On Behalf of the Emperor: The Finnish Guard's Campaign to Poland, 1831 Author(s): JUSSI JALONEN Source: The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (July 2010), pp. 468-494 Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20780432 Accessed: 03-08-2015 11:22 UTC
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This content downloaded from 185.3.35.82 on Mon, 03 Aug 2015 11:22:29 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SEER, Vol. 88, No. 3, July 2010
On Behalf of the Emperor: The Finnish Guard's Campaign to Poland, 1831 JUSSI JALONEN
Preface The conflict that broke out between Poland and Russia in November an 1830 had immediate and direct impact on Finland. For the first time since the Seven Years War of 1756-63 and Gustav IV Adolfs ill-fated Pomeranian expedition of 1805-07, Finnish soldiers were dispatched to overseas on a fight the battlefields of Central Europe. As result, Finland became involved in the international crisis generated by the Polish Russian conflict, while the willing participation of the Imperial Life-Guard's Finnish battalion in the campaign testified to the peculiar contrast between rebellious Poland and loyal Finland. The soldiers of the Finnish Guard who followed the banner of the double-headed eagle and the golden lion in the fight against the Polish a insurrectionists have remained curious note in Finnish historiogra phy. Although the various political consequences for Finnish autonomy following the November Rising have been discussed in scholarly litera ture from time to time, no independent study has been made of the Finnish Guard's participation in the 1831 campaign against Poland. Even military histories of the Guard have tended to ignore the battles in Poland and instead chosen to focus on the service of the Finnish Guard in the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish war in the Balkans.1 What, then, was the role of the Finnish Guard in the context of the 1831 campaign? was as What the role of the Finnish soldiers tools of the Imperial war Russian machine in the suppression of the Polish struggle for
a Jussi Jalonen is researcher in the Department of History and Philosophy at the Univer sity of Tampere. 1 Teuvo Laitila, TTie Finnish Guard in theBalkans: Heroism, Imperial^alty and Finnishness as in theRusso-Turkuh War of i8jj-i8j8, recollected in theMemoirs ofFinnish Guardsmen, Helsinki, A 2003, p. 83. beautifully illustrated narrative description of the participation of the Finnish was Guard in the 1831 campaign in Poland included in Torsten Ekman's recent popular on history, Suomen kaarti 1812-igoj, Helsinki, 2006, pp. 81-127. Ekman has relied mostly G. A. Gripenberg's Lifgardets 3 finsh sfarpskyttebataljon 1812-igoj: ettminnesblad, Helsingfors, account 1905, pp. 38-106, the earliest of the Finnish involvement in the campaign.
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independence? And what kind of trace did the campaign and its events leave on the Finnish historical memory at the time?
Finland and Poland in theRussian Empire: The Decembrist Rising of 1825 an<^ its Consequences The degree of self-government enjoyed by Poland and Finland within the Russian Empire during the early nineteenth century has been sub jected to occasional comparative analysis.2 The autonomous status that on the 1815 Treaty of Vienna bestowed the Kongres?wka, the Congress was more Kingdom of Poland, inmany ways extensive than that given an to the Grand Duchy of Finland in 1809. As impoverished border no land with history of independent statehood, the administration of Finland was still based on the old Gustavian constitutions inherited no from Swedish rule. Having currency of its own, Finland used the as Swedish riksdaler and the Russian ruble mediums of exchange. Meanwhile, the four-estate Finnish Diet that had assembled at Porvoo in 1809 was not convened again until 1863. The Kingdom of was as a Poland, by contrast, designed model example of progressive government with its own constitution drafted by Prince Adam Jerzy a Czartoryski, close confident of Emperor Alexander. The gold-based zloty remained as the Polish national currency and the bicameral one Polish legislature, the Sejm, convened in 1818 and 1820. Only in respect did Finland gain more than Poland. In 1812, Emperor Alexan der returned the Karelian lands conquered by Russia in 1720 and 1743 ? to the Grand Duchy, but the Kresy the historic eastern territories of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth annexed by Russia in ? were the partitions of 1772, 1793, 1795 and the 1807 Treaty of Tilsit never reunited with the Congress Kingdom.3 Both the Grand Duchy of Finland and Congress Poland possessed their own military establishments. First reassembled at the outbreak of new war between France and Russia in 1812, the Finnish military units included five enlisted J?ger battalions and one training battalion, sub ordinated to the governor-general in Helsinki and the general staff in St Petersburg. After 1819, these Finnish military units were rearranged into two line infantry and one J?ger regiments, each with two battal as a ions, with the training battalion in Helsinki remaining separate on detachment. The Cadet School of Hamina, based the old Topo graphic School of Haapaniemi, remained the cradle of the Finnish
2 Norman Davies, God's Playground: A History ofPoland. Volume II: iygj to thePresent, revised edn, Oxford, 2005, pp. 270-71; Finland and Pohnd in theRussian Empire: A Comparative Study, ed. Michael Branch, M. and Antoni Maczak, London, 1995. 3 Janet Hartley Kalervo Hovi, 'Miksi Aleksanteri I ei palauttanut Puolan it?alueita Puolan kuningas kuntaan?', Faravid, 8, 1984, pp. 161-74.
This content downloaded from 185.3.35.82 on Mon, 03 Aug 2015 11:22:29 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 470 ON BEHALF OF THE EMPEROR military class, providing education for native-born officers in their was more homeland.4 The Polish military, by contrast, considerably sizeable and independent, and the Kongres?wka spent one-third, and occasionally two-fifths of its national income to maintain its ? profes sional army of 30,000 the national pride of Poland. Commanded by the Emperor's brother, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, the army wore of the Congress Kingdom Polish uniforms, followed the Polish as flag and used Polish its language of command. At the same time, the army continued the French traditions adopted during the 1807-13 Duchy ofWarsaw. A majority of high-ranking Polish officers, such as General J?zef Zaj^czek, consisted of veterans of the Napoleonic Wars, soldiers who had earned their ranks fighting against Russia in the grande arm?e and later opted for reconciliation with the tsarist regime. The paths of Poland and Finland quickly diverged. In the context of the 'political night' that reigned supreme under the Congress System soon and the Holy Alliance, the Finnish ruling elites acknowledged that they could expect no further concessions from Russia. The Emperor's convene decision not to the Finnish legislature again after 1809 was a quietly accepted as fait accompli, and the authorities of the Grand on Duchy concentrated safeguarding the extant autonomous adminis as as tration, well courting imperial favour, often by rather egregious demonstrations of loyalty. The reaction of the Poles to Alexander I's angry dissolution of the second Sejm in 1820, on the other hand, was a an completely different, and within few years underground extra as a parliamentary opposition had formed in the Congress Kingdom determined protest against Russian imperial authority, with radical on conspiratorial societies based the continental European model.5 By the time of the Decembrist Uprising of 1825, the lines between were a Poland and Finland already drawn. While politically turbulent Poland was heading towards collision with Russia, the peaceful atmo was sphere of the Grand Duchy of Finland still characterized by 'impe ? an rial silence' unquestioning loyalty to the Russian sovereign. The contrast between the two autonomous borderlands of the Russian Empire was best demonstrated by the obedience of Finnish officers in the imperial service. While disgruntled Polish military officers such as Colonel Seweryn Krzyzanowski had been ready and willing to conspire together with the Russian Decembrist leaders against the Emperor,
4 L. G. Beskrovny, The Russian Army and Fleet in theNineteenth Century:Handbook ofArmaments, Personnel and Policy, ed., trans., Gordon E. Smith, Gulf Breeze, FL, 1996, pp. 87-88; Pertti Luntinen, The Russian and Navy inFinland, Helsinki, 1997, pp. 5 Imperial Army - 56-58.- Arnon Gill, Frdh?tsk?mpfe der Polen im ig. Jahrhundert; Erhebungen Aufst?nde Revolutionen, am Frankfurt Main, 1997, pp. 90-91; Emanuel Halicz, Polish National Liberation Struggle and theGenesis of theModern Nation: Collected Papers, Odense, 1982, pp. 41-42.
