for fifteen months, showing the king as neglectful of his fleets and forces, especially those active so far from the royal palaces

(Isocrates 4.142). The resultant mutiny remained plausibly deniable as a Persian ploy since

Conon was a non-Persian leader with Persian and Greek forces under his command, and yet no

Persian gold to substantiate this role. In fact, “the mutiny which had threatened to unravel

Konon’s command would not have arisen were it not for the neglect of the satraps and the

Persian King.”229 In other words, the king’s support proved vital for the function of Conon’s command, as did that of Pharnabazus.

Whatever influence the Athenian commander had over the Persians, it is clear that he and his power under them were secondary concerns. Only when Conon started losing did they

227 March 1997, 264. 228 Bruce 1961, 166. 229 March 1997, 265.

75

appoint a Persian co-commander and fund the endeavor. The pecuniary rewards for success in

Rhodes demonstrated Pharnabazus’ resultant estimation of Conon’s value rather than his preliminary assessment. After receiving better financing, Conon led his forces to victory at the

Battle of Cnidus, which consolidated Persia’s military growth, particularly in the Aegean.230

Conon’s service to the empire strengthened both Athens and the western frontier of Persia by helping build a stronger military force and develop naval techniques while undermining Sparta’s hegemony in the Aegean. Such contributions demonstrate the Persian interest in using a skilled

Greek to solidify particularly Pharnabazus’ authority while rewarding his activities to the benefit of his home state.

One final Greek in Persian employ, whose impact should not be ignored or understated in this discussion, is the historian Xenophon. As a member of the famous mercenary Ten Thousand,

Xenophon marched across the western Persian Empire under Cyrus the Younger’s command against Artaxerxes II. As a result of his participation in this undertaking, he was able to record general observations of the empire, with some strange omissions like the existence of the palace at Persepolis, of which he likely would have heard through camp talk if nothing else. In his

Persian works, Xenophon provides a synthesis of Greek and Persian thought231 as expressed through Xenophon’s authority as a witness to the Persian Empire. Such a perspective was not unique, but he offers valuable insight into what he perceived in his sojourn in support of a rebellious potentate.

230 Brouchet 2007, 236. 231 Hirsch 1985, 142.

76

Xenophon’s quest in Persia was to support the actions of a prince he seemed to admire to secure a new king on the highest throne in the empire, that of the king of kings. Had the revolt succeeded, his mercenary troop would have been crucial to determining authority in Persia, making it apparent that the Greeks on the periphery of the empire impacted the strength of the center. Cyrus’ preparations for revolt were by necessity, very stealthy. He had the support of exiles and wooed people from court. He employed mercenaries from Europe rather than

Anatolia. Nominally Cyrus led his troops against Tissaphernes in in 404.232

At the time, the Greeks’ status in the rebel army depended on the men under whose command they were. Due to a sense of disorder and animosity among their leaders, the Greek force dispersed gradually in a disorderly manner.233 As a result, the Greek army experienced internal disciplinary problems, apparently originating from Greek democratic ideals applied in a non-democratic environment.234 The rebellion against the Persian Empire’s sovereignty depended on an unstable force and the changes of environment proved disastrous.

The relationships between the Greek leaders and Cyrus also determined the role of the

Greeks in the Cyrean army. For instance, Cyrus’ expression of interest in Clearchus fed the ambitions of the Greek general. Isocrates describes the march of the Ten Thousand as the expedition of Clearchus and Cyrus (5.95). It seems as though Clearchus was the only Greek privy to Cyrus’ real goal (Xenophon Anabasis 1.3.5).235 Moreover, Clearchus expressed abiding

232 Dusinberre 2013, 44. 233 King 2013, 383. 234 King 2013, 384. 235 Laforse 2000,58.

77

loyalty to Cyrus despite his general Greek patriotism.236 His interest in Persia extended beyond the demise of his sponsor. Clearchus’ ambitions after Cyrus’ death extended to

(Anabasis 2.1.4, 2.2.1). Such ambitions did not reflect understanding of Persian aristocracy, but demonstrated an attempt to continue his use of the Greek army at his disposal for Persian potentate.237

Despite poor and infrequent pay from his Persian employer, Xenophon appears to have been fascinated by Cyrus and even wrote a Cyropaedia about Cyrus’ homonymic ancestor.

Whether Xenophon was right to impose his perceptions of the younger Cyrus onto the life of the elder one has been questioned.238 It is possible that and members of rebellion allowed significant number of non-Persians into inner circle, distorting the image of Persian court life

Xenophon witnessed.239 In other words, Xenophon’s image reflected his fourth-century perception of the court of a rebellious prince rather than the man credited with founding the

Persian Empire. The depiction of this empire, the royal court, and Cyrus the Great reveals a high measure of respect on Xenophon’s part. He focuses on the role of education, military science, and the administration of the Persian Empire to perhaps unintentionally display the influence of

Persian ideas and values on his own ideas as an author.240

Critics of the Cyropaedia perceive it as more of a literary product than the fruit of unprejudiced observations. The subsequent influence upon modern research would be therefore

236 Laforse 2000, 77. 237 Laforse 2000, 80. 238 Tuplin 2010, 225. 239 Tuplin 2010, 225. 240 Hirsch 1985, 142.

78

unwarranted.241 Xenophon’s description of Cyrus’ life constitutes the ideal and idealized picture of archaic Persia rather than a realistic portrait of the life of a prince of such a powerful state.242

Xenophon’s biases become clearer as he presents the events following Darius II’s death

(Anabasis 1.1.1-3) with what Christopher Tuplin considers immense vagueness and no localization in order to remove the sense of court and entourage from the events of the Anabasis including the Battle of Cunaxa.243

The struggle taken on in the Cyropaedia then was to maintain an image that court environment was civilian, not military, even though Xenophon’s experience was almost exclusively of a military environment during his Persian venture.244 The final section of this work does not express the same fascination or respect for the Persians, who experienced a noticeable decline following the death of the idealized Cyrus.245 Nevertheless, the Persia-centric works of Xenophon provide a vital corpus of information regarding life in Persia while offering insight into the power structure within the empire by means of the struggles to obtain or maintain it.

In these ways, the Greeks act as though they were already subjects to the Persian Empire, although there were still some vocal proponents of the opposite view among the orators. Their ability to assume the positions of mercenaries, navarachs, and royal advisers while in exile shows a utilitarian Persian attitude regarding the employment of non-subjects. These potent

241 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1984, 118. 242 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1984, 119; Tuplin 2013, 72. 243 Tuplin 2010, 195. 244 Tuplin 2010, 197. 245 Tuplin 1993, 77; Dillery 1995, 59-98; Laforse 2005, 3-6; Tuplin 2013,70-71.

79

positions aided in maintaining or redefining the authority of the empire. Greek success was far from something the Persians appear to have been concerned about. Rather security in the Aegean

Sea, extending their influence and securing their positions seem to be the motivations of the satraps and kings for employing the Greeks in exile.

1.3 Direct Interference in Greek Politics

The next issue to address, which demonstrates the king’s authority in Greece despite the

Persians having failed to conquer it, is the interference in political matters. In this section I plan to review cases of the Persians directly interfering in Greece, usually but not exclusively Athens or Sparta. Most of these instances occur in the early to mid-fourth century, prior to Philip and

Alexander’s campaigns, but after the death of Cyrus the Younger. The satraps, not the king, mostly took advantage of this apparent extension of their range of influence. To what degree could these potentates exercise unofficial power outside their domain? Here I examine the role assumed by an intervening Persian potentate, predominantly bearing the rank of satrap rather than king.

Generally cases of Persians directly interfering in Greece involve ambassadors arriving at the polis in question and summarily ordering the officials to do something. This sequence of events occurred in Athens when Chabrias was general in Egypt and alienating the Athenians from the king’s good graces (Diodorus 15.29.3-4).246 It recurred in Sparta in 369/8 with

Artaxerxes attempting to force a peace settlement to the war against Thebes by granting it mercenaries (Diodorus 15.70.2). Further, by 362/1 the Persian king acquired the authority to

246 Cf. Nepos Chabrias 3.1

80

dictate peace terms between Greek states for a war in which Persia had no involvement

(Diodorus 15.90).

Whether the Greeks acquiesced to these terms and the orders of the king would depend on their current alliances in Greece itself. Sparta seems to have no qualms acceding to the king’s authority. Athens provides evidence of unrest and internal discord throughout the fourth century.

This unrest permitted the establishment of the , which carefully avoided acting as a second Athenian Empire by narrowly dodging the issue of authority within the

League. Though the autonomy of all members was guaranteed by the Athenians, they managed to create a second league with their fellow Ionians.247 Specifically the Chios and Athenian alliance of 384 was written with caution, expressing insistent respect for the peace in force, the

Spartans, and for the Persians,248 neither of which participated actively in the treaty. Diodorus claims Artaxerxes commanded the sea-adjacent satraps to aid as much as possible against Philip’s expansion (16.75.1-2). Epigraphical evidence and Diodorus (15.25.1-29.8) indicate that the foundation of this confederacy involved gradual diplomatic negotiations. The raid of Sphodrias seems irrelevant to the foundation of Second Athenian League.249 The documents adhered rather carefully to the provisions of King’s Peace during the League’s early days, listing only names of individual poleis.250Despite this care interpretation has led to miscomprehension of this alliance’s founding. The anachronistic definition of autonomy used by

247 Cargill 1981, 134. 248 Sealey 1993, 16. 249 Pownall 2004, 67. 250 Cargill 1981, 134-5.

81

modern scholarship makes appeal provisions from Second Athenian League incompatible with autonomy of states granted in the King’s Peace (387/6).251

Since Greece was clearly more important to the satraps than the king based on the amount of interest shown by the satraps (even though there are those who argue that the king was aware of every move made in his empire),252 satrapal authority exercised among the Greeks should be examined. Even with the network of spies reporting contemporary events in the remotest regions of his realm, the king of Persia could not have always been in a position to negotiate, dictate, or govern every situation, particularly on the extremities of his domain. The replacement of satraps appears to have been a reactionary response to rebellious or treasonous behavior, including overextension of the traditional role of the satrap. There are no stated criteria for the limits of satrapal power in any known extant document. In some cases, such as that of

Tissaphernes, it appears to be a knee-jerk reaction; in others, such as that of Tiribazus, the decision seems more reasoned, and subject to a trial.

The response to Persian authority among the Greeks in Europe, whether official or simply practical, was a reluctant acceptance of royal authority by the major poleis. The European Greeks paid no tribute to the Persians, although a capital and titular head for their unified state was chosen, much as it would have been had the Persians conquered it. This head switched with every new treaty, depending on the polis favored by the Persian representative whose court the representatives came to, usually in Lydia. These treaties bear further scrutiny in chronological order as fitting for the impact or lack thereof they eventually held.

251 Cargill 1981, 140. 252 MacGregor 1987, 100-101; Waters 2010, 817-818; Jehne 199, 101-115; Dmetriev,61-62.

82

In 386, Sparta was selected as the prostates of the Greeks under the Common Peace under the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas (Xenophon Hellenica 5.1.31; Diodorus 14.110.2-5).

The appointment fomented the frequent instability of the internal affairs in Greece. Already before the formation of the peace, one of the satraps took advantage of the discord between the mainland Greeks, inciting the Corinthian War. As discussed previously, after the establishment of the King’s Peace, Persian decrees established and ratified a series of multilateral Common

Peaces in Greece. After the Satrapal Revolts in 362,253 they began to make it their policy to exclude Sparta from these treaties (Demosthenes 16.9-10; Rhodes and Osborne #41; Diodorus

15.89.1-3; 4.33.8-9). Sparta was excluded from the common peace in 361 and the allies excluded both Sparta and Persia in the Peace of Philocrates in 346. Fear of Persian or Spartan retaliation appears to have faded, nevertheless its later absence highlights that Persian authority decided which poleis were internationally relevant, promoting Thebes and Athens over Sparta as prostates of united Greek alliance, although not necessarily a panhellenic one, since many states were omitted.

The fear of Persian response apparently faded as the image of a mighty, powerful empire able to reinforce the terms of an unpopular, common peace was entirely absent by 346, although already waning in 360s. A likely explanation for the dissolution of this image, and the authority that accompanied it, is the instability of the empire at least on the western fronts. The revolts of several western satraps and Egypt’s success at breaking off from the empire undermined the empire’s image to the Greeks. As a result, Persia intervened less in external matters, looking

253 Bauslaugh 1991, 211.

83

toward its own stability before that of the Hellenic states, diminishing its perceived authority beyond the scope of the empire’s borders.

As to the notable Lacedaemonian absence, the Greeks as well as the Persians appear to have deliberately distanced themselves from Sparta as allies. Sparta’s alienation of other allies began as early as the non-compliance with Agesilaus, who decided to liberate the Greeks in Asia

Minor despite the agreement with Persia to relinquish claims to that specific area. His behavior reportedly caused unease among the Persian allies he had acquired (cf. Diodorus 14.80.2-7;

Plutarch Agesilaus 15.1-2). Or it could have simply been that his unsuccessful venture no longer seemed beneficial to the satraps, or other residents of Asia. Xenophon testifies that

Ἀγησιλάῳ μὲν δὴ τῆς ἀπολείψεως τοῦ Σπιθριδάτου καὶ τοῦ Μεγαβάτου καὶ τῶν

Παφλαγόνων οὐδὲν ἐγένετο βαρύτερον ἐν τῇ στρατείᾳ (Hellenica 4.1.28).

Nothing came heavier to Agesilaus in the field than the departure of and

Megabates and the Paphlagonians.

While this mass exit demonstrates these Persian leaders’ inconsistency in commitments, it also opens the question of Agesilaus’ treatment of his allies in Asia during his campaign. From this representation, the aggression against the Greeks in Asia was brought about by the Greeks.

There was no man more eager to cause dissent in the Persian Empire than Agesilaus.

During his campaign in Asia, Agesilaus effectively caused strife between two satraps from neighboring regions, leaving parts of the coast vulnerable to exploitation. Seager claims that this behavior justifies claims about his polis’ later exclusion from such treaties with Persia, even

84

though the King’s Peace heavily favored Sparta.254 Knowing this, the Persians still maintained treaties with mainland Greece, exercising unprecedented authority while aware that they never had to enforce it. They falsely reported a Spartan naval victory (Xenophon Cyropaedia 1.6.13) despite their apparent concern and care for troops reported by Xenophon (Anabasis 4.5.7-9;

Hellenica 5.4).255 The rejection of Persian gifts (Xenophon Agesilaus 4.6), an act atypical of diplomacy, met with praise as good leadership and seemed to enrich the army rather than himself.256 Xenophon presents an altered negative report of the battle of Cnidus (Xenophon

Hellenica 4.3.13; Memorabilia 4.2.17). Clearly, Xenophon favored the policies and virtues of

Agesilaus. His interest in positive leadership rather than maintaining alliances or philia in Persia, and truthful reporting to Sparta informed his representation of Agesilaus’ actions.257 Agesilaus failed to contribute to traditional reciprocity of friendship with Spithridates (Xenophon Hellenica

3.4.10).258 Xenophon provides no true insight in Persia’s motivation to maintain any alliance or truce with this leader at that point in time.

Persia’s western satraps had apparent cause to wish to remove the led by

Agesilaus from their territory. Agesilaus behaved aggressively, abusing oaths and alliances formed in the western satrapies with local potentates. The allegedly panhellenic cause abused by

Agesilaus shown by his demand for autonomy of Greek cities in Asia violated the oath recorded in Xenophon, although it was not necessarily Plutarch’s Agesilaus’ intent to deceive

254 Seager 1977, 184. 255 Krentz 1989, 104. 256 Krentz 1989, 136. 257 Krentz 1989, 158. 258 Shipley 1997, 137.

85

Tissaphernes in response to deception (Plutarch Agesilaus 9.3). Nevertheless, such a demand would have been impossible for Tissaphernes without royal approval.259 The representations of

Agesilaus’ aggressive motivation in Plutarch ignore his panhellenic cause in that he proposed to leave in order to gain revenge at his enemy’s cost (Agesilaus 1.8).260 Xenophon, on the other hand, suggests that Tissaphernes put the gods on the Greek side by violating his oath to

Agesilaus (Hellenica 3.4.11), thereby providing a convenient excuse for war, even though his presence at Aulis entailed Greek aggression in the Persian point of view.

The handling of Agesliaus’ conduct seems similar to that of any other relation to the empire. A border incident as this one was meant to be dealt with by local officials rather than someone as remote as the great king.261 The plundering Agesilaus led at Sardis (Hellenica

Oxyrhynchia 7.1; Xenophon Hellenica 3.4.24; Agesilaus 1.32) resulted in the breaking of his alliance/truce with Tissaphernes, as emphasized by both Plutarch and Xenophon.262 Even though this act of aggression occurred against the core of Tissaphernes’ territory, the king may have held

Tissaphernes responsible for his failure to stop the Spartans in Asia, or may have been goaded by

Parysatis to penalize the satrap (Diodorus 14.80.6).263

In Asia, very little territory was in fact under Spartan control by 393, leading to talk of bribery although it can be seen that the rapidity of the Spartan campaign’s collapse was due to both Agesilaus’ own behavior and the assurances of Conon and Pharnabazus that cities would be

259 Shipley 1997, 136 notes that the mistreatment of friendships by Agesilaus was a theme in Plutarch’s chapters 5 and 7, particularly its criticism from Lysander. 260 Shipley 1997, 144. 261 Shipley 1997, 145. 262 Shipley 1997, 160 263 Shipley 1997, 161; cf. Tuplin 1993, 79 on Pharnabazus’ revenge on Agesliaus’ invasion of his territory.

86

free and ungarrisoned (Diodorus 14.84.5; Xenophon Hellenica 4.8).264 The response of the satraps, particularly Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, to Agesilaus’ behavior suggests a temporary disruption of the hierarchical system of empire, indicating a threat to the empire’s stability in the northwestern satrapies. Not all actions of Persian satraps toward extending or maintaining their power and influence were strictly anti-Lacedaemonian. For instance, of Caria supported Chios, Rhodes and Byzantium in their war against Athens (Diodorus 16.40.3-44.1-2;

45.1-6; 46.1-3). Subsequent Persian action, namely the dispatching of Timocrates of Rhodes to incite a land war in Greece, further indicates that the decision to interfere with the Greeks in

Europe tended to result in the interest of maintaining the empire rather than expanding it.

In this way, the Greeks become dependent on Persia for creating treaties and determining which poleis were included in the treaties, as seen with the deliberate neglect of Sparta in the common peace of 362 (RO 82).265 Artaxerxes II had become an arbiter for Hellenic inter-state conflicts, although not necessarily an effective one, since the general peace of 371 resulted in

Sparta’s defeat at only weeks later.266 Subsequently, the Persians, usually the satrap of

Lydia or Dascylium, ratified treaties, agreements, and leadership in a country they did not rule over. It is no wonder that Isocrates bemoaned the consequences and complained that Greece was weighed down under Persian pressure (4.175). The foreign entity unofficially ruling there, however, did not conduct themselves as fit masters of European Greece. When the selected

264 Lewis 1977, 143; cf. Briant 2002, 645-646. 265 Ryder 1965, 84-85; 140-144; 158-159;161. 266 Briant 2002, 656.

87

prostates failed to exercise the moral authority and King’s Peace,267 by the rights asserted in the

Peace of Antalcidas, the Persians chose a replacement.

Perhaps the pressure suggested by Isocrates is a poorly represented phenomenon in fourth-century Athens. The enforced peace resembles the Pax Persica in many ways, and the

Persians as masters of the Greeks in Europe rarely intervened, particularly without an invitation from one of the native poleis. While no Persian king ever formally renounced such right,268 their authority in Greece seems to have waned as the fear of Persian intervention did.

Whatever power these treaties granted was based predominantly on the intimidating force and threatened immediacy of a Persian response. After the Great Satrapal Revolt, this fear dissipated. It was replaced partly by Philip II of Macedon, whose propaganda used the glorious past of thwarting Xerxes’ invasion and desire to right past wrongs to unite Greeks. In response,

Demosthenes urged several times that embassies be sent to Persia to form alliance to stop

Macedonia with no reference to violation of any Common Peace (12.6-7; 10.52; 9.71). In each of these cases, the image of king as the enemy to Greek freedom has receded.269

The fundamental fear and enmity may have no longer applied, but the sense of Persian authority and the right of the Persians to interfere against Philip remained. For example, Persia’s interference in the Third Sacred War caused Philip to concern himself over the prospect of

Persian intervention by reviving the Greek awareness of Persia’s ability to intervene with financial and human resources as they deemed fit. The satrap Artabazus contributed money to

267 Sealey 1993, 38. 268 Buckler and Beck 2008, 233. 269 Buckler and Beck 2008, 240.

88

the Theban army in 355, which provided for without the king’s direct involvement or the risk of the king’s retaliation (Diodorus 15.90.3).270 Buckler claims that it was probably not until after the campaigning season of 351 that the Thebans turned to the king of Persia rather than a satrap for financial support, asking for the sum of 300 talents (Diodorus 16.40.1-2).271 The king’s campaign in the west foundered although little is known about this expedition, and he contributed presumably in exchange for Greek forces for his campaign in Egypt (Demosthenes

15.11-12; Isocrates 5.101). The likelihood of Philip’s Persian ambitions become clearer in the demands from Isocrates to undertake a Helleno-Persian war in To Philip272 as well as Philip’s eagerness to be nominated commander-in-chief of the Greeks after arranging the Amphictyonic peace.273

Situations occurred that mandated diplomacy and yet were answered by other means.

Especially as the balance of power in Greece shifted, interest in the perceived Persian threat grew. One such situation was born of the political strife in the 360s. Due to the apparent renewed

Persian interest in Greek affairs, Philip perceived the Persians as a threat to his political ambitions. Long before Peace of Philocrates, Philip employed anti-Persian movements, including receiving Persian exiles in the Macedonian court, and laying siege to Perinthus (Diodorus

16.75.2). Similarly, in 341, Demosthenes urged the Athenians to form an alliance with against

Macedonian interests in Greece (Demosthenes 9.71; 12.6). Moreover, Thebes, Argos and Athens

270 Buckler 1989, 50. 271 Buckler 1989, 100. 272 Gabriel 2010, 174. 273 Gabriel 2010, 174.

89

all made Persian alliances in the 340s,274 re-establishing the reach of the Persians into some major regions in Greece. Persia’s response to the attacks on Perinthus and Byzantium drew both

Athens and Persia closer to thwarting Philip’s ambitions in Asia Minor and the Troad.275 The royal directive given by Artaxerxes (III) was swift, decisive, and left no doubt of Persia’s strength. He ordered the coastal satraps to give as much assistance as possible to Perinthus in response to the Macedonian siege (Diodorus. 16.75.1-2). With this response, the western satraps proved their ability to fend off Philip at the Hellespont, and the power of the empire to defend its confirmed territory.

Through their actions and direct control of the Greeks, the Persians exercised an unofficial set of rights in Greece. Even by refusing to act, the absence of a Persian presence and the Greek response of demanding new intervention even to the extent of sending embassies to

Persia demonstrate a dependence on Persia’s arbitration. No one particular individual appears to have had a stronger interest or range of power in Greece, although Persian support became a source of concern for Philip once the empire seemed to have settled, and especially after

Artaxerxes III reclaimed Persian authority in Egypt. As Philip strengthened his kingdom and began to realize his Greek ambitions, Persia’s response and the appeal of Persian support to the

Greeks validate the idea that the Persians seemed to act as though they were the leaders of the

Greek poleis as they came into conflict with one another.

274 Brosius 2003, 234-5. 275 Buckler and Beck 2008, 242.

90

1.4 Conclusion

Persia’s authority outside of the Persian Empire was obtained less effectively by force and more so by political manipulation of vulnerable situations. The satraps’ extension of their power through influence among the Greeks developed their position as controllers of the Aegean Sea.

Their power was always an extension of regal power, and all satraps appear to have been motivated predominantly by security within their own borders. When viable, they attempted to extend their reach to whatever direction open to their intervention. Satrapal motivations for doing so derived from the royal directive.

The pattern of collaborating rather than necessarily dominating in difficult to secure regions matches the treatment of the Greeks in Europe. The Greeks, when faced with the possibility of one of their own poleis dominating them, sought out Persia’s intervention, thereby voluntarily granting a non-Greek a degree of authority over the European Greeks. Frequently, the inimical poleis required Persian help and support in order to achieve success in their goal, as made evident to the Thebans in the Third Sacred War (356-346). What was more important than nominal authority among the Greeks was the Greek perception of Persia’s authority and Greek fear of a less predictable, much closer enemy. Persia’s authority gradually, inconsistently, reached into Greece, as validated by the Greeks.

91

Chapter Two: Medism, Corruption, and Cohabitation

No study of the subversive political Helleno-Persian relations would be complete without addressing directly the topic of medism. Although medism’s basic definition is siding with the

Persians, the reality of its use leaves room for interpretation. The root of Mede instead of Persian demonstrates an antiquated misunderstanding of the Persian Empire. No source explains the use of the root Mede, while the earliest Greek representation of the Persians in the fifth century,

Aeschylus’ Persae, uses the term Persae in reference to the Persians Medae, indicating that the

Athenians were aware of the distinction, or at least that they knew there was one. The first

Persian conquest, Christopher Tuplin claims, was perceived as the work of the Medes, due to the conquest to Sardis and Ionia being led by generals who were likely Medes.276 The demonization of the Medes in the Near East can be seen in Isaiah 13.18, which calls them “bow-bearing Medes who care nothing for gold and silver, only the slaughter of young men and unborn children.” The association between Medes and fear likely contributed to the use of the root Mede instead of

Persian for the term medism.

It is still unclear what criteria distinguish cross-cultural exchange of ideas, goods, and money from a complete betrayal of one’s homeland and ethnicity. Further, it is necessary to consider whether as contact and trade between the mainland Greeks and the Persians developed and grew profitable, medism would become an obsolete concept. If the definition of medism is tightened to make it collaboration with Persia with the aim of creating new imperial subjects, the

276 Tuplin 2013, 225.

92

actions of both parties make more sense.277 This definition, however, raises more questions than it can sufficiently answer. Throughout this chapter, I will work toward a more satisfying definition of the concept by examining the known cases where others have accused individuals or poleis of this offence, and cases in which these accusations are strikingly absent.

Medism exemplifies the tension between the concept of the other in the Greek world and the reality of how the Greeks interacted with those labelled barbaroi (non-Greeks), a term usually used to describe Persians. Yet this attitude appears as early as 508/7 (Herodotus 5.73)278 and continues in Greece until long after Alexander’s conquest of Persia. The origin of medism279 and the attitude towards the other, especially the contradictory image of an effeminate, luxuriant ever-present source of peril280 predominant in sources from the fourth century or later but strangely lacking in earlier works, will be examined in this section. Other factors, such as when the term was used, by whom, and in what context, and when it seems to have faded, require scrutiny before a satisfactory definition of medism can be determined.

The idea of the Hellenic national identity and its contrast with the other or the barbarian in historic sources is a dominant topic of discussion in recent scholarly literature.281

Panhellenism and the campaigns to free the Greeks from Persian oppression demonstrate the prevalence of the action of medizing despite the fading away of the term as the Persian War became less culturally relevant, although it never disappeared altogether. In this chapter, I

277 Tuplin 1997,162. 278 See Holladay 1978. 279 Graf 1984. 280 See Hall 1989; Harrison 2002; Gruen 2011; Hirsch 1985 particularly contrasts the views of Plato and Xenophon. 281Hartog 1988; Hall 1989; Malkin 2001; Harrison 2002; Isaac 2004; Rollinger 2006; Lenfant 2013.

93

consider how relevant to current circumstances actual charges of medism were, particularly the cases of Pausanias and Themistocles. The Greek presence in Persia will be discussed briefly, especially considering the Persian perspective, where possible. In the section that follows, the benefits of a polis medizing for both the medizer and the satrap in question will be discussed, especially in light of the Persian political structure. In the last section I look at the idea of Greek freedom in contrast to the slavery associated with collaborating with the Persian Empire in light of the emergence of panhellenism outside the religious or athletic contexts, which appears to have borrowed some of the devices of medism.

Previous attempts to discuss medism in the Greek world tend to be limited in scope and focus, and therefore shed only a little light on the issue at hand. David Graf, for example, focuses on analyzing the term “medism” and medism’s spread through Persia’s empire, especially Egypt and Israel, yet limits his discussion to these states, offering no further consideration of the

Greeks.282 N.G.L. Hammond briefly considers the Greek terms τὰ μήδικα and τὸν μήδικον, generally relating to the Persian War but does not expand further or examine the phenomenon of medism.283 Some take the approach of considering the process of cultural exchange and the evolution of acculturation through prolonged exposure.284 Jonathan Hall evaluates the importance of Greekness, or as he calls it Hellenicity, and the merits of ethnic and national identity, providing his own insight as to what the Greeks considered essential character traits; however, he does not concern himself overly with the loss of this identity, nor the elements that

282 Graf 1984. 283 Hammond 1957. 284 Brosius 2011; Tuplin 2011; Miller 2011.

94

consist of its betrayal.285 Jack Balcer, on the other hand, discusses acculturation as a result of cultural exchange, focusing primarily on the Persian territories known as Sparda and Ionia, and the cultural blending between the Persians and Greeks as well as the other cultures who cohabited in the territory. He concludes that the merging of the two led to a blended localized culture, identifying respectively as each Greek or Persian, but exhibiting aspects of each.286

Another approach to the medizing phenomenon is that of specific cases when individuals collaborated with Persia for their own purposes, generally seen as a form of corruption. Józef

Wolski considers only Pausanias’ and Themistocles’ medism and their impact in light of the subsequent fall from grace following the betrayal of each.287 Daniel Gillis generally follows the work of Herodotus and critics of Herodotus, limiting his focus to the early fifth century.288 A.J.

Holladay’s work looks even earlier, confining his work to the end of 480.289 Recently, Eduard

Rung has built on the work of these previous discussions with consideration of medism in

Herodotus290 and prior to the Persian Invasion.291

Perhaps it is time to reconsider the issues concerning medism, particularly after the

Persian Invasion, since most of these works are Herodotean in focus or dated in their frame of reference. Medism’s association with betrayal combined with the anachronistic incorrect root of the terminology indicates the politically charged nature of this concept. It appears at times in which the relationship between the Greeks (usually the Athenians) and Persians experienced a

285 Hall 2002. 286 Balcer 1983. 287 Wolski 1973. 288 Gillis 1979. 289 Holladay 1978. 290 Rung 2013. 291 Rung 2015.

95

significant shift. Medism strongly relates to panhellenism, implies a degree of agency in the decision to submit to Persian authority, and limits what the Greeks consider to be their innate liberty.

These topics have been broken into selected categories, especially in light of the recent renewed interest in Persian history. First, I will look at the process of acculturation or the saturation of two cultures in close contact. The following section examines the idea of medism in a polis, focusing one subsection on Asia and another on Europe. Next, I examine the use of medism by individual politicians, starting with those accused immediately following the invasions, following with Pericles, and moving on to discussing the shifting attitudes of the

Greeks. Finally, I analyze the similarities of medism and the concept of the freedom of the

Greeks in Asia, comparing the abuse of the panhellenic spirit with the concept of medism.

2.1 The Image of Acculturation

As could be expected, the process of acculturation occurred most strongly within the

Persian empire. When the Persians collaborated with a group with their support, whether political, military, or financial, the satrap in question generally stood to profit from such a transaction. The indisputable truth is that there were Greeks in the Persian Empire living as

Greeks under Persian domination that never rebelled nor seemed at all discontent with their circumstances. The Ionian Revolt was never repeated and Agesilaus’ campaign to liberate these particular Greeks proved burdensome to their communities. The Persians took over Asia Minor in the middle of the sixth century, yet the Ionian and Aeolian Greeks maintained their Greek identities and were not particularly collaborative with the Persian king. They were even stamping

96

their own coins.292 Balcer gives the example of Helleno-Persian integration over the course of time in the Persian satrapy of Sparda. The point Balcer emphasizes is that this process of cultural integration took place gradually, and only because of the proximity of the two cultures inhabiting the same place.293 There are several known (even more unknown) cases of Greeks living among the Persians and cohabitating without facing allegations of medism, or often after having encountered them. Greek individuals flourished within several Persian courts, not only that of

Sardis or Susa.

The Persian Empire was created by the conquest of several different nations, making it a multicultural mosaic. Cultural blending was inevitable, but never forced. The subject states were allowed to maintain their own cultural identities as long as they answered to the assigned satrap and his court. As fitting for a conquering empire, Persian law and governors were forced on their subjects, and their collective liberty was denied since they did not voluntarily join.294 was reserved for specifically Persian inscriptions. Correspondences were written in the language of the subject state, or failing that, .295After the Peace of Callias, Greek states in Asia

Minor were allowed to voluntarily join (or rejoin as the case may be) the empire.296 Although most of the territory was taken by conquest, the Persian Empire did not force assimilation.297

Strictly speaking, medism is not a crime in any polis. No legislation barring a person from favoring Persia has been found, nor is there any known document forbidding contact with

292 Balcer 1983, 264. 293 Balcer 1983, 265-267. 294 Briant 2002, 439. 295 Tuplin 2011, 157-158. 296 See Badian 1993. 297 See Brosius 2011, 135-138.

97

the Persians, despite the ostracon condemning “Callias the Mede” who was otherwise unknown.298 In fact, to some degree, acquiring Persian habits and goods was normal for the

Greeks on the mainland. The Athenians took to wearing Persian tunics, as both masculine and feminine clothing. The traditionally male kandys was adopted as a woman’s garment in fifth- century Athens.299 The parasol similarly appears in the possession of Greek women despite its masculine Near Eastern tradition.300 Trends like the above play into the stereotypes of effeminate

Persians among the Greek elite.301 Trade took place between the Greek poleis and the Persians after the cessation of hostilities between them, making Persian goods readily available to Greek citizens. Examples of these Persian wares have been found at the Workshop of Phidias at

Olympia and in the treasury inventories of Parthenos for 403/2.302

Whether these came from Persia itself or simply the Persian imperial centers is uncertain, but the Athenians regarded translucent glass as characteristically Persian.303 Embroidery and embroidered textiles are traditionally eastern, yet appear in Greece in the fifth century. Persian gold supported the restoration of Athens after its overthrow of the Thirty. Persian gold exploited the antipathy between Hellenic states to trigger the Corinthian War. From 392 onward, the Greek states began to compete for Persia’s support in the form of treaties. Nevertheless, contact with

Persia could be interpreted as corruption, betrayal, and in cases of voluntary medism, treason.

298 Graf 1984, 15. 299 Miller 1997, 160-171. 300 Miller 1997, 194-5. 301 Miller 1997, 206. 302 Miller 1997, 74-75. 303 Miller 1997, 75.

98

Naturally, there were exceptions to the use of the label of medism. Over time, the exact phrase appears to fade into obscurity. Herodotus also avoids using term medism regarding actions of Asiatic Greeks. For example, Miletus’ deal with Cyrus (Herodotus 1.141.14) does not merit the label, making it unclear what criteria excluded these actions from the medism label,304 even following the definition determined above. What can be noted is that Herodotus, the source who uses the term most,305 never used the term to describe Athens or the Athenians.

Furthermore, he never directly associated with the action with treachery.306 The exception of the

Athenians likely indicates more about the Athenocentrism of most surviving Greek authors:

Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon all spent a significant amount of their lives in Athens.

The orators, tragedy,307 and most surviving philosophy came from Athens. However, the Greeks in Asia placed no such pressure on writers, leaving their representation to the author’s discretion.

Living in the Persian Empire, however, did not mean acquiring Persian customs or even cultural identity. The work of Jack Balcer demonstrates strongly that the Ionians in Sparda,

Cilicia, Lydia, and Caria remained Greek in both their own consideration and that of the mainland Greeks, despite two centuries of Persian domination. While the cultures may have blended, as would have been natural over prolonged cohabitation of the same space, the archaeological and textual evidence suggests that Persianization was not forced on the subjects of the empire, whom the Greeks seem to view as slaves to the king. Moreover, Kurt Raaflaub

304 Tuplin 1997, 161. 305 Forms of the term (without certain variants) appear at: 4.144, 4.165, 6.109, 6.64, 7.138, 7.139, 7.139, 7.172, 7.174, 7.205, 7.206, 7.233, 8.112, 8.144, 8.30, 8.30, 8.30, 8.31, 8.34, 8.50, 8.73, 8.92, 9.17, 9.17, 9.31, 9.40, 9.67, 9.86, 9.86, 9.87, 9.88, 9.106, 9.15. 306 Rung 2013, 77. 307 On tragedy’s relevance to the development on the idea of the “other” see Hall 1989, 56-100.

99

points out that subjugation of these states in no way ended contact between the east Greeks and those in Europe, giving both groups ample opportunity to learn Persian methods of leadership.308

The expansion of the empire slowed if not stopped after Xerxes’ failed expedition in

Greece. Material evidence suggests contact and cultural blending between the Greeks and the

Persians. Coins depicting satraps with Greek images, namely Tissaphernes and Cyrus the

Younger, and the Athenian tetradrachm depicting Darius II indicate a shared identity between the different cultures, to the extent that it was commemorated on money. Cultural sharing also extended to religious shrines. For instance, the Macedonians were surprised to discover a statue of Ariobarzanes outside the Athena sanctuary in Ilium (Diodorus 17.7.6). This statue and others like it indicate more than just respect for the Greek religion. They demonstrate a shared reverence for the regional gods. Moreover, the Pax Persica, an apparent peace throughout the

Persian empire, required the integration of local elite into the empire’s political apparatus based on merit,309 despite the image of the Greeks in Persia as slaves of the empire.

Herodotus probably faced the most criticism from later sources, especially Plutarch. The

Greek historian expresses what seems like admiration for some Persian customs, and even situates a discussion of the types of government (as known to the Greeks) during Darius’ coup

(3.79-82). Herodotus expresses admiration for certain Persian customs, and therefore earns condemnation of Plutarch (De malignitate Herodoti 857a). The later biographer applies the term philobarbarus to the work of Herodotus, implying that the historian betrayed his very project of

308 Raaflaub 2009a, 91. 309 Brosius 2010, 33.

100

defining the causes of the Helleno-Persian conflict. Plutarch’s assessment of philobarbarus seems like a naïve and superficial judgment of Herodotus’ approval of Persian system.310

Comedy offers another avenue to express a Persian presence, this time, a commercial one. Aristophanes refers to the use of Persian garments, specifically slippers several times. Two such instances stand out. In the Thesmophoriazousae, the female infant is nothing but a skin filled with wine and shod with Persian slippers (734). This comic incident shows an acceptance of Persian customs within Athens to the extent that a relatively obscure family would purchase these shoes for an infant, one who is always referred to with feminine pronouns. To the kinsmen of who made the discovery it was more scandalous that the baby was a wine-skin than that it had Persian shoes, signifying that these accessories were commonly accessible to the

Athenians. In Aristophanes’ Clouds, Socrates puts Persian slippers on the flea to measure distance it could jump (149). The idea of a silly, frivolous, and unnecessary experiment like the jumping-distance of a flea demonstrates the Thinkery’s lack of true purpose in Athens. Further, the flea is a small and insignificant creature, whose slippers would have been extremely tiny as well. The specialization of such specifically Persian footwear seems decadent. To the older, rustic Strepsiades, the very concept is incomprehensible. This portrayal demonstrates the attempt to elegantize the older generation while displaying the corruption of the younger population,311 who spend money on frivolities, and indulge in strange experiments, calling it wisdom.

The Greeks continued to depict Persians using mythology. In tragedy, an Orientalizing trend appeared following the Persian Wars. Medea, for instance, became the subject of at least

310 Gruen 2011, 73. 311 Miller 1997, 154.

101

one tragedy, speaking the plight of women and non-Greeks. Characters often wore oriental garments, often mistaking male clothing for female, emphasizing further the perception of the unfamiliar as weak or effeminate. Yet the orientalization of myth became widespread, reflecting a significant change in Weltanschauung, which was not limited to one moment of stimulus.312

Pinpointing the arrival of eastern figures in Greek tragedy or mythology would be difficult. For instance, tragedies in the sixth and fifth centuries frequently featured the and its survivors,313 demonstrating a continued interest in both those myths and the conflict between

East and West.314

Regardless of the nature of the interest, in this case conflict rather than congruity, they established and influenced the common opinion of the Persians in Greece, particularly Athens.

Tragedy and comedy agree that the Persians corrupted those in contact with them. With this image frequenting the popular forms of entertainment of the time, it is necessary to remark the disparity between material evidence, which suggests trade, frequent contact, and some degree of respectful truce.

2.2 Use and Abuse of Medism by Poleis and Satraps

Although they never bore the label of medizers in Greek sources, the Greeks in Asia often collaborated toward making the empire more stable, since it was their home. The reasons for doing so vary based on circumstances. The approval of the local satraps offered socio- political security and benefitted oligarchs and regularized government rather than the enforced

312 Miller 1997, 169. 313 See also the sculptural program of the metopes of the Parthenon and that of the Stoa in Athens. Castriota 2005, 90-95 especially on the Stoa scenes. 314 Also demonstrated in the prooimion to Herodotus (Herodotus 1.1)

102

alliance with Athens.315 European poleis also had the option available, although fewer examples remain for discussion. For this reason, I look at the use of medism by certain poleis, starting with

Samos, then Thebes, and Thessaly since they were tarred with the brush of medism both early and repeatedly.

After the Peace of Callias, Greek states in Asia Minor were allowed to voluntarily join

(or rejoin as the case may be) the empire.316 Though most of the territory was taken by conquest, the Persian Empire did not force assimilation.317 Herodotus shows the medizers as betrayers of

Hellas (6.49). Rather than portraying the decision to submit or aid the Persians as an intelligent choice, those who chose to do so were labeled as traitors, at least by Herodotean standards.

Those who willingly chose to live under Persian rule rather than revolt or submit to Athens’ liberation are judged harshly by their contemporaries as well as by later orators (cf. Demosthenes

14.33-35; Isocrates 14.30; Aeschines 3.116 on the Thebans who medized; Athenaeus 12.49).318

Given Herodotus’ tendency to embellish events, and his knowledge of the outcome, it is quite possible that the medists’ contributions to Persia’s invasions did not match the degree of betrayal to Greece or significance to Persian strategy assigned by Herodotus. Although advice on strategy may have been appreciated, such as landing at Marathon, there was very little benefit to the advice given and the Persians ignored it as often as they followed it. Intelligence from an exile would quickly turn stale, although the intrinsic value of local knowledge appears to have

315 Balcer 1984, 388. 316 Badian 1993. 317 Brosius 2011, 135-138. 318 Steinbock 2013, 153-156 states that the orators employ the historical paradigm as a simple analogy for impending barbarian invasions since the barbarians are driven by greed and determined to invade Greece.

103

appealed to Herodotus’ Persians. For example, both Demaratus and Hippias had been absent from their home poleis for a long time before allegedly giving the Persian generals their advice.

However, both appear to have served as advisers following their loss of regency of their poleis

(see 1.2) while receiving royal favor at the Persian court. As discussed above, the Persian court system relied on a system of indenture between a man in power, such as a satrap and his favorites. His generosity kept those under him reliant on him, thereby theoretically forcing them to maintain loyalty to him.

2.2.1 The Greeks in Asia

That the Greeks in Asia submitted to Persian rule in the sixth century makes them an interesting case for the hybridization of Greek and Persian cultures. Unfortunately, acts of medism would be difficult to distinguish from survival within their native environment.

However, the islands off the coast of Asia, technically Greek, oscillated between liberty and

Persian rule (later, Athenian or Spartan rule as well). Later, Persian-installed Greek leaders of the communities in Asia medized not out of necessity but out of self-interest. The island of Samos, for one, provides an excellent example of an autonomous Hellenic community deliberately medizing for their own advantage.

Motivation for medism extended beyond the safety of the polis or sheer greed. Decades prior to the Persian invasion of Greece, medism becomes apparent. Asia was a breeding ground for such behavior, whether an astute political decision or an act of betrayal. For instance,

Polycrates of Samos collaborated with Cambyses as a political strategy to resolve internal conflict in Samos. Having developed a thalassocracy, the tyrant of Samos agreed to contribute to the Persian campaign in Egypt. Here the king seems directly involved in a Greek’s medism. The

104

tyrant of Samos directly contacted Cambyses and asked to be commanded to provide support for the war in Egypt despite his alliance with Amasis. Although not of royal instigation, Polycrates’ decision to involve the king of Persia in an internal conflict of his tyranny demonstrates his prudence as a ruler as well as his assumption that he would have had no choice except to concede to the demands of the Persian king.

Polycrates’ motivations, however, were entirely based in political expedience. Herodotus’ account of the affair shows the tyrant asking the great king to seek Samian support of his rebellion against the treasonous satrap of Lydia, Oroetes (3.44). Herodotus describes the action as follows:

Πέμψας δὲ κήρυκα λάθρῃ Σαμίων Πολυκράτης παρὰ Καμβύσην τὸν Κύρου συλλέγοντα

στρατὸν ἐπ' Αἴγυπτον, ἐδεήθη ὅκως ἂν καὶ παρ' ἑωυτὸν πέμψας ἐς Σάμον δέοιτο

στρατοῦ. Καμβύσης δὲ ἀκούσας τούτων προθύμως ἔπεμπε ἐς Σάμον δεησόμενος

Πολυκράτεος στρατὸν ναυτικὸν ἅμα πέμψαι ἑωυτῷ ἐπ' Αἴγυπτον. Ὁ δὲ ἐπιλέξας τῶν

ἀστῶν τοὺς ὑπώπτευε μάλιστα ἐς ἐπανάστασιν ἀπέπεμπε τεσσεράκοντα τριήρεσι,

ἐντειλάμενος Καμβύσῃ ὀπίσω τούτους μὴ ἀποπέμπειν.

Unbeknownst to the Samians, Polycrates sending a herald to Cambyses, son of Cyrus,

while he was gathering an army against Egypt, asked him for an army by sending a

messenger to him in Samos. Cambyses, having heard this, sent an envoy to Samos,

asking Polycrates to send a naval force to him against Egypt immediately. Choosing

those citizens whom he most suspected for plotting to rise against him, he sent forty

triremes, demanding to Cambyses that he not send them back. (Herodotus 3.44)

105

There are two noteworthy pieces of information for the purposes of this chapter: that political foes were sent off with expectation that they would not return, and that Herodotus’s habit of inflating the numbers of the navy was probably in effect here.319Although Polycrates’ action may be plausible for a thalassocracy, a total of 40 triremes seems like an extremely high figure for token service or compliance. The mission did not promote Samian interests abroad, nor did it secure the borders of the thassalocracy. The financial burden of dispatching 40 ships in service of an ally could have been crippling to a polis; moreover, the human resources required to sail and to maintain these ships would have been considered extremely heavy.

Furthermore, he asked the king to request his support against Egypt, breaking one Persian alliance, with the nearby satrap, to solidify another, this time with the king, despite a previously positive relationship between Samos and Egypt. This demand suggests collaboration between the ruler of the empire rather than an established ally and a closer Persian power, namely the satrap.

Polycrates subjected himself to the empire to betray Oroetes and to rid Samos of his rivals. This action resulted in Polycrates’ goals against his own people being met,320 since the worst of his political opponents had been sent away. Such a pragmatic political attitude made it easier for later generations of Samians to accept the medizing of their ancestors,321 but did not account for the general dissatisfaction of his subjects, or that of his satrap.

Oroetes’ conspiracy failed against Cambyses, and Polycrates proved too difficult for the satrap to control, therefore Oroetes could not trust Polycrates. As a result, Oroetes executed him

319 On Herodotus’ numbers see Young 1981. 320 Papalas 1999, 7. 321 Papalas 1999, 8.

106

(Herodotus 3.122-126).322 Perhaps this action is simply a tyrant solidifying his position in power by removing a potential threat by politically acceptable means; however, the decision to break his alliance with Oroetes in favor of Cambyses suggests he deemed a degree of Persian influence in Samian culture more favorable than the freedom of the Samians from Persia’s empire.

