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Tricentennial, Too: King Philip's War Northern Front (Maine, 1675-1678) Alvin H. Morrison SUNY, Fredonia

The strong human tendency not to perceive those historical and cultural similarities which might prove discomforting in no way decreases their reality. Thus, many State-of-Maine Yankees and their visitors now, quite unconsciously but none the less actually, are travelling freedom trails and celebrat­ ing independence causes that are tricentennial as well as bicentennial, and stem just as directly from English tyranny. The major difference, of course, is that English-speaking colonists were the perpetrators of chafing foreign domination 300 years ago, instead of the victims. Therefore, Yankees selectively proclaim the positive anniversary while tending to forget the negative one. Only the amazingly ironic timing of recent court decisions in favour of Maine Indian rights serves as the nagging voice of conscience to remind about the tricentennial, too. King Philip's War (like World War II) had one name but two distinct fronts, which, for similar but separate reasons, began and ended at different times. The more infamous Southern Front (south of Boston) started and stopped first, and gave the name of its major personality to this entire period of anti-English conflict. Except for the triggering of hostilities north of Boston, events in southern New England are of no concern to us here. The Northern Front war was more a matter of issues than of personalities, all with the common denominator of English interference with Wabanaki lifeways. (Wabanaki, translated "Dawnlanders," is the collective name applicable to the several Amerindian peoples of northern New England and the Maritimes, all of which spoke closely related languages of the Algonkian Family, and were culturally similar, too.) Interference with native lifeways is not a simple matter to explain. In some affairs European influences were highly desired, but in others clearly not. The dynamics of culture- contact situations always are complicated processes, wherever they occur. The Wabanaki constantly welcomed trade with Europeans. Explorer Verrazzanno's 1524 account tells us that even during the French and Indian Wars trading with English "enemies" occurred. The Wabanaki also sought religious instruction from Europeans, to which desires the French responded far more effectively than the English, thereby starting their long-term political alliance with the "Abenaki Mission Indians." What the Dawnlanders eventually could no longer tolerate, by 1675, was the ever-increasing encroachment upon their lands by the ever-swelling ranks of English freehold settlers. Not only Wabanaki garden plots, but hunting territories, and even fishing grounds were lost to the English, who insisted on their own exclusive usage of lands that the natives had been quite willing to share with the Europeans. (Sagamore Samoset's 1625 "deedPublished" of lan in d: Papersnear ofDamariscott the 8th Algonquiana tConferenceo Englishman(1977) John Brown apparently was the first such formal misunderstanding in Maine.) 209

The French presence never threatened the Wabanaki in this way, largely because of the small numbers of French farmers living among the Dawnlanders. Furthermore, the French seem not to have imposed as many annoying restrictions on their Wabanaki neighbours as the English did, nor to have held native lifeways in such contempt. One of the few English colonists who shows any sign at all of glimpsing the Wabanaki anxiety about English domination was Reverend William Hubbard. In his contemporary account of King Philip's War, Hubbard tells of a 1665 Anglo-Wabanaki "Agreement" (seemingly the first such ever made) to attempt settling potential complaints, "if any Mischief should happen to be done" by either English or Indians against the other. This treaty, Hubbard states, was made "in Kennibeck," between "the Sagamores of the Indians in those Parts" and the Duke of York's Commissioners. Unfortunately, English local and area government "in those Parts" soon collapsed, and the "Agreement" came to naught. Hubbard laments about this treaty that, "if it had been observed, [it] might in all Probability have prevented in a great Measure the Quarrel which is now fain out betwixt the English and the said Indians." If, after 1665, the English had done too little to prevent conflict on the northeastern frontier, they did far too much there toward that goal as soon as the Southern Front erupted in June 1675. They short-sightedly attempted to disarm the Wabanaki of Maine, apparently oblivious to the fact that these hunting peoples had become economically dependent