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Coming to Terms with the Past: Commemorating a Key Step in Democratisation

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Coming to terms with the past: Commemorating a key step in democratisation Andres Kasekamp Director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, Professor of Baltic Politics at the University of Tartu The year 2009 was celebrated as the 20th anni- versary of the collapse of communist regimes and the restoration of liberty in Central and Eastern Europe. The high point was the 20th anniversary of the fall of the infamous Berlin Wall – the most visible symbol of the divided continent and the absurdities of the Cold War. The ice had begun to melt in Tallinn earlier than in East Berlin. The “Singing Revolution” occurred The ice had begun to melt in in Estonia already in June 1988, when massive Tallinn earlier than in East Berlin. spontaneous peaceful demonstrations at the Song Festival Grounds in Tallinn resulted in the removal of the old guard hard-line communist party leadership. The 1989 revolutions in the Warsaw Pact countries showed the people of the Baltic states that anything is possible. Nevertheless, Western governments counselled patience – their fi rst priority was to support Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms in Moscow, and they feared that the Baltic peoples’ desire for independence would undermine his position. Diplomacy naturally favoured stability and the status quo, even though most Western governments had never offi cially recognised the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states. Though Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians began their drive for freedom earlier than most of Central Europe, it took them longer, until 1991, to achieve it. An important milestone on this complicated road was the Congress of People’s Depu- ties of the USSR, elected in March 1989 in the fi rst competitive elections held in the USSR. The Congress opened up public political debate in the USSR. Deputies from Estonia were among the staunchest advocates of democratisation. In the spirit of 98 COMING TO TERMS WITH THE PAST: COMMEMORATING A KEY STEP IN DEMOCRATISATION 2010 glasnost (openness) proclaimed by Gorbachev, they called for the establishment of a committee to investigate the existence of the secret protocols of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact. Gorbachev reluctantly acquiesced and appointed his close advisor Alexander Yakovlev to head the committee. The deputy chairmen were Edgar Savisaar, leader of the Estonian Popular Front, Yuri Afanasyev, Director of the Moscow State History and Archive Institute, and Valentin Falin, Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. Among the other prominent indi- viduals of the 27-member committee were Alexy Ridiger, the future patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, and Estonian physicist Endel Lippmaa, who was actually the driving personality behind the work of the committee. The secret protocols of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggres- sion Treaty, widely known as the Molotov-Ribben- With this deal, Stalin gave Hitler trop Pact after the foreign ministers who signed the the green light to launch his in- treaty on 23 August 1939 in Moscow, carved Eastern vasion of Poland and ignite the Europe into spheres of infl uences – Finland, the Bal- Second World War. tic states, Bessarabia, and the eastern part of Poland were assigned to the USSR. With this deal, Stalin gave Hitler the green light to launch his invasion of Poland and ignite the Second World War. The USSR soon joined Nazi Germany by dismembering Poland from the east. After Poland, it was time for the Baltic states: On 24 September 1939 the USSR issued an ultimatum to Estonia demanding the immediate stationing of Red Army troops on its territory. In the next act, in June 1940, Moscow installed puppet governments in the Baltic states and subsequently incorporated them into the USSR. Tens of thousands of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians lost their lives as a result of Soviet terror. The Baltic members of the committee hoped for a resolution by the Congress in time for the 50th anniversary of the Pact on 23 August 1989. When it became clear that this was not forthcoming, the Estonian Popular Front, together with its Latvian and Lithuanian counterparts, organised an unprecedented human chain, stretching from Tallinn to Vilnius via Riga – a distance of over 600 kilometres. An estimated one-and- a-half million people joined hands across the Baltic republics on that day to signal to the world their desire for freedom and to put pressure on Moscow to admit to the existence of the secret protocols. Finally, the Congress denounced the Molotov-Rib- bentrop Pact on Christmas Eve, 24 December 1989. Finally, the Congress de- The resolution omitted any mention of the conse- nounced the Molotov-Ribben- quences of the pact. It was a political and moral trop Pact on Christmas Eve, judgment rather than a legal