This content downloaded from 185.3.35.82 on Mon, 03 Aug 2015 11:22:29 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JUSSI JALONEN 47I as their Finnish colleagues, such Captain Johan Reinhold Munck, remained steadfastly loyal to the tsar, to the extent that they even su pervised the execution of the five sentenced Decembrist leaders in the fortress of Peter and Paul in St Petersburg.6 a Finnish loyalty was not left unrewarded, and as gesture of favour towards the northern Grand Duchy, the tsar decided to elevate the a Finnish training battalion inHelsinki to the rank of Guard unit after, an according to apocryphal story, being impressed by the parade performance of its soldiers on the field of Tsarskoe Selo in 1829. As the first Finnish unit to reach status in the Guards, the battalion remained under the command of a native officer, Colonel Anders Edvard Ramsay, the scion of an old Scottish family that had first arrived in Finland in 1577 and become part of the local Swedish-speaking aristo cracy. Like many of his colleagues, Colonel Ramsay had participated in the suppression of the Decembrist riots while serving in the Preobra zhenskoye Guard in St Petersburg, and also personally supervised the protection of the tsarevich. Simultaneously, the paper strength of as the unit was raised to the same level the light infantry battalions of the Russian Guards, from 500 to 600 men, commanded by seventeen as permanent Finnish officers. A year later, the infantry and J?ger as regiments were disbanded, the battalion remained the only Finnish national military unit, renamed the 'Imperial Life-Guard's Finnish as Sharp-Shooter Battalion', but simply known the 'Finnish Guard'.7
The Revolutionary Year 1830: An Imperial Visit toHelsinki, Insunection in Warsaw
1830 marked the first serious blow to the European security system a established in the Congress of Vienna fifteen years earlier. In July, revolution broke out in Paris, and the absolutist Bourbon monarch Charles X had to flee the country while Louis-Philippe, the Duke of new Orl?ans, was hailed as the 'citizen-King' of the French. By August, this revolutionary tide reached the United Netherlands, and the riots in Brussels sparked the Belgian fight for independence against the Dutch royal house of Orange-Nassau. Events in France and Belgium and the potential for repercussions across Europe caused great alarm,
6 R. F. Leslie, Polish Politics and theRevolution ofNovember 1830, London, 1956, pp. 113-14; Helge Pohjolan-Pirhonen, Kansakunnan historia 3: Kansakunta l?yt?? itsens?, 1808-1835, Porvoo, ? 973>0 412. 7Ake Backstr?m, 'Full Cirkel; Finska Gardets befal 1827 och 1906', Genos, 67, 1996,
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especially in St Petersburg, where the memory of the Decembrist was Uprising still fresh. In the eyes of the tsar, the events in St were a Petersburg, Paris and Brussels concrete manifestations of vast across an revolutionary conspiracy stretching the continent that posed immediate threat to the peace and security of Russia and Europe.8 At this time of international crisis the surveillance of the Russian was n an borderlands increased. On August, the tsar left for official visit to Finland together with the chief of his secret police, the Baltic German Count Alexander Benckendorff. Upon his arrival at Helsinki two days later, he leftGovernor-General Arseni Andreievich Zakrevskii with written instructions to tighten Finnish border controls in order to 'prevent the spread of the revolutionary agitation'.9 Nevertheless, the Emperor had very little reason to feel concerned about Finland, and expressed his satisfaction with the Cadet School of Hamina and the Finnish Guard's Battalion that received him in Helsinki.10 The sincere a demonstrations of loyalty made by the local population also left on favourable impression the tsar. The burghers of Helsinki greeted the Emperor with the traditional gift of bread and salt, and the representa tives of the Finnish peasants' estate, led by rusth?llareKarle Vitikkala from the parish of Kokem?ki, declared their happiness for the favour which the Emperor had extended to the Grand Duchy with his visit.11 an Events in Poland, however, developed in opposite direction. During his stay in Finland, the tsar wrote an official letter to Grand Duke Konstantin inWarsaw, enquiring about the military readiness of theKongres?wka and the possibilityof using the Polish military in the expected intervention against the French and Belgian revolutionaries.12 Rumours of the tsar's intentions spread quickly among the Polish soon officer corps, and the political situation inWarsaw turned explo sive. Fears that he might try to exploit the general European crisis, abrogate the autonomy of the Congress Kingdom and force the Polish soldiers to fight against their former French comrades-in-arms simply for the sake of the Holy Alliance's reactionary foreign policy proved to be the last straw for the radicalized Polish officers. On 18 November,
9 maa: Oiva Turpeinen, Keisar?n Akhanter? lmja Nikolai I:n kansakuntavierailut. Suur?ruhtinaan Suomi, osa 4, Helsinki, 2004, p. 10 148. Helsinki, Finnish War Archives, M51/5, Finska Gardets Ordrejournaler 1830, Bataillons-Ordres 225, 13 11 August 1830. Turpeinen, Keisann maa, pp. 150-52. The Swedish term rusth?llare refers to well-to-do crown a peasant-farmers who had earned tax deductions from the through military con a tract, in exchange for equipping soldier for cavalry service. Members of the peasants' a estate, these 'cavalry-farmers' formed socially mediating layer between ordinary land owning peasant-farmers and the petty gentry.
This content downloaded from 185.3.35.82 on Mon, 03 Aug 2015 11:22:29 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JUSSI JALONEN 473 news theWarsaw press published the first of Polish mobilization orders, provoking the local conspiracy of officers and cadets into decisive action. The events of the night of 29 November are well known and need a no elaboration. The breakout of military revolt inWarsaw, the failed assassination attempt of Grand Duke Konstantin and the general were a riots in the Polish capital followed by futile effort by Prince a com Czartoryski and General J?zef Chlopicki to reach negotiated promise with their incensed Emperor. The November events confirmed on the rupture between Warsaw and St Petersburg, and 25 January 1831, the fifth anniversary of the execution of the Russian Decembrist leaders, the Sejm and the Polish Provisional Government declared that the tsar had lost his right to the Polish crown. The conflict escalated a into full-blown insurrection, and having secured the safety of a Grand Duke Konstantin, the tsar now began to assemble punitive expedition to restore order in the rebellious borderland. was Among the military units summoned to the task the Finnish Guard's Battalion which, according to a letter written by Staff Colonel Ivan Alekseievich Chepurnov to Governor-General Zakrevskii on 14 arms December, answered the call to with 'thunderous joy'.13 The feel were as ings of the Finnish soldiers apparently still somewhat mixed, an one witnessed by anecdote about unknown sharp-shooter. Upon receiving the news of the mobilization, the soldier thought that the unit were remem was preparing to fight against the Russians, who still often as bered the traditional enemy. After realizing the actual situation, a the soldier shrugged and squared the matter with casual comment, ? 'Russians or Poles one and the same'.14 In spite of temporary misconceptions, the soldiers of the Finnish arms on Guard did not hesitate to take up behalf of their Emperor. Ultimately, therefore, at the decisive moment, the Grand Duchy of was Finland ready to prove its loyalty towards the Russian Empire even by force of arms. Whereas Polish officers had initiated an open mutiny an and launched uprising for fear of having to fight against the French and Belgian revolutionaries, the Finnish sharp-shooters answered the imperial battle call against the rebellious Poles enthusiastically.
on From Cholera Hospitals to theGlo?ous Homecoming: The Finnish Guard the Battlefieldsof Poland news After the of the November Rising had reached Helsinki, the Finnish authorities began immediate preparations to equip the Guard's
12 p. 408. 13Morley, 'European Significance', Kansakunnan histo?a 3, p. 461. 14Pohjolan-Pirhonen, Matti Klinge, Kdsar?n Suomi, Espoo, 1997, p. 83.
