Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China

Nijhoff Classics in International Law

VOLUME 5

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A New Look at Asian Relationships

Willem van Eekelen

LEIDEN | BOSTON

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Contents

Abbreviations IX Maps X 1 The northern frontier of India x 2 Aksai Chin in the Western Sector xi 3 The Western Sector (Ladakh) xii 4 The Eastern Sector (McMahon Line) xIii Introduction XIv

1 The Policy of Non-Alignment 1

2 Sino-Indian Relations Prior to 1954 8 Tibet 8 Britain Firms Up the Border Control in nefa 14 Suzerainty 16 Tortuous Negotiations at Simla 19 The McMahon Line 32 Indian Nationalism and China 35 Independent India 38 Communism in India 40 China Occupies Tibet 43 The Search for a New Relationship 49

3 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 53

4 Panchsheel and Afro-Asian Cooperation 65 The Bandung Conference 70

5 India’s Position in International Conflict 79 Junagadh and Hyderabad 79 Kashmir 80 Korea 82 Suez and Hungary 85 Goa 87 Conclusions 91

vi Contents

6 The Border Dispute with China 94 China Probes the Boundary 94 Revolt in Tibet 98 Reactions in Parliament 99 Diplomatic Notes 105 Challenge to the Entire Border 106 Serious Incidents 108 The Premiers Meet (April 1960) 112 The Officials Report 115 Chinese acquiescence? 119 China’s Agreement with Burma 121 Deadlock 122 Expiration of the 1954 Agreement 124 Further Proposals 125 The Fighting Starts 128 The Colombo Proposals 133 The Question of Prisoners 141 China’s Agreements with Other Neighbours 142 Nepal 142 Pakistan 143 Afghanistan, Outer Mongolia and Bhutan 145

7 Legal Aspects of the Border Dispute 149 The Legal Status of Tibet 150 The Simla Convention of 1914 155 The McMahon Line 155 Mountain Boundaries 157 The Watershed Principle 158 Maps and Boundary Disputes 160 Effective Occupation 164 Prescription 166 Protest, Acquiescence and Estoppel 167 The Critical Date 168 Further Application to the Border Dispute 169 The Western Sector 171 The Border with Sinkiang 171 Ladakh’s Border with Tibet 176 The Eastern Sector 177 The Thagla Ridge 179

Contents vii

8 Political Motives in the Border Dispute 181 China Changes her Evaluation of India 181 Marxist Ideology 184 The Soviet Union and the Border Dispute 189 The Communist Party of India 192 Indian Assessment of China’s Motives 195 Conclusions 197

9 Conclusions (1964) 203 The Boundary Question 203 The Implications of the Border Dispute 207 Panchsheel 210 Prospects, a 1964 Assessment 214

10 Three Post Mortems…and More 218 The Addis Paper 219 The Forward Policy 221 The Henderson Brooks / Bhagat Report 224 The Prasad Report 229 A cia Report 231 Conclusion 232

11 Sino – Indian Relations after the War of 1962 234 War with Pakistan – Tension on Sikkim Border 235 Serious Clashes 238 Sumdorong Chu 244 A New Beginning? 246

12 The Wider Context 264 A Shift to the Sea 269 The Rise of China 274 China’s Coming-out Party 279 Political Change in India 280

Appendix 1: A Further Note on Tibet 285 Appendix 2: Contacts between Dharamsala and Beijing 303 Bibliography (1964) 315 Bibliography (2015) 328 Index 333

Abbreviations a.j.i.l. The American Journal of International Law b.y.i.l. The British Yearbook of International Law g.a.o.r. u.n. General Assembly, Official Records i.c.j. International Court of Justice i.c.l.q. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly i.i.s.s. International Institute of Strategic Studies i.y.i.a. The Indian Yearbook of International Affairs jwg Joint Working Group, India – China MoU Memorandum of Understanding pla People’s Liberation Army p.c.i.j. Permanent Court of International Justice r.c.a.j. Journal of the Royal Central Asia Society r.g.d.i.p. Revue Generale de Droit International Public y.b.w.a. The Yearbook of World Affairs Indian report / Chinese report Ministry of External Affairs (m.e.a.), New Delhi, Report of the officials of the governments of India and the People’s Republic of China on the boundary question. (The Indian and Chinese reports are numbered separately. The Chinese Report was issued as a Press Release from the Chinese Chargé d’Affaires in London) White Paper Ministry of External Affairs, notes, memoranda and letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China (A series of ten white papers)

Maps

kashgar U.S.S.A Sinkiang

Kabul Shahidullah

Ladakh Srinagar Chinghai Leh PAKISTAN Gartok Shipki La TIBET Barahoti Chamdo Delhi Lhasa NEPAL Gyantse

S. NEFA BHUTAN

Tezpur

EAST PAK. Calcutta 0 200 400 600 Km.

Map 1 The northern frontier of India

MAPS xi

78° 80° Kuenlun range 36° SINKIANG

AKSAI CHIN Karakoram Kizil Pass Jilga

Lokzhung range

35°

LINGZI TANG

Lanak La Chinese Kongka road La

British proposal of 1899 34° TIBET 02550 75 Km.

Map 2 Aksai Chin in the Western Sector

xii MAPS

SINKIANG Yaratagh Haji Pass Karakoram Karakash Langar Pass AKSAI CHIN Daulat Beg Oldi Chip Chap Kizil Jilga Amtagar Lake

LINGZI TANG Galwan

Lanak Shyak S

La n

Kongka La k

Changchenma a

Leh T i

Hot Spring b

R TIBET

o Pangong a Lake d Indus

Chushul Spanggur Lake Rudok

Indian claim line

Chinese claim 1960

Chinese positions on Sept. 7, 1962 and approx. Claim of 1956 Demchok

Tashigong

02550 75 Km.

Map 3 The Western Sector (Ladakh)

MAPS xiii 28° 100 pass Diphu 0 Rima Km. Walong BURMA 05 Mishmis Lohit 96° ASSAM Dihang Miris Abors

94°

g Tamadan

n a

Subansiri s

Brahmaputra T Longju TIBET Tezpur Migritum Bomdila Sela Dzong Tawang Udalguri Thagla Tsona frontiers BHUTAN Rivers Chinese claim line Other international Khinzemane McMahon Lone

Map 4 The Eastern Sector (McMahon Line)

Introduction

The idea for a study of Indian foreign policy originated during a diplomatic posting to New Delhi between 1957 and 1960. These years were marked by the eruption of the Tibetan revolt, the flight of the Dalai Lama and the first incidents along the Sino-Indian border. My departure coincided precisely with the landing of the aircraft carrying Premier Chou En-lai to a lengthy meeting with Prime Minister Nehru in a vain attempt to arrive at a negotiated solution. The conflict subsequently assumed proportions affecting the overall foreign policy of India. It provided the most severe testing ground for Panchsheel, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which India advocated as a new and Asian contribution to international relations. My next posting was in London, which coincided with the short war of 1962 and where I could consult the India Office Library which contains most documents relevant to the colonial period. Originally my purpose was to trace the Five Principles from their optimistic start in an atmosphere of friendship with China to their decline as an instrument of practical politics. As Panchsheel experienced both its rise and fall in the bilateral context of Sino-Indian relations, these were examined in considerable detail. Most emphasis was put on the border dispute which represented the first conflict between a communist power and a non-aligned state. The analysis of legal aspects and political motives in the dispute was preceded by a lengthy chronological description, which seemed necessary not only to complete the accounts given in other and often biased publications, but also as an illustration of both its climactic development and the gradual increase of Chinese pressure. When I defended my doctoral thesis at the University of Utrecht in 1964 the records of the Simla conference of 1914 were not yet available to the public. Soon thereafter the ‘fifty year rule’ for access to official records was relaxed to a thirty year rule, which enabled me to publish a second edition in 1967 incorporating important information. I also made use of Alastair Lamb’s interesting study on the McMahon line. Comments by mr Hugh Richardson enabled me to clarify events in Tibet during the period 1935–37. In 1965 an undeclared war raged between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, complicated by a Chinese ultimatum to India. The relations between the two countries have never been easy, but gradually were overtaken by the perception of a larger Chinese threat. At the same time disintegrating tendencies in the non-aligned and Afro-Asian camps took away the shine of the Nehru period.

Introduction xv

Ever since those years I have continued following Sino-Indian relations and the border dispute in particular. After fifty years I have picked up the thread and described developments since the 1962 war up to the present time and the spectacular changes in the wider geo-political context. My narrative on the Simla conference has been extended on the basis of a paper I did in 2014 for a conference marking its 100th anniversary, organized by the Indian Institute of Chinese Studies and the Indian Institute for Advanced Studies in the former lodge of the Viceroy. A further note on Tibetan history has been added as an appendix, as well as a survey of the contacts between Dharamsala and Beijing, which for a while seemed promising, but did not lead to any concrete results. In the border dispute the Indian position froze as early as April 1960. Apparently, Nehru had lost confidence in the trustworthiness of his interlocutors. He made some tough statements about expelling the Chinese, which he could not follow up, but gave the Chinese a cause for action, especially in the few places where their claims could have some merit. The dispute ultimately boiled down to the question whether Tibet in 1914 had treaty making powers, when it signed the McMahon map. India never conducted a political inquiry into the failures of the 1962 war, but a number of ‘post mortems’ were held. They have been included to the extent that their reports have been released or leaked to the public. All of them are very critical of the forward policy, which India conducted without the means to make it credible. A string of small posts without reserves to back them up was bound to fail. Quite unbelievable was the feeling that India could do almost anything without provoking a Chinese reaction. The course of events had something of a Greek tragedy, with a quarrel within the larger dispute, centring on the disparities between the rough McMahon map of 1914 and the realities on the ground. At the time of the Officials Report of 1960, the Indian position looked quite strong, but lost its advantage by insisting too much on the principle of the ‘watershed’ even on the few spots where their policy had either been inconsistent or open to argument. The possibility of a swap of claims between the Eastern and Western sectors, broached by Deng Xiao-ping and Chou En-lai, also receded into the background, rejected by an aroused public opinion on both sides. Yet, this did not affect a growing trade volume. The issue is on the back burner, but large forces have moved up to the border and are so close to each other that incidents may happen when either side finds them politically convenient. In Tibet the political climate deteriorated with up to 120 self-immolations of Tibetans to demonstrate their lack of freedom. The chances of meaningful autonomy seem dim in a China preoccupied with the risk of losing central authority of the communist party. In anticipation of his demise in the not too

xvi Introduction distant future, the Dalai Lama created both surprise and uncertainty by ceding his temporal powers to a Prime Minister and even doubting the necessity of having a successor. My original thesis could not have been completed without the stimulating advice and supervision of Professor Dr. C.L. Patijn of the University of Utrecht. Among those who assisted me, I am particularly indebted to Mrs. E. Selby for checking my English and to Miss S.M. Thesen Ender for preparing the type- script. The staff of Chatham House, the library of India House and the India Office Library have greatly facilitated my research. The present book has almost doubled in size and the bibliography has been updated. I am grateful to my grandson Gerard de Rotte, for transforming the original text into a Word document, which made additions possible, and ordering the footnotes and the index, and to my second grandson Peter-Paul for frequently solving computer problems.

W.F.v.E The Hague, October 2015

chapter 1 The Policy of Non-Alignment

The primary concern of newly independent nations was the assertion of a national identity after their previous colonial existence and foreign policy became the main instrument for expressing their new dignity. The post-war international situation provided an opportunity to gain a position of influence which exceeded the realities of economic and military power. But diplomatic action was strongly conditioned by the domestic scene.1 International relations were spread as widely as possible since partiality towards any group of nations, and particularly towards the former colonial powers, would have carried the risk of losing control over the nationalist movement. As both camps in the cold war gradually accepted the existence of non-aligned nations and were prepared to aid them economically, a neutralist position acquired considerable attraction for countries in need of substantial assistance. Immediately after World War ii the system of collective security envisaged under the United Nations seemed to leave no room for neutrality. But the widening rift between the big powers and the failure of the Charter to provide for automatic application of enforcement measures, soon revived the desire to keep out of conflicts individually. The difference with pre-war neutrality was that modern neutralists, although not claiming to be able to avoid another world war, positively aimed at preventing one. In halting further bi-polarisation they hoped to perform a positive function as a channel of international communications and to play a part in reducing tension. They therefore rejected neutralism as a negative term and preferred to be described as non-aligned or non-committed. As early as 1964 already there was no chance of the non-aligned functioning as the “balancer” of power politics. Not only was their weakness too apparent, but they also lacked substantial common interests besides their desire for peace. They came together mainly through the negative impulses of anti- colonialism and a refusal to join military alliances. In the halls of the United Nations General Assembly the vote of the ‘group of 77’ would influence the adoption of resolutions, but had little impact on their implementation. The demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of China changed the picture but would not make the role of the Security Council in peace and security any easier.

