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Theory of Knowledge and Theory of Science in the Work of Auguste Comte

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Theory of Knowledge and Theory of Science in the Work of Auguste Comte lHEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND lHEORY OF SCIENCE IN 1HE WORK OF AUGUSTE COMlE NOlE ON COMIE'S ORIGINALfIY «Au lieu de chercher aveuglement une sterile unite scientifique, aussi oppressive que chimerique, dans la vicieuse reduction de tous les phenomenes a un seul ordre de lois, l'esprit humain regardera finale­ ment les diverses classes d'evenements commeayant leurs lois speciales. » Auguste Comte. RESUME. Theorie de la connaissance et theorie des sciences chez Auguste Comte. Plut6t que de reduirel'ceuvre de Comte ason «positivisme », il est utiled'etablir une distinction entresa theorie de la connaissance et sa theorie des sciences. Si la theorie de la connaissance comtienne ne parait pas particulierement originale, sa theoriedessciences est ici consideree comme une innovationintellectuelle majeure: c'est une des toutespremieres theories historiques et differentielles. Elle a ete capi­ tale pour la formation de l'epistemologiefrancaise. The most common opinion on the work of Auguste Comte is that it can well be reduced to the issue of « positivism ». Comments generally indi­ cate that the sense of his writings may be recapitulated by this word, however trivial and however abominable the matter is considered today. Ever since the unfortunate polytechnicien presented his enterprise under the sign of « positive philosophy», his disciples and critics alike have associated his name with the « positivist )} doctrine. And especially in the social sciences, nothing is more evident than that Comte's intellectual significance resides in his positivism in all its manifestations (from his epistemology and sociology to the religion of humanity) 1. I. For a typical example see the introduction by Gertrud Lenzer, in Auguste Comte and Positivism. The Essential Writings, ed. by Gertrud LENZER, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1975. See also Anthony GIDDENS, ed., Positivism and Sociology. London, Heinemann, 1974; Christopher BRYANT, Positivism in Social Theory and Research, New York, St Martin's Press, Revue de synthese : IV S. N" I, janv.-mars 1991. 76 REVUE DE SYNIHESE : IV' S. N" I, JANVIER-MARS 1991 In this essay", I would like to raise two questions as to this dominant image. First of all, does this « positivism» represent historically such an original conception? Historians of science seem to conclude that it was less original than philosophers tend to assume. Once Comte is situated in the history of the sciences, his notions appear to be less new and less scandalous than in traditional histories of philosophy. The characteristics Comte attributed to positive knowledge largely corresponded to the conceptions of the «newtonian current» in French science, including both mathematical physicists and representatives of the life sciences such as Barthez', From this perspective, Comte's originality seems to have been overemphasized. If this is true, either Comte was not a very original thinker or his originality resides elsewhere. It is useful in this connection to distinguish his theory of knowledge from his theory of the sciences. This distinction is somewhat obscured by the term «epistemology », since it can mean both. Positivismin Comte's work was first and foremost a theory of knowledge. It was founded on his scheme of the « three stages », which was founded in turn on a conception of the human mind. His theory of the sciences, however, was less general and far more speci­ fic, founded as it was on the idea of the « hierarchy of the sciences» 4. Broadly speaking, his theory of knowledge was concerned with the common characteristics of knowledge : the progressive break with theo­ logy and metaphysics, and the development towards positive forms of cognition, involving his notions of «laws» and « explanation », The theory of the sciences, on the other hand, was concerned with the specific properties of the various sciences. What I would like to suggest here is that this theory of knowledge was not particularly original, whereas his theory of the sciences represents an important innovation of great historical significance. 1985; Theodor W. ADORNO, et al., Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie, Darm­ stadt, Luchterhand, 1972. 2. This text was presented in 1989 in a seminar of the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences in Uppsala, Sweden. It is based on the last part of my Het ont­ staan van de sociologie (The Making of Sociology), Amsterdam, Prometheus, 1990, p. 207­ 281. 3. See especially the different studies of Georges Canguilhem ; Gaston BACHELARD, Etude sur l'evolution d'un probleme de physique. La propagation thermique dans les solides, Paris, Vrin, 1928, p. 33-72; Leon BRUNSCHVICG, L 'Experience humaine et la causalite physique, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1949, p. 324-330; Georg MISCH, Zur Entstehung des franziisischen Positivismus, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969. 