BIOLOGICAL NOMENCLATURE, CLASSIFICATION AND THE ETHNOZOOLOGICAL SPECIEME

Michael J. Tyler University of Adelaide

INTRODUCTION The objectives of biological nomenclature on the one hand, and constructing and maintaining a hierarchial system of classification on the other, are related but distinct. In his classic workSysterna Naturae, Linnaeus (1766) adopted a binomial nomenclature, whereby each animal was given a specific and a generic name. Although zoologists now use a modem language for the description of the taxon, Latinisation of specific and generic names (as used by Linnaeus) is adopted universally. To promote universality and aid stability of nomenclature, various regulatory codes have been proposed throughout the past century. There is now a single code(The International Code of Zoological Nomenclature, Third Edition, adopted by the 20th General Assembly of the International Union of Biological Sciences, and published in February 1985). That Code, like its predecessors, addresses problems such as those of homonymy and synonymy, and provides the procedural mechanics for resolving them. Nomenclature is a utilitarian device: we must communicate. To the uninitiated it is perhaps a surprise to discover that the practice of zoological nomenclature is volatile and generates more heat than a nuclear reactor. Classification in biology creates a hierarchical system of units of decreasing magnitude ranging from the Animal Kingdom as a whole through to a recognisable component of a portion of a single species. Linnaeus used what would today be considered a simplistic scheme involving only five units within the Kingdom: Class, Order, Genus, species and variety. Subsequently the number of units increased as the need for them arose and the complexity and diversity of the Kingdom was revealed. It is apparent that there is considerable divergence of use of classification, such that zoologists working on fishes and reptiles may have totally different perceptions of a Family unit. Similarly at a level below a genus there is no uniformity in the nomenclature of “sub-generic” units. The problems of classification have been compounded over the past 25 years by the introduction of biological and molecular techniques demonstrating that biological and genetic divergence is not always accompanied by morphological change. Thus they may demonstrate that two genetically distinct populations meriting recognition at a species level may be identical in their appearance. Clearly the hierarchial classification has proved inadequate to accommodate the subtleties of various degrees of divergence between and within populations, and also inadequate to express various degrees of affinity between species within a genus. This comment is equally valid in anthropology in the study of communities and their history, and their assumed origins and relationships. Here I address some of the problems that exist. I have in part been deliberately provocative, in the hope that the contribution will generate meaningful discussion. It is against that background that I put in perspective the implications of one of Ralph Bulmer’s findings in ethnozoological nomenclature.

CL AS S IRC ATION HIERARCHY Mayr (1969) summarised the “generally accepted categories” in zoological classification as follows: Kingdom Phylum Subphylum Superclass Class Subclass Cohort Superorder Order Suborder Superfamily Family Subfamily Tribe Genus Subgenus Species Subspecies 164 The Ethnozoological Specieme 165

Mayr also drew attention to a number of supplementary subdivisions between Class and Superfamily. Twenty years on, it is clear that a vast number of additional categories has become in vogue or has been coined to accommodate varying degrees of divergence and affinity, particularly below the level of genus. The point has been reached where the practice of classification amongst contributors between and even within different Classes, has become blurred.

CLASSIFICATION UNITS BELOW THE GENUS Within the last decade I have encountered the following terms being employed by those engaged in studies of organisms below the level of genus. I have chosen to present them in alphabetical order to eliminate any suggestion of a hierarchial inference:

chromosomal race race clone sibling species cryptic species species aggregate cytotype species assemblage dilectal races species clade ecospecies species complex forma species group incipient species species taxon infra-genus sub-genus klepton sub-species morph super-species morpho-species synklepton morphotype variant polymorph variety

At its most generous interpretation it could be argued that contributors probably are grappling with a need to give expression to meaningful aggregations of species, or genetic or other attributes within and between interbreeding individuals forming populations. The unit of choice (independent of the name given to it) will reflect intent. Some terms probably are synonymous but, given the rarity with which the use of a unit in a publication is defined by the author, it is difficult to recognise synonymy and ambiguity when they occur. Nevertheless it is highly significant to observe that nomenclatural options below the genus exceed those from Kingdom to genus.

DIVERGENCE AND HIERARCHY IN CLASSIFICATION Compared with the approaches to systematics of perhaps 20 years ago, it is likely that the multiplicity of nomenclature below the level of genus is attributable to (a) the independence of workers employing different scientific techniques to address problems, and (b) the varying degrees of divergence in the taxa examined. At a broad brush level it is evident that the proportion of units observed differs between workers studying organisms in different classes. For example ornithologists do not seem to use units between genus and species. The obvious explanation is they do not recognise genera containing many species, and in fact monotypic genera are extremely common: units between genus and species do not seem to have much use amongst ornithologists. The above observation raises the obvious question as to just why speciose genera do not exist amongst birds. Is it the existence of limited intra-specific variation? (Certainly morphological variability will contribute, because the less discrete a population, the greater the likelihood of a ‘splitter’ taxonomist creating discrete taxonomic units.) But if those studying different Classes produce different concepts of genera, does it matter very much? I would suggest, tentatively perhaps, that comparative studies of evolution as a whole (across vertebrates) would only lead to confusion if the genus is perceived as being as natural a unit as a species. I suspect that above the species, collective terms are utilitarian. It is only when we try to create an orderly hierarchy that problems are likely to be created. Concerning the second point, namely whether different degrees of divergence in the taxa being studied contribute to nomenclatural problems, Figure 1 represents the difference in age since origin of eight congeners. Nothing is inferred about their phylogeny - only that they have existed as discrete genetic units for varying periods. There is nothing particularly profound about it - only that in examining discrete populations at a single fixed point in time, their varying histories and age will no doubt influence their degree of difference from one another, whether the viewpoint is gross morphology, the chromosome or whatever. 166 Michael J. Tyler

Congeners Figure 1: Variation in times since origin amongst eight members of a genus. Comparison at the fixed point in time (1988) must accept the difficulty of according each an identical status

It would seem that the ability to recognise, in theory and practice, that age and divergence differ, cannot be accommodated adequately below the genus, above the species or within the species. The process of speciation and attainment of genetic integrity is so dynamic that populations, as well as perceptions of them, differ. Any attempt to impose a hierarchial structure upon the multiplicity of nomenclatural units would be doomed to failure.