1 See: Scalapino, A., Neutralism in Asia.

2 chapter 1

Individual non-aligned nations, however, were able to play a useful part in exploring the possibilities of a particular compromise during the Cold War when both sides were edging towards each other but found it difficult to reach agreement.2 Depending upon the willingness of the great powers to accept some form of mediation, the non-committed could be instrumental in prolonging a cease fire by assisting in the execution of an agreed solution or by pressing for continuing negotiations. Indian chairmanship of the International Control Commission in Laos and her membership of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva provided two examples. In India non-alignment had its roots in the freedom movement and, under Nehru’s predominant influence in the field of foreign affairs, its leaders already had committed themselves to this policy before independence. The Haripur session of the Indian National Congress in 1938 considered it “urgently necessary for India to direct her own foreign policy as an independent nation, thereby keeping aloof from both imperialism and fascism and pursuing her path of freedom and peace.” Immediately after the transfer of power there was still a reference to opposition against “fascism and all other tendencies which suppress human spirit,”3 but from then onwards non-alignment was transferred to the juxtaposition of the Western alliance and the communist bloc. The same resolution expressed that India should “maintain friendly and cooperative relations with all nations and…avoid entanglement in military or similar alliances which tend to divide up the world in rival groups and thus endanger world peace.” It may even be argued that any other course would inevitably have produced such serious internal disagreements that a national policy would have been impossible. The freedom struggle created a yearning for an important voice in world affairs, but the reaction against British imperialism simultaneously produced a desire to save India from involvement in power politics. A peculiar mixture of interventionism and isolationism, partially accentuated by the emphasis on non-violence, determined the moral climate in which foreign policy had to be formulated. This dual urge reproduced itself on different levels in Nehru’s thinking. His British education inclined him towards the concept of individual liberty and a democratic system of government, and Gandhi’s teachings drew from ancient Indian concepts. On the other hand, Marxist treatment of history and Russian achievements in social and economic organisation and in the field of education exerted a profound influence. In 1959 Nehru again condensed his views and his attempt to arrive at a synthesis

2 cf. Morgenthau, H.J., Neutrality and Neutralism; G. Schwarzenberger, The scope of neutralism. 3 Foreign policy resolution of Jaipur Session, December 1948.

The Policy Of Non-alignment 3 of Western democracy and Marxist economics in the first Azad Memorial Lectures.4 The democratic structure of the State and, above all, technological progress and the urge for social justice had transformed capitalism, although its basic features and its tendency towards monopolies and aggregations of economic power were maintained. The danger in socialism was that, while leading to affluence or even equitable distribution, some of the significant features of life might be missed; therefore stress on the individual became necessary. In foreign affairs he saw nationalism as still the strongest force in Asia. “It might be said that the strength of communism, wherever it is in practice, is partly due to its association with the national spirit. Where the two are dissociated, communism is relatively weak, except in so far as it embodies the discontent that exists in under-developed and poverty-stricken countries.” At this point it should be made clear that non-violence and non-alignment are two entirely different concepts which have only remote links with each other. The doctrine of non-violence, which in medieval India had become very influential and had made most of the respectable classes vegetarian, was never at that time taken to forbid war or capital punishment. It was only in modern times that Gandhi reinterpreted it in this sense.5 His special contribution to the teaching of the Gita was not so much selfless action for the common welfare as his emphasis on the purity of means. The writings of Thoreau, himself familiar with the Indian epics, left a deep impression on the Mahatma, particularly his dictum “the only obligation which I have the right to assume is to do at any time what I think right.”6 The words of the Gita: “there is more joy in doing one’s own duty badly than in doing another man’s duty well” were thus given a fuller moral significance. Nehru noted with interest the emphasis on non-violence in the Mahabharata, which centred around a great war, because of its obvious contradiction with fighting for a righteous cause. He concluded that the concept of Ahimsa (non-violence) had a great deal to do with the

4 Nehru, J., India today and tomorrow, Indian Council for Cultural Relations 1959. See also “The Basic Approach,” a.i.c.c. Economic Review, No. 201–202 (15,8.’58). 5 Basham, A.L., The Wonder that was India, Grove Press, New York, 1954, p. 123. The movement of Indian nationalism coincided with a Hindu reformation largely based on the Bhagavad Gita, the conversation between Arjuna and Krishna on the eve of battle. Although intended as a defence of the established order in which everyone should fulfil his class function to the best of his ability, its message of action, directed to ordinary people, lent itself to a revolutionary interpretation. Its conception of the ideal man stressed the person of equitable mind acting without personal desire or attachment and directing his efforts towards the welfare of the world. The Gita also foresaw the inevitable decay of all institutions and the necessity of change to restore the harmony of life. 6 Fisher, L., Gandhi, pp. 38–39.

4 chapter 1 motive, the absence of the violent mental approach, self-discipline and control of anger and hatred, rather than with physical abstention from violent action, when this became necessary and inevitable.7 This rationalisation explains why Nehru, although strongly behind disarmament efforts, never subscribed to an unconditional application of the principle of nonviolence. His remarks during the discussions of the Tibet question provide one example: “Violence might, perhaps, be justified in the modern world, but one should not resort to it unless there is no other way.”8 The maintenance of a strong army and a relatively high expenditure on defence furnish another illustration. Gandhi argued differently and rejected results reached with violent means: “If India takes up the doctrine of the sword she may gain momentary victory, but then India will cease to be the pride of my heart.”9 Nevertheless he was quoted by Nehru as agreeing with the dispatch of the army to Kashmir after it had been invaded by Pakistani raiders. Only a few of his most devoted followers would be prepared to push the doctrine of non-violence to its extreme but logical consequences by opposing the upkeep of military forces. After completing two terms as President of India, Rajendra Prasad advocated unilateral disarmament to give an example to the world, but in the middle of disputes with Pakistan and China the Government was in no mood to follow up his own suggestion.10 India needed peace for her own ambitious development projects and wanted to avoid outbreaks of violence as they could easily lead to larger confla- grations. But this attitude has become a matter of practical politics rather than doctrinal conviction and basically this aspect of foreign policy does not differ from the policy of peace professed by other countries. Non-alignment, on the contrary, is typical for the policy of India and a number of countries influenced by her. It, too, may have a deeper significance if its positive aspect, tolerance, is emphasised. There was, however, convincing logic in remaining non-committed as long as both East and West were prepared to furnish large amounts of foreign aid without any direct strings attached. We do not share the opinion11 that India’s overall economic progress might have been greater if she had aligned herself outright with either one of the power blocs. It is difficult to see how the West could have given more aid than the great combined

7 Nehru, J., The Discovery of India, p. 97. . 8 Lok Sabha Debates, Dec. 6, 1950. The Lok Sabha is the House of the People in the Indian Parliament, the Rajya Sabha the House of States. 9 Fisher, L., op. cit., p. 69. 10 The Times, June 18, 1962. 11 E.g. Suri, Surindar, “Economics,” Seminar, No. 19, pp. 31–34.

The Policy Of Non-alignment 5 efforts of the Aid to India Club, while Russian assistance has only been a fraction of these amounts. This does not mean that the need for foreign aid is the exclusive cause for India’s non-alignment. At the time of independence attachment to any one side would have destroyed the chance to fight for the freedom and unity of all Asians, which was then still a part of the nationalist concept of many Indian leaders and was regarded as a step to big power status.12 Neither of the two blocs was able to inspire unqualified enthusiasm. Indian statesmen attributed the world wars to a declining sense of moral values in politics throughout the Western world13 and developed an understandable but not entirely rational dislike of power politics. Some wished to make India so strong that neither bloc would want to see her aligned,14 but it was soon realised that India would be too weak to play the role of balancer. Close association with a power bloc was rationally discarded as threatening peace. As Nehru said war would be terribly near if all countries belonged to one of the blocs. He admitted that India’s geographic position favoured her non-aligned role; “although it – non-alignment – would seem good for everybody, it might be more difficult for others”.15 In general he maintained that military alliances and bases would only increase the chance of eruption of those conflicts they were designed to prevent, but also admitted that Indian opposition to alliances was mainly directed towards those agreements which could endanger the “area of peace” in Asia. Kundra has shown that originally Nehru saw no objection to the Brussels Treaty or nato as defensive agreements and that his main concern about nato was that it could lead to the protection of colonialism.16 A parliamentary document ascribed this fear to the “interlocking” process, which meant that partners in one agreement supported each other also on other issues and thereby became interested in maintaining the status quo even if it were bad.17 A policy of pronouncing judgment on issues as they arise, on their own merit and with an open mind, could degenerate into opportunism, since it seemed to preclude the pursuit of a pattern. Neutralism also laid itself open to the criticism that it was merely negative. Nehru has frequently emphasised that this was unwarranted: “where freedom is menaced or justice threatened

12 Levi, W., “The evolution of India’s foreign policy”. t.b.w.a. (1958), p. 117. 13 Mansergh, N., Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, p. 357. 14 Bajpai, G.S., “Ethical stand on world issues,” The Hindu, Jan. 26, 1950. 15 Address to Indian Council of World Affairs, April 5, 1960. 16 Kundra, J.C., Indian Foreign Policy 1947–1954, pp. 89–90. 17 Lok Sabha Secretariat, Military Alliances 1947–57, p. 14.

6 chapter 1 or where aggression takes place we cannot be and shall not be neutral”.18 Indians therefore often preferred the term positive neutrality or the pursuit of an independent foreign policy as a definition of their position, as these better describe the core assertion of an independent judgment. Its basic contents, anti-imperialism, anti-racialism and the recognition of the position of Asia, together with friendship for every nation, appeared relatively simple and non- controversial goals of foreign policy. The increasing involvement of India in foreign affairs and the corresponding growth in the complexity of the issues faced could hardly be expected at the time of independence. Nehru’s address to the Constituent Assembly did not anticipate an active international role and stated “ultimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy, and until India has properly evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate and will be groping.” His emphasis on non-alignment as a principle developed with the rapid rise of Indian influence. As early as 1930 he took the view that India would be in a favourable position because an invasion of India would never be tolerated by the other great powers. After independence he qualified non- alignment by saying that it did not prevent India from having closer relations with some countries than with others, but in 1950 he drew a sharp distinction between economic and political relations: “our economic policy is obviously tied to England and other Western powers…political policy is another matter”.19 His earlier assessments of India’s small political capabilities did not hold true because the West did not insist on a political quid pro quo for its economic policy of aid and technical assistance.20 As the scope for Indian foreign policy grew wider India became eminently suited for providing a bridge between East and West: “an Asian State, traditionally friendly to China, without any legacy of conflict with Russia, yet friendly to the West, and following a middle way in its programme of economic and social change”.21 The Indian approach to peace was twofold. It attempted to tackle the roots of conflict by striving for the end of colonialism and racial discrimination and for raising living standards and by generally promoting the “temper of peace.” If a conflict erupted she would try to localise it and to reduce tension by exploring more fully the potentialities of negotiation and other means of peaceful

18 Tanya Zinkin, “Indian foreign policy,” World Politics vii (1955) 179; Nehru in u.s. Congress Oct. 13, 1949; Nehru’s Speeches 1949–53, pp. 121–125. 19 Speeches of Dec. 4, 1947, March 22, 1949 and July 7, 1950 quoted in Gupta, K., India’s Foreign Policy, p. 15 and 20 and Kundra, op. cit., p. 55. 20 The Economist, May 12, 1956, p. 587. 21 Brecher, M., Nehru, a political biography, p. 559.