4. A summary of his theory of knowledge can be found in the first lesson of the COUTS de philosophie positive, and an outline ofhis theory ofscience is presented in the second lesson. J. HEILBRON : NOTE ON COMfE'S ORIGINALITY 77 SENSES OF POSmVISM Ordinarily the notion of « positivism» is used in two senses. First, it denotes an imitation of the natural sciences in the domain of the human sciences. Hobbes is thus probably the first « positivist », Condorcet, Cabanis and perhaps the early Saint-Simon were positivists, but Comte rejected such imitations and was not a positivist in this sense. As early as 1819, Comte noted: « Les erreurs de [00'] Condorcet, Cabanis et M. de Tracy proviennent toutes de cette idee fausse qu'il n'y a d'autre moyen de rendre positive la science sociale que de la fonder sur une autre science, deja positive elle-meme »5. Positivism can also refer more broadly to antimetaphysical conceptions of knowledge. Here the central idea is that no positive knowledge can be acquired of « first and final causes» or of the « essence» of phenomena, and that all such questions have to be banned from science, Comte was of course a positivist in this sense, but it is not certain that he contributed much to the formulation of this conception. He invented a word for it, but did he actually do much more? Positivism in this sense emerged parallel to classical physics. Newton wished to refrain from « hypothetical questions », i.e. questions about first or final causes. This attitude became prevalent at the French Academy of Sciences during the eighteenth cen­ tury", and the rejection ofmetaphysics was commonly accepted in French 7 scientific circles around 1800 • Comte never disputed this development. On the contrary, he stressed that positivism in this sense was nothing new. In 1835, he addressed the Academy of Sciences and started his speech by saying that scientific state­ ments need « positive verification ». This « general principle» was an « indispensable condition» for validity and was « universally accept­ ed »8. He expressed the same attitude in the Cours de philosophie posi­ tive: 5. Auguste CoMfE, Ecrits de jeunesse, 1816-1828, Paris, Mouton, 1970, p. 418. 6. Roger HAHN, The Paris Academy ofSciences, 1666-1803, Berkeley, University of Cali­ fornia Press, 1971, p. 34. 7. Nicole DHOMBRES, Jean DHOMBRES, Naissance d'un nouveau pouvoir: sciences et savants en France (1793-1824), Paris, Payot, 1989, p. 450. 8. A. COMfE, « Premier memoire sur la cosmogonie positive» (1835), in op. cit. supra n. 5, p.585. 78 REVUE DE SYNIHESE : IV'S. N" I, JANVIER· MARS 1991 « n est inutile d'insister beaucoup sur un principe devenu maintenant aussi familier atous ceux qui ont fait une etude un peu approfondie des sciences d'observation »9. In his first writings, Comte made no claim to have contributed much to the idea of'« positive science ». He viewed his law ofthe three stages as a great discovery, but made no attempt to formulate new or particularly strict criteria for what positive science was or was not. In a sense, he dele­ gated the question of « demarcation» to the various sciences. It was only in his later works, written after his second crisis in 1838, that his « positiv­ ism» became a more elaborate system. « Positive» then no longer meant « real» and « testable» but also « useful », « precise» and « certain» 10. This change coincided with a marked disinterest in scientific practices and an increased suspicion of scientists. If Comte made any contribution to a theory of positive knowledge, it is probably by generalizing conceptions that already existed in the sciences ofhis time. One might therefore doubt whether these aspects of his work can be interpreted as important innovations. And historically, these contributions have not been especially significant either. For the logical positivists Comte barely existed; there is not one such thinker for whom Comte was important. In fact, Comte's theory was opposed in many ways to the program of the logical positivists. Comte rejected the idea that there existed purely logical criteria or universal methods by which scienti­ fic statements could be distinguished once and for all from nonscientific ones. His positivism was historical, not logical, and according to him there was no «positive method », independent of the practices of the various sciencesII. 9. ID., Philosophie premiere. Cours de philosophie positive, lecons 1 d 45. Presentation et notes par Michel SERRES, Francois DAGOGNETet AlIaI SINACEUR, Paris, Hermann, 1975, p. 26. It is curious that this edition, presented as « la premiere edition savante », has no index and does not contain the « avertissement » where Comte discusses his notion of positive philo­ sophy. 10. See, for example, A. COMTE, Discours sur l'esprit positif, 1844, Paris, Vrin, 1983, p.64-65. II. See, for example, his statement in the first lesson of the Cours: « La methode n'est pas susceptible d'etre etudiee separement des recherches au elle est employee; ou, du moins, ce n'est hi qu'une etude morte, incapable de feconder I'esprit qui s'y livre. », J. HEILBRON : NOTE ON COMrn'S ORIGINALITY 79 COMTE'S ORIGINALITY The mistake ofmany interpretations is that they reduce Comte's theory ofthe sciences to his theory of knowledge.
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