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What Threats Contribute to Successes of Taliban in Northern Afghanistan?

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What Threats Contribute to Successes of Taliban in Northern Afghanistan? What Threats Contribute to Successes of Taliban in Northern Afghanistan? The followers of the Taliban movement (banned in Tajikistan and other countries of Central Asia) invaded the customs and commercial entry point of Sherkhan-Bandar on June 21 on the border with Tajikistan. The position of the governmental forces in Badakhshan province on the border with Tajikistan worsened, as well. According to Tajikistan, thousands of Afghan refugees can follow. Afghan soldiers in Tajikistan. Photo of the press center of the Border Troops of the State Committee for National Security of Tajikistan Last Monday, early on June 21, the armed group of the Taliban (the movement banned in Tajikistan and other Central Asian states) attacked the commissariat of Sherkhon-Bandar in Kunduz province of Afghanistan on the border with Tajikistan. According to the press centre of Border Troops of GKNB of Tajikistan, 134 soldiers of the Afghan army had to withdraw via the 3rd and 4th frontier posts of the Pyandzh border guard detachment to the territory of Tajikistan. “The border patrol of Tajikistan being guided by the humanism and neighbourliness principles allowed the Afghan military that got through the national border to enter the territory of Tajikistan without let of hindrance,” according to the message. What Threats Contribute to Successes of Taliban in Northern Afghanistan? The remaining military – up to 100 people, either died or felt prisoners. This is not a single success of the Taliban. According to Deborah Lyons, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the Taliban managed to seize 50 out of 370 districts of Afghanistan since early May. Source: gandhara.rferl.org/ Nearly 35 of these districts are located in four provinces bordering Tajikistan. What Threats Contribute to Successes of Taliban in Northern Afghanistan? In particular, some towns of the Afghan province of Badakhshan face battles. The authorities of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) of Tajikistan that share the border with Badakhshan of Afghanistan are concerned about the possible arrival of refugees. Yodgor Fayzov, the chair of GBAO, on Sunday, June 20, held the extraordinary meeting and said they are prepared to accept 5-10 thousand refugees. However, he fears that there may be much more refugees – up to 30 thousand people. “Bloody summer” in Afghanistan Sherkhan-Bandar entry point is a critical commercial point between Afghanistan and Central Asian states and the CIS. According to General Nuralisho Nazarov, the ex-deputy commander of border troops of Tajikistan, most part of the foreign trade between Afghanistan and Tajikistan and other countries in the region was carried out via this entry point. According to experts, the return of this entry point is of crucial practical and moral importance for the governmental forces. Fakhim Kukhdomani, the Afghan political analyst, suggested Nuralisho Nazarov. Photo: ozodi.org that the army of Afghanistan could liberate Sherkhan-Bandar from the Taliban soon. “The Taliban have no potential to control this point and run it. They have no certain programme in terms of ensuring security and administrative control,” said Kukhdomani to CABAR.asia. According to him, the situation in the country will aggravate. “The Pakistan religious schools will go on vacation in summer. According to unofficial data, thousands of militant students have already penetrated into Afghanistan or are going to. Afghanistan is going to have a bloody summer. But it doesn’t mean that the Taliban can easily seize the towns of Afghanistan in future. Afghanistan has no other chance but to fight the Taliban,” said Kukhdomani. Tajikistan-based expert Kosim Bekmukhammad said that the seizure of Sherkhan-Bandar and other Afghanistan towns bordering Tajikistan in the region is a great success for the What Threats Contribute to Successes of Taliban in Northern Afghanistan? Taliban amid the withdrawal of the American troops from Afghanistan. “This is the way how the Taliban demonstrate their power and emphasise that they seized control of one of the most important economic and commercial routes of Afghanistan with the outer world,” said Bekmukhammad to CABAR.asia. He reminded that the Taliban previously could seize control of Kunduz town and other tows sharing joint border with Tajikistan in 2015 and 2016. Back then, the authorities managed to liberate these territories rather rapidly. Kosim Bekmuhammad. Photo: CABAR.asia “However, this time the situation has become worse because of the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan and the lack of the equal foreign partner that would support the government in Kabul,” the Tajikistan- based expert said. According to Bekmukhammad, “irresponsible” behaviour of the Americans who decided to leave the country in the critical moment has caused