The Policy Of Non-alignment 7 settlement. In her efforts to prevent a dispute from spreading India laid herself open to the accusation that she was prepared to negotiate on the basis of a fait accompli and in practice did not judge issues on their merits, but merely on their potential danger to peace. There is also some truth in the criticism that Indian statesmen exploited in the cause of peace an equilibrium which was created by others. Neither the North Koreans nor the North Vietnamese were prepared to listen to Indian preaching before they started their attacks and mediation was accepted only when the military phase of the conflict was over. India’s actions, therefore, were supplementary to normal power politics in Asia. The hope that Asia would find a native pattern of its own, unspoilt by the conflict-contaminating Western system would not come true. Even Indians admitted that Asian countries as such were not more inclined towards peace than towards conflict.22 But an attempt was made to provide a framework in which the non-aligned could maintain their existence and develop their economy without constant fear of being drawn into the big power struggle. During the 1962 war India was criticised for abandoning non-alignment by appealing to the us for arms. Subsequently it devoted less diplomatic resources to global peacemaking, although it remained an important contri butor to un missions like in the former Belgian Congo. Non-alignment kept a strong hold on Indian views regarding their global role by ensuring non- dependence, “carving a distinct persona for a nation unimpressed by the somewhat ideological policies underpinning containment during the Cold War”.23

22 Rusett, A. de, “On understanding India’s foreign policy”; reply by A. Appadorai. 23 Rudra Chaudhuri, Forged in Crisis: India and the United States Since 1947. Hurst, London, 2014, p. 257.

chapter 2 Sino-Indian Relations Prior to 1954

The speed with which the Indian Government accustomed itself to the conduct of foreign policy can be explained by the interest taken in external affairs by the nationalist movement, the Indian National Congress, which was founded as early as 1885. Originally its attention was directed towards issues closely related to India’s neighbours. The use of the Indian army and the consequent drain on Indian resources by various British expeditions caused early protests. The first session of the Congress passed a resolution condemning the annexation of Upper Burma, largely because of fears of increased taxation, and advocated separate status for Burma as a Crown Colony. In 1891 reference was made to the subject again as a possible source of a clash with China. The Younghusband expedition to Tibet in 1904 was severely criticised by the Congress President, Sir Henry Cotton, as an “act of wanton violence and aggression.” Another member condemned the action, because there were no indications of fresh provocation by Russia in Tibet or Central Asia, which in any case would not necessarily concern India.1

Tibet

Early British explorers were drawn to Tibet by the wool of the famous Kashmir shawls. In the East T.T. Cooper was looking for a shorter way to China by way of Bhutan and Tibet, but was not allowed to cross. In the West much earlier William Moorcroft crossed the Niti pass in 1812 and reached Gartok. Britain obtained a direct border with Tibet with the acquisition of Kumaon and Garhwal following the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1814–16. Its double purpose was to have access to the wool trade, but also to prevent an alliance between Nepal with its large army and the Sikh state. Gulab Singh, the Dogra Raja of Jammu and feudatory of the great Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh, conquered Ladakh, which at present forms the north-eastern part of Kashmir. In 1834 he turned his army towards the Tibetan provinces of Rudok and Ngari. Forces sent from Lhasa almost annihilated the Sikhs, marched on Leh, the capital of Ladakh, but were driven out again. A treaty of ‘amity and peace’ signed on 17 September 1842 by a general of Gulab Singh, the governor of Kashmir and officials from Lhasa

1 H.A. Waidya. See Bimla Prasad, The origins of Indian foreign policy, pp. 35–45.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 9 contained the Tibetan guarantee, that Ladakh will “absolutely and essentially not be the subject of our designs and intention” and that the trade in wool and other commodities would be carried on via Ladakh in accordance with the old customs.2 Article I said ‘that the boundaries of Ludak and Lhassa shall be constituted as formerly’, engaging the parties to confine themselves within their respective boundaries and to refrain from any act of aggression. What was the ‘formerly’ ? Presumably the treaty of Tingmosgang between Ladakh and Tibet of 1684, which in turn was based on a partition effected in the 10th century. With the treaty of Amritsar of 1846 ending the Anglo-Sikh War both the Sikh and the British governments recognised Gulab Singh as an independent ruler. As the East India Company still feared his ambitions in West Tibet, which could damage the profitable wool trade or cause difficulties with China, it preferred a formal definition of the eastern border. With great difficulty the British plenipotentiary in Hongkong obtained Chinese agreement to send a delegation to cooperate in the demarcation of Tibet’s western frontier. When the two British commissioners arrived at the border in August, 1847, however, nobody was awaiting them and the Tibetans showed active hostility. They proceeded on their own and prepared a map which conformed essentially to the alignment currently claimed by India. With the collapse of Chinese rule in eastern Turkestan British policy in the frontier area was generally determined by the danger of Russian expansion, which posed an immediate threat to Hunza. As this area in northwest Kashmir bordered on Sinkiang the British were alarmed when in 1898 the negotiations between representatives of the Mir of Hunza and the Chinese Amban at Kashgar produced no success. They intervened with an attempt to settle the whole northern frontier of Kashmir. In 1896 Chinese officials, reportedly prompted by Russia, had challenged British maps of the Aksai Chin plateau (an uninhabited area in the northeast corner of Kashmir whose high lying salt deposits were regularly exploited by traders), which incorporated a larger area than appears in present day maps. British interest in Aksai Chin was out- weighed by concern over the threat of Russian interference further West and in 1899 London made an offer to delimit the boundary on the basis of ceding the plateau and the Karakash basin in exchange for Chinese recognition of Hunza’s claims. Peking did not even reply formally to this offer, which contained substantial territorial concessions, including a departure from the position that

2 Sapru, A.N., The building of the Kashmir State. Punjab Record Office, Lahore, 1931, Appendix ii. Text also in A.G. Noorani, op. cit., pp. 235–238. In 1959 Chou En-lai dismissed the treaty as a non-aggression pact. Claiming non-participation would have clashed with his argument of Tibet not possessing treaty-making powers.

10 chapter 2 the Kuenlun range constituted the de-facto boundary between Sinkiang and Kashmir. Greater receptivity on the part of China could have obtained a large part of the currently disputed area between Kuenlun and Karakoram ranges, but suspicion or a disinclination to consider boundary proposals during periods of Chinese weakness apparently prevailed.3 Since the first Gurkha invasion in 1793 Tibet was closed off as much as possible by China, whose representative in Lhasa, the Amban, was to deal exclusively with foreign questions. British attempts to establish direct contacts met with little success, even when the Peking Government appeared cooperative. In 1888 the Foreign Office faced a dilemma as a result of Tibetan intrusions into Sikkim which had to be forcibly repelled. It favoured accepting Chinese claims to suzerainty over Sikkim since these would merely be provisional and a matter of face for China. A contrary decision was taken, however, because of Durand’s persuasive argument, that if Britain gave way over Sikkim, it must be prepared to do so at some future time with regard not only to Bhutan, but also Kashmir and perhaps Darjeeling.4 The Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 (elaborated with the Regulations of 1893) which recognised the British protectorate over Sikkim, settled its boundary with Tibet and established a trademart at Yatung in Tibet, was repudiated by the Tibetans. Spurred by rumours of nego tiations between the Dalai Lama and a Russian emissary Dorjieff, the Viceroy asked permission to establish relations with Tibet, by force if need be. He recognised the collapse of Chinese influence in Tibet and called for a change in British policy to do away with Chinese suzerainty, which he described as “a political affectation” and a “constitutional fiction.”5 At first London was reluctant, but consented to an expedition after the first attempt to open negotiations in 1903 had failed. As the British troops under Col. Younghusband, supported by 500 men and 3500 yaks from Nepal, approached Lhasa, the Dalai Lama fled to Mongolia. Nepal played a dual role, participating militarily, but also managing to soften the terms of the Lhasa Convention of 1904 which was signed with his representatives of the Dalai Lama. No Chinese protest was launched against the campaign and their Amban assisted in drafting the document.6 The relative ease of the British campaign had convinced Peking of both the possibility and the necessity of strengthening its hold on Tibet. By the time

3 See Fisher, M.W. and others, Himalayan Battleground. Ch. viii, “Great Power rivalry”. 4 Round Table, “Between Delhi and Peking.” Dec. 1962, pp. 31–39. Sir H. Mortimer Durand, Indian civil servant and diplomat. 5 House of Commons, Command Paper 1920 (on 1904), No. 66, p. 154. 6 Younghusband failed to obtain the signature of the Amban as instructed. He exceeded his instructions by insisting on an indemnity and obtaining the right for the British trade-agent

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 11 the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 had confirmed the Lhasa Convention, Chinese troops had established a dominant position, but the Aksai Chin border down to the Lanak La remained undefined. The Lhasa text made no mention of China. Tibet undertook not to cede or lease territory to any foreign power without previous British consent, not to allow such power to intervene in Tibetan affairs, and not to admit foreign agents or grant concessions without giving equivalent concessions to the British Government. Britain did not associate itself fully with Lord Curzon’s views and implicitly continued to accept Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. In the agreement of 1906 the British Government engaged not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet.7 China undertook “not to permit any other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet” and added a declaration that she would not employ any one in Tibet who was not of Chinese nationality. British acceptance of Chinese suzerainty was further illustrated by the modification of the prohibition of foreign concessions which henceforth would apply to any state “other than China”. Britain also found it necessary to include in the Convention Chinese consent to the construction of telegraph lines connecting the trade marts with India. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 formed a logical conclusion of this legal framework with a mutual guarantee to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and not to interfere in its internal affairs. Its preamble recognised that, as a consequence of the geographical situation, Great Britain had a special interest in the integral maintenance of the existing system of Tibet’s external relations. But in Article ii both parties admitted the principle of Chinese suzerainty and undertook to deal with Tibet only through the intermediary of China. Direct contacts by British trade agents were excepted. Religious relations between Buddhists from either side would be allowed, but these could not be construed as affecting the principal stipulation. Both sides also promised not to send representatives to Lhasa or to seek concessions in Tibet. The inclusion of a prohibition of telegraph concessions derogated from the Anglo- Chinese Convention. Britain got around this difficulty by agreeing to transfer telegraph lines to China in the Calcutta agreement of 1908, which amended the trade regulations of 1893. This text, which settled a great number of technical details, is the only document bearing the full signatures of British, Chinese and Tibetan representatives. Its wording illustrated the subordinate position of the Tibetan delegate, who was instructed to act under the directions of the Chinese

at Gyantse to visit Lhasa. The Indian Government cancelled this right and reduced the indemnity. 7 International Commission of Jurists, The Question of Tibet and the rule of law, 1959.

12 chapter 2 plenipotentiary. Paragraph 5 mentioned “obedience” of the Tibetan authorities to the instructions of the Peking Government in their desire for judicial reform. Paragraph 8 referred to the possible abolition of British couriers “when effective arrangements have been made by China in Tibet for a postal service.” The inactivity of the Tibetan delegate whose only contribution to the negotiations seems to have been his signature, did not deter Britain from agreeing to an arrangement which envisaged superior Chinese powers in several fields. The return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet in 1909 did not lead to a period of normalcy. He had given orders not to resist the entry of Chinese troops, but when an invitation to visit China was pressed upon him he fled again, this time to Darjeeling in India. As they had done in 1904, the Chinese issued a decree to depose him. The Chinese revolution of 1911 changed the situation completely by producing a mutiny of the Lhasa garrison and a disintegration of Chinese forces. The remainder was saved from annihilation by Nepalese mediation, which made possible their departure. In spite of these reverses the Chinese president issued an order that Tibet was to be “regarded as on an equal footing with the provinces of China proper” and that “all administrative matters” con- nected with that country “will come within the sphere of internal administration.” The British Minister in Peking formally declined to accept such a definition of the political status of Tibet and pressed for the conclusion of a written agreement between China and Tibet as a condition for extending recognition to the Chinese republic. His memorandum8 stated:

1. His Majesty’s Government while they have formally recognized the “suzerain rights” of China in Thibet, have never recognized, and are not prepared to recognise, the right of China to intervene actively in the internal administration of Thibet, which should remain as contemplated by the treaties, in the hands of the Thibetan authorities, subject to the right of Great Britain and China, under Article 1 of the Convention of the 27th April 1906, to take such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of treaty stipulations. 3. While the right of China to station a representative with a suitable escort at Lhasa, with authority to advise the Thibetans as to their foreign relations, is not disputed, His Majesty’s Government are not prepared to acquiesce in the maintenance of an unlimited number of Chinese troops either at Lhasa or in Thibet generally.

8 Aug. 17, 1912. Public Records Office, Cab. 371116 (1913) Mo. 68. Chinese Presidential Order of April 21, 1912.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 13

At first Peking refused but attempted to show its goodwill by reinstating the Dalai Lama who returned to Lhasa in 1913 after the last Chinese had left. It is not surprising that, twice deposed and once misled, His Holiness was extremely suspicious of Chinese intentions. As, moreover, their short administration had been a failure due to lack of cooperation from the Tibetan population, and the Chinese troops were on the run, he felt sufficiently secure to issue what was generally regarded as a declaration of independence. His message said that he wanted no rank from the Chinese and that he resumed the temporal and spiritual government of his country. The defeat of an army sent by Peking meant the end of direct Chinese influence in Tibet for several decades. British policy towards Tibet wavered between London and Delhi, the Indian government being more inclined towards a forward policy, but London prefer- ring the stability of delimitation of the boundaries. Britain was excessively concerned with counter-acting Russian influence in Tibet and went as far as accepting the exclusion of its own influence. The cloak of suzerainty of a weak China was a convenient means of ending the ‘Great Game’ with Russia by sta- bilizing the status quo without a permanent commitment of British funds or troops.9 In this framework commercial ambitions also could be fairly easily satisfied. Younghusband was the last of the ‘forwardists’: A modest campaign, quickly concluded, was an effective way of neutralising an area of potentially strategic importance. However, his campaign was criticised for the atrocities on its way and was not allowed to capitalise on the ease of its success by clarifying neither the status and constitutional position, nor the borders of Tibet, both of which would remain contested. Charles Bell accused his country of abandoning the Tibetans to Chinese aggression for which the British military expedition and its subsequent withdrawal were primarily responsible.10 It might be argued that without the success of Younghusband China would never have felt the need or been able to assert its control, but other dangers seemed more imminent at the time. In the years to follow Britain made a considerable effort to secure the autonomy of Tibet. Both in 1910 and 1912 her diplomats took prompt action to press for the maintenance of a Tibetan identity whenever the Chinese showed unexpected determination in asserting their control. Britain protected her immediate interests by accelerating the consolidation of the Himalayan frontier. In 1910 Bhutan signed a treaty leaving its foreign affairs to the Indian Government in exchange for a guarantee of internal autonomy.

