Elusive Memories of Technoscience

Elusive Memories of Technoscience Barry Barnes University of Exeter “Technoscience” is now most commonly used in academic work to refer to sets of activities wherein science and technology have become inextricably intermingled, or else have hybridized in some sense. What, though, do we understand by “science” and by “technology”? The use of these terms has varied greatly, but their current use presumes a society with extensive institutional and occupational differentiation. Only in that kind of context may science and technology be treated as “other” in relation to “the rest” of the social or- der; whether as differentiated sets of practices or as specialized institutional forms. References to “technoscience” may then be taken to imply a reversal of earlier processes of cultural and institutional differentiation and/or a recom- bination of separate bodies of practice and skill. Either way a move back to a less differentiated state is implied, which makes it surprising that we appear to have very few memories of technoscience in periods less culturally and insti- tutionally differentiated than our own and a lower level of technical and in- tellectual division of labor. However, the elusiveness of our memories of technoscience may be signiªcant mainly for what it suggests about our ways of conceptualizing the past, rather than for any insight it offers into that past “itself.” We tend to identify practices and networks of practices in terms of functions. And it may be because, at different times, different functions have been selected as constitutive of practices, that “technoscience” has come to be regarded as something especially characteristic of the present. The comments and criticisms of the members of the workshops in Berlin where this paper was originally presented were invaluable in developing the ªnal version: particular ac- knowledgements are offered for the detailed feedback from Wolfgang Lefèvre and John Pickstone. Colleagues at Exeter also offered valuable comments on an earlier draft, and I need to make special mention of Jane Calvert, whose empirical research is cited later. Perspectives on Science 2005, vol. 13, no. 2 ©2005 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology 142 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/106361405774270520 by guest on 30 September 2021 Perspectives on Science 143 This paper is at once a reºection on the notion of technoscience and an at- tempt to engage with a fundamental problem that in different guises has long interested sociologists of science. A nice illustration of this problem can be found in Charles Fisher’s study of the “death” of Invariant Theory (1966, 1967), one of the earliest recognized contributions to the sociology of mathematical knowledge. Fisher described how many of the practices of Invariant Theory continued in use long after its supposed “death,” although they were then no longer described as applications of, or contributions to, Invariant Theory “itself.” The practices were subsumed under other descriptions, and those enacting them were said to be doing different things. Thus, the relationship between practices and descriptions of those practices was rendered problematic by Fisher’s work, and the question was raised of how far accounts of what we do relate to intrinsic fea- tures of the doing, and how far to context and to the goals and functions of the doing. Eventually, I shall ask this question of “technoscientiªc” practices, but ªrst of all it is necessary to prepare the ground. 1. Diverse uses of the terms “science” and “technology” Since “technoscience” is supposedly science and technology intermingled, or else hybridized, it makes sense to begin the discussion by asking what the terms “science” and “technology” might themselves refer to. In truth, the use of these terms has varied so much from time to time, and from one context to another, that an entire monograph could only scratch the sur- face of what has been involved. And even that would ignore the cognates and afªnes of the terms in other languages, sustained by other cultures no less important than those of the English-speaking world. Fortunately, however, a very simple account will sufªce for present purposes. I shall highlight just three important variations in the modes of use of these terms, which index corresponding variations both in how knowledge and skill are institutionalized and how they are understood. “Science” and “technology”, I shall suggest, may be used in ways that mark a cultural differentiation of specialized forms of knowledge and skill, in ways that ac- knowledge our alienation from these specialized forms, and in ways that involve their reiªcation. I shall also make mention of the efforts to oppose tendencies to reify that are to be found in the current discourse of sociology and STS. A considerable number of English words are obvious derivatives of four key ancestors: “ars”, “scientia”, “techne”, and “episteme”. It is hard to make ªrm distinctions between the meanings of these four kinds of word. A craft trade, for example, could long be legitimately referred to as a science, and it was common at one time to speak of the science of hunting, or even the science of pugilism. Conversely, the term “technical” long meant, Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/106361405774270520 by guest on 30 September 2021 144 Elusive Memories of Technoscience and still can mean, “pertaining to a speciªc art or science.” Even so, for as long as these terms have been in use they have also been employed to mark a distinction between knowledge in the sense of our cognizance of things, or our systematic classiªcations and theoretical accounts of things (scientia, episteme), and knowledge in the sense of skill and trained com- petence (ars, techne). And this distinction seems to have gained in impor- tance, so that by the nineteenth century it had become routine to speak of science (knowledge) as opposed to art (skill), and something of that con- trast is still evoked today when science and technology are spoken of as distinct and separate entities. Over time, we have come routinely to speak of “science and technology” and to regard them, however inconsistently, both as a mysterious composite essence and as two distinct entities with different characteris- tics, but even as this was happening another important development of usage was under way. The terms were more and more being used to refer only to specialized varieties of knowledge and skill, preserved and de- ployed by trained practitioners in the context of speciªc sub-cultures. This shift was the correlate of an extensive cultural and institutional differentiation, and a corresponding change in the nature and extent of the division of labor in the relevant societies. The semantic shift here is commemorated in standard dictionary deªnitions of “science” and “technology” and a sense of what was involved is readily derived from them. Thus, both the O.E.D. and the “Chambers” I like to use offer initial deªnitions wherein the science and technology of a society consist in its knowledge, and its repertoire of technical skills, re- spectively. Note what this implies about the science (knowledge) and the technology of a simple undifferentiated society. Both will be embedded in the common culture and inseparable from it. Were an anthropologist to give an account of the shared culture of the society, she would at the same time give an account of its science and technology. All this changes, however, with differentiation and division of labor. As these proceed, much in the way of knowledge, and of technical skill, is alienated from ordinary life, and comes to reside in specialized sub-cultures, wherein expert practitioners sustain them and employ them on our behalf. The dictionary com- memorates the change with a second set of deªnitions, wherein science is the knowledge (and/or the trusted methods of extending knowledge) of a speciªc ªeld of learning, and technology is the practice (or the study of the practice) of the various applied sciences or mechanical arts.1 Crucially, sci- 1. The bracketed deªnitions here are interesting in that they evoke a theme that ap- pears later, that of the historical tendency for arts and techniques to be ranked of less worth than theories and modes of cognition. Thus, “technology” was not merely characterized as the “study” of technical practices and procedures, but sometimes as their “scientiªc study”, Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/106361405774270520 by guest on 30 September 2021 Perspectives on Science 145 ence and technology may be confronted as if externalities. Now it may be meaningful, even if still formally incorrect, to speak of the effects of “science and technology” upon the culture or society of which in truth they still remain a part. And indeed we have long been inclined to refer to science and technology in precisely this way. There is, however, a third semantic shift, besides those involving differentiation and alienation, which must be taken into account if we are to gain a tolerable understanding of our current usage. I can convey what it involves by citing a third deªnition of technology, although it is one that does not ªgure prominently in dictionaries. When I ask people what technology is, almost invariably they identify it, not as skills or skilled practices but as tools, machinery and gadgetry. It is arguable that this third shift, unlike the two that preceded it, represents a loss to our understanding. It is true that skilled technical activity has always involved tools and artefacts, and that accounts of technology have always been expected to do justice to their role. And it is true that there has long been a tendency, even amongst professional historians of technology, to emphasize that role above all else: outstanding studies of the evolution of tools and machines, those by George Basalla (1988) and Edward Constant (1980) for example, merely follow precedent when they describe themselves as histories of technology.

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