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Battalion for the upcoming campaign. On the day before New Year's Eve, Colonel Ramsay submitted his evaluation of the Battalion's an annual expenses to theWar Commissary of the Grand Duchy, with estimate of the additional costs for the coming months. By the New sum Year, the total of Finnish soldiers' wages and equipment costs had over was already reached well 30,000 rubles which covered by bank own assign?tes entirely from the Grand Duchy's finances. In addition, the Finnish War Commissary paid the Russian Field Intendenture 70,000 rubles to cover the further maintenance of the Finnish Battalion a at the front.15Meanwhile, completely new reserve company of 150 was fresh recruits established for the Battalion, and several professional civilian craftsmen were hired to undertake miscellaneous tasks as gun smiths, stockmakers and carpenters.16 These civilian specialists followed the Battalion to the front, sharing most of the hardships and privations of the rank-and-file. As the Battalion assembled in the Finnish capital, its ranks included 530 sharp-shooters and sixty-three musicians, com manded by fifty-six NCOs and nineteen officers, including two staff officers.17 The Finnish Guard began its journey to the battlefields of Poland a with march from Helsinki to St Petersburg in January 1831. On 25 January, the 600 men of the Battalion arrived at Krasnoe Selo, where they were received by Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich, the Emperor's younger brother and commander of all the units of the Imperial Life Guard. Two days later, the Finnish soldiers paraded once more before the Emperor himself at the Customs-House of Narva.18 A brief break was an followed by exhausting seven weeks' march through the Baltic provinces to Kalwaria, where the Finnish Battalion joined the other Russian Guard units. As the Battalion drew closer to the front, Colonel Ramsay briefed his Finnish soldiers on the Articles of War and the special orders issued by the Russian High Command in Biafystok to maintain discipline and prevent looting and violence against the Polish was civilian population.19 The practical enforcement of these orders
15 Helsinki, Finnish War Archives, M32/2, Lif-Gardets Finska Skarpskyttebataljonens handlingar f?r ?r 1830, Acten No. 11, 'Till Finska krigskomissariatet', 30.12.1830, No. 1055. The expenses of the 1831 campaign made up 2.5 per cent of the total annual expenditure of the Grand Duchy. To put this figure in perspective, the total expenditure of the Russian was army during the Polish campaign 97,268,000 paper rubles. Beskrovny, The Russian Army, p. 289. ^Helsinki, Finnish War Archives, M32/2, Lif-Gardets Finska Skarpskyttebataljonens for ?r 1830, Acten No. 26. handlingar17 p. 18Gripenberg, Lifgardets, 46. Helsinki, Finnish War Archives, M51/6, Finska Gardets Ordrejournaler 1831, Bataillons-Ordres 20, 24-25 19 January 1831. Helsinki, Finnish War Archives, M51/6, Finska Gardets Ordrejournaler 1831, Ordres till Activa Arm?en; Hu?vud-Qyarteret i Beliostock', 18March 1831; Bataillons-Ordres 103, 14April 1831.
This content downloaded from 185.3.35.82 on Mon, 03 Aug 2015 11:22:29 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JUSSI JALONEN 475 to as prove less than successful during the campaign, testified by the massacre a infamous conducted by Russian Cossack regiment in the on n Lithuanian village of Oszmiana April, subsequendy in commemorated Adam Mickiewicz's epic poem.20 The exhausting march and harsh winter were a severe ordeal for the as Finnish soldiers, frostbite and disease began to take their toll well before actual fighting began. The most serious threat came from the global cholera epidemic of 1831 which crippled the operations of the entire Russian army almost completely during the early weeks of spring.21 The Russian High Command made its best efforts to improve the sanitary conditions of troops on the front, and Grand Duke Mikhail ordered the War Commissary in St Petersburg to dispatch new ambulance wagons and medical supplies for the Finnish Battalion.22 The hapless situation also prompted the Grand Duchy's domestic authorities to consider sending the reserve company to the front. It was, however, not able to leave until July, and remained in Krasnoe Selo until the end of the war.23 were While the Finnish troops recovering from their predicament, the hostilities began in earnest. On 5 February, the Russian main army of over 100,000 troops under Baltic German Field-Marshal Hans Karl von Friedrich Anton Diebitsch crossed the Bug, preparing to crush the Polish rebellion against the Empire. Polish resistance, however, proved to be a good deal tougher than anticipated. On 25 February, the was Russian advance halted by the bloody battle of Groch?w, and the Poles were able to start their own counter-offensive. After General Chlopicki had fallen in battle, the command of the Polish army passed to the talented and skilful chief of staff, Lieutenant General Ignacy Pr^dzynski, who was able to defeat the Russians at D?bie Wielkie on on 10 31 March, and again at Iganie April. Unfortunately for the war Polish effort, Chlopicki's replacement as commander-in-chief, the was somewhat defeatist General jan Skrzynecki, unable to exploit these victories, and instead attempted to initiate negotiations with Diebitsch.24 The initiative passed once again to the Russians. With Diebitsch and on the main army still holding to their positions at Siedlce on the east ern side of the Vistula, the main effort of the Russian spring offensive
20 Leslie, Polish Politics, p. 205. 21 p. 49. 22Gripenberg, Lifgardets, Finnish War Finska Helsinki, Archives, M51/6, Gardets Ordrejournaler 1831, 'Uttdrag af Orderne ?t afdelta 22 March 23 Gardets-Corpsen', 1831. Ekman, Suomen 24 kaarti, p. 127; Gripenberg, Lifgardets, pp. 94-95. Stefan Kieniewicz, Andrzej Zahorski and Wladysiaw Zajewski, Trzy Powstania Narodowe: kosciuszkowskie, listopadowe, styczniowe,Warsaw, 1994, pp. 211-12.
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had to be undertaken by Grand Duke Mikhail's Life-Guard, advancing between the Narew and the Bug in the northern parts ofMazovia. As the fulcrum of the campaign moved north-east, the Finnish soldiers finally experienced their baptism of fire. At the beginning of a March, Grand Duke Mikhail commenced systematic operation to clear the territory between the Narew and the Bug of Polish insurgents, in order to ensure the lines of communication with Diebitsch's main was army in Siedlce through W?growo. A copy of the order passed to Colonel Ramsay, but the Finnish Battalion was still unable to take part on as in the fighting with full strength. Since the situation the front well as on the honour of the Battalion demanded action, 4 April Colonel a Ramsay decided to form separate detachment of seventy sharp shooters at Lomza. Nine days later, under the command of Staff Captain Alexander Jakob Wendt, Finnish sharp-shooters made their first contact with the enemy, providing support for the Russian troops of General Major Neolov in the fight against Polish insurgents at Wyszk?w. As the Russians pursued the retreating Polish forces further south-east, the Finnish guardsmen also participated in the advance on the town of Pultusk. Wendt's unit survived the operation with minimal casualties, with only one younger non-commissioned officer, were Adolf W?mlin, wounded in battle. Three other sharp-shooters incapacitated by disease during the march.25 was By mid-April, the Finnish Battalion finally able to join the fight was ing at full strength. On 19 April, the Battalion ordered to support the ist Brigade of the Imperial Life-Guard's 2nd Light Cavalry Division in the defence of the northern bank of the Bug against Polish insur gents. Since sharp-shooters were required at all posts, Finnish troops ? were dispersed along the riverbank separate companies were assigned to support the Russian forces at various other points. Thus, the ist company of the Finnish Battalion, commanded by 2nd Lieuten was ant (Podporuchik) Karl Johan Fagerroth, dispatched to defend was Kamienczyk; the 2nd company, commanded by Colonel Ramsay, a ordered to guard Rybinki; and detachment of thirty men, led by Ensign (Praporshchik) Gustaf de Besehe, took up positions at Br?k. The sharp-shooters were able to repulse the Polish insurgent forces cross attempting to the Bug without suffering any losses.26 For the Finnish soldiers, these short, victorious encounters marked a welcome break from the disease-ridden lethargy of the early spring, an providing them with opportunity to test their skills in battle. At the
on. 25W?mlin died from his wounds later Gripenberg, Lifgardets, p. 50; Kaarlo Wirilander, Suomen armeijan upseeristo, aliupseeristo ja sotilasmrhmwkist? i8i2?i8yi (1880): luettelo,Helsinki, 1995, p. 92. viranhaltijain26 Gripenberg, Ltfgardets, pp. 51-53.
