Network Centrality and Coalitional Competition: an Economic Experiment in an Achuar and Sápara Community of the Ecuadorian Amazon ______
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NETWORK CENTRALITY AND COALITIONAL COMPETITION: AN ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT IN AN ACHUAR AND SÁPARA COMMUNITY OF THE ECUADORIAN AMAZON ____________________________________ A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of California State University, Fullerton ____________________________________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in Anthropology ____________________________________ By James G. Zerbe Thesis Committee Approval: John Q. Patton, Division of Anthropology, Chair Elizabeth Pillsworth, Division of Anthropology Brenda Bowser, Division of Anthropology Spring, 2017 ABSTRACT One instance of a cooperation dilemma consequential to humans is inter- coalitional competition and conflict. Here, results are reported from a series of five one- shot anonymous public goods games (PGG) designed to elicit varying coalitional and competition motivations for cooperation within the PGG. The data presented in this thesis were collected in Conambo, a bi-ethnic tribal community of Achuar and Sápara peoples in the Ecuadorian Amazon. This research has two aims: (a) discern the relative influence of group composition, random or coalitional, and the level of group competition, either none, intra-group, or inter-group on cooperation; and (b) test predictions concerning how variation in social network centrality affects cooperation in intergroup competition. Analyses of experimental PGG treatments reveal a significant increase in offers due to variation in group composition (from random to coalitional) in the context of between- group competition. Additionally, betweenness centrality in an alliance network was found to differentially affect cooperative offers in men and women across a range of coalitional and competitive contexts. These results give further confidence that group competition is a robust factor increasing cooperation and limited support for the argument that inter- individual differences rather than group level differences explain variation in PGG offers. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................... ii LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................... v LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................... vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................. vii Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ...................................................................... 4 The Problem of Cooperation................................................................................. 4 Evolutionary Game Theory ........................................................................... 5 Indirect Fitness Mechanisms ......................................................................... 7 Direct Fitness Mechanisms ............................................................................ 9 Coalitional Aggression and Human Evolution ..................................................... 16 The Human-Chimpanzee Connection ............................................................ 17 The Archaeology of Prehistoric Violence ..................................................... 20 The Ongoing Debate ...................................................................................... 22 Mechanisms of Coalitional Aggression ......................................................... 31 Inter-Individual Differences and Collective-Action ............................................. 37 Evidence from Economic Experiments ......................................................... 38 Individual Variation in Social Capital ........................................................... 42 Social Network Analysis ...................................................................................... 43 Summary ............................................................................................................... 48 3. ETHNOGRAPHIC CONTEXT ............................................................................ 49 Introduction, Location, and Ecology .................................................................... 49 Social Organization and Demography .................................................................. 50 Subsistence Patterns .............................................................................................. 52 Recent History of Violence in Conambo and Surrounding Areas ........................ 53 Achuar and Sápara Ethno-histories....................................................................... 55 Achuar History ............................................................................................... 56 Sápara History ................................................................................................ 58 Summary ............................................................................................................... 61 iii 4. METHODS AND HYPOTHESES ....................................................................... 62 Information-Sharing Network Task ...................................................................... 62 Successive Pile-Sort: Coalitional-Alliance Network ............................................ 64 Public Goods Game .............................................................................................. 66 Hypotheses ............................................................................................................ 70 Coalitional Effects on Cooperation ................................................................ 70 Competition Effects on Cooperation ............................................................. 71 Social Network Centrality Effects on Cooperation ....................................... 72 5. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS ............................................................................... 74 Information-Sharing Network Analysis................................................................ 74 Coalitional-Alliance Structure .............................................................................. 75 Hypothesis Testing ............................................................................................... 79 Cooperation in Coalitional and Competitive Contexts .................................. 80 Network Centrality and Cooperation ............................................................. 89 6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION .................................................................. 94 Discussion ............................................................................................................. 94 Cooperation in Coalitional and Competitive Contexts .................................. 94 Cooperation and Centrality ............................................................................ 97 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 105 APPENDICES ............................................................................................................... 109 A. PUBLIC GOODS GAME ENGLISH PROTOCOL ..................................... 109 B. PUBLIC GOODS GAME SPANISH PROTOCOL ...................................... 112 REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 115 iv LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Coalitional and Competitive Conditions of the PGG .......................................... 70 2. Descriptive Statistics of Information-Sharing Network Centrality Variables ..... 85 3. Descriptive Statistics of Alliance Strength .......................................................... 77 4. Descriptive Statistics of Alliance-Network Centrality Variables ........................ 79 5. Descriptive Statistics of PGG Offers ................................................................... 81 6. Mixed ANOVA Omnibus Test of PGG Offers.................................................... 81 7. Mixed ANOVA Omnibus Test of PGG Round Order ......................................... 83 8. Mixed ANOVA Contrast of Treatment One and Three ....................................... 84 9. Mixed ANOVA Contrast of Treatment Two and Four ........................................ 87 10. Mixed ANOVA Contrast of Treatment One and Two ......................................... 87 11. Mixed ANOVA Contrast of Treatment Three, Four, and Five............................ 88 12. Mixed ANOVA Contrast of Treatment Four and Five ........................................ 89 13. Hierarchical Regression of PGG Offers and Information-Network Centrality ... 91 14. Hierarchical Regression of PGG Offers and Men’s-Alliance Network Centrality ............................................................................................................. 92 15. Hierarchical Regression of PGG Offers and Women’s Alliance-Network Centrality ............................................................................................................. 93 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1. Prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix ....................................................................... 6 2. Typical distribution of Achuar and Sápara households in Conambo .................. 50 3. Map of the regional ethnosphere.........................................................................