Taxonomy and Its Pleasures
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Research research in phenomenology 47 (2017) 429–448 in Phenomenology brill.com/rp Taxonomy and its Pleasures Anne O’Byrne Stony Brook University Anne.O’[email protected] Abstract Taxonomy is our response to the proliferating variety of the natural world on the one hand, and the principle of unrelieved universality on the other. From Aristotle, through Porphyry to Linneaus, Kant and others, thinkers have struggled to develop taxonomies that could order what we know and also what we do not yet know, and this essay is a reflection on the existential desire that propels this effort. Porphyry’s tree of logic is an exhaustive account of the things we can say about the sort of beings we are; Linneaus’s system of nature reaches completion in the classification of humans; Kant discovers a way to have natural and logical forms coincide in the thought of natural purpose and purposiveness. The stakes are high. When we order the world, we order ourselves: when we enter the taxonomy, it enters us and confronts us with our judg- ments of kind, race and kin. Keywords taxonomy – judgment – Porphyry – Linneaus – Kant – race – kinship 1 Introduction Everything in the world, all together, is too much for us. The onrush of sensa- tion is overwhelming; the manifold of sensibility is a jumble; nature appears in a dazzling array of forms; new sorts of life burst upon us. We share the earth with seven billion others but we cannot possibly imagine what it would be like to meet seven billion individuals. We long for order, or orders, or at least a capacity for ordering. Foucault describes the experience of an aphasiac trying to arrange one small collection of skeins of wool: © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi �0.��63/�569�640-��34�Downloaded378 from Brill.com09/25/2021 03:04:07PM via free access 430 o’byrne [T]he sick mind continues to infinity, creating groups then dispersing them again, heaping up diverse similarities, destroying those that seem clearest, splitting up things that are identical, superimposing different criteria, frenziedly beginning all over again, becoming more and more disturbed and teetering finally on the brink of anxiety.1 It is an anxiety that haunts us in the form of a fear of not being able to estab- lish an order, and of not being able to give up trying. We fear we can’t endure the mess, and so we cling to our categories even when there are more excep- tions than cases that follow the rule, when the system of classification pro- duces more violence than it deflects, more racism than solidarity, more zones of speechlessness than adequate description, more silence and death than speech and life. Encountering far fewer than seven billion individuals—individual spiders, leaves, stars, microbes, people, objects, others, ways of doing something, any- thing—we develop taxonomies. This is empirically demonstrable and also epistemologically necessary, but what interests me here, in this search for on- tological structures, is that it emerges as a response to an existential anxiety. How can we discern anything about Being in general, or Being as such, when our only access is in beings, and when those beings show themselves to us in very many different ways and, moreover, keep appearing in new ways all the time? How can we discern anything about our mode of Being when we keep appearing to ourselves and to and with one another in new and different ways, constantly?2 How does anything become distinct against—as Foucault puts it—the confused, undefined, faceless and indifferent background of differences?3 A mode of ordering pulls us back from the brink of two anxieties, one brought on by the vertiginous display of difference, the other rising in the face of unrelieved universality.4 On the one hand is Hernan Cortés, who in 1520 1 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), xx. 2 Foucault explicitly rejects the phenomenological approach because of its concentration on the subject and its postulation of a transcendental subjectivity. Yet those criticisms are less pertinent insofar as phenomenology develops the thought of intersubjectivity and being- with, and insofar as it is understood hermeneutically. See The Order of Things, xv. 3 Foucault, The Order of Things, xxvi. 4 Note the parallel between the structure described here and the principle Arendt identifies when she writes: “There is something here [in the camps] that should never be involved in politics as we used to understand it, namely all or nothing—all, and that is an undetermined infinity of forms of human living-together, or nothing, for the victory of the concentration- camp system would mean the same inexorable doom for human beings as the use of the research in phenomenologyDownloaded from47 Brill.com09/25/2021(2017) 429–448 03:04:07PM