This content downloaded from 185.3.35.82 on Mon, 03 Aug 2015 11:22:29 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JUSSI JALONEN 477 same a time, however, the skirmishes may have given the soldiers somewhat distorted image of their enemy. The Polish forces had so far consisted mostly of the local lev?e-en-masse of Mazovia, and the entire purpose of the operation had been merely to test Russian defences a along the river, in preparation for general offensive which the Polish High Command planned to launch later on in the spring. Consequent were ly, the Finnish soldiers leftwith the impression that the enemy forces consisted of a few small, unco-ordinated rebel bands that could soon be easily driven away. This complacency would very turn out to be unfounded. Although the Finns managed to survive their first encounters with now the enemy without casualties, cholera began to cut swathes through their ranks. Ironically, the first to die of the disease was the one person whose task would have been to supervise the burials of the others. On ioMay, the Battalion's Lutheran chaplain, Reverend Karl Henrik was near Ingman, fell and buried Nowa Wies inMazovia.27 In spite of was these hardships, the Battalion able to join the Russian defences at the borough ofW^sewo in early May.28 In the second week ofMay, General Skrzynecki's Polish army com a menced a northwards offensive in the Narew valley, with plan to destroy Grand Duke Mikhail's isolated forces before they could link up with Diebitsch and the main Russian army. Placed on the vanguard of the Russian defences, the Finnish battalion engaged in fierce batde near on the village of Przetycz, south ofW^sewo, 16May. Protecting a the right flank of the Russian force, Finnish sharp-shooters repulsed occa cavalry charge by General Dezydery Chlapowski's Polish uhlans, as sionally resorting to their bayonets Polish cavalrymen broke into their ranks. The fighting intensified during the retreat to Dhigosiodlo, a where attacking Polish lancers managed to encircle detachment of fourteen Finnish sharp-shooters under Ensign Henrik Lyra and Under Ensign (Podpraporshchik)Fabian Reinhold Niklas Spalding. The Finnish were soldiers taken prisoner and escorted by the Poles to Warsaw, where they remained in captivity until September.29 men Besides the captured in Lyra's detachment, the Finnish Guard men men on lost four dead and fourteen wounded in the fighting the was road toW^sewo.30 Among the wounded Colonel Ramsay, who a had caught Polish bullet in his side while commanding the firing line was a from the front ranks. He evacuated to field-hospital in Lomza
27 Wirilander, Suomen p. 84. 28 arm?jan upseeristo, Polskaia Kampaniia 1830-1831 gg.; zapiski, sostavlennyiapokktdiat' General'-Maiora Stankevicha i Polhvnifa St 1881, p. 230. 29 Puzyrevskago, Petersburg, Wirilander, Suomen p. 90. 30 arm?jan upseeristo, Jussi Jalonen, 'The Batties of the Finnish Guard in Mazovia, 1831', Journal of Slavic MilitaryStudies, 22, April 2009, 2, pp. 281-300 (pp. 293, 298).
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and the command of the Battalion passed to Lieutenant Colonel Robert Vilhelm Lagerborg, who had survived the encounter with just a minor injury to his left shoulder.31 As the Russian Guard units fell back in the face of General Skrzynecki's attack, the Finnish Battalion cover joined with the new 4th Guard's Infantry Brigade to the with reserve drawal of the main force. Although the Finns remained in and were able to avoid any further encounters during the retreat from a Sniad?w to Tykocin, they nevertheless received commendation from the Emperor himself for their service in the rearguard.32 The batdes that the Finnish Guard fought between Narew and were Bug inMay 1831 later immortalized by the Finnish artist Robert Wilhelm Ekman. Seventeen years after the campaign, Ekman's paint ing depicted the young Lieutenant Adolf Aminoffwounded on the batdefield of Tykocin on 21 May 1831 (see Fig. 1). The painting captured the two ideals which subsequendy were to become the ? quint essential virtues of the Finnish military tradition an officer who leads men even own his from the front at the risk of his personal safety, and men are the who equally ready to risk themselves by rushing to the aid of their wounded comrade. on For the Poles and Russians, the battles the road from Przetycz to were W^sewo minor skirmishes, overshadowed by other, larger and bloodier field confrontations of the war, but for the Finnish Battalion a these encounters marked watershed in the campaign. After fighting a an unseen series of minor actions against often adversary and suffer no on ing almost casualties the batdefield, the Finnish soldiers had finally met their Polish enemy face to face. At one stroke, the enemy a had suddenly become real and dangerous opponent, capable of killing them at a faster pace than frostbite, hunger or even cholera. In Colonel Ramsay's journal, the so far unseen and anonymous fienden ? (enemy), was now more concretely described as polska rebell-trupper on Polish rebel troops.33 The manifestation of sudden, violent death the battlefield clarified the Finnish soldiers' consciousness of the enemy and as completed their experience veterans, preparing them for the closing stage of the campaign. During the week following the battle of Przetycz, Field-Marshal Diebitsch and the Russian main army marched north to support Grand
31 Helsinki, Finnish War Archives, M51/6, Finska Gardets Ordrejournaler 1831, Bataillons-Ordres 137, 17 32 May 1831. Helsinki, Finnish War Archives, M51/6, Finska Gardets Ordrejournaler 1831, 'Copia af Hans Kejserliga Majest?ts N?diga Rescript till Befvelhafvaren for Gardes-Corpsens Infanten 26 1831. 33 General-Adjutanten', June Helsinki, Finnish War Archives, M51/6, Finska Gardets Ordrejournaler 1831, Bataillons-Ordres 137, 17May 1831.
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Duke Mikhail, forcing Skrzynecki to withdraw and regroup. On 26 May, relying on their artillery superiority, the combined Russian forces were able to defeat and destroy the bulk of Skrzynecki's infantry in the decisive battle of Ostrol?ka. Both Polish and Russian casualties in the confrontation reached approximately 6,000 dead and wounded, but Diebitsch's army remained intact, while the defeated Poles had to scramble back towards Warsaw in disorder, abandoning the bridges of the Narew to the victorious Russians.34 The Finnish Battalion had remained in reserve, guarding the rear flank of the main Russian force was across the Narew, and thus spared from direct participation in the bloodiest encounter of the war. However, the early summer had were now worse ever aggravated the effects of the cholera, which than a before. As a recovered Colonel Ramsay returned to duty month after the battle of Ostrol?ka, he found that all four companies of the Finnish Battalion had shrunk down to platoon strength.35
34 men According to contemporary figures, the Russians lost 5,868 in the battle, whereas Polish casualties reached Leslie, Polish Politics, p. 212. 35 6,418. Helsinki, Finnish War Archives, M51/6, Finska Gardets Ordrejournaler 1831, Bataillons-Ordres 147, 27 May 1831.
This content downloaded from 185.3.35.82 on Mon, 03 Aug 2015 11:22:29 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BEHALF OF THE EMPEROR 480 ON a new On the same day, the Russian army received commander ? Diebitsch, too, had died of cholera. The new commander-in-chief, the ruthless Field-Marshal Ivan Paskevich, who had recendy returned now across from a mission in Georgia, led the Russian army the lower Vistula, beginning the final onslaught towards the Polish capital by a manoeuvre large flanking from the west.36 By the first week of September, Paskevich's offensive reached the outskirts ofWarsaw, and the Finnish Battalion was thrown into the fray once again. While the Russian main strike in the key sector ofWola was directed against the famous Redoubt No. 54 under the crippled Polish General jan Sowi?ski, were the Finnish sharp-shooters attached to the forces of Lieutenant General Nikolai Murav'ev, a former Decembrist, and participated on in the storming of the fort of Rakowiec the south-western side of at Warsaw. The participation of the Finnish soldiers in the battle the was gates of the Polish capital dutifully recorded in Colonel Ramsay's report to Grand Duke Mikhail: On 26 August (6 September NS), after storming out of the positions under the personal command of Your Excellency, together with the two Regi ments of the Life-Guard, our Battalion advanced towards Rakowiec over the right side of the entrenchments. The advance continued towards the direction of Szcz?sliwice, where the Battalion stood for quarter an hour, as we exposed to occasional ricochet fire from the enemy batteries, moved approximately nine hundred feet to the left to protect the rightwing of the 2nd Light Company of theGuard's 2nd Artillery Brigade, operating against the enemy batteries No. 26 and 27. We remained in these positions until dusk, exposed to strong crossfire from three enemy batteries, after which we were ordered by lieutenant general Murav'ev to defend the captured enemy redoubt No. 28.We kept our defences until seven o'clock the following morning, when we received an order to join with the other Guard's Regiments at Jerusalem Avenue [Aleje Jerozolimskie]. It ismy most pleasant duty to informYour Excel lency that all our officers demonstrated fearlessness during the combat, setting an example that our men followed with unshaken steadfastness.37 was The following midnight, the Polish capital evacuated and aban doned to the Russian army, and the remaining Polish forces in the were vicinity ofWarsaw surrounded in the fortress ofModlin. Shortly afterwards, the fortresses of Modlin and Zamosc, the last strongholds of Polish resistance, surrendered to Paskevich.
36 Helsinki, Finnish War Archives, M51/6, Finska Gardets Ordrejournaler 1831, 'Ordres tillActiva-Arm?en; Staden Pultusk'. 37 H?g-Qwarteret Helsinki, Finnish War Archives, M51/6, Finska Gardets Ordrejournaler 1831, 11 Bataillons-Ordres 254, September 1831; Gripenberg, Ltfgardets, pp. 81-83. Ramsay that had apparently mistaken the numbers of the enemy batteries and redoubts, given Rakowiec and Szcz?sliwice were actually defended by Polish batteries 48-53.
