SUB-COMMITTEE on SHIP DESIGN and EQUIPMENT 54Th Session
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E SUB-COMMITTEE ON SHIP DESIGN AND DE 54/INF.2 EQUIPMENT 14 June 2010 54th session ENGLISH ONLY Agenda item 13 DEVELOPMENT OF A MANDATORY CODE FOR SHIPS OPERATING IN POLAR WATERS A tiered risk assessment approach to polar operations safety and the mandatory Polar Code Submitted by CLIA SUMMARY Executive summary: As a consultant to CLIA on the matter of Polar safety and operations, the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO) commissioned Safety at Sea Ltd. (SaS) to undertake an initial risk assessment study of SOLAS passenger vessels operating in Antarctic waters. This preliminary study is aimed at supporting passenger ship operators in the development of a Tiered Risk Assessment approach that can be used in the development and application of a mandatory Polar Code and/or as a framework for voyage planning and risk assessment. Strategic direction: 5.2 High-level action: 5.2.1 Planned output: 5.2.1.2 Action to be taken: Paragraph 8 Related document: DE 53/26, section 18 Background 1 The Sub-Committee will recall that CLIA and the International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators (IAATO) presented an overview of a tiered risk assessment approach to a polar operations safety and the mandatory Polar Code at DE 53. CLIA was asked to kindly make the full report of the study available upon its completion. 2 The Risk Assessment Study, prepared by Safety At Sea Ltd. has been finalized and is attached for consideration. I:\DE\54\INF-2.doc DE 54/INF.2 Page 2 Overview 3 The study consisted of a review of: current activities of passenger ship-based tourism within the Antarctic (IAATO context); the work of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting Intersessional Contact Group (ATCM ICG) on issues concerning passenger ships operating in Antarctic waters; as well as documents and discussion pertaining to the development and adoption of Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 4 On this basis, a preliminary risk assessment of passenger vessel operations in Antarctic waters was carried out, following an established risk assessment methodology, with the intention of illustrating the potential framework for a full quantifiable risk assessment. This included the following steps: .1 description of activities and the operating environment; .2 hazard identification; .3 risk analysis; and .4 risk control. 5 Most of the factors and hazards associated with the operation of passenger vessels in Antarctic waters relate to the nature of the Antarctic environment. As such they are seasonal and vary largely with the location even within a defined sea region – this is particularly so for ice cover. The degree of uncertainty (e.g., localized, extreme and unpredictable weather conditions, HID #7) introduces potentially significant variations in the risk level between operational profiles even with slight variations (such as, itineraries, sites, destinations, month within the season, etc.). These variations need to be accounted comprehensively in order to consolidate the relevant sea areas that can then be subjected to the risk assessment process described in this preliminary report. 6 While the work illustrates how a comprehensive tiered risk assessment could be carried out and should be considered an initial iteration, the findings of the present study suggest that a risk-based approach for voyage planning, preparation and execution is justified. In this respect, a preliminary proposal is presented for carrying this work forward. It is envisaged that the complete assessment, as illustrated in this report, has to be done only ONCE every so many years, to incorporate any new operational knowledge or changes in climatic trends (e.g., shift of ice cover minimum limits). 7 The study suggests that this framework can easily be used to evaluate the requirements implicit in the IMO Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters and could provide SOLAS passenger vessel operators with a basis for operational risk management and control. Action requested of the Sub-Committee 8 The Sub-Committee is invited to consider and incorporate this study and its findings in the development of the mandatory code of safety for ships engaged in Polar operation. The Sub-Committee is further invited to transmit this study to the Correspondence Group for its consideration and use. *** I:\DE\54\INF-2.doc DE 54/INF.2 Annex, page 1 ANNEX I:\DE\54\INF-2.doc Risk Assessment Study IAATO Technical Report Title Risk Assessment Study Client IAATO Report No. IARA021-RE001-LG.doc Date 08/12/2009 Project No. Project No. Author L Guarin Work carried L. Guarin [email protected] out by J. Logan Checked by K. Dodworth Approved by K. Dodworth