via free access taxonomy and its pleasures 431 reported to Charles V that he could not describe everything he saw in the New World because he did not know the words by which they all were known,5 or Foucault’s aphasiac fretting over colored threads; on the other is Pascal made fearful by the vastnesses of space, or any of us aghast at the Genesis figure of the “tohu-bohu,” the “deserted and empty universe crushed under the spirit of God.”6 We need categories, species, taxa, orders, groups and genera as a way to give us access to beings, and we need a system that sets them in relation to one another so that we can make sense of what is before us and also what we have yet to see, whatever that might be. We need Aristotle’s Categories; we need Porphyry to help inherit and bequeath the dynamic figure of the γένος through medieval philosophy; we need Linneaus to create his modern taxonomy of ab- solute genera from them. We also need Kant and Darwin, Mendel and modern cladistics, the Human Genome Project and the Tree of Life Project, W.E.B. Du Bois and Lucius Outlaw and, above all this, reflection on the purpose of taxonomy in the context of the entire burgeoning conversation about the meaning of race and kin. What follows is offered as an opening onto that reflection. Porphyry purveyed a logic that offered itself as the demonstration of its own principle, as logics do. What I hope to show here is the underlying existential principle for his categories. When Linneaus later brought the Aristotelian/Porphyrian schema to bear on the natural world, his study was propelled by the desire for a complete system that would quickly systematize us. When we ordered the world, we ordered ourselves: when we entered the taxonomy, it entered us. 2 The Tree of Porphyry, or, the Pleasure of Order Κατηγορίαι are predications. Insofar as Aristotle’s Categories is about an action or process, it is about predication, and it aims to determine what can be said of what. This is why it is classed among his works of logic. While it begins with hydrogen bomb would mean the doom of the human race” (Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism [Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973], 443). 5 See Andrea Giunta, “Strategies of Modernity in Latin America,” in Gerardo Mosquera (ed.) Beyond the Fantastic: Contemporary Art Criticism from Latin America (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 53. Cited in Juan Carlos Guerrero Hernández “Mutilated Bodies and Memories of Violence: Displacements and Contestations of Representations of Violence, in Contemporary Video Art and Photography in Colombia, 1993–1998” (PhD Dissertation, Stony Brook University, 2015), 83. 6 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved (New York: Summit Books, 1988), 85. research in phenomenology 47 (2017) 429–448 Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 03:04:07PM via free access 432 o’byrne the naming of things, it immediately leaves behind those equivocal names that name just one case alone (1a), since what propels the work is predication that is applied to many cases and the many predicates that are applied to any one case. That is to say, what is predicated of the individual can be predicated of other individuals, and no single predicate exhausts what can be said of an in- dividual. Things are categorized with others, and with various others. Plato is a man, and so are Socrates and Alcibiades; all are classed together under the species “man”: Plato is also an animal, as is this cat and that horse, not to men- tion Alcibiades, and all are classed under the γένος “animal.” Encountering any particular person standing before us in the marketplace, there are many things I might want to say about him but, for Aristotle, there are a finite number of sorts of things that can be said. I can pose very many ques- tions as I try to categorize this person, but they will all be versions of ten basic questions that yield ten sorts of knowledge. Aristotle lists them: What (or Substance), how large (that is, quantity), what sort of thing (that is, quality), related to what (or relation), where (that is, place), when (that is, Time), in what attitude (posture, position), how circumstanced (state or condition), how active, what doing (or Action), how passive, what suf- fering (affection). (1b25–28)7 Is this a matter of words or objects? When Aristotle asserts what can be said, is he also asserting what is? The answer is not clear and we need not try to settle the matter here. Porphyry, a student of Plotinus, was the author of the Introduction or Isagoge that served throughout the Middle Ages as an introduc- tion to the Categories, and also as the introductory handbook for logic.8 He sim- ply sidesteps the question, declining to discuss such deep matters, which, he points out, would need a larger investigation.