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After the capitulation of Warsaw, the Russian High Command issued medals to the Finnish officers who had distinguished themselves in the conquest of the Polish capital. As well as Colonel Ramsay and Lieutenant Colonel Lagerborg, who were both awarded Golden Swords of the Order of St George, various lower-ranking officers received Orders of St George, St Anna and St Vladimir. Many of the deco rated officers, for example, Lieutenant Achates Ferdinand Gripenberg, von Ensign Mauritz Ferdinand Kothen and Ensign Edvard Karl Axel Rotkirch, represented the most important noble families of the Grand Duchy.38 The Finnish Guard returned to Helsinki in triumph in August 1832, a and grateful Emperor commended the loyalty of the Grand Duchy by rewarding the Battalion with the Banner of St George, bearing the inscription cZa Odichie Pri Usmirenii Pol'shi' (Tor the Pacification of Poland'). The dead of the Battalion, including Lieutenant Johan Fredrik Schybergson, who had fallen in the storming of Rakowiec 'on behalf of the Emperor and the Fatherland' and was buried in the Polish capital, were remembered as heroes, and their names inscribed on the black marble plaque of the Finnish Cadet School.39 Colonel Ramsay an our made appeal to future generations with the declaration, 'may banner call the sons of Finland to perform the highest civil virtues in the future, to fulfil their obligations and loyalty towards their sovereign'.40
The Casualties of theFinnish Guard The triumphant homecoming and victory celebrations in Helsinki in 1832 did not, however, hide the fact that the Finnish soldiers had paid a ever heavy price for their share of the glory. Only having marched on no parade grounds, they had begun the campaign with prior expe rience, and the Battalion had suffered heavy losses during the six months of across Poland. All in all, Finnish casualties amounted fighting ? to 289 dead and no in action or wounded, with 756 men missing ? just over half the original size of the Battalion dead from cholera and other diseases such as typhus and tuberculosis. These casualties corresponded to those of the other Russian units in the Guards.41 Even if the impact of disease is taken into consideration, there is on little doubt that the Finnish Guard had embarked its first campaign ill prepared. For the people of the Grand Duchy, the honour gained
38 Lifgardets, pp. 84-87. 39Gripenberg, Ibid., p. 91. 40 Juhani Paasivirta, Suomi ja Eurooppa; Autonomiakausi ja hnsainv?liset kriisit i8o8-igi4, Helsinki, p. 109. 41 1978, V. V. Pohlebkin, Suomi vihollisena jayst?v?n? iyi4~ig6y? Porvoo, 1969, p. 59.
This content downloaded from 185.3.35.82 on Mon, 03 Aug 2015 11:22:29 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 482 ON BEHALF OF THE EMPEROR by their soldiers in the service of the Emperor was a source of on national pride, but the casualties suffered by the Battalion distant battlefields were also a cause for bitterness and sorrow. Six decades was later, novelist August Schauman still able to recall the sights of or amputated and crippled guardsmen who had begged for money was an pensions from his father, who official in the Finnish Senate.42 The shortcomings in the Battalion's training and their tragic conse were quences partly explained by the Imperial Life-Guard's tradition of 'bloodless glory'. During the reigns of Empress Elizabeth and Catherine the Great, the Guard had been spared front-line service, and ever since the days of Emperor Paul, the training of the Guard's on units had focused mainly parade drill. While the other continental military powers had gradually abandoned rigid linear tactical doctrine and the mechanical training of soldiers through harsh and inflexible drills, these old traditions of Frederick the Great still held sway in even Russia, and strengthened further during Aleksei Arakcheev's tenure as Minister of War in the aftermath of the Napoleonic cam paign.43 Apart from regular marksmanship exercises in the capital and field manoeuvres at Krasnoe Selo in 1829, the Finnish Guard had also a more or received less similar kind of strict, regimented training.44 were While field training and combat exercises neglected, the Guard were an Regiments also subjected to early form of Officers' purge', as the old commanders were, in the aftermath of the Decembrist more Uprising, replaced with new, politically reliable candidates. Since a was the Finnish Battalion was already considered to be loyal unit, it new not subjected to this action, but the indirect effects of the practice, which placed more importance on Imperial favour than merit, could be felt all through the Guards. In practice, this translated into further emphasis on orderliness, formal discipline and proper outlook, all of which would characterize military life under Nicholas I. Arseni Zakrevskii, the governor-general of Finland, had commented bitterly on the politically motivated changes, that 'from now on, the noting? Life-Guard will decline in every respect except for the state of are now the soldiers' feet, which the only matter receiving special attention'.45 The failure of Russian military reform had been evident during the as as battles against Persia in 1826, well in the humiliating campaign
42 August Schauman, Kuudelta vuosikymmenelt?; muistoja el?m?n vanelta, Porvoo, 1967, pp.43 109-10. ChristopherDuffy, Russia's Military Way to theWest: Originsand Nature ofRussian Military Power, London, Boston, MA and Henley-on-Thames 1981, pp. 140?42, 206. 44Ekman, Suomen kaarti, pp. 51, pp. 45 56-57; Gripenberg, Lifgardets, 26-27. Beskrovny, The Russian Army, pp. 71-72, 79.
This content downloaded from 185.3.35.82 on Mon, 03 Aug 2015 11:22:29 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JUSSI JALONEN 483 against the Ottoman Empire in 1829, which had also revealed the Russian army's material shortcomings in its depletion of stocks of infantry small arms.46 Scant attention given to the supply apparatus of the army became painfully obvious as the logistical system of the Russian broke down military completely during the 1831 campaign.47 Consequently, with these issues still unrectified by the time of the 1831 ? campaign, the Finnish like their Russian com ? sharp-shooters just rades-in-arms became victims of the same imperial stagnation that had blocked reform within the Life-Guard and the entire army. same At the time, the Finnish Guard was unable to compensate for own these problems with its home-grown merits. Domestic military at expertise created the end of the Swedish reign had largely been subsumed by the Russian takeover, and the Finnish officers who had received their training in Haapaniemi and Hamina under the new as 'imperial silence' were, sadly enough, just inexperienced and unaware as of the realities of the batdefield the rank-and-file. Lacking own its traditions, the Finnish Guard was dependent on the Russian assume command and prone to not only the advantages of Russian military doctrine, but also itsmost glaring defects. was The end result that the undeniable professionalism and intensive training of the sharp-shooters of the Life-Guard had not prepared them adequately forwar in 1831. Under the circumstances, the Battalion had performed surprisingly well in actual combat but itwas also forced to pay part of the price for the failure of Russian military reform, in blood. In the event, the Finnish soldiers were no but to ? given option learn their trade the hard way on the battlefield.
as a The Battalion Miniature Society was Although the Finnish Battalion formally part of the elite forces of the Imperial Russian military, most of its soldiers inevitably represented the lower echelons of society. The majority of the rank-and-file were young, unmarried men in their twenties from southern or south western Finland, with backgrounds in the rural poor, and sometimes even were vagrancy. Approximately 5 per cent townspeople, mostly from Helsinki or Turku, with a few from Porvoo, Tammisaari or Pori. were a Only 18 per cent married, most having taken wife only after as a joining up. A position soldier's wife brought various social benefits a towomen, assuring steady income in times of peace and support from the state in times of war.48
46 Ibid, 159. 47 p. van Martin Creveld, Supplying War: L?gistics fiom Wallenstdn to Patton, 2nd edn, New York, 1977, p. 77. 48 Gripenberg, Lifgardets, pp. 44-45?