disappointment among the representatives of state bodies, army and security forces in regions. Officials and the military developed doubts regarding their future. “According to the assessment of the US intelligence, the government of Afghanistan could collapse six months after the American military withdrawal. Previously, they said the government of Kabul would remain for up to two years. In other words, they create public opinion in Afghanistan, region and the world about the imminence of the return of the Taliban to power,” Bekmukhammad said. Prospective appearance of Afghan refugees in Tajikistan According to experts, the fear of mass exodus of refugees from Afghanistan is exaggerated. According to Fakhim Kukhdomani, even if the situation gets worse, the Afghan refugees will try to depart to the European countries. “Even if they come to Tajikistan, they don’t stay there for long. They leave for western countries then. They get money for living in Tajikistan from abroad,” Kukhdomani said. What Threats Contribute to Successes of Taliban in Northern Afghanistan? According to Kasim Bekmukhammad, the influx of tens of thousands of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan is unlikely. According to him, Tajikistan can accept 10-15 thousand Afghan refugees, mainly individuals and family members of employees of local authorities and Afghan security forces, and the army. “Afghan refugees are mainly concentrated in the United States and Europe. They consider other countries as a temporary place to stay,” he said. Have Taliban defeated the US Army? The Taliban became active amid the withdrawal of the American troops from Afghanistan, which is to take place in autumn this year. Afghan First Vice President Amrullah Saleh said in the interview to the Voice of America radio station that the withdrawal of the American troops has contributed to the self-confidence of the Taliban. “They think they have defeated the foreigners, and now it’s time for the troops of Afghanistan,” Saleh said. However, Afghanistan-based political analyst Fakhim Kukhdomani said that the American military withdrawal has rather propaganda than practical effect since the Afghanistan army has been fighting the terrorists independently for a long time. “Of course, there are successes and defeats in the war. But I believe that the Afghan army would win because the Taliban have no wide support among people. No people’s, political or tribal councils in the provinces or districts of Afghanistan have ever supported the Taliban,” Kukhdomani said. Kasim Bekmukhammad said that after Joe Biden had declared on April 14 the American military withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban became more aggressive in their actions and taking control of the country. According to him, the situation in Afghanistan will depend on the Kabul-based government’s will, army and security forces, in particular, on the Afghan political figures who seek to create the national levy against the Taliban. Fahim Kukhdomani. Photo from personal page on According to Bekmukhammad, the success of the What Threats Contribute to Successes of Taliban in Northern Afghanistan? facebook.com Taliban in some provinces may be due to blunders of the central authorities in terms of ensuring their security. “It is possible that some powers in Kabul have intentionally allowed seizing some districts in northern Afghanistan. This step was meant to supress popular non-Pashtun individuals and parties. In this context, we can see geopolitical interests of some regional actors,” Bekmukhammad said. According to the Tajik expert, the growing influence of the Taliban in non-Pashtun regions, especially Tajik-speaking ones, meets the interests of Pakistan. Also, according to Bekmukhammad, it allows strengthening the Russian military presence in Central Asia under the pretence of the increasing threat of the Taliban. “In other words, the tense political and military situation in northern and northeast Afghanistan causes damage to the residents of these regions and their neighbours in Central Asia. But for some most active regional actors, Afghanistan is like a magic tablecloth that suits any taste,” Bekmukhammad said. General Nuralisho Nazarov suggested that the aggression of the Taliban creates threats for neighbouring countries. “Previously, in the 99s, the Taliban said they did not need Tajikistan and other neighbouring Central Asian countries. But now their tactics have changed. If they seize the power, we’ll be under the risk,” Nazarov said to CABAR.asia. However, according to Bekmukhammad, the scenario of a large-scale invasion of the armed groups to the territory of Tajikistan is unlikely. “Some groups, including of citizens of Central Asia, can attempt doing so, but the capacity of the army and security forces of Tajikistan will neutralise their efforts,” he said. If you have found a spelling error, please, notify us by selecting that text and pressing What Threats Contribute to Successes of Taliban in Northern Afghanistan? Ctrl+Enter..
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