To a degree, the decision Polycrates made to compromise with the Persians, especially in support of the campaign against Egypt, was not an act of submission since he took advantage of the opportunity to set the leaders of the Samian dissidents on the expedition.323 His thalassocracy in the Eastern Aegean created proto-imperial power structures, demonstrating the Greek habit of foreign imitation,324 borrowing Persian methods for maintaining control of his subjects. Oroetes and even Cambyses seemed content to allow this mini-empire to develop as long as Polycrates appeared loyal to the empire. Through imitation of the empire, Polycrates also demonstrated a tendency to collaborate with the Persians, thereby fulfilling both definitions of medism: collaborating with Persia, and betraying his fellow Greeks to do so.

Polycrates was not the only tyrant on Samos to demonstrate a degree of loyalty to the

Persians in support of his own political interests. After the execution of Polycrates, Darius installed the tyrant’s brother, Syloson, as the new tyrant of Samos (Herodotus 3.139-49). Such actions show the Persian tendency to arbitrarily determine the government of a Greek polis in order to establish a medizing government in that location. The government of Mytilene was arbitrarily replaced.

322 Papalas 1999, 11. 323 Shipley 1987, 97. 324 Raaflaub 2009a, 113.

107

This is only one of several individual set up against wishes of the local population by Darius. The departure from hereditary succession benefitted Persia, as seen in appointment of

Theomestor as a tyrant of Samos.325 Based on the support from the empire, especially royal sponsorship (or even appointment), it is a reasonable conclusion that Ionian tyrants of sixth century were more loyal to the Persian king than their own cities based on Herodotus’ account.326

A tyrant established by the king would naturally be more loyal to the king than his recently established people. One perhaps apocryphal example that appears in Herodotus is the unwillingness of Histiaeus to destroy Darius’ bridge over the Danube and leave him to the mercy of the Scythians in 513 (4.134).

During the Ionian Revolt, the leaders of some Greek poleis rebelled, but the nature of the complaints and the general disinterest in participating in the revolt can be seen through the paucity of support from the Asiatic Greeks. Histiaeus convinced gathered Greek tyrants that to support Persian king was in their best interest (Herodotus. 4.137.2) since personally preserving the king meant maintaining their tyrannies.327 It seems Darius’ intervention following the Ionian

Revolt was the exception to his ruling policy.328 Subsequently, the poleis remained complacent, largely cooperating with the Persians, helping to maintain the stability of the empire. The

Colophonians even asked for the satrap’s help during the Samian Wars (Thucydides 3.34.2-4), demonstrating dissatisfaction not with Persian rule but Athenian. Since the satraps set to profit as

325 Graf 1985, 83. 326 Gorman 2001, 132. 327 Gorman 2001, 131. 328 Graf 1985, 84.

108

much as possible from Athenian setbacks, they exercised a policy of intervention329 during the wars first with their subjugated allies, then with the Peloponnesian League.

2.2.2 The Greeks in Europe

Another group that merits examination are the Greeks in Greece who medized both during and after the Persian invasion. A relationship established for the sake of self-preservation on the polis’ part tended to develop into a mutually beneficial relationship between a polis and a satrap. Although it is not my goal to specifically discuss the wars between the Greeks and

Persians, in this section it is unavoidable. Medism occurred most frequently in Europe during

Xerxes’ invasion of Greece. Xerxes’ goal as expressed by Herodotus (7.145.2) was to deter communities from taking action against the Persian invaders rather than to develop alliances in

Greece.330 To a degree, the poleis that did so overcame the later stigma and rescinded their medism. Among others, Thessaly and Thebes were known to have sided with the Persians, though it is Theban medizing that is remembered best, likely due to its fraught relationship with

Athens.331

Two particular examples stand out among the many poleis for which medism continued even intermittently after the war. The first of these is Thebes, not for actions during the war, although the advice and participation with the Persian forces at Plataea displayed medism as a form of betrayal, but for the consistent reputation for medism which they had to defend during and after the Peloponnesian War. Thessaly’s history with the Persians extends much further than

329 Briant 2002, 581. 330 Baragwanath 2008, 212. 331 See Steinbock 2013.

109

the invasion of 480,332 as discussed below. The association of both states with the Persians and the stigma of medism lingered despite the ubiquity of Persian affiliates throughout the poleis of these critics.

2.2.2.1 Thebes

Thebes did commit the betrayal of siding with the invading Persians during Xerxes’ invasion in 480-479. The Thebans fought with the Persians at the battle of Plataea (Herodotus

9.68-69), and advised Mardonius that Greece would be more easily defeated by gold than by force (Herodotus 9.3). However, most of took Persia's side in the invasion, as did

Thessaly. Thebes was hardly alone in fighting for the invaders. But this betrayal haunted Thebes to the extent that a century later, Athenian orators offered it as a strong reason not to trust Thebes

(Isocrates 12.93; 14.30, 62; Demosthenes 6.11; 14.33-34; 59.95).

The Theban response to the Persian invasion, according to Herodotus, was, similar to the

Thessalians’, encouraging and supportive of the invaders rather than of the Greek states uniting against them. In fact, their advice to the Persians was described as follows:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ πορευόμενος γίνεται ὁ στρατὸς ἐν Βοιωτοῖσι, οἱ Θηβαῖοι κατελάμβανον τὸν

Μαρδόνιον καὶ συνεβούλευον αὐτῷ λέγοντες ὡς οὐκ εἴη χῶρος ἐπιτηδεότερος

ἐνστρατοπεδεύεσθαι ἐκείνου, οὐδὲ ἔων ἰέναι ἑκαστέρω, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ ἱζόμενον ποιέειν

ὅκως ἀμαχητὶ τὴν πᾶσαν Ἑλλάδα καταστρέψεται (9.2; cf. 7.202).

When the army, having driven forward, was in Boeotia, the Thebans advised Mardonius

to stop, claiming that there would not be a place more convenient to be occupied than

332 See Westlake 1936.

110

there and not to go further but that he should stay here and from there make measures to

overturn all of Greece without a fight.

This description suggests that the Thebans preferred to serve as a base for the Persians, who would hold the land already conquered and continue their conquest. Further, it indicates that with the fall of Thebes, many other Greek states would capitulate, choosing to surrender rather than face a large invading force. They further advised the general to bribe the Greeks instead of fighting them (Herodotus 9.2). As a result of this advice, harboring the Persian army, and willingly fighting alongside the Persians, the Thebans were remembered for medizing, and the reputation waxed and waned depending on current events.

The relationship between Athens and Thebes was tainted by strong hostilities in the 370s and 360s, partly due to Athens’ affiliation with Plataea. This is expressed through apparent resentment for Thebes’ medism. Despite the lengthy period between the Persian withdrawal from

Greece and these newer hostilities, the resentment lingered at least on the Athenian side. As

Thebes accrued power in Greece, the antipathy from Athens increased. Medism cannot be the sole excuse, however convenient it seemed.333 Athens had developed much firmer ties to Persia once their overt hostilities ceased. The Athenians had established treaties and trade by the end of the fifth century. Thebes appears to have done none of these until much later. Thucydides has the

Thebans claim, in their defense:

333 Steinbock 2013, 102-103 discusses contemporary geopolitics as the reason for the resurgence of the image of the Thebans as medizers in the fourth century, namely following the destruction of Plataea, and the alliance of Thebes, Argos, and Macedon.

111

ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ὅ τε Μῆδος ἀπῆλθε καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔλαβε… ἠλευθερώσαμεν τὴν Βοιωτίαν

καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους νῦν προθύμως ξυνελευθεροῦμεν, ἵππους τε παρέχοντες καὶ παρασκευὴν

ὅσην οὐκ ἄλλοι τῶν ξυμμάχων. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐς τὸν μηδισμὸν τοσαῦτα ἀπολογούμεθα·

(Thucydides 3.62.5).

But when the Mede left and took our laws… we freed Boeotia, and also now with much

zeal assist you in the liberating the rest and we offer more horses and more provisions of

war than any of the other confederates. And so much we have spoken in for

our medizing.

This statement is made to the Lacedaemonians to dissuade them from intervening in Thebes’ assault on Plataea. The fact that they are defending a crime half a century past in defense of their destruction of a Greek polis shows how much they at least heard about it. Or, rather, how

Thucydides thought they had been plagued by the continued suspicion against them. As discussed, by 427, however, the charge of medism should have been obsolete due to shifts in the

Helleno-Persian relationship.

The next known interaction between Thebes and Persia was the unsuccessful embassy sent in 392 to negotiate a truce with Persia without success.334 These negotiations included envoys from several poleis, but failed. The King’s Peace established in 387/6 was not exclusive to Sparta, but applied to all participants in the Corinthian War and guaranteed autonomy with

Sparta as the peace’s enforcer. After the battle of Leuctra in 371, Thebes began to establish an

334 Xenophon Hellenica 4.8.14-16, the poleis that had united to oppose Sparta in Greece (Athens, , Argos and Boeotia, which was united under Thebes) sent embassies to Persia in response to Sparta’s negotiations with the Persians.

112

unofficial hegemony, which was ratified by the Persian king on ’ embassy in 367.

Xenophon reports that the king looked especially favorably upon the Theban envoy, Pelopidas, for the following reasons:

πολὺ ἐπλεονέκτει ὁ Πελοπίδας παρὰ τῷ Πέρσῃ. εἶχε γὰρ λέγειν καὶ ὅτι μόνοι τῶν

Ἑλλήνων βασιλεῖ συνεμάχοντο ἐν Πλαταιαῖς, καὶ ὅτι ὕστερον οὐδεπώποτε

στρατεύσαιντο ἐπὶ βασιλέα, καὶ ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ τοῦτο πολεμήσειαν αὐτοῖς, ὅτι οὐκ

ἐθελήσαιεν μετ' Ἀγησιλάου ἐλθεῖν ἐπ' αὐτὸν οὐδὲ θῦσαι ἐάσαιεν αὐτὸν ἐν Αὐλίδι τῇ

Ἀρτέμιδι. (Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.34; cf. Plutarch Pelopidas 30.1).

Pelopidas benefited greatly at the Persian court. For he was able to say that alone of the

Greeks, they fought with the king at Plataea, and that they had never taken up a campaign

against the king, as well as that the Lacedaemonians waged war against them because of

this, and that they refused to march with Agesilaus against him and did not allow him to

sacrifice to at Aulis.

Xenophon’s statement suggests that Thebes, or at least Pelopidas, was well remembered by the

Persian court, and that recent actions had won favor abroad, though seemingly not in Greece.

With this endorsement, the Thebans were able to solidify their claim to hegemony in Greece, and established themselves as the dominant power until 362. In 367 the Thebans took pride in their apparently long established friendship with the Great King once their power had been sanctified by Artaxerxes.335

335 On the Theban hegemony, see Buckler and Beck 2008. On the common peaces, see Ryder 1966.

113

As proof of their sanction of Theban friendship, Persia even provided the Thebans with funding in 351/0 for their war with the Phocians.336 Julia Heskel claims that in light of Thebes’ fourth-century friendship with the Persian King, it is unlikely Thebes supported Artabazus’ rebellion in 353/2, and suggests an earlier date for Theban aid during Satrapal Revolt.337 Even though their philia with the king was not proving to be profitable, it was established and maintained from 367 until Thebes’ fall. Yet, Xenophon’s claim that perhaps Athens should find a new philos in 387/6 (Hellenica 7.1.37) shows that while Thebes and Sparta were vying for

Persian help, Athens did not remain untainted, despite later Athenian protests against Theban medizing.338

Where then do the charges of medism against Thebes in particular come from if they have had little exclusive contact with Persia in nearly a century? In addition to her fluctuating hostility with Athens, her sometimes ally and frequent adversary, the objectives of the orators and historians making these claims merit some consideration. In 373, Thebes subjugated Plataea and . The Athenians took offense and used medism as a form of smear campaign against the Thebans immediately afterward (Isocrates 14; Isocrates 8.17; Isocrates 8.115; Demosthenes

16; Xenophon Hellenica 6.3.20; Xenophon Hellenica 6.5.35). Another plausible cause of the constant reminders of Thebes’ medism in 480 and 479 is the use of emotionally charged social memory of victory over the medizing Thebans to rally the general assembly or soldiers before

336 Heskel 1997, 120. 337 Heskel 1997, 120; cf. Diodorus 16.34.1-2. 338 Tuplin 1993, 153.

114

battle.339 Memory being flawed, the stories would tend to converge with the official version inscribed on temples and expressed in public orations.340

The reality of these allegations is very limited and politically charged, which could be to a degree attributed to flaws in memory. It would be convenient to forget that Athens and Sparta were as guilty of medism as Thebes, if not more so, although unlike Thebes, neither Athens nor

Sparta sided with Persia during the invasion. Elsewhere the charges seem to have faded, but

Thebes was branded by its actions, and the corruption stuck.

2.2.2.2 Thessaly

Thessaly was largely represented as a land of political and cultural backwardness

(Hellanicus of Lesbos FGrH 601a F1; Isocrates Ep.2.20; Plato 53d; Critias DK 88 B31), and its citizens often faced the stereotype of licentious gluttons without sophrosyne

(Aristophanes Wasps 1274; Critias DK 88 B31; Plato Crito 53d-e; FGrH 115 F49).341

Commonly modern interpreters cast blame on , fear, and the ruling dynasty. The political structure of Thessaly differs in that it was not a polis but a tetrad of cities reorganized by

Aleuas the Red in the second half of the sixth century. Each territory was headed by a tetrarch.

Aleuas divided the tetrads into kleroi led by officers called tagi for optimal military mobility.

During the fifth century, Thessaly came to dominate their neighboring cities, including ,

Pherae, and Pharsalus politically and economically. In this way, Thessaly was a led by

339 Steinbock 2013, 114. 340 Cf. Aeschines 3.116. 341 Pownall 2009, 249-252.

115

aristocrats (the of , the Scopadae, and the Creondae of Crannon (cf. Theocrites

Id. 16.34-39))342 rather than a true polis.

Herodotus himself faces scrutiny over the portrayal of the medizing Thessalians. The appearance of the sheltering from war motif in Herodotus (7.172.2-3), in this case used to represent the Thessalian alliance with the Persian as a defensive stance rather than one taken in hope of positive gain,343 suggests that the Thessalians could be forgiven to a degree. The

Thessalians were constrained by geography, living in a land easy to take and quickly conquerable by an enemy approaching from the east (Herodotus 7.130.2).344 Herodotus describes the Thessalians as enthusiastically medizing, using the term prothumos (7.174). The use of this word, however, does not necessarily suggest that medizing was desired by Thessalians. It could only indicate the sense of urgency, and the recognition that resistance to the Persian invasion was a lost cause.345 In these ways, their culpability has been underplayed, limited to the concept of wartime survival or convenience despite the longevity of the Thessalian relationship with the

Persians and their history of mutual cooperation, commerce, and amiability.

Thessaly, in contrast, has been portrayed as an ardent admirer of the luxurious lifestyle

(Pindar Pythian Odes 10.69-72; Critias DK 88 B2, B6, B33; Athenaeus 10.418b-e) readily available through Persian interference. Unlike that of several poleis, Thessaly’s apparent medism extended beyond the duration of the Persian War. Its northern location made it an ideal entry

342 Cf. Aston 2012, 248. 343 Baragwanath 2008, 225. 344 Baragwanath 2008, 208. 345 Baragwanath 2008, 211 claims, unconvincingly that the use of this word, however, does not necessarily suggest that medizing was desired by Thessalians. It could only indicate the sense of urgency, and the recognition that resistance to the Persian invasion was a lost cause.

116

point for the Persians during their invasion. Its natural resources exceeded those of most of the other poleis. Critias’ explanation is that the Thessalians wished the Persians would invade

Greece (DK 88 B 31). This author, as an admirer of Sparta, likely condemned the Thessalian lifestyle, using a view predicated by the existing Thessalian enjoyment of luxury.346 He states that:

ὡμολόγηνται δ' οἱ Θετταλοί, ὡς καὶ Κριτίας φησί (FGrH II 69), πάντων Ἑλλήνων

πολυτελέστατοι γεγενῆσθαι περί τε τὴν δίαιταν καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα· ὅπερ αὐτοῖς αἴτιον

ἐγένετο κατὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπαγαγεῖν τοὺς Πέρσας, ζηλώσαντας τὴν τούτων τρυφὴν καὶ

πολυτέλειαν. (Critias Thessalian Polity apud Athenaeus 14.662f) 347

As Critias says, the Thessalians are agreed to have become the most wealth-driven of the

Greeks in their dress and lifestyle. This was the very reason for their inviting in the

Persians against Greece, because they admired their luxury and lavishness.

His exact words, “the most lavish” and “inviting” the Persians into Greece imply a strong anti-

Thessalian bias. To be clear, the Thessalian aristocracy was not accused of adopting the Persian life-style, but of sharing the same values as Persians.348 Nevertheless, it was considered to have medized, and supported the Persian force during the invasion. Since Greeks who sided with the

Persians before the mission of Darius I’s herald to Greece might reasonably have been considered not as medizers but as slaves of the king, Eduard Rung understands Thessaly`s

346 Tuplin 1997, 171. 347 BNJ 338A. 348 Rung 2013, 77.

117

medism as an act of slavery.349 In this light, Thessaly’s medism can be interpreted as an action of necessity during the invasion. Therefore Herodotus did not deem it treason.350

Nevertheless, Herodotus also comments on the Aleuads’ loss of influence due to their willing, pre-war medism (7.6.2, 130.3) as well as the resultant increasing strife and factionalism in Thessaly.351 One result of the medism of the leadership is that the perception of Thessaly shifted toward a form of caricature, showing the Thessalians as licentious hedonists, best known for their love of extravagant banquets, much like the corruptive Persians. This ostentatious behavior rendered them incapable of intellectual refinement,352 as far as their Athenian critics were concerned (Plato Crito 53d-54a). Critias further contrasted this love of luxury against

Sparta’s customs (Critias apud Athenaeus 10.432d; 11.463e), thereby demonstrating the similarity of reputation between a Greek state known for medism to that of the Persians.

Thessaly, however, had coins made under the Aleuadae, before Xerxes or even Darius invaded their territory, struck on the Persian standard, depicting pan-Thessalian themes, indicating enduring contact and commerce between Persia’s subject or vassal states and

Thessaly.353 Thessaly’s nearest neighboring states, and Thrace, existed intermittently as Persian vassal states or subjects. H.D. Westlake claims the conquest of Megabazus in 513 was probably not the origin of this relationship and concludes that the conquest of Mardonius in 492, which had more lasting effects, seems more reasonable.354

349 Rung 2013, 78. 350 Rung 2013, 74. 351 Pownall 2009, 239. 352 Pownall 2009, 239. 353 Westlake 1936, 12. 354 Westlake 1936, 13; Cf. Briant 2002, 157.

118

During this campaign, the Aleuadae, all three of them, were chosen as personal advisers to Mardonius (Herodotus 9.58), implying a deeper connection between the leader of the Persian army and the leaders of Larissa, one of Thessaly’s eminent poleis.355The legend of Thargelia, a

Milesian woman who served as a hetaera to the Pharsalian, promoted the Persians in

Thessaly, persuading each of her fourteen consorts to medize, and served as a model for the literary treatment of (Plutarch Pericles 24.3).356 Philip Stadter argues that for Aeschines, this woman helped win Thessaly over to the Persians at the time of Xerxes’ invasion, seemingly derived from Aeschines’ Aspasia.357 A more plausible story is that she was queen to subsequent tagi of Thessaly, developing a reputation for promoting the Persian cause among gossipmongers.358 Personal loyalties cannot be determined without more thorough documentation. The reputation alone suggests an ongoing preoccupation with a relationship with

Persia, especially a policy of medizing.

Moreover, the Thessalians are shown to be inconsistent in their loyalties. Like many poleis, Thessaly’s medizing ceased once the Persians withdrew (Philostratus Heroicus 743), returning to “the customs of Achilles.” Perhaps proximity can be blamed for Thessaly’s actions, as can its rejection of its previous policy toward the Persians, although Persia seems to have considered the Thessalians subjects between 506 and 494. However, as Rollinger points out, the inscriptions at Behistun say nothing to clarify who they mean by Yauna (Greeks) and say nothing

355 Westlake 1936, 14-15; Briant 2002, 528. 356 Frost 1980, 59 claims such anecdotes demonstrate Plutarch’s habit of slipping into free association, and tendency to ramble. 357 Stadter 1989, 235. 358 Westlake 1936, 15-16.

119

about political affairs in connection with them.359 Further, the Persian coins circulating in

Thessaly suggest that the relationship between this polis and the empire, particularly the nearest satraps and the general Mardonius, continued after the rejection.

The importance of the Aleuadae suggests a previous relationship based on similar political ideals. The ruling family’s relationship to the Persians frequents the literary tradition.

Herodotus (7.130) represents the Aleuadae as the first of the Greeks to surrender themselves to the invading Persian king, who assumed they spoke for all of Thessaly. Plato (Menon 78d) refers to Menon as patrikos xenos (hereditary friend) of the Persian king; in this case the Thessalian-

Persian ties are presented as longstanding rather than opportunistic, as appears in Herodotus.360

Moreover, fourth-century representations, which coincide with the relative prominence of

Thessaly on the Greek political stage through association with Philip as well as through the ambitions of Jason of Pherae, 361 may reflect their contemporary zeitgeist. The combination of these representations leaves Thessaly’s loyalty open to discussion, especially in light of the blame placed on the Aleuadae.

Herodotus remained undecided as to the degree of culpability to place on the ruling dynasty. He continues by presenting the Aleuadae as having invited Xerxes to invade Greece, in a manner similar to the Peisistradae (9.6.2).362 As such, the Aleuadae are presented as manipulators who called in a larger force to crush their enemies by pledging away their Hellenic freedom, making them willing medizers. In other words, their voluntary submission to the

359 Rollinger 2016, 39-40. 360 Aston 2012, 265. 361 Aston 2012, 268. 362 Keaveney 1995, 30.

120

Persians rendered the Thessalians, especially the Aleuadae, Persian subjects, albeit temporarily.

However, this act of medism was to be expected with the threat of retribution from Xerxes looming in 480.363 Having the threat of Persian subjugation transform from nominal to real seems to have shifted the attitude in Thessaly from overall support of the alliance or vassaldom of 485 to asking for Greek aid against it in 480 (cf. Herodotus 7.172).364 The conflicting attitudes in Thessaly manifested in strong dislike for Aleuadae and Thessalian usefulness to Persians during invasion.365 These hostile stereotypes written against Thessaly are not necessarily indicative of contempt for a community in decline; rather they suggest of the archaic importance a proposition full of elements of legend and imagination.366 Perhaps responsibility can be laid at the feet of social memory. Perception of medizing as well as the similarities of the stereotypes of the Persians seems to have inflicted long-term damage to Thessaly’s reputation.

2.3 Medism and Politicians

First, the benefits of medism for an individual politician and the gains for the satrap or king involved in the political corruption must be discussed. Medizing has been interpreted by sources such as Herodotus, Isocrates, and Plutarch, as a form of betrayal in favor of the Persians.

This interpretation simplifies a much more complex issue by paring it down to a clear dichotomy. The idea of the Greeks against everyone else, especially the Persians, only allows for a narrow window into the world of the Greeks in the fifth and fourth centuries to be open.

However, this impression seems to be the standard by which many authors of various genres

363 Keaveney 1995, 32. 364 Keaveney 1995, 35-36. 365 Keaveney 1995, 31. 366 Aston 2012, 268.

121

(such as philosophy, tragedy, comedy, and history) measured their culture’s practices. As a result, the accusation of medism contains an array of implications which I will examine below.

While on the one hand, medizing could be perceived as a form of betrayal when it was convenient for the accuser, outside European Greek territory, on the other, it appears to have been less treasonous. What impact did geography have on the perception of acculturation as opposed to medism? When political expedience dictated, the allegation of medism could easily be attached to the charge of betrayal of one’s polis, and all of Greece. If the Greeks understood medizing as betrayal depending on the concurrent political situation, what did the Persians think of this same action?

To the Persians, a medizing Greek was a willing ally and while not entirely trusted, certainly appreciated as an asset, as seen by the state of the Persian courts and the amalgam of an empire the Persians maintained. Take, for instance, the cases of both Demaratus and Hippias, whose medism showed how internal divisions and factions weakened the Greek cause against

Persia.367 Each of these exiled Greek leaders gained enough influence in the Persian court that they could determine where the Persians would attack the Greeks when they invaded.

The value of Greeks in service can be determined by how frequently they appear in accounts from the north-western regions of the Persian empire. While occasionally Greeks would submit to the king or enjoy a position in the king’s court, it was far more likely that they would take up a position in the court of a satrap. Collaborating to make the court function better could

367 Whelan 1997, 219.

122

also promote the stability of the empire. In some cases, the decision to cooperate with a Persian potentate aided the standing satrapal mandate to expand the empire whenever possible.

Politically speaking, the idea of betrayal which accompanies the use of the term medism cannot have existed prior to 490, at least not in Europe. The Greeks in the Aegean and in Asia

Minor, however, had lived under Persian rule for several decades at this point. Prior to the

Persian wars, giving in submission to the Persians, or performing proskynesis toward a Persian potentate (usually the king), did not have the same implications as it did after the Persians withdrew from mainland Greece. When a politician medized independently of his polis, there were surely consequences, including exile and execution as shown in the cases of

Themistocles and Pausanias, discussed below.

Expressed hatred toward the Persians, demonstrated most amply in post-war propagandist works, such as Aeschylus’ Persae, failed to reflect contemporary attitudes toward Persia. It was hardly conducive to commerce or diplomacy for the Greeks to openly despise the Persians.

Nevertheless, mere rumors of medism, obviously a convenient pretext for his political rivals, drove Themistocles from Athens. Simonides’ elegy of the battle of Plataea also gives a first- hand, strongly anti-Persian account of the Persians.368 This time, though, the account is fragmentary, and therefore difficult to interpret definitely. Immediately after the Persian War, usually meaning the early fifth century, the barbarian was strongly associated with miasma.369

368 See Boedekker 2001, 149-150, 153-154 on use of Trojan War imagery and heroization of those who fought at Plataea. 369 Tuplin 1999, 53.

123

When the Persians began taking Greek territory, several poleis simply defected, joining

Persia and her empire rather than face down the vastly superior numbers and resources available to the enemy. The Greek leaders who did not side with Hellenic league in this conflict behaved either as though they were unaffected by the Persian presence or as though the invading Persians were a tool with which they could achieve their own interests. The Hellenic League and its anti-

Persian sentiment seem small and unpopular considering how few the members were. This alone shows that most Greeks did not consider resisting the invasion necessary for their safety, whether the threat was too great to successfully repel the Persians. Xerxes’ forces treated medizers relatively well. Neutral poleis, such as Argos, were left unharmed by both Xerxes and Mardonius

(Herodotus 7.148-152).

After the wars with Persia, individuals committed the same betrayal often for survival or money. The term medismos evolved from indicating betrayal to the Persian side during the fifth century Greek war with Persia (as shown in Herodotus) to contain a more accusatory and politically charged meaning. While references to medism can be found in the Greek sources as early as the events of 508 BCE (Herodotus 5.73),370 the term becomes most meaningful in the fifth century after the Persian Invasion of Xerxes. Naturally, most references to medismos and medizw occur in the dominant source for this invasion: Herodotus. The second most appear in the work of Plutarch, mostly in his works on Herodotus and the Persian Invasion, with a total of 27 uses of these terms. For both authors, the term means to betray the Greeks by siding with the invaders; however, Herodotus distinguishes between those who participated on the Persian side

370 See Holladay 1978.

124

voluntarily and those who had been vanquished. Plutarch does not discriminate on his use of the term, applying it dominantly to individuals rather than poleis.

What exactly would this term mean to a Greek post-Persian War? How prevalent is this term after 478 and how is it used by states and politicians? The most probable answer is that medism, originally a great betrayal, evolved into a rhetorical tool to portray Persia as the panhellenic enemy. What follows will be a discussion of occurrences of medism during the fifth and early fourth century in light of shifting attitudes and perception of Persia.

Was medism a political phenomenon which emerged through prolonged exposure or merely a convenient charge to add to treason against political opponents? Charges of medism, and attested cases of it, usually accompanied the charge of treason, resulted in the accused’s execution or banishment, as demonstrated by the fates of several Greek generals, most famously

Pausanias and Themistocles.371 In 478, the Delian League was established and an oath was sworn to despise Persia until cast in the sea floats according to Plutarch (Aristides 25.1). It is not surprising that it is in this period that the term medism was applied most frequently by

Herodotus.

2.3.1 Pausanias and Themistocles: Heroic Demise?

An accurate tally of true medizers may never be reached. Accusations and suspicions alone led to penalties, and the claims against medizing appear during times of strife and discord with Persia. Since the Persian invaders had recently been driven off, the connection between the term medism and the charge of treason was most relevant in the 470s. Two of the generals who

371 Graf 1984, 15-16.

125

led the Greeks against the Persian invasion were prosecuted for medism: Themistocles and

Pausanias. These allegations, regardless of their substance, demonstrate the velocity with which one could fall from grace. The infamy of the demise of each leader worsens the severity of the betrayal.

Pausanias, for one, is accused in Thucydides, of assuming Persian customs and betraying

Greek secrets to the Persians (1.95, 128-134). Thucydides lays out Pausanias’ betrayal as a matter conveyed in writing. The intercepted letter claims:

‘Παυσανίας ὁ ἡγεμὼν τῆς Σπάρτης τούσδε τέ σοι χαρίζεσθαι βουλόμενος ἀποπέμπει

δορὶ ἑλών, καὶ γνώμην ποιοῦμαι, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ, θυγατέρα τε τὴν σὴν γῆμαι καί σοι

Σπάρτην τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα ὑποχείριον ποιῆσαι. δυνατὸς δὲ δοκῶ εἶναι ταῦτα

πρᾶξαι μετὰ σοῦ βουλευόμενος. εἰ οὖν τί σε τούτων ἀρέσκει, πέμπε ἄνδρα πιστὸν ἐπὶ

θάλασσαν δι' οὗ τὸ λοιπὸν τοὺς λόγους ποιησόμεθα.’ (Thucydides 1.128.6-7)

“Pausanias, leader of Sparta, wishing to do you a favor, sends you these who were

captured at war, and I will marry your daughter, if you agree, and make Sparta and the

rest of Greece your subjects. I think I am able to achieve these things, with your

consent. Therefore, if any of these things please you, send a trusted man by sea through

whom we will conduct our future correspondence.”

This letter contains convincing evidence of Pausanias’ treason, setting a precedent for the connection between medism and treason against all of Hellas. In turn, he allegedly received

Persian gold and decided it was safe to openly assume the Persian habits as a reflection of his

126

Persian aspirations.372 These actions are the only evidence listed against this particular leader, although they condemned him in the eyes of his peers, and for later generations. Pausanias’ medism became iconic amongst the Greeks, particularly his additional adoption of Persian customs and extravagance.

No evidence suggests this was done to survive or under duress. Alec Blamire contests

Thucydides’ account as unlikely since the duration of Pausanias’ occupation of Byzantium would not have allowed for such correspondence between the Persian king and the Spartan general to occur.373 Nor would the king have sufficient incentive to offer such a reward as marriage to his daughter. An account offered by Justin (9.1.3) suggests that Pausanias’ stay in

Byzantium lasted seven years, more than sufficient time for the correspondence claimed by

Thucydides.374 Regardless of time, the reward demanded by Pausanias exceeds realistic expectations. While there is some credibility to the notion of the locals opting to purchase complacency rather than expend resources and lose more territory to the Greek invading force in

Byzantium, the effectiveness of corrupting a single leader of a joint cause seems dubious. The image remains, however, of a war hero corrupted by the enemy while abroad.

The punishment faced by Pausanias, even though clearly not intended, shows the Spartan response to such actions. According to Thucydides, who breaks his narrative to explain the fate of Pausanias, the regent was recalled to Sparta by the (1.131.1-2), thereby demonstrating the severity of such a betrayal under Spartan law. Although Thucydides’ details are in fact

372 Cf. Briant 2003, 83 on Polycrates’ assumption of Persian luxuriant habits in imitation of the satraps due to his ambitions to conquer Lydia. 373 Blamire 1970, 297. 374 Blamire 1970, 300 claims this statement is an error on Justin’s part.

127

lacking, the omission seems characteristic of Thucydides’ tendency to remain silent on topics of little interest to him.375 George Cawkwell suggests that based on Thucydides 1.135.4, the allegations of medism against Pausanias were untrue.376 His circumstances exhibit the response to even perceived treachery during the post invasion campaign, and an extreme Greek fear of betrayal, despite the lack of concrete evidence.

Another instance with a shortage of evidence for the claims is the medism of

Themistocles. The Athenians ostracized Themistocles in 472, after which he fled to Argos, where the antipathetic Spartans leveled accusations of his complicity with Pausanias’ treachery

(Diodorus 11.55-58; Plutarch Themistocles 23; Thucydides 1.137). Only once he had fled to

Persia from his Lacedaemonian enemies did Themistocles have any ostensible contact with the

Persians, including learning the Persian language and adopting Persian customs.377

Herodotus shows Themistocles encouraging the Greeks to demobilize their fleet rather than pursue the Persians (8.109), which Gillis supposes the historian introduced into the narrative as an indication of early medizing on Themistocles’ part.378 Evidence against Themistocles appears scarce, but Pausanias’ guilt has been largely accepted by the ancient authors, with no apparent arguments to the contrary (Plutarch Cimon 6.1-6; Thucydides 1.128-134). Each man faced a rather grueling and humiliating fall from grace suited to what Herodotus called a betrayal to all of Hellas (Herodotus 6.49). Themistocles died in Persia as a court adviser, in complete

375 Cf. Hornblower 2008, 218-9. 376 Cawkwell 1970:51. See also Hornblower 2008: 219; 220. 377 See Gera 2007 for a discussion of Themistocles’ learning Persian and the ancient author’s fascination with his language acquisition. 378 Gillis 1979, 56.

128

reversal to his earlier policies. In contrast, Pausanias starved in a temple and was dragged out to die. These deaths demonstrate the depths of the reversals379 each leader experienced following the Persian invasion of Europe.

Yet, Themistocles’ so-called foresight often receives praise –and suspicion- in the sources, especially due to his apparent willingness to accept bribes (Herodotus 8.1-5; Plutarch

Themistocles 4.2; Thucydides 1.93). Themistocles’ involvement in the Persian wars often parallels with Pausanias’ in the ancient works. Pausanias’ corruption by the Persians and its affiliation with Themistocles even earned its own entry in the Suda.380 Themistocles, however, is credited with remarkable foresight for deciphering two peculiar oracles given to the Athenians shortly before Persia’s invasion, as Polyaenus claims, stating:

τοῦτο λεχθὲν θάρσος Ἀθηναίοις ἔδωκε, καὶ ἡ νίκη τὴν ἐξήγησιν ἐπιστώσατο. Τοῦ θεοῦ

χρήσαντος τεῖχος Τριτογενεῖ ξύλινον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι Ἀθηναῖοι τειχίζειν

τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἠγόρευον, Θεμιστοκλῆς δὲ ἐς τὰς τριήρεις ἐμβαίνειν, ὡς ταύτας οὔσας τὸ

ξύλινον τεῖχος τῶν Ἀθηναίων. ἐπείσθησαν, ἐνέβησαν, ἐναυμάχησαν, ἐνίκησαν.

(Polyaenus 1.30.1-2; cf. Herodotus 7.143-144.1).

This explanation gave the Athenians courage, and the victory proved its truthfulness.

Then the god prophesized: Zeus will give to Tritogeneia a wall of wood. The Athenians

thought that they had to fortify their , but Themistocles said to embark on their

379 Plutarch claims that the story circulating about Themistocles’ death is that having been forced by the Great King to betray the Greeks, he decided to drink poison, or bull’s blood, instead (Themistocles 31.3-5). 380 μυ 886: μηδισμὸς ὁ Παυσανίου: ἁλόντος γὰρ ἐπὶ μηδισμῷ, συναιτιῶνται Θεμιστοκλέα. The medism of Pausanias: who having been convicted for medism, they would censure Themistocles.

129

triremes, since they were the wooden wall of the Athenians. They were persuaded, they

embarked, they fought, and they won.381

From this description, the audience can believe that either Themistocles had remarkable foresight or he had taken whatever reports he received about the invading force seriously. Polyaenus was several centuries removed both from the battle at hand, and from Themistocles. As he wrote, he was surely aware of the fate in store for this Athenian leader. Plutarch in fact attempts to make claims of Themistocles’ contacts in the Greek poleis in Asia as his principal source of this foresight (Themistocles 25). These connections, though, are strictly Greek, and therefore not blameworthy.

Themistocles’ rise to glory emphasises the tragedy of his downfall and eventual medism.

Themistocles’ death pales compared to the tragic end of Pausanias, who betrayed the Greeks in

479 and was starved to near-death in a temple, whence he was dragged out only when he was about to die. This perspective, however, contains extemporaneous information and prematurely judges the future reputations of both Themistocles and Pausanias. During the period immediately before the invasion, while disbelief of the Persian army’s impending arrival, and the size of this army, was still high, Themistocles and Pausanias were two of the principal leaders who developed an alliance against the Persian invaders.

Others did not bear the same stigma, despite their actions having merited it more clearly than those of Themistocles. Perhaps this distinction reflects a shift in the attitude in Athens

381 Cf. Herodotus 7.141-143.

130

toward Persia. A more likely explanation lies in the benefit to the Persians in accepting the collaboration of certain politicians. If the satraps held to the mandate of expanding the borders and securing them when possible, the policy of encouraging the Greeks to medize should have only been exercised in instances when they stood to gain territory, or eliminate a threat to their security in the Aegean.

To this end, the empire established policies regarding the recruitment of external sources of intelligence and influence in order to extend their reach into neighbouring territories, including the Balkan regions and Eastern Europe. Cyrus’ employment of Greek mercenaries to support his rebellion demonstrated his use of Greek forces in the interest of expanding or securing the Persian empire for himself. While Cyrus did not exclusively hire Greeks, nor was he the only Persian potentate to do so, he provides a strong, memorable example of this practice.

Other Persian practices included deployment of embassies and engaging in commerce generally established through diplomacy suggesting that there was frequent exposure of both cultures to one another. Further, the prioritizing of Persian stability over Greek conquest can be seen through the refusal to participate in the Peloponnesian War until it suited their interests, namely after the revolt of Amorges involving Athens 412-411.

Privileges could be granted as suited their needs, as occurred with in

Tissaphernes’ court, when he could reportedly attend the hunts with the satrap and held the satrap’s ear as well as direct attention (Thucydides 8.87). However, as Alcibiades discovered with his expulsion from Lydia (Thucydides 8.88), these privileges could be revoked at the satraps’ whims just as easily. In some cases, this recall resulted in death, imprisonment or flight

131

from persecution; in others, simply the removal from the court. Yet condemnation seems swift, and convenient, during the early fifth century. As seen in the cases of both Pausanias and

Themistocles, for whom mere rumour was enough to condemn prior to actual contact with

Persia, consequences for medism immediately after the invasion were severe. Each did medize, though Themistocles seems to have been driven to it in the interest of continued survival. At one point, each had information and connections of value to the Persians, although contact seems to have been initiated by the Greek individual. It appears that medism occurred voluntarily, then, when such an asset arose in direct or indirect collusion toward a Persian leader’s goals.

2.3.2 Pericles and his Persian-Sympathizing Friends

Pericles’ actions as a leader of the Athenians represent a change in disposition toward

Persia. Whether Pericles was the architect of a new Athenian policy toward Persia or simply acted as the instrument of these changes, the shift nonetheless appears associated with his leadership.382 Perhaps it was simply a shift in priorities, with conflicts arising between Athens and its subjects/allies frequently enough to justify relaxing an anti-Persian policy. The prosperity of Persian trade likely aided in this course of actions as well. Under Pericles, Athens experienced what is considered its golden age.

The environment Pericles is credited with cultivating in Athens drew many innovative thinkers including , , and dramatists. As a result of the exploration of new ideas became prominent in Athens. Pericles’ appearances in Thucydides’ narrative suggest that he also benefited from the teachings of the rhetoricians. Since all his speeches have been heavily

382 Mendalo 2013, 127.

132

edited if not wholly rewritten by Thucydides (1.29), it is difficult to assess the degree to which the rhetoric should be credited to Pericles. However, Thucydides (2.65.8-9) and Plutarch

(Pericles 8) both credit Pericles with impeccable rhetorical skills. His affiliation with Zeno

(Plutarch Pericles 4.6), (Plutarch Pericles 8; Institutio Oratio 12.2.22;

Cicero Brutus 44), and (Plutarch Pericles 36.4-5; Plato Protagoras 351 A, 328B,

309D), well attested as rhetoricians, teachers, and sophists from poleis in Asia Minor, lends credibility to these statements.383 Pericles’ affiliation with these figures from the East suggests a positive relationship with the Persian empire during Pericles’ era of influence in Athens.

However, it seems as though his transformative ambition for Athens reflected Athenian ambitions for the empire.384 These ambitions allowed him to lead a central Athenian empire, establish temporary peace with both Sparta (in 446) and Persia (in 449), and open trade relations with Persia. Pericles’ apparent rationalism demonstrates strains of amoralism, particularly in the

Funeral Oration, in which the leader “denigrates tradition, shuns Homeric values, and makes no reference to Athens’ religious beliefs.”385 First he discards the tradition of praising the deceased honored at the funeral (2.35). Then he devalues the traditional time by focusing his attention on the glory of Athens rather than the valor of the war dead (2.36-39).386

383 Stadter 1989, 285-89 suggests that accusations against Pericles’ friends and affiliates never affected Pericles’ credibility or financial probity in Athens (cf. Thucydides 2.60.5, 65.8) although the documentary evidence and personal information cannot be blended into a consistent whole. 384 Mendalo 2013, 136. 385 Mendalo 2013, 139. 386 See also Loraux 2006, 260-278 on the place of traditional values in Pericles’ Funeral Oration.

133

While it cannot be ascertained what degree of this speech is authentically Pericles’,387 the speech itself demonstrates characteristics striking similar to those of the philosophers and rhetoricians with whom Pericles was known to affiliate. However, Pericles’ position in Athens prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War seemed unassailable. Despite his pro-Persian actions of ending the war and encouraging trade, thereby strengthening Athens’ relationship with the Persian Empire, and his ambitions for the Athenian Empire, Pericles remained Athens’ principal leader with the exception of his removal and re-election during the winter of 430/29, which occurred after the outbreak of the war.

Those closest to Pericles were more likely to face allegations that could not be applied directly to the statesman himself. He surrounded himself with Greeks from Asia Minor, who were much more vulnerable on account of their activities in Athens as well as their affiliation with participants of the Persian empire. One particular case that stands out is the exile of

Anaxagoras. Laertius describes as:

Σάτυρος δ' ἐν τοῖς Βίοις ὑπὸ Θουκυδίδου φησὶν εἰσαχθῆναι τὴν δίκην… καὶ οὐ μόνον

ἀσεβείας ἀλλὰ καὶ μηδισμοῦ· καὶ ἀπόντα καταδικασθῆναι θανάτῳ. (Diogenes Laertius

2.12).

Satyrus in his Lives says that he was charged by Thucydides … with not only treasonable

correspondence with Persia but also with impiety. And that the sentence of death was

passed on Anaxagoras by default.388

387 Thucydides 1.22 states that not Thucydides edited the speeches heavily or fabricated them based on what he thought was appropriate for the context. 388 Cf. Plutarch Pericles 32.3 for the persecution of Pericles’ close affiliates, particularly Aspasia.

134

Impiety may have foundations as a charge389 since elsewhere it is attested that Anaxagoras claimed the sun was not divine but instead that it was a red-hot mass of stone (Plato Apology

26b-d; Plutarch Pericles 32.1-4; 35.4-5; Xenophon Memorabilia 4.7.7; Diodorus 12.39.2;

Josephus Against Apion 2.265-7), but there is no evidence to suggest that Anaxagoras had contact with anyone in Persia other than the fact that he was from Clazomenae.390 In light of the biases of the authors, perhaps this detail should be dismissed as an embellishment. Nevertheless, its appearance in Laertius’ work demonstrates its credibility to a much later audience, especially given the ambiguity of the trial’s date. Tuplin suggests that the action of medism in question may have been connected to the Periclean policy involving an entente with Persia.391 He does, rightly, point out that the source is unreliable and deliberately unclear as to exactly what action led to this treason charge.392

Pericles’ position also left his long-term mistress, Aspasia, vulnerable to attacks of this nature. Reliable sources on Aspasia’s life are difficult to come by. Based on the comic representations of the woman in question, Aspasia’ influence on Pericles and his policies is considered to have been detrimental to both the man and the polis.393 Her Milesian birth as well as her alleged role as Pericles’ concubine according to her contemporaries were made subject of many jokes (for instance, Aristophanes Acharnians 515ff; see also Plutarch Pericles 24, 25).394

Moreover, her association with Socrates left her open to suspicions. In his satire, Plato alleged

389 Philips 2013, 407-462; Rubel 2014, 33-41. 390 Impiety charges were often paired with other charges, as in the cases against Socrates and Aspasia (cf. Plutarch Pericles 32.1). 391 Tuplin 1997, 159. 392 Tuplin 1997, 159. 393 Podlecki 1998, 111. 394 Henry 1995, 10.

135

that she, not Pericles, wrote the famous Funeral Oration (Menexenus 240 C-D). While none of these sources can be considered reliable or true depictions of the real Aspasia, they do reveal an exaggerated image of how she was perceived by her contemporaries. However, the most significant of her faults as Pericles’ mistress concerns suspicions of her loyalty to the Persian king. Plutarch indulges in the gossip as well, stating:

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἦν Μιλησία γένος, Ἀξιόχου θυγάτηρ, ὁμολογεῖται· φασὶ δ' αὐτὴν Θαργηλίαν

τινὰ τῶν παλαιῶν Ἰάδων ζηλώσασαν ἐπιθέσθαι τοῖς δυνατωτάτοις ἀνδράσι. καὶ γὰρ ἡ

Θαργηλία, τό τ' εἶδος εὐπρεπὴς γενομένη καὶ χάριν ἔχουσα μετὰ δεινότητος, πλείστοις

μὲν Ἑλλήνων συνῴκησεν ἀνδράσι, πάντας δὲ προσεποίησε βασιλεῖ τοὺς πλησιάσαντας

αὐτῇ, καὶ ταῖς πόλεσι μηδισμοῦ δι' ἐκείνων ὑπέσπειρεν ἀρχάς, δυνατωτάτων ὄντων καὶ

μεγίστων. (Plutarch Pericles 24.2).

It is agreed that she was Milesian by birth, the daughter of Axiochus. They say that she

emulated Thargelia, an Ionian woman of long ago, as a model, by pursuing the most

powerful men. For Thargelia, being quite beautiful, and having grace with her

shrewdness, cohabitated with very many men of the Greeks, and made them all well-

disposed to the king, and laid the foundations of medism in the poleis, through these

lovers, who were men of the greatest power and influence.

Promiscuity endures as an allegation against unpopular women even today. Several other authors state that Aspasia ran a brothel, partook in prostitution, or had multiple affairs. However, few claim that she was guilty of “emulating Thargelia,” who “laid the foundations of medism.” Exact examples are lacking, but her appearance in Pericles’ life nearly coincides with the end of

Athens’ hostilities against Persia.

136

It is plausible that Plutarch thought her responsible for the shift in policy rather than the troubles with the Delian League or Pericles’ ambitions to develop Athens’ empire through other means. Comic hostility toward Aspasia emanates through the work of her male contemporaries.395 No further evidence suggests that she corrupted her lovers to Persian sympathies. Pericles, as her best known consort, is implied to have medized in as much as cessation of hostilities can be called medism. However, there was no public outcry contemporary with Pericles against the politician, indicating that if the demos agreed with such claims, they enjoyed the benefits of his apparently pro-Persian policies more than they were outraged by the change of sympathies.

2.3.3 An attitude shift in Greece

As Wolski observes, it is easy to find the terms medizw and medismos in sources relating to the Persian Wars,396 but less so for the periods that follow Persia’s withdrawal from Greek territory. Instead, it is necessary to consider who would be at risk of receiving such a condemning label. Diplomats as well as generals were particularly vulnerable to such allegations.