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Most of the active soldiers were too young to have any previous or military experience either from the War of 1808-09 any other conflicts of the time. Some of the civilian specialists in the Battalion, were as however, old enough to pass veterans and had seen previous service. For example, the thirty-seven-year-old Commissary Driver Nils R?rman from the 2nd Company had served in the Swedish Royal Artillery Regiment from 1811 to 1820, after which he had returned to as a his homeland, joined the Finnish Guard rank-and-file sharp-shooter a a as and subsequently received transfer to position commissary case driver. R?rman's is particularly interesting because he opted to serve in the Swedish armed forces after the Russian conquest of Finland, apparently refusing to take any oaths of loyalty to the tsar. This, however, did not make him ineligible for subsequent service in the Grand Duchy after his return to Finland.49 Enlisting for Swedish and Russian service in turn reveals that the Finnish soldiers did not care were as as necessarily very much who they fighting for long they was received their pay. Even though patriotic sentiment perhaps or even undeveloped absent, military service in itselfmay have been a a genuine calling, representing pursuit of time-honoured masculine ideals and comradeship. Of those soldiers who fought in Poland, a were men approximately third who had already fulfilled their first 'capitulation5 of six years, and decided to enlist again for another stint.50 With the elevation of the Battalion to the Life-Guard, the qualifica as as on tions expected of the recruits well the demands placed them had become stricter, but instilling former farmhands and vagabonds with the necessary esprit de corps and pride in their profession was a lengthy process. As late as November 1829 there were still reports of soldiers from the Finnish Guard begging on the streets of Helsinki and breaking into homes in search of food.51 At the same time, however, was a the Battalion able to establish special 'First Class5 rank for those soldiers who had 'distinguished themselves with their diligence and good behaviour5. According to standing orders, First Class soldiers were not to be subjected to corporal punishment. Flogging in itself did not, however, present any kind of obstacle to further advancement. On the contrary, the most stubborn soldiers subjected to punishment often seemed to have been the ones who were able to show the most initia was tive and even rise through the ranks. One such example Hermann Simberg from Ostrobothnia, sharp-shooter number 77 from the 2nd
49 Helsinki, Finnish War Archives, M59/1, Munster-Rulla for Lif-Gardets Finska Ar Skarpskytte-Bataillon,50 1830. Ibid. 51 Ekman, Suomen kaarti, p. 59.
This content downloaded from 185.3.35.82 on Mon, 03 Aug 2015 11:22:29 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JUSSI JALONEN 485 a company who, in spite of past punishment of running-the-gauntlet in was his records, regarded competent enough to receive a promotion to the rank of corporal.52 Besides the draconian War Articles of the Russian Army, the indoc trination of to was Finnish soldiers military life also enacted through their Lutheran faith. For an individual soldier, the failure to attend was divine service punishable by fifty pairs of lashes.53 Almost all the were even soldiers Lutheran, though the muster rolls list a few of them as no. Orthodox (Grek).Johan Ihl, sharp-shooter 112 from the 2nd com was an pany, had been born in Russia and presumably Orthodox Finn from Ingria. His comrade-in-arms Fredrik Michailoff, sharp-shooter no. same 81 from the company, had been born in the Russian garrison town was of Savonlinna in Eastern Finland in 1796, and possibly the son a or a of Russian soldier merchant.54 Some soldiers clearly had a were foreign origins; few born in Sweden, whereas one, Morten Jung, sharp-shooter no. 78 from the 2nd company, was born in Estonia, while another, Christian Schellback, sharp-shooter no. 8 from the 3rd was company, born in Livonia. An unusual example was Clement no. Wilhelmsson, sharp-shooter 58 from the 2nd company, who was, interestingly and ironically enough, born in Poland (Konunga-riketP?len). name was Judging by his and his Lutheran faith,Wilhelmsson probably a Polish German emigrant who had, for whatever reason, decided to settle in Finland.55 The social gap between ordinary Finnish soldiers and their officers was, ifnot quite as wide as elsewhere in the Russian army, nonetheless was as a considerable. Noble birth regarded precondition of officer as status in the Imperial Life-Guard well as in the grenadier units, men were and of aristocratic background also well represented in the were Finnish Battalion. Of the first seventeen officers who appointed in 1829, si* hailed from noble families of the Grand Duchy, whereas the others represented the petty gentry.56 Even the non-commissioned officers were often young noblemen for whom the rank of NC O was an the first step towards officer's commission. Due to the specific arrangements designed for the Emperor's Finnish subjects, several a non-noble NCOs and officers who had managed to gain commission contrary to the usual practices of the Imperial Life-Guard did,
52 Finnish Helsinki, oWar Archives, M59/1, Munster-Rulla for Lif-Gardets Finska ?r Skarpskytte-Bataillon,53 1830. Ekman, Suomen kaarti, pp. 30, 49, 59. 54 Helsinki, Finnish Waro Archives, M59/1, Munster-Rulla for Lif-Gardets Finska Ar The town of Skarpskytte-Bataillon, 1830. Savonlinna had already been ceded by Sweden to Russia in the of Abo of 1743. 55 Treaty Ibid. 56 Gripenberg, Lifgardets, p. 31.
This content downloaded from 185.3.35.82 on Mon, 03 Aug 2015 11:22:29 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 486 ON BEHALF OF THE EMPEROR serve however, in the Battalion during the 1831 campaign. One such was a as a exception Henrik Lyra, who managed to gain promotion a a non-noble through the rank of port d'ep?e Junker, special arrange even an ment that allowed non-nobles the possibility to gain officer's rank.57 Differences in social background were also reflected in attitudes towards the war. Whereas rank-and-file Finnish soldiers regarded war as the part of their ordinary, everyday work and duty, young war Swedish-speaking officers in the payroll of the Guard saw as a career splendid opportunity for advancement. For them, military a a service provided possibility for networking and acquiring place in the aristocratic cabal which exercised power in the Grand Duchy.58 Aside these opportunistic considerations, the individual officer's ethos was on also often based family tradition extending back to Swedish times. In the case of Anders Edvard Ramsay, the commander of the an was Guard, such example provided by the memory of his famous kinsmen, Major Anders Vilhelm Ramsay and Lieutenant Carl Gustaf Ramsay, who had both been killed in the war against Russia in 1808. a The memory of the fallen brothers had become family legend after a their grieving mother, Sofia Lovisa Ramsay, minted memorial coin to commemorate the heroism of her sons.59 as The national Finnish military tradition, insofar such existed at the was on time of the 1831 campaign, still largely based the so-called 'small tradition' of broadside ballads, folk stories, popular anecdotes and memories of past wars in Swedish service. The 'great tradition', which a incorporated the substance of these recollections into developing Finnish national sentiment, was still only beginning to take shape. Johan Ludvig Runeberg, author of the national epic, 'The Tales of the Ensign Stai', did not publish his first war poem, 'The Dying Soldier', until 1836. Some traces of emerging national sentiment can, however, be identified in the actions of Finnish officers during the campaign a in Poland. For example, Colonel Ramsay's decision to form special detachment of able-bodied Finnish sharp-shooters to support the was Russian operations while the rest of the Battalion incapacitated in was April 1831 apparently specifically motivated by the 'honour of the
57 a son a as a Henrik Lyra was of Lutheran chaplain; eventually, he retired major general. Biografiska anteckningar ?fver officerare och civile tj?nstem?n vid Lifgardets Finsfa Skarpskytte Bataljon, Helsingfors, 1912, p. 77; 'Suomalaiset kenraalit ja amiraalit Ven?j?n sotavoimissa 1809-1917', Biography Centre of the Finnish Literature Society,
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Battalion5 as a Finnish Battalion.60 For a non-Russian military unit of the tsarist army, esprit de corps could often be indistinguishable from national pride. A particular problem presented by the study of the Finnish Guard's campaign in Poland is contained in the fact that most of the surviving are primary materials relate solely to officers. Even though soldiers listed by name and trade, their unique personal recollections and as are can experiences representatives of the rank-and-file missing, and be ascertained only indirectly through impersonal statistics. Social are none cleavages between officers and their 'unknown guardsmen' theless visible enough. The unquestionable importance of military as service to soldiers and their families is also clearly evident, shown by lists of sums of money that Finnish soldiers sent home to their relatives. Recorded by the Finnish Passport Office in St Petersburg, the average 100 a remittances figured around paper rubles, roughly equivalent to or years' pay, usually addressed to soldiers' mothers sisters.61 During the bad harvests and cholera epidemic of 1831-32, the wages which Finnish soldiers sent home may have often been the only substantial income for their relatives, and even the meagre sum of 100 rubles may an very well have prevented individual soldier's sister from succumbing to a life of domestic service or prostitution in St Petersburg. Ironically, thehardships and sufferingof Finnish soldierson thePolish battlefields as may have brought not only political benefits for the Grand Duchy a a whole, but also some positive social consequences for few people back home. was as war Needless to say, not everyone quite fortunate, and the as a could just often result in permanent loss of family's provider. For example, Hedvig Jung, wife ofMorten Jung, the Estonian-born sharp shooter from the 2nd company, was three months' pregnant when her husband was called to arms. The newly-promoted, forty-year-old sergeant who would have otherwise ended his service in December 1831 after twelve years of enlistment never got the chance to see his first born. He died from tuberculosis in the camp at Lomza on 9 April a was on 1831. The child, daughter, born 29 June, and baptized Hedvig Charlotta. On 12 March 1833, the death of the baby girl
60 Helsinki, Finnish War Archives, M51/6, Finska Gardets Ordrejournaler 1831, Bataillons-Ordres, 2 61 April 1831. Helsinki, Finnish National Archives, Governor-General's Chancery, General Acts, Fa 452, Kart. 10, No. 188, 'Nachal'nik' f?nliandskoi Pasportnoi Ekspeditsii Sanktpeterburge, s an 28go Aprilia i83igo, No. 654: preprovafodeniesh' 2680 rublei'. One daily 'ration' for enlisted man in the Guards consisted of six silver kopecks, although the soldiers could one or sometimes receive special payments of two silver rubles during parades and exercises. At the time, the conversion rate between a silver and a paper ruble was approximately 1:3 V2.Gripenberg, Lifgardets, p. 45; Ekman, Suomen kaarti, pp. 55, 59.