9 In Endgame Jennifer Siegel plausibly argued that 1907 was only a temporary bridge over the gaping divide of diverging aims of Britain and Russia. 10 Tibet past and present, pp. 71, 115. For internal developments see Appendix i.

14 chapter 2

Britain Firms Up the Border Control in nefa

In the 19th century British India concluded a great number of agreements with tribal chiefs in the eastern sector. In 1844 the Bhutiya chiefs of Tawang and other districts adjoining the Darrang district of Assam pledged themselves “to act up to any orders we may get from the British authorities” in return for an annual pension or posa of Rs. 5000. It is difficult to assess its precise meaning. Lamb reached the conclusion that it amounted to a surrender of those rights the Rajas may have possessed in a limited area on the north bank of the Brahmaputra. India considered the agreement as an explicit acceptance of sovereign jurisdiction as “no government in the world pays stipends to those who were not its citizens.”11 The situation is, however, more complicated than this obvious simplification. Tibet also paid subsidies to some of the tribes, while one of the Tawang Rajas used to hand over most of his posa to Lhasa.12 Lamb has also drawn attention to the fact that in 1872 four monastic officials from Tibet came down to mediate with the Mönpas a boundary settlement along the foothills of the southern Bhutanese border. When China attempted to reassert control over Tibet around 1910 – her last effort before the revolution – her troops penetrated into the Walong area of eastern Assam and placed boundary markers there. Appreciative of the danger of further encroachment, the governor of Assam advised the Viceroy to press forward beyond the limits which “under a self-denying ordinance” contained the frontier:13

We only now claim suzerainty up to the foot of the hills. We have an inner line and an outer line. Up to the inner line we administer in the ordinary way. Between the inner and the outer lines we only administer politically. That is, our Political Officer exercises a very loose jurisdiction, and to prevent troubles with frontier tribes passes are required for our subjects who want to cross the inner line. The country between the two lines is very sparsely inhabited and is mostly dense jungle. Now should the Chinese establish themselves in strength or obtain complete control up to our outer line, they could attack us whenever they pleased, and the defence would be extremely difficult… It is accepted that, if the outposts were

11 Lamb, A., The McMahon Line, A study in the relations between India, China and Tibet, 1904 to 1914, p. 53; Aitchison (1909) ii, p. 297; Report of Chinese and Indian officials, December 12, 1960, p. 215. 12 Lamb, A., op. cit., pp. 25, 301. 13 Reid, Sir. R., History of the frontier areas bordering on Assam from 1883–1941, p. 221.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 15

pushed forward so far as the outer line, then in each case it would be necessary to place them on the spurs of the hills and above malaria height. This we could only do if we establish our suzerainty or could claim the consent of the hill people who are in occupation, as being in our protection…

The Indian Government was not convinced and wanted to confine itself as hitherto to cultivating friendly relations with the tribes beyond the Outer Line and to punishing them for acts of hostility. No promise was to be given that the tribes could rely on British support in the event of Chinese aggression. Analys ing the situation in preparation for negotiations with China the Secretary of State for India wrote:

It should be observed that Tibet is nowhere coterminous with the settled districts of British India, but with a belt of country which, though geo- graphically part of India, politically is partly a no-man’s land inhabited by aboriginal savages, partly the territories of states, independent (Nepal), and subordinate (Bhutan and Sikkim). …political relations are now being opened up with the tribes on the Indian side of the watershed – a step which was directly necessitated by the presence of Chinese missions among them, and by the Chinese military expedition to the Po-med country which is immediately north of the Abor country.14

In 1911 the Indian government initiated surveys of the border area and the next year two frontier tracts were created, each under a political officer. The Viceroy favoured inclusion into Article 5 of the draft Simla Convention some definition of the boundary with Tibet; “In the light of knowledge acquired from our recent survey it will now be possible to define a satisfactory frontier in general terms.”15 Asked to submit proposals he suggested an alignment, which was later included in McMahon’s exchange of letters with the Tibetans, except for the Tawang section east of Bhutan. Delhi did not have detailed information concerning “the southern limits of Tibetan possessions in and south of Tawang” and supposed that they extended to within 11 miles of Odalguri; “should question hereafter arise we can recognise Tibetan right to any area south of line to which her claims may be established.”16 The Assam government was under the

14 Tibet, secret memorandum of Jan. 27, 1913, 1472/13. 15 From Viceroy, Oct. 9, 1913. 16 From Viceroy, Nov. 21, 1913.

16 chapter 2 impression that the watershed in this area would also exclude the wedge in which Tawang was situated.17 In 1914 a political officer visited Tawang. He reported excessive taxation by the Drepung monastery in Lhasa which still appointed the principal officers. By that time the General Staff had also come to the conclusion that the area formed “a dangerous wedge of territory…thrust in between the Miri country and Bhutan” and proposed a Himalayan boundary: “There appears to be a convenient watershed for it to follow.”18 It may be assumed, therefore, that in the middle of the Simla Conference Britain decided to extend her claims to Tawang on strategic grounds. The McMahon Line was a logical defence barrier and Sino-Tibetan territory should not be allowed to extend too close to the Brahmaputra valley. The Tawang monastery, moreover, was said to control villages south of Se La, so that administration would be easier if the whole area were included in Indian territory.19

Suzerainty

Before the Younghusband expedition of 1904 the British accepted the Chinese right to claim some supervisory status in Tibet, but none of their treaties with China defined that status with any precision. The Foreign Office took the view that a precedent of Tibet conducting its own foreign relations without reference to its suzerain might be undesirable, as the Afghans might quote it as an argument for direct relations with the Russians.20 During the early stages of the negotiations for the 1906 Convention the distinction between suzerain and sovereign power was made by the British delegates, who refused to accept an article recognising Chinese sovereignty. The Chinese representative then proposed the wording “Great Britain recognises the existing authority of China over Tibet”; when this was refused he suggested that no mention of suzerainty or sovereignty should be made at all.21 In preparing a communication to China in 1912 which would give British views on the Sino-Tibetan relationship, the India Office proposed inclusion of a formal distinction between sovereignty and suzerainty, but the Foreign Office

17 Chief Secretary to Foreign Secretary, Govt. of India, Sept. 17, 1913, No. 358c and Oct. 17, No. 394c. 18 Reid, Sir R., op. cit., p. 281. 19 Lamb, A., op. cit., p. 150. 20 Landsdowne to Satow, October 6, 1904, quoted by Lamb, p. 34. 21 Lamb, pp. 43 and 45.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 17 objected to any formal use of the word sovereignty. As a result the British minister in Peking mentioned only recognition of Chinese suzerain rights in Tibet, but denied her right to interfere actively in the internal administration of Tibet.22 Originally Britain pressed for a bilateral agreement with China defining the status of Tibet and the Chinese rights there. Then the British extended their role by acting as mediators in the Sino-Tibetan dispute and they ended up as parties to a tripartite agreement. The text of the Simla Convention shows the effects of this change in policy. The first draft by the India Office was bilateral: “The two Governments, recognising that Tibet is under the suzerainty, but not the sovereignty, of China…”. The word sovereignty, which was omitted from the note of 1912, had appeared again and was also embodied in the text McMahon presented at Simla on 11 March 1913, but dropped during conversations with Ivan Chen on April 15; a request by the Chinese plenipotentiary for a separate agreement to define the exact meaning of suzerainty was refused.23 After the presentation of the memorandum of 1912 British policy remained directed at securing the maintenance of peace and order on the Tibetan border and at seeing that the controlling influence at Lhasa would not be overtly hostile to India or to the frontier states. Their memorandum had insisted on a new Anglo-Chinese agreement as guarantee against Peking’s claims of sovereignty over Tibet. The unsettled military situation made some sort of Sino- Tibetan conciliation desirable.24 One of the reasons advanced for bringing China and Tibet together at the conference table was that the disturbances between the two countries had given rise to serious unrest in the border area. If Nepal were to enforce claims for damage suffered by her citizens it would be difficult to restrain her, but Britain would still be held responsible by Russia. Originally London assumed that a bilateral Sino-Tibetan agreement could be reached – possibly concluded on Indian soil – which would take into consideration British preoccupations considering parts of Tibet inside which no Chinese troops should be allowed. Following a suggestion from Jordan, the Minister at Peking, a tripartite conference was considered a more effective means of obtaining a solution, as it would be impossible to influence the talks

22 Memorandum of August 17, 1912, reproduced by Lamb, p. 604. 23 Lamb confirms my view that the concept of suzerainty was foreign to China, op. cit., p. 44, note 18. 24 Cabinet memorandum explaining the position in relation to Tibet, Oct. 18, 1913. Public Office, Cab. 371116 (1913) JVo. 68.

18 chapter 2 unless Britain took a direct part.25 In proposing abandonment of the traditional disinterested policy Jordan was primarily concerned with the danger of Tibet gravitating towards Russia, but British freedom of manoeuver was also limited by the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907. The negotiations on a tripartite basis should, therefore, not lead to Britain becoming a party to the final convention as this would involve a new agreement with Russia.26 The British plenipotentiary, Sir Arthur McMahon, was to take an attitude of benevolent assistance and act as an honest broker.27 Only when Petersburg made no objection to the British course of action, of which it was kept informed, Britain decided to accede to the agreement herself. A more formal communication to Russia would only be required if the well-recognised frontier were rectified. It was not easy to obtain Chinese participation in a conference. In January, 1913 Peking first stated that a Chinese officer was on his way to Tibet to negotiate a lasting peace, but then proposed negotiations on the basis of the British memorandum which could result in an exchange of notes. Jordan wanted a formal agreement and in correspondence with London added that Tibet might resent an Anglo-Chinese agreement without previous reference to Lhasa as it would curtail the independence which she had won by her own efforts. In March China proposed talks in London, but Britain suggested Darjeeling, which was finally changed in Simla. Shortly before accepting the invitation and naming Chen as the Chinese plenipotentiary Peking appointed him “Commissioner for the pacification of Tibet,” which provoked a prompt British protest.28 China also refused to communicate his full powers until the designation of the delegates had been agreed. When in August the Chinese Government objected to the equal status of the three plenipotentiaries it was told that the negotiations would proceed without Chen if he did not arrive with proper full

25 This paragraph and the following are based upon the India Office Library Political Files, Tibet negotiations with China (1913) Vol. 16, 17, 18, and Foreign Office Register of Correspondence, China (1913). Public Records Office, ind. 27857. 26 The Foreign Office wrote to the Under Secretary of State in the India office: “h.m.g. must acquire no rights and undertake no responsibilities that can in any way be held to infringe the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907” (April 30, 1913, No. 16537/13). It also rejected the idea of having two separate sets of negotiations, with China and with Russia, as these would inevitably influence each other’s course (May 15,1913, No. 20005/13). 27 Grey to Jordan, April 5, 1913, No. 101. 28 Alston to Grey, June 29, 1913, No. 148 and July, 9, No. 152. The Chinese President assured the British Chargé d’Affaires that Chen’s title carried no territorial powers. The Chinese Foreign Office confirmed in a memorandum that the pacificators (who also functioned in the provinces of China proper) had no connection with the internal administration.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 19 powers before October 6.29 Within a few days the British Legation was in possession of this document, but shortly afterwards the Chinese attempted to hand over a memorandum to the effect that a new arrangement was necessary to enable China to regain her former position in Tibet30 It was withdrawn only after the Chargé d’Affaires had refused to receive it on the ground that it would reopen the settled question of the scope of the forthcoming negotiations. In the meantime China also probed in another direction by trying to arrange a meeting with the Tibetans in Chamdo prior to the Simla conference and their efforts to achieve this would continue even after the negotiations had started.