Callias the son of Hipponicus, who negotiated peace between Athens and Persia, was later accused of treason and medism due to the unfavorable outcome of his negotiations in Persia

(Demosthenes 19.273).

In light of how distant Xerxes’ invasion was compared to the condemnation of the very generals responsible for expelling them, it is not unexpected for the response from the Greeks to medizing and especially collaborating with the Persians, to be rather harsh. What about the later

395 Podlecki 1998, 111-117. 396 Wolski 1973, 6.

137

figures charged with medism? It is necessary then to consider the frequency and appearance of medism in Greece after these Themistocles and Pausanias. The Delian League was created with the basic premise of liberating the Greeks from Persian oppression and to oppose the Persian army.

The previous known league of Greek poleis came together under duress and was wrought with dissent and discontent. Leadership met with serious debates. Appeals to Syracuse for support were refused. Eventually Sparta assumed the role of leader due to her Peloponnesian

League. If there were really spies and informers among the Ionians in Asia Minor, there would be no reason that the Greeks would not have been aware and had time to prepare against the invasion since most of the forces were on foot and an invasion of that magnitude would be difficult to hide as the troops crossed the entire Persian empire to get to Greece by land. Depots were even set up in Thrace prior to the invasion. Therefore, access to intelligence suggests that the spies were less ubiquitous than they may have seemed during the invasion. Suspicions in this alliance seem to have risen based on political enmities rather than physical evidence.

As the Persian hostilities settled, the alliances endured. However, without the looming specter of the invading Persians, the implication of medism became less necessary in order to condemn someone as a traitor as it grew less politically relevant. For example, Alcibiades changed sides in the Peloponnesian war several times, including joining the Persians for a brief stint in 412, when Plutarch describes him adopting Persian habits (Plutarch Alcibiades 23.4-6).

Yet, in contrast with the earlier accusations against Pausanias and Themistocles, Alcibiades was never accused of medism despite his time in Tissaphernes’ court, and his life in Phrygia under

Pharnabazus’ protection. Another example of a set of leaders vulnerable to such charges

138

occurred in Cyrus the Younger’s revolt. The generals in the Ten Thousand who fought in Cyrus the Younger’s campaign against Artaxerxes II received no such label, nor did Conon, who served as a navarch to Pharnabazus (397/6-392). If anyone merited the label of “medizer”, surely it was these two, both of whom were later allowed to return to Athens, despite, or even because of, their

Persian ties. Whereas the mere allegation was enough to drive Themistocles into Persia’s courts,

Conon returned to Athens with Persian gold, which funded the refortification of the polis.

Persian financial support against a shared enemy in hostile territory seems more worthy of the label than the actions of many predecessors. Further, the perception of Persia as a looming threat had passed with Sparta becoming the more pressing Athenian enemy during this period, which likely influenced the application (or non-application) of the term medism as well as the acceptability of Persian support.

What becomes apparent, though, is the gradual shift in attitude as the relationship between the poleis and the Persian Empire developed. Internal conflicts greatly impacted this development. The result of failure turning into execution or exile led to the flight of unsuccessful generals, including Conon, who took up residence in Rhodes until he began to serve Pharnabazus as an admiral to the Persian navy. Exile to Persia rather than Greece’s European or African neighbors plausibly became a cultural norm as a result of the severe judgment system in Athens.

The king often appears in the Greek sources, particularly Herodotus, as the source of succor for those with what sometimes appears as a Medic mind (medike phrenos). More often than not, however, it was a satrap whose domain an exile or accused traitor resided in, occasionally sending the politician on to the king as seemed beneficial to them all, as occurred in the cases of Themistocles and Demaratus. The decision to flee to Persia rather than Italy or

139

Libya, for instance, demonstrates a willingness to join the Persian empire with its reputation for luxury and corruption when encountering internal strife. The motive for Persia to exploit an individual’s medism, or desperation, needs no in-depth consideration since the gain is obvious.

Why they would maintain the politician once he had been ousted is less so, however. A medizing

Greek politician once in Persia could no longer offer the same degree of political gain, connection, or expedience that he could in his home polis. I propose that the satrap’s purpose of doing so would be to use the politician’s knowledge to achieve his own goals, either in a conspiracy against the king or in order to expand the empire’s influence among the Greeks.

It has been noted before that the Persians were more likely to leave local infrastructure intact as long as the conquered people submitted to Achaemenid authority, allowing the satrap to impose law and collect tribute as the king’s governor in the satrapy. When politicians outside the empire collaborated with the Persians by accepting their money, or performing favors for the

Persians, they also deemed it unnecessary to remove the figure in many cases. A policy of non- interference would indicate that medism occurred without an active campaign by the Persians.

Since this is known to be untrue, another explanation must be determined.

Corruption, treason, and bribery all still appear at the end of the fifth century and throughout the fourth, but the term medism seems to have become anachronistic. It appears in reference to the first half of the fifth century, and after the King’s Peace (387/6). During each period, the relationship between the Greeks and the leaders of the Persian empire was particularly fraught, and fear of the Persians emanates through the writings of many authors. The term certainly faded as the Greeks came to rely on a relationship with Persia. Perhaps the

140

accompanying sense of betrayal dissipated as Persian support and influence grew within the

Greek mainland as well.

However, some throwbacks to anti-Persian sentiment emerged in the work of the orators, especially Isocrates, who talks about betrayal to Persia and the glory of a united Greece397 but uses different terminology (e.g. Isocrates 4.10; 12.14; Epistula 3.6, 9). The prominence of Persia as a threat in his orations indicates a commonly held enemy possibly in response to the rise of

Philip II of Macedon. The act of medism did not disappear, though the atmosphere in which it takes place altered dramatically over the decades separating the works of Herodotus and

Isocrates. This shift in terminology reflects a new reality, one in which what was once betrayal evolved into a matter of survival for Greek politicians, whether for themselves or for their polis.

Even though taking refuge from a hostile environment certainly does not constitute treason, the deliberate decision to do so in Persia rather than elsewhere suggests an affinity between the

European Greeks and the Persians.

2.4 The Freedom of the Greeks

Fear of medism, fear of corruption, and fear of conquest appear in the context of the longstanding slogan of the liberation of the Greeks under the Persian thumb. Despite the evidence to the contrary of the enslavement of the Greeks in Asia, Athens, and then Sparta used this ideal to justify invading Persian territory, thereby burdening the very people they planned to liberate with extra demands on their resources. Fear of Persia can be deemed a strong motivator for unlikely alliances as well as for compliance with otherwise inconceivable treaties, such as the

397 Flower 2000, 93-96.

141

King’s Peace of 387/6. However, it does not necessarily justify the antidote of the liberation of the Greeks from Persian oppression. This section focuses of the abuse of this fear on the Greek part in support of the recurring campaign to free the Greeks. The focus of most of these endeavors was the release of the Greeks in Asia from Persian oppression. Despite the motivations, the propaganda circulated focused on what modern critics consider panhellenism, a united Greek endeavor against a common, non-Greek enemy.

Based on their actions and inability to collaborate with each other in long-term endeavors, the Greeks sought to preserve their own freedom, choosing to engage in collective action insofar as it aimed at a collective good. Therefore, the idea of universal Greek freedom became a non-excludable concept to the relevant social class, namely the wealthy elite.398 To expand, it appears that there was no need to unite the Greeks to free the slaves or metics of non-

Greek or even Hellenic powers. Inter-polis antipathies motivated many refusals to join in a potentially beneficial alliance, such as Argos’ refusal to join the Hellenic League in 481 because of its inimical relationship to Sparta (Herodotus 7.152.3).

Persia made a convenient enemy to unite the Greeks in a common cause, especially in

478, immediately following the victories at Plataea and Mycale. The actions of the Athenians demonstrate the use of medism as an offense, the antithesis of their goal. With the Persians no longer pursuing a campaign in Greece, the exact purpose of the Delian League becomes ambiguous, at least at its foundation. The cleansing of Athens performed by Aristides shown in

Plutarch’s Aristides demonstrates a sense of pollution after the Persian invasion, requiring sacred

398 Whelan 1997, 220.

142

fire to cleanse it (20). The solution to the miasmic destruction seems to have been a panhellenic anti-Persian campaign predominantly promoted by Athenian policy makers.

The Delian League also shows that the Athenians sought more than revenge after the

Persian withdrawal from Europe. Further, the oath of Plataea, as attested by the orator Lycurgus, shows that the freedom of the Greeks, and the punishment of medizers as well as revenge against the invaders served as the League’s ostensible purpose. The phrasing suggests that freedom, fidelity, and faith superseded the value of Greek unity. Moreover, the barbarians in question were notoriously impious, despite their respect for most of the Greek sanctuaries during the

Persian invasion (Lycurgus Against Leocrates 81). Lycurgus cites the oath taken at Platea in light of Leocrates’ crimes. These terms indicate a strong passion against the Persians. Even more remarkable, however, is the absence of invaded states in the revenge oath, apparently suggesting a sense of non-agency in cases of forced cooperation.

On the other hand, the epigraphic tradition of the Oath of Platea differs greatly from the textual one (RO 88). The brevity of the oath displayed in the works of orators such as Lycurgus appears to be a summary of the fifth-century original rather than the actual document.399

Naturally, omissions occur in a summary. However, some common features appear in each tradition: swearing unity, tribute, and allegiance toward a group of poleis. The element shared in each tradition is the hatred of Persia, or rather unity against a common threat to the Greeks.

399 Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 440.

143

There is always the question of the authenticity of such an oath, likely due to the paucity of sources and the disparity in the participants.400

Cimon and Pericles both used this oath, the league, and Athens’ eventually impressive fleet to advance their own interests, either through collaboration with other poleis or in combat.401 For instance, the actions of Cimon at Eurymedon, where he encountered the

Pamphylians, penalized the non-Greek medizers, forcing them to Atticize instead (Plutarch

Cimon 12.3-4). Rather than destroy or enslave the Pamphylians, Cimon decided to impose

Athenian standards of life upon them, demonstrating that liberation was not a priority of the

Athenian leaders while on campaign in Persia. Under Cimon, the actions of the Delian League were brutal and destructive, bent on avenging a brief Persian invasion of Greece. Some of the actions in Asia taken by Cimon have been described as:

Φοινίκην δὲ καὶ Κιλικίαν ἐπόρθησαν, ἐπ' Εὐρυμέδοντι δὲ καὶ πεζομαχοῦντες καὶ

ναυμαχοῦντες ἐνίκησαν, ἑκατὸν δὲ τριήρεις τῶν βαρβάρων αἰχμαλώτους ἔλαβον, ἅπασαν

δὲ τὴν Ἀσίαν κακῶς ποιοῦντες περιέπλευσαν. καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον τῆς νίκης, οὐ τὸ ἐν

Σαλαμῖνι τρόπαιον ἀγαπήσαντες ἔστησαν, ἀλλ' ὅρους τοῖς βαρβάροις πήξαντες τοὺς εἰς

τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, καὶ τούτους κωλύσαντες ὑπερβαίνειν, συνθήκας

ἐποιήσαντο, μακρῷ μὲν πλοίῳ μὴ πλεῖν ἐντὸς Κυανέων καὶ Φασήλιδος, τοὺς δ'Ἕλληνας

αὐτονόμους εἶναι, μὴ μόνον τοὺς τὴν Εὐρώπην, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας.

(Lycurgus 72-74).

400 Krentz 2007, 735-740 argues that this oath was not taken at Plataea but at Marathon based on the testimony of Herodotus and a stele from Thebes. See also Kozak 2012 on the question of authenticity. 401 Raaflaub 2009a, 92.

144

They devastated Phoenicia and Cilicia, triumphed by land and sea at the Eurymedon,

captured a hundred barbarian triremes and sailed around all of Asia ruining it. And to top

their victory: not satisfied with erecting the trophy at Salamis, they fixed boundaries

necessary for Greek freedom with the Persians and prohibiting them from crossing them,

they made an agreement that they would not sail their great fleet between the Cyaneae

and Phaselis and that the Greeks would be autonomous, not only those in Europe but also

those in Asia.

The description uses the language of destruction, demonstrating the vengeful purpose of these actions as well as showing the disrespect of the desires of the local population. The Delian

League having the capacity to dictate Persia’s borders as indicated above is an unrealistic concept, but occurs sometimes in orations. The terms are clearly inflated to show a greater impact for the Persians, and to display Athens’ strength in Persia’s territory. However, as unlikely as the description of these actions in Persia seem, the portrayal shows the perception of

Persian weakness and the apparent value of Greek liberty as though the Greeks in Asia lived as slaves.

Diodorus accounts for attention specifically to Cyprus as a strategic location for domination of Aegean (11.61-62; 12.2-5) during the Pentecontaetia. The Persian base on Cyprus held 300 triremes and the land army at Cilicia had 300 000 men. As a result of such heavy opposition, Cimon acted aggressively to prevent the Persian response to his raid on Cyprus

(12.3-4). This engagement followed by further Athenian activity in Cyprus and Egypt was

145

thought to have broken the back of Persian naval dominance in the eastern Mediterranean,402 therefore lending increased significance to Cimon’s Cyprus campaign. These actions solidified the image of Greek dominance of the sea, hailing themselves as liberators from the Persian oppressors, contraposed with that of the Persians fighting to maintain their position and territory.

Moreover, the synchronicity of Eurymedon and Cyprus campaigns seems symbolic since these events are unlikely to have occurred in same day due to their geographic distance (c.130 miles).403 As propagandistic rhetoric, however, the embellishment of the Cypriot campaign supported Athenian morale.

As for Cyprus, there was a paucity of Cypriot enthusiasm for Athenian presence, demonstrating their preference for Persian rule. The Athenians were motivated by the chance to deny Persia advance onto Cyprus in eastern Mediterranean, and the opportunity to take advantage of Cypriot goods, reduce Persian fleet, and raid Phoenicia simultaneously.404 All of these actions were strongly anti-Persian moves, and met with very little response or aggression from the Persians to justify such antics. That the Persians appeared to have no countermove to this invasion of their territory suggests that the Greek actions held little significance compared to other events around the empire concurrent to the raids. Cyprus’ wealth paled in comparison to

Egypt’s, and the island was much farther removed from the Persian capitals than some internal conflicts. The lack of immediate response indicates a disinterest in penalizing the Athenians for such boldness.

402 Green 1996, 181. 403 Green 1996, 127. 404 Green 1996, 179-180.

146

Pericles’ panhellenic actions had limited success and relied on a different tactic than

Cimon’s. While the latter excelled at making war against the Persians, Pericles’ strength as a leader was in diplomacy. At an unclear date, if Plutarch is to be believed in this instance, Pericles attempted to form a panhellenic council using the Athenian Empire as its focal point. The alleged purpose of this council was to discuss Hellenic religious sanctuaries burnt down by the Persians and the formation of a Hellenic naval law (Plutarch Pericles 17).405 Many of these reasons were outdated, especially since Athens dominated the Aegean Sea by that point. Athens’ true motivations appear to have been gaining recognition for her role as the leader against the barbarian and a unifier of the Greeks.406 Moreover, these subjects contra-indicate the idea of

Greek freedom, as promulgated by Athens through the Delian League.407 Even at the League’s foundation, the value of continuing campaign against Persians was uncertain.408 As liberators, the Athenians had failed. Instead, they demonstrated their eagerness to learn from their enemies in matters of war and empire. Greek borrowings from Persians in culture as seen with perserie were presentable as models to contemporaries in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia.409

More importantly, the Athenians succeeded Persia as an imperial power in the Aegean

Sea and as the collector of tribute from east Greeks.410 The alleged liberators turned into oppressors. Pericles’ Congress Decree only attempted to justify the continuance of the Athenian

Empire as the dominator of the Aegean Sea. The idea of the Athenians as the oppressors of the

405 Stadter 1989, 202 notes that the terminus ante quem for this decree is provided by the beginning of work on the Parthenon in 447, after which point the subject of the temples destroyed by the Persians would have been moot. 406 Stadter 1989, 203. 407 Balcer 1984, 392. 408 Raaflaub 2009a, 98. 409 Raaflaub 2009a, 112. 410 Raaflaub 2009a, 97.

147

Greeks recurs in speeches by Demosthenes (9.23), although he uses the concept to rile their audience rather than chastise them. The Persians respected Greek liberty to a much greater degree than the Athenians, despite the Greek claims otherwise. Panhellenism as a counter to medism failed under the Athenians, although the aspects of empire adapted from Persia indicate a rather liberal attitude toward Persia.

The slogan of Greek liberty and the use of panhellenism to promote it reappear at the outbreak of Peloponnesian War, and in Agesilaus’ campaign in Persia. Again, those who promote these campaigns label the Asiatic Greeks as slaves to Persia, whose liberty can be attained only through Persian defeat, either diplomatic or martial. Consequently, the connection between medism and slavery grew stronger in the propagandist mindset. One prominent example of this ideology occurs in Demosthenes’ declaration that:

οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ λόγου καὶ δικαίας αἰτίας οὔτε τόθ' οὕτως εἶχον ἑτοίμως πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν οἱ

Ἕλληνες οὔτε νῦν πρὸς τὸ δουλεύειν. ἦν τι τότ', ἦν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, … ὃ νῦν οὐκ

ἔστιν, ὃ καὶ τοῦ Περσῶν ἐκράτησε πλούτου καὶ ἐλευθέραν ἦγε τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ οὔτε

ναυμαχίας οὔτε πεζῆς μάχης οὐδεμιᾶς ἡττᾶτο, νῦν δ' ἀπολωλὸς ἅπαντα λελύμανται καὶ

ἄνω καὶ κάτω πεποίηκε τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πράγματα. (9.36-38)

The Greeks of old were as eager for freedom as their descendants today are for slavery.

There was something, men of Athens…something which triumphed over the wealth

of Persia, which upheld the liberties of Hellas, which never lost a single battle by sea or

land, something the decay of which has ruined everything and turned our affairs upside

down.

148

Here, Demosthenes’ language is telling. He uses the terms liberty, freedom, and slavery. Other terms he applies are decay, ruin, and chaos, in reference to his contemporaries. He referred to the glorious past to promote his purpose, obviously trying to incite strong emotions among his audience. It cannot be determined to what degree his audience would have believed his speech, but clearly those who fought for liberty were to be revered and imitated.

Athens never repeated the rise to glory it experienced using the Delian League, even though it formed the Second Athenian League, which it ratified through the Persians. The initial decree, enacted in 377 invited states outside the area reserved for Persia by the Peace of

Antalcidas to join in an existing league with the objective of keeping within the framework of the

Peace of Antalcidas.411 It says nothing of Athens’ powers as hegemon of the alliance or about the working of the .412 One important note is that this time Athens vows to avoid the practices of the Delian League in the prospectus of the Second Athenian League.413

Similarly, Isocrates considered Agesilaus suitable to take charge of the panhellenic campaign in 370 because of the consistency in his panhellenism, despite his earlier failures (Ep.

Archidamus 11).414 The orator advocates homonomia twice, a goal only achievable through the cessation of conflict. In other words, the only means by which this objective could be achieved would be to join forces to face a mutual enemy. Receiving resources from an outside source what

Isocrates considered to be the aporia of the Greeks, resulting in homonomia (Isocrates 4.3-5).415

411 Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 100. 412 Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 100. 413 Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 101. 414 Cawkwell 1993, 70. 415 Pownall 2007, 20.

149

Such a task had proven difficult among Greek poleis in previous anti-Persian attempts to unite the Greeks. The Persians were chosen as victims for this campaign due to the inferiority of their culture, since the wandering dregs of Greek society would be sent off to find fortunes in Asia,416 much like Polycrates sent his political enemies to Egypt. Like medism, panhellenism became a matter of convenience for the leaders advocating it. Similarly, both are associated strongly with the idea of Greek freedom, and maintaining an independent Greek identity.

Instead, the Spartans attempted to use a similar strategy to justify their later actions in

Asia as well as in Europe. The leader given credit for most of the actions taken in pursuit of

Greek liberty was Agesilaus, although he followed the course set by several others to do so.

During the Peloponnesian War, the Peloponnesian League formed an alliance with various satraps, first Tissaphernes, then Pharnabazus, and finally Cyrus the Younger. While anti-Persian panhellenism was expressed as late as 406 by Callicratidas (Xenophon Hellenica 1.6.7), it grew temporarily quiescent when alliance with Persia proved its worth to Sparta. By accepting Persian aid, the Spartans in fact medized, since they agreed to relinquish any European claim on the

Asiatic Greeks in exchange for fiduciary support and a fleet (Thucydides 8.18) thereby benefitting the Persian empire, especially the western satraps. The price for Persian help for

Sparta in Peloponnesian War was medizing. This policy was later denounced. The terms discontented the Spartans, but Persian aid was indispensable to Sparta’s success during the war

(Xenophon Hellenica 1.6.7).417

416 Pownall 2007, 24. 417 Cawkwell 1993, 66.

150

Persian support obviously did not come without cost. Cyrus the Younger claimed aid from the Spartans proportional to their support during Peloponnesian War in his revolt against

Artaxerxes II. The campaign of the Ten Thousand under Clearchus has been made to sound like a Spartan operation instead of a satrapal bid for royal power with Sparta’s interest in resisting

Persian control of Asia Minor.418 Nevertheless, the involvement of the Ten Thousand in a purely

Persian enterprise demonstrates the use of Greek liberty to encourage medizing rather than as a response to it. In other words, the satrap recruited a medizing Hellenic mercenary force for his own goals against the great king rather than against the empire.419For the most part, however, the

Ten Thousand were uninformed about the nature of their campaign, namely that they were working in support of a rebellion against Artaxerxes II. The leaders therefore made the voluntary decision to medize on behalf of their troops, making the support of Cyrus’ Persian cause strictly involuntary on the part of the majority of the mercenary forces. Whether they may be truly considered medizers or not, the leaders’ decision demonstrates a loss of mercenary freedom by the removal of their agency in such a decision.

Fame and fortune were available to the Greeks who conquered Asia. These desires seem more likely to have motivated particularly later Greek movements to unite against a common enemy. Perhaps the operation of Agesilaus was meant to rival the first documented conflict between East and West,420 indicated by an expressed desire to sacrifice at Aulis (Xenophon

418 Dillery 1995, 102. 419 Dillery 1995, 103. 420 Dillery 1995, 107.

151

Hellenica 3.4.3-4). Strangely, the same event was not recorded in Agesilaus,421 suggesting that the parallels to the Trojan War422 could have been constructed by Xenophon rather than the

Spartan king, either because it did not fit the narrative of the biographer or because the failure reflected poorly on Agesilaus. Xenophon (Anabasis 3.2.25) warns of the dangers of settlement in

Asia: the loss of hellenicity, the seductive force of good living in the East, and the loss of freedom. However, if this was truly the case, there would be no one left to liberate since there would be no Greeks in Asia due to the loss of the Hellenic identity from cohabitation with non-

Greeks. Another rhetorical motive for the panhellenic war against the barbarians is allowing fourth-century thinkers to dispense with new ideas and practice their rhetoric for or against these endeavors.423

Sparta, then Athens, continued to propagate the slogan of freedom in the and 370s.

The claim of liberation is attributed to Spartan deceit, ignoring the testament of Thucydides regarding the Delian League’s campaign against Persia.424 Despite what orators and historians contemporary to the event have claimed, the determination to liberate the poleis in Asia had more to do with destroying the unification of the Persian empire’s western frontier to gain the resources in Asia. Perhaps Agesilaus proved unable to ratify any agreements for this reason.

However, the autonomy of Greeks in Asia remained non-negotiable in Sparta’s campaign of the

421 Dillery 1995, 116. 422 Parallels to the Trojan War were commonly drawn in fifth-century comedy and tragedy in discussion of the empire and Pericles’ boast about the conquest of Samos (Plutarch Pericles 28.5.6). Herodotus and Thucydides use it as a point of reference. 423 Mitchell 2007, 173. 424Dmitriev 2010, 36.

152

390s.425 Having released any claim on the freedom of the Greeks in Asia, the Spartans subsequently adopted this very concept as the core slogan to justify their actions within the

Persian Empire. In a speech to the satrap, Pharnabazus, with whom Agesilaus failed to form a treaty, the Spartan king made grand claims of the virtues of being free, in contrast to enslavement to material possessions as well as the great king of Persia (Xenophon Hellenica 4.34-5).

Liberty, therefore, gained new meaning when promoted by a Spartan campaign. There would have been no benefit to Pharnabazus in supporting this king’s purpose in his territory, and his refusal of the offer was unsurprising. When speaking to Tissaphernes, Agesilaus again promoted the idea of Greek independence, this time arranging an armistice in Lydia until word arrived from the Persian king (Xenophon Agesilaus 1.10). These negotiations failed since the justification of the Spartan invasion of Persia under Agesilaus in no way benefited the stability or expansion of the empire. The ostensible goal of freedom in Asia was never truly achieved, particularly through such undiplomatic negotiations.

The satraps, and even the king, had no motivation to submit to Sparta’s demands in the early 390s. As far as can be seen, the autonomy of the Greeks in Asia was abandoned while

Sparta’s positive relationship with Persia stood. Sparta’s promise of panhellenic autonomy was reaffirmed several times.426 Both the abandonment of the campaign and the promise of autonomy suggest that the campaign ran on a hollow slogan. Agesilaus’ words and actions were too hostile toward the great king to achieve anything through negotiations, whereas Thibron’s successes

425 Cawkwell 1993, 67. 426 Lewis 2008, 27-28.

153

have been lightly passed over.427 Later, the slogan of Greek autonomy reappeared as a Spartan initiative in the King’s Peace of 387/6, which granted the Spartans Persian support to impose their will on the other poleis in Europe.428

2.5 Conclusion

As discussed above, working toward a definition of medism means developing an understanding of the ways in which the idea is applied and when it is used. The image of medism from the fourth-century orators does not seem to match the reality of events. The term itself appears to have been a loaded political ideology synonymous with both corruption and treason immediately after the Persian War. The taint lingered much longer. Accusations against individuals faded as the process of cultural contact made them less relevant. Trade, peace, and diplomacy appear to have aided in a shift away from the idea of the Persian corruptor of Greek loyalties.

Persia’s use of medizers when possible appears to have been a matter of pragmatism.

Where possible to gain an advantage, the satraps were expected to do what was necessary to achieve it. Satrapal decisions to shelter exiles, aid anti-Athenian rebellions, and recruit support for their own rebellions indicate that the Greeks were a resource to the potentates of the Persian empire. There appears to have been no active campaign beyond convenience on Persia’s behalf to recruit medizers prior to Cyrus. Corruption and collaboration appear to be associated with medism, although not necessarily through Persian initiative.

427 Tuplin 1993, 77. 428 Dmitriev 2010, 28.

154

The idea of corruption in attempt to collaborate with the Persians appears to have returned once the association of Persia with slavery resurged in the Athenian ideology. Once

Persia no longer appeared a benevolent diplomatic partner, the fear of Persian domination reasserts itself in the sources, particularly Isocrates. Domination of Greece, however, quickly fell into Greek hands, as shown with the panhellenic activities of the Athenians in the fifth century and the Spartans in the fourth. The association of slavery and Hellenic unity indicates fear of dominance by a unifying, usually external, power: a feat only achievable with Persian support.

155

Chapter Three: Money’s De-Hellenizing Force

Suspicions of the susceptibility of Greek authority figures, including ambassadors, high ranking politicians, and military officers, to indulge in venality to promote a Persian cause appear frequently in ancient and modern sources. Cases of bribery with money and land demonstrate Hellenic suspicion against one another as well as an awareness of the apparent venality of their leaders. Further, there are several instances of a Persian potentate purchasing the services of Greek mercenary armies at his convenience, indicating that the Greeks were readily available for purchase in more than one respect. The motivation of the satrap, or even the unspecified Persian individual, fails to see discussion from the Greek authors, and bribery does not appear in inscriptions from the Persian empire.429

Accordingly, I divide this chapter on the Greeks’ apparent availability for Persian purchase into three sections. One important point of consideration I look at in all sections is the contemporary conditions in Persia when the Persians purchased the loyalties or treacheries of the individuals in question. I will discuss the circumstances in Persia’s empire at the time of the sale in each section. In the first section, I consider the idea of bribery in accordance with the Greek and later sources. In the next, I address the exploitation of the venality of separate groups. The first of these groups facing such accusations are fifth and fourth-century politicians, in particular those on the Greek mainland. Then I consider the case of ambassadors and political figures of the fourth century. Finally, I examine the use of Greek mercenary armies within Persia.

429 See also Tuplin 2017, 37-8 on the voice of the Persians as seen through inscriptions and iconography, in particular the silence out of the empire.

156

A dissertation produced by Kellam Conover focuses on the figure of the dorodokos

(bribe-taker) in Athenian society.430 Matthew Christ discusses moral obligation and expectations for citizens of Athens; bribery is not a principle focus, although relevant to the theme. Christ notes on the influence of generals for military recruitment and their susceptibility to corruption, especially in the form of receiving bribes.431 Claire Taylor gives a detailed analysis on the idea of corruption and pecuniary influence within predominantly Athenian settings. She considers the reality of allegations of bribery and what she labels as their common occurrence in Athens during the late fifth and early fourth centuries, providing a convenient collection of data on bribery and some consideration of the circumstances of these accusations.432

The idea of bribery quickly gives way to discussion on the merits of the Athenian orators of the fourth century since these were often the only sources that mentioned the acts and ramifications for bribery. Yet discussions of Demosthenes provided by MacDowell433 and

Worthington434 divert attention from the concept of corruption and focus instead on the polemical tone against Philip of Macedon. The question of the value of Demosthenes, Isocrates, and their fellow orators as historical sources has been asked numerous times,435 especially in light of their tendency to exaggerate or invent details for their own purposes.

430 Conover 2010. 431 Christ 2006, 57-58. 432 Taylor 2001; Taylor 2001a. 433 MacDowell 2009. 434 Worthington 2014. 435 Usher 1999; Missiou 1999; Steinbock 2013; MacDowell 2009;Worthington 2014.

157

D.J. Mosley began the trend of expressed interest in diplomacy independently in 1973, looking at most aspects of a diplomatic life from the ancient Greek perspective. However bribery and gifts are a rare point of discussion.436 In 1975, the aggregate work by Sir Frank Adcock and

Mosley offered insight into the roles and benefits of diplomacy, including the ramifications of joining an embassy and the question of the effectiveness of the Greeks sending envoys to such places as Persia.437 The volume provides an overview of diplomatic relations among the Greeks and under the Romans, focusing largely on internal affairs and the purpose and methods of forming embassies. In 1976, Shalom Perlman published an article building and speculating on the frequency of bribery and the culpability of ambassadors who would receive these bribes.438

Such a topic rarely saw much more attention, though bribery and diplomacy independently have been subject to a few discussions.439

Diplomacy receives further attention by means of studies that consider intercultural exchanges.440 While it is commonly acknowledged that the role of a diplomat was rife with troubles, the rewards for such ventures also appear to have been great. If not linguistic barriers then cultural ones would face envoys and diplomats. The existence of proxenoi in Greece prevented many of these concerns, yet the representation of a polis’ interests was often questionable, especially since the state often sent its own alternate embassies for matters such as

436 Mosley 1973. 437 Adcock and Mosley 1975. 438 Perlman 1976. 439 Cawkwell 1972; Perlman 1976; Lenfant 2013; Lenfant 2016. 440 Cf Walbank 1978; Jones 1999; Allen 2003.

158

war and trade.441 The financial gains have resulted in a corruptive diminishment or absolution of the individual’s Hellenic identity according to the Greeks and a victory of no apparent value to the Persians.

Several recent studies consider the use of Greek mercenaries in Persia and throughout the

Mediterranean Basin.442 By reaching into the archaic age and relying heavily on the work previously done by archaeologists in the site now known as Al Mina, Nino Luraghi proposes that the earliest occurrence of Greek mercenaries under Persian employ took place in the eighth century BCE, prior to the foundation of the Persian empire. Luraghi dismisses the options of trade or travelers as the source of the ubiquitous potsherds and decisively Greek artefacts in this region by instead attributing the steady supply of Greek items to the presence of mercenaries.443

The practice of extravagance and generosity was common throughout Persia. Work on the Persian practice of gift-giving, particularly to favorites or to those who have been of service saw new life in the work of Sancisi-Weerdenburg, who explored the royal ritual of the king’s alleged birthday party and gift distribution during this feast. She expanded as well on the nature of a Persian's gift to his fellow Persians, considering the likelihood of an aristocrat giving someone an army as a gift.444 Briant’s discussion on gifts and tribute within the Persian Empire considers extant cases of the Persians doling out land, and the Greeks’ revisions of the past in

441 See Walbank for a complete study on the position and power of a proxenus and a complete list of known proxenies. 442Cf. Marinovich 1988; Knapp 2002; Trundle 2004; Trundle 2005; Luraghi 2006; English 2010; Rop 2013. 443 Luraghi 2006, 27-29. 444 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1989.

159

their sources.445 Briant concludes that sumptuous royal gifts were symbolically charged within the Persian empire, although diplomatic gifts did not bear the same weight.446 It is useful, then, to compare the accepted Persian traditions regarding gifts and bribes with the Greek practice, especially for embassies. Lynette Mitchell discusses gift exchange in the Greek world, which naturally included the overlap between the two meanings of doron: gift and bribe. She concludes that the intersection between the receipt of gifts and bribery to difficulty identifying which of the two may have occurred. The occasion of gifts of currency or bullion compounded the problem further.447

The Persians’ generosity extended to non-Greek ambassadors to their courts as well as the Hellenic envoys yet there are no implications of identity or ethnicity alteration as a result.

Other Persians would often be rewarded for service. Ambassadors from other nations would be given gifts especially if they won the king’s favor (or the satrap’s). Aelian provides a list of goods granted to the embassies sent to Persia by the king, listing a talent of minted silver, two silver bowls, bracelets, a knife, and a necklace as well as a cloak. He also lists the financial worth of each gift in terms of Babylonian or Persian currency and the relevant exchange rate.448 Even a

445 Briant 2002.305-322. 446 Briant 2002, 306-308. 447 Mitchell 1997, 182-183. 448 Aelian VH 1. 22 Δῶρα τὰ ἐκ βασιλέως διδόμενα τοῖς παρ' αὐτὸν ἥκουσι πρεσβευταῖς, εἴτε παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀφίκοιντο εἴτε ἑτέρωθεν, ταῦτ' ἦν. τάλαντον μὲν ἑκάστῳ Βαβυλώνιον ἐπισήμου ἀργυρίου, ταλαντιαῖαι δὲ φιάλαι δύο ἀργυραῖ. δύναται δὲ τὸ τάλαντον τὸ Βαβυλώνιον δύο καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα μνᾶς Ἀττικάς. ψέλια δὲ καὶ ἀκινάκην ἐδίδου καὶ στρεπτόν, χιλίων δαρεικῶν ἄξια ταῦτα, καὶ στολὴν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς Μηδικήν· ὄνομα δὲ τῇ στολῇ δωροφορική. ‘The gifts which are given by the Great King to ambassadors who come to him, either from Greece or elsewhere, are these. To each man a Babylonian talent of minted silver. Two silver bowls worth a talent. The Babylonian talent has the value of seventy-two Attic minae. The King also gives bracelets, a knife, and a necklace, which are worth a thousand darics. And he gives to them a Median cloak, which is called the ‘dorophorike’.

160

Greek source specifies that this treatment be not exclusively reserved for ambassadors from the

Greek mainland.

3.1 What Does Bribery Mean?

Bribery (dorodokia) has received some attention by modern critics, yet there is no definite authority established on the topic. This section will address several questions that will rely heavily on the ancient sources. The consequences for such a betrayal were reflexive of the crime. However, the term doron means gift as well as bribe, and what may be seen as innocent reception of gifts by one individual could be deemed bribery by another.449 The distinction between true cases and accusations is nearly impossible to make. The Persian records contain no reference to such actions, whereas the Greek authors often produce unsubstantiated claims of them.

It is no coincidence that the terminology for gift is the same as that for bribes in ancient

Greek. The concept of dora pertains to much more than just money, and the practice of dorodokia among embassies and court favorites among the Persians was well established under the Achaemenid dynasty. Gifts given by the Persian elite were not limited to money or goods.

Occasionally they gave land to their favorites among the Greek politicians. Such gifts provided for the needs of these individuals, rendering them dependent on the donors. Gold seems to have been a less permanent gift, forcing a dependency relationship in which the recipient cannot be the equal to the donor of the gift. Land, on the other hand, if governed well, demonstrates an

449 Mitchell 1997, 183.

161

intention to supply for the needs of the recipient as well as an expectation that the land will be tended to well, and the populace governed according to Persia’s laws, as seen in the case of

Themistocles (See 2.3.1).

Such gifts aggregated their own intrinsic value by means of produce and trade. In addition to the wealth already bestowed upon the recipient, such grants of land entitled the bearers to power, trading rights, and even more money. Further, such financial security often rewarded pro-Persian services for several generations since the land and estates could be inherited, thereby giving figures such as Gongylus longevity of reputation.450 The Greek practice of exchange was one of reciprocity, in which the rewards equated the services rendered. Equal gift for equal gift, and equal favor for equal favor characterized the system familiar to the

Greeks.

However, the Persian practice was hierarchical and reinforced the imbalance of power451 since the recipient of these lavish gifts required the support of the satrap or king who granted them to maintain them. As a result, a satrap’s generosity became a reflection of his authority and prestige among his peers. The more dependents, local and foreign, a Persian potentate maintained, the wealthier and more powerful he appeared. Generous gifts to ambassadors, therefore, signified more than the satrap’s personal favor to the ambassadors standing amongst the Persians. Land, money, and gold seemed lavish to these recipients, and inflated suspicions of

450 Cf. Xenophon Hellenica 3.1.6. 451 Mitchell 1997, 132.

162

corruption. However, such a perspective lacked insight into the nature of the Persian political hierarchy.

The types of domains granted, while not mutually exclusive, can be broken into three categories: cities, estates, and uncultivated land.452 Twelve examples of this type of exchange between Persians and Greeks appear in literature.453 Pytharchus, the earliest known example, received seven estates from Cyrus II (the Great) at an unspecified time during the mid-sixth century, and allegedly ruled them as a tyrant, playing into the perception of Persian-based rulers reigning hubristically (Agathocles FGrH 472 F6).

καὶ Κῦρος δὲ ὁ μέγας Πυθάρχωι τῶι Κυζικηνῶι φίλωι ὄντι ἐχαρίσατο ἑπτὰ πόλεις, ὥς

φησιν ὁ Βαβυλώνιος ᾽Αγαθοκλῆς, Πήδασον, ᾽Ολύμπιον, <᾽Α>καμάντιον, <Τίον>,

Σκῆπτρα, ᾽Αρτύψον, Τορτύρην. «ὁ δ᾽ εἰς ὕβριν» φησί, «καὶ ἄνοιαν προελθὼν τυραννεῖν

ἐπεχείρησε τῆς πατρίδος, στρατιὰν συναγαγών. καὶ οἱ Κυζικηνοὶ ἐξορμήσαντες ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν

ἐβοηδρόμουν, πρόκροσσοι φερόμενοι ἐπὶ τὸν κίνδυνον».

And Cyrus the Great granted to Pytharchus of Cyzicus, who was his friend, 7 cities, so

says Agathocles the Babylonian: Pydasum, Olympium, Akamantium, , Sceptra,

Artupsum, Tortures. It says “He began ruling tyrannically, going forth toward thoughtless

hybris, leading his army. And the Cyzicans called for aid, and set upon him, rushing in

serried ranks into danger.”

452 Herman 1987, 109. 453 Herman 1981, 109-110 gives a complete table detailing these instances as well as those of Macedonian land grants and those granted by Hellenistic monarchies.

163

The description above suggests that the recipients of these land grants were not always well- received by the locals, nor were they always good rulers. While the definition of a tyrant has altered dramatically since this document’s writing, the calls for help and the acts of hybris suggest that Pytharchus was not suited to rule in this region. Three specific cases of estates as a form of remuneration for services rendered to the Persians as well as the peculiar instance of

Alcibiades’ reception of a gift of land demonstrate amply how the Persians expressed favoritism with generosity and did so with the anticipation of sustaining the recipient of these gifts by providing the resources necessary to flourish.

For example, Demaratus, who dwelled in the Persian court in the early fifth century, also received gifts of land to provide for his needs after rendering valuable services to the Persians

(Xenophon Hellenica 3.16). Thucydides reports of the treatment of Themistocles and the

Persians’ acceptance of the alleged traitor in their inner courts as an advisor, for which the former-general was remunerated with a city called Magnesia, another called , and a third called Myus, to provide his bread, wine, and meat (Thucydides 1.138).454 Perhaps these gifts were meant simply to be payment for services rendered. Xerxes and Darius were known for their generosity towards their favorites and the Achaemenids valued the services of non-Persians equally to those of their own subjects.455 Gongylus and his descendants received a considerable tract of land, as reported by Xenophon when he encountered the Gongylids:

454Cf. Nepos Themistocles 10; Plutarch Themistocles 29; Plutarch Moralia 328e-f; Scholia Aristophanica Equites 84; Diodorus 11.23.3. 455 See Sancisi-Weerdenberg 1989; Briant 2003a.

164

ἀδελφοὶ ὄντες, ἔχοντες ὁ μὲν Γάμβριον καὶ Παλαιγάμβριον, ὁ δὲ Μύριναν καὶ Γρύνειον·

δῶρον δὲ καὶ αὗται αἱ πόλεις ἦσαν παρὰ βασιλέως Γογγύλῳ, ὅτι μόνος Ἐρετριέων

μηδίσας ἔφυγεν (Xenophon Hellenica 3.1.6)

Being brothers, one held Gambrium and Palaegambrium, while the other and

Grunium. The same cities were both gifts from the king to Gongylus, because he alone of

the Eretrians fled for medizing.

The description gives no clear account of the crime, simply the participle of the verb medizw, indicating a singular action although no specific details are provided by Xenophon.456

Gongylus’ reward for doing so appears to have been hefty: 4 poleis to sustain himself as well as to reign over and pass down to his descendants nearly a century later. Demaratus, Gongylus, and

Themistocles, all served in a court of the Persian Empire in their own capacities.

However, the explanation for the land given to Alcibiades by the Persian satrap,

Pharnabazus, is not as obvious as the examples discussed above. Alcibiades’ dynamic and multi- faceted career involved only a brief period in the court of Tissaphernes, alternatingly advocating the Spartan and Athenian causes for Persian support during the Ionian War. While he apparently won Tissaphernes’ favor during this period, he decidedly did not provide any valuable service to either the satrap or the Persian king; however, since other regional satraps were beginning to form ties with the Greeks in support of the Peloponnesian War, including Cyrus and

Pharnabazus, it is likely that the benevolence toward Alcibiades was a result of his value as a

456 His services to Pausanias in the early 470s have been accepted as his medism, and deemed worthy of a hereditary parcel of land.

165

general. Alcibiades’ behavior in Lydia indicated a sense of security as well as his apparent longing to return to Athens. Yet, Cornelius Nepos recorded in his biography of Alcibiades that:

ad Pharnabazum in Asiam transiit, quem quidem adeo sua cepit humanitate, ut eum

nemo in amicitia antecederet. namque ei Grynium dederat, in Phrygia castrum, ex quo

quinquagena talenta vectigalis capiebat. (Alcibiades 9.3).

He went to Pharnabazus in Asia, where that man took his very culture, so that no one

would precede him in friendship. For, he had given him Grynium, a camp in Phrygia,

from which he received 50 talents of revenue.

The statements made by Nepos here suggest that the individual satrap, not the king nor the empire, gave Alcibiades a home and revenue. He fled not to Persia but to Pharnabazus, the

Phrygian satrap, according to this text. Moreover, no one exceeded him in friendship with the satrap, indicating that during Alcibiades’ earlier encounters with Pharnabazus he had demonstrated some value to the satrap. It behooved Pharnabazus to keep Alcibiades as a dependent in his region although the reasons are unclear. The satrap’s generosity with

Alcibiades, who was not technically an exile at that point, is noted with the gifts of land and money. Perhaps Nepos exaggerates in his account, especially since other Greek exiles had been sheltered and valued by Persian potentates. This account suggests Pharnabazus had the resources to maintain a dependent apparently for friendship’s sake, demonstrating his wealth and power to his peers.

Alcibiades’ flight to safety among the Persians seems to have been a direct result of his personality and suspicions of his motives. Running to Persia and receiving land there may not 166

have clarified his ambitions but it provided a stay of execution. Granting Alcibiades a means of sustenance and extensive sanctuary offered little political gain to Pharnabazus, with whom

Alcibiades seems to have had no established relationship, friendship, or political ties. Perhaps this decision had more to do with a rivalry between Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes than the value of Alcibiades to a satrap of Persia. Nevertheless, when Alcibiades encountered suspicions in 407, just months after finally returning to Athens he was allowed to take shelter in the Persian satrapy of Phrygia. Alcibiades’ service to Persia was limited, despite Thucydides’ estimation of his influence over Tissaphernes (8.45-60). His reported receipt of land could simply be a misunderstanding or a misrepresentation on Nepos’ part.

Alcibiades had little to offer to the Persians by the time he required their shelter, unlike other exiles. He appears to have expected active pursuit from his polis. Nevertheless, the idea of

Alcibiades receiving a parcel of land in Phrygia does not fit the mold of the previously discussed examples. The men discussed in previous examples had performed a service for the Persians or were limited to access to the court in which they were sheltered. Documentation is scarce apart from casual remarks such as those discussed.457 Instead, Alcibiades’ estates appear to have been granted based on the status Pharnabazus gained by maintaining a dependent rather than the recipient’ merit.

457 Cf. the discussion of Herman 1987, 106-115.

167

3.2 The Purchase of the Greeks

The apparent exploitation of the venality of the Greek character occurs throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, at least in the Greek and Roman authors’ works.458 Even if these claims and allegations were not true, the recurrence in the literature has become a topos, which suggests that there were enough real examples to make these charges plausible. Whether the

Persians embarked on a deliberate campaign in order to corrupt Greek leaders is indeterminate.

The circumstances of each case should be reviewed in this discussion. Questions to be addressed include: how did Persian gold turn the situation into one that favors Persian interests at the time?

Was it simply easier to pay the Greeks off than to face the alternative of warfare with the Greeks or civil unrest within the Persian satrapies? Did such interactions instill confidence in Persia’s support? Were these accusations entirely hollow? On a case by case basis, individuals appear to have been more likely to receive what their peers considered bribes than larger groups.

As Isocrates’ statement below demonstrates, bribery as a conceptual ill plaguing society inflated during the fourth century, yet this case was not the reality of the crime. Isocrates’ statement suggests a better, purer age when Athens was at the peak of her power, claiming:

πλείστους δὲ τιθέμενοι νόμους οὕτως ὀλίγον αὐτῶν φροντίζομεν – ἓν

γὰρ ἀκούσαντες γνώσεσθε καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων – ὥστε,

θανάτου τῆς ζημίας ἐπικειμένης ἤν τις ἁλῷ δεκάζων, τοὺς

τοῦτο φανερώτατα ποιοῦντας στρατηγοὺς χειροτονοῦμεν,

458 Cf. Polyaenus 1.48. 3; Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 6. 3-7. 2; Nepos 4. 1-2; Justin 6.8. 5-7.

168

καὶ τὸν πλείστους διαφθεῖραι τῶν πολιτῶν δυνηθέντα,

τοῦτον ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων καθίσταμεν· (Isocrates 8.50).

We, having set many such laws, heed a few of them so – for hearing one and about

others, you know them – and so, if someone should be caught for bribery, for which the

set penalty of death, we vote the generals doing this most obviously, and the man who

was able to destroy the fleet of the state, him we set upon the greatest of actions.

If the penalty for bribery is execution or exile, and Isocrates thinks rightly so, being caught with unaccounted for Persian gold would be incredibly perilous. By the time Isocrates delivered this oration, however, relations with Persia had become much less clear than the time he describes.

Trade had been established decades prior to Isocrates’ emergence as an orator in Athens, rendering the presence of Persian goods as well as Persian money common for Athenians of a certain social and political standing.

