The Positive Philosophy Auguste Comte Batoche Books

The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte Freely Translated and Condensed by Harriet Martineau With an Introduction by Frederic Harrison In Three Volumes Vol. II Batoche Books Kitchener 2000 London, George Bell & Sons, 1896 Contents Book V: Biology................................................................................. 5 Chapter I: General View of Biology ................................................. 5 Chapter II: Anatomical Philosophy ................................................ 43 Chapter III: Biotaxic Philosophy ................................................... 53 Chapter IV: Organic or Votive Life................................................ 67 Chapter V: The Animal Life. ......................................................... 82 Chapter VI: Intellectual And Moral, or Cerebral Functions .......... 95 Book VI: Social Physics .................................................................116 Chapter I: Necessity and Opportuneness of this New Science ......116 Chapter II: Principal Philosophical Attempts to Constitute a Social System. .................................................................................... 162 Chapter III: Characteristics of the Positive Method in Its Application to Social Phenomena. .............................................................. 175 Chapter IV: Relation of Sociology to The Other Departments of Positive Philosophy ................................................................. 215 Chapter V: Social Statics; or, Theory of The Spontaneous Order of Human Society ........................................................................ 229 Chapter VI: Social Dynamics; or, Theory of the Natural Progress of Human Society ........................................................................ 249 Book V: Biology Chapter I General View of Biology The study of the external world and Man is the eternal business of philosophy, and there are two methods of proceeding; by passing from the study of Man philosophy to that of eternal nature, or from the study of external nature to that of Man. Whenever philosophy shall be perfect, the too methods will be reconciled: meantime, the contrast of the two distinguishes the opposite philosophies,—the theological and the positive. We shall see hereafter that all theological and metaphysical philosophy proceeds to explain the phenomena of the external world from the starting-point of our consciousness of human phenomena; whereas, the positive philosophy subordinates the conception of Man to that of the eternal world. All the multitude of incompatibilities between the two philosophies proceed from this radical opposition. If the consideration of Man is to prevail over that of the universe all phenomena are inevita- bly attributed to will,—first natural, and then outside of nature; and this constitutes the theological system On the contrary, the direct study of the universe suggests and develops the great idea of the laws of nature, which is the basis of all positive philosophy, and capable of extension to the whole of phenomena, including at last those of Man and society. The one point of agreement among all schools of theology and metaphysics, which otherwise differ without limit, is that they regard the study of Man as primary, and that of the universe as secondary,—usually ne- glecting the latter entirely. Whereas, the most marked characteristic of the positive school is that it founds the study of Man on the prior knowledge of the external world. 6/Auguste Comte This consideration affects physiology further than by its bearing on its encyclopedical rank. In this one case the character of the science is affected by it. The basis of its positivity is its subordination to the knowledge of the external world. Any multitude of facts, however well analysed, is useless as long as the old method of philosophizing is persisted in, and physiology is conceived of as a direct study, isolated from that of inert nature. The study has assumed a scientific character only since the recent period when vital phenomena began to be regarded as subject to general laws, of which they exhibit only simple modifications. This revo- lution is now irreversible, however incomplete and however imperfect have been the attempts to establish the positive character of our knowledge of the most complex and individual of physiological phenomena; especially that of the nerves and brain. Yet, unquestionable as is the basis of the science, its culture is at present too like that to which men have been always accustomed, pursued independently of mathematical and inorganic philosophy, which are the only solid foundations of the positivity of vital studies. There is no science with regard to which it is so necessary to ascer- tain its true nature and scope; because we have not only to assign its place in the scale, but to assert its originality. On the one hand, metaphysics strives to retain it; and on the other, the inorganic philosophy lays hold of it, to make it a mere outlying portion of its scientific domain. For more than a century, during which biology has endeavoured to take its place in the hierarchy of fundamental sciences, it has been bandied between metaphysics and physics; and the strife can be ended only by the decision of positive philosophy, as to what position all be occupied by the study of living bodies. The present backwardness of the science is explained by the ex- treme complexity of its phenomena, and its recent date. That complexity forbids the hope that biological science can ever attain a perfection comparable to that of the more simple Old general parts of natural philosophy: and, from its recent date, minds which see in every other prov- ince the folly of looking for first causes and modes of production of phenomena, still carry these notions into the study of living bodies. For more than a century intelligent students ave in physics put aside the search after the mystery of weight, and have looked only for its laws; yet they reproach physiology with teaching us nothing of the nature of life, consciousness, and thought. It is easy to see how physiology may thus be supposed to be far more imperfect than it is; and if it be, from Positive Philosophy/7 unavoidable circumstances, more backward than the other fundamental sciences, it yet includes some infinitely valuable conceptions, and its scientific character is far less inferior than is commonly supposed. We must first describe its domain. There is no doubt that the gradual development of human intelligence would, in course of time lead us over from the theological and metaphysical state to the positive by a series of logical conceptions. But such an advance would be extremely slow; and we see, in fact, that the process is much quietened by a special stimulus of one sort or another. Our historical experience which testifies to every great advance having been made in this way, shows that the most common auxiliary influence is the need of application of the science in question. Most philosophers have said that every science springs from a or responding art;—a maxim which, amidst much exaggeration, contains solid truth, if we restrict it, as we ought, to the separation of each science from the theological and metaphysical philosophy which was the natural product of early human intelligence. In this view it is true that a double action has led to the institution of science, the arts furnishing positive data, and then leading speculative researches in the direction of real and accessible questions. But there is another side to this view. When the science has once reached a certain degree of extension, the progress of speculative knowledge is checked by a too close connection of theory with practice. Our power of speculation limited as it is, still far surpasses our capacity for action so that it would be radically absurd to restrict the procuress of the one to that of the other. The rational domains of science and art are, in general, perfectly distinct, though philosophically connected: in the one we learn to know, and therefore to foreknow; in the other to become capable, and therefore to act. If science springs from art, it can be matured only when it has left art behind. This is palpably true with regard to the sciences whose character is clearly recognized. Archimedes was, no doubt, deeply aware of it when he apologized to posterity for having for the moment applied his genius to practical inventions. In the case of mathematics and astronomy we have almost lost sight of this truth, from the remote- ness of their formation but, in the case of physics and of chemistry, at whose scientific birth we may almost be said to have been present we can ourselves testify to their dependence on the arts at the outset, and to the rapidity of their progress after their separation from them. The first series of chemical facts were furnished by the labours of art; but the prodigious recent development of the science is certainly due, for the 8/Auguste Comte most part, to the speculative character that it has assumed. These considerations are eminently applicable to physiology. No other science has been closely connected with a corresponding art, as biology has with medical art,—a fact accounted for by the high impor- tance of the art and the complexity of the science. But for the growing needs of practical medicine, and the indications it affords about the chief vital phenomena, physiology would have probably stopped short at those academical dissertations, half literary, half

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