upon fire­ arms and metal blades. The effect of this ultimate English affront to the Dawnlanders was, of course, open warfare on the Northern Front, too. The English colonists had, by then, given the Wabanaki even more reason to fight for their independence and freedom from foreign domination in 16 75 than Mother England had given the American Patriots by 1775. The issues were clear to the Wabanaki, who were not fight­ ing for anybody's cause but their own, in this first of their several wars against the English. Without the support of their French allies of later wars--indeed, without any sort of overall organization—and encouraged in their own deep convictions of right only by the uprising of the southern New England Indians, the Dawnlanders revolted fiercely, but spasmodically and capriciously. To the English, the Wabanaki appeared to be hateful and perfidious friends, to be treated accordingly. Atrocities were perpetrated by both sides. Neither side "won", and both lost heavily. It was a war of attrition, and it settled nothing but the minds of the surviving opponents against each other, for future reference. Later, however, the ongoing cause of Wabanaki independence became hopelessly lost in Anglo-French political struggles. There is really nothing for most Americans to celebrate about King Philip's War Northern Front, except the desire and attempt of human beings to achieve independence. (English colonial "victories" against the Wabanaki in that war were setbacks to the Indians' freedom, and Wabanaki "victories" can give little satisfaction to the White majority.) If American Bicentennial Celebrations are intended to raise the collective consciousness of American independence, it would be only fittinPublishedg in t: o Paperstempe ofr theth 8the Algonquianjubilee Conferencewith some Tricentennia(1977) l Awareness from the collective conscience that Yankees have 210 not always given as well as they have gotten. And, if visits to historic places serve to enhance the observances of the cause of human freedom, the following list is of settings where, tricentennially, that cause was fought. Piscataqua River Area On the Maine-New Hampshire border were a number of English settlements. Cocheco (now Dover) was the headquarters and trading post of Major Richard Waldron, a leading military commander for the defense of Maine communities, but who per­ sonified everything wrong with Massachusetts Colony's Indian policy. Newichawannock (now South Berwick) lay just across Salmon Falls, while other small settlements occupied sites on the Piscataqua's tributary streams and bays. In the Autumn of 1675, this entire area was plagued by repeated Indian attacks. In 1676, the Cocheco Treaty of 3 July brought hope of peace, but on 6 September Waldron's Trick marked him as a villain for eventual execution by the Reds: Taking advantage of the coincidental presence of immense numbers of both colonial troops and visiting Indians, Waldron organized a military "game," in which ca. 200 "suspected" Indians were captured for later execution or enslavement in foreign parts. York--Wells Area In early Winter 1675-76, Fall 1676, and Spring 1677, the small coastal settlements of this area were raided intermit­ tently by Wabanaki war parties intent upon driving out the English settlers. Sagamore Mogg applied artful diplomacy toward that end (in October 1676) , allowing unmolested departure, but at other times other Indians used more direct and lethal means. Biddeford--Saco Area The lower Saco River was the homeland of sagamore Squando (no relation to the Pilgrims' Squanto), and the area of his most specific grievance and vengeance. In the Summer of 1675, some English seamen tested a folk-belief that Indian children could swim instinctively, by tipping over a canoe containing Squando's wife and child. While the wife saved the child from drowning, it died soon after, and Squando blamed the Whites for this as well as other offences. He was an implacable foe of the English throughout the war, which was particularly fierce in this area in the Autumn of 1675. Scarborough Area Especially hard-pressed were the Black Point settlers and their would-be rescuers, under different English leadership in each of the four major attacks: October 1675, October 1676, May 1677, and June 1677. In the first attack, the English garrison commander's inhumane unwillingness to aid ambushed relief columns caused much unnecessary slaughter. The second attack was largely a bloodless diplomatic evacua­ tion led by sagamore Mogg, who was killed there during the third attack. Green English troops were decimated at Massacre Pond on nearby Prout's Neck by seasoned Wabanaki warriors in the fourth attack.