3.2.1 Bribery’s Consequences in Athens

Ramifications and the notoriety of receiving bribes were depicted as rather heavy burdens to bear. Such high stakes, exile or execution as well as alleged loss of identity, should have been an effective deterrent. In light of the consequences, the least of which was exile and the worst of them was public execution after a trial for treason, incentives for corruption must have been high. Perhaps contemporary circumstances could be blamed for even submitting to negotiation with the Persians in light of the apparent common image of the non-Greek in Athens.

Demosthenes offers his opinion when he claims:

ἐξ ὧν καὶ σαφέστατ' ἄν τις ἴδοι ὅτι ὁ μάλιστα φυλάττων τὴν αὑτοῦ πατρίδα καὶ πλεῖστ'

ἀντιλέγων τούτοις, οὗτος ὑμῖν, Αἰσχίνη, τοῖς προδιδοῦσι καὶ μισθαρνοῦσιν τὸ ἔχειν ἐφ' 169

ὅτῳ δωροδοκήσετε περιποιεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς τουτωνὶ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθισταμένους τοῖς

ὑμετέροις βουλήμασιν ὑμεῖς ἐστὲ σῷοι καὶ ἔμμισθοι, ἐπεὶ διά γ' ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς πάλαι ἂν

ἀπωλώλειτε. (Demosthenes 18.49).

From these examples, one can most clearly see that he who is most vigilant in protecting

his country, and who speaks most against those, this man, Aeschines, provides you

traitors and mercenaries with whatever you can have for a bribe, and according to those

many here and those who thwarted your own plans, you are safe and paid, since you

would have destroyed yourselves because of yourselves long ago.

His choice of words tells his audience how great of a crime receiving a bribe is to the fourth- century Athenian. He claims that destruction follows the actions that Aeschines leads the

Athenians to perform. Aeschines here provides the Athenians with traitors and mercenaries, and a polis to betray. The standard which Aeschines promotes may in fact be conflated for rhetorical purposes; however, it reflects the severity of the charge, the loss of timia as well as the probability of execution or exile resulting from the action of receiving bribes.

Bribery from external forces appears to have been tried as a form of treason, for which the penalty would be exile or execution, demonstrating the standard to which the citizens of

Athens would be held.459 Sources report that those indicted for an atimia offence such as graphe doron or eisangelia dorodokias would face a public trial (Andocides 1.74, Demosthenes

21.113).460 Hyperides (4.7-8, 29) specifies a rhetor giving advice or making speeches contrary to

459 Cf. for example Cimon’s trial in Plutarch Cimon 13-15; Aeschines 1.87 cites death as the penalty for bribery. No penalty is specified for non-elite individuals. 460 Hansen 1976, 90-91.

170

the interests of Athens or receiving bribes should face impeachment, giving the example of

Philocrates of Hagnus, who served Philip against Athenian interests. Sara Foresdyke observes that ritual destruction served as a communal event in which elite transgressors against collective values were symbolically exterminated, including setting their homes ablaze.461 What would motivate a Greek to accept gifts from foreigners in light of the treatment of the recipients of bribes? Since receiving these gifts as an ambassador was necessary to move forward with negotiations, it would be difficult to avoid accusations of bribery as an envoy to Persia should the mission flounder. However, an ordinary politician within Athens would have no ostensible reason to accept Persian gifts or money under normal quotidian circumstances. Distinguishing between gifts and bribery should theoretically be much simpler in this case.

The treatment of dorodokia displays a conflicting demeanor on the Greeks’ part towards the Persians. The Persian image hardly makes individual Persians seem like a threat. However, the Persians were likely aware, particularly after the invasion of 480-79, of what Albert

Olmstead calls “the outstanding weakness of the Greek – their susceptibility to bribes.”462 The charges for bribery lay namely on the Greeks’ self-perception of their corruptibility as was the case for medism. The question of how seriously to consider such images, both of the Greek venality, and the Persians as an effeminate archenemy of the Greeks has resulted in no clear answer. The issue of bribery was often connected with the conviction of treason in Athenian

461 Forsdyke 2000, 33. 462 Olmstead 1954, 263.

171

courts and contemporary sources claim that such actions emasculate and de-Hellenize the recipient of such illicit finances.463

The condemnation of Greeks who had accepted bribes is nearly universal in the fourth- century sources, particularly the published works of the Athenian orators. Aristotle also offers a rather negative opinion, giving a contemporary example as a reason to condemn those who had been corrupted by gifts from anyone, not necessarily the Persians. The example comes up in his criticism of rhetorical devices, being described as follows:

δὲ ὁ τρόπος ᾧ ἐχρήσατο Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Ἀριστοφῶντα, ἐπερόμενος εἰ προδοίη ἂν

τὰς ναῦς ἐπὶ χρήμασιν: …τοῦτό τις ἂν εἴπειεν ἄλλος πρὸς ἀπιστίαν τοῦ κατηγόρου:

ὅλως γὰρ βούλεται ὁ κατηγορῶν βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ φεύγοντος: (Aristotle Rhetoric

1392a.7).

…How Iphicrates acted toward Aristophon, asking whether he would betray the fleet for

money… should someone else charge him with treason, for he wholly thought it was a

worse charge than fleeing.

Aristotle’s choice of the crime of “betraying for money” for his demonstration of this rhetorical device suggests a long-standing expectation of bribery from enemies abroad.464 Further, he selected an example of a general who, despite his military record and service to Athens, had

463 Examples include: Themistocles (Plutarch Themistocles 29.5, 6.4); Agesliaus (Plutarch Agesilaus 10.6-7); Epicrates (Lysias 27; Demosthenes 19.277), and Callias (Demosthenes 19.273-275). Cf. Perlman 1976, 226-229. 464Cf. Nepos Timotheus 3: Iphicrates’ military accomplishments on behalf of Athenian interests were such that the Athenians did not accept Aristophon’s accusations of bribery, although his attacks on Timotheus, despite his military record, met with success. Iphicrates defended himself with a speech allegedly crafted by the orator Lysias. See also Dionysius of Halicarnassus On Lysias 12.

172

faced accusations from a disreputable orator465 and fended them off with his reputation and allegedly the aid of Lysias. This example demonstrates the perception of money as a corrupting influence in Greek sources. There remains little to no Persian record to offer a different perspective on the matter.

The tensions between the apparent paucity of actual cases of Greek envoys bought off by

Persia, the alleged turn-cloak habits of the Greeks and the depiction of Persia lead to the conclusion that perhaps the Greeks feared Persian invasion. However, most documented Greco-

Persian bribery cases, especially in the fourth century, did not take place in Greek territory or even with direct threat of the Persians to the Greeks in question. Instead, the allegations refer to specific incidents that seem to occur while abroad, suggesting that the Persian satraps were more likely to offer dora in their own territory.

The overall derisive image the Greeks assign to the Persians could be interpreted to an extent as propaganda, especially in the earlier half of the fifth century. Criticism of Greeks engaging in international relations with the Persian empire occurs regardless of the source’s era.

Perhaps the stigma derives from social memory, as suggested by Steinbock,466 or from an ill- defined sense of Hellenic identity, as suggested by Jonathan Hall.467 Regardless of source, contact with Persia seemingly corrupted good citizens, at least in the early 470s and after the

Peloponnesian War. Following the withdrawal of the Persians from Europe, such questions arose

465 Aristophon had been taken to court for pressing charges 75 times. Cf. Aeschines 3.194. Whitehead 1986, 313-317 discusses some of these cases and their plausibility in light of what is known of Aristophon’s career. 466 Steinbock 2012. 467 Hall 2002.

173

among the Greeks. More importantly, the treatment and perception of the events of the Persian invasion varied from one polis to the next. Athens, of course, has the strongest representation in the sources.468 It is the Athenians, specifically their orators, who attest to fourth century incidents of bribery most often.469

3.2.2 Money, Corruption, and Context: the historic tradition

The historical tradition focuses on Persia’s continued interest in the Greeks, extending to financial corruption, or the purchase of a Greek’s loyalty thereby demonstrating the Greeks’ sense of the caliber of their intrinsic value. Sources as early as (Works and Days 11-39) and (Iliad 1.40, 9.506, 11.163) lend credence to the reputation of the Greeks for venality by complaining of leaders being bribed by other Greeks. This apparent trait resulted in an image of a corruptible race of people, thereby leading to its exploitation by the Persians.470 It seems that the Greeks believed they had been bought due to the superior quality of the individual or the group that has succumbed to the criminal temptations of money.

There are several instances recorded in the ancient sources which concern themselves specifically with the bribery of Greek politicians in Greece. For example, Cimon is praised for his treatment of the discovery of Persian gold in his Persian friend’s possession. The attempt to bribe Cimon met with an offer of friendship, while earlier the man with the Persian gold was cast out with his dependents as a demonstration of Cimon’s merits (Plutarch Cimon 10.8-9). Cimon

468 MacFarlane 2002, 4. 469 Such as Aeschines’ complaints of Demosthenes (3.175), Demosthenes’ complaints against Timagoras (19.137), and Lysias’ defence against charges of bribery (21). 470 Beslin 2002, 23; 29-32.

174

himself did not handle the gold nor did he advise his friend to maintain the relationship that could have resulted in his persecution and exile or execution.

Plutarch also tells of Pericles’ strength of character in resisting Persian bribery while establishing the on Samos (Pericles 25.2). If Plutarch was the only source for these instances or it only occurred with these three Athenian leaders, the evidence could be dismissed as Plutarch’s moral idealization of these figures for his audience.471 Plutarch promotes the value of honesty and the moral implications of refuting those offering bribes. This vivid description of the condemnation of Pausanias for accepting bribes demonstrates his perception of a strong

Lacedaemonian rejection of corruption and pecuniary advantage, especially in light of the treatment of Pausanias after his death.472

However, this phenomenon also occurs in the works of Thucydides, Xenophon, and

Pausanias. Megabazus bribes the Spartans to invade Attica in 454.473 Xenophon gives the case of the King sending Timocrates the Rhodian to pay off the Greeks to make war with and rally ill-

471 Cf. Moysey 1992; Gygax 2006. 472 Chrysermus BNJ 287 F 4b: ΠΕΡΣΩΝ τὴν Ἑλλάδα λεηλατούντων Παυσανίας ὁ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων στρατηγὸς πεντακόσια χρυσοῦ τάλαντα παρὰ Ξέρξου λαβὼν ἔμελλε προδιδόναι τὴν Σπάρτην. φωραθέντος δὲ τούτου Ἀγησίλαος ὁ πατὴρ μέχρι τοῦ ναοῦ τῆς Χαλκιοίκου συνεδίωξεν Ἀθηνᾶς καὶ τὰς θύρας τοῦ τεμένους πλίνθῳ φράξας λιμῷ ἀπέκτεινεν· ἡ δὲ μήτηρ καὶ ἄταφον ἔρριψεν· ὡς Χρύσερμος ἐν δευτέρῳ Ἱστορικῶν. When the Persians were devastating Greece, Pausanias, the Lacedaemonian general, having taken five hundred talents from Xerxes, would betray Sparta. This act having been discovered, his father, Agesilaus, persecuted him as far as the temple of Athena Chacioecos, and had the doors of the temple were fortified with brick, and he died from hunger. His mother cast him out unburied. So claims Chrysermus in the second book of his Histories. Ceccarelli 2011 notes that Chrysermus’ version as related by Plutarch specifies Pausanias’ parents’ involvement in his condemnation for bribery in contrast to the terse description offered by Thucydides. Moreover, Pausanias’ father was Cleombrotus, not Agesilaus. The amount of 500 talents is typical of Plutarch’s Parallela Minora rather than a figure attested in the tradition surrounding Pausanias. 473 Thucydides 1.109, 2-3.

175

will towards Sparta (Xenophon Hellenica 3.5.1-2; cf. Pausanias 3.9.8).474 Agesilaus levels the allegation that ten thousand archers (the image on Persian coins) were the king’s method of driving the Spartans out of Asia Minor (Plutarch Agesilaus 15.6).475 Since these incidents are not limited to Plutarch’s biographies, it would make sense for there to be a good deal of attention granted to the matter of Persian bribery in Greece, yet there is little scholarly concern for the issue.476 Bribery is only the most obvious of these means. Persian corruption of Greeks using money and Persian potentates’ motivations to do so, however obvious the occurrence, require further discussion. For instance, Herodotus’ Thebans advise Mardonius that the Greeks would be easier to defeat by using money than by using armies (9.2.3).

Literary sources hold several hints to the reception of financial enticements from the

Persians, expressing disdain at the corruption and venality of the recipient. While such works generally do not offer a wholly accurate portrayal of their contemporaries, they do reflect the perceptions and attitudes of those who wrote them, demonstrating the widespread sentiments in their regions and the easily recognizable stereotypes. In Hesiod’s Works and Days, he expresses a disdain for bribery and an inherent sense of injustice following his maligning during his inheritance trial. He complains:

ἤδη μὲν γὰρ κλῆρον ἐδασσάμεθ', ἄλλα τε πολλὰ

ἁρπάζων ἐφόρεις μέγα κυδαίνων βασιλῆας

474 See also Bruce 1961; Perlman 1964; Seager 1967; Hamilton 1972; David 1984. 475This same incident recurs in the lives of Artaxerxes and Lysander as well. Cf. Plutarch. Artaxerxes 20.3; Plutarch Lysander 27. 476Taylor 2001; Taylor 2001a; Conover 2010; Conover 2013; Conover 2014; Taylor 2017.

176

δωροφάγους, οἳ τήνδε δίκην ἐθέλουσι δικάσσαι.

νήπιοι, οὐδὲ ἴσασιν ὅσῳ πλέον ἥμισυ παντὸς

οὐδ' ὅσον ἐν μαλάχῃ τε καὶ ἀσφοδέλῳ μέγ' ὄνειαρ. (37-41).

We divided the inheritance, and you, snatching them away, hold many other things,

having the pride of kings, greedy for bribes, those who wish to judge this justice.

Children, you do not see his advantage by so much more than half of everything, nor so

much benefit in mallow and asphodel.

His choice of dorophagos (bribe-eater) to describe the basileus of the trial indicates not only that he felt cheated out of his inheritance, but also that he perceived the king and aristocrats sitting in judgment were easily corruptible. Hesiod is not alone in expressing his malcontent against those who consume bribes in court or abroad, however. The concept of purchasing a Greek’s loyalty whether as a mercenary or as an ambassador swayed to fail in his mission reverberates as early as the Homeric epics and continues long after the fall of Persia as discussed above. Some of the most accessible records of such allegations, suspicions, and legal actions come from oratory and comedy. Each of these critics offers a different set of opinions and charges, drawing up precedents and tampering with the memory of notorious events to serve the speaker’s purpose.

What comedy provides, similarly to the work of the Attic orators, is a distorted reflection of current events and attitudes. Traditional reception of an ambassador in a foreign land can be found in an exaggerated form in the Acharnians. Criticism of contemporary events often appears within the work of Aristophanes, whose work reflects what his audience would immediately be able to identify as humorous. The unnamed ambassador freshly returned from Ecbatana rather

177

than the traditional destination of Susa or Sardis, the Persian summer capital, describes the embassy’s reception as:

{ΠΡ.} Καὶ δῆτ' ἐτρυχόμεσθα τῶν Καϋστρίων

πεδίων ὁδοιπλανοῦντες ἐσκηνημένοι,

ἐφ' ἁρμαμαξῶν μαλθακῶς κατακείμενοι,

ἀπολλύμενοι. …

Οἱ βάρβαροι γὰρ ἄνδρας ἡγοῦνται μόνους

τοὺς πλεῖστα δυναμένους φαγεῖν τε καὶ πιεῖν. ...

Ἔτει τετάρτῳ δ' εἰς τὰ βασίλει' ἤλθομεν·

ἀλλ' εἰς ἀπόπατον ᾤχετο στρατιὰν λαβών,

κἄχεζεν ὀκτὼ μῆνας ἐπὶ χρυσῶν ὀρῶν. (68-82).

Amb.: And we consumed the Caustrian fields, roaming about, feasting, idling lazily in

covered carriages, chattering… the barbarians rule over only the men who could eat and

drink the most… in the fourth year, we came to the palace; but he had left for the toilet,

taking his army, and eased himself for eight months on a golden throne.

Even removing the elements of comedy from these lines, this excerpt demonstrates the perception of those who traveled to Persia’s courts. The embassy had been allowed to travel unmolested through the unfamiliar territory and escorted to the court of the king himself. They experienced luxury and received the finest foods and drinks available. Such incentives alone would be considered worth the risks and consequences of failure without the gifts. The embassy here claims to have experienced an eight months wait after a four-year journey through the

178

luxuriant courts of the Persian empire, having struggled to endure the golden or crystal flagons for wine described as delicious and gaining the barbarian esteem only through eating rich food and drinking heavily. The luxury customarily associated with corruption appears in positions of vulnerability and great trust, such as these. For such a depiction to be humorous to the Athenian audience there would have to be suspicions of such a lifestyle undertaken by the very representatives meant to uphold the polis’ values and champion its cause abroad.

The additional honors open to ambassadors as well as the financial rewards likely further enticed potential diplomats to embark on their missions. Contemporary depictions testify to the immediate recognition of Persian wealth and the ease with which an envoy slips into the Persian lifestyle. In the Acharnians (59-64), the herald and Dicaeopolis describe the recently returned ambassador as:

ΚΗ. Οἱ πρέσβεις οἱ παρὰ βασιλέως.

ΔΙ. Ποίου βασιλέως;...

Βαβαιάξ. Ὦκβάτανα τοῦ σχήματος.

Her: The ambassadors from the King.

Dic: From which king? …

Wow! Oh! By the get-up, Ecbatana.

The fellow in question clearly comes from elsewhere despite his established Athenian identity.

Dicaeopolis immediately recognizes the ambassadors as non-Greek, specifically Persian. The location he names, Ecbatana, is the summer palace of the Persian royal court rather than the traditional Susa. The implication is that the ambassador has been luxuriating, shirking his duties

179

to enjoy the Persians’ hospitality longer than the mission to Susa would require. There is no mention of bribery here but a loss of recognizable identity. The diplomat has been away for four years and in that time subject to several extravagancies. To the common Athenian, the ambassador seems to have been wasting time enjoying himself with the indulgences the effeminate Persians offer. He expresses his corruption through his travels, leaving allegedly from the summer palace rather than the capital to which envoys were traditionally dispatched.

Conversation with the king’s direct representative demonstrates the corruption of the ambassador as well. He interprets the representative’s words as a promise of gold and plenty of it from the Persians even though later reveals that the representative intends the opposite.

He even criticizes the Greeks, calling Dicaeopolis a χαυνόπρωκτ᾽ Ἰαοναῦ (104). That the Persian ambassador considers the protagonist a “wide-anused Ionian”477 indicates that the Persians had similarly unflattering perceptions of the Greeks. The critique often applied to followers of the sophists, associated with Athens, originating in the east,478 although not necessarily Persia.

If comic exaggeration is taken into account, the portrayal still would have seemed quasi- credible to Aristophanes’ contemporary audience, demonstrating the common Athenian perception of embassies and the corruption of ambassadors, even without the issue of bribery.

The envoy here bearing the prestigious title of presbeus demonstrates that the practice of diplomacy has either not exposed him to the Persian representative’s language or corrupted him

477 Clearly refers to excessive buggery. 478 Comparable to the more frequently used terms, euruproktos and lakkoproktos in reference to a promiscuous pathic homosexual male. See Henderson 1991, 209-211.

180

to the extent that he deliberately misrepresents the Persian’s statements and by extension his intentions. This representation of the ambassador implies that the corruptibility of the prestigious member of Athenian society carries a degree of culpability for the failure and misrepresentation of Athenian interests abroad. In other words, those sent to the Persian courts enjoy the luxury, and become dishonest,479 although the gifts appear to mean significantly less to the Persians giving them480 since gift-exchange was an expected part of establishing xenia and philia.481

3.2.3 Bribery of 5th and 4th Century Politicians

Perceived corruption of politicians endured beyond the fifth and fourth centuries, however, examples continued to be drawn from these years by later sources. Failed attempts to bribe Themistocles and Cimon serve Plutarch’s purpose of demonstrating the moral fiber of the

Athenian generals considered responsible for the strongest anti-Persian policies in Athenian history. This theme recurs with Nepos’ biography of Epaminondas, the Theban general turned ambassador to Persia (Nepos Epaminondas 7). These three leaders apparently resisted or succumbed to bribery from Persian figures. The resistant two demonstrated the virtues of a true political leader, following the moral behavior Plutarch in particular tried to promote. Such strong protests offered by significantly later biographers suggest the vulnerability and established venality associated with politicians, especially ones with direct contact with the Persians. It is difficult to distinguish between cases of slander and true bribery without considering the actions

479 As occurs at Plutarch Pelopidas 30.7; Diodorus 17.1.2; Herodotus 3.160.2, 7.106.1, 3.139-141, 154.1, 10.1-2, 6.30.1, 8.85.3, 90.4; Thucydides 1.129.3. 480 See Nelson 2014, 119’s assertion about Dicaeopolis as the ideal Athenian demonstrated by the profiteering embassy and self-interested politicians. 481 Mitchell 1997, 182-183.

181

surrounding a particular accusation. In many cases, the pursuit of the truth yields no results since accusations were very easy to levy and required very little proof beyond ill-will. Although with no history of corruption, such accusations would likely not appear in the court cases, making it harder still to distinguish fact from vindictive fiction.

Consider instead the Persian perspective in such events. There would be little gain to bribing Themistocles in the 470s since his immediate focus following the return to Athens was the restoration of his polis both physically and politically after the damage done by the Persian invaders in 480 and 479. Themistocles’ efforts had little to do with gaining revenge on Persia’s invasion or the destruction of Athens. His work focused instead on asserting Athenian independence from Spartan command and restoring Athens (Thucydides 1.90-93). Themistocles is allowed to remain in Persia and even welcomed into the great king’s court after a year’s grace

(Thucydides 1.138).

The Greeks were no less biased in their judgment of each other, especially in extreme circumstances. Demosthenes’ case recalls the exile of Themistocles, an Athenian leader during the Persian invasion of Greece in 480 BCE. Themistocles is named by Plutarch (Themistocles

4.1-3), Herodotus (8.8), and Thucydides (1.138) as the preeminent Athenian leader during and immediately after the Persian War. However, in the 470s, Themistocles descended from charging people with accepting bribes to being run out of Athens for communications with the Persian king. Plutarch describes Themistocles’ praise-worthy actions as:

182

ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ Ἄρθμιον τὸν Ζελείτην· Θεμιστοκλέους γὰρ εἰπόντος καὶ τοῦτον εἰς

τοὺς ἀτίμους καὶ παῖδας αὐτοῦ καὶ γένος ἐνέγραψαν, ὅτι τὸν ἐκ Μήδων χρυσὸν εἰς τοὺς

Ἕλληνας ἐκόμισε. (Themistocles 6.4).

And still, concerning the matter of Arthmius the Zeletan: for Themistocles indicted him

for saying this to those without worth and his own sons, and his clan, because he from the

gold of the Medes.

This figure was so loyal and vital to the promotion of Athens during and immediately after the

Persian invasion that he could not be tempted with the lure of Persian gold. In turning down the bribes, Themistocles demonstrated the resistance to corruption that the orators attempted to idealize. Yet, despite Themistocles’ previous patriotism, he would later form a personal alliance with the Persians, as a result of suspicion cast his way by the Spartans likely because Persia was the only place to escape allegations of medism. When he was discovered, he fled first to Argos, then eventually eastward to Persia.

Themistocles’ case runs parallel to that of Pausanias, the Spartan regent who led the

Greek alliance of 481 BCE during the Persian invasion. Pausanias, once the Persians were driven out of Greece, led the Greeks against the Persian forces in Byzantium. While there, he began to communicate with the Persian king and, as Thucydides tells it, accepted his gold in order to betray those he commanded (Thucydides 1.128-130). Even worse, he began to act in the Persian manner as Thucydides describes:

ἀλλὰ σκευάς τε Μηδικὰς ἐνδυόμενος ἐκ τοῦ Βυζαντίου ἐξῄει καὶ διὰ τῆς Θρᾴκης

πορευόμενον αὐτὸν Μῆδοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι ἐδορυφόρουν, τράπεζάν τε Περσικὴν

183

παρετίθετο καὶ κατέχειν τὴν διάνοιαν οὐκ ἐδύνατο, ἀλλ' ἔργοις βραχέσι προυδήλου ἃ τῇ

γνώμῃ μειζόνως ἐς ἔπειτα ἔμελλε πράξειν. (1.130).

But he went from Byzantium through Thrace, assuming Medic dress, and setting Medes

and Egyptians his bodyguards, and he set out a Persian table and was not able to contain

his ill intentions, but demonstrated with harmful acts those greater things which he had in

mind that he would rather do.

The corruption implied by such an action apparently violated the Spartan expectation of

Laconian behavior, particularly the noticeable avarice. This instance provides evidence that rumors alone can serve as condemnation. Pausanias’ military record against the Persians up to

479/8 notwithstanding, the general would die labeled a traitor outside a temple where he had sought sanctuary. For further discussion on Pausanias and Themistocles, particularly as medizers, see 2.3.1.

These two are not the only Greek political leaders to betray or be thought to have betrayed their home poleis for the sake of money. Cimon also faced such charges in 463 and would be exiled from Athens for pro-Laconian sympathies in 461 BCE. Plutarch argues against the possibility of Cimon accepting bribes with several instances where he did the opposite.482 He was never charged with accepting bribes from Persia, however. Instead, Cimon faced allegations of bribery from the Macedonians for failing to invade Macedonia after his handling of the

482 Cf. Plutarch Cimon 10.8 ‘It is said that Rhoesaces, a barbarian who defected from the King, came to Athens with a great deal of money, and hounded by sycophants he took refuge with Cimon. He placed two jars in his courtyard - one filled with silver, the other with gold. Cimon when he saw this smiled and asked the man whether he wanted Cimon as his employee or his friend. When he answered that he wanted him as a friend, Cimon replied: “Well then, take this money with you when you go; for, once I have become your friends, I may use it whenever I have need of it.”’ (trans. Perrin).

184

conquest of Thasos in 463 (Plutarch Cimon 14.2-3). While charges against Cimon were unfounded and ultimately dismissed, they demonstrate the ease with which suspicions of bribery arose. The inextricable link of corruption with the acceptance of bribes was circumvented by

Cimon appealing to his reputation and history of service to his polis (Plutarch Cimon 14.4). The example of Cimon demonstrates the suspicions with which Athenian political leaders were met as well as the ease of dismissing unfounded charges on the grounds of moral character and personal history.

The oratory speeches are littered with allegations of accepting bribes, particularly the speeches against Demosthenes, who violently opposed allying with the Macedonians against the

Persians. Such a point of view led to his rival orators, namely Aeschines and Dinarchus, accusing him of having taken bribes from the Persian king. This act is seen as a form of not only treason, but also cowardice. Aeschines tells Demosthenes (Against Ctesiphon 209):

ἃ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ βεβούλευσαι, πάντες ὁρῶμεν. Ἐκλιπὼν μὲν τὸ ἄστυ οὐκ οἰκεῖς,

ὡς δοκεῖς, ἐν Πειραιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐξορμεῖς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἐφόδια δὲ πεπόρισαι τῇ σαυτοῦ

ἀνανδρίᾳ τὸ βασιλικὸν χρυσίον καὶ τὰ δημόσια δωροδοκήματα.

For we all see what you have planned for yourself. Having left the upper city, you do not

dwell, as you seem, in Piraeus, but from the coast of the city, and you have provided for

your cowardice from gold from the king and the results of your bribery.

Thus, Demosthenes as a traitor to his polis is no true citizen, as Aeschines would have his audience believe. If Aeschines was alone in his accusations or generally considered unreliable as a source, it would be easy to dismiss such claims. Demosthenes spent a considerable amount of

185

energy trying to rouse the Athenians. Perhaps contemporary geopolitical affairs influenced the perception, and accusations, against Demosthenes, since at this point the Macedonians, a closer and suddenly very powerful militant force, had become a threat to the Greeks in Europe with a potent leader in the person of Philip II. These allegations had not been as severely levied against public officials since the time the Persians had invaded.483

Whether Demosthenes was guilty or he was simply accused by strongly antipathetic fellow citizens is unclear. What is clear is that later sources believed it, as shown by Diodorus’ claim that he received a considerable sum of money from the Persians to speak out against the

Macedonians (Diodorus 17. 4. 8; cf. Justin 11.2.7). This unwillingness to unite with the

Macedonians against the Persians does not in itself indicate that Demosthenes had been bought off by an ambiguous enemy. However, his contemporaries and later authors have leapt to that conclusion as though the one means the other. What Diodorus presents, however, is a set of suspicions. It is entirely possible that Aeschines merely cast aspersions on Demosthenes’ character in a tumultuous period as Usher suggests is characteristic of Aeschines’ speeches.484

Without delving too deeply into the implications of social distrust among the prominent figures in the citizen body of Athens, Persia’s interest in Demosthenes in particular and the politicians of Athens in general needs further consideration. For example, consider the accusation made against Demosthenes by the orator Dinarchus, who claims:

δεῖξον γὰρ δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς σὺ Δημόσθενες νυνί, ὡς τούτων τι τῶν ⌈ἁ⌉μαρτη⌈μά⌉των

483 Conover 2010, 19 notes that the most powerful Athenian politicians in the fifth and fourth centuries, including Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles, Cleon, Aeschines, and Demosthenes, had been accused of dorodokia and that most of these statesmen perceived this as in some way benefiting the democracy rather than harming it. 484 Usher 1999, 290-3.

186

ὅμοιόν ἐστι τοῖς σοῖς ἀδικήμασι, καὶ ὡς τὸ δῶρα λαμβάνειν κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος

συγγνώμης ἐστὶν ἄξιον, ὥστ' ἀποφύγοις ἂν παρὰ τούτοις εἰκότως. ἀλλ' οἱ νόμοι περὶ μὲν

τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικημάτων τῶν εἰς ἀργυρίου λόγον ἀνηκόντων διπλῆν τὴν βλάβην ὀφείλειν

κελεύουσι, περὶ δὲ τῶν δωροδοκούντων δύο μόνον τιμήματα πεποιήκασιν, ἢ θάνατον,

ἵνα ταύτης τυχὼν τῆς ζημίας ὁ λαβὼν παράδειγμα γένηται τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἢ δεκαπλοῦν τοῦ

ἐξ ἀρχῆς λήμματος τὸ τίμημα τῶν δώρων, ἵνα μὴ λυσιτελήσῃ τοῖς τοῦτο τολμῶσι ποιεῖν

(1.60).

Now, Demosthenes, show the jury that any of those crimes is equal to yours, and that to

take bribes against your state is a forgivable act, so that you might avoid the penalty for

them. But the laws, for other such crimes involving money, command a penalty of twice

the harm committed, but for bribery, they have set only two penalties: either death, in

order that the taker might become an example to others by receiving this punishment, or a

fine ten times the original sum, in order that he who perpetrated this crime might not gain

from it.

Dinarchus’ statement shows the impact and possible consequences of receiving a bribe within

Athens, regardless of the source. The constant accusations of their fellow (usually Athenian) citizens often without evidence or even grounds for suspicion reflects the personal vendettas of the accusers as well as the political agendas of various figures maneuvering rivals from positions of power.485 Note that he also discusses other pecuniary crimes, though fails to specify which ones, and the penalty for committing them. Bribery comes across as the greatest of these

485 Taylor 2001, 62-3.

187

offences with the possible ramification of capital punishment. Surely such a response would limit the appeal of this illicit money, Persian or otherwise. The loss of timia received severe penalty as discussed above, but only when prosecuted.

Persian interference through financial corruption appears in another form, the bribery of one or several poleis in order to achieve a Persian-beneficial goal. One key example of this form of bribery was the dispatch of Timocrates of Rhodes to bribe a set of poleis to wage war against

Sparta, thereby causing the Spartans to recall Agesilaus from Asia. Despite Perlman’s assertion that the Corinthian War would have happened without the delegation of Timocrates the Rhodian in 394/3,486 the events presented by Xenophon concur well enough with the conflicting version of the Oxyrhynchus historian that it cannot be disregarded in a discussion of Persia’s interference within Greece. The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia differs in its account of Corinth’s joining the alliance against Sparta, claiming instead that personal motives led to the decision to participate (2.3).

During this time, Agesilaus had led an army of predominantly Spartan troops into Asia with the stated goal of liberating the Greeks there. In this case, the motivation of the satrap, whether

Pharnabazus or Tithraustes, is clear. He wants security within his own borders by the removal of a foreign army causing havoc.487 Further, the Spartan army encountered a lack of enthusiasm from those they intended to save, and the lack of resources at their disposal within Asia including money and food. Where possible, Agesilaus attempted to meet with local aristocrats in order to persuade them to support his army and its cause, namely the liberation of the Greeks in Asia

486 Perlman 1964; See also Rung 2004, 414 -417 on the conflicting accounts of Timocrates’ mission. 487 Rung 2004, 422-423.

188

Minor. Xenophon’s account has Timocrates the Rhodian deployed to bribe the other Greek powers, especially Athens and Corinth, to declare war on Sparta in order to force Agesilaus to withdraw from Asia (Xenophon Hellenica 3.5).

Here is a clear case of apparent meddling and bribery to the direct benefit of the Persians.

Like Pausanias, Agesilaus had a sizable force at his command in Persian territory and had set his army to the task of liberating the Greeks there, attempting to convert and gain support locally as he did so. Unlike Pausanias, this Lacedaemonian king received no financial enticements to change his alliance or to withdraw. Instead his polis’ political enemies received Persian gold, although Xenophon claims Athens received none (Hellenica 3.5.2), demonstrating the superiority of Athens to all the other poleis visited by this diplomat. More to the point, this dispensing of Persian funds via the Rhodian diplomat allegedly forced Agesilaus’ withdrawal from Persian territory after the Spartan had exhausted the good-will of the satraps of Asia (cf.

Xenophon Hellenica 3.5.1; Plutarch Agesilaus 15; Plutarch Artaxerxes 20).

In each of the above cases, either a satrap or the Persian king stood to gain from the bribing of certain officials. Plutarch’s exonerative tales of the virtues of Themistocles and Cimon suggest perhaps that these two were considered threats to the western frontiers of the Persian empire, as can be seen through their military actions, particularly those of Cimon. Their incorruptibility exemplified the Greek virtue Plutarch often tried to promote in his biographies.

Later, Agesilaus would receive different treatment for a similar reason. In any case, the use of money to purchase a solution to a problem with the Greeks benefited the Persian empire, particularly on the western front. In other parts of the empire, it is difficult to determine the role

189

of financial corruption as customs varied and the Persians tended to promote a dependency relationship within its political hierarchy.

The conclusion arises that, although the Greek accusations of accepting bribes often relied on little more than what modern interpreters would consider hearsay, the exploitation of an individual’s venality and avarice simplified matters when used in response to a threat to the empire. While a satrap often borrowed royal authority to act in such a manner, they generally acted alone in removing a threat, or many threats, from their own territory. The employment of dorodokia was by no means the default or only Persian response to perceived threats to empire, but it proved an effective one, especially given the Greek perception of Persian wealth and luxury. The king himself tended to prioritize threats in other, more central regions, especially since the Persian foothold in Europe did not usually extend into Greece itself. The matter of how pressing of a concern the Greeks were to the Persian potentates reflects the degree of priority.

Accusations of bribery appear to have faded as the fifth century progressed, only to resurge after the Greek involvement in the revolt of Cyrus the Younger, an event which strongly impacted the stability of the northwestern satrapies and the king’s treatment of them.

3.2.4 Bribery of (gifts to) Ambassadors

In particular, diplomats and ambassadors were vulnerable to allegations of having received bribes. In this section, I discuss the tumultuous position of Greek ambassadors to the

Persian courts and the frequency of the purchasing of Greek loyalties. I also examine in brief the expectations towards Greek diplomats and the nature of guest-friendship. Claire Taylor remarks how the traditional gift exchange with ambassadors, especially those in Persia and Macedonia,

190

could easily be interpreted as treasonous or questionable due to the obligation ties owed by these particular Greeks to non-Greeks. Greek cooperation in non-Greek attempts to dominate the

Greek world would be considered what Taylor dramatically calls evil.488 Perlman contributes the following opinion of the state of embassies in the poleis:

...there was, then, no direct economic incentive to serve as an ambassador, and there was

always the risk of prosecution after the embassy… in spite of these difficulties and

dangers, there was no lack of candidates wishing to serve as ambassador. …the

accusations against ambassadors for bribery were not very frequent.489

Perlman’s statement of the lack of incentive may be incorrect but his assessment of the risks to an ambassador requires further consideration. Rather, allegations of bribery were almost exclusively reserved for envoys sent to the Persian King or the king of Macedon.490

Free Greeks did not accept bribes, but took spoils instead, or so Agesilaus claims

(Plutarch, Apophthegmata Laconica 214D 3). When it did occur or when suspicions of bribery were aroused, the guilty party would be condemned and persecuted. Demades describes the

Athenians’ attitude toward bribery, stating that

οὐχ ἡ δόσις τῶν χρημάτων λυπεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἡ πρᾶξις τοῦ λαμβάνοντος, ἐάν ἦι κατὰ τοῦ

συμφέροντος. (1.21).

488 Taylor 2001, 162. 489 Perlman 1976, 225. 490 Perlman 1976, 225.

191

The giving of the money does not offend, but the action of taking it, if it goes against our

cause.

In other words, it is not the offering or even the distribution of bribes that causes such a vehement response, merely the corruption of the recipient. The counter-image of the Persian perspective of embassies, bribery, and gift-giving is lacking through the material culture from the

Persian empire. As a result, this topic receives little attention from modern historians. Neither ancient nor modern critics scrutinize the satraps’ influence over the matter, nor their priorities during their negotiations with the ambassadors.

Clearly diplomats were prone to the accusation if not the reality of selling out the polis they represented in favor of the foreign power to which they paid respect. It is necessary to understand the anticipated role of a diplomat, and where the Greek envoys would stand within the satrapal or royal court. Demosthenes offers an alternate explanation of the response to cases of bribery by claiming:

ἀλλ' ὅτι τοὺς παρὰ τῶν ἄρχειν βουλομένων ἢ διαφθείρειν τὴν Ἑλλάδα χρήματα

λαμβάνοντας ἅπαντες ἐμίσουν, καὶ χαλεπώτατον ἦν τὸ δωροδοκοῦντ' ἐλεγχθῆναι, καὶ

τιμωρίᾳ μεγίστῃ τοῦτον ἐκόλαζον, καὶ παραίτησις οὐδεμί' ἦν οὐδὲ συγγνώμη.

(Demosthenes 9.37).

But since they hated all those who having taken money from those who wished to rule or

destroy Greece, and the worst thing possible is for bribes to have been taken, and they

punished this crime with the greatest penalties, and there was neither pardon nor

sympathy.

192

Demosthenes’ claims of a better day when persecution for bribery led to universal and unalterable condemnation of the accused seem unrealistic, especially in the case of diplomats.

What Demosthenes claims lends credence to later claims that accepting bribes diminishes a man’s masculinity and strips a Greek of his ethnic identity (cf. Plutarch Agesilaus 10.1). Since gifts to ambassadors of any nationality were traditional, even in Greece, a distinction between corruptive influence and a considerate host must be made. To refuse these offerings would risk insulting the host, especially for a Greek embassy to a non-Greek power such as Persia (cf.

Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.35-7). To the Persian receiving the embassy, such gifts would seem simply a matter of custom, although favoritism obviously occurred.

The embassies would frequently go to a satrapal court and return having secured or failed in accomplishing their goal. To return with the goal unattained would leave the envoys open to claims of betrayal and bribery. Even successful embassies were prone to claims of dorodokia depending on the political climate upon their return. The ramifications for such betrayal, if

Plutarch is to be believed, are exile from one’s home polis and the de- of an individual regardless of whether the king showed him favor or not, as occurs in the case of

Timagoras (Plutarch Pelopidas 30; Athenaeus 6.251b). Demosthenes makes accusations against

Callias, for whom the alleged peace in 450/449 is named, accusations which are repeated in

Aristophanes’ Frogs (Demosthenes 19.273; Aristophanes Frogs 432-433). Demosthenes himself faced similar accusations (Aeschines 3.156; Diodorus. 17.4.8). Justin provides the strongest accusations in the case of Demosthenes having corrupted the Spartans and Athenians on the

Persians’ behalf against Alexander (9.2.7). In his Panegyricus, Isocrates contrasts the cowardice

193

of the ambassadors accepting gifts from Persia as opposed to the valiant ancestors who proved incorruptible by facing down the grand invasion of Xerxes’ vast army (4.94).

Ambassadors and embassies were thus quite vulnerable to allegations of having taken bribes and thus betraying their polis. Taylor remarks how the traditional gift exchange with ambassadors, especially those in Persia and Macedonia, could easily be interpreted as treasonous or questionable due to the obligation ties owed by these particular Greeks to non-Greeks. She further points out that the approval of an embassy depends on its success.491 After all, if an embassy should fail, it would be quite simple to lay the blame on corrupt envoys rather than rejection from the leaders of other states. Yet the constant suspicion of bribery does not necessarily reflect the character of the chosen ambassadors so much as that of the Greeks overall.492

A chief example of an ambassador persecuted for bribery is the case of Timagoras, whom the Athenians executed for accepting Persian gifts. When Artaxerxes favored the Theban ambassador, Pelopidas, instead, the other ambassadors, from Sparta and Athens, were sent home in disgrace (Plutarch Pelopidas 30). Plutarch recounts the circumstances of Timagoras’ execution as follows:

Τιμαγόραν γοῦν Ἀθηναῖοι κρίναντες ἀπέκτειναν, εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ πλήθει τῶν δωρεῶν,

ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως· οὐ γὰρ μόνον χρυσίον οὐδ' ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κλίνην

491 Taylor 2001, 163. 492 Cf. Taylor 2001’s argument on the prevalence of suspicion and tolerance of bribes particularly in Athens; See Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1989 on the tradition of gifts to foreigners as well as Persian residents among the Persians.

194

πολυτελῆ καὶ στρώτας θεράποντας, ὡς τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὐκ ἐπισταμένων, ἔτι δὲ βοῦς

ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ βουκόλους, ὡς δὴ πρὸς ἀρρωστίαν τινὰ γάλακτος βοείου δεόμενος.

τέλος δὲ κατέβαινεν ἐπὶ θάλασσαν ἐν φορείῳ κομιζόμενος, καὶ τέσσαρα τάλαντα τοῖς

κομίζουσι μισθὸς ἐδόθη παρὰ βασιλέως. ἀλλ' ἔοικεν οὐχ ἡ δωροδοκία μάλιστα

παροξῦναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους· Ἐπικράτους γοῦν ποτε τοῦ σακεσφόρου, μήτ' ἀρνουμένου

δῶρα δέξατῶν … ὅπως λαμβάνοντες εὐπορῶσιν, ἐγέλασεν ὁ δῆμος· (Plutarch Pelopidas

30; cf. Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.38).

The Athenians decided to kill Timagoras, if [they did so] due to the plenitude of gifts,

rightly and justly. For he took not only silver and gold, but also a costly couch, and an

attendant bed-maker, since the Greeks do not know the skill, and eighty cattle and cattle-

tenders, since he had some sickness in want of the cow’s milk. And finally, he was

carried down to the sea on a litter, and had a gift of four talents for his bearers given to

him by the king. But it seems not the gift taking that offended the Athenians most.

Epicrates, his shield-bearer, confessing to having received gifts… and in that way, taking

[Persian gifts] they would be wealthy. But the people laughed.

As Plutarch states, it is not the acceptance of the gifts that ended Timagoras. It is his failure to secure an alliance or treaty with the Persians for the Athenians. Obviously, Plutarch has read

Demosthenes 19, which recounts a rumor that Timagoras took bribes (136-137). Athenaeus tells

195

the tale in a slightly different light, claiming it is not the acceptance of bribes at all, but the act of proskynesis493 that led to the demise of Timagoras (Athenaeus 6.251B).

Corruption, or a ritual that may have appeared very similar to the act of supplication to the Greeks, or failure led to the execution of an elected representative who had been entrusted with the Athenians’ foreign political aims. Moreover, previous diplomats had been praised for engaging in similar behaviors while in the Persian courts, demonstrating inconsistency not on the part of the Persians receiving the diplomats or granting gifts but on behalf of the Athenians themselves. For the Persian audience, the act of submission would seem much more significant than the use of money and gifts to corrupt a foreign ambassador. Establishing dominance and loyalty to the empire, while allowing Timagoras to become dependent on his host, meets with the apparent satrapal goal of expanding the empire’s influence abroad.

Xenophon’s version of the tale has the promotion of the Theban hegemony in Greece as the ultimate result of this particular embassy, a circumstance with no place on the Athenian agenda. Timagoras’ co-ambassador, Leon, charged him with corruption because he consulted with Pelopidas, the Theban (Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.33-38).494 Following all these versions of events shows that the Greeks perceived accepting and indulging in Persian gifts while abroad representing Athens as a sign of corruption and a lack of character on Timagoras’ part. Plutarch’s remark above of “as if the Greeks did not know how” to make a bed lends credence to the idea of insult to the Athenians in behaving in this way. It is unclear whether this insult refers to a

493 Rather than financial corruption, this action would indicate a submission to the Persian king as the ultimate authority thereby rendering Timagoras a subject of Persia rather than an Athenian ambassador to the king. 494 Cf. Tuplin 2007, 196.

196

connection between sexual favors and politics or simply a criticism of Persian indulgence in luxury. Regardless of which author’s version is correct, the message is clear: Timagoras’ embassy to the Persian court in 367 BCE failed. Therefore, the Athenians executed him as a traitor.

In contrast to Timagoras, Alcibiades, whose treachery has been made notorious by his contemporary and later critics, represented the Spartans in Persia at the court of the satrap

Tissaphernes in 411. Thucydides, who admittedly demonstrates a strong bias against Alcibiades to the extent that he describes how corrupt this character was (6.15), claims that Tissaphernes favored Alcibiades so strongly that he took him hunting, showered him with gifts, and followed his advice in every aspect of his governing (Thucydides 8.45). Thucydides also claims that

Alcibiades told Tissaphernes to bribe Greek leaders in order to obtain their cooperation

(8.45). Considering that Alcibiades’ mission was allegedly to support Sparta’s pursuit of Persian financial support for the Peloponnesian War, such advice would be inappropriate and construed as treasonous. His turncoat behavior in this instance demonstrates both Thucydides’ knowledge of the outcome of the Ionian War and the corrupt behavior that Athenians suspected their ambassadors indulged in while abroad. Despite the obvious misrepresentation of his mission’s interests, Alcibiades never faced accusations of having received bribes, unlike Timagoras.

The issue of betrayal and corruption required no apparent investigation within Athens.

The gifts provided sufficient evidence for a condemnation and for the execution of one of the most prominent Athenian citizens of the 360s. Reputation, a redeeming factor in some instances,

197

did not affect the decision. A second example that demonstrates the suspicion and vulnerability of an embassy sent abroad to Persia is that of Epicrates:

καίτοι τίνα χρὴ ἐλπίδα ἔχειν σωτηρίας, ὁπόταν ἐν χρήμασιν ᾖ καὶ σωθῆναι τῇ πόλει καὶ

μή, ταῦτα δὲ οὗτοι, φύλακες ὑφ' ὑμῶν καταστάντες, οἱ τῶν ἀδικούντων κολασταί,

κλέπτωσί τε καὶ καταδωροδοκῶσι; καὶ οὐ νῦν πρῶτον ὤφθησαν ἀδικοῦντες, κλέπτωσί τε

καὶ καταδωροδοκῶσι; καὶ οὐ νῦν πρῶτον ὤφθησαν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότερον ἤδη

δώρων ἐκρίθησαν. <ὃ> καὶ ὑμῖν ἔχω ἐπικαλέσαι ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀδικήματος †

Ὀνομάσαντος † μὲν κατεψηφίσασθε, τούτου δὲ ἀπεψηφίσασθε, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς

ἁπάντων κατηγοροῦντος καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν καταμαρτυρούντων, οἳ οὐχ ἑτέρων ἤκουσαν,

ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ ἦσαν οἱ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων καὶ τῶν δώρων πρὸς τούτους πράττοντες (Lysias

27.3-5.1).