Tortuous Negotiations at Simla

Few conferences can boast of relevance hundred years after their meeting, certainly when their outcome could at best be described as a limited success. The Convention lacked not only Chinese signature (despite some further proposals up to 1919), but also Russian agreement. Yet, it contained several items which – though not precisely defined – are still relevant to the debate about the status of Tibet and Sino – Indian relations. McMahon played the part of a mediator between the widely divergent Chinese claim of full sovereignty based on the conquest by Dzenghis Khan, and the well documented claims of Tibet for an acknowledgement of independence, invalidation of the 1906 Convention and the delineation of a frontier with China which would include all Tibetan people. Britain rejected independence for Tibet, which had not been recognised by any power except by Mongolia in a treaty of dubious authenticity. The problem was to ensure the reality of autonomy for Tibet while leaving China sufficient dignity. After allowing the Tibetans and Chinese to present evidence in support of their claims, McMahon on 17 February 1914 introduced a statement on the limits of Tibet and a map embodying those ideas. He based himself on the erection of a Chinese pillar near Batang in the 18th century:

…it is clear that that pillar, together with the watershed on which it stands, then marked and has generally continued to mark, a well-defined line between the sphere of periodical Chinese intervention in Tibet and the sphere in which Chinese dictation was of a purely nominal nature.

29 Alston to Grey, Aug. 25, 1913, No. 200. 30 Alston to Grey, Aug. 30, 1913, No. 206.

20 chapter 2

McMahon continued by advocating recognition of

the established autonomy of Outer Tibet, whilst recognizing also the right of the Chinese to re-establish such a measure of control in Inner Tibet as will restore and safeguard their historic position there, without in any way infringing the integrity of Tibet as a geographical and political entity.

His distinction was between Outer Tibet, roughly west of the Yangtze, where Chinese influence would be severely restricted and their presence limited to one high official with an escort of 300 men, and Inner Tibet, a broad peripheral area next to China, where it could send officials and troops, but which could not be converted into a Chinese province.31 The Tibetans were persuaded to modify their claim that Tibet was an independent state in so far as they agreed to the clause in which Britain and China recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet if it would be combined with autonomy for Outer Tibet.32 Ivan Chen, or Chen I-fan, the Chinese delegate, was only brought to serious discussion of a draft, introduced by McMahon on March 11, after hints that otherwise Britain would conclude a bilateral agreement with the Tibetans. His main opposition was directed against the proposed boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet and up to the last moment he demanded – and often obtained – concessions on its alignment. Clever pressure tactics finally persuaded Chen to initial the draft and the map on April 27, 1914, but a message from Peking soon disavowed his action, though expressing willingness to continue amicable discussions. McMahon attributed the refusal to the “proverbial disinclination of the Chinese to final issues” and remained confident of obtaining their agreement. Part of the minutes of the conference were revealed by a Chinese source in 1940 and provided some information regarding the concept of suzerainty.33 McMahon’s draft contained the following Article ii:

The Governments of Great Britain and China, recognizing that Tibet is a State under the suzerainty, but not the sovereignty, of China, and

31 The distinction was not without precedent. Edward Balfour’s Cyclopedia of India (3rd ed., Quaritch, London, 1885, Vol., p. 87) stated: “The Chinese government divides Tibet into two provinces, Anterior Tibet and Ulterior Tibet.” 32 Exchanges of notes between all three parties would state that Tibet formed part of Chinese territory, but that Outer Tibet would not be represented in the Chinese parliament. 33 The Boundary Question between China and Tibet, pp. 96–98, 101–105, 122, 130–133, 140–141, 147–148.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 21

recognising also the autonomy of Outer Tibet, engage to respect the territorial integrity of the country, and to abstain from interference in the administration of Outer Tibet (including the selection and appointment of Dalai Lama), which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa. The Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province and Tibet shall not be represented in the Chinese Parliament or any similar body. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion of it.

In the course of the negotiations the words “a State” and “but not the sovereignty” were omitted, the word “appointment” was replaced by “installation” and the prohibition of representation in the Chinese Parliament was limited to Outer Tibet only. A separate note stating that Tibet formed part of Chinese territory also was added to meet Chinese wishes, but McMahon rejected a request by Chen to define the political limits of suzerainty in a separate agreement. The agreed minutes of their conversation describe the British argument: “I reminded Mr. Chen of the vagueness of this term, and the diffidence shown by all authorities on International Law in putting forward any definition of suzerainty.” It seems clear that Britain considered her recognition of Chinese suzerainty only as a harmless face-saving device for the Peking government. But the original balance in the draft between British recognition of suzerainty with a Chinese admission that this did not amount to sovereignty had disappeared by the acceptance of the amendment in an attempt to obtain Chinese consent to the Convention. Yet, Article ii did not constitute a Tibetan recognition of Chinese suzerainty. The main reason why the concurrence of Tibet was omitted from this vital provision may well have been the history of the British draft, which had originally been prepared for a bilateral Sino-British agreement.34 The lack of definition of Chinese rights was further demonstrated when Chen requested a clause in Article iv (regarding the Chinese representative and his escort of 100 men, later enlarged to 300 men) recognising the right of the Amban to guide the Tibetans in their foreign policy. McMahon replied that the draft represented the most favourable terms which could be expected

34 The India Office Library possesses a Revised draft of March 1913 for a bilateral Sino-British agreement commencing with Article i: “The two governments, recognising that Tibet is under the suzerainty, but not the sovereignty of China, mutually engage to respect the territorial integrity of the Country and to abstain from interference in its internal administration, which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa.”

22 chapter 2 from Britain and “recognised the traditional position of the Chinese representative, and it was unnecessary to attempt any definition of that position.” McMahon obtained the right to direct negotiations with Tibet to establish new trade regulations. As her troops would not be allowed there, China was released from her engagement of 1890 to prevent acts of aggression from the Tibetan side of the Sikkim frontier. Before final drafts of these texts had been agreed the British and Tibetan delegates completed discussions on the north- eastern border of India, later to be known as the McMahon Line. The Chinese were not invited to take part and their specific acceptance was not sought. They were informed later when the line appeared in the map annexed to the Convention drawing the borders of Tibet and the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet. A Tibetan suggestion to establish a permanent mission in Lhasa was rejected by Britain in view of her obligations under the Anglo-Russian Convention. Instead the British agent at Gyantse was allowed to visit the capital whenever he needed to consult the Tibetan Government on matters arising out of the Lhasa Convention.35 During the negotiations Chen produced another instruction from Peking including the demand that the new trade regulations between Great Britain and Tibet be submitted to the Chinese Government for its approval. Peking finally agreed to the “main principles” of the revised draft, but remained adamant in its rejection of the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet and requested the British delegation to make further concessions. This move apparently induced McMahon to persuade the Tibetan representative that the area around Kokonor lake be detached from Inner Tibet and included in China. His assistants finally prevailed upon Chen to initial the convention after a separate discussion with him in the ante-room of the conference. Meanwhile the Tibetan delegation had been assured that “unless Chen was able to cooperate, it might become necessary to eliminate the clause recognising the suzerainty of China, and ipso facto the privileges appertaining thereto”. Soon after the three delegates had initialled the Convention on 27 April, 1914, it was repudiated by China, but the conference remained in session.

35 The India Office attached great importance to this right as it would be the only effective means to enforce observance of the tripartite agreement (Secret Department No. 1706). The Times of Jan. 6, 1913 had argued “The best way of terminating forever Chinese attempts to assert sovereignty over Tibet is to send a British representative to Lhasa.” At the Simla Conference a compromise was reached after the Chinese delegate had opposed discussion at Lhasa of any questions of a political, territorial or international character by the British agent.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 23

McMahon agreed to bring the border of northern Tibet down from most of the Kokonor region to the Kuen Lun mountains. The Chinese were not impressed and insisted on concessions in the East where they claimed a dividing line along the Salween river, thus keeping Chamdo (which they occupied at that time) in Inner Tibet. Another change in the text of April 27 was the deletion of Article x, which had proved unacceptable to Russia as it provided for Sino- Tibetan differences arising out of the Convention being referred to Britain for equitable adjustment. It was replaced by the second paragraph of Article xi which gave priority to the English text of the Convention.36 Lord Crewe in the India Office sent three cables in a row: on July 1 he wrote that if Chen refused to sign the Convention, McMahon should terminate the negotiations and express to the Tibetan delegate his regret at the failure to reach a settlement and assure him “that if Chinese aggression continues, Tibet may count on diplomatic support of His Majesty’s Government and on any assistance which we can give in supplying the munitions of war. … As long as Chinese fail to proceed to signature they will debar themselves from the privileges contemplated by the Convention, but the text will be unchanged, and our position will remain unprejudiced in regard to Russia and sufficiently satisfactory in regard to Tibet even if only initialled”.37 These instructions crossed a report from McMahon that the Tibetan delegate, Lonchen Shatra, would be quite content with an initialled convention, which his government would regard as binding. The Viceroy added his conviction that after a bilateral signature between Britain and Tibet “the Chinese will not long allow themselves to be dissociated from the Convention”. Jordan, the British Minister in Peking did not agree. On July 2 London sent a further instruction: “McMahon should say in full conference that Convention as initialled represents settled views of HMG as to the status and boundaries of Tibet” (but the assurances given to Tibet should be privately given to the Tibetan Plenipotentiary.)38 The Foreign Office maintained its opposition to a separate signature with Tibet on the ground that it would amount to tearing up the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Lord Crewe was aware of this and attempted to change the plans of McMahon. On July 3 he cabled to the Viceroy “His Majesty’s Government cannot authorize separate signature with Tibetans. If Chinese delegate refuses to sign McMahon should proceed in manner laid down in my telegrams of 1 and 2 July”. Due to absence

36 On 21 April 1914 Chen declared that he did not recognise any agreement between Britain and Tibet. 37 S. of S. to Viceroy, with approval of Grey, July 1, 1914, Reg. No. 2555. 38 Text cables in Noorani, op. cit., p. 192.

24 chapter 2 of staff on Friday afternoon, the text arrived in Simla only the following day, when McMahon and Lonchen Shatra already had initialled the revised Convention (containing amended Articles x and xi). The course of events had again been determined by an accident!39 So, after the introductory paper with map of 17 February and the draft Con vention McMahon produced on 11 March, there were two Simla Conventions, one of 27 April initialled by all three plenipotentiaries, and one of 3 July 1914 initialled only by McMahon and Lonchen Shatra, (which contained a smaller map than the one they had signed in March) who then signed a Declaration with the seal of the Dalai lama, acknowledging “the annexed Convention as initialled to be binding on the governments of Great Britain and Tibet and we agree that so long as the Government of China withholds its signature to the Convention, she will be debarred from the enjoyment of all privileges accruing therefrom”. These privileges were not specified, but could be assumed to include the whole range of provisions, from the recognition of suzerainty to the right to have an Amban with an escort of 300 men. The hope that China would later accede to the Convention almost materialised in 1915 when the British Minister in Peking was informed that if the statement that Tibet formed a part of Chinese territory were transferred from the notes to the main text of the Convention and if in the Convention Tibet recognized Chinese suzerainty, China would be prepared to agree to the inclusion of Chamdo in Outer Tibet and withdraw her troops within a year.40 The Viceroy, on the other hand, had become less keen on signature of a convention: Even if satisfactory Convention were negotiated, we should be confronted with inconvenient demands of Russia regarding Afghanistan before such a Convention could be operative. The Delhi government added that Britain should first come to terms with Russia on Asian questions and suggested that the minister in Peking should not go further than ascertaining informally the Chinese position. The excessive preoccupation with Russia ended soon afterwards with the Soviet revolution.

39 From Viceroy, July 4, 1914. P. 2593. Lamb, pp. 518–519, is less complete on the final days of the conference. He believed that the idea for a bilateral declaration originated in or was approved by London, while in fact, the home government thought an oral statement to be sufficient. Lamb was unaware of the late arrival of the cable of July 3. The India Office file contains a note that the delay had been unavoidable, but that McMahon’s actions under the circumstances appeared praiseworthy and could be approved. In the trade regulations no mention was made of China. As the possibility of Chinese adherence remained open, no attempt was made to reconcile the Regulations with the Anglo Russian convention of 1907, which anyhow became a dead letter with the Russian revolution. 40 From Jordan, August 2, 1915. India office file 464, pt,5,6, P. 2845.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 25

Even if China would have become a party to the Simla Convention its contradictory provisions could hardly determine the status of Tibet. The combination in Article 2 of a recognition of Chinese suzerainty with an engagement “to respect the territorial integrity of the country” denied the traditional view that the vassal state is a mere portion of the suzerain state. Yet the accompanying exchange of notes stated exactly the opposite when confirming that Tibet formed part of Chinese territory. The provision that China should abstain from interference in the administration of Outer Tibet, which also should not be represented in the Chinese parliament, seemed to imply that China was not restricted with regard to Inner Tibet. Yet the obligation not to convert the country into a Chinese province was demanded for the whole of Tibet. This lack of precision may have been deliberate to tempt China to accept the Convention by suggesting that in Inner Tibet she could do anything short of formally reducing it to a Chinese province. Further limitations on Chinese power included the prohibition of sending troops or stationing civil or military offices in Outer Tibet, with the exception of one high official with 300 men, or establishing Chinese colonies in the country. The second ambiguity was the recognition of the autonomy and territorial integrity of Tibet, under the suzerainty of China, but at the same time writing in the Schedule attached to the Convention: “It is understood by the High Contacting Parties that Tibet forms part of Chinese territory”. Thirdly, the rough McMahon Line combined the proposed border between Inner and Outer Tibet with an agreement of the border between Tibet and N.E. India, which implied the transfer of territory to India. This ploy did not succeed, but in practice the Line got a life of its own, even though its underlying principles were unclear. Some watersheds, some high peaks and some military and administrative considerations which (like on the Tawang tract) were formulated only in early 1914. Fourthly, mention should be made of Article 5:

The Governments of China and Tibet engage that they will not enter into any negotiation or agreements regarding Tibet with one another, or with any other Power, excepting such negotiations as are provided for by the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet and the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China.41

41 International Commission of Jurists, op. cit., p. 125. The reference to the Lhasa Convention of 1904 presumably regarded the subjects Tibet would not act on without previous consent, as the engagement to negotiate new trade regulations was separately mentioned in Art. 7(b) of the Simla Convention.