THE SPECIEME CONCEPT Ralph Bulmer’s initial studies on the vertebrate fauna known to the Karam led to a comparison of the perceptions of kinds, the criteria for their recognition, and the hierarchical system within which units were arranged. Examining the manner in which Lêvi-Strauss was justified in applying the category “species” for categories in ethnozoology, Bulmer (1970:1089) observed

It seems to me important that a species is not merely to be definable by multiple criteria, but that these criteria are almost infinitely extendible in number. Having isolated a valid natural species (in the biological as well as in the logical sense), the more closely one examines it, the longer the list of characters one can note which contrast it with other species.

It is quite plain that the species is here viewed from the aspect of its distinctiveness from others. Bulmer is emphasising the number and extent of the characters that are unique to the species. With this attitude in mind there developed the concept of a “specieme” in which “natural kinds” recognised in a folk-taxonomy need not necessarily equate with a species (Bulmer and Tyler 1968). Certainly it was noted that many speciemes did correspond to species but others did not. The explanation for the non-correspondence was not scientific inaccuracy, but rather a different perception of what kinds were all about, and the utilitarian objective of the nomenclature employed.

MUTUAL PROBLEMS My purpose in drawing attention to the specieme concept is to suggest that there may be parallels between it and the evident scientific nomenclatural problems that exist directly above and below the level of a species. The biological species concept requires potentially interbreeding individuals producing viable and fertile offspring retaining that capacity. But when does a species become a species? It is easy enough to enumerate criteria such as the acquisition of pre-mating and post-mating isolating mechanisms and genetic integrity, but The Ethnozoological Specieme 167 the absolute moment in time cannot be determined with any degree of accuracy. But the evolutionary milestone of a segment of a population becoming a new species is not necessarily accompanied by a fanfare of morphological trumpets. It is where gross morphological diversity is slight that nomenclatural problems arise: different workers may use different techniques and their perceptions of the status of elements of a natural kind may also differ. Darwin (1874) commented on the difficulty of accommodating racial differences in nomenclature of a species, and stated, “The choice of terms is only so far important in that it is desirable to use, as far as possible, the same termsfor the same degrees of difference [italics mine]”. There are few modem workers who would agree with adopting such a principle, for it would seem that the degree of difference varies between units that in an evolutionary sense merit being accorded a similar status. Our concepts of what is important and significant have not just changed, but have been supplemented by the ability to explore similarity and diversity using techniques that formerly were unknown. It is impossible to arrange all of the nomenclatural units, above, in a hierarchial, two dimensional structure. Several schemes involving different parameters of measurement and different dimensions are included. The data have been obtained independently. I am not suggesting that the species is not a natural entity, only that components of the phenotype and genotype are perceived in different ways, and that the species concept is becoming blurred. We are trying to squeeze a dynamic 20th century concept into a static 18th century mould. The latter is not big enough and is the wrong shape to accommodate it: the result is a lot of little odd fragments of the species floating around trying to find a home. Perhaps it is my perception that is wrong, and in reality the species concept is indeed becoming more malleable, to accommodate change. But, malleable or rigid, the broader specieme has something to offer and the future debate on species, kinds, speciemes and nomenclature is one that R.N.H.B. would approve.

REFERENCES

BULMER, R.N.H., 1970. Which Came First, the Chicken or the Egg-head? in J. Pouillon and P. Maranda (eds), tchanges et communications: Melanges offerts a Claude Lêvi-Strauss a I’occasion de son 60eme anniversaire. The Hague, Mouton. pp. 1069-91. ------, and M.J. TYLER, 1968. Karam Classification of Frogs.Journal of the Polynesian Society, 77:333-85. DARWIN, Charles, 1874. The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. 2nd Edition, 1883. London, John Murray. LINNAEUS, Carolus, 1766.Systema Naturae. 12th Edition, London. MAYR, Ernst, 1969. Principles of Systematic Zoology. New York, McGraw-Hill.

ETHNO-ICHTHYOLOGY IN THE UPPER WAINIMALA VALLEY, VITI LEVU

Alanieta Waqaniu and Garth Rogers University of Auckland

Fiji embraces over 320 islands and many Fijians1 live within the sound of the sea and extensively exploit the marine environment. But people of the interior of Viti Levu, the largest island2 in Fiji,3 may live up to 50 kilometres from the coast and are therefore denied direct access to marine resources.4 Instead, they extensively forage the forests and bush and the rivers, streams and swamps which abound in the region. For the mountainous interior of Viti Levu raises to over 100 metres in several areas and is dissected and worn by several long rivers and their extensive tributaries. These rivers are the focus of economic life for numerous peoples of the interior,5 and often their best means of communication with one another and the outside world, providing easy access by means of rafts and punts to much of their garden land,6 and supplying a reliable source of protein in the form of fresh- water fish, eels, crabs and prawns. This essay examines the classification of these fresh-water resources at Nawaisomo on the Waicakena River, a tributary of the upper Wainimala River.7 We note how some of these creatures articulate vanua with and m ataqali social classifications and are used to portray some kinship relations.