And what hope of safety do we have, whenever the safety of the city depends on money,

but those guards set by you, those punishers of wrongdoers, who both steal and betray the

city in return for bribes? And I would accuse you since you voted against the criminal

Onomas, but you acquit this same man who is accused, you heard both all those charges

and others against you, but they are those who acting on these things, on account of

money and gifts.

Lysias’ description condemns the entire embassy as well as the original accuser for committing such a horrendous crime against Athens and indicates that by accepting these bribes, the envoys were stealing from the Athenian people themselves. The criminal indictment of theft as well as bribery is difficult to disprove or demonstrate as nothing has been removed from the Athenian

198

coffers and the courts of Artaxerxes were beyond Athenian jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the concept of the dorodokos as a thief echoes through other representations of Epicrates, whose gains abroad were perceived as pure profit (Plato Comicus Fr. 119.2K; 120K; 121K; Hellenica

Oxyrhynchia 2.2-5).495

Claims of bribery occur in anecdotal accounts of Athenaeus which state that the result of bribery was Epicrates’ declaration that rather than nine annual archons, the Athenians should elect nine envoys to the Persian courts annually. Athenaeus credits such a statement as evidence of corruption and wonders why the Athenians would execute Timagoras but not Epicrates for such corruption (6.251). Then again, since Epicrates was sent to Persia in 393, when Conon was filtering Persian funds into the to refortify the polis, his diplomatic mission and enjoyment of Persian bribes (whether true or false) would likely have been less of a betrayal than performing proskynesis496 in 367. Timagoras’ diplomatic mission required success for

Athens to maintain whatever standing remained after the failure of the Second Athenian League.

Epicrates was in a less dire, Persian-dependent situation.

Such behavior and distrust of the very citizens chosen to represent a polis rendered the appointment of presbeis risky at best. It would seem reasonable for there to be a shortage of volunteers for such a tumultuous honor. However, Lewis points out that Herodotus makes only six references497 to the possibility of the Spartans having been bribed in matters of foreign

495 Connover 2010, 16-18; cf. Occhipinti 2016, 99. 496 See Miller 1997, 126 for a description of proskynesis and a discussion of hospitality. 497 These occur at: 3.148; 5.51.2; 6.50.2; 6.72; 6.82.1; and 8.5.1.

199

policy,498 which is peculiar in light of Agesilaus’ claim of real men not accepting bribes. The observation offered by Lewis is that as Sparta moved to the outside world opportunities to make money from bribes arose.499 Xenophon also complains of the Spartans’ eagerness for overseas service in the fourth century (Xenophon Lacedaemonian Polity 14.4-7). Here, unlike the rest of his Spartan work, his tone changes from admiration to exasperation, leading to discussion as to whether Xenophon wrote it at all.500Although Sparta’s embassies to Persia may have been less discussed than those of Athens, such behaviors suggest that the image of Persian wealth and the ideal of liberating the Greeks in Asia Minor struck a chord with more than just the Athenians and

Thebans. The response suggests a loss of freedom and identity.

From the other perspective, for the Persians to attempt to buy off the Greeks seems reasonable. Persian exchange of gifts was marked by inequality, with the King giving more than anyone else, thereby keeping the recipients in his debt.501 This system could be seen as indenture; however, it served more like a return on an investment through the establishment of a dependency relationship between the Greek ambassadors and the Persian potentate. Moreover,

Persian exchange depended largely on the display of these material objects rather than the

Greeks tradition of exchanging favors.502 Instead the object of value demonstrated the recipient’s

498 Lewis 1977, 33. 499 Lewis 1977, 33. 500See Humble 2004, 217-220 for a discussion of the arguments against the composition and date of this chapter, although Humble concludes that Xenophon most likely wrote it, and did so as he composed the rest of the Lacedaemonian Polity it based on the writing style and the chapter’s position in the work. 501 Mitchell 1997, 113. 502 Mitchell 1997, 132-3.

200

status and influence at the court.503 As a result, the security of the empire could be ensured temporarily through such means.

Even if the Persians were not the cowards the Greek authors would have readers believe it is much easier to purchase a victory than to waste resources fighting, even though Persia had such vast resources at its disposal. Greek motives for accepting bribes despite the legal and political ramifications of doing so also seem clear. What does not fit, however, is that Greek individuals would accept bribes to betray their country under no immediate threat. If the Persians are the ultimate Panhellenic enemy, taking their gifts is a betrayal to all of Greece, not just one’s polis.504 If they were a weak race of effeminate dandies, accepting their bribes rather than fighting them, or entertaining their bribes not to fight them, is demeaning as the Greeks understood it, since in this case the loss of their freedom included the voluntary cessation of their

Hellenic identity. The conclusion that emerges from considering bribery of both politicians and ambassadors from the Athenian-dominated Greek perspective is that sheer avarice motivated the reception of such gifts and suspicions of corruption by the Persians. Yet the Greeks say nothing to indicate the Persians’ intent for bribing.

On the other hand, very little of the extant Persian documents indicate the donation of great amount of silver or gold in order to dissuade an ambassador. What remains through inscriptions suggests that all foreign guests received similar gifts as a form of welcome.

Favorites, as chosen by the potentates, may have received extra privileges and goods.

503 Mitchell 1997, 113. 504 Cf. Herodotus 6.34

201

Entertainment followed the reception of an important set of guests such as an embassy.505 Such sources and their silence make the motivation for giving bribes difficult to discern in many cases.

Questions remain, such as: why would a satrap bribe an ambassador who visited his court and failed to accomplish his mission, such as Timagoras?

Using bribery to achieve a diplomatic goal seems counter-intuitive even though gift- giving was customary and characteristic. Persia would derive no benefit from bribing an envoy to its courts since it suffered no major defeats at Greek hands in its own territory, and had no apparent reason to seek an alliance or truce with the Greeks even at the height of the Delian

League’s actions. Moreover, should an embassy’s mission run counter to the court in question’s interests, the host had the option of dismissing the envoys and refusing future representatives regarding that purpose. This occurred in 392, when representatives from Sparta and Athens were each turned away since Persia had no interest in interceding in the Corinthian War it had allegedly started (Xenophon Hellenica 4.8.14). Moreover, Artaxerxes II replaced three of the western satraps in the 390s. These actions suggest internal discord within the Persian governing body. If this was the case, these Persian problems would have superseded any interest in Greek affairs as well as interest in financing either side of the Peloponnesian War. After the revolt of

Cyrus the Younger, the western frontier received more royal attention.

Yet the interest in the Greeks remained, although inconstant and inconsistent. To bribe an ambassador away from his original goal on behalf of his polis, according to the Athenians, was a

505 Miller 1997, 122-124.

202

typical corruptive form of Persian behavior. From the evidence available, lavish gifts as they seemed to the Greeks served little purpose other than to honor the recipient in the Persian perspective. The intent was twofold: to bind the guests to xenia and to welcome them to the court. As Briant argues, little gain could be available to the Persians in bribing the embassies, and the Persian king rarely would act against his own interest in favor of someone else. Perhaps the Greeks have mistaken favoritism and celebration, traditionally reserved for an occasion as important as receiving an envoy, for corruption and bribery,506 especially since evidence to the contrary appears dubious: there is a lack of inscriptions from Persia, and the Greeks testify to these occurrences often in the form of flimsy accusations, as those discussed above.

Inconsistency comes from the Greek side, rather than the Persians, as far as the use of bribery is concerned. It is nearly impossible to distinguish the true cases of bribery, either of individuals or of ambassadors, especially as trade grew between the two regions. The donor of the gift or bribe never seems to be held accountable for doing so, nor considered corrupt or corruptive. Claims of a pleasant reception, ample gifts, and favor from the Persian courts met with two extreme responses: jubilation or loathing. Expedience played a role in the likelihood of the Persians offering a bribe, since money proved an effective way to resolve a potential conflict temporarily. However, other motives should be accounted for, such as prioritizing conflicts, removal of threats, and misinterpretation of favoritism. Since the Greeks often did not take into account motivation or even likelihood of the alleged donor to bribe the accused, it became an effective way to discredit a political enemy in Athens, with few questions regarding how realistic

506 Briant 2009.

203

such allegations could be. The consequences including loss of life, home, and even Hellenic identity, proved a very convenient means to remove a powerful citizen from Athens.

3.3 Mercenaries

Another set of people particularly vulnerable to allegations of corruption and loss of their

Greek identity through purchase was mercenaries. These people bore several names among which are misthophouroi, xenoi, stratiotes, and epikouroi.507 For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to mercenaries with the more accurate and common term of misthophouroi (pay-bearers) to avoid the ambiguity of the other applicable terminology. There is no reason to assume that the empire was overly dependent on hired mercenaries, and incapable of raising an army throughout its existence. Satrapal armies existed as well as the Royal Army, although infrequent and routine needs were often fulfilled by mercenaries during empire’s formative phase.508

These soldiers hold an ambiguous status in historical texts. Xenophon, for instance, gives his firsthand account of life accompanying a troop of mercenaries under Clearchus, who in turn was employed by the Persian prince, Cyrus the Younger, who tried to usurp his brother’s throne and died doing so in 401. However, the employment of Greek mercenary armies in Persia is hardly new to the fourth century. Greek mercenaries are often considered essential to the spreading of the Greek culture in places far from home.509 Greek mercenary armies appear as early as the ninth century BCE in the form of the Carians summoned by the king of Jerusalem (2

507 See Trundle 2004, 10-21 for a detailed explanation of the difference between terms and the shift from the one to the other. 508 Kuhrt 2014, 120. 509 Roy 1967; McMullin 2001; Knapp 2002; Trundle 2004; Trundle 2005; Luraghi 2006.

204

Kings 11.4, 19). The Ionians even attempted to hire the Spartan army for their revolt against

Persia. Herodotus tells of the mercenaries hired in Egypt and Phoenicia, although not exclusively

Greek armies, indicating how common the practice of military services for hire would seem to the inhabitants of the Mediterranean. He also establishes the longevity of the tradition of eastern employment of Greek mercenaries, usually by local leaders and satraps rather than the king of the Persian empire.

The incentives for a soldier to turn mercenary are generally assumed to be poverty, the ambiguous socio-economic position of a soldier after war, and the economic crisis that rose following a conflict, especially after the Peloponnesian War. As Nino Luraghi points out, there is no reason at all to assume mercenaries came exclusively from the upper or middle classes.

Inherited armor could undergo repairs or be replaced by a soldier willing to invest in the tools of the trade. Often a soldier would acquire newer, more expensive equipment as booty of war.510 It is the emphasis placed on officers, especially generals by authors such as Xenophon, who have lent credibility to the assumption of a lack of poor mercenary soldiers.511

Hiring Greek mercenaries in the ancient Mediterranean had a longstanding tradition, seen early and referred to in the Old Testament, Herodotus, and Homer. It is clear that the Greeks became accustomed to fighting for pay for a cause not their own under the Persian thumb. The payment received would vary, and often first and second instalments would be paid but later ones would be delayed or withheld once the initial enthusiasm wavered. A trained army foreign

510 Luraghi 2006, 24. 511 Roy 1967, 284.

205

to the land it is occupying would have little reason to remain loyal to a patron who refused to pay. If the pay fluctuated too greatly, the satisfaction of the mercenaries certainly would as well.

The misthophouroi could expect to be treated as though they had been purchased permanently by their temporary employers, despite the inconsistency of pay. The surge in mercenary armies from

Greece after the fall of the Athenian empire suggests that little difference in status between a misthophouros and an ordinary Greek citizen would exist in pro-Spartan poleis.

Like the ambassadors, mercenaries would often be far from their native poleis for a prolonged period, sometimes settling in places discovered during their employment. Xenophon recounts the mercenary army employed by Mania in . Mania used her army to expand her territory, demonstrating the gain to her personally and politically through employing non-Persian soldiers. As she watched her army attack other fortresses, she would denote soldiers who performed exceptionally well in battle and reward them generously, offering great incentives to remain loyal to the rare female sub-satrap (Xenophon Hellenica 3.1.13). The mercenary officer’s note of Mania’s generosity accompanies his description of her relationship to Pharnabazus, claiming that the satrap received taxes as irregularly as he had with any other subordinate.

However, Mania would give generous gifts to all callers at her court, Persian or otherwise

(Xenophon Hellenica 3.1.12-14). Perhaps it is Mania’s more vulnerable position as a sub-satrap, and a woman, that led her to be so generous with her soldiers as well as her favorites. Even in the form of payment for services rendered, gift giving demonstrated power over subjects and employees inside Persian courts, while appeasing those whose support was necessary to maintain her position.

206

In contrast with Mania’s misthophouroi, other Greek mercenaries would often go unpaid despite their contracts with their patrons, as Xenophon reports (Anabasis 1.3.1), and the payment of the soldiers would heavily influence their loyalties, as it should. When they were paid, it would be with satrapal coinage, limiting its use and marking the mercenaries’ venality. Yet the

Persian use of Greek mercenaries to accomplish their own ends is well documented. The second son of King Darius II, Cyrus the Younger, declared war on his brother, Artaxerxes II, with an army of Greeks at his back. Upon Cyrus’ death at Cunaxa in 401, his army of Greek soldiers was at a loss as to what to do or whom they should follow due to their patron’s demise (Xenophon

Anabasis 2.1.1). Here the loss of their patron resulted not only in the loss of their pay, but also the loss of their purpose.

Cyrus hired the Ten Thousand for a specific reason to serve his specific end, namely that of usurping his brother’s throne with his mother’s support if Xenophon is to be believed

(Anabasis 1.1.6). For such a purpose, Cyrus had to rely on troops who had no loyalty to the incumbent king of Persia such as the Greeks whose domain was so close to his own, and the

Milesians who revolted in support of Cyrus, demonstrating Greek support for his cause was not limited to his misthophouroi. His bodyguards already held a sizable Arcadian contingent. He had been made satrap of Phrygia, a satrapy traditionally associated with the Greeks. Clearchus, who commanded an army of 2000, spent his exile from Sparta in the company of Cyrus developing the Chersonese as a base of operations (Xenophon Anabasis 2.6.4-5). Taking into account such proximity and the resources at Cyrus’ disposal as well as the secrecy of his mission, the amassing of a total of ten thousand becomes much more conceivable.

207

The motivation of the armies under Cyrus with no stake in the Persian throne seems simple to understand. Cyrus promised great rewards for their service to him. The spoils of conquered armies from great victories would be enticing. Examples include the attempt to buy off the loyalty of Antiochus, whom Xenophon extolls for declining the sumptuous gifts of the

Persians and who reported back to the Ten Thousand the nature of the goods offered

(Demosthenes 19.31, 37, 191; Plutarch Artaxerxes 22).512 Actions such as these suggest that the

Greek mercenary armies formed a loose among themselves, maintaining a separate community within the larger mercenary force.513 Despite this separate community, Xenophon portrays a notable sense of dislocation and loss of identity throughout the Anabasis, suggesting that the mercenary force surrendered more than they had intended.514

The increasing importance of the misthophouroi to the maintenance of Persia’s borders as the fourth century progressed emphasized the mounting instability of the satrapal system under the Persian king. The reliance on Greek mercenaries for conflicts, usually internal Persian ones after the death of Cyrus the Younger, in the western part of the empire demonstrates also the lack of trust of local forces and governors. Artaxerxes III’s decree of 358 granting use of a standing

512 Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.38: ὁ δὲ Ἀντίοχος, ὅτι ἠλαττοῦτο τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν, οὔτε τὰ δῶρα ἐδέξατο ἀπήγγειλέ τε πρὸς τοὺς μυρίους ὡς βασιλεὺς ἀρτοκόπους μὲν καὶ ὀψοποιοὺς καὶ οἰνοχόους καὶ θυρωροὺς πεμπλήθεις ἔχοι, ἄνδρας δὲ οἳ μάχοιντ' ἂν Ἕλλησι πάνυ ζητῶν οὐκ [ἂν] ἔφη δύνασθαι ἰδεῖν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὸ τῶν χρημάτων πλῆθος ἀλαζονείαν οἷ γε δοκεῖν ἔφη εἶναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν ὑμνουμένην ἂν χρυσῆν πλάτανον οὐχ ἱκανὴν ἔφη εἶναι τέττιγι σκιὰν παρέχειν.ἔφη εἶναι τέττιγι σκιὰν παρέχειν. Antiochus, since the Arcadian federation was depreciated, did not receive royal gifts and reported to the Ten Thousand that the king had bakers, cooks, wine-pourers, and old porters, but that he did not see any men who could fight the Greeks in any way, although he had looked. He told them that he thought he king’s wealth and money was a ruse, since even the famed golden plane tree was not sufficient to provide shelter for a grasshopper. 513 English 2012, 63-7. 514 Ma 2010, 339.

208

Greek force in the western satrapies demonstrates the importance of these mercenaries. The satrapies also acknowledged the role of these mercenaries in service of the empire.515

A series of revolts against the Persian king from satraps to the west including Egypt,

Phrygia, Caria, and Mysia resulted in an alliance against the king (Diodorus. 15.90.3) (See

1.1.4). The response to these concurrent revolts was to hire non-Persian troops, as benefited the empire, with no loyalties to the satraps in questions but who had experience in battle. Rather than allow this series of revolts to run its course, thereby breaking off a significant chunk of the western empire, the king was forced to respond.516 The damage to his property and the damage to his authority due to the revolts of his subordinates could not remain unpunished. Weiskopf specifically rejects the idea of direct royal involvement in these revolts, claiming that the reports of Datames’ revolt had been greatly exaggerated.517 Even still, the fiscal blow of his satraps, one of his chief sources of income, revolting in concert would be crippling. It may not have halved the king’s income as Diodorus says, but there would be a significant decline in provincial income should a significant portion of Asia separate from the empire (Diodorus 15.90.4).518 Another possible reason to give credit for the king’s active participation in response to the revolt is the potential of a new Cyrus rising from within the empire.519 Such campaigns weakened

515 Marinovich 1998, 118. 516 Stylianou 1998, 533 notes that prior to the rebellions, the king broke up the excessively large satrapy once held by Tiribazus, redistributing the territory in the name of stability and avoiding the rise of a second Cyrus. This idea suggests that the king’s attention turned warily westward following Cyrus’ revolt, and the northwest coast became less stable, either as a result of the earlier revolt or as a response to it. 517 Weiskopf 1989, 60-1. 518 Stylianou 1998, 537 suggests that the assumption that the great king was less wealthy than the Greeks imagined, and the coinage economy on the coastal area misled Polycleitus (FGrH 128 F3)’s as well as Diodorus’ understanding of the tribute system of the empire. 519 Weiskopf 1989, 64.

209

Artaxerxes’ control of the empire, ostensibly demonstrating the diminishing authority of the king to his subjects and potentially weakening the security of the empire.520

Artaxerxes also paid for his soldiers, when the Egyptians revolted against him in

350/349, and returned their loyalties to their respective homelands once the fighting had ceased

(Diodorus 16.51.3). Before that, Greek armies were summoned to Persian aid during the satrapal revolts of the late 370s and intermittently through the 360s. Xenophon would have his audience believe that the Greeks were simply superior soldiers and it was more convenient to bring on foreign armies to deal with Persia’s civil discord (Hellenica 3.4; Anabasis 3.20-22).521 However, the Persians had several of their own armies, including the royal army. Persian inferiority fails as an explanation for the decision to purchase Greek armies during times of civil strife.

The treatment of Greek mercenaries who fought in the satrapal armies against Alexander seems similar to that received by their predecessors. During Alexander’s conquest of the Persian empire, it became common for Greek military leaders to flee Greece and fight for the Persians against Alexander. The potential to rise in influence and wealth under Persian patronage522 likely augmented the decision to do so. While there, their position relied heavily on Persian success, since the treatment offered to survivors who fought Alexander was undesirable. Arrian claims that following the Battle of Granicus:

ἔθαψε δὲ καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους Ἕλληνας, οἳ ξὺν τοῖς πολεμίοις στρατεύοντες ἀπέθανον· ὅσους δὲ αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους ἔλαβε, τούτους δὲ δήσας ἐν πέδαις εἰς Μακεδονίαν

520 See also Moysey 1991, 120-121. 521 Cf. Briant 2002, 783 on the “Greek Thesis” concerning the alleged superiority of Greek soldiers. 522 Trundle 2005, 78.

210

ἀπέπεμψεν ἐργάζεσθαι, ὅτι παρὰ τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα τοῖς Ἕλλησιν Ἕλληνες ὄντες ἐναντία τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὲρ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐμάχοντο. (Arrian 1.16.6)

He also buried the Greek mercenaries, who died fighting with the enemy; those of them whom he took as prisoners he sent bound in fetters to work as slaves to Macedonia, since it seemed to the Greeks that they, being Greek alike, fought against Greece on behalf of the barbarians.

The price for failure against Alexander’s forces, not necessarily made clear elsewhere, was steep.

In this instance, the value of an individual’s freedom as well as his Hellenic identity depended on his success in battle. The dead may have received proper burial rites, as did the Persians. The living, however, faced condemnation for betraying the Greeks and their cause.

Nevertheless, the possible rewards for mercenary service must have outweighed the potential consequences for some. The example of the career of Memnon of Rhodes set an enviable precedent. Memnon, however, straddled the boundary between Greek and Persian.

Politically, he could be considered both. He left Rhodes in early 350s when his sister was married to Artabazus, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (Diodorus 16.52.4) following a failed revolt in the 350s. He also had ties to Athens through Second Athenian League (RO 98). As a result, he was able to exploit both. For instance, he used his Athenian connections to supplement his forces, and foment resistance to the growing threat of Macedon.523 At the same time, he was paired with his brother, Mentor, in support of Persian forces. Together, they respectively reached the pinnacles of success in the 340s and 330s. Mentor’s success in Egypt (Diodorus 15.45.1) led to the royal promotion of his career (15.52.1), to the extent that he used his influence to restore

523 Rop 2013, 239.

211

Memnon and Artabazus and recall them from exile (16.50.7).524 Memnon, as a result of his own military prowess, his brother’s influence as a mercenary leader and royal favorite, and his relationship with Artabazus, held a position of trust to the highest ranking Persians officials. This role is seen in his service to Artabazus in Hellespontine Phrygia (Diodorus 16.52.4) and the selection of Memnon as one of his commanders against Alexander’s invasion. Diodorus claims that Darius III placed 5000 soldiers under the Rhodian’s command to regain Cyzicus, where

Memnon broke the Macedonian siege (Diodorus 17.7.3-9) and that Memnon faced the

Macedonians at Granicus, leading prominently along with the satraps (Diodorus 17.19.5; Arrian

1.12.8-16.7). It was further Memnon’s decision to withdraw to Miletus (Diodorus 17.22), demonstrating his influence in significant military decisions.

Although Rop notes that Memnon was far from the only Greek leader serving Darius III against Alexander, and the value attributed to Memnon and other Greek mercenaries overrated,525 the mercenary leader was renowned for his military strategy and creativity. Despite the depiction by Diodorus, Arrian, Justin, and Polyaenus, it seems unlikely that Memnon was the only general on the Persian side capable of matching Alexander’s military genius,526 or the empire should have fallen shortly after his death in 333. Polyaenus in particular presents

Memnon’s strategies as brilliant. For instance, he attacked Magnesia during mealtime, and thereby caught his enemy unaware (Polyaenus 44.4). At the Bosporus, he planted a false traitor, who claimed to defect to the Macedonians, leaving a spy in their midst (Polyaenus 44.2). He also

524 Trundle 2005, 158. 525 Rop 2013, 5, 13. 526 Rop 2013, 93-6.

212

tricked the Macedonians by putting his army in Macedonian caps, making it seem as though they were allies (Polyaenus 44.5). Diodorus also credits Memnon with profound insight. Memnon advocated not fighting pitched battle against Alexander, and suggested they strip the land to prevent Macedonian advancement, send naval and land forces to Macedonia to transfer impact of war to Europe (Diodorus 17.18.2). While this advice was apparently rejected as lacking in proper

Persian dignity, it demonstrates the intelligence which Memnon seems to have possessed. Rop claims that Memnon was credited as the best commander since there was no one else to accredit for any Persian success.527

There are other explanations for Memnon’s success under Darius. Ian Worthington notes that the last days of the career of Memnon were fortuitous. As a representative of the empire, he faced Alexander in place of Orontobantes, satrap of Anatolia. He seemed to be in charge of the

Persian fleet and the defense of Asia Minor at Halicarnassus (Diodorus 17.23.4; Arrian 1.20.2-

23.5). He set fire to defense equipment and houses before fleeing Alexander’s forces at

Halicarnassus (Diodorus 17.27.5-7). Afterward, he gathered a Persian fleet at Cos and won back

Chios in the Aegean by 333. He died laying siege to Mytilene on Lesbos to be succeeded by his nephew, Pharnabazus, as leader of mercenaries under Darius (Diodorus 17.31.3; Arrian 2.1.1-

3).528 His advice and role seem more literary creation than historical reality,529 since luck features heavily in many of his strategies. Further, it seems unlikely for a Greek mercenary leader to have

527 Rop 2013, 106. 528 Worthington 2014, 82-89. 529 Rop 2013, 103.

213

been invited to a meeting of satraps directly advising the king, regardless of the territory or forces under his command.530

The Persians certainly seemed aware of how inconstant the Greek mercenaries’ loyalty could be yet payment fluctuated unpredictably. In the case of Cyrus’ rebels, financial resources fluctuated since the rebelling prince’s main source of income was his Persian supporters. Cyrus’ revolt and his collection of supporters demonstrate a weakening of the central authority within the Persian empire. The king’s own brother, supported by their mother, raising money and support throughout the empire was a viable threat to the royal claim to absolute authority. The use of money to influence affairs, to promote an individual leader’s affairs, and to stabilize internal conflicts factored into the Persian decisions to employ the Greeks.

3.4 Conclusion

The question of the Greeks’ perception of their own venality tied to a sense of betrayal and corruption perhaps should now be set aside to consider the overall benefit to the Persians, whose continued interest and conveyance of fiduciary or other forms of gifts instead of a direct overt influence in Greek affairs poses several questions. The Persians surely derived some benefit from purchasing the Greek loyalties, and rewarding the services to the Persian Empire, though exactly what this would be remains uncertain. Had the cost of accepting Persian gold covertly from powerful individuals served as an effective deterrent to accepting the financial

530 Briant 2002, 822-3.

214

gains available to these individuals, the instances discussed above would likely have been less conspicuous. Yet it seems unlikely that the orators present an accurate image of the frequency of external corruption.

Many look to the obvious reason for bribery: expedience.531 Yet such an approach falls short by failing to consider why it would matter to the Persian king or the satraps whether a few politicians or diplomats outside his sphere of influence decided to promote Persian interests.

Persia had access to most of the Greeks’ resources through trade and diplomatic relations.

Moreover, the empire contained more fertile lands abundant with resources that exceeded what was readily available in Greece. Skilled Greeks, such as physicians, artisans, and poets, looking to expand their horizons were well received in the Persian courts, allowing the Persians access to the Greek techniques, trades, and writings. The Persians ultimately lack any strong motivation for seizing Greece either overtly or through the more subtle and manipulative means discussed here. What has been shown is that despite the image of luxury, weakness, and emasculation within Persia, the Greeks were desirous, perhaps even envious, of the fortunes available. When offered a sampling of this perceived luxury, temptation proved difficult for many individuals to resist. As a result, it became nearly as much of a trope to have spurned such overtures as it did to accuse others of accepting them. The suspicions on the envoys reflect the conflicting attitudes.

531 Conover 2010, 39, 119; Taylor 2001, 62; Perlman 1964, 64.

215

Perhaps the fear that exposure to Persia’s customs motivated some of the accusations and contemporary depictions of corruption as a result of playing the Persian. However, these actions only occur when it benefited the Persian Empire. As the empire became less stable, the purchase of Greek services became more common, especially for services on the western coast.

216

Chapter Four: Diplomacy, Peace, and Division

Treaties, peaces, and other such agreements can be an effective form of political manipulation. Each side is expected to make concessions, though one tends to dominate the other, making a power vacuum for the weaker party. This section of this work will consider the peace treaties and negotiations between the Greek states and Persia.532 The negotiations between the various states reflect poor communication between the king’s envoys and the state officials whom they approached on his behalf.533 These treaties and the attempts to make them, merit their own individual discussion, especially because of their ramifications.

Ambiguity opens several questions on the subject of peace between the Persian Empire and the Greeks. For instance, why would the Persians agree to the peace with that polis at that time? Who proposed these peace agreements? How did each side receive them? Which side understood the treaty to be more binding or experienced a greater impact from the treaty in question likely would have ramifications for each group. The response to a violated treaty, or peace often indicates more than the terms overtly recorded by the groups involved.

In this chapter, I will demonstrate the significance of the Persian potentates using peace accords, treaties, and alliances to manipulate the Greeks when it served their specific purposes, namely to help the empire run more smoothly either through new allies or through an expansion of their already vast authority. What follows will be a discussion of the distinction between various truces and their impact, especially the response to these treaties. The next significant issues to examine in this chapter are attempted—and failed—peaces. The reasons the Persians

532 Ryder 1965; Raaflaub 2004; Raaflaub 2009. 533 Thucydides 4.50.1-3; these particular negotiations ended with the death of Artaxerxes. Cf. Lewis 1977, 2-3.

217

and the poleis in question wanted peace, and why the peaces never were signed require consideration here. Sparta, for example, attempted to make peace with Artaxerxes in 424, only to be thwarted by the king’s death before any of their ambassadors could be properly received

(Thucydides 4.50). The following section discusses the major confirmed (or speculated) peaces between the Greeks and Persians, especially the Peace of Callias, the Peace of Antalcidas, and the Common Peaces that followed. Finally, this chapter will consider the other cultures with which Persia made peace and under what circumstances these treaties were achieved.

Historians focus predominantly on the Hellenic perspective of international relations and the development of diplomatic agreements like peaces, treaties, or alliances between the

Greeks and the Persians. Particular international treaties, especially the Peace of Callias and the

Peace of Antalcidas, receive the majority of the attention in this case. Research published on various other alliances, treaties, and official agreements made between the Greek poleis and various potentates of the Persian Empire usually focuses on particular agreements. The development of Hellenic antipathy toward the Persians as a literary topos receives ample attention as well, although the resolution of such hostilities and the terms of these eirenai have not been central to most works.

As the major Greco-Persian treaty of the fifth century, the Peace of Callias has been the focus of several scholarly works from the turn of the twentieth century. Ernst Badian534 and

Loren Samons535 disagree over when, where, and what the Peace of Callias entailed and what

534 Badian 1993. 535 Samons 1998.

218

such a treaty would mean to the Greeks.536 Briant, however, summarizes these arguments and dismisses them as insignificant to the Achaemenid empire, calling such a treaty as inconsequential to the continuation of the Persian Empire.537

T.T.B. Ryder wrote on the Common Peaces that emerged in the fourth century beginning with the Peace of Antalcidas. His work considers the circumstances around each, especially the Greek motivations for joining each peace. Cawkwell’s discussion on the topic focuses on debunking the theories put forward by Ryder in 1957 on the topic of the Common

Peace of 366/5 BCE. What Ryder states that Cawkwell objects to so strongly is that the peace was established between the Persians and the Greeks despite the inaccuracies in Diodorus’ account of the treaty.538 Ryder’s 1965 volume on the koine eirene of the fourth century BCE dominates the discussion of the impact of peace with Persia, focusing on the Greek perception of their own internal turmoil and the consequent reliance on Persian validation of the prostates and

Greek alliances with or against the current holder of this title.539 Martin Jehne similarly discussed the impact of these Common Peaces on Greece, concluding that the characteristic element of these types of agreements is the guarantee of autonomy for a large region and that a treaty was established.540 A volume and peace in the ancient world compiled by Kurt Raaflaub in

2008 covers peace treaties among the Greeks as well as other ancient cultures, failing to adequately consider Greco-Persian treaties but offering a discussion of Greek response to both

536 Sealey 1954; Stockton 1959; Eddy 1970; Murison 1971; Thompson 1971; Thompson 1981; Bosworth 1990; Bloedow 1992; Badian 1993. 537 Briant 2002, 557. 538 Ryder 1957. 539 Ryder 1965; Raaflaub 2009; Raaflaub 2004. 540 Jehne 1994, 269.

219

inter-polis and international policies.541 Since it is much simpler to discuss the Greek perspective on this ambiguous topic, the works on peace and treaties tend to do so.

Researchers of Achaemenid studies have discussed Persia’s Hellenic affiliations, depending more on the evidence taken from the Persians’ own subjects and territories to form their arguments.542 Yet, as Maria Brosius states, there is almost nothing remaining from the

Persian empire which indicates diplomatic relations with an external force from the Persian point of view.543 The illusion of peace within the empire, sometimes labelled as the Pax Persica, has been seen as essential to the Persian empire’s function and character, making it of utmost importance to the king to stifle rebellions.544 Tranquility and imposed-order, however, do not necessarily mean peace nor are they always accomplished through diplomatic negotiations and legally binding agreements.

In this chapter, I first examine how the Greeks formed treaties and alliances among themselves. I then look at the role of the divine in diplomacy, particularly in Persia’s relationship with the various Greek poleis of Europe. After this, I discuss the known alliances between the

Greeks and Persians, their terms, and their impact on both the Greeks and Persians involved.

Finally, I consider Persia’s diplomatic relations with non-Greeks as a means for comparison.

4.1 What does Peace Mean?

Was there a significant difference between an official peace and a treaty or alliance between two states who desired some mutually assured gain? What should historians consider an

541 Raaflaub 2008. 542 Tuplin 1987a; Tuplin 2017; Rollinger 2016; Lenfant 2015; Lenfant 2016. 543 Brosius 2012. 544 Briant 2003; Kuhrt 2001; Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1988; Ruzicka 1983.

220

actual peace as opposed to an alliance or a mere agreement between two states? The Greeks make a distinction in their choice of vocabulary when discussing foreign relations, both amongst the Greek poleis and with other states. Terms used include sponde (treaty), philia (friendship), symmachia (defensive alliance), epimachia (alliance), and eirene (peace). The meanings of each, treaty, friendship, alliances, and peace indicate some degree of negotiation and the set distinction of the agreement reached by the parties involved. Among the Persians, such terminological distinctions do not seem to have as much weight in light of how easily such things would be broken or renewed.

Greek systems of alliances (both symmachia and epimachia) appear to have been subject to much debate, particularly in Athens, regardless of with whom the negotiations took place. Inter- hellenic alliances were binding, yet unstable. The Peloponnesian League, for instance, was established as a loose alliance with Sparta at the helm because of a series of wars. The goal of the

Peloponnesian League supported the cause of the Spartans. It also allowed the system to be called into service for Greece’s internal wars, especially the Peloponnesian War. Similarly, the

Delian League, which should have been an alliance of equals if Thucydides can be believed, also demonstrates a collection of Greek poleis forming spondai and symmachiae with each other for a mutually beneficial goal (1.96.1). In each instance, a leader emerged and seized control of the alliances. Rather than an alliance of equals, what came of it was the Athenian empire.

I will consider what a treaty or a peace is to the Greeks as well as to the Persians in this chapter. Obviously agreements formed by embassies were subject to much debate and deliberation. Any agreement officially sanctioned between two territories would require at least some consideration or deliberation among official parties. There is one notorious incident of

221

Aristagoras having been turned away by the Spartan king, Cleomenes, on the advice of his young daughter, the future queen Gorgo (Herodotus 5.51). That Herodotus believed it was credible to the Greeks that even a small child could influence the outcome of an agreement indicates the variable nature of diplomatic discussion among the Greek poleis. However, the idea that a child in fact could influence the outcome of a diplomatic mission seems unlikely. Christopher Pelling asserts that this interaction reflects the criticism of Cleomenes’ character found throughout

Herodotus’ account.545 Moreover, this incident is contrasted with the ease of influencing the

Athenian assembly, highlighting the differences between the political structures and the methods of negotiation.

Negotiations and peace among the Greeks themselves appears to have been a fluid notion.

Aristophanes’ Acharnians mocks the nature of Athens’ truces by offering Dicaeopolis the option of a 5-year, 10-year, or 30-year personal sponde with the Spartans (187-202). The comic poet refers to the failed but established treaties between Athens and Sparta as well as the nature of the agreement with the Delian League, all of which had resulted in open warfare and taxed Athenian resources. Each of these treaties marked a change or an end to some war with an enemy and a redirection of efforts in a more prosperous direction, at least for Athens.

The role of the diplomat becomes again a significant point of discussion. Negotiations between the Greeks shifted and grew more delicate. Trustworthy or not, the envoy held the power to establish a new set of relations with his host, especially in post-war circumstances. For instance, the Peace of would not have been possible in 421 had and Cleon not

545 Pelling 2007, 192.

222

died in the war. Nicias’ fragile peace between the Athenian empire and the Peloponnesian

League established in 421 could not have come into being had the wrong politicians remained alive after the Archidamian War. As it was, the peace lacked sufficient support to endure, and

Nicias’ efforts were undermined and eventually undone by his peers in Athens as well as those in

Corinth.546 Without Nicias’ reputation and with adequate support to the opposition, this treaty likely would not have come to be. This treaty, though, also demonstrates a shift in the formula for creating an official alliance. In practice, a sponde combines with symmachia to form a temporary agreement between the warring powers.547

The text of this peace agreement bears consideration as well. Thucydides provides the full text of this treaty. For the sake of brevity, only the beginning which is of greatest interest to this work will be discussed. The recorded treaty reached between the Athenians and the Spartans is described by Thucydides as follows:

’Σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι κατὰ τάδε, καὶ

ὤμοσαν κατὰ πόλεις. περὶ μὲν τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν κοινῶν, θύειν καὶ ἰέναι καὶ μαντεύεσθαι καὶ

θεωρεῖν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἀδεῶς. τὸ δ'

ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν νεὼν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ Δελφοὺς αὐτονόμους εἶναι καὶ

αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ αὐτοδίκους καὶ αὑτῶν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆς ἑαυτῶν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια. ἔτη δὲ εἶναι

τὰς σπονδὰς πεντήκοντα Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις τοῖς Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις

καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίων ἀδόλους καὶ ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ

θάλασσαν. (Thucydides 5.18.2).

546 Cf. Bederman 2001, 156 -164 on the Peace of Nicias and Sparta’s motivations. 547 Alonso 2008, 220.

223

The Athenians and Lacedaemonians and their allies made a treaty about these things and

likewise about the poleis. It was desirable to act respectfully concerning common sacred

rights, sacrificing, praying, learning, and looking according to traditions both by land and

by sea. The priest and the temple of at Delphi and the Delphians were autonomous

and self-defending and self-governing both for themselves and for their own land as

according to tradition. And this treaty was for fifty years between the Athenians and the

allies of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians and the allies of the Lacedaemonians

freely and without injury both by land and by sea.

The language used above provides some insight as to what the Greeks considered integral to a treaty. Sparta’s symmachoi are included in the scope of this accord. The divine have been included by means of sacrifice, and prayer. Further, traditions of land and sea are invoked, in a manner reminiscent of the earth and water demanded by the Persian messengers in 480. What has been established officially is a sponde548 between two parties and their nonconsenting allies.

This treaty covers more ground than previous accords reported to be between the one polis and the other directly without the addition of their allies to the terms. Athens and Sparta generated a bilateral truce, but included multiple other groups in the statement. While no one involved expected a permanent state of peace between the warring groups, a fifty-year term suggests that

Nicias intended his truce to outlive him. No previous treaty had so much intended longevity. Yet

548 The Suda (sigma, 958) defines a sponde as: σπονδή: οἴνου εκξηυσις ἐπὶ τιμῆι δαιμόνων: η ̓́̂ φιλίαι. καὶ σπονδῖτις. ἔν ἐπιγράμμασι: καὶ σταγόνα σπονδῖτιν ἀεί θυέεσσιν ὀπηδόν. The wine pored to honor the gods: a philia. Also:sponditis. In inscriptions: "and a libational drop always poured alongside a sacrifice."

224

aspects of the peace dissatisfied several of the allies on each side of what could be considered a multifaceted bilateral treaty. The limited liberties granted to certain poleis, for instance, were a cause of discontent.

Unlike the Peace of Nicias, not all diplomatic interactions were entered with the goal of successfully achieving a treaty, or alliance, or of averting conflict. Sometime over the course of the fifth century the nature of diplomacy and the necessity of maintaining peace among the

Greek states shifted noticeably. Negotiations such as those between the Athenians and the

Peloponnesian League immediately prior to the Peloponnesian War appear to have been designed to fail (Thucydides 1.139-145, 2.7-8). As Sarah Bolmarcich puts it, “states must therefore make, first of all, reasonable demands…, and second of all, be prepared to concede some of their own desires.”549 In these cases, all the perceived power is held by the stronger, less-dependent party, as demonstrated in the Melian Dialogue (Thucydides 5.84-116).

Compromise is rejected and negotiations become a farce. Reasonable demand and concessions disappear. The stronger party imposes its will upon the weaker one.550

Of course, this is in reference to the Greeks and their interstate activities. Does this material apply to Greek negotiations with the Persians, however? Conventions between the two cultures bear some striking similarities, including gift giving, diplomatic legal license, and feasting in celebration of the arrival of the guest. The Homeric example of negotiations between

Priam and Achilles demonstrates many of these commonalities.551 Priam enters Achilles’ tent,

549 Bolmarcich 2012, 84. 550 Bolmarcich 2012, 88. 551 Ka1992, 182.

225

where they share a meal, and through compassion, the one accedes to the other’s will (Iliad

24.468-676). Similar observations can be made regarding Achilles’ negotiations with Priam

(Iliad 23-24) and Menelaus’ contest with Paris (Iliad 3.15-35).

Looking at early delegations between the Greeks and the Persians, something different becomes apparent. One of the first documented set of negotiations with the Athenians and the

Persians recorded by Herodotus states the following:

Ἀπικομένων δὲ τῶν ἀγγέλων ἐς τὰς Σάρδις καὶ λεγόντων τὰ ἐντεταλμένα Ἀρταφρένης ὁ

Ὑστάσπεος Σαρδίων ὕπαρχος ἐπειρώτα τίνες ἐόντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ κῇ γῆς οἰκημένοι

δεοίατο Περσέων σύμμαχοι γενέσθαι· πυθόμενος δὲ πρὸς τῶν ἀγγέλων ἀπεκορύφου σφι

τάδε· εἰ μὲν διδοῦσι βασιλέϊ Δαρείῳ Ἀθηναῖοι γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ, ὁ δὲ συμμαχίην σφι

συνετίθετο, εἰ δὲ μὴ διδοῦσι, ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι αὐτοὺς ἐκέλευε. Οἱ δὲ ἄγγελοι ἐπὶ σφέων

αὐτῶν βαλόμενοι διδόναι ἔφασαν, βουλόμενοι τὴν συμμαχίην ποιήσασθαι. Οὗτοι μὲν δὴ

ἀπελθόντες ἐς τὴν ἑωυτῶν αἰτίας μεγάλας εἶχον. (Herodotus 5.73)

When the messengers came to Sardis and spoke the things they had been bidden,

Artaphernes, son of Hystaspes, hyparch of the Sardians, asked, “What men are you and in

which land do you dwell, you who wish to become allies of the Persians?” Having

received what he wished from the envoys, he answered that if the Athenians give earth and

water to the king, Darius, the alliance with them would be established. If, however, they

did not give these substances, he commanded them to depart. The representatives, having

consulted among themselves, said they would give the earth and water, desiring to make

the alliance. Upon their return to their polis they received great blame for their actions.

226

What the messengers ask for, earth and water, is very specific, and generally considered a form of submission to the Persians.552 The second option, to be destroyed, offers a clear depiction of the Persian king’s concept of negotiations. The negotiator in question is not the king here but his representative at Sardis, the capital of the satrapy with which the Greeks appear to have the most contact. What is offered is framed as an alliance, as expressed by Herodotus’ use of the term symmachia. This differs from later negotiations since in the fourth century the Persians establish eirenai with certain Greek poleis aimed at establishing hegemony via peace as Kurt Raaflaub claims.553

While official treaties and established public documents may be easy to discuss and dismiss, the private agreements with no official documentation or poorly documented peaces leave only their aftermath or the response by which to gauge their effectiveness and popularity on each side of the agreement. For instance, Aristophanes’ Acharnians mentions an eirene, which the Athenians’ ambassador has just returned from developing (60-66). Perhaps it overextends comic distortion to read an actual diplomatic mission with some degree of success into the Acharnians, which coincides with the ascension of Darius II to the Achaemenid throne.

As the political structure in Greece as well as in Persia progressed, the value of peace as uncomplicated benefit changed in the fourth century with the result of a boost of trade, and enhancement of prosperity, as well as fostering the well-being of Athens and all of Greece.554 If peace necessarily resulted in prosperity for the Greeks, did the Persians have similar motivations

552 Waters 2014, 332; Rung 2015, 6-7. 553 Raaflaub 2009, 241. 554 Low 2012, 122.

227

to make peace with the Greeks? Was there a strong fear of an established and unified Greek hegemony? If a united Greece threatened the Persian Empire, there should have been an immediate and armed response rather than a continued interest in making these treaties with the

Greeks. Corruption of western frontier of the Persian Empire could explain some of Persia’s interest in making peace with the Greeks. One other possible explanation, though, is the Hellenic misinterpretation of Persia’s interests during diplomatic negotiations. Further examination will reveal which instance, or which of the Persian magistrates’ interests, held for the major treaties.

4.2 Diplomacy and the Divine

Above, the nature of Greek treaties among their own poleis has been discussed (See 4.1).

Here, I examine the use of the gods in diplomatic relations. The role of the divine in ancient diplomatic relations seems obvious at first glance. The gods were invoked to seal oaths among the Greeks (Herodotus 6.8).555 Moreover, heralds and messengers documented and reported events under divine protection in both the Greek and Persian cultures.556 The Greeks respected the gods as guarantors of oaths.557 Moreover, sanctuaries served as sources of intelligence, information, and favor from the gods. This assumption would lead to a Persian underestimation of the united Greek poleis. Dedications at Greek sanctuaries appear to have sealed international xeniae.558Regardless of interpretation, the divine had a definite role in diplomacy between the two, particularly when it came to negotiations and alliances between the two.

555 Bayliss 2013, 160-163. 556 Bederman 2001, 98-100, 111; Mosley 89; Karavites 56. 557 Bayliss 2013, 160-1 notes that popularity of Zeus, , the Rivers, Gaea, and Helios for sanctifying oaths, particularly a combination of these gods resulting in the presence of the four elements. 558 Kaplan 2006, 145.

228

Consider the impact of the violation of the sacrosanctity of messengers in diplomatic relations. For example, when the Athenians and Spartans disrespected this divine protection, they each faced divine penalty, although not immediately for either polis. Furthermore, the Persians refused to penalize the Spartans themselves for the execution of their messenger. Perhaps this privilege was left to the gods, or the invasion of 480 was sufficient to Persia’s representatives.

An exact reason is not given. While the Persians did not seek out retribution against either polis, the resultant exclusion of Athens and Sparta from offers of submission during Xerxes’ invasion

(Herodotus 6.48-9; Herodotus 6.94) certainly reflects a degree of ill-will toward the two poleis

Herodotus deemed leaders during Xerxes’ invasion. Herodotus further deems the 430 Athenian murders of Spartan ambassadors, the sons of Sperthias and Bulis, retribution for the execution of the messenger in Sparta decades beforehand (Herodotus 7.133-37).559 The intended message to the Athenians in Herodotus’ account seems to be that the consequences of their sacrilegious actions had yet to come.560 To the Greek perspective, the gods’ retribution was merited and could not be avoided. Violation of an oath faced divine penalty. One such instance is Xerxes’ death as a penalty for his destruction of shrines and statues. As a result, Artaxerxes was pleased to relinquish any attempt to repeat his predecessors’ expansionist ventures. 561 However, this interpretation superimposes Greek religious beliefs on Persian diplomats as well as the Hellenic representatives.