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Strictly speaking this provision would have frozen the status quo of Tibet and kept her from international contacts, but would also have curtailed Chinese suzerainty by preventing any representation on behalf of Tibet. Despite its contradictions and the lack of positive definition the Simla Convention, even if accepted, would have preserved Chinese suzerainty over Outer Tibet in name only. In commerce Tibet accorded most favoured nation treatment to Britain. The only real Chinese advantage over the British would have been their mission in Lhasa with a slightly larger escort than the contin- gents for the British trade agencies in Tibet. By refusing to sign the Convention Peking lost recognition of its suzerainty, however rudimentary, but maintained the possibility of settling with Tibet on its own terms later. Her legal position was weakened, however, by the fact that she had consented to participate in a conference on a basis of equality with the Tibetan delegation. To the outside world this could only signify that China accepted the treaty making power of Tibet which would be effective externally regardless of any possible bilateral obligation of Tibet towards China to enter into agreements only when they were concurrently concluded by Peking. The initials of the Chinese representative on the maps annexed to the Convention further signified the acquaintance of the Chinese Government with the McMahon Line. The arguments of the Indian officials in 1960 concerning suzerainty and the right of a vassal to conclude agreements with the knowledge and expressed or implied consent of the suzerain did not tally fully with their assertion of Tibet’s equal status at the conference table and could only be used in parallel reasoning. China flatly rejected them because the concept of vassal states was imperialist in origin. India was quick to point out that the Chinese side earlier had argued that till the 19th century Ladakh had been a vassal of Tibet, which hardly could have meant to describe imperialist designs of Tibet.42 Scoring this point did not bring a definition of Tibet’s status any closer. All we can say is that between 1912 and 1950 Tibet enjoyed at least de-facto independence without obtaining a more explicit recognition than was inherent in her direct relations with British India and Nepal, which accorded her a certain international personality. To Lamb’s history of this period I should add that the India Office sent a note to the Foreign Office saying that the insertion of a clause defining Tibet “under the suzerainty but not the sovereignty of China” was advocated by His Lordship (Lord Crewe) “mainly as a point to be pressed in the first instance, with a view to affording some margin for concessions in the course of negotiations”. In their view there was no objection to dropping the word sovereignty, as

42 Indian Report, p. 133.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 27 reported by McMahon, if this was preferred by China. The Foreign Office, however, did not agree and on 21 April the India Office instructed McMahon that if the addition “but not the sovereignty” could not be maintained, the whole passage about suzerainty should be deleted. As no further detailed negotiations took place before the initialling ceremony McMahon, who probably felt that insistence on this point would nullify the chances of Chinese approval of the Convention, took no action.43 It was not the only instance during the conference that a final wording was due to the hazards of a negotiating table far removed from the respective capitals. The point remains, however, that in Article ii of the Convention as initialled Chinese suzerainty was recognised only by Britain and China and not by Tibet. In May 1919 Chinese overtures for a resumption of the Simla negotiations suggested modifications of the frontier between Inner and Outer Tibet (ceding Chamdo to Tibet, but keeping Litang, Batang and Tachienlu in Szechuan). They also requested permission to station Chinese officers at the trade marts at Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok., which India found difficult to accept but left pending.44 Britain obtained that there would be no objection to a British permanent representative in Lhasa (the Russian complications having vanished). Tibet rejected all proposals, which soon were abandoned by China as well when a swell of internal criticism and chauvinism was directed against an agreement in which Britain played such an obvious part. Parshotam Mehra concludes that now Britain was prepared to accept the Chinese terms in the hope of reaching a permanent settlement. Jordan, who was on good terms with Yuan Shih-kai, was very critical of the Simla negotiations which conveyed to him “a lack of reality” with Britain and Tibet knowing each other’s cards throughout. He got support from the experienced consular officer Eric Teichman in a Memorandum questioning the artificial creation of Inner Tibet which left China at liberty to make what any military dispositions. As long as Chinese fail to proceed to signature they will debar themselves from the privileges contemplated by the Convention, but the text will be unchanged, and our position will remain unprejudiced in regard to Russia and sufficiently satisfactory in regard to Tibet even if only initialled. Two years later Lord Curzon, then Foreign Secretary, informed the Chinese Minister that failing Chinese consent to the Convention his Government did not feel justified in withholding any longer their recognition of the status of Tibet as an autonomous state under the suzerainty of China, and intended

43 Political and Secret Subjects File 464, pt. 4. S. of S. to Viceroy, April 21, 1914. On April 27 the Viceroy’s cable stated casually that the word sovereignty had been dropped., P. 1646. 44 Bell, Sir Charles, op. cit., p. 173. Purshotam Mehra, Vol. 2, p. xiv–xviii.

28 chapter 2 dealing with Tibet on this basis in the future.45 British diplomacy has produced better statements than this peculiar memorandum. It purported to make clear that direct relations would in future be entertained with Lhasa, but added quite unnecessarily the acceptance of Chinese suzerainty, which itself would have been the main prize for Chinese accession to the Simla agreement. The threat of direct British contacts was insufficient to move the Chinese and an opportunity was lost to define the new status of Tibet. In the early thirties Tibet suffered reverses in incidents with Chinese war lords, necessitating territorial concessions. Chinese sources report an eight point questionnaire addressed to the Dalai Lama through a Tibetan intermediary. In reply to questions like “How shall the Central Government exercise administrative control over Tibet” he himself raised points regarding a definition of his country’s status. His answers were very careful and evasive and constitute a good example of the lack of precision which is characteristic of most exchanges regarding Tibet. After the death of the thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1933 China sent a delegation to offer condolences but, again according to Chinese writers, also proposed that Tibet must obey the central government, which would direct foreign affairs, plan national defence and communications and appoint a High Commissioner.46 The only result was that Tibet allowed the mission to stay on as a liaison office, but Richardson confirms that there was no written communication. Similarly, Britain made no request for an equivalent office, but in 1935 only secured an invitation for the Political Officer in Sikkim to visit Lhasa. He died soon after arrival and a new invitation was obtained for Gould. British presence remained indefinite and temporary until it was converted into a Consulate by India. A Chinese envoy to attend the installation of the new Dalai Lama was allowed to pass through India at the request of Lhasa. Tibet’s greatest assertion of independence occurred during the second World War when it observed a strict neutrality. An approach by Chiang Kai- shek, directed through the British mission, for the construction of a supply road to Assam through the south-east of Tibet was firmly refused; a Chinese survey team was turned back near Rima. Finally the Regent and the Council of Ministers assented on their own authority to the passage of non-military goods on the existing routes. The Tibetans also got a chance to make good their claims to Inner Tibet when, after Chinese provocation, they captured Chamdo, but British persuasion led to their withdrawal.

45 British Foreign and State Papers, Part ii, Vol. 151 (1956). Apparently its terms were not communicated to the Tibetans. 46 Sources quoted in Li, op. cit., pp. 153–155 and 168.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 29

When difficulties arose and China seemed to despatch troops, Tibet decided to fight back if invaded. In 1942 Tibet set up a Bureau of Foreign Affairs under two high officials. The Chinese did not go along with this denial of their suzerainty and their mission in Lhasa became virtually isolated. Expression was given to the actual situation in an informal memorandum from Foreign Secretary Eden to Dr Soong of August 5, 1953, which stated that since 1911 Tibet had enjoyed de facto independence and opposed Chinese attempts to reassert control.47 Chiang made a final attempt to establish closer relations with Lhasa through the mission of Shen Tsung-lien who in Richardson’s opinion was an “able, unostentatious, and broadminded man well supported by a capable staff (who) certainly won a higher degree of Tibetan confidence and regard than any of his predecessors”. Shen invited an official delegation to China, but apparently did not specify that it would be at the time of a meeting of the Chinese National Assembly session in Nanking in May 1946. In any case, mindful of the political testament of the thirteenth Dalai Lama to balance the influence of India and China, the Tibetan government did not accept the invitation but offered to send goodwill-missions to both countries. China announced the Tibetans as the delegation to the Assembly and held them in China for months until the session was postponed indefinitely. The mission attempted without success to make clear its status of observers, but was steadfast in refusing to sign any document or draft resolution. They had previously been warned by Richardson that the Simla agreement excluded Tibetan representation in a Chinese parliament. In India the goodwill mission was received by the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, and met Gandhi and Nehru in anticipation of the forthcoming transfer of power to the new Government of India. They accepted an invitation from the Congress Party to attend the 1947 Asian Relations Conference, which led to a Chinese protest. The organisers were prepared to withdraw a map of Asia, showing Tibet outside the boundaries of China. At about the same time Lhasa was shaken by an attempted coup organized by the ex-regent, the Reting Rimpoche. His principal support came from the the College of Sera Monastery which had been suspected of collusion with the China. The crisis lasted three weeks and took the lives of some 200 monks and 15 Tibetan soldiers. It was seen as continuing proof of Chinese machinations just at a time when the traditional link between Britain and Tibet was about to end. A similar example was the sudden enthronement of the new Panchen Lama by a member of

47 Parshotam Mehra, The NE Frontier, Vol 2, 146–147. Li, p. 398, disputes Tibetan neutrality and quotes “sincere cooperation” with Chunking of some sheepskins and 500.000 dollars.

30 chapter 2 the staff of his predecessor, who was also a member of the Chinese Central Executive Committee, thus bypassing the traditional prerogative of the Dalai lama to select him. When India became independent Tibet considered concluding a new agreement with China but was eventually dissuaded by the opportunity it would provide for renewed Chinese pressure. The Tibetan leaders considered how a mission to Peking could be made to look independent and business-like and decided to address requests to India and China for the “return” of Tibetan territories, including – in the case of India – Sikkim, Bhutan and large parts of Ladakh and Assam. The claims on Indian territory were unbelievably vast and unrealistic and in Lhasa Richardson refused to transmit them to Delhi. He suggested reconsideration but the Tibetan government sent it direct. Their move may have been a naive attempt to test the attitude of independent India towards the border regions; it was also made to balance the request made to China. Delhi replied that it would appreciate an assurance of Tibet’s intention “to continue relations on the existing basis until new agreements are reached on matters either party may wish to take up”.48 The last days of the Kuomintang regime produced similar feelers. For the first time a Chinese protest was directed against the presence of Indian officials in the North East Frontier Agency and in 1948 the suggestion was made that the Trade Regulations of 1908 (which had been cancelled by the Simla Convention) were due for revision. After a long silence India replied that it recognised only the Simla Convention. The last nationalist Ambassador in India, Lo, claims that his final official act was the delivery of a note challenging its validity.49 Much criticism was later directed against India for not taking the opportunity to use the last days of the nationalist Government for defining her relationship with Tibet. In view of what we saw above such moves could only have consisted of recognising complete Tibetan independence as the Kuomintang was neither willing nor capable to conclude new agreements containing substantial concessions of the traditional Chinese position. And India faced with the more pressing problems of integrating the state and the dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir understandably gave a low priority to her northern border. In conclusion, what was signed at Simla? Actually very little and only between Great Britain and Tibet. The map of the India-Tibet frontier reproduced at the cover of Claude Arpi’s book of 2013 was signed by McMahon and Lonchen Shatra but gives New Delhi, 24th March 1914 as the date and

48 Richardson, H.E., op. cit., pp. 174–176; A. de Riencourt, Lost World, pp. 220–221; White Paper ii, p. 39. 49 Li, op. cit., p. 142.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 31 place while the Tibetan agreement to the line was formalised only through an exchange of letters between Lonchen Shatra and McMahon on 24 and 25 March. The frontier was accepted on two conditions: the Tibetan ownership of private estates on the British side of the frontier will not be disturbed; and, if the sacred places of Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa fall within a day’s march of the British side they will be included in Tibetan territory. The McMahon line had departed from the watershed near Tsari for a short distance in order to include in Tibet the course of the pilgrimage route. McMahon wrote that the holy places were probably situated “either on the main watershed which forms the boundary, or to the north of it”. He also agreed with Lonchen Shatra to settle the question of dues collected from Monpas and Lopas for articles sold in Tibet.50 To sum up: the first version of the Simla Convention of 27 April was initialled by all three delegates, although, paradoxically, Ivan Chen wrote his full name!51 The map to illustrate article 9 of the Convention relating to the borders of Tibet and the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet also was initialled by the three, albeit in a somewhat peculiar manner: they wrote in the margin “We hereby initial in token of our acceptance, this 27th day of April 1914” and then wrote what appeared to be their full signature. The writing in the margin clearly stated that the initialling applied to all three. A photostat of this map was published by the Royal Geographical Society with the permission of the Government of India in The Geographical Journal of September 1960, but with an erroneous subtitle: “…initialled by the British Representative and signed by the Chinese and Tibetan Representatives. The two latter did not merely initial the convention but signed it”. Quod non. Much has been made about the lack of publicity given to the Simla Con vention and the map of the McMahon Line. A.G. Noorani discovered that the China Year Book 1921–2 included the ‘Chinese Official Version of Anglo-Chinese Negotiations’ from November 1911 to July 1914 by an official from Waichiapu, China’s Foreign Office.52 It stated the proposals of China, including the engagement not to convert Tibet into a province of China, and to allow direct relations between the British trade Agent and Tibetan authorities as provided in the Convention of 1906. In a spirit of compromise “China has more than once offered to renew negotiations with the British government, but the latter has up to the present declined to do so. China wants nothing more than the re-establishment of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, with recognition of the

50 Lamb, op. cit., pp. 618–619. 51 Lamb, A., op. cit., p. 504, which might be caused by the difficulty of initialing Chinese names. 52 A.G. Noorani, op. cit., Appendix 18.q.