assessment. Yakovlev 24 December 1989. realised that the resolution would not have been 99 2010 ESTONIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YEARBOOK approved by the Congress had the implications been stated, since the denunciation of the secret protocols undermined the legitimacy of Soviet rule in the Baltic republics. To commemorate this important breakthrough – one of the most signifi cant diplo- matic accomplishments for Estonians – the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, an in- dependent think-tank which co-operates closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, organised an international conference in Tallinn on 17–18 September 2009. The con- ference commemorated a unique moment in recent history when Estonians and Rus- sians (and others) were able to honestly face their shared tragic past together. While there has been much bitter controversy over the past few years, notably the crisis involving the relocation of the Soviet war memorial in Tallinn in 2007, the work of the committee in 1989 gives hope that in the future Estonians and Russians can fi nd common ground. An honest approach to history can provide an opening for reconcili- ation between nations. The conference participants included veterans of the 1989 committee from the Baltic states and Russia, including Vitaly Korotich, the editor-in-chief of the highly infl u- ential Russian current affairs magazine Ogonyok during the perestroika years, who remarked that “Estonia has been ‘liberated’ so many times during its history – by Germans, Danes, Swedes, Russians and others – my sincere wish is that Estonia will never be ‘liberated’ again!” In addition to Estonian scholars and politicians who have been personally involved with the issues, such as Professor Marju Lauristin and Igor Gräzin, the conference also featured presentations from younger Russian researchers: Irina Karatsuba from Moscow State University, Nikita Petrov from Memorial, and Anna Sevortian from the Andrei Sakhorov Centre in Moscow, as well as speakers from Germany: Dr. Ludwig Biewer, the Director of the German Foreign Ministry’s Ar- Several of the speakers under- chive, and Dr. Jan Lipinsky, who has conducted lined the worrisome trends in extensive research on the subject1. Russia today where the space for public debate is increasing- Several of the speakers underlined the worri- ly limited and where the justi- some trends in Russia today where the space for fi cation of the crimes against public debate is increasingly limited and where humanity committed by the the justifi cation of the crimes against humanity Stalinist regime is increasingly committed by the Stalinist regime is increasingly accepted. accepted. The establishment of a commission by 1 Jan Lipinsky, Das Geheime Zusatzprotokoll zum deutsch-sowjetischen Nichtangriffsvertrag vom 23. August 1939 und seine Entstehungs- und Rezeptionsgeschichte von 1939 bis 1999 (Frankfurt: Peter Lang Verlag, 2004). 100 COMING TO TERMS WITH THE PAST: COMMEMORATING A KEY STEP IN DEMOCRATISATION 2010 The book presented at the conference, Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: Challenging Soviet History is a must-read for anyone seeking insight into the inner workings of glasnost and perestroika. Russian president Dmitry Medvedev specifi cally tasked with combating the “falsifi ca- tion of history”, i.e. contradicting the offi cial view of recent history, was noted as one example of this negative trend in 2009. As well as the speakers from the above-mentioned countries, presenters from Finland, Poland and Ukraine also shared their experiences of coming to terms with the past, contributing a valuable comparative perspective to the conference. The best-known example of successful reconciliation in contemporary Europe is that between former enemies France and Germany. A highlight of the conference was the launch of English and Russian versions of the book Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: Challenging Soviet History written by Professor Heiki Lindpere, an Estonian specialist on international law who served as a consultant to the committee in 1989.2 It is a fascinating insider’s account of the deliberations of the committee. It is a must-read for anyone seeking insight into the inner workings of glasnost and perestroika. The conference showed that coming to terms with the past is an important founda- tion for democratisation as well as a way towards reconciliation between nations. The problem is not with history or historians – professional Estonian and Russian histo- rians who stick to the objective standards of their profession are able to discuss and debate complicated and painful episodes among themselves. The diffi culties arise when politicians engage in ‘memory politics’ and seek to impose one orthodox narra- tive which excludes all other possible interpretations or experiences. 2 The book is available as a pdf fi le at the homepage of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute: www.evi.ee under “Publications”. 101.
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