559 Munn 2006, 264. 560 Munn 2006, 264. 561 Munn 2006, 289.

229

Exactly what role the Persian gods played in these and similar international relations has not been made clear by the ancient sources. However, it is worth noting that the Persians tended to practice respect for gods, even those other than their own. Among others, there are several cases of Greek sanctuaries with evidence of Persia’s presence. For one thing, Herodotus shows

Democedes using sacred sites as sources of information. famously made a dedication at

Delos and Xerxes one at Ilion. In both cases, these were consumable items (frankincense and cattle) (Herodotus 3.135-138). The offerings suggest that it was not impossible that Persians would have sacrificed to local deities, even though they were much more likely to dedicate to own gods, such as Zurvan or Anaita, interpreted by Herodotus as minor Greek deities rather than

Persian respect for Greek gods.562

As awareness of Hellenic religion grew among the Persians, so did the respect paid by

Persian officials. In 480 Mardonius sent to Apollo Ptoios, not the oracle at Delphi, to consult the oracle, spoke Carian not Greek, an action which, according to Philip Kaplan, reinforces the idea that the Persians were ignorant of Greek religion.563 Instead, perhaps this suggests not that the

Persians were ignorant of Hellenic religion but that they chose the Hellenic site familiar to them over the European site of worship in this instance. However, the Persian presence at Greek sanctuaries became noticeably more pronounced as familiarity increased including the protection of sanctuaries and dedications at sanctuaries under Persian control.564 Such a stance, however, neglects the contact between the Greeks in Asia and the Persians who controlled their territory.

562 Kaplan 2006, 136. 563 Kaplan 2006, 136. 564 Kaplan 2006, 137.

230

Choosing Ptoion over the more famous Delphi suggests that the Persian forces paid respect, at least nominally, to all the gods they were aware of, although they may have been less familiar with the sanctuaries in Europe. This trend also can be seen with Tissaphernes’ defense of

Artemis at in 409; and the naming of himself as the warden of this particular temple

(Xenophon Hellenica 1.2.6; Anabasis 5.3.6). A tendency to honor and protect the temple of the gods of other cultures indicates that the sanctity of oaths would likely be respected as sacred by both parties in ideal circumstances.

The question left open, however, is to what end did the Persians demand earth and water from various Greek poleis? Details from ancient sources are scarce. Moreover, there are no known examples of the demand of these tokens before Darius I or after the Persian Wars. This paucity does not necessarily mean that the ceremony was connected exclusively to the foreign policies of Darius and Xerxes.565 Perhaps these demands could be interpreted as tokens of submission to the Persians, or as Zoroastrian symbols of religious validity. Other theories suggested by modern interpreters include the possibility that this demand was an expression of the greatness of the empire; another interpretation is that the tokens were indications of the peoples or countries under sway.566 On the other hand, earth and water certainly appeared to be signs of submission to Persia, and an official acknowledgement of Persian overlordship over the water and earth as second and third of Seven Creations in Zoroastrian religion.567

565 Rung 2015a, 505. 566 Rung 2015a, 514. 567 Keaveney 1996, 39.

231

Simple explanations exist. Earth and water appear as customary gifts to the great king in the compilation of land registers. Earth and water also held recognizable functions in the

Zoroastrian world-view:568 earth as right-mindedness, water as wholeness. These could be simply signs of submission,569 however. In this light, they would represent the cession of a right to the basic productive resources of donor land to the empire. Theoretically, the subjects surrendered everything that made life physically possible.570 Perhaps they were both religious and cultural symbols: tokens of submission through Athenian religion and symbols of Persian sovereignty.571 The ideological concepts embedded in Athenian cults underwent changes after the end of war between Athens and Persia,572 becoming more distinct from other poleis.

With the possibility of religious significance, these tokens evolve into symbols of Persian superiority and oaths of submission. The exact role earth, water, and even the Persian pantheon played in Helleno-Persian diplomacy is unclear. The role of the Greek gods, more familiar to the

Hellenic-biased writers, as overseers of oaths is transparent. Swearing to the gods, honoring the sacrosanctity of messengers, heralds, and diplomats, as well as paying respects at Greek temples suggest that the Persian leaders respected a divine presence in their diplomatic interactions. In fact, they seem to have respected it, even expecting the Greek gods to penalize Greek violators of oaths and sanctity.573

568 Rung 2015a, 505. 569 Rung 2015a, 506. 570 Tuplin 2011, 44. 571 Munn 2006, 262. 572 Munn 2006, 263. 573 Cf. Torrance 2013, 314, 317-318 on the careful avoidance of perjury among the Persians.

232

4.3 Established Peaces and Their Consequences

The Peace of Callias in 450/449 marked the end of the Athenian campaign against the

Persians which began with—and was the pretext for—the foundation of the Delian League in

478.574 Callias and his peace received much criticism from their compatriots, both from his own and later generations.575 That Callias was brother-in-law to the recently deceased Cimon, who led the majority of the Athenian campaigns into Persian territory, only adds insult to the injury of capitulating almost immediately after Cimon’s death. Depending on the exact date of the eirene,576 the fundamental difference in the reception of an Athenian peace with Persia could be attributed to the context within which it occurred. For instance, the fourth-century orators approach this peace with biases polluted by their recent relationship with Persia, particularly after the Peace of Antalcidas. Between these peaces, several small agreements, and failed negotiations occurred between Greek states and Persian satraps. However, for many of these diplomatic missions, evidence remains scarce.

Other peaces and terms, especially the more notorious ones, do deserve a degree of discussion. Without such treaties and alliances, those that have been considered more important or significant would not have been possible. Negotiations of this nature remain difficult to discern from the historical record as they have failed or at least not met with significant response.

For instance, Thucydides mentions the revolt of Amorges against Pissuthnes and that the

574 Discussion of the Peace of Callias questions the date and authenticity of this truce as well as exactly what the terms were. See Sealey 1955; Stockton 1959; Murison 1971; Eddy 1971; Thompson 1981; Badian 1987; Bosworth 1990; Bloedow 1992; Cawkwell 1997; Samons 1998; Briant 2002. 575Cf. Aristophanes Frogs 432-434; Isocrates 4.118-120; Diodorus 12.3.3-6; Demosthenes 19.373; Isocrates 7.80; Livy 33.20. 1-2; Aristodemus FGH 104 F 13; Plato Menexenus 242a; Andocides 3. 29; Theon Progymnasmata 2. 67.22; Harpocration s.v. ‘Attic letters’; Lycurgus Leocrates 73. 576 See Badian 1987 for a discussion on the authenticity and date of the Peace of Callias.

233

Athenians added their support to the rebellion (8.28.3). He mentions these events but does not explain their significance to the events of the Peloponnesian War. It is therefore necessary to examine the nature of these peaces, the reasons for forming them, and finally the consequences of making concessions to Persia, and the apparently willing Persian king. I will discuss these peaces and their impacts in chronological order, as clearly as evidence allows.

4.3.1 The Peace of Callias

Ambiguity remains concerning the situation in the 450s, and the clarity of the truce which probably ended the Athenians’ war with Persia. Much debate surrounds the controversial peace of Callias, which more than likely occurred in 450/49, on Callias’ second embassy to Persia, almost immediately following the battles of Cition and Salamis on Cyprus.577 Because of the general lack of contemporary primary sources, debate focuses on the peace’s authenticity, date, and exact nature.578 Ideological and economic contexts point to Artaxerxes’ having reaped sufficient profit to accept coexistence with the Athenian empire, as ill-defined as the details remain.579

Theopompus of Chios declares the entire treaty inauthentic, thereby sparking the scholarly debate over this peace’s existence (FGrH 115 F 153-154).580 But too much is known about it, and too many of the events that follow the Peace of Callias’ agreement

577 Diodorus 12.4 has the battle of the Eurymedon as one of the final battles before this peace; however, the timing does not seem to fit with his summary here. 578 Badian 1993.Except for his adherence to the existence of a peace agreement in 466 with Darius following the battle of the Eurymedon, I follow here Badian’s arguments for the existence and date of the Peace of Callias; cf. Briant 2002, 557 provides a discussion of the usual arguments on each side of the debate. 579 Hyland 2018, 15. 580 Connor 1968, 81-83 explains the absence of the Oath of Plataea and the Peace of Callias in Herodotus and Thucydides’ accounts by the loss of Athenian stele, which Theopompus may have considered post-Euclidean.

234

indicate some sort of agreement for there to be nothing at all. Exactly what the agreement comprised of is debatable since sources are scarce. Diodorus provides the earliest and clearest set of terms for this truce, which are as follows:

αὐτονόμους εἶναι τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἁπάσας, τοὺς δὲ τῶν Περσῶν

σατράπας μὴ καταβαίνειν ἐπὶ θάλατταν κατωτέρω τριῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδόν, μηδὲ ναῦν

μακρὰν πλεῖν ἐντὸς Φασήλιδος καὶ Κυανέων· ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν

ἐπιτελούντων, μὴ στρατεύειν Ἀθηναίους εἰς τὴν χώραν, ἧς βασιλεὺς [Ἀρταξέρξης] ἄρχει

(Diodorus 12.45).

All the Greek cities in Asia are to be subject to their own laws. No Persian satrap is to

come nearer than three days’ travel to the coast. No Persian warship is to sail the waters

between Phaselis and Cyaneae. Provided the Great King and his generals observe these

conditions, the Athenians will not move troops into any territory under the king’s

jurisdiction.

Plutarch, in the Life of Cimon, has the Persians agree to stay one day’s ride from the coast, but sets this term as a result of the battle of the Eurymedon (Plutarch Cimon 13). Perhaps, though,

Diodorus and Plutarch err in their terms. They are both significantly later sources, and often follow a less well-known tradition.

Whatever the source, at least some of these terms seem implausible. Hyland suggests that the empire’s interests did not require direct control of Ionia and that Artaxerxes may have come to see Athens as a client state, and hence able to contribute to the empire’s prosperity.581 For

581 Hyland 2018, 16.

235

instance, it seems unlikely that the Persians would allow Athens to draw a line which they were not allowed to cross within their own territory. Athens certainly would not permit the Greek cities she controlled to become independent, though this treaty seems to offer them the option of joining Persia’s empire instead of Athens’. Further, the Athenian tribute list for the year 449/8 is strikingly absent.582 Quota for the Delian League, seems to have not been assessed. The Athenian gain of rights in Asia Minor should have caused significant financial gain from the ensuing tribute even though the amount of tributary income was unaffected. A dozen cities on the tribute list for 450/49 do not appear on the ones from 448/7 and 447/6, though the tribute remains approximately the same.583 The number of contributors from Asia Minor, namely the Ionic-Caric region, increases dramatically, while some names are consistent. Although the royal army never approached the coast until 412/11, there is no reason to assume that Athens’ treaty is the reason.

Persia’s royal army rarely marched and was usually situated near the capital, several weeks’ ride from the coast of Asia Minor. Nothing suggests Athens emerged the victor of these negotiations, despite its representation in fourth century and later sources.

Circumstances in Persia would make some form of cease-fire with the Athenians beneficial to the empire. The same amount of Persian tribute was still owed to the king by each satrapy, even if it was declining with the loss of its Greek subjects to the Athenian liberators.

Artaxerxes himself was uninvolved in this peace, which was apparently unilaterally dictated by the Athenians. It would be extremely odd for the king to agree to the loss of territory conquered a

582 ATL 29. 583 ATL 29.

236

century beforehand.584 A satrap simply would not have the authority to make such an agreement last. These terms simply did not keep with the Persian practice.

Moreover, states long ago subjugated by the Persians began to revolt either independently or with the support of the Athenians. Egypt revolted twice in a single decade. Miletus revolted during 450, when the Athenians were nearby invading Cyprus. However, for the Persian king, such a peace would be a considerable loss due to the forfeiture of access to the Eastern

Aegean.585 Persia’s issues may have been settled by a peace with Athens. But Artabazus would not have the authority to forfeit access to the sea or part of Persia’s empire unilaterally without a serious threat to it.

However, after the 450s the Achaemenids did not openly partake in war with the Greek mainland again. Still there is nothing to suggest the king ratified or even participated in such an agreement. The change in strategy, whether authorized by king or satrap, seems sensible since it proved much simpler to turn the Greeks on each other than to fight them directly. The decree imposed on the Erythraeans by the Athenians demonstrates that the Persians had already begun to employ this tactic as evidenced by the Decree in 453/2.586 By encouraging the Greeks in Erythrae to Medize instead of participating in the Delian League, the Persians demonstrate the understanding that war was less effective than the offer of liberation from an oppressive master

584 Briant 2002, 578. 585 Briant 2002, 580. 586 Briant 2002, 580: The members of the council of Erythrae agreed “not to receive any of the exiles who sought refuge from the Medes.” The passage suggests that Persia was involved in its revolt. Cf. Forsdyke 2005, 222-225; Highby 1936’s discussion of this decree and its impact on the Athenians and their allies.

237

in gaining allies, and that the Athenians were in fact harsher on their subjects than the Persians were.

There seems to have been an agreement of mutual non-aggression, wherein the Persian refrained from advancing on Athens’ dependents in western Anatolia and the Athenians ceased attacks on Achaemenid territories.587 The cessation of open hostilities and the new policy toward the Greeks led to what Samuel Eddy calls a “cold war” between Athens and Persia.588 With the peace with Athens agreed to, the Persians were able to regain Cyprus and squash the revolt in

Egypt. Further, this peace marked a temporary cessation of the Athenians and their allies –soon to be subjugated- invading Persian territory to liberate the Greeks therein. Isocrates boasts that the Athenians had prevented the Persian king from using the Aegean Sea and limited his power

(Isocrates 4.120). The loss of tribute from the Greeks in Asia Minor only becomes an issue when

Darius II commanded Tissaphernes to pay the long absent tribute in 412/11 (Thucydides 8.5.5).

However, these inconveniences appear to have been minor. The king regained security of commerce on the seas, and by association, the prosperity of the Persian tributary, Levant.589

Even though this peace would have given Athens the security needed to focus on the issues in Greece among both her adversaries and her allies, Callias and his peace agreement with the Persians met with much criticism at home. Demosthenes reports, decades later, that Callias was prosecuted for accepting bribes and nearly executed, but instead charged a fine of 50 talents

(Demosthenes 19.273). Aristophanes has his chorus of Frogs mention Callias’ corrupt

587 Hyland 2018, 17. 588 See Eddy 1973. 589 Badian 1993, 56.

238

negotiation while Dionysus rows his way to the underworld (406). Such a response to a peace that later was reported as a triumph suggests that, while the negotiations achieved some end, the

Athenians did not reach the intended goal of whatever negotiations took place at Sardis.

Despite the perceived corruption of the delegate deemed responsible for whatever the symmachia entailed, the Athenians were able to focus their energy on their own imperial ambitions, solidifying their grasp on their former allies, while subjugating those who continued to rebel. In the 440s, there were several revolts against Athenian domination. defected to the Peloponnesian League in 448 and again in 446. Euboea revolted in 446. Samos revolted in

440. Cimon’s truce with Sparta expired in 446, and hostilities between Sparta and Athens resumed, to be settled by the Thirty Year Peace. Persian interference did not cease despite the treaty. Pissuthnes gave support to the revolt of Samos, and exiles in Erythrae were encouraged to

Medize against Athenian domination (Thucydides 3.34.2-4). These actions suggest that Athens had enough other concerns to make them desire an end to their on-going war with the Persians.

In light of the consequences and the apparently mutual change in Greek and Persian foreign policies, there was probably something, though it is unlikely that the Peace of Callias met the boasts of Isocrates and Demosthenes or the terms of Diodorus. The terms of this peace obviously became embellished at the hands of discontented Athenians, re-interpreting and even redesigning their own memory in response to another peace which left them less than satisfied.

The shortage of direct documentation, however, leaves room for a myriad of interpretations. The notable changes in Persia’s Greek policy indicate some form of agreement between the two empires. The burdens of trireme replacement and naval recruitment were sufficient to encourage restraint by the mid-fifth century, and peace meant Artaxerxes no longer had to replace every

239

trireme lost to storm, battle, or age.590 The benefits of this sponde for both sides strengthened each’s perception of its own power regardless of the significance of its outcome. To the Greeks, the Persians had sent envoys to propose talks, offering Athens the opportunity to send Callias in response; however, in Persian terms, the king issued a summons and the Athenians obeyed, as subjects or clients would have.591

4.3.2 After Callias

The veracity and accuracy of the peace of Callias aside, there appears to have been a change in foreign policy between the Athenians and the Persians in the 440s. The general trend seems to have been to avoid conflict and respect boundaries following 449/8, except when it came to the Aegean Sea. Diplomacy between the Greeks and Persians opened up trade in Greece, and minimal official conflict existed between the cultures. The empire maintained its borders and its Hellenic subjects, despite the alleged terms of the truce discussed above while the Athenians turned their attention to their own empire, and the conflicts therein.

Nevertheless, the Persians appear to have assisted and encouraged rebellions against the

Athenians among their allies, as occurred during the Samian Revolt after the Athenians imposed the first settlement (Thucydides 1.115.4-116.3; Diodorus 1227.3-5; Plutarch Pericles 25.3-4,

26.1). Pissuthnes’ assistance to the Samians allowed them to regain control of their island, thereby forcing the Athenians to send a second fleet to recover the island (Thucydides 1.115.4-

117.3, Diodorus 12.27.3-28.4; Plutarch Pericles 25.4-28.1). Pissuthnes, the satrap of Lydia, rather than the king or a local governor, decided to assist the Samians. He provided military

590 Hyland 2018, 26-28. 591 Hyland 2018, 32.

240

assistance, but little else, to help resecure the autonomy of the Samians from Athenian domination. Did this action violate the Peace of Callias? There was no ensuing embassy to complain of a broken peace or to re-establish goodwill between the Athenians and the Persians following this intervention in Samos. Rumors circulated of the arrival of the Phoenician fleet even though there is no evidence that this fleet ever was dispatched.592 The Samians faced severe consequences for the rebellion and the preceding war with Miletus from the Athenians; however, there appear to have been no international consequences of Persian involvement.593

Other agreements established after 449 have anecdotal evidence, but little else in terms of documentation. The unconfirmed agreement between Sparta and Darius II in 424 appears in

Thucydides’ narrative as an intercepted messenger, Artaphernes, to the Spartans (Thucydides

4.41.4). This account claims that the Athenians returned him to Ephesus with a full Athenian embassy instead and only learned upon their arrival of the death of Artaxerxes. It seems unlikely that Athens would be unaware of the death of the great king of Persia by accident since there were trade relations established much earlier and many of the Athenian allies and subjects lived in close proximity to the Persian Empire.594 However, neither the embassy nor the messenger appears to have succeeded in their missions, rendering this diplomatic contact unproductive.

592 Lewis 1977, 59-60. 593 Quinn 1981, 14-16 discusses the nature of these consequences and the omission of details in Thucydides’ account, focusing, as the primary sources do, on the relationship between the Athenians and Samians following the revolt rather than any impact Persian involvement may have had on Greco-Persian diplomatic ties. 594 Lewis 1977, 71-2 argues that the chronological disparities would make the Athenians lucky to have returned home upon learning of Artaxerxes’ death.

241

Aeschines claims the Athenians concluded a sponde with Darius II in 424/3(3.29), which

Theopompus denounces as a forgery (FGrH 115 F 153-4).595 The label assigned to this poorly attested treaty is the Peace of Epilycus, for Andocides’ uncle, who he claims led the embassy.

The date and nature of the treaty have been debated since there is almost no documentation of this peace.596 The orator’s version claims a promise of a friendship forever with the king of

Persia (Andocides 3.29), a term which seems unlikely due to how soon after Darius’ ascension this sponde would have taken place and how little incentive the Athenians offered to the Persians at the time.597

The unlikely, ill-attested Peace of Epilycus is difficult to ascertain, especially since

Darius II would have little to no motive to form such a sponde, not being at war nor being under threat from the Athenians in the mid-420s.598 Persia’s motives for joining such an agreement seem scarce since their involvement in the Peloponnesian War would not result from Athenian persuasion, but Spartan diplomacy, much later, forcing the focus of the war to shift from the mainland to the Aegean Sea. To do so, the Spartans undertook several sets of negotiations with at least three different regional satraps, each pledging different degrees of support for different reasons between 413 and 411. The third of these treaties specified that all of the Persian land in

Asia belonged to the king (Thucydides 8.58.2). This agreement has been interpreted as

595 Lewis 1977, 76. 596 Wade-Gery 1958, 210; Thompson 1971, 119-124; Blamire 1975, 21-6; Harris 1999, 124-128. 597 Lewis 1977, 77. 598 Contra Hyland 2018, 43.

242

amounting to the Peloponnesians handing over the territory to the Persians,599 despite the pre- existing Persian claim on the land.

Unverifiable agreements between the Greeks and Persians are poorly attested and difficult to place temporally. Theopompus’ Philippica indicated there was some false treaty between Darius and the Athenians written in the wrong dialect on the stele in Athens

(Harpocration s.v. ‘Attic letters’ Theon Progymnasmata 2. 67, 22). Other examples can be found through the Greek inscriptions. The proxeny decree of Heraclides at Clazomenae, for example, deserves consideration due to the amount of information it provides. As with many inscriptions, the stele is fragmented and difficult to discern the whole of the textual information, but what exists is as follows:

ἔδοξεν τῆι βολῆι [καὶ τῶι δήμωι· ․․6․․․]- ․ὶς ἐπρυτάνευεν, Σ[․․․․ ἐγραμμάτευεν], [Ν]εοκλείδης ἐπεστ[άτει, ․․․․․12․․․․․] [εἶ]πεν· Ἡρακλείδην [τὸν Κλαζομένιον ἀν]- [αγρ]άψαι τὸγ γραμμ[ατέα τῆς βολῆς πρόξ]- [ενο]ν καὶ εὐεργέτη[ν καθ’ ὅτι ἂν τῶι δήμω]- [ι δο]κῆι καὶ θε̑ναι ἐ[ν πόλει, ἐπειδὴ εὖ ἐπ]- [όησ]εν τὰς Ἀθηναίω[ν πρεσβείας καὶ ἐν π]- [ᾶσι ἀ]νήρ ἐστι ἀγαθ[ὸς εἰς τὸν δῆμον τὸν] [Ἀθη]ναίων. Θοκυδίδ[ης εἶπε· τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κ]- [αθά]περ τῆι βολῆι· ἐ[πειδὴ δὲ οἱ πρέσβες] [οἱ π]αρὰ βασιλέως ἥκ[οντες ἀγγέλλοσι Ἡ]- [ρακ]λείδην συμπράτ[τεν ἑαυτοῖς προθύ]- [μως ἔ]ς τε τὰσπονδὰς {τὰς σπονδὰς} [τὰς πρὸς βασιλέα ἔ]- [ς τε ἄ]λλο ὅτι ἐπαγγέ[λειαν ε ν̑ αι Ἡρακλε]- [ίδηι] γῆς ἔγκτησιν κα[ὶ οἰκίας Ἀθήνησι]- [ν καὶ ἀ]τέλειαν καθάπ[ερ τοῖς ἄλλοις πρ]- [οξένο]ις· καὶ ἐάμ πο βι[ασθῆι ὧν Ἀθηναῖο]- [ι κρατο̑σιν, π]ερὶ αὐτο̑ τ[— — — — — —]

599 Mitchell 1997, 117.

243

Resolved by the [and the People, -6-] [..]s held the prytany, S[....was

Secretary, N]eoklides presided, [-12-] made the motion. Heraclides [-14-] shall be

recorded by the Secretary [of the Boule] as a prox[enus] and benefactor [in

accordance with what the People] …Thucydides[s made the motion. Let all the rest

be] as (resolved) by the Boule. [But] since [the envoys who] have returned from the

King [announce that Herac]lides cooperated [with them zealously] both as to the

treaty [with the King and as to] any other thing they enjoined, [there shall be granted

to Heraclides] the right to possess land and [a dwelling at Athens and] immunity

from public burdens just as for the other proxenoi.] If [he should die] anywhere by a

violent death, punishment shall be (exacted)] for him [just as---] (IG ii2 8).

This legally binding agreement indicates exactly who ratified these decisions and what duties a proxenus could be expected to perform at the beginning of the fourth century. Moreover, it mentions the return of envoys from the royal court, presumably of Persia, where Heraclides’ cooperation proved valuable with the establishment of an unspecific treaty.

The date for this appointment has been established as 424/3. No known established treaty was agreed on during this time between the Athenians and Persians which involved Clazomenae.

However, the unverifiable peace of Epilycus, poorly testified in literary sources, theoretically occurred sometime around the ascension of Darius II. For this peace, the goal would have been dictated by the Athenian current state of emergency. Its spondai surely contained at least one declaration of mutual non-aggression for the Athenians and the Persians. Moreover, there must

244

have been some form of formal guarantee of non-assistance to each other’s enemies.600 The failure of contemporary sources to produce written evidence must not be ignored, however. The earliest Athenian documentation, which fails to specify terms, is Andocides’ speech. In which he states:

οἵτινες πρῶτον μὲν βασιλεῖ τῷ μεγάλῳ …σπονδὰς ποιησάμενοι καὶ συνθέμενοι φιλίαν εἰς

τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, ἃ ἡμῖν ἐπρέσβευσεν Ἐπίλυκος <ὁ> Τεισάνδρου, τῆς μητρὸς τῆς

ἡμετέρας ἀδελφός, <μετὰ> ταῦτα Ἀμόργῃ πειθόμενοι τῷ δούλῳ τῷ βασιλέως καὶ φυγάδι

τὴν μὲν βασιλέως δύναμιν ἀπεβαλόμεθα ὡς οὐδενὸς οὖσαν ἀξίαν, τὴν δὲ Ἀμόργου

φιλίαν εἱλόμεθα, κρείττω νομίσαντες εἶναι· ἀνθ' ὧν βασιλεὺς ὀργισθεὶς ἡμῖν, σύμμαχος

γενόμενος Λακεδαιμονίοις, παρέσχεν αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον πεντακισχίλια τάλαντα, ἕως

κατέλυσαν ἡμῶν τὴν δύναμιν (3.29).

Having first made a treaty with the great king and established a friendship for all of time,

which Epilycus, son of Teisander, the brother of my mother, negotiated for us, when we

were persuaded by Amorges, the king’s slave and a fugitive, we threw away the power of

the king as though it was worthless, and we seized the friendship of Amorges, judging it

to be the stronger; and the king, enraged by us, forming an alliance with the

Lacedaemonians, granted them five thousand talents for the sake of war, until he

destroyed our empire.

The treaty (sponde) is mentioned as a motivation, as is the decision to support Amorges’ rebellion, although details are not specified by the orator. Judging by the response of the king,

600 Blamire 1975, 23.

245

the terms were violated by the decision to support Amorges. While Thucydides’ silence on the matter seems problematic, it is not the only notable omission from his historical account.601 With an inscription of a similar date to that provided, perhaps this silence can be disregarded. Similar problems occur in the discussion of the more significant, higher impact, Peace of Callias.

Documentation for a peace improved as such alliances, treaties, and peaces became more common and Hellenic perspective on international treaties developed into a favorable direction.

Other Helleno-Persian treaties are poorly documented, some appearing only in the final book of Thucydides, such as the treaty of Chalcideus (Thucydides 8.17.4-18). In 412, the

Athenians lent their support to the rebellion of Amorges. Almost immediately afterward, Sparta sent Alcibiades to open negotiations with Tissaphernes, allegedly to secure Persian support for the Peloponnesian League,602 especially to allow the Spartan forces to develop a fleet to counter the Athenians in naval warfare (Thucydides 8.20; Andocides 3.30). Not for the first time, the

Persians expressed an interest in participating in the Peloponnesian War. A messenger between

Sparta and Persia was intercepted by the Athenians during the Archidamian War, with a letter written in Aramaic (Thucydides 4.50) rather than Greek, against Persian tradition of using the recipient’s language when possible.603 Other evidence for this incident is scarce. Moreover, the intercepted message never seemed to bear fruit for either party involved.

601 Blamire 1975, 26. 602 Hornblower 1998-2009, 801; Cawkwell 2005, 149 ff.; Connor 1984, 219 discuss the degrading or disfavourable terms agreed to by the Spartans during this treaty. Cawkwell considers it a draft for the third of the series. Hornblower specifically notes that the treaty says nothing about Persian pay or maintenance for a Spartan fleet. 603 Gera 2013, 96.

246

This instance differs from the previous, admittedly scurrilous account in many ways. This time, official representatives met and negotiated terms, although Tissaphernes’ interest in

Spartan politics appears motivated by Athenian violation of an existing agreement rather than a desire to support the Peloponnesian League. These particular negotiations experienced deceit on both sides, with neither Alcibiades nor Tissaphernes engaging in appropriate diplomatic discussions despite each representing the interested parties.

As the representative of the Spartans’ interest, Alcibiades proved disingenuous. Instead, he began negotiations on the Athenians’ behalf. Tissaphernes, according to Thucydides’ account, made a pretense of listening, and heeding Alcibiades’ advice, demonstrating his favoritism of the delegate while feigning interest in his negotiations to form an agreement to help support Sparta.

When Alcibiades’ agenda switched from Sparta to Athens, the satrap seemed to accept his advice, allowing the Athenian to serve his own interests in the Ionian War (Thucydides 8.47). As

Lewis points out, Tissaphernes, the agent of the Persian King, was very unlikely to switch to the

Athenian side, as Alcibiades should have been aware. Their mutual pretense of influence concealed the lack of influence for both parties by shifting the responsibility for end of negotiations onto the Athenians.604 As a result, extremely specific and dramatic concessions were demanded from then Athenians apparently in attempt to persuade the king of Tissaphernes’ efforts, and to turn away the royal response for backing Amorges.605

What served Tissaphernes’, and Darius II’s, interests in 412, was to form an alliance with the Peloponnesians as originally proposed by the dispatch of Alcibiades by the Spartans.

604 Lewis 1977, 100-1. 605 Lewis 1977, 101.

247

Thucydides provides an account of limited value due to his obvious bias, as a former Athenian general, against the Peloponnesian League and the Persians. Thucydides describes the

Peloponnesians’ second attempt at establishing negotiations with Tissaphernes as follows:

πρὸς δὲ τὸν Τισσαφέρνην ἐδόκουν ὅμως τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις αἱ πρῶται ξυνθῆκαι αἱ

πρὸς Χαλκιδέα γενόμεναι ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι καὶ οὐ πρὸς σφῶν μᾶλλον, καὶ ἄλλας ἔτι

Θηριμένους παρόντος ἐποίουν· (Thucydides 8.36.2)

Nevertheless the Peloponnesians decided that the agreement they first set down at

Chalcidea with Tissaphernes was defective and better for Tissaphernes than for them, and

still they made another while Therimenes606 was with them.

Thucydides clarifies that the Spartans had made more than one agreement with the Persians, finding the first one dissatisfactory, and yet finding another desirable. The successful delegation eventually made what Thucydides calls

Ξυνθῆκαι Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς βασιλέα Δαρεῖον καὶ τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς

βασιλέως καὶ Τισσαφέρνην, σπονδὰς εἶναι καὶ φιλίαν κατὰ τάδε (Thucydides 8.37.1).

The treaties of Darius and the descendants of the king and Tissaphernes [with] the

Spartans and their allies were established [as] a treaty and a friendship according to these

terms.

The terminology used to describe the treaty established between the two Athenian enemies indicates the nature of the agreement: an alliance, a treaty, and a friendship with King Darius and

606 Therimenes was a Spartiate who led a fleet to Asia Minor in 412, having forced the Athenian forces to flee at Miletus, he negotiated a subsidy treaty with the Persians that autumn (Thucydides 8.26.1-29.2). He died in a shipwreck the following year (Thucydides 8.36.2-38.1).

248

with Tissaphernes. Persia’s direct gain for supporting the Peloponnesian League in the Ionian

War seems to have been revenge for the Athenian support of the rebellion in Persia. Without the

Persian gold and timber, the Peloponnesians would not have been able to develop a fleet to counter the Athenians in naval encounters. The Spartans had little to offer in terms of long-term benefits to the Persians as allies so the Persians used the opportunity to limit Peloponnesian funding sources in order to increase Sparta’s dependency and status as imperial clients.607

In the case of the Sparto-Persian alliances of the Peloponnesian War, the agreements become progressively more precise.608 In this case, the Spartans began imposing Persian rule on

Greeks rather than giving freedom. The treaties of Therimenes and Chalcideus neglected to include the liberation of the Greeks in either Asia or Europe, thereby tacitly agreeing to cede the poleis in Asia (Thucydides 8.43.3 cf. 8.18; 8.37). With the last of these three treaties, the

Peloponnesians were summoned by Tissaphernes, on account of pressure from the great king.

They poured third set of libations and in thirteenth year of Darius II’s reign created the only one of these treaties with a formal prescript (Thucydides 8.57.2).609 The third treaty stresses the arrival of king’s fleet, and securing the end of the war, and gave Sparta only a relatively minor role in the alliance (Thucydides 8.87.3; DS 12.3.2).610 This reduction has been attributed to the current affairs. The greater frequency of interventions of Thucydides’ authorial reflections in book 8 presents the diminishing influence of Alcibiades, especially over Tissaphernes, and

607 Hyland 2018, 63. 608 Hornblower 2008, 801. 609 Cawkwell 2005, 149f. 610 Lewis 1977, 132.

249

therefore the Persians.611While there is evidence that Greeks still feared the Persians near the mainland and islands in first treaty between the Spartans and Persians,612 they appear less cautious through prolonged exposure.

Close contact allowed personal philia to develop, impacting the outcome of Helleno-

Persian negotiations. For instance, Alcibiades’ misjudgment of his philia with Tissaphernes ultimately led to his failure to secure Persian support for Athens. These treaties allowed other alliances to form, such as that of Lysander and Cyrus the Younger, then still a satrap rather than challenger to the throne.613Moreover, the Spartans have been blamed for repeatedly ceding the liberation of the Asian Greeks to Persia.614 To some, it seemed the Spartans broke faith by enslaving Greeks and repaying the king by setting Cyrus upon him, betrayal of both allies and the alliance with the great king (Isocrates 12.103-4).615 Cyrus the Younger’s arrival marked a change of policy, since his presence meant royal support for the Peloponnesian League, rather than simply satrapal. Cyrus’ involvement extended satrapal authority over Tissaphernes’ previous position, rendering Tissaphernes his subordinate rather than his peer (Xenophon

Hellenica 1.5.5-7).616 As a result, he made a more powerful ally, and a stronger partner in an alliance. Mitchell claims it was the personal philia between Cyrus and Lysander that allowed the

Spartans to win the war.617 Certainly, it benefited the Peloponnesian navy. When Lysander

611 Hornblower 2008, 923. 612 Goldstein 1974, 161. 613 Badian 1991, 27. 614 Pownall 2004, 44. 615 Lewis 1977, 109. 616 Lewis 1977, 131. 617 Mitchell 1997, 119.

250

demanded more pay for his troops after a toast to Lysander’s health,618 he managed to do so without fear of repercussions. 619 This particular philia ameliorated the symmachia created between the Spartans and Persians, granting resources for the Spartans and the opportunity to remove the Athenians from the Aegean for the Persians.

Beyond the Sparto-Persian agreements, few negotiations and truces of significant impact appear to have occurred prior to 387. Later attempts at diplomacy include the failed negotiations in 392/1 (Xenophon 4.8.12), which could have involved a conference in Sardis, although this conflicts with Andocides 3, which claims a conference occurred at Sparta, involving the main belligerents in Europe but mentions the Persian king (Andocides 3.15). These conflicting accounts seem to exist only to make the point of opposition to restoring the Athenian empire.

Those at Cnidus and Corinth never happened. Moreover, the conference at Sparta occurred without king’s sanction, independent of king’s policy, demonstrating the satrap Tiribazus acting independently. Most of these treaties appear to have had little impact on Persia’s claim on the

Greeks, although the Spartans officially yielded the Greeks in Asia to the Persian empire, despite their alleged aim of liberating them. The price for Persian aid was to yield Persian-held territory.

Sparta’s relationship with the north-western satrapies appears to have improved temporarily as a result of these agreements, and Persian intervention provided the resources necessary to disempower the Athenians in the Aegean Sea.

618 Mitchell 1997, 119. 619 Badian 1991, 28.

251

4.3.3 The Peace of Antalcidas (387/6)

The first Common Peace of 387/6 (also known as the King’s Peace and the Peace of

Antalcidas) was supposed to neutralize the conflicts between Athens, Sparta, and Persia.

Xenophon goes to great lengths describing how wearied of constant warfare both the

Lacedaemonians and the Athenians were at that point. The Argives and Corinthians also conceded to this peace, demonstrating at length the sacrifices and concessions the major parties involved made (Hellenica 5.1.29). In other words, these Greek poleis were disarmed on the international stage, and Asia Minor was ostensibly once again under Persian dominion. Persia even regained some of the original islands taken by the Delian League. The use of an external force or additional reinforcements to one side became a new custom in subsequent Greek treaties. Therefore, this particular peace developed into a turning point in external policy among the poleis. As occurs with all stated instances of truces (or near truces) with the Persian king, a degree of independence is lost to the Greek states making the peace. The Greeks in question are weakened by the peace, and the king gains some security, and with the Peace of Antalcidas, some degree of authority in Greece and among the Greeks.

The King’s Peace, although often bemoaned for its long-ranging effects, lacks the debate about its existence that surrounds the Peace of Callias. After all, contemporary sources as well as later ones discuss, complain, and accept this peace. The accepted date for its commission is

387/6, and the eponymous Antalcidas set the terms in a definite agreement with the king’s delegate. War came to an end with the peace negotiated between the Spartans and the Persians.

Sparta was set as the enforcer of this peace through all of Greece, and for the first time the term

252

eirene was used in reference to a peace rather than sponde.620 The change in terminology suggests that the peace was not simply a termination of hostilities but an establishment of a new relationship between the parties involved. Sparta, as the negotiators of this agreement, and its enforcers were able to do so in their self-appointed capacity, using the peace to their advantage in dominating Greece from 386 until 378, ending with the rise of the Second Athenian League.621

Authority had shifted with the king’s policy toward Greece. The king decided he held the power to dictate terms to the Greeks, and they simply complied. In 387, Artaxerxes through

Tiribazus set the terms of this peace as follows: the king gained control of all the Greek cities in

Asia Minor and a guarantee that no one city could dominate the Aegean. There would be autonomy among the islands and all the other poleis in Greece (Xenophon Hellenica 4.8.14-15).

What Xenophon outlines, however, shows he thinks that the Spartans only intended a bilateral truce but ended up speaking for all of Greece, both their allies and enemies.622 Since the intended hostilities that this peace was supposed to end were between Sparta and Persia,623 it would be peculiar to extend the same terms to the whole of Greece, much of which had successfully broken from Sparta’s hegemony due to Persian aid. Athens had even managed to refortify herself using misdirected Persian funds.

The circumstances have led to Artaxerxes’ decree must be considered to understand this peace fully. What has happened in Persia that the King would mandate such terms to his satrap and adviser? The beginning of Artaxerxes II’s reign saw Agesilaus and Cyrus the Younger

620 Ryder 1965, 5. 621 Hamilton 1991, 121. 622 Ryder 1965, 28; cf. Xenophon Hellenica 4.8.12-13. 623 Jehne 1994, 37-39.

253

leading armies into Persian territory on campaigns of liberation and conquest. Agesilaus was unable to conquer any fortification held by the king’s men. Despite this failure, he managed to stir enough unrest that the theoretical possibility of some Persians deserting the king remained.624

In fact, Spithridates did form an alliance with Agesilaus (Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 21.4). Justin claims that Artaxerxes was so eager to implement this peace because he had been preoccupied by the war with Egypt, and the king feared his armies would be tied up in Greece if he sent aid to the Spartans (6.6.2). Diodorus suggests he imposed the peace upon the Greeks to have a free rein to operate against Cyprus (Diodorus 14.110.5). The basic tangible result of the peace for the

Persians was victory on Cyprus, but not Egypt or .625 Yet with one fewer enemy to handle,

Persia was able to manage the rebellions of territory actually under its imperial jurisdiction.

In 392 when Sparta first sent Antalcidas to Persia, the Athenians and the Thebans were unnerved by the potential threat to themselves and their allies should Sparta gain Persian support for the Corinthian War, which was started partly by the spread of Persian gold against Sparta’s interests,626 and they sent their own envoys to negotiate their own treaties simultaneously to

Sparta’s truce.627 All the envoys were dismissed in 392/1 since at the time the king had no need to make a peace with any of the Greeks.628 However, Antalcidas’ suggestion of a peace in 388 met with a positive and prompt response from Artaxerxes in Susa. Control of Hellespont forced

624 Briant 2002, 641-3. 625 Briant 2002, 655. 626 Pausanias 3.9; Plutarch Artaxerxes 20: The Persians deployed Timocrates of Rhodes to bribe the other Greeks into attacking Spartan interests in 395. 627 Hamilton 1980, 89. 628 For a discussion of these failed peace talks, see Devoto 1986.

254

Athens to negotiate.629 In 387, Antalcidas was dispatched to Sardis once more to negotiate peace terms with Persia on Sparta’s behalf. Sparta’s goals were the end of the war in Greece in order to secure her position there, even if it meant withdrawing from Asia Minor and foregoing the stated goal of liberating the Greeks therein.630 In short, Artaxerxes dictated the terms for all the Greeks, rather than join an exclusively Sparto-Persian peace.

However, by 387 the other Greeks involved in the Corinthian War were wearied of warfare and had largely been defeated by sea. A peace congress with Sparta and Persia separately would have been acceptable. The other Greek poleis did not need to be involved with this truce. When the Spartans called a conference to ratify the Peace of Antalcidas, Thebes was singled out by Agesilaus for his wrath with the dissatisfactory terms of the truce.631 The Spartans were accused of Medizing and betraying the Greeks in Asia Minor to the Persians.632 Such a hostile response to what should be a peace and the first of a series of common peaces ratified between Greek poleis and the Persian King in the fourth century, suggests a glance at the peace’s terms is in order. Xenophon supplies the following terms as read out by Tiribazus:

Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι καὶ τῶν

νήσων Κλαζομενὰς καὶ Κύπρον, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας

αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι πλὴν Λήμνου καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου· ταύτας δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον

εἶναι Ἀθηναίων. ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, τούτοις ἐγὼ πολεμήσω

629 Cargill 1981, 8. 630 Hamilton 1980, 89. 631 Hamilton 1991, 117. 632 Plutarch Agesilaus 23.2; cf. Hamilton 1991: 119.

255

μετὰ τῶν ταῦτα βουλομένων καὶ πεζῇ καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ χρήμασιν

(Xenophon Hellenica 5.1.31).

King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the poleis in Asia are their own and the islands of

Clazomenae and Cyprus, all the other Greek poleis great and small are autonomous

except Lemnos and and Scyros. For these have belonged to Athens for a long

time. If any should not welcome this peace, I will make war on them with those who

want these things and enforce it by sea also, both with ships and with money.

In other words, the royal decision was that there would be peace in Greece, and the Greek assets in Asia were his to dispose of as he deemed fit. Further, this peace guaranteed the autonomy of the poleis involved. With the king’s backing, this peace would last forever, or so they suspected.

The Peace of Callias (or the Peace of Epilycus) certainly did not (Andocides 3.29). As presented by the Greeks, except Andocides who asserts that peace is much better than war in any circumstance (Andocides 3.1), this peace was not any form of mutual agreement as much as it was a decree dictated by the Persian King.633 The koine eirene amounts to a peace between the chief powers in Greece and a declaration of Greek autonomy at Persian hands, but left a significant room for interpretation.634

None of the Greek poleis seem to have been satisfied with this peace, particularly

Athens.635 Unlike the Peace of Callias, this peace is well attested, and demonstrates the king’s

633 Cf. Dandamaev 1989, 294. 634 Dillery 1995, 204; Jehne 1994, 40. 635 Philochorus FGrH 328 F149a claims that Athens rejected the peace because it placed the Ionians under Persian control; the signing ambassadors were exiled without trial, especially Epicrates, Andocides, Cratinus, and Euboulides. Bruce 2001, 57-62 claims that this peace refers to the Common Peace of 386 as Philochorus does not specify or provide relevant context; the implications of accepting the later date rather than 392. See also Keen 1995,

256

interest and authority within foreign states. Artaxerxes II dictated his terms to the Lydian satrap

Tiribazus in 387. With the Spartans effectively withdrawn from Asia Minor on account of the

Corinthian War, circumstances must have compelled Artaxerxes to make an agreement with the

Greeks. The king’s direct involvement rather than the usual delegation or unilateral decision by a satrap indicates that the Persian empire stood to gain from this agreement with the Greeks who participated in the Corinthian War. It seems unlikely that the Greeks had somehow become a threat to Persian stability, at least in 387.

Between 397 and 392, the satraps that had the most exposure to the Greeks were replaced. The Ionian satrap, Struthras, and Autophradates, the satrap of Lydia, were replaced by

Tiribazus, Artaxerxes’ trusted counselor and former satrap of Armenia in 388. Pharnabazus was recalled to Susa in 387 and replaced with Ariobarzanes as the satrap of Phrygia.636 Cyprus’ king,

Evagoras, had been paid off by Hecatomnus, commander of the fleet against Cyprus, shortly after the alliance with Athens.637

For the first time, there was a documented multilateral treaty, termed eirene (peace) instead of sponde (treaty), symmachia (alliance), or philia (friendship), guaranteeing the autonomy of all states involved in the agreement. The idea of guaranteed autonomy with a powerful enforcer was unheard of in a peace accord. Such a clause clarifies the peace’s aim of permanent and stable order throughout Greece,638 although it seems unlikely for peace among the

who argues against accepting the peace talks Philochorus refers to as those of the 392 negotiations since most use the silence of other sources as the basis for their support, and the Common Peace of 386 is much more established. See also Pownall 1995. 636 Cf. Diodorus 14.110-15.2 637 Briant 2002, 651. 638 Wilker 2012, 104.

257

Hellenic poleis to concern the Persian king to that degree. The absence of a defined, fixed duration for this treaty indicates that the peace, as Persia’s treaties tended to be, was established with the idea of permanence.639 Perhaps this design seems unimportant, but it is without precedent in Greek peace treaties even though as time progressed Athenian peaces were set out for longer durations, originally enduring for 5 years then moving from the Thirty Years Peace

(which did not meet its name), to the Peace of Nicias, which was intended to last for fifty years.

One fundamental flaw in the idea of permanence is the failure to account for all the hostilities among the poleis. Another was that only the poleis involved in the Corinthian War and their immediate allies were included in the guarantee for autonomy. Even worse, this was not a peace sought out by the majority of these Greek poleis but a decree of a barbarian king.640

Violent changes to the constitutions and imposition of harmosts641 within the poleis followed the peace, demonstrating the turmoil which followed the agreement. Further, the imposed autonomy generally threatened the necessary, durable, and contractual protection from rivals regardless of which police held dominant position.642

Matters in Persia were hardly settled by this peace, although the terms did allow a degree of remission from Greco-Persian conflict and weakened the Greeks against them. The terms of the peace favored the Persians heavily and struck against specific members of the peace. The clause indicating that Cyprus and Clazomenae as well as Asia Minor belong to Persia struck

639 Wilker 2012, 107. 640 Perlman 1985, 157. 641 The was a previously Spartan office, generally imposed in territory taken by Sparta to maintain control of conquered territory filling the roll of a military governor. 642 Wilker 2012, 106.

258

against Athens and its alliance with the Cypriots and the Egyptians formed in 389 (Xenophon

Hellenica 5.1.25-31). Athens had also crossed Persia by way of Conon’s use of Persia’s money to refortify Athens and Piraeus.643 With Sparta as its chief ally in this treaty, Persia asserted its unprecedented authority in Greece and kept the Athenians out of Persian territory. The declaration of Sparta as prostates also led to the abuse of this power as a means to enforce

Sparta’s agenda and to allow the Spartans to attempt to restore their failed hegemony.