32 chapter 2 autonomy of the territory immediately under the control of the Lhasa government; she is agreeable to the British idea of forming an effective buffer territory in so far as it is consistent with equity an justice; …”

The McMahon Line

While the Simla Conference was in progress the Tibetan delegate received a proposal from McMahon for the boundary between India and Tibet east of Bhutan. He submitted this map to Lhasa and obtained authorisation to agree with it. The alignment was later embodied, on a reduced scale, in the map showing the borders of Tibet and the boundaries between Inner and Outer Tibet, which was initialled by all three representatives.53 Lamb’s study of 1966 reached the conclusion that there was nothing inevitable about the definition of the McMahon line in detail. In his opinion it was essentially an ethnic boundary, based on the division between Tibetan and non-Tibetan populations; only near Tawang in the West and on the Lohit in the East, where it departed from ethnic consideration, did it assume the characteristics of a boundary based on geographical features selected for strategic reasons.54 McMahon’s own words repeatedly showed a preference for watersheds. His memorandum of March 28, 1914 described the line as “…the highest mountain range in this tract of country. To the north of it are people of Tibetan descent; to the south the inhabitants are of Bhutanese or Akan extraction. It is unques- tionably the correct boundary.” This was his general description, which in practice happened to coincide with other geographical and ethnic considerations. Yet, in details the watershed was departed from only for important reasons. The watershed principle might have had merit for the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet, where the British proposed a dividing line based on “watersheds and deserts which will afford to both sides the best and safest natural barrier against periodic acts of aggression”,55 but had less validity for the Himalayan range. There, under the influence of tectonic plates pushing up the mountains, but not quickly enough to stem the rivers flowing south, the major alignment was cut by half a dozen rivers originating in Tibet. Thus the

53 Richardson, H.E., op. cit., pp. 117, 268. 54 Lamb, A., op. cit., pp. 534, 563. 55 Verbal statement communicated by A. Rose to Ivan Chen on March, 1914. I. O. File 464, p. 1215.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 33 main India-Central Asian watershed was further North. In reality the McMahon Line was drawn along the highest peaks and linking them by a number of local watersheds; only in a very few places other considerations were adopted. Near Tawang the watershed dominated, mainly for strategic reasons, over ethnic factors;56 in the Dihang valley the McMahon Line went south of the highest peak to avoid a salient of territory in Tibet where, moreover, the Abor tribe had lost its majority. After consulting a great number of maps Alastair Lamb came to the conclusion “that it cannot be maintained that the McMahon Line had been a carto- graphical feature before the Simla Conference”.57 Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Tibetans agreed to it at Simla, which returns the whole dispute to the question whether the Tibetans at that time had treaty making powers. And who else might have had political authority in the area? Even in the Tawang tract, which had religious links with Tibet, the answer is not clear as it seems to have been governed not by a Jongpen as in Tibet, but by a chain of Deb Rajahs as practiced in Bhutan.58 When India achieved independence the British had not yet pushed their administration all the way up to the McMahon Line. Tawang was still under Tibetan control including the collection of taxes and it was necessary to obtain permission from Tibetan authorities there to travel in the area, but the region south of Se La was administered by the Delhi government. During the World War armed posts had been placed up the Lohit as far as the McMahon Line.59

56 McMahon’s Final Memorandum, p. 536, p. 11 reads: “This secures to us a natural watershed frontier, access to the shortest trade route into Tibet, and control of the monastery of Tawang which has blocked the trade by this route in the past by undue exaction and oppression.” 57 Lamb, op. cit., p. 547, note 28. He found very little information on what actually happened at the Bell–Lonchen Shatra meetings, only a memorandum by McMahon of March 28, later incorporated in his full report fo 535/17, no. 91. 58 Gondker N. Rao, The India-China Border, p. 87, quotes a report of 11 Nov. 1913 by Capt. Nevill: “Towang district is cut off from Tibet proper by snow from December to June. People are very independent Monpas and differ from Tibetans”. Lhasa traders are not permitted beyond the Chona jong jurisdiction. Rao did not find any 19th century Chinese works showing any knowledge of the Tawang area. Their maps showed the entire belt outside Tibet, p. 64. 59 Mills, J.P., “Problems of the Assam-Tibet Frontier” r.c.a.j. xxxvii (1950) 154. He “was allotted the task of making the Convention boundary good” and added (p. 158) that this line “is not in fact the natural boundary, whereas the frontier along the base of the plains is the natural one.” Hopkinson, A.J., “The position of Tibet”, Ibidem, p. 232, “owing to other preoccupations, we forgot, or omitted to vindicate the boundary allotted to us”.

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In 1947 India realised the importance of consolidating her position in the North East Frontier Agency and, giving it priority over Ladakh, quickly pushed her effective administration up to the McMahon Line. In February 1951 Major R. Khating evicted the Tibetan administrators from Tawang and established a sub-divisional headquarters there. Therefore the Indian opinion that the McMahon line “only applied the coping-stone to the actual ethnic, natural and administrative frontiers as established by British-Indian control prior to 1914”60 seems untenable. Britain had acquired certain powers of jurisdiction, but did not establish full administrative control in nefa. The legal aspects of these questions will be further discussed in Chapter 7. During the meeting of the officials in 1960 India quoted the acknowledgement of the Tibetan Prime Minister that Tawang was not a part of Tibet and his specific request that the income which Drepung received in return for the services of its agents might be considered as the income of private individuals.61 Nevertheless, Lhasa appeared to have entertained second thoughts about its concessions in 1937 when it told the British that the McMahon Line had only been agreed in conjunction with a satisfactory Sino-Tibetan boundary.62 To counter this argument the governor of Assam ordered a mission to Tawang to collect a tax, which met, however, with protests from Tibet and the local authorities. But the Government of India was averse to “any action which would commit them to permanent occupation and further expenditure” and decided that the political officer should not press for the withdrawal of the Tibetan officials; it also refused a second expedition. Its excessive preoccupation with Russia terminated soon afterwards with the Soviet revolution. On the 1937 issue, Mr. Hugh Richardson, who was present at the discussions at the time, wrote me that the Tibetans made the point only in the form of a question. When it was discovered that they were talking without having studied their own records, the British, to the apparent satisfaction of the Tibetans, showed them photostats of the map and the exchange of letters of 1914. Richardson believes that reference to the complete records of New Delhi would clear this up, as Reid based it only on a letter of the Governor of Assam to one of his officers. In 1944 the Tibetan Foreign Office, “though not wishing to dispute the validity of the McMahon Line as the limits of the territory…in which India and Tibet respectively are entitled to exercise authority”, requested the British Government to postpone extension of their regular administration up to the McMahon Line. They had, however, not registered any protest against

60 Krishna Rao, K., The Sino-Indian boundary question and international law, p. 403. 61 Reid, Sir R., op. cit., p. 281. 62 Ibidem, p. 295.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 35 the open demarcation of the boundary by the joint Indo-Bhutan Commission of 1936.63 China made much of the collection of taxes by Tibetan monks, which was dismissed by India as payment of religious dues not involving any recognition of sovereignty; spiritual influence should not be confused with temporal authority.64

Indian Nationalism and China

The All India Congress Committee in 1919 accepted Gandhi’s draft for the first formal declaration of independence from British foreign policy. As, according to Congress, most treaties by the Indian Government were designed to per- petuate the exploitation of India, an appeal was directed to other countries to desist from such agreements. In the same year Tilak, one of the most militant among the Congress leaders, wrote to the President of the Peace Conference in Paris that India, being a self-contained country, harboured no designs upon the integrity of other states and had no ambitions outside her own borders. India, he thought, could become one of the leading powers in Asia.65 The need for Indian participation in an Asian federation emerging as a union of oppressed nationalities of Asia and an outgrowth of the Pan-Islamic Movement was asserted by C.R. Das in his presidential address to Congress in 1922. The next year Mohammed Ali commended an Eastern Federation. The Congress of Oppressed Nationalities held in Brussels in February, 1927 would prove to be most significant in Pandit Nehru’s outlook on foreign affairs. He delivered an address on the first day and was elected one of the honorary presidents. One of the resolutions of the Congress, which set up the League against Imperialism, was a joint declaration by the Indian and Chinese delegations referring to the intimate cultural ties existing for the past 3000 years and the need for their revival; “British imperialism, which in the past has kept us apart and done us so much injury, is now the very force that is uniting us in a common endeavour to overthrow it.” Nehru’s action should be seen against the background of the resolution of the All India Congress Committee (a.i.c.c.) in 1925 conveying sympathy to the Chinese people in their struggle for national unity and protesting against the despatch of Indian troops to China. Following the Brussels Conference the

63 Ibidem, pp. 297, 300. 64 See also Lamb, A., op. cit., pp. 148–167; Patterson, G.N., Peking versus Delhi, pp. 173–174. 65 Bimla Prasad, op. cit., pp. 64–65. Congress party machinery consists of the annual session, a.i.c.c. and the Working Committee.

36 chapter 2

Congress met in Madras and sent its warmest greetings to the people of China. The next year Congress took a further step by instructing the Working Committee to correspond with Asian leaders in order to organise the first session of a Pan-Asiatic Federation in India in 1930. This idea did not materialise, however, as by that time India had become engrossed in the campaign for civil disobedience. Brussels, and his subsequent visit to Moscow, inclined Nehru favourably towards communism which “whatever its faults, was at least not hypocritical and not imperialist.”66 Moreover, if Russia succeeded in finding a satisfactory solution for her problems as a large agricultural country with only slight industrialisation, India could benefit from her example. This very motive will return later behind India’s interest in communist China’s “Great Leap Forward.” The Kellogg Pact for non-aggression encountered reluctance in India as nothing in it concerned people under foreign rule. Gandhi admitted the great possibilities arising under the Treaty “the patent insincerity of many signato- ries notwithstanding”, but concluded that the Peace Pact “in substance means a desire to carry on the joint exploitation peacefully.”67 Nehru wrote at length about the defence of the subcontinent after independence.68 While conceding the weakness of India’s military forces for the first few years after independence he thought that no country would tolerate other nations attempting to possess India. And who would threaten her? China would have her hands full with her own difficulties and besides, it was difficult to imagine that India’s relations with her would be anything but friendly. Other countries would be either too remote or engaged elsewhere so that the conclusion presented itself that free India would occupy a favourable position in the world, largely free from the danger of external aggression. Nehru’s first visit to China in August, 1939 took him mainly to Chungking. His plans to visit the front in the north-west, where an Indian ambulance was attached to the Eighth Route Army under communist command, had to be cancelled as the outbreak of war in Europe required his presence at home. His departure from Delhi came shortly after the crisis in the Congress leadership had reached a climax in the dismissal of Subhas Chandra Bose, and Nehru seems to have left in a rather depressed state of mind. The visit – the circumstances of which curiously resemble the voyage he would make fifteen years later – brought him an enthusiastic reception at Chungking and a new assessment of the future of China: “A new China is rising, rooted in her culture, but