Revision History Rev Date Description DRAFT 08/12/2009 Draft report for review by IAATO LG-rev1 15/02/2010 Final draft – incorporation of comments by IAATO LG-rev2 23/04/2010 Final draft – further comments by IAATO LG-rev3 01/06/2010 Final version. i Risk Assessment Study IAATO Executive Summary The International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO) commissioned Safety at Sea Ltd (SaS) to undertake an initial risk assessment study of SOLAS passenger vessels operating in Antarctic waters. This preliminary study is aimed at supporting IAATO in the development of a Tiered Risk Assessment approach that can be used in the development and application of a mandatory Polar Code and/or as a framework for voyage planning and risk assessment by IAATO members. The study consisted of a review of: current activities of passenger ship-based tourism within the Antarctic (IAATO context); the work of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting Intersessional Contact Group (ATCM ICG) on Issues Concerning Passenger Ships Operating in Antarctic Waters; as well as papers and discussion pertaining to the development and adoption of Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). On this basis a preliminary risk assessment of passenger vessel operations in Antarctic waters was carried out following an established risk assessment methodology, with the intention of illustrating the potential framework for a full quantifiable risk assessment. This included the following steps: 1. Description of activities and the operating environment 2. Hazard identification 3. Risk analysis 4. Risk control Description of activities and the operating environment The description of the activities and their operational environment set the scene for the study (section 2). This involved an overview of IAATO fleet and included a detailed analysis of a representative vessel. The patterns of tourism (with a Peninsula focus) were assessed and on this basis a representative voyage was identified and used as an example for the risk assessment. In addition, seven key environmental and defining features (sea ice cover, sea water temperature, sea conditions, air temperature, traffic levels, Search and Rescue (SAR) response and navigational chart coverage and availability) were evaluated and used to preliminarily define five representative sea areas within the Antarctic region. Within those five sea areas there can be significant variability on a seasonal basis that will affect risk levels; this variability has not be accounted for, and only average values have been considered. Hazard identification The hazard identification step (Section 3) was carried out on the basis of IAATO’s operational information and extensive output from the work of the ATCM ICG coordinated by Norway, between 2007 and 2009. A total of 25 hazards were identified (e.g. sea ice, unknown bathymetry/ poor surveys etc.) See Sec. 3.2 and Table 3-2 for a consolidated list of influencing factors and corresponding hazards. Subsequently, a qualitative risk assessment of the identified hazards was undertaken to assess the potential influence of factors (e.g. crew training and experience) and events (e.g. grounding or contact with ice) had on potential risk (impact on people) associated with passenger vessel operations in Antarctic waters. From this assessment the following conclusions were made: Executive Summary Page ii Risk Assessment Study IAATO Events of grounding (drift or power, AID #1), contact (allusion) with ice (AID #2) and medical emergency (incl. slips, trips and falls, AID #5) are associated with potentially HIGH RISK to human life. Events of stranding in ice (AID #3), collision with another vessel (AID #14), capsize (small boat/yachts, AID #6) and heavy weather damage (AID #7) are associated with potentially MODERATE RISK to human life. Other events evaluated were deemed of low risk. The factors with the highest level of influence (more room for introducing risk control, in particular for prevention measures) hence contributing significantly to the overall risk to human life associated with the operation of passenger vessels in Antarctica were level of crew experience (HID #3) and vessel maintenance (HID #19). The corresponding hazards are inexperienced crew and poorly maintained vessels, respectively. Other hazards related to environmental factors significantly contributing to risk include localised, extreme and unpredictable weather conditions (HID #7), large seas (wind driven) and swells (HID #21) as well as not readily available SAR assets (spatially and/or temporally, HID #9). Risk analysis The risk analysis step (Section 4) was based on historical casualty data complemented by first-principles modelling of the exposure to grounding and ice hazards and the probability of a navigational