The ensuing internal strife in Greece kept the Greeks too preoccupied to invade Persia uninvited for several decades.644 The Greek states now vied for Persian approval of their policies, hegemonies, and leadership in Greece.645 Each subsequent koine eirene reasserted the king’s authority in Greece, and reaffirmed the Greek fear of the Persian king reinforcing the established hegemony.646 Internally, the Persians were free to use their resources to recapture Egypt after the war with the Spartans was over. Artaxerxes also attempted, unsuccessfully, to subdue the

Cadusian tribes in the Median satrapy.647 Tiribazus led an effort against Cyprus in 382, using

Greek mercenaries as the nucleus of the attacking army.

The Greeks obviously did not concern the Persian king as much as rebellions in his own empire during either period. For each peace the attitude and the degree of seriousness with which the Persians treated it depended on which Persian authority dictated it and why the Persians made the truce. The koine eirene stood stronger with both parties because of the king’s direct

643 Xenophon Hellenica 4.12-17: Tiribazus imprisoned Conon for not promoting the re-establishment of Persian control over the Greek cities of Asia Minor. 644 Greek mercenaries and support for each side were essential during the Satrapal Revolts from 366-360. Cf. Weiskopf 1989. 645 For example the embassies of 367, when the Thebans were approved over the Athenians and Spartans. 646 Tuplin 1993, 153. 647 Dandamaev 1989, 294.

259

involvement. Later Hellenic peace treaties and agreements would be filtered through the Persians for approval and validation, as seen with the koinai eirenai of 375, 371, 367, 366, and 362. The results of this peace were a decline in political stability, Hellenic powers vying for the positions of prostates, and yet an unprecedented bloodless victory over the Greeks for the Persians.

4.3.4 Common Peaces After the King’s Peace

The balance of power between the Greeks and the Persians, as mentioned (4.3.3), notably shifted after the peace of Antalcidas. While the Greeks still tended toward conflict between the poleis, the prostates had the additional clout of Persia’s threat to reinforce universal autonomy in

Greece. For the Greeks, this peace meant power lay with whomever Persia ratified as the prostates among them. Consequently, rather than peace, the product of such a threat among the

Greeks was fierce competition for dominance of this unofficial hegemonic power. Likewise, the

Persians experienced upheaval after the Peace of Antalcidas, although for different reasons.

It served the Persians’ interests to keep the Greeks fighting amongst themselves, turning the theoretical peace into a form of control. The Greeks, while pre-occupied with internal dominance of their immediate neighbors such as Thebes, Sparta, and Athens, paid little attention to their wavering campaigns to liberate the Greeks in Asia Minor from Persian control. The

Persians, in turn, were able to focus on the various rebellions and cases of civil strife within the empire itself. Relative stability within the borders of the northwestern satrapies allowed the

Persian king at the time of each peace agreement to focus on the other aspects of the vast empire.

The peace that officially ended the Corinthian War in 386 was intended to last perpetually. Instead it barely survived Greek political strife until 378. An Athenian-Chian

2 alliance came into being in 384 (IG II 34; RO 20) which stated that the two states were

260

autonomous and free in strict adherence to the framework of the Peace of Antalcidas. It is noteworthy that this is the earliest known Athenian alliance following the Peace of Antalcidas648,

2 and offers “good things to the people of Athens and to all of Greece and the king” (IG II 34.3-

17). Rhodes and Osborne observe that despite the language of this inscription, it is unlikely that the Persian king would have sworn as an equal partner with the Greeks.649 In 382, the Chalcidian

League was formed under the leadership of the Olynthians, which was perceived as a threat to the other Greek poleis in the area.650Alliances were formed between Athens and Thebes with the

Chalcidian League. Speeches given at the subsequent congress at Olynthus demonstrate that although this alliance was not a violation of the common peace, it was a threat to the nascent hegemony, and while Thebes was free to unite with this league had it wished, such a consolidation could endanger the Spartans.651

As far as the Persians were concerned, however, there was no violation of their eirene with the Greeks. Despite the looming threat Xenophon indicates in his list of the peace terms described above, Persia never enforced the autonomy clause in Greece nor did the Greeks ever report its violation. The threat appears to have been sufficient deterrent for the actions taken by the Greeks since even the Second Athenian League formed in the 370s honored the autonomy clause, stating directly that the members have joined as “free and autonomous” states (RO 22, 9-

15). Further, after 386, common peaces were actively sought out by the Greek poleis to enforce their authority among their allies as well as their enemies.

648 Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 86. 649 Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 86. 650 Buckler and Beck 2008, 73. 651 Buckler and Beck 2008, 75.

261

In 375, the second Common Peace was established with the stagnation of the war in

Greece. The Athenians seized the opportunity to reassert themselves as leaders in the Aegean

Sea and claimed they had gone to war to force the Spartans to respect the Peace of Antalcidas

(Diodorus 15.38.2-4).652 To do so, they needed Persia’s support in the form of a renewed incentive for the Spartans to stop pursuing Thebes.653 Diodorus claims that the Persian king was responsible for the initiative behind the treaty because of his need for Greek soldiers (15.38.1).

On account of the problems following the original common peace, this clause contained an additional clause ensuring that all poleis should be free of external garrisons (Diodorus 15.38.2), such as those Sparta left to reinforce its hegemony. Since Thebes was the target of these garrisons, and had become Athens’ principal ally in central Greece in the 380s and early 370s, this clause favored Thebes more than any other polis included in this peace agreement. In other words, Thebes emerged victorious from the Athenian peace established with the Persians.

Theoretically, the Second Athenian League was ratified by this peace agreement.654

Following the Battle of Leuctra, the Athenians, Thebans, and Spartans sent envoys to

Sardis with fluctuating success to ratify the end of their war with Persia’s approval in 372/1 BCE

The pattern that emerged was an increased reliance on non-Greek parties to mitigate conflicts among the Greek poleis. Autonomy and peace clearly did not work for the Greeks since there was constant strife from the end of the Peloponnesian War until their forcible union first under

Philip II, and then under Alexander III of Macedon. Wars in Greece were closed by external

652 See also Dmetriev 2011, 57-58. 653 Ryder 1966, 58; Perlman 1976, 158; Jehne 1994, 58. 654 Ryder 1966, 59.

262

forces, both Persian and Macedonian, in the fourth century as opposed to previous peace accords arranged by representatives between the warring poleis in attempt to end the discord. General autonomy became a guarantee for an unlimited term for all Greek states as a key element for all

Common Peaces. These peace agreements were a new type, which broke the traditions of international law, set up to have permanent legal force.655

In light of how serious of an ideological shift such a peace accord would be it becomes necessary to reconsider the Persians’ role and goals in these agreements. Rather than attempting to impose the royal will on non-subjects of the Persian empire with these common peaces, the king began to treat the warring Greeks as though they were his subjects. To what degree did the

Persians feel their intervention in Greek politics as the arbiters of peace among the Hellenic poleis benefited the empire?

The Common Peace in 371 confirmed definitely that the Greeks and Persians found this new type of eirene mutually beneficial, or at least reassuring. New rivals for resources and power rose within Greece throughout the Sparto-Boeotian War which culminated at the Battle of

Leuctra. Against this background, Artaxerxes sent envoys to make peace following Leuctra.656

The agreement instated the Thebans as the dominant power in Greece and lasted for five years

(Diodorus 15.76.2-3). The Thebans held the power of prostates following this truce, which ratified the Theban Hegemony uniting Boeotia despite the claims of Athens and Sparta to alliances with Plataea and Phocis respectively. Amphipolis was guaranteed its autonomy, particularly from Athenian domination, and the Athenian fleet dissolved, demonstrating the loss

655 Wilker 2012, 103. 656 Cf. Jehne 1994, 77.

263

of Persia’s official favor on Athens’ behalf.657 During these negotiations, Pelopidas clearly set his goal to end Athenian and Spartan hegemony, with Persia’s backing. This agenda allowed the

Persians to set self-serving terms,658 and favor the polis of their choosing based on the strength of their alliances and previous relations with Persia. The terms included set out to nullify all earlier congresses granting Athenian power especially on the sea.659

At the Congress at Susa in 367, a combination of factors brought the petitioners together to establish another common peace. A degree of desperation resulted in the convention of embassies from Sparta, Athens, and Persia following the convention at Thebes to ratify an end to the war (Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.27-33; Diodorus15.72.3; Plutarch Agesilaus 33.5; Plutarch

Artaxerxes 22.6). Theban leadership in Greece did not work. The king’s position had displayed signs of weakness during these negotiations, conceding to Athens’ ownership of Amphipolis (RO

38), a term in direct contrast to those of the previous koine eirene.660 Sparta’s need for funding and claim of Messene propelled the Lacedaemonian envoys to appeal to the Persian diplomats

(Xenophon Hellenica 7.4.1). Athens joined the alliance to suppress Amphipolis.661 With Persia presenting such an unintimidating image of an unstable and weak empire to the west rather than the traditional powerful authority, however, there was very little incentive to adhere to the terms of this peace agreement. In the spring of 366, Ariobarzanes sent embassies to various Greek

657 Ryder 1957, 202. 658 Jehne 1994, 100. 659 Heskel 1997, 127. 660 Ryder 1965, 81. 661 Heskel 1997, 125-6.

264

states to garner support of his efforts in Asia Minor ostensibly, although he shortly would be in position to revolt against Artaxerxes.

Xenophon’s account (Hellenica 7.1.33ff) shows the 367 mission as one limited in duration, confined to a single year, and the only known mission to Persia for Leon and

Timagoras from Athens.662 There was no apparent maintenance of intact envoy teams such as

Leon and Timagoras generally or to particular states, suggesting that these diplomatic teams would have been inconsistent and inconstant due to frequent change of representation and location.663 Generally, embassies to Persia lent themselves to exaggeration or assertions of scandal, making it unsurprising if Demosthenes exaggerated his claim against this set of ambassadors (20.146).664 Artaxerxes had his hands full in 361665 when Antalcidas returned as an envoy from Sparta (cf. Xenophon Agesilaus 2.28-31; Diodorus 15.92). He, therefore, refused to help Sparta, especially following the actions Agesilaus, discussed above (1.3).666

Stability among the Greeks was rare, as evidenced by the warring of the poleis to the extent that there was yet another common peace established at the direction of the king of Persia in 362. By the end of the 360s, the direct involvement of the king served as a reminder that even though the satraps particularly of the western frontier had rebelled against him, he was still the king of a mighty empire with the accompanying resources at his disposal (Diodorus 15.94.1).

Contrary to the Greek representation of the Persians as weak, and non-threatening, the Greeks

662 Mosley 1968, 157. 663 Mosley 1968, 158. 664 Mosley 1968, 160. 665 As of 361, Artaxerxes’ other western concerns included the Satrap’s Revolt (See 1.1.4), and Egypt’s continued revolt Diodorus 15.91-95). Other concerns for the stability of the empire included the frequent revolts of the Cadusians (Diodorus 17.6.1-2; Justin 10.3.2-5) and securing his hold on the throne. 666 Buckler 2003, 143.

265

relied on external forces to maintain order within their native territory. During this period of satrapal revolt and general instability in the north-western regions of the empire, for the great king to even send a representative to the Greeks seems unlikely, as Jehne points out.667 If, however, they were treating the European Greeks as subjects of the empire such a venture would seem mandatory toward the stability of the empire’s borders. Through such diplomatic means, the Persian king managed to wield his customary authority in poleis where he had none, using representatives rather than appearing himself.

Persian ambitions do not necessarily appear to have turned toward the Hellenic states in

Europe for the sake of these peace treaties. Rather, the satraps invested in peace closer to their borders as well as friendships and treaties that divided the Greeks among themselves. Persian involvement in these alliances subsides as the priorities became internal stability rather than external expansion. These treaties kept the more ambitious Greeks pre-occupied with securing their own territory, fighting over autonomy, and towing the line of maintaining the terms. In turn, the Persians officially sanctioned the treaties although never had to reinforce them. Other parties received similar treatment at the outskirts of the empire, although actual subject states did not receive the same respect (See discussion in 4.4).

4.4 Persian Alliances with non-Greeks

This section considers how the Persians used peace and diplomacy throughout their empire as well as dealing with non-Greek civilizations. Other states with which the Persians dealt included , closer to the Persian Empire’s core than the Greeks, and likely the Carthaginians

667 Jehne 1994, 109.

266

who were descended from the Phoenicians, although diplomatic relations and treaties appear to have limited documentation had these contacts existed. Looking outside the empire for treaties and negotiations perhaps is not necessarily the only way to determine how the Persians developed eirenai and diplomatic relationships with non-Hellenic peoples. This section will look at examples of how Persia engaged in diplomacy outside of Greece and how the Persians made peace with rebelling non-Persian provinces.

One drawback to considering the Persians and their methods for making peace with non-

Persians is that the majority of the surviving records of such events were put together by Greek sources. As a result of the shortage of written sources to establish more than a glimpse of Persian diplomacy with other peoples beyond their borders, archaeological finds that would be difficult to explain otherwise appear in Siberia, and Thrace become the best way to determine that such events occurred.668 Hellenic interests in the dealings between the Persian Empire and non-

Hellenic cultures were limited to those with whom the Greeks had formed alliances and established definite connections.

Persian internal politics could be relatively simple at least in theory. The king was the central authority within his empire, with his satraps, whom he could replace at his whim, governing in his name on borrowed royal authority. Diplomacy, therefore, operated simply.

Relations were established from the top downward. The king’s actions focused on controlling the

Persian elite, especially those who were conquered as part of the Persian peace. Refusal to

668 Brosius 2012, 151.

267

comply with the decrees of the king met with severe punishment.669 When the king conquered new territories, he established the firm authoritative hand of the Persian peace throughout the empire. As long as the territories complied with his demands, the king enjoyed a reputation for bringing justice and order to the newly conquered regions.

According to Herodotus, the Ionians and Aeolians in Asia Minor learned this policy of the

Persian emperor during the fall of Lydia to Cyrus the Great. When the Persian king received the messengers from these Greek poleis, they proposed that the king accept their submission under the same terms as had. The messengers received a story and an angry retort from the king that they would not revolt against Lydian domination when prompted but were prepared to kneel before him now that he was victorious. The result of these alleged negotiations was that the

Milesians alone received their pre-existing terms, and the rest of the Greeks in Asia Minor received warnings to fortify their poleis (Herodotus 1.141). This incident exemplifies the structure of diplomatic negotiations within the empire although at the time described the envoys represented non-subject states which Cyrus was about to conquer rather than actual subjects.

In contrast to these negotiations and the hostility to those who failed to submit at the desired time, Cyrus’ conquest of Babylon was achieved legally, peacefully, and diplomatically.

A column relates the peaceful conquest of Babylon, how Cyrus was welcomed as a saviour, and how the great Persian king spared the city (ABC 7, col. III. II.12-19). , the Babylonian king, reported by Daniel to have been at least temporarily mad (Daniel 4), had left the city by the time of Cyrus’ arrival. This convenient absence seems to have been manoeuvred by diplomatic

669 Brosius 2012, 152.

268

relations with high officials and the ruling elite of Babylon to ensure a smooth transition of power.670 The military action which followed the surrender of Babylon took place outside the city’s walls, where the hereditary king of Babylon resisted Persian domination. According to

Cyrus, the rest of the Babylonians apparently deemed Cyrus a benevolent rescuer from their previous condition, as evidenced in the . The combination of each of these incidents demonstrates the role of diplomacy in the Persian Empire. If the king’s will was not obeyed in all official negotiations, the Achaemenids replaced diplomacy with military actions, usually employing crushing force.671

Another case in which the Persian governors formed treaties through diplomatic relations is that of internal rebellions against Persian dominance. With an empire of that size, the chances of at least one subject rebelling ran high. Not every subject nation joined the empire willingly.

Egypt, in particular, frequently expressed its desire to leave the Persian umbrella by means of frequent rebellions against the king of Persia. After these revolts, reconciliation could only happen with the aid of diplomatic negotiations, wherein the rebels received due punishment, and the state returned to the fold. In rare cases, the leaders of the revolt had a mediator, as occurred with Evagoras of Rhodes. Such an allowance marked a notable change in western foreign policy in allowing Evagoras’ survival and continuance in a position of power.672 Traditionally, Persian leaders executed the rebel leaders (DB 1.16; 2.23-27; 3.46), as occurred in the revolt of Inarus from 461 to 455 (Ctesias Persica FGrH 688 F14. 40-43). Such treatment hardly marks

670 Brosius 2012, 153. 671 Brosius 2012, 153. 672 Brosius 2012, 157.

269

diplomatic interests or peaceful reconciliation. However, this incident does reflect the policy of the Persians to negotiate the surrender of those who had not provoked their military force.

Exceptions could be made to this treatment. For example, Egypt’s multiple revolts were not resolved diplomatically but with force. These rebellions against imperial authority endured for an extended period. The first revolt, which had Athenian support, lasted much too long for diplomatic tactics to seem effective. Instead the response was militant, and the leader was executed (Thucydides 1.104, 109-110, 112; Ctesias Persica FGrH 688 F14 3-8; Diodorus

11.71). A second considerable rebellion from the empire’s control occurred in the fourth century, lasted much longer, and had a more significant impact on the empire. Egypt’s longest revolt from

Persian control ran simultaneously with other rebellions within empire in the 360s, the combined revolts cut off half of royal revenue (Diodorus 15.90.3-4), with the support of Spartan mercenaries (Xenophon Agesilaus 2.26; Plutarch Agesilaus 36-40). Tachos took advantage of

Persian discord to prevent the invasion of Egypt and the re-subjugation of the province, with the hope to establish his own hold on the throne of Egypt.673

Rather than diplomacy with the rebelling state, Artaxerxes employed diplomacy with other states, particularly the European Greeks, to resolve the conflict. The rebellion endured until

Egypt was finally recaptured in the 340s, with a significant number of Greek mercenaries under the command of Artaxerxes. Diplomatic tactics recruited them from European poleis (Diodorus

16.44.1), namely to prevent employment by Egypt.674 This use of allies and external forces to

673 Moysey 1992, 163. 674 Ruzicka 2012, 177.

270

intimidate the Egyptian rebels into submission in 343675 demonstrates the Persian tactic of employing its resources to maintain or retain its boundaries, in this case its financial ones. The recapture of Egypt after an extensive revolt, exhibits the Persian king himself employing the model of diplomacy Tuplin summarizes as use of external forces, and ignoring the possibility of local assistance to rebellion.676

Collaboration with non-rebellious subjects likely accounted for some of the leniency toward states in rebellion as well as the interest in continued relations with their subject nation.677

Such a system worked to Persia’s advantage. Even though one leader had rebelled, his dynasty was allowed to remain in power, likely to maintain stability and garnish the favor of the inhabitants of the rebellious state. Although this system included enormous risks by allowing local dynasties to remain in positions of influence and to gain support of traditional allies, the

Persians allowed it to remain intact for decades.678 Perhaps no established agreement arose from these events, but since Persia dominated Egypt, it had no need for an official treaty or peace as seen with the Greeks.

Royal authority extended throughout the empire, and enforcing the peace of this empire led to stability and prosperity since it allowed the subjects to focus on other matters such as trade and technological . In this empire, it became possible to appeal to the king and his satraps as a higher power, as occurred in the conflict between Miletus and Myus.679 Based on

675 Ruzicka 2012, 182. 676 Tuplin 2015, 680; see also Ruzicka 2012, 66-198. 677 Briant 2002, 576. 678 Briant 2002, 576-7. 679 Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 16.

271

material evidence found outside the traditional reach of the Persian Empire, the Persians successfully established trade or at least some form of diplomatic missions outside of the Greeks.

In light of the treatment of rebellious subjects, mediation of some form likely took place, although only if it suited the royal agenda.

4.5 Conclusion

Peace relations between the Greeks and Persians only took place when it suited the interests of each party. The Persians proved willing to ratify terms that were unjust and unfair for certain unrepresented poleis as it suited their negotiations. In certain cases, the question of utility to the empire should be asked before crediting every Greek account of a peace’s agreement. The terms listed of the Peace of Callias in particular seem peculiar, rendering its existent debatable, although it seems as though some form of agreement existed. It seems unlikely that the

Athenians successfully sought out the Persians and demanded a treaty with the relatively unharmed Persian empire. Nothing about the circumstances in Persia in the fifth century suggests that the king would yield such territory, although the beginnings of diplomacy allowed the two states to establish trade and use their resources for more pressing concerns like internal rebellion.

One key component of Persian foreign policy to bear in mind when considering the concessions and negotiations discussed here is that nothing the Persian king agreed to was done without the aim of benefiting the empire, usually by maintaining internal stability. When the king engaged in diplomacy outside the empire, envoys came to his representatives and serving his will was the anticipated aim of such missions. His representatives ended rebellions without alienating his subjects out of prudence. The response to rebel leaders was swift and decisive, and in most cases resulted in capital punishment.

272

In the case of the Common Peaces, first established in 387/6, the king extended his royal authority to force an eirene among the Greeks that would be enforced by the Persians. The terms may have fluctuated with each peace, but the treatment of the Greeks, especially with the

Hellenic prostates changing each time, did not. Despite the decline in stability in both Greece and Persia as the fourth century progressed, the king of Persia had begun to treat the warring

Hellenic poleis as though they were subject to his royal authority. Although initially disgruntled by such accords, the Greeks responded as though the king’s threatened enforcement of these peace agreements was realistic. In other words, despite the lack of official sovereignty over the poleis, Artaxerxes was able to treat the Hellenic poleis as though they were rebellious leaders under his jurisdiction. These tactics provided some means of extending the northwestern boundaries, through treatment of the non-subject Greek states in a comparatively similar manner to rebellious subjects, especially through the establishment of Persian enforced Common Peaces.

273

Conclusion

Based on the above discussion, the obvious conclusion is that Persian intervention in

Greek political affairs occurred as it benefitted the Persian potentates rather than out of fear of

Greek influence or Greek arms, as the Greeks expressed in their written works. In many cases, the written and material evidence disagree (See 2.1). The mandate to expand the borders when possible or to fortify them motivated the satraps on the north-western frontiers of the empire to interfere in Greece whenever timing suited them. Often this behavior mimicked the treatment of

Persia’s subject states by these powerful entities. The Greeks were far from alone in their interactions with the outskirts of the Persian empire.

Rather than random interference among the Greeks, the Persians took interest in the

Greeks with the aim of stabilizing their own territories, usually within a satrapy, or expanding them. In other words, the Persians only took interest in Greeks as to ensure the stability of the empire or in support of rebellions against it. Satraps often designated their successors, making the positions seem hereditary. As a result, the process of acculturation and the proximity of the

Greeks to the edges of the empire made interference easy.

Although the Persian elite did not forget their heritage, the royal courts were often far and local leaders governed local affairs. Cyrus the Younger’s ability to exploit these extended loyalties in support of his revolt caused a significant shift in the king’s policy toward the northwestern frontiers of his empire, as well as toward the states with which there was the most contact. Moreover, such interference occurred not through animosity but through the treatment of the Greeks in a manner similar to Persian subjects, and Persian rebels. Whatever power Persia

274

held was permitted by the Greeks due to constant conflicts between the poleis and fear of Persian retribution.

Officially Persia had limited authority outside of the Persian Empire, as seems obvious. It expressed an unofficial degree of authority through the response to Persian presence, especially that of the satraps. The satraps’ extension of regal power allowed them to exercise their power within their own borders, and to do what was necessary to secure their own borders. In other words, the power of the satraps was borrowed from the king. Consequently, they applied the royal directive, and expanded their boundaries when possible. With the Greeks divided amongst themselves, there was little threat to Persia’s claim to the Aegean. To that end, various satraps secured the Aegean both through diplomacy and through the subversion of Spartan and Athenian authority among islands rather than actively making war on Greeks. Yet such actions only can be seen on the coast of the Aegean, where the Persians most frequently encountered the Greeks.

Obviously, the Persians were in the habit of prioritizing stability in their own territory over conquering or stabilizing Greek territory, especially central territory over peripheral, as that of

Lydia or Phrygia.

Records exist demonstrating the employment of Greek individuals, the use of Hellenic services, and corresponding remuneration as fit the employment. The habit of granting estates to

Greek favorites dependents reflects the political and social status granted to Persian potentates with dependents. That is, the more dependents, the greater the individual’s political status.

Skilled laborers and artisans found employment and favor throughout Persia. Often exiles were not brought to the royal court, despite the writings of Plutarch. The presence of so many

275

European Greeks was not necessarily because of their intrinsic value, although it did provide access to the Greek techniques, trades, and writings (See 1.2).

The pattern of collaborating rather than necessarily dominating in difficult to secure regions matches the treatment of the Greeks in Europe. The Greeks, when faced with the possibility of one of their own poleis dominating them, sought out Persia’s intervention, thereby voluntarily granting a non-Greek official authority over Greece, at least as an arbiter. Frequently, the inimical poleis required Persian help and support in order to achieve success in their goal, as made evident to the Thebans in the Third Sacred War (1.3). What was more important than nominal authority among the Greeks was the Greek perception of Persia’s authority and Greek fear of a less predictable, much closer enemy. Persia’s authority gradually, inconsistently, reached into Greece, as validated by the Greeks. Moreover, Philip’s response demonstrates how threatened his Greek ambitions were by the actions of the satraps in collaboration with the

Greeks (See 4.3.4).

Betrayal appears in Greek sources for many circumstance of direct Greek contact with

Persia, although no other groups of people, such as Italians or Egyptians, both of whom the

Athenians had contact with. The overall benefit to the Persians should be looked at in the cases of such allegations. There were exceptions, such as the practice of gifts as cultural exchange, and signs of favoritism. Persian money and Persian goods were highly valued, as demonstrated through continued trade between the Athenians and the Persians. Moreover, allegations of corruption followed the Persian habit of rewarding the services to the Persian Empire.

What has been shown is that despite the image of luxury, weakness, and emasculation within Persia, the Greeks were desirous, perhaps even envious, of the fortunes available. When

276

offered a sampling of this perceived luxury, only a few are reported to have resisted temptation.

The suspicions that fell on the envoys reflect the conflicting attitude; perhaps the fear that exposure to Persia’s customs motivated some of the accusations and contemporary depictions of corruption as a result of playing the Persian. The bribery of politicians seems to have been a reality; the consequences of these actions failed to outweigh the potential gains. However, these actions only occur when it benefited the Persian Empire (See 3.2). As the empire became less stable, the purchase of Greek services became more common, especially for services on the western coast.

International diplomacy only took place as suited the interests of each party, although the

Persians performing the negotiations were less likely to negotiate than dictate their terms using borrowed royal authority. As a result, peace agreements often were unjust toward certain poleis that were not represented in the negotiations. The utility to the empire should be considered before crediting every Greek account of a peace since often the Greek sources, especially ones written considerably later, tended to exaggerate in the Greeks’ favor. For instance, the Persian position, when considered, reveals the unlikely terms of the Peace of Callias. Greeks and other cultures alike would be met with violence for failure to comply. The result of diplomacy allowed the two states to establish trade and use their resources for more pressing concerns like internal rebellion.

Despite the decline in stability in both Greece and Persia as the fourth century progressed, the king of Persia had begun to treat the warring Hellenic poleis as though they were subject to his royal authority, which was undermined by the obvious loss of stability as the satraps revolted in the west. The king’s threatened enforcement of these peace agreements was an effective

277

deterrent to direct violation of the peace terms, thereby keeping the poleis divided among themselves. Despite the lack of official sovereignty between the poleis, Artaxerxes was able to treat the Hellenic poleis as though they were rebellious leaders under his jurisdiction.

The idea of corruption in attempt to collaborate with the Persians appears to have returned once the hostilities against the Persians renewed. Diplomacy seems to have been similar to the treatment of subjects and subjects in rebellion. Persian authority extended through Greek action more than any Persian, reflecting Greek fear of Persian dominion more than Persia’s plot to conquer the Greeks of Europe. Ultimately, the Greek-dominated sources demonstrate that the

Pax Persica was easier to maintain than any hypothetical pax hellenica.

278

Bibliography

Ackroyd, P.R. 1970. Israel under Babylon and Persia. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Adcock, F. E. and D.J. Mosley. 1975. Diplomacy in . London: Thames& Hudson. Aidoso, T. 1996. “Tissaphernes’ dealings with the Greeks.” Classica et Mediaevalia 47: 89-108. Alcock, S.E. et al., eds. 2001. Empires: Perspectives from archaeology and history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Alonso, V. 2007. “Peace and International Law in Ancient Greece” in War and Peace in the Ancient World, edited by K. Raaflaub, 206-225. Blackwell. Allen, K. H. 2003. “Intercultural exchanges in fourth century Attic Decrees.” 22 (2): 199-250. Almagor, E. 2017. “Plutarch and the Persians.” Electrum 24: 123-170. Anderson, J.K. 1974. “The Battle of Sardis in 395.” California Studies in Classical Antiquity 7: 27-53. Anson, E. 1989. “The Persian fleet in 334.” Classical Philology 84(1): 44-49. Antela-Bernardez, B. 2012. “Philip and Pausanias: a deadly love in Macedonian politics” Classical Quarterly 62 (1): 859-861. Arrington, N.T. 2011. “Inscribing defeat: The commemorative dynamics of the Athenian casualty lists.” Classical Antiquity 30 (2): 179-212. Aston, E. 2012. “Friends in High Places: the Stereotype of Dangerous Thessalian Hospitality in the Later Classical Period” Phoenix 66 (3/4): 247-271. Badian, E. 1987. “The Peace of Callias.” Journal of 107: 1-39. ———. 1991. “The King’s Peace.” In Georgica: Studies in Honour of George Cawkwell, . London: University of London. ———.1992. From Potidaea to Plataea. John Hopkins University Press. ———. 2003. “The Death of Philip II.” Phoenix 17 (4): 244-250. Bakewell, G. 1998. “Persae 374-83: Persians, Greeks, and ΠΕΙΘΑΡΧΩΙ ΦΡΕΝΙ.” Classical Philology 93: 232-236. Balcer, J. M. 1972. “The date of Herodotus IV.1 Darius’ Scythian Expedition.” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 76: 99-132. ———. 1974. “Separatism and anti-separatism in the Athenian Empire (478-433 B.C.).” Historia. 23(1): 21-39. ———. 1976. “Imperial magistrates in the Athenian Empire.” Historia 25: 257-287. ———. 1977. “The Athenian Episkopos and the Achaemenid ‘King's Eye.’” AJP 98: 252-263. ———. 1983. “The Greeks and the Persians: The process of acculturation.” Historia 32: 257- 267. ———. 1978. Athenian Regulations for Chalkis: Studies in Athenian Imperial Law. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. ———. 1984. Sparda by the bitter sea: imperial interaction in western Anatolia. Saarbrücken, Germany: Scholar’s Press. ———. 1987. Herodotus & Bisitun. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. ———. 1988. “Persian Occupied Thrace ().” Historia 37 (1): 1-21.

279

———. 1989. “Ionia and Sparda under the Achaemenid Empire: The sixth and fifth centuries tribute, taxation, and assessment.” In Le tribut dans l’Empire perse: actes de la table ronde de Paris. 12-13 décembre 1986. P. Briant and C. Herrenschmidt, 1-27. Paris: Peeters. ———. 1991. “The East Greeks under Persian rule: A reassessment.” In Achaemenid History VI. Asia Minor and Egypt: Old Cultures in a New Empire: Proceedings of the Groningen 1988 Achaemenid History Workshop. Edited by A. Kuhrt and H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, 57-65. Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten. ——— 1993. A prosopographical study of the ancient Persians royal and noble, c. 550-450 B.C. Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press. ———. 1994. “Herodotus, the ‘Early State’ and Lydia.” Historia 43(2): 246-249. ———. 1997. “The Liberation of Ionia: 478” Historia 46(3): 374-377. ———. 2008. Motivation and Narrative in Herodotus. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Basset, S. 2002. “Innocent victims or perjurers betrayed? The arrest of the Generals in Xenophon’s ‘Anabasis.’” Classical Quarterly 52 (2): 447-461. Bassi, K. 2007. “Spatial contingencies in Thucydides’ History” Classical Antiquity 26 (2):171- 218. Bayliss, A. 2013. “The Formulation and Procedures of Interstate Oaths” in Sommerstein and Bayliss, 151-184. Beck, H. 2001. ““The Laws of the Fathers” vs. “The Laws of the League”: Xenophon on Federalism.” Classical Philology 96 (4): 355-375. Bederman, D.J. 2001. International Law in Antiquity. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Ben-Yehuda, N. 1997. “Political assassination events as a cross-cultural form of alternative justice” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 38 (1-2): 25- Benjamin, S.G.W. 1886. “Persia and the Persians” Journal of the American Geographical Society of New York 18: 27-66. Bengston, H. 1968. The Greeks and the Persians: From the sixth to the fourth centuries. New York: Delacorte Press. Bigwood, J.M. 1980. “Diodorus and Ctesias.” Phoenix 34 (3): 195-207. ———. 1983. “The Ancient Accounts of the Battle of Cunaxa.” American Journal of Philology 104 (4): 340-357. Billows, R. 2010. Marathon: How one battle changed Western civilization. Blamire, A. 1975. “Epilycus’ Negotiations with Persia.” Phoenix 29 (1): 21-26. Bloedow, E. 1992. “The Peaces of Callias.” Symbolae Osloenae 67: 41-68. Boardman, J. 2000. Persia and the West: an archaeological investigation of the genesis of Achaemenid Art. Boedeker, D. 1996. “Heroic Historiography: Simonides and Herodotus on Plataea.” Arethusa 29 (2): 223-242. ———. 1987. “The Two Faces of Demaratus” Arethusa 20 (1,2): 185-201. Boedeker, D. and K. Raaflaub, eds. 1998. Democracy, Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ——— and S. Sider. 2001. The New Simonides. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

280

Bolmarcich, S. 2012. “Thucydides’ Theory of Negotiation.” In Maintaining Peace and Interstate Stability in Archaic and . edited by J. Wilker, 78-91. Mainz: Verlag Antike. Bonfante, L., ed. 2011. The barbarians of Ancient Europe: realities and interactions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bosworth, A.B. 1990. “Plutarch, Callisthenes and the Peace of Callias.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 110:1-13. Bouchet, C. 2007. “Conon, Navarque Perse a Cnide en 394?” Rivista di Cultura Classica e Mediovale 2: 231-247. Breslin, T. 2002. Beyond Pain: the role of pleasure and culture in the making of foreign affairs. Westport, CT: Praeger. Briant, P. 2003. “New Trends in Achaemenid History.” Bulletin 17 (1-2): 33-47. ———. 2003a. “Histoire et archéologie d’un texte. La Lettre de Darius a Gadatas entre Perses, Grecs et Romains.” In Licia e Lidia prima dell'ellenizzazione: Atti del convegno internazionale, Roma, 11-12 ottobre 1999. Edited by M. Giogieri et al., 107-144. . ———. 2002. From Cyrus to Alexander: A history of the Persian Empire. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbraun. ———. 2002a. “History and Ideology: The Greeks and Persian decadence.” In Greeks and Barbarians (Edinburgh Readings of the Ancient World), edited by T. Harrison, 193-210. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. ———.1999. “L’histoire de l’empire achéménide aujourd’hui: L’historien et ses documents (commentaire de l’auteur).” Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales 54 (5): 1127-1136. ———.1987. « Institutions perses et histoire comparatiste dans l'historiographie grecque. » In Achaemenid History II : The Greek sources edited by H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg and A. Kuhrt, 1-10. Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten. ———. 1985. « Dons de terres et de villes: l’Asie Mineure dans le contexte Achemenide. » Revue des Etudes Anciennes: 54-72. ———. 1984. L’Asie Centrale et les Royaumes Proche-Orientaux du Premier Millénaire (c. VIIIe – IVe siècles avant notre ère). Paris: Éditions Recherche sur les Civilisations. ——— and C. Herrenschmidt, eds. 1989. Le tribut dans L’empire perse: actes de la table ronde de Paris. 12-13 décembre 1986. Paris, Peeters. Bridges, E., E. Hall and P.J. Rhodes, eds. 2007. Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brosius, M. 2012.“Persian Diplomacy Between “Pax Persica” and “Zero Tolerance.”” In Maintaining Peace and Interstate Stability in Archaic and Classical Greece. edited by J. Wilker, 150-164. Mainz: Verlag Antike. ———.2011. “Greeks in the Persian Court.” In Ctesias’ World. Edited by J. Wiesehöfer, R. Rollinger, and G.B. Lanfranchi, 69-80. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. ———. 2011a. “Keeping up with the Persians: between cultural identity and Persianization in the Achaemenid period” in Cultural Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean, edited by E.S. Gruen, .Los Angeles: Getty Institute. ———. 2007. “New out of old? Court and court ceremonies in Achaemenid Persia.” In The Court and Court Society in Ancient Monarchies, edited by A.J.S. Spawforth, 17-57. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 281

———. 2006. The Persians. London: Routledge. ———. 2003. “Alexander and the Persians.” In Brill’s Companion to , edited by J. Roisman, 169-193. Leiden; Boston: Brill. ———. 1996. Women in Ancient Persia. Oxford : Claredon Press. Brouchet, C. 2014. Isocrate l’Athenien ou la belle hegemonie. Bordeaux: Ausonius. ———. 2007. “Conon, navarque perse a Cnide en 394?” Rivista di Cultura Classica e Medioevale 2: 231-248. Brown, T.S. 1988. “The Greek Exiles. Herodotus’ Contemporaries.” Ancient World 17: 17-28. ———. 1986. “Menon of Thessaly.” Historia 35 (4): 387-404. Bruce. I.A. F. 2001. "Philochorus on the King's Peace." In In Altum: Seventy-Five Years of Classical Studies in Newfoundland, edited by M. Joyal, 57-62. St John's, Newfoundland. ———. 1966. “Athenian Embassies in the Early Fourth Century.” Historia 15 (3): 272-281. ———. 1961. “The Democratic at Rhodes.” The Classical Quarterly 11 (2): 166- 170. Brunt, P.A. 1953. “The Hellenic League against Persia.” Historia 2 (2): 135-163. Buck, R. J. 1998. Thrasybulus and the . Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. ———. 1979. A History of Boeotia. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press. Buckler, J. 2003. Aegean Greece in the fourth century BC. Leiden: Brill. ———. 1999. “A Note on Diodorus 14.86.1.” Classical Philology 94 (2): 210-214. ———. 1989. Philip II and the Sacred War. Leiden: Brill. Buckler J. and H. Beck. 2008. Central Greece and the politics of power in the fourth century BC Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Burke, E.M. 2002. “The Early Political Speeches of Demosthenes: Elite Bias in Response to Economic Crisis.” Classical Antiquity 21 (2): 165-193 ———. 1978. “The Greeks at War in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC.” Military Affairs 42 (3): 142-143. Burkert, W. 2004. Babylon, Memphis, Persepolis: Eastern Contexts of Greek Culture. Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press. ———., ed. 1990. Hérodote et les peuples non grecs: Neuf expose suivis de discussions. Geneva: Fondation-Hardt.Burn, A.R. 1984. Persia and the Greeks: The defence of the West 480- 431. New York: St. Martin’s Press. ———. 1969. “Hammond on Marathon: A Few Notes.” Journal of Hellenic Studies. 89: 118- 120. ———. 1965. “The Generalship of Alexander.” Greece & Rome 12 (2): 140-154. Butler, M.E. 2010. “The Logic of Opportunity: Philip II, Demosthenes, and the Charistmatic Imagination” Syllecta Classica 21: 1-33. Cahill, N. 1985. “The Treasury at Persepolis: Gift-Giving at the City of the Persians.” American Journal of Archaeology 89 (3): 373-389. Cameron, G.G. 1973. “The Persian Satrapies and Related Matters.” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 32 (1/2): 47-56. ———. 1948. The Persepolis Treasury Tablets. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Carawan, E.M. 1989. “Thucydides and Stesimbrotus on the Exile of Themistocles.” Historia 38 (2): 144-161.

282

Cartledge, P. 1987. Agesilaos and the crisis of Sparta. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Cawkwell, G.L. 2011. From Cyrene to Chaeronea. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———.2005. The Greek Wars: The failure of Persia. New York: Oxford University Press. ———. 1997a. Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War. New York: Routledge. ———. 1997. “The Peace between Athens and Persia.” Phoenix 51 (2): 115. ———. 1976a. “Agesilaus and Sparta.” Classical Quarterly 26 (1): 62-84. ———. 1976. “The Imperialism of Thrasybulus.” Classical Quarterly 26(2): 270-277. ———. 1961. “The Common Peace of 366/5 BC” Classical Quarterly 11(1): 80-86.Charles, M. Charles, M. 2015. “The Chiliarchs of Achaemenid Persia: Toward a Revised Understanding of the Office” Phoenix 69 (3/4): 279-303. Childs, W. 1981. “Lycian Relations with Persians and Greeks in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries Re-Examined.” Anatolian Studies 31: 55-80. Christ, M. 2006. The Bad Citizen in . Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Chroust, A-H. 1954. “Treason and Patriotism in Ancient Greece.” Journal of the History of Ideas 15 (2): 280-288. Claessen, H.J.M, and P. van de Velde. 1987. Early State Dynamics. The Hague: Mouton. Connor, W. R. 1968. Theopompus and fifth-century Athens. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ——— and J.J. Keaney. 1969. “Theophrastus on the End of .” American Journal of Philology 90 (3): 313-319. Conover, K. 2014. “Rethinking Anti-corruption Reforms: the View from Ancient Athens.” Buffalo Law Review 62: 69-117. ———. 2010. Bribery in Classical Athens. PhD Diss. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cook, J. 1983. The History of the Persian Empire. New York: Schocken Books. Costa, E.A. 1974. “Evagoras I and the Persians, ca. 411-391 B.C.” Historia 23(1): 40-56. Coppola, A. 2010. “Alexander’s Court.” In Der Achämenidenhof: Akten des 2. Internationalen Kolloquiums zum Thema “Vorderasien in Spannungsfeld klassischer undaltorientalischer Überlieferungen” Landgut Castelen bei Basel, 23.-25. Mai 2007, edited by B. Jacobs and R. Rollinger, 139-150. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. Curtis, J. et al, eds. 2005. Forgotten Empire: The world of ancient Persia. Berkley: University of California Press. Curtis, J. and St. John Simpson, eds. 2010. The World of Achaemenid Persia: The diversity of ancient . London: I.B. Taurus. Dandamaev, M.A. 1989. A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire. Translated by W.J. Vogelsang. Leiden: Brill. Danzig, G. 2007. “Xenophon's wicked Persian, or What's wrong with Tissaphernes? Xenophon's views on lying and breaking oaths.” In Persian Responses: political and cultural interaction with(in) the Persian Empire, edited by C. Tuplin, 27-50. Swansea: Classical Press of Wales. David, E. 1984. “The Oligarchic Revolution at Rhodes 391-89 BC.” Classical Philology 79 (4): 271-284.

283

De Vries, K. 1977. “Attic Pottery in the Achaemenid Empire.” American Journal of Archaeology 81 (4): 544-548. Devoto, J.G. 1986. “Agesilaus, Antalcidas, and the Failed Peace of 392/91 B.C.” Classical Philology 81(3): 191-202. Develin, R. 1977. “ and Ostracism: Precedents and Intentions.” Antichthon 11: 10-21. Dillery, J. 1995. Xenophon and the history of his time. New York: Routledge. Dmitriev, S. 2010. The Greek slogan of freedom and early Roman politics in Greece. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Doegnes, N.A. 1988. “The Campaign and Battle of Marathon.” Historia 47 (1): 1-17. Dougherty, C. 2003. The cultures within ancient Greek culture: contact, conflict, collaboration. Dominick, Y.H. 2007. “Acting the Other: Atossa and Instability in Herodotus.” Classical Quarterly 57 (2): 432-444. Dull, C.J. 1977. “Thucydides 1.113 and the Leadership of Orchomenus.” Classical Philology 72 (4): 305-314. Dusinberre, E.R.M. 2013. Empire, authority, and autonomy in Achaemenid Anatolia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———.1997. “Imperial Style and Constructed Identity: A “Graeco-Persian” Cylinder Seal from Sardis.” Ars Orientis 27: 99-129. Ebbott, M. 2000. “A List of the War Dead in Aeschyus’ ‘Persae.’” Classical Philology 100: 83- 96. Eddy, S.K. 1973. “The cold war between Athens and Persia, ca. 448-412 B.C.” Classical Philology 68: 241-258. ———. 1970. “The Peace of Callias.” Classical Philology 65 (1): 8-14. Ellis, W. M. 1989. Alcibiades. London; New York: Routledge. English, S. 2012. Mercenaries in the classical world to the death of Alexander. Barnsley: Pen & Sword. Evans, J.A.S. 1993. “Herodotus and the Battle of Marathon.” Historia 42 (3): 279-307. ———. 1976. “Herodotus and the Ionian Revolt.” Historia 25 (1): 31-37. Fears, J.R. 1975. “Pausanias, the assassin of Philip II” Athenaeum 53: 111-135. Fine, J. 2010. “Political and Philological Origins of the Term ‘Terrorism’ from the Ancient Near East to Our Times” Middle Eastern Studies 46 (2): 271-288. Finkel, I. ed. 2013. The Cyrus Cylinder. London: IB Tauris. Flower, M. 2000. “From Simonides to Isocrates: The Fifth-Century Origins of Fourth-Century Panhellenism.” Classical Antiquity 19 (1): 65-101. ———. 1998. “Simonides, Ephorus, and Herodotus on the .” Classical Quarterly 48(2): 365-379. ———. 1994. Theopompus of Chios. Oxford: Claredon Press. Forsdyke, S. 2005. Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy: The Politics of Expulsion in Ancient Greece. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 2000. “Ostracism, Exile, and the Athenian Democracy.” Classical Antiquity 19 (2): 232-263. Foss, C. 1975. “A Bullet of Tissaphernes” Journal of Hellenic Studies 95: 25-30. Fragoulaki, M. 2013. Kinship in Thucydides: intercommunal ties and historical narrative. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 284

Francis, E.D. and M. Vickers. 1985. “The Marathon Epigram in the Stoa Poikile.” Mnemosyne 38 (3/4): 390-393. Freitag, K. 1966. “Eine vergessene Notiz zur Geschichte Achaias im 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr. Bei Herodot (8, 36, 2).” Historia 45(1): 123-126. French, A. 1972. “Topical Influences on Herodotus’ Narrative.” Mnemosyne 25 (1): 9-27. Frost, F. 2005. Politics and the Athenians: Essays on Athenian history and historiography. Toronto: Edgar Kent. ———, ed. 1969. Democracy and the Athenians: Aspects of ancient politics. New York: Wiley. Gates, J.E. 2002. “The Ethnicity Game: What Lies behind Graeco-Persian?” Ars Orientalis 32: 105-132. Gazzano, F. 2017. “The King’s Speech. La Retorica Dei Re Persiana Fra Eschilo, Erodoto e Tucidide.” Electrum 24: 55-73. Georges, P. 2000. “Persian Ionia under Darius: The Revolt Reconsidered.” Historia 49 (1): 1-39. ———.1994. Barbarian Asia and the Greek Experience: From the Archaic Period to the Age of Xenophon. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Gera, D. 2017. “Letters in Xenophon.” In Epistolary Narratives in , edited by Owen Hodkinson, Patricia Rosenmeyer, and Evelien Bracke, 85-106. Leiden: Brill. ———. 2007. “Themistocles' Persian Tapestry.” Classical Quarterly 57 (2): 445-457. Gershevitch, I., ed. 1985. The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. II: The Median and Achaemenian periods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gillis, D. 1979. Collaboration with the Persians. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. Goldstein, .S.M. 1974. “Athenian-Persian Peace Treaties: Thuc. 8.56.4 and 8.58.2” California Studies in Classical Antiquity 7: 155-164. Görkay, K. 2008. “Representations of Shield-Aprons on Attic Pottery and their Connection with the Battle of Marathon and Miltiades.” Tekmeria 50-63. Gorman, V.B. 2001. Miletos, the ornament of Ionia: A history of the city to 400 B.C.E. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Graf, D. 1985. “Greek Tyrants and Achaemenid Politics.” In The Craft of the Ancient Historian: Essays in Honor of Chester G. Starr. Edited by J. W. Eadie and J. Ober. Lanham, University Press of America: 79-123. ———. 1984. “Medism: The Origin and Significance of the Term.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 104: 15-30. ———. 1979. Medism: Greek Collaboration with Achaemenid Persia. University of Michigan: Ann Arbor, MI. Phd Dissertation. Granerod, G. 2013. ““By the Favour of Ahuramazda I am King”: On the Promulgation of a Persian Propaganda Text among Babylonians and Judeans.” Journal for the Study of Judaism 44: 455-480. Gray, V.J. 2003. “Intervention and Citations in Xenophon, Hellenica and Anabasis” Classical Quarterly 53 (1): 111-123. ———. 1987. “The Value of for the Years 411-386.” Hermes 115(1): 72-89. Gray-Fow, M. 2013. “Assassination before assassins: a discussion paper” Law, Crime, and History 3: 42-65.