This content downloaded from 185.3.35.82 on Mon, 03 Aug 2015 11:22:29 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 488 ON BEHALF OF THE EMPEROR deprived sergeant Jung's widow of her last memory of her husband who had perished in Poland. As the example of sergeant Jung and his family demonstrates, even behind the cold statistical information held in the records of the Finnish Guard's Battalion, it is possible to a recognize family tragedy.62
The November Insunection and Finnish Public Opinion The bloody suppression of the November Insurrection aroused power across ful emotions Europe. In the general revolutionary enthusiasm, an cause the Polish independence struggle became immediate c?l?bre for European liberal intellectuals. The connection between the July Revolution in Paris and the November Rising inWarsaw prompted the as French poet Casimir Delavigne to celebrate France and Poland resurgent Napoleonic brothers-in-arms in his exhilarating verses La Varsovienne and La Dies Irae de Kosciuszko. In German-speaking countries, Polenlieder, August von Platen's mournful collection of sonnets became the bestseller of 1831. Western European sympathy towards Poland hardened attitudes in Russia, and even the otherwise liberal Russian intelligentsia abandoned its critical stance towards the tsarist regime and turned to support Imperial policy. The assault against the hypo critical Western European attitude culminated in Aleksandr Pushkin's legendary poem of 1831, Klevetnikam Rossii ('To the Slanderers of Russia').63 Russian opinion also determined the rules of discourse in Finland. After receiving the news of the revolt in Warsaw, Robert Henrik Rehbinder, the Finnish minister-state secretary in St Petersburg, concern expressed at possible Russian plans to restrict the autonomy of the Grand Duchy under the pretext of the Polish events.64 In this threatening situation, the Finnish authorities considered it best to protect their precarious self-government by firmly following the Impe rial lead. Concrete Finnish expressions of loyalty towards the Russian
62 HisKi, the internet archives of the Genealogical Society of Finland; the archives of the Finnish Guard,
This content downloaded from 185.3.35.82 on Mon, 03 Aug 2015 11:22:29 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JUSSI JALONEN 489 ? Empire such as equipping the Guard's Battalion for the ? campaign in Poland were all the more important since the Polish events had also triggered foreign speculation as to the position of Finland and its potential reaction to the Polish uprising. The most absurd example was a rumour circulated in Stockholm by a group of unknown Polish was emigrants claiming that Finland secretly ready to rise in rebellion against Russia in support of the Polish insurgents. The story reached St Petersburg, where it caught the attention of the tsar's foreign minister Karl Vasilevich Nesselrode, who ordered the origins of the rumour to be traced.65 Under the 'Political Night' of the Grand Duchy, nascent Finnish newspapers had to limit their coverage of the Polish events to official reports from the Russian High Command and occasional mentions of the valorous conduct of the Finnish Battalion during the campaign.66 The Russian communiqu?s published in Finland made no attempt to hide Field-Marshal Paskevich's brutal methods in the suppression of the Insurrection in any way. Instead the tsarist government deliber ately publicized even the darkest retributions in order to demonstrate the consequences of rebellion to the Finns. The most important tool of was the Finnish authorities in the indoctrination of the populace the Evangelical Lutheran Church, which condemned the Polish rebellion a against God-ordained Russian authority in the spirit of the Pauline doctrine and the thirteenth chapter of the Letter to the Romans. A majority of devout Finnish church-goers apparently also accepted the message they had heard from the pulpits, concluding that the Poles must have lost their minds.67 was Despite official efforts, Finnish loyalism not completely unques tioning, and censorship could not entirely prevent the spread of anti Russian sentiment by the Swedish and Danish press. Even though postal connections between Finland and Sweden had been severed immediately after the outbreak of the Rising, Scandinavian newspapers continued to be smuggled into Finland. During 1831, the authorities of over the Grand Duchy confiscated 1,000 copies of foreign newspa pers.68 A famous example of the hidden sympathy felt by some Finnish intellectuals towards Poland was the 'Polish Toast' raised at a student celebration at Imperial Alexander University in Helsinki in December
65 Paasivirta, p. 103. 66 Suomija Eurooppa, see For examples, 'Finska Gardes-Regementet lidit stora f?rluster; Ramsay s?rad', 11 Finlands Allm?nna T?dning, 6 June 1831; 'Choleran Besegrad; Warschau den Juni 1831', Hebingfors T?dningar, 6 July 1831; 'Wasta tulleet sanomat Puolan soasta', Oulun Wiikko Sanomia, October 1831; 'Finska Skarpskytte-Bataljons ank?rnst tili Helsingfors', Hekingfors 18 Tidningar,67 April 1832. Paasivirta, pp. 103-04, 68 Suomija Eurooppa, 108-09. Ibid., p. 104.
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1830. Docent Johan Ludvig Runeberg, the future Finnish national poet, as a had attempted to prevent the toast 'dangerous and demonstrative were not unaware action'.69 Finnish officers serving in Poland of these and letters domestic sympathies towards the Polish revolutionaries, the officers of Lieutenant-Colonel Lagerborg reveal the bitterness felt by academic towards this peculiar but ultimately meaningless dolchsto? by intellectuals.70 The most open statement on behalf of Poland was made by the twenty-four-year-old poet Fredrik Cygnaeus, member of the so-called 'Saturday Society' founded in Helsinki in 1831. A year after, Cygnaeus von wrote a followed the example of Delavigne and Platen and poem in memory of Tadeusz Kosciuszko.71 The Polish national hero had resided briefly in the city of Turku after his release from St Petersburg in 1797, and the November Rising had refreshed the memory of his short visit to Finland.72 Under the circumstances, Cygnaeus was unable of his work to publish his poem in Finland, and instead only fragments nom appeared under the de plume 'Rudolf in the Swedish periodical a Vinterblommor {WinterFlowers, 1832). Meanwhile, in sign of the times, was a Swedish translation of Pushkin's Borodino openly published in on a magnificent layout the front page of Johan Ludvig Runeberg's on Helsingfors Morgonblad 22 October 1831.73 An extreme Finnish case was that of August Maximilian Myhrberg, an adventurer from Raahe who had previously fought in the Greek War of Liberation and settled in Paris in 1830. Following his conviction a volun as a freedom fighter, Myhrberg defied the fate of traitor and the Russians. teered to fight in the ranks of the Polish army against Anders Colonel Ramsay's nephew, the author and businessman one and Ramsay, subsequendy became ofMyhrberg's acquaintances, recorded a story of Myhrberg's experiences during the campaign. friend Adolf According to Ramsay, Myhrberg and his old childhood
69 Ohto Manninen, 'Vapauden marttyyri? Isaac Svahnin surullinen el?m?', Genos, 48, 1 1977, pp. 65-87,
This content downloaded from 185.3.35.82 on Mon, 03 Aug 2015 11:22:29 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JUSSI JALONEN 491 as a Aminoff, who had served lieutenant in another Russian military unit during the campaign in Poland, had met on the Esplanade in Helsinki after the war, and discovered to their surprise that they had on fought opposite sides in the battle of Ostrol?ka.74 Even though Ramsay's description of the incident is stylized, anecdotal and most likely inaccurate, it nonetheless reveals something of the legends that characterized the memory of the 1831 campaign in Finland at the time. as Both Cygnaeus and Myhrberg, however, remain extraordinary cases. For the officials of the Grand Duchy, the welfare of Finland and were its good relations with its Emperor all that mattered, whereas for the majority of the population at large, the Poles were rebels who had a raised their hands against rightful sovereign and brought their fate on themselves. When the campaign finally ended in October 1831, the was celebratory manifesto of the Russian Emperor published simulta neously in Finnish translation and circulated all across the Grand no Duchy, leaving doubt of the indivisibility and power of victorious Russia:
With the help of God, We shall fulfil the task begun by our valiant armies. Through time and through Our diligence, the very seed of this discontent between two kindred nations shall be removed. Our subjects in the realm now of Poland, united with theRussian Empire, must be regarded also by you as members of the same family inwhich you also belong. Not by threat a of revenge, but instead by high-minded example of loyalty and forgive ness you must aid Our efforts towards a firmer and stronger union of this country with the other parts of our Empire, toOur joy and to the glory of the Russian Empire.75
TheL?gacy of the1831 Campaign In the context of the politically incendiary situation of 1830-31, the participation of the Finnish Guard in the campaign in Poland had an played important role in securing imperial favour towards the autonomous status of the Grand Duchy. For the Finnish officers who on had distinguished themselves the front, the campaign marked the careers not beginning of magnificent only in the military, but also in
74Eino Cederberg, August Maximilian Myhrberg; suomala?en vapaustaistelijan el?m?nkerta, see Helsinki, 1928, pp. 202-03, also the critical review of Gederberg's work by Stig J?gerski?ld, Genos, , 1930, pp. 97-98,
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the civil administration of the Grand Duchy. Over the following decades, the men who had earned their ranks on the battlefields of Poland exercised an important role in the government of the Grand Duchy of Finland. The young Casimir von Kothen, who had served in was as the 1831 campaign, promoted Aide-de-Camp of the newly appointed Governor-General Aleksandr Sergeevich Menshikov, and a also earned nomination for governor of the province of Viipuri.76 Colonel Ramsay, the commander of the Guard, eventually rose to the was rank of General of Infantry and appointed to the Russian Impe was rial War Council. He subsequently rewarded for his services with a ? manor landholding the estate ofMichalice in Poland. The Polish remained in the possession of the Ramsay family until 1918.77 For the common people of the Grand Duchy, the Guard's campaign a became the first concrete example of growing Finnish patriotism, sentiment that put love for the Finnish fatherland and loyalty towards the Russian Emperor into one and the same breath, with no sense of contradiction. Belief in the virtues of the Finnish soldier instilled a special sense of devotion and enthusiasm, celebrated in the popular broadside ballads that assured the willingness of younger generations to follow the example of their predecessors and take up arms in the defence of Finland and the Empire under the banner of the Finnish Guard. Sotamieheks' mielell?ni l?hden aivan totta, jos waan minut Keisarini Suomen Kaartiin ottaa Min? menen soltaatiksi, menen aivan wissiin, Suomen eest? henkenikin panen my?s alttiiksi.