Published in : Papers of the 8th Algonquian Conference (1977) 211 Portland Area The killings and burnings here started in September 1675. In August 1676, Wabanaki attacks led to such losses that the English settlers fled to the islands of Casco Bay, but even on outermost Jewell's Island they still were assaulted. The next month, Captain Hathorn's expedition arrived, and was unable to engage any Indians—yet raiding continued within its sight. The Casco Treaty of 12 April 1678 was signed here, officially stopping the war, but scarcely ameliorating its causes. Brunswick Area Here on the Androscoggin River the Northern Front war really began, and the Wabanaki who lived on this river were credited most with keeping it going. On 4 September 1675, the trading post of Thomas Purchase was sacked, to even up accounts for supposedly unfair trading. Soon after this, jittery settlers started shooting at Indians, who returned the fire with interest. In February 1677, Major Waldron's expedition eastward stopped at Merepoint and parleyed with Indians there, but Waldron's congenital diplomatic inability led to instant hostilities instead of negotiations. Bath Area The old name of Sagadahoc River (which designates the joint estuary of the Androscoggin and Kennebec Rivers) would be a better title for this area because it focuses on its logistical importance to the Wabanaki: It was their Main Street inland. English settlement here was truly marginal, so there were few attacks needed to discourage foreign occupation. On 13 August 1676, Hammond's trading post (just across the river from modern Bath) was sacked, and the occupants killed or "captivated," because of supposedly dishonest trading. The next day, the larger commercial establishment of Lake and Clarke on Arrowsic Island was taken, and Captain Lake (who was disliked by the Indians, if only for his Summer 1675 disarmament campaign) was pursued and killed, along with many others who tried to defend the post. Throughout the war, it was hazardous for Englishmen to be found on or near the Sagadahoc thoroughfare, and many aban­ doned the area voluntarily, such as at the isolated Sheepscot Farms. Waterville Area Taconic Falls, on the Kennebec River, was an ancient area of Indian occupation. Here the Wabanaki had a fort (to protect themselves from Mohawk invasion, among other things), fishing grounds, and garden plots. The English ran a trading post here, too, which was shut down in July 1675 as part of the disarmament program. Many Indians fled here in Autumn 1675 to avoid English militia patrols (and, from 1676 onward, the Kennebec-Chaudiere River Trail became the evacuation route for the many Wabanaki who quit New England for New France). A fruitless Anglo-Wabanaki conference at Taconic in ear} ' August 1676 merely strengthened the respective demands and fears of each side against the other. In February 1677, captives, parley, fight, or whatever seemed appropriate, but the Wabanaki had totally escaped from the vicinity just before thPublishede Englis in h: Papersarrived of the. 8th Algonquian Conference (1977) 212 Pemaquid Area This was the furthest-east English outpost in Maine, and (either in spite of it or because of it) harbored the most able and least biased English diplomats in Indian affairs throughout the war. Pemaquid was the site of various parleys and preliminary conferences, but its agents seldom had authority to finalize anything. Major Waldron's expedition eastward arrived here in late February 1677 to parley with Indians about English captives. Claiming perfidious intent on the Wabanaki side, Waldron turned the ransom transaction into an armed assault, killing or capturing his opponents (even executing one later), and keeping the agreed-upon ransom, after obtaining the captured Englishmen. In June 1677, the Governor of New York acted in the best interests of the Duke of York, who was the proprietor of the Pemaquid Grant as well as of the New York Colony. Fearing that Pemaquid would fall from English hands if Massachusetts-style "diplomacy" continued, the New York governor sent Anthony Brockholts to Pemaquid to make peace with the Wabanaki. By 18 August, Brockholts could report peace made with all the various belligerent constituencies of the Dawnlanders, and Massachusetts begrudgingly accepted the happy fact. Brockholts' peace became the basis for the Casco Treaty of 12 April 1678. Penobscot Bay Area There were no English settlements on Penobscot Bay. This was the homeland of sagamore Madockawando, whose participation in King Philip's War was more diplomatic than military. A leader of great influence, Madockawando perhaps held a vestigial ancient status of paramount sagamore among the Wabanaki, but neither ethnologists nor historians yet agree on this point. It was in Madockawando's name (and that of another Penobscot Bay sagamore, Chebartina) that sagamore Mogg made a treaty while in Boston in November 1676. This Boston Treaty was then taken to Penobscot Bay for Madockawando's ratification in early December. However, not all Indian masters of English captives were willing to return them, as the treaty required, nor were all Wabanaki sagamores sufficiently inclined toward peace at that time, so the treaty accomplished little. The official status of sagamore Mogg, or even his precise tribe affiliation and village location, are still more problematical than Madockawando's status, and only long-term ethnohistorical teamwork can ever bridge this knowledge gap. Mogg clearly appears (until his death at Black Point, 16 May 1677) as the perennial traveling diplomat of the Northern Front war, but perhaps he had no true "authority" at all for his actions. Mogg is thought by some to have authored a plan to establish a Wabanaki privateering fleet of captured English vessels, but such a plan was not carried out until after his death. Then, in July 1677, Wabanaki warriors seized a fleet of Salem (Massachusetts)-owned fishing boats off Cape Sable (Nova Scotia) and headed them for Penobscot Bay. However, one vessel's English crew overpowered its captors and arrived at Marblehead (Massachusetts) on Sunday 15 July with two of the Indians still aboard but tied up. The angry women of Marblehead, coming home from church, seized the two Wabanaki captives anPublishedd literall in : Papersy tor of thee the8th Algonquianm to piece Conferences in reveng(1977)e for their piracy.