285

Grayson, A.K. 1975. Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles (Texts from Cuneiform Sources 5). Locust Valley, NY: Eisenbrauns. Green, P. 1996. The Greco-Persian Wars. Berkley; Los Angeles: University of California Press. Gribble, D. 1997. “Rhetoric and History in [Andocides] 4, Against Alcibiades” the Classical Quarterly 47 (2): 367-391. Gruen, E. S., ed. 2011. Cultural Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean. Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute. ———.2011a. “Herodotus and Persia.” In Cultural Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean, Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute. ———. 1970. “Stesimbrotus on Miltiades and Themistocles.” California Studies in Classical Antiquity 3: 91-98. Grundy, G.B. The Topography of the battle of Platea: the City of Platea. The field of Leuctra. London: John Murray. Gygax, M.D. 2006. “Plutarch on Alcibiades’ return to Athens.” Mnemosyne 59(4): 481-500. Hall, E. 1996. Aeschylus. Persae. Warminster: Aris and Phillips. ———. 1989. Inventing the Barbarian. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hall, J.M. 2002. Hellenicity: Between ethnicity and culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hallock, R.T. 1969. Persepolis Fortification Tablets. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hamel, D. 1998. Athenian Generals: Military Authority in the Classical Period. Leiden: Brill. Hamilton, C.D. 1992. “Lysander, Agesilaus, Spartan Imperialism and the Greeks in Asia Minor.” The Ancient World 23 (1): 35-50. ———.1991. Agesilaus and the failure of the Spartan hegemony. Syracuse: Cornell University Press.1980. “Isocrates, IG ii 2 43, Greek Propaganda and Imperialism.” Traditio 36: 83- 109. ———.1979. Sparta’s Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. ———.1972. “The Politics of the Revolution at Corinth, 395-86.” Historia 21 (1): 21-37. Hammond, N.G.L. 1992. “Plataea’s Relations with Thebes, Sparta, and Athens.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 112: 143-150. ———. 1986. “The Kingdom of Asia and the Persian Throne.” Antichthon 20: 73-85. ———. 1982. “The Narrative of Herodotus VII and the Decree of Themistocles at Troezen.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 102: 75-93. ———. 1968. “The Campaign and Battle of Marathon.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 88: 13-57. ———. 1957. “τὸν Μηδικὸν and τὰ Μηδικὰ.” Classical Review 7 (2): 100-101. ———. 1937. “Diodorus’ Narrative of the Sacred War and the Chronological Problems of 357- 352 B. C.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 57(1): 44-78. Hardwick, L. and C. Stray, eds. 2008. A Companion to Classical receptions. Oxford: Blackwell. Harris, E.M. 1995. Aeschines and Athenian Politics. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. ——— and R.W.. Wallace, eds. 1996. Transitions into empire: essays in Greco-Roman history, 360-146 B.C. in honor of E. Badian. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press Harrison, T 2011. Writing Ancient Persia. London: Bristol Classical Press.

286

———. 2008. “‘Respectable in Its Ruins’: Achaemenid Persia, Ancient and Modern.” In A Companion to Classical Receptions, edited by L. Hardwick and C. Stray, 50-62. Oxford: Blackwell. ———., ed. 2002. Greeks and Barbarians. New York: Routledge. Hartog, F. 1988. The Mirror of Herodotus: the representation of the Other in the Writing of History. Trans. J. Lloyd. Berkley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press. Haubold, J. 2012. “The Achaemenid Empire and the sea.” Mediterranean Historical Review. 27 (1): 5-24. ——— 2007.”Athens and .” In Reading Herodotus. Edited by Greenwood, E. & Irwin, E, 82-89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Heisserer, A.J. and R. Moysey. 1986. “An Athenian Decree Honouring Foreigners.” Hesperia 55 (2): 177-182. Henderson, J. 1991. The Maculate Muse. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Herrenschmidt, C. 1991. “Vieux-perse šiyāati.” In La religion iranienne à l'époque achéménide: actes du colloque de Liège. Acta Iranica Supplement 5, edited by J. Kellens, 13-21. Gent: Iranica Antiqua. Heskel, J. 1997. The North Aegean Wars. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. Hirsch, S. 1985. The friendship of the barbarians: Xenophon and the Persian Empire. Hanover; London: University Press of New England. Hodkinson, S. 2000. Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta. London; Swansea: Duckworth and the Classical Press of Wales. Höffken, P. 2005. “Xerxes und (k)eine Marduk-Statue: Überlegungen zu einem Randthema alttestamentlicher Prophetenexegese.” Vetus Testamentum 55 (4): 477-485. Holladay, A. J. 1978. “Medism in Athens 508-480 BC.” Greece & Rome 25 (2): 174-191. Holladay, J. 1987. “The Forethought of Themistocles.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 107:182-187. Hornblower, S. 2010. Thucydidean Themes. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press. ———. 1991-2008. A Commentary on Thucydides. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press. How, W.W. 1919. “Cornelius Nepos on Marathon and .” Journal of Hellenic Studies 39: 48-61. Humble, N. 2004. “The Author, Date and Purpose of Chapter 14 of the Lakedaimonian Polity.” In Tuplin 2004, 215-228. Hunt, P. 2010. War, Peace and Alliance in Demosthenes’ Athens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hyland, J. 2018. Persian Interventions: the Achaemenid Empire, Athens, and Sparta, 450-386 BCE. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. ———. 2007. “Thucydides’ Portrait of Tissaphernes Re-examined.” In Persian Responses: Political and Cultural Interactions with(in) the Achaemenid Empire, edited by Christopher Tuplin, 1-26. Swansea: University of Wales Press. ———. 2004. “Waiting for Tissaphernes: Athens and Persia in Thucydides VIII.” Syllecta Classica 15: 71-101. Irwin, E. and E. Greenwood, eds. 2007. Reading Herodotus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 287

Isaac, B. 2004. The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press. Jacobs, B. 1994. Die Satriapienverwaltung im Perserriech zur Zeit Darius’ III. Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag. Jacobs, B. and R. Rollinger, eds. 2010. Der Achämenidenhof: Akten des 2. Internationalen Kolloquiums zum Thema “Vorderasien in Spannungsfeld klassischer undaltorientalischer Überlieferungen” Landgut Castelen bei Basel, 23.-25. Mai 2007. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. Jacoby, F. 1957-1999. Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker. Leiden: Brill. ———. 1945. “Some Athenian Epigrams from the Persian Wars.” The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens 14 (3): 157-211. Jamzadeh, P. 2012. Studies in Persian Cultural History: Alexander Histories and Iranian Reflections: Remnants of Propaganda and Resistance. Leiden: Brill. Jehne, M. 1994. Koine Eirene: Untersuchungen zu den Befriendungs und Stabilsierungsbemuhungen in der griechischen Poliswelt des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. Jigoulov, V. 2010. The Social History of Achaemenid Phoenicia. London: Equinox Press. Johnson, D. 2005. “Persians as in Xenophon’s « Cyropaedia».” Transactions and Proceeding of the American Philological Association 135 (1): 177-207. Jones, C.P. 1999. Kinship diplomacy in the ancient world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Joyce, C.J. 2008. “The Athenian Amnesty and Scrutiny of 403.” Classical Antiquity 58(2): 507- 518. Kaplan,P. 2006. “Dedications at Greek Sanctuaries made by Foreign Kings in the Eighth through the Sixth Centuries BCE.” Historia 55 (2): 129-152. Karavites, P. 1992. Promise-giving and Treaty-making: Homer and the Near East. Leiden: Brill. Katouzian, H. 2009. The Persians: Ancient, mediaeval, and modern Iran. New Haven: Yale University Press. Keaveney, A. 2011. The Persian Invasions of Greece. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military. ———. 2003. The Life and Journey of the Athenian Statesman Themistocles, 524 – 460 B.C. as a refugee in Persia. Lampeter, Wales: Edwin Mellen Press. ———. 1995. “The Medisers of Thessaly.” Eranos 93: 30-38. Keen, A.G. 1995. “A “Confused” Passage in Philochorus (F 149a) and the Peace of 392/1.” Historia 44 (1): 1-10. Kelly, T. 2003. “Persian Propaganda- A Neglected Factor in Xerxes’ Invasion of Greece and Herodotus.” Iranica Antiqua 38: 173-219. Kienast, D. 1973. Philipp II von Makedonien und das Reich der Achaimeniden. Munich: Fink. Kistler, E. 2010. “Grosskönigliches « symbolon » im Osten - exotisches Luxusgut im Westen: zur Objektbiographie der achämenidischen Glasschale aus Ihringen.” Interkulturität in der Alten Welt, edited by R. Rollinger, B. Gufler, M. Lang and I. Madreiter. 63-95. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. Kitchen, K.A. 2009. “Now You See It, Now You Don’t! The Monumental Use and Non-Use of Writing In the Ancient Near East.” In Writing and Near Eastern Society: Essays in Honour

288

of Allan R. Millard, edited by Piotr Bienkowski, Christopher Mee and Elizabeth Slater, 175-188. Continuum International Publishing. King, D.R. 2013. “Managing uncertainty: lessons from Xenophon’s retreat” Journal of Management History 19 (3): 377-393. Konstan, D. 1987. “Persians, Greeks, and Empire.” Arethusa 20 (1.2): 59-73. Knox, R. 1985. “‘So Mischievous a Beaste’? The Athenian ‘Demos’ and Its Treatment of Its Politicians.” Greece & Rome 32 (2): 132-161. Knapp, R.C. 2002. “Greek mercenaries, coins, and ideology.” Eulimene 3: 183-196. Konstan, D. 1987. “Persians, Greeks, and Empire.” Arethusa 20(1,2): 59-73. Kousoulis, P. 2007. Moving across borders: foreign relations, religion, and cultural interactions in the ancient Mediterranean. Leuven: Peeters. Kozak, L.A. 2012. “The Oath at Plataea” In Oath and State in Ancient Greece, edited by A.H. Sommerstein and A.J. Bayliss, 192-199. Berlin: De Gruyter. Kramer, N. “Athen: Keine Stadt des Grosskönigs!” Hermes 132 (3): 257-270. Krentz, P. 2010. The Battle of Marathon. New Haven; London: Yale University Press. ———. 2009. “The Athenian Treaty in Theopompus F 153.” Phoenix 63 (3/4): 231-238. ———. 2007. “The Oath of Marathon, not Plataia?” Hesperia 76: 731-742. ———. 1998. “Athenian politics and strategy after Kyzikos.” The Classical Journal 84: 206- 215. ———. 1982. The Thirty at Athens. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kuhrt, A. 2014. “State communications in the Persian Empire.” State Correspondence in the Ancient World: from New Kingdom Egypt to the Roman empire, edited by K. Radner, 112- 140. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2010. “Xerxes and the Babylonian Temples: A Restatement of the Case.” In World of Achaemenid Persia: History, Art, and Society in Iran and the Ancient Near East, 492-494. London: I.B. Tauris. ———. 2007. The Persian Empire: A corpus of sources from the Achaemenid period. London: Routledge. ———. 2002. ‘Greeks’ and ‘Greece’ in Mesopotamian and Persian perspectives. The twenty- first J.L. Myres memorial lecture, Oxford. Oxford: Leopard's Head Press. ———. 2001. “The Achaemenid Persian empire (c. 550-c. 330 BCE): continuities, adaptations, transformations.” In Empires: Perspectives from archaeology and history, edited by S.E. Alcock et al., 93-123. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1995. The ancient Near East, c. 3000-330 BC, 2 vols. London; New York: Routledge. Laforse, B. 2013. “Praising Agesilaus: the Limits of Panhellenic Rhetoric” Ancient History Bulletin 27: 29-48. Lanfranchi, G. 2010. “Greek historians and the Memory of the Assyrian Court.” In Der Achaemenidhöf/ The Achaemenid Court, edited by B. Jacobs and R. Rollinger, 39-65. Stuttgart: . Lawall, M. 1998. “Ceramics and positivism revisited: Greek transport amphoras and history” in Trade, Traders, and the Ancient City, edited by H. Parkins, and C.J. Smith, 73-98. Florence, USA: Routledge. Lecoq, P. 1997. Les inscriptions de la Perse achéménide. Paris: Gallimard.

289

Lehmen, G.A. 1977. “Ein neues Fragment der Hell. Oxy.: Einige Bemerkungen zu P. Cairo (Temp. inv. no.)26/6/27/1-35.”Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 26: 181-191. Lenfant, D. 2016. “La role de la proxenie dans les relations diplomatiques entre Grecs et Perses.” Ktema 41: 275-287. ———. 2015. “Le Satrape et l’Oeil du Roi. Les hommes du pouvoir perses passe au filtre grec” In Traduire l’altérité culturelle dans les civilisations de l’Antiquité. Edited by F. Colin, O. Huck & S. VansévereInterpretatio, 95-122. Paris: de Boccard. ———. 2014. “Greek Monographs on the Persian World.” In Between Thucydides and Polybius: the Golden Age of Greek Historiography. Edited by G. Parmeggiani, 197-210. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press. ———. 2013. “Les Malentendus culturels entre Grecs et Perses (VIe – IVe siècle avant J.C.)” Revues des Sciences Sociales 50: 36-41. ———. 2011. “Ismenias et les ambassadeurs de Thebes a la cour perse” Ktema 36: 331-347. ———. 2011a. Perses vus par les Grecs. Lire les sources classiques sur l’empire achemenide. Paris: Armand Collin. ———. 2010. “Ambassadeurs d’Athenes ou ambassadeurs du Roi?” Zeitschrift fur Papyrologie und Epigraphik, edited by R. Merkelbach and L. Koenen, 91-96. Bonn: Dr. Rudolf Habelt GMBH. ———. 2003. “De l’usage des comiques comme sources historique: les Vies de Plutarque et la Comedie Ancienne. In Grecs et Romains aux prises avec l’histoire, Representations, recits, et ideologies. Edited by G. Lachenaud and D. Longree, 391-414. Rennes: Presses Universitaire Rennes. Lewis, D. M. 1997. “Persian Gold in Greek International Relations.” In Selected Papers in Greek and Near Eastern History, edited by D. M. Lewis and P.J. Rhodes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1977. Sparta and Persia: Lectures delivered at the University of Cincinnati, autumn 1976 in Memory of Donald W. Bradeen. Leiden: Brill. ———. 1958. “The Phoenician Fleet in 411.” Historia 7 (4): 392-397. Lewis, D. 2011. “Near Eastern Slaves in Classical Attica and the Slave Trade with Persian Territories.” Classical Antiquity 61(1): 91-113. Lewis, S. 2009. Greek tyranny. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. Llewellyn-Jones, L. 2013. King and Court in Ancient Persia 559-331BCE. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. ———. 2012. “The Great Kings of the Fourth Century and the Greek Memory of the Persian Past.” In Greek Notions of the Past in the Archaic and Classical Eras. Edited by J. Marincola, L. Llewellyn-Jones, and C. Maciver, 317-246. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Loraux, N. 1986. The Invention of Athens: The funeral oration in the classical city. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Lourdas, B. and C.H. Makaronas, eds. 1970. Ancient Macedonia: papers read at the first international held in Thessaloniki, 26-29 August 1968. Thessaloniki, Greece: Salonica Institute for Balkan Studies.

290

Low, P. 2012. “Peace, Common Peace, and War in Mid-Fourth Century Greece.” In Maintaining Peace and Interstate Stability in Archaic and Classical Greece. Edited by J. Wilker, 118- 134. Mainz: Verlag Antike. ———. 2003. “Remembering War in Fifth-Century Greece: Ideologies, , and Commemoration beyond Democratic Athens.” World Archaeology 35(1): 98-111. Luckenbill, D. 1926. Ancient records of and Babylonia. New York: Greenwood Press. Luraghi, N. 2006. “Traders, Pirates, Warriors: The Proto-History of Greek Mercenary Soldiers in the Eastern Mediterranean.” Phoenix 60(1/2): 21-47. Ma, J. 2017. “The Autonomy of the Boiotian Poleis.” In Boiotia in the Fourth Century B.C. edited by S.D. Garland, 32-41. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. ———., N. Papazarkada, and R. Parker, eds. 2009. Interpreting the Athenian Empire. London: Duckworth. MacDowell, D. M. 2009. Demosthenes the Orator. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. MacGregor, M.F. 1965. “The Genius of Alkibiades.” Phoenix 19 (1): 27-50. Magee, P. et al. 2005. “The Achaemenid Empire in and Recent Excavations in Akra in Northwest .” American Journal of Archaeology 109 (4): 711-741. Malkin, I. 2001. Ancient perceptions of Greek ethnicity. Cambridge, MA: Center for Hellenic Studies. March, D. 1997. “Konon and the Great King’s Fleet, 396-394.” Historia 46 (3): 257-269. Marincola, J.2010. “The Persian Wars in Fourth-Century Oratory and Historiography.” In Ma et al, eds, 105-125. ———. 2002. Greek historians. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. ———. 1997. Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. ———, L. Llewellyn-Jones, and C. Maciver, eds. 2012. Greek Notions of the Past in the Archaic and Classical Eras. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Marr, J. 1995. “The Death of Themistocles.” Greece and Rome 42 (2): 159-157. MacFarlane, K. 2002. ‘To Lay the Shining Foundation…’: The Tradition of the Persian Wars in Classical Greek Poetry. PhD Diss. Edmonton: University of Alberta. McCoy, W.J. 1989. “Memnon of Rhodes at the Granicus.” The American Journal of Philology 110 (3): 413-433. McKechnie, P. 2015. “Themistocles’ Two Afterlives” Greece & Rome 62 (2): 129-139. McMullin, R.M. 2001. “Aspects of Medizing: Themistocles, Simonides, and of Rhodes” The Classical Journal 97(1):55-67. Meadows, A. and K. Shipton. 2001. Money and its uses in the ancient Greek world. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Meeus, A. 2009. “Some Institutional Problems Concerning the Succession to Alexander the Great: Prostasia and Chiliarchy.” Historia 58 (3): 287-310. Meiggs, R. 1972. The Athenian Empire. Oxford: Claredon Press. ——— and Lewis, D. 1988. A selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mendalo, M. A. 2013. Leadership and Transformative Ambition in International Relations. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.

291

Meritt, B. D., H. T. Wade-Gery, et al. 1939-50. The Athenian Tribute Lists. Princeton: American School of Classical Studies. Michelini, A. 1998. “Isocrates’ Civic Invective: Acharnians and On the Peace.” Transactions of the American Philological Association 128: 115-133. Miller, H. F.1984. “The Practical and Economic Background to the Greek Mercenary Explosion.” Greece and Rome 31(2): 153-160. Miller, M. 2011. “"Manners makyth man": diacritical drinking in Achaemenid Anatolia” in Cultural Indentity in the Ancient Mediterranean, edited by E.S. Gruen, . Los Angeles: Getty Institute. ———. 2010. “I am Eurymedon: tensions and ambiguities in Athenian War imagery” in War, Democracy and Culture in Classical Athens, edited by D.M. Pritchard, 304-338. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1997. Athens and Persia in the fifth century B.C.: A study of cultural receptivity. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Missiou, A. 1992. The subversive oratory of Andokides: Politics, ideology, and decision-making in democratic Athens. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Mitchell, B.M. 1991. “Kleon’s Amphipolitan Campaign: Aims and Results.” Historia 40 (2): 70- 192. ———. 1966. “Cyrene and Persia.” The Journal of Hellenic Studies 86: 99-113. Mitchell, L.G., ed. 2009. Greek history and epigraphy: Essays in honour of P.J. Rhodes. Swansea: Classical Press of Wales. ———.2007. Panhellenism and the Barbarian. Swansea: Classical Press of Wales. ———. 1997. Greeks bearing gifts: the public use of private relationships in the Greek world, 435-323 B.C. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Mosley, D.J. 1971. “Diplomacy and Disunion in Ancient Greece.” Phoenix 25 (4): 310-330. Moysey, R. 1992. “Plutarch, Nepos and the Satrapal Revolt of 362/361 B.C.” Historia 41 (2): 158-168. ———.1985. “Chares and Athenian Foreign Policy.” The Classical Journal 80 (3): 221-227. ———. 1981. “The Thirty and the Pnyx.” American Journal of Archaeology 85 (1): 31-37. Munn, M. 2006. The Mother of the Gods, Athens, and the tyranny of Asia: a study of sovereignty in ancient religion. Berkeley: University of California Press. Murison, C.L. 1971. “The Peace of Callias: Its Historical Context.” Phoenix 25 (1): 12-31. Murray, O. 1972. “Herodotus and Hellenistic Culture.” The Classical Quarterly 22 (2): 200-213. Naiden, F.S. 2006. Ancient Supplication. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Occhipinti 2016. Olding, G. 2007. “Shot from the Canon: Sources, Selections, Survivals.” In The World of Ion of Chios, edited by V. Jennings and A. Katsaros, 45-63. Leiden: Brill. Oleg Deripask Velnoe Delo Foundation, August 9 2016. “Darius I Stele Found in Ancient Town of Phanagoria in Russia” http://volnoe-delo.ru/en/events/news/darius-i-stele-found-in- ancient-town-of-phanagoria-in-russia/ Accessed December 29, 2017. Olmstead, A. 1948. The history of the Persian Empire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Orsi, D. 2004. “Sparta e la Persia: la guerra in Asia: 400-394.” Incidenza dell’ Antico 2: 41-58. Osborne, R. and S. Hornblower, eds. 1994. Ritual, finance, politics: Athenian democratic accounts presented to David Lewis. Oxford: Claredon Press. 292

Papalas, A. 1999. “Polycrates of Samos and the First Greek Trireme Fleet” Mariner’s Mirror 85 (1): 3-19. Parker, S.T. 1976. “Objectives and Strategy of Cimon’s Expedition to Cyprus.” Classical Philology 97 (1): 30-38. Payrau, S. 1971. “Eirenika.” Revue des Études Anciennes 73: 24- 79. Pearson, L. 1943. “Lost Historians Judged by their Fragments.” Greece & Rome 12 (35/36): 43- 56. Pédech, P. 1984. Historiens compagnon d’Alexandre: Callisthène – Onésicrite- Néarque- Ptolémée-Aristoboule. Collection d’études anciennes. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Perlman, S. 1985. “Greek Diplomatic Tradition and the Corinthian League of Philip of Macedon.” Historia 34(2): 153-174. ———. 1976. “On Bribing Athenian Ambassadors.” Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 17: 223-233. ———. 1968. “Athenian Democracy and the Revival of Imperialistic Expansion at the Beginning of the Fourth Century B.C.” Classical Philology 63(4): 257-267. ———. 1964. “The Causes and Outbreak of the Corinthian War.” Classical Quarterly 14 (1): 64-81. Philips, D. 2013. The Law of Ancient Athens. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Piccirilli, L. 2001. “L’invenzione della diplomazia: Temi del linguaggio.” In Linguaggagio e Terminologia Diplomatica Dall’Antico Oriente All’Impero Bizantino, edited by M. G.A.. Bertinelli and L. Piccirilli, 67-83. Rome: Giorgio Bretschneider Editore. Podlecki, A.J. 1998. Perikles and his Circle. London; New York: Routledge. ———. 1976. “Themistocles and Pausanias.” Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica 104: 293-311. Potts, D.T. 2010. “Achaemenid Interests in the Persian Gulf.” In World of Achaemenid Persia: History, Art, and Society in Iran and the Ancient Near East, edited by J. Curtis and St. J. Simpson, 524-533. London: I.B. Tauris. Pownall, F.. 2012. “Critias in Xenophon’s Hellenica” Scripta Classica Israelica 31: 1-17. ———. 2009. “The Decadence of the Thessalians: A Topos in the Greek Intellectual Tradition from Critias to the Time of Alexander.” In Alexander & His Successors: Essays From the Antipodes, eds. P. Wheatley and R. Hannah, 237–60. Claremont, CA: Regina Books ———.2007. “The Panhellenism of Isocrates.” In Alexander’s Empire: formulation to decay. Edited by Waldemar Heckel, Lawrence Tritle, and Pat Wheatley, 13-25. Clarement, Calif.: Regina Books. ———. 1998. “Condemnation of the Impious in Xenophon’s Hellenica” The Harvard Theological Review 91(3): 251-277. ———.1995. ““Presbeis Autokratores”: Andocides De Pace” Phoenix 49 (2) : 140-149. Pritchard, D. 2010. War, democracy, and culture in classical Athens. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Pritchett, W. K. 1994. Essays in Greek History. Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben. Raaflaub, K. 2009. “Conceptualising and Theorising Peace in Ancient Greece.” TAPA 139 (2): 225-250.

293

———. 2009a. “Learning from the Enemy: Athenian and Persian ‘Instruments of Empire.’” In Interpreting the Athenian Empire. Edited by J. Ma, N. Papazarkadas and R. Parker, 89- 124. London: Duckworth. ——— ed. 2008. War and Peace in the Ancient World, Oxford: Blackwell. ———. 2004. “Archaic Greek Aristocrats as Carriers of Cultural Interaction.” In Commerce and Monetary Systems in the Ancient World. Edited by R. Rollinger and C. Ulf, 197-217. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. ———. 2004a. The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. ———. 2003. “The Alleged Ostracism of Damon.” In Gestures: Essays in Ancient History, Literature, and Philosophy presented to Alan L. Boegehold on the occasion of his retirement and his seventy-fifth birthday. Edited by Geoffrey W. Bakewell and James P. Sickinger, 317-331. London: Oxbow. ———. 1998. “The Transformation of Athens in the Fifth Century.” In Democracy .Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens. Edited by D. Boedeker and K. Raaflaub, 15-41. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. ———. 1987. “Herodotus, Political Thought, and the Meaning of History.” Arethusa 20 (1, 2): 221 -248. Rahe, P.A. 1980. “The Military Situation in Western Asia on the Eve of Cunaxa.” American Journal of Philology 101(1): 79-96. Rathmann, M. 2005. Griechische Weltgeschichte. Buch XVIII-XX. Diodoros. Stuttgart: Hiersemann. Raubitscheck, A.E.1991. The School of Hellas: essays on Greek history, archaeology, and literature. Rhodes, P.J. and R. Osborne, eds. 2003. Greek Historical Inscriptions, 404-323 BC. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rhodes, P.J. 1970. “Thucydides on Pausanias and Themistocles.” Historia 19 (4): 387-400. Richmond. 1998. “Spies in Ancient Greece.” Greece & Rome 45(1):1-18. Ritter, S. 2001. “, the Symmachy, and the Persians.” In Die Gegenwart des Altertums: Formen und Funktionen des Altertumsbezugs in den Hochkulturen der alten Welt edited by Dieter Kuhn, 183-201. Heidelberg. Rollinger, R. 2016. “Royal Strategies of Representation and the Language(s) of Power: Some Considerations on the audience and the dissemination of the Achaemenid Royal Inscriptions.” In Official Epistolography and Language(s) of Power, edited by S. Prochazka, 117-130. Vienna. ———.2006. “The Eastern Mediterranean and Beyond: the Relations Between the Worlds of ‘Greek’ and ‘Non-Greek’ Civilizations.” In Companion to the Classical World edited by Konrad H. Kinzl, 197- 226. Oxford: Blackwell. ———.2003. “The western expansion of the Median “empire”: a re-examination.” In Continuity and Empires (?) Assyria, Media, Persia. Edited by G. Lanfranchi, M.Roaf, and R. Rollinger, 289-320. Padova: S.A.R.G.O.N. Editrice e Libreria. Rood, T. 2004. “Xenophon and Diodorus: continuing Thucydides.” In Xenophon and his world, edited by C. Tuplin, 341-395. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. ———.1998. “Thucydides and his Predecessors.” Histos 2: 230-267. 294

Roosevelt, C.H. 2009. The archaeology of Lydia, from Gyges to Alexander. Rop, J. 2013. All the King’s Greeks: Mercenaries, Poleis, and Empires in the Fourth Century BCE. Pennsylvania State. PhD. Dissertation. Rowe, C. 2007. Plato and the Persian Wars. In Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars. Edited by E. Bridges, E. Hall, & P.J. Rhodes, 85-104. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Roy, J. 2004. “The Ambitions of a Mercenary.” In The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand. Edited by R.J.L. Fox, 264-288. New Haven: Yale University Press. ———.1967. “The Mercenaries of Cyrus.” Historia 16 (3): 287-323. Rubel, A. 2014. Fear and Loathing in Ancient Athens: Religion and Politics during the Peloponnesian War. Translated by M. Vickers and A. Piftor. New York: Routledge. Rung, E. 2015. “Athens and the Achaemenid Persian Empire in 508/7 BC: Prologue to the Conflict” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 6: (3.2): 57-62. ———. 2015a. “The Language of Imperial Diplomacy towards the Greeks: the Meaning of Earth and Water.” Klio 97(2): 503-515. ———. 2013. “Herodotus and Greek Medism.” In Ruthenia Classica Aetatis Novae: A Collection of Works by Russian Scholars in Ancient Greek and Roman History, edited by A. Mehl, A. Makhlayuk, and O. Gableko, 71-82. Stuttgrart: Franz Steiner Verlag. Rutherford, I. 2001. “The New Simonides: Toward a Commentary.” In The New Simonides. Edited by D. Boedeker and D. Sider, 33-54. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Ruzicka, S. 2012. Trouble in the West, Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BCE. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 1998. “Epaminondas and the Genesis of the Social War.” Classical Philology 93 (1): 60-69. ———. 1992. “Athens and the Politics of the Eastern Mediterranean in the Fourth Century B.C.” The Ancient World 23(1): 63-70 ———. 1985. “Cyrus and Tissaphernes, 407-401.” Classical Journal 80 (3): 204-211. ———. 1983. “Curtius 4.1.34-37 and the ‘Magnitudo Belli.’” The Classical Journal 79 (1): 30- 34. Ryder, T.T.B. 1965. Koine Eirene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———.1963. “Spartan Relations with Persia after the King’s Peace: A Strange Story in Diodorus 15.9.” Classical Quarterly 13 (1): 105-109. ———. 1957. “The Supposed Common Peace of 366/5 BCE” Classical Quarterly 7 (3/4): 199- 205. Samons, L.J. 1998. “Kimon, Kallias, and Peace with Persia.” Historia 47 (2): 129-140. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, H. 2002. “The personality of Xerxes, King of Kings.” In Brill’s Companion to Herodotus, edited by E. Bakker, I. de Jong, and H. van Wees. Leiden; Boston: Brill. ———. 2001. “Yauna by the Sea and across the Sea.” In Ancient Perspectives of Greek Ethnicity. Edited by I. Malkin, 323-346. Cambridge, MA: Center for Hellenic Studies. ———. 1999. “The Persian Kings and History.” In The Limits of Historiography. Genre and Narrative in Ancient Historical Texts, edited by C.S. Kraus, 91-112. Leiden: Brill. ——— and A. Kuhrt, eds. 1991. Achaemenid History VI Asia Minor and Egypt: Old cultures in a new empire: proceedings of the Groningen 1988 Achaemenid History Workshop. Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten. 295

——— and J. W. Drijvers, eds. 1990. Achaemenid History V: The roots of the European tradition: Proceedings of the 1987 Groningen Achaemenid History Workshop. Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten. ——— and A. Kuhrt, eds. 1989. Achaemenid History IV Centre and periphery: Proceedings of the Groningen 1986 Achaemenid History Workshop. Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten. ———. 1988. “ΠΕΡΣΙΚΟΝ ΔΕ KAPTA O ΣΤΡΑΤΟΣ ΔΩΡΟΝ: A Typically Persian Gift (HDT. IX 109).” Historia: Zeitschrift fur Alte Geschichte 37( 3): 372-374. ——— and A. Kuhrt, eds. 1987. Achaemenid History II: The Greek Sources Proceedings of the Groningen 1984 Achaemenid History Workshop. Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten. ———. 1985. “The Death of Cyrus: Xenophon’s “Cyropaedia” as a source for Iranian history.” Acta Iranica 25: 459-471. Schmidt, T. 2005. “Les historiens d’Alexandre et la rhétorique des barbares.” Cahiers des etudes anciennes 42: 1-29. Schmitt, R. 2015. “A New Inscription of Xerxes? One More Forgery” Arta 3: 1-8. ———. 1991. The Bisitun inscriptions of : Old Persian text. London: School of Oriental and African Studies. Schreiner, J.H. 2007. “The Battle of Phaleron in 490 BC.” Symbolae Osloenses 82: 30-34. Schwenk, C. J. 1985. Athens in the Age of Alexander: the dated laws and decrees of the Lykourgan era 388-322 B.C. Seager, R. 2001. “Xenophon and Athenian Democratic Ideology.” Classical Quarterly 51(2):385-397. ———. 1977. “Agesilaus and Asia: propaganda and objectives.” LCM 2: 183-4. ———. 1967. “Thrasybulus, Conon, and Athenian Imperialism, 396-386 B.C.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 87: 95-115. Sealey, R. 1993. Demosthenes and his Time: A study in defeat. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 1954. “The Peace of Callias Once More.” Historia 3 (3): 325-333. Sears, M. 2015. “Athens.” In A Companion to Ancient Thrace, Edited by J. Valeva, E. Nankov, and D. Graninger, 320-336. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. ———. 2014. Athens, Thrace, and the shaping of Athenian leadership. Sekunda, N. 2005. Marathon, 490 BC: The first Persian Invasion of Greece. Shipley, G. 1987 A History of Samos. Oxford: Claredon Press. Shrimpton, G. 1980. “The Persian Cavalry at Marathon.” Phoenix 34 (1): 20-37. Sinatra, D. 1992. “Xenoi, misthophouroi, idio oiketores: lotte interne ed equilibri politici a stracusa dal 466 al 461.” Kokalos 38: 347-363. Skinner, J. 2012. The Invention of Greek ethnography: from Homer to Herodotus. Skjaervo, P. O. 2005. “The Achaemenids and the Avesta.” In Birth of the Persian Empire. Edited by V. S. Curtis and S. Stewart 52-81. London: I.B. Tauris. Smith, A. C. 1999. “Eurymedon and the Evolution of Political Personifications in the Early Classical Period.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 119: 128-141. Speck, H. 2002. Alexander at the Persian gates: A study in historiography and topography. New Jersey: Rutgers University. 296

Stadter, P. 1989. A Commentary on Plutarch’s Pericles. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Starr, C. 1979. “Thucydides on Sea Power.” Mnemosyne 31: 343-350. ———. 1977. Greeks and Persians in the fourth century B.C.: A study in cultural contacts before Alexander. Leiden: Brill. Steinbock, B. 2012. Social memory in Athenian public discourse: uses and meanings of the past. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Stem, S.R. 2012. Political Biographies of Cornelius Nepos. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. Stockton, D. 1959. “The Peace of Callias.” Historia 8 (1): 61-79. Stolper, M.W. 2015. “’His Own Death’ inBsotun and Persepolis” Arta 2: 1-27. Stoneman, R. 2015. Xerxes: A Persian Life. New Haven: Yale University Press. Strauss, B. 1986. Athens after the Peloponnesian War: Class, faction and policy, 403-386 BC. London; Sydney: Croom Helm. ———. 1984. “Thrasybulus and Conon: A Rivalry in Athens in the 390s B.C.” American Journal of Philology 105(1): 37-48. Stronk, J. 2010. Ctesias’ Persian History. Düsseldorf: Wellem. ———. 2004/5. “A Physician as Historian: Some Problems.” Talanta: 36-7. Strootman, R. and M. J. Versluys eds., 2017. Persianism in Antiquity. Oriens et Occidens 25. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. Stylianou, P.J. 1998. A Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus XV.Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sulimani, I. 2008. “Diodorus’ source-citations: A turn in the attitude of ancient authors towards their predecessors?” Athenaeum 96 (2): 535-567. Sykes, P.M. 1930. A History of Persia. Kessinger Publishing. Tamiolaki, M. 2017. “Xenophon’s Cyropaedia: Tentative Answers to an Enigma.” In Cambridge Companion to Xenophon. Edited by M. Flower, 174-204. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. 2017. “Corruption and Anticorruption in Democratic Athens.” In Anti-corruption in History: From Antiquity to the Modern Era, edited by R. Kroeze, A. Vitoria, and G. Geltner, 21-34. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ——— . 2001. “Bribery in Athenian Politics Part II: Ancient Reaction and Perceptions.” Greece & Rome 48 (2): 154-172. ——— . 2001a. “Bribery in Athenian Politics Part I: Accusations, Allegations, and Slander” Greece & Rome 48 (1): 53- 66. Thompson, W.E. 1983. “Chares at .” Philologus 127 (2): 303-305. ———. 1983a. “Isocrates on the peace treaties.” Classical Quarterly 33(1): 75-80. ———. 1981. “The Peace of Callias in the Fourth Century.” Historia 30 (2): 164-177. ———. 1971. “Notes on the Peace of Callias.” Classical Philology 66 (1): 29-30. ———. 1965. “Tissaphernes and the Mercenaries at Miletos” Philologus 190: 294-297. Tod, M. 1948. A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions II. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Todd, S.C. 1993. The Shape of Athenian Law. Oxford: Claredon Press. Torrance, I.C. 2013. “Oaths and the Barbarian.” In Sommerstein and Bayliss, 307-322. Tritle, L.A. 2009. A New History of the Peloponnesian War. Wiley. 297

———., ed. 1997. The Greek World in the Fourth Century B.C. London; New York: Routledge. ———. 1988. Phocion the Good. London; New York: Routledge. Trundle, M. 2005. “Ancient Greek Mercenaries (664–250 BCE).” History Compass 3: 1-16. ———. 2004. Greek mercenaries: from the late archaic period to Alexander. London; New York: Routledge. Tsetskhaladze, G.R., ed. 1999. Ancient Greeks west and east. Leiden: Brill. Tuplin, C. 2017. “War and Peace in Achaemenid Ideology.” Electrum 24: 31-54. ———. 2014. “Ephorus on Post-Herodotean Persian History” in Eforo di Cuma nella storia della storiografia greca, edited by P. de Fidio and C.Talamo, 643-682. ———. 2014a. “From Asharma to Alexander. Reflections on Persian Responses to Attack.” In From Source to Hisory: Studies on Ancient Near Eastern Worlds and Beyond, edited by S. Gaspa, A. Greco, D.M. Bonacossi, S. Ponchia, and R. Rollinger, 669-696. Munster: Ugarit- Verlag. ———. 2013. “Xenophon’s Cyropaedia: Fictive History, Political Analysis, and Thinking with Iranian Kings.” In Every Inch a King: comparative studies on kings and kingship in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds, edited by L. Mitchell and C. Melville, 67-90. Leiden: Brill. ———. 2011. “The limits of Persianization: some reflections on cultural links in the Persian empire.” In Cultural Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean, edited by E.S. Gruen,. Los Angeles: Getty Institute. ———. 2011a. “Managing the World: Herodotus on Persian imperial administration.” In Herodot und das Persische Weltreich, edited by R. Rollinger, B. Truschnegg, and R. Bichler, 39-63. Weisbaden: Harrasowitz. ———. 2010. “All the King’s Men.” In the World of Achaemenid Persia, History, Art and Society in Iran and the Ancient Near East. Edited by J. Curtis and St. J. Simpson, 51-62. London: I.B. Tauris. ———. 2010a. Xenophon and Achaemenid Courts: a Survey of Evidence” in Jacobs and Rollinger, 189-230. ———. 2009. “Darius’ Ascension in (the) Media.” In Writing and Near Eastern Society: Essays in Honour of Allan R. Millard, edited by Piotr Bienkowski, Christopher Mee and Elizabeth Slater, 217-244. Continuum International Publishing. ———, ed. 2007. Persian Responses: Political and Cultural Interactions with(in) the Achaemenid Empire. Swansea: University of Wales Press. ———. 2006. “Ctesias as a Military Historian.” In Ktesias und der Orient. Edited by J. Wiesehoefer et al. ———., ed. 2004. Xenophon and his world: papers from a conference held in Liverpool in July 1999. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. ———. 2003. “Xerxes’ March from Doriscus to Therme.” Historia 52 (4): 385-409. ———.1999. “Greek Racism? Observations on the Character and Limits of Greek Ethnic Prejudice.” In Ancient Greeks West and East. Edited by G.R. Tsetskhladze, 47-76. Leiden: Brill. ———. 1997. “Medism and its Causes.” Transeuphratene 13: 155-185. ———. 1996. “Achaemenid Studies.” Historia 99 (1). ———. 1994. “Xenophon, Sparta, and the Cyropaedia.” In The Shadow of Sparta. Edited by A. Powell and S. Hodkinson, 127-182. London: Routledge. 298

———. 1993. The failings of empire. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. ———. 1987. “The Leuctra Campaign: Some Outstanding Problems” Klio 69 (1): 72-107. ———. 1987a. “The Administration of the Achaemenid Empire.” In Coinage and Administration in the Athenian and Persian Empires. Edited by Ian Carradice, 109- 58.Oxford: British Archaeological Reports. ———. 1986. “Four Textual Notes on Xenophon Hellenica VI” Philologus 130 (1): 24-28. ———. 1983. “Lysias XIX, the Cypriot War and Thrasyboulos’ Naval Expedition.” Philologus 172 (2): 170-186. ——— and R. Seager. 1981. “The Freedom of the Greeks in Asia: on the Origins of a Concept and the Creation of a Slogan.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 100: 141-154. Unz, R.K. 1986. “The Chronology of the Elean War” Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 27(1): 29-42. Usher, S. 1999. Greek oratory: tradition and originality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Valeva, J., Emil Nankov, and Denver Graninger, eds. 2015. A Companion to Ancient Thrace. Wiley-Blackwell. Van der Spek, R.J. 2014. “Cyrus the Great, Exiles, and Foreign Gods, A comparison of Assyrian and Persian policies on Subject Nations.” In Extraction and Control: Studies in Honor of Matthew W. Stolper. Edited by W. Henkelman, C. Jones, M. Kozuh, and C. Woods. Chicago: Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. Van Wees, H. ed. 2000. War and Violence in Ancient Greece. London: Duckworth; Classical Press of Wales. Vassileva, M. 2015. “Persia.” In A Companion to Ancient Thrace. Edited by J. Valeva, E. Nankov, and D. Graninger, 320-336. Verdegem, S. 2010. Plutarch’s Life of Alcibiades: Story, Text, and Moralism. Leuven: Leuven University Press. Vickers, M. 2008. and Alcibiades: Athenian politics in ancient Greek literature. Stocksfield: Acumen. ———. 2005. “Persepolis, Vitruvius and the Erechtheum Caryatids: the Iconography of Medism and Servitude.” Revue Archeologique 1: 3-28. Vlassopoulos, K. 2007. Unthinking the Greek Polis: ancient Greek history beyond Eurocentrism. Walbank, M.B. 1978. Athenian Proxenies of the Fifth Century. Toronto and Sarasota: Samuel and Stevens. Wallace, W.P. 1954. “Kleomenes, Marathon, the , and Arkadia.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 74: 32-35. Wallinga, H.T. 2005. Xerxes’ Greek Adventure: the Naval Perspective. Leiden: Brill. ———. 1984. “The Ionian Revolt” Mnemosyne 37(3,4): 401-437. Ward, A. 2008. Herodotus and the Philosophy of Empire. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press. Waters, K.H. 1985. Herodotos the Historian: His Problems, Methods and Originality. London; Sydney: Croom Helm. Waters, M.W. 2017. Ctesias’ Persica in its Near Eastern context. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. ———. 2014. Ancient Persia: a concise history of the Achaemenid empire, 550-330 BCE. ———. 2014a. “Earth, Water, and Friendship with the King: Argos and Persia in the Mid-fifth Century” in Extraction and Control: Studies in Honor of Matthew W. Stolper. Edited by M. 299

Kozuh, W. Henkelman, C.E. Jones, and C. Woods, 331-336. Chicago: Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. ———. 2010. “Applied Royal Directives: Pissuthnes and Samos.” In Jacobs and Rollinger, 817- 828. Watts, J.W., ed. 2001. Persia and Torah: The Theory of Imperial Authorization of the Pentateuch. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature. Webster, T.B.L. 1932. “Attic Vase Painting During the Persian Wars.” Greece & Rome 1 (3):137-142. Weiskopf, M. 1989. The so-called “Great Satraps’ Revolt”, 366-360 B.C. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. West, S. 2003. “Croesus’ Second Reprieve and Other Tales of the Persian Court.” Classical Quarterly 53(2): 416-437. Westlake, H.D. 1986. “Spartan Intervention in Asia, 400-397.” Historia 35 (4): 405-426.1936. ———. 1985. “Tissaphernes and Thucydides.” Classical Quarterly 35 (1): 43-54. ———. 1985a “The Influence of Alcibiades on Thucydides, Book 8.” Mnemosyne 38 (1/2):93- 108. ———. 1983. “Friends and Successors of Dion.” Historia 32 (2): 161-172. ———. 1981. “Decline and Fall of Tissaphernes.” Historia 30 (3): 257-279. ———. 1979. “Ionians in the Ionian War.” The Classical Quarterly 29 (1): 9-44. ———. 1977. “Thucydides on Pausanias and Themistocles- A Written Source?” Classical Quarterly 27(1): 95-110. ———. 1977a. “Athens and Amorges.” Phoenix 31 (4): 319-329. ———. 1936. “The Medism of Thessaly.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 56 (1): 12-24. Whelan, F.G. 1997. “Greek Freedom and Collective Action in Herodotus.” Rationality and Society 9(2): 215-244. Whitehead, D. 1986. “The Political Career of Aristophon.” Classical Philology 81 (4): 313-319. Wickersham, J.M. 1994. Hegemony and the Greek historians. Lanham, Maryland; London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Wilber, D. 1969. Persepolis: the archaeology of Parsa, seat of the Persian kings. Willi, A. 2004. “Old Persian in Athens Revisited (Ar. Ach. 100).” Mnemosyne 57(6): 657-681. Wilker, J. ed. 2012. Maintaining Peace and Interstate Stability in Archaic and Classical Greece. Mainz: Verlag Antike. ———. 2012. “War and Peace at the Beginning of the Fourth Century. The Emergence of the Koine Eirene.” In Maintaining Peace and Interstate Stability in Archaic and Classical Greece. Edited by J. Wilker, 92-117. Mainz: Verlag Antike. Williamson, H. 2004. Studies in Persian period history and historiography. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Wolak, A.J. 2012. “Ezra’s radical solution to Judean assimilation” Jewish Bible Quarterly 40 (2): 93-103. Wolski, J. 1973. “‘ΜΗΔΙΣΜΟΣ’ et son importance en Grèce à l’époque des Guerres Médiques.” Historia 22 (1): 3-15. Wolpert, A. 2007. “The Genealogy of Diplomacy in Classical Greece.” Diplomacy and Statecraft 12 (1): 71-88. Worthington, I. 2008. Philip II of Macedonia. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 300

———, ed. 2007. A Companion to Greek Rhetoric. Oxford: Blackwell. Xin, W. 2010. “Enemies of Empire: A Historical Reconstruction of Political Conflicts between and the Persian Empire.” In The World of Achaemenid Persia. Edited by J. Curtis and St. J. Simpson, 545-606. London; New York: I.B. Tauris. Young, T. C. 1980. “480/79 B.C. – A Persian Perspective.” Iranica Antiqua 15: 213-239. Zahrnt, M. 2015. “Early History of Thruace to the Murder of Kotys I (360 BCE).” In A Companion to Ancient Thrace. Edited by J. Valeva, E. Nankov, and D. Graninger, 35-47. Oxford: Blackwell. Zournatzi, A. 2005.“Persian Rule in Cyprus: Sources, Problems, Perspectives,” Meletemata 44.

301