Minussa on el?m?, ja minussa on henki, enk? tahdo olla min? talonpojan renki. Iloinen on luontonikin, wereni my?s juoksee, syd?meni haluaakin Suomen Kaartin luokse.78
I will leave to be a soldier, I shall do it gladly if only to the Finnish Guard my Emperor will take me I will be a soldier, and a soldier I'll be truly For Finland, I shall riskmy life, and always faithfully.
My heart, it throbs with life, and a strong spirit is inme I won't remain as a farmhand in the country. Always merry ismy nature, and animated my blood and to the Finnish Guard my heart desires to go.
76Kristiina Kalleinen, Suomen kenraalikuvernementti,Helsinki, 1994, pp. 113?14. 77 'Suomalaiset kenraalit ja amiraalit Ven?j?n sotavoimissa 1809-1917', Biography Centre of the Finnish Literature Society,
This content downloaded from 185.3.35.82 on Mon, 03 Aug 2015 11:22:29 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JUSSI JALONEN 493 Two decades after the 1831 campaign, these feelings reached their as to height Finland had defend itself against the British maritime assault during the Crimean War. Finnish willingness to fight against the a enemies of the Russian Empire made lasting impression on Nicholas I, who commended the north-western borderland in his testament political with the words 'leave Finland alone; all through my has one long reign, it been the and the only part of my Empire that has never me one caused sleepless night'.79 For the next forty-four years, his successors on the Russian throne followed this advice. The Poles, meanwhile, had also noticed the participation of the Finnish soldiers in the suppression of their insurrection. The Finnish Guard was in subsequently mentioned the memoirs of General Ignacy Prince Kruszewski, Stanislaw Jablonowski and Dr Teodor Tripplin. These Polish portrayals of Finnish soldiers expressed admiration for a men worthy enemy, and also sympathy towards who had fought far from their in a away homeland the armed forces of dominating impe rial a was power.80 By contrast, condemnatory reference later made by Adam Mickiewicz, who briefly mentioned the obscure northern nation on in his lectures Slavonic literature in Paris. The Polish national poet the as one regarded Finns of the barbarous foreign peoples who, the were together with Tatars, responsible for the corruption of the original Slavonic character of Russia. In the judgement ofMickiewicz, the Finns were 'born as slaves, loving their yoke and blindly following orders'.81 Occasionally, the memory of the 1831 campaign could even be invoked for political purposes. As Russian imperial reaction began to turn the autonomous against Finnish establishment after the February Manifesto of 1899, the novelist August Schauman reminded the Russian Empire of its debt of honour to the Finnish soldiers who had been to and lose their blood in ready fight the defence of the Empire.82 a As time passed, certain dualism emerged in Finnish opinion vis-?-vis the November Rising, based on a silent admiration of the enemy that was a feature of a romantic concept of warfare. Six decades after the November a Rising, Johan Jakob Ahrenberg, Swedish-speaking Finnish novelist, recalled the 1831 campaign in his 1891 novel Anor och ungdom (Heritage and Youth). His protagonist, the young officer Carl Alexander as Stjernstedt, is left emotionally scarred he is ordered to supervise an
79 Pertti Luntinen, 'Nikolai I; tunnollinen j?rjestyksenpit?j?', in Suomen hallitsijat; kuninkaat, keisar?t ed. P?ivi? Tommila, Porvoo, 2000, ? 80 ja presidentit, pp. 222-27 ( 227)? Jussi Jalonen, 'The Finnish Guard's Campaign to Poland, 1831: Finnish Soldiers in Outsiders' Perspectives', Zeitschrift fur Ostmittekuropa-Forschung, 57, 2008, 4, pp. 403-24 (pp.B1 405-16). Stanislaw Eile, 'The Image of Russia in Polish Romanticism', in Finland and Poland in theRussian A pp. 82 Empire: Comparative Study, 188-89. Schauman, Kuudelta vuosikymmenelt?,p. no.
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execution of Polish With the memory of their ? insurgents.? haunting shouts 'Vivat Poloniae' echoing in his ears, the story is probably the first description of post-traumatic stress disorder in Finnish litera on eve ture.83 Written the of the new century, Ahrenberg's novel captured the ambivalence of the Finnish participation in the suppres sion of the Polish uprising and expressed the sense of pride that gave a sense way to of guilt in the Finnish historical memory. Over the years, the memory of the 1831 campaign gradually faded to oblivion, at least pardy due to deliberate amnesia. As the Guard's Battalion celebrated its centennial in the newly-independent Republic were over of Finland in 1925, the battles in Poland glossed by this simple statement: 'it is not pleasant today to remember that Finnish were a soldiers helping to suppress people fighting for its liberty, but one was has to take into account that opinion different back then.'84 Adam Mickiewicz's famous description of Poland as the betrayed as can Christ, theMessiah of the Nations waiting for Resurrection, thus as perhaps be matched by the description of Finland the Roman centurion who dutifully follows his orders, participates in the crucifix ion and impales the body of the Saviour, but who nevertheless also acknowledges the executed Christ as the Son of God at the moment of his death. or For better worse, the November Insurrection and the campaign of 1831 determined the fates of both Poland and Finland within the Russian Empire for the rest of the nineteenth century. The Polish attempt to regain lost national independence by force of arms in the context of general European revolutionary turmoil was crushed, result ing in over eight decades of repression under Russian rule. By contrast, the contribution of Finnish guardsmen and their participation in the suppression of the Polish uprising ensured that the Grand Duchy of Finland was able to secure and extend her self-government by a over pronounced loyalty to the Russian Emperor the following decades. Thus, the cruel irony of history was that the protection of Finnish autonomy was partly based on the destruction of Poland, and the continued strengthening of its status during the nineteenth century took place partly at Poland's expense.
83 Max Engman, 'Landsm?nnens dubbia lojaliteter', Finsk Tidskrifl, 7-8, 2002, pp. 377 84 'Finska Gardets minnen', Hufiudstadsbladet, 18 September 1927; Laitila, The Finnish Guard in theBalkans, p. 83.
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