66 Nehru, J., Toward Freedom, pp. 125–126. 67 Young India, July 4, 1929. 68 Young India, Sept. 24 and Oct. 1, 1931. Bimla Prasad, op. cit., pp. 104–105.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 37 shedding the lethargy and weakness of ages, strong and united”.69 He mentioned the possibility of an Eastern federation of China, India, Burma, Ceylon, Nepal and Afghanistan, which would not be hostile to the West, but nevertheless stand on its own feet and join with all the others to work for world peace and world federation.70 Nehru was genuinely impressed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek whom he described as the symbol of the unity of China and her desire to free herself, but about the Kuomintang the picture was less clear: “I did gather, however, that it was not a very democratic body though it calls itself democratic.”71 In any case, he thought that China and India would have a powerful effect on the shape of things to come “whatever that shape might be.” “There can be no stable order or effective cooperation in the world if China and India are ignored, and relatively weak though they might be today, they are not so weak as to submit to any such treatment.”72 During the early years of the war Chiang Kai-shek and his wife carried on a correspondence with Nehru, mainly concerning Chinese attempts to influence President Roosevelt to exert pressure upon the British Government for grant- ing early independence to India.73 Chiang paid a visit to India in February, 1942 and declared that there could be no real international peace should freedom be denied to either China or India. One has, however, to keep in mind that the primary aim of the Generalissimo was to induce the nationalist leaders in India to participate in the war effort and to forestall the anti-British “Quit India Movement” which started in August, 1942. This objective proved unattainable, but Gandhi abandoned his approach of non-violence towards a possible Japanese invasion and wrote to Chiang that the appeal to Britain to withdraw from India was not meant in any shape or form to weaken India’s defence against the Japanese or to embarrass China in its struggle.74 The a.i.c.c. Meeting of September, 1945 once again expressed admiration for the Chinese, looking forward to the day that the nation would be united and strong of purpose for peace and freedom. The Committee added that Free India would seek close association with neighbouring countries, particularly the formation of common policies for defence, trade, economic and cultural

69 Brecher, M., Nehru – a political biography, p. 255. 70 Hindi Cheeni, Indian view of China, Ch. i. 71 Nehru, J., China, Spain and the war, pp. 21–53. 72 Atlantic Monthly, April 1940. 73 Levi, W., Free India in Asia, p. 20. 74 Letter dated August 15, 1942, cited in Hindi Cheeni, op. cit., p. 15. See also Nehru, J., A bunch of old letters, Nos. 335, 348 from Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

38 chapter 2 growth with China, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Ceylon and the Middle East.75 A more sober note was struck by Nehru when he declared that “coordination” of Asian countries would be possible and probable, but that federation was perhaps still premature.76 By the time India convened the Asian Relations Conference at New Delhi in 1947, the rivalry with China for leadership in Asia, which so far had been absent, began to show itself. The Chinese had no wish to be tied to an organisation in which India was predominant and their tactics were to keep India’s influence within bounds.77 Their representatives refused to enter the conference hall until the map showing Tibet as a separate state, was removed.78 From the outset the Chinese leaders were apprehensive about the Tibetan delegation, but it scarcely participated in the discussions and never mentioned freedom movements in its country. Differences of opinion within the Indian delegation made it comparatively easy for the Chinese to prevent India from running away with the leadership of the conference. The organisers had expected a strong psychological effect strengthening Asian solidarity and producing a trend towards organisation. It was their aim to secure implicitly, if not explicitly, some recognition of India’s cultural leadership in the new Asia. Despite its impressive array of participating countries, however, the Conference did not result in anything more than a vague expression of solidarity. The differences coming to the fore convinced most delegates that Asian union would probably be impossible or at least much harder to achieve than abstract pronouncements had earlier made them believe. While the first stage in Asia might be one of mistrust on the part of the smaller powers towards the greater, the next stage could well be a struggle for leadership between the three great powers on the mainland, India, China and Russia.

Independent India

Panikkar, who was Indian Ambassador to China during the last years of the Chiang regime and the communist take-over, described the Kuomintang attitude to India as a little patronizing, though generally friendly; “the attitude of

75 Simla Prasad, op. cit., p. 223. 76 Interview with United Press, Jan. 1, 1946. 77 Levi, W., op. cit., pp. 37–38. Mansergh, M., “The Asian Conference.” International Affairs, July 1947, p. 303. 78 Joachim Alva during LokSabha debate on May 15, 1954; Chanakya Sen, Tibet disappears, p. 123. See also Thomson, V., and R. Adloff, “Asian unity: force or facade.”

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 39 an elder brother who was considerably older and well established in the world, prepared to give his advice to a younger brother struggling to make his way. Independence of India was welcome, but of course it was understood that China as the recognised Great Power in the East after the war expected India to know her place.”79 Gradually the goodwill China possessed in India as a result of the war against Japan evaporated; there were fears of Chinese expansionism while China’s position on Kashmir seemed lukewarm and its general orientation too Western to suit Indian tastes.80 As the communist threat to the Kuomintang Government became greater, General Wu Te-chen (who had become Foreign Minister in early 1944) summoned the Asian Ambassadors in Nanking, i.e. the representatives of Burma, Thailand, the Philippines and India, and formally proposed an alliance to fight communism everywhere. Ambassador Panikkar mentioned this plan – which met with immediate opposition from India and Burma – as an example of the unreal atmosphere in Nanking.81 New Delhi decided to recognise the communist Government of China after Chiang Kai-shek had moved to Formosa, which at that time was technically still part of Japan as the peace treaty had not yet been signed. After consultations with the United Kingdom formal recognition was extended during the last days of 1949, just after Burma, which had requested to be the first state outside the Soviet bloc to recognise the New China.82 Nehru told the Lok Sabha that it was not a question of approving or disapproving the change, but of recognising a major event in history and dealing with it. He had no doubt that the communist regime was firmly established and that there was no force likely to supplant it.83 Some Indian newspapers regretted the fall of Chiang Kai-shek and reminded their readers of the support he had given to the Indian freedom movement, but on the whole the initial reaction to the communist rise to power was neither alarmist nor naively optimistic. There was a willingness to try to understand the new regime and to give it a chance to develop its domestic and international policies instead of an outright rejection as another manifestation of totalitarianism.84 With an undertone of anxiety, the argument was advanced that China needed peace even more than India for its reconstruction and

79 Panikkar, K.M., In Two Chinas, p. 26. 80 Levi, W., op. cit., p. 86. 81 Panikkar, K.M., op. cit., p. 44. 82 Ibidem, p. 68. 83 Lok Sabha Debates, March 17, 1950. Vol. 3, col. 1699. 84 Hindi Cheeni, op. cit., pp. 36–38.

40 chapter 2 development and that, moreover, the maintenance of friendship with China was essential, no matter what Government was in power.85 Chinese press opinions, however, were far from favourable towards Nehru. Mao’s dictum that neutrality was a camouflage and that a third road did not exist was conducive to criticism of India in terms of Marxist dialectics. World Culture86 accused the Indian Prime Minister under the headline “India and Anglo-American Imperialism” of aiding imperialist designs for annexation of Tibet: “Into his slavish and bourgeois reactionary character has now been instilled the beastly ambition of aggression.”87 Nehru’s initiative in calling an Asian conference on the Indonesian problem was described as a “guise for undertaking a preliminary discussion of a South East Asian alliance.” Here we find an early example of Communist Chinese suspicions regarding the role India could play as a leader of Asian countries; similar instances will be traced in the developments around the Bandung Conference and in the Chinese efforts to isolate India from Burma and Nepal in the border dispute. Even after India’s recognition of the communist regime adverse press comments continued; the Shanghai Observer88 wrote “…it is a matter of Nehru weighing his desire for u.s. assistance against his need to assume the hypocritical role of a progressive to deceive the Indian people”. These statements have been used to demonstrate that China’s attitude has all along been hostile towards India. Such generalisations should be avoided, although they serve as a useful counterweight to the platitudes concerning the “2000 years of friendship” which the two countries are said to have enjoyed, but which, in fact, have no other meaning than stating that armed conflict has been avoided during that period; these peaceful relations were largely due to the geographical barriers between the two countries.

Communism in India

In those days and until 1951 communist opinion in general was unfavourable to the Congress Government. Indian independence almost coincided with Zhdanov’s “two camp” doctrine which came close to Mao’s thinking in its division of the world into imperialists and anti-fascists. For Asia it implied that those not prepared to declare for communism were enemies of the popular

85 Levi, W., op. cit., p. 87. 86 Shanghai, Sept. 16, 1949. 87 Jain, Girilal, Panchsheela and after, p. 8. 88 April 11, 1950.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 41 cause. Gandhi, who had always been firm in his rejection of communism, was treated as a reactionary or a spent force. Despite his acknowledged admiration for some communist achievements, Nehru, after 1947, was described as a tool in the hands of British imperialism. The Communist Party of India showed an amazing number of miscal culations and analyses which ran counter to the main stream of nationalistic thought. When the Congress was engaged in the Quit India Movement the communists decided to cooperate with the British after the Soviet Union had joined the war. Their ideas concerning the shape of independent India included a Balkanisation of the subcontinent in many small states, while the tide surged in the direction of unity. Arguing by analogy the c.p.i, apparently wanted to apply Stalin’s doctrine of nationalities to the Indian situation, forgetting that the Russian case of certain nationalities traditionally being dominated by others would not apply. Panikkar regarded this communist tendency to use analogy as the main reason for their lack of objective evaluation.89 This certainly applied to the mistaken parallel between the Kuomintang and the Congress which was drawn by those who supported Mao’s strategy and, for a while, seemed to be a generally accepted dogma. Like the Kuomintang the vast Congress party was expected to come under the control of vested interests, to become corrupt and inefficient so that the progressive section would turn away. This comparison overlooked, however, that the kmt had almost always been dominated by the military, lacked a democratic basis and created a conservative image with neo-Confucian philosophy. Although Indian communist policy relied mainly on Moscow and the extent of Chinese influence was often exaggerated, the c.p.i, more than other parties showed the constant pulls from various factions and personalities. Frequent changes in Russian directives issued exclusively for reasons uncon- nected with India brought embarrassment to the leaders of the moment and led to their (often temporary) eclipse. The left wing considered bourgeois nationalism as the main enemy of the class struggle and concentrated on anti-capitalism. The right was basically anti-imperialist and was prepared to cooperate with the progressive elements of the bourgeoisie against imperialism, feudalism and colonialism. This progressive sector was distinguished from the imperialist group, or in party jargon, the national bourgeoisie should be supported against the collaborating bourgeoisie. As the Congress party obviously included bourgeois nationalists, the question of cooperation with Congress became a crucial point in the controversy between the different wings of the c.p.i. The left generally favoured a combative course with

89 Panikkar, K.M., The foundations of New India, p. 201.

42 chapter 2 provocation and violence if necessary, but the right was not averse to compro- mises. In the years immediately following 1947 both sides were more prone to use violence than later, when the Congress Government had survived the initial difficulties of independence. A centre group followed a rather orthodox but moderate Marxism. The flexibility of these distinctions was illustrated by the ultimate swing of the right behind the Chinese line in the ideological dispute with the Soviet Union. In 1948 B.T. Ranadive, an advocate of terrorism and strike action in urban areas, became General Secretary of the c.p.i. At that time his main opponent was Rajeshwar Rao who wanted to base a Maoist strategy on rural peasant rebellions focussing on imperialism and feudalism as the central enemies; Rao’s native Andhra with its caste-ridden politics and its poor agricultural districts naturally predisposed him towards this course. Shortly after Ranadive had ridiculed the ideas of Mao Tse-tung as reactionary, counter-revolutionary and horrifying, the Cominform abruptly changed its views about the Chinese example and advised the c.p.i. “to strengthen the alliance of the working class with all the peasantry, to fight for the introduction of urgently needed agrarian reform.”90 This rebuke led to Ranadive’s downfall and Rao succeeded him as General Secretary in June, 1950. Although the Cominform directive did not specify that violence should be used, Rao engaged the party in a guerilla type opposition in the Telengana district of Andhra, which led to a hardening of Congress policy with regard to internal communism. The campaign ended in failure, largely because of sudden Russian support for Nehru on the eve of elections. In 1951 the c.p.i. rejected both theses of urban insurrection and peasant guerrilla, but retained the emphasis on a united front. The new party programme called for a non-violent struggle towards a government of people’s democracy and a coalition of all anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces; this policy was “a path which we do not and cannot name as either Russian or Chinese.” With Ajoy Ghosh the party got a middle of the road figure as General Secretary. In a period in which communist attitudes, both Indian and international, towards Nehru’s Government were still highly critical, these were bound to find expression in the Chinese press.91 This was even more natural as Chinese

90 “For lasting peace, for a people’s democracy”, Bucharest, Jan. 27, 1950. 91 Replying to a message of greetings from the c.p.i. Mao cabled on Oct. 19,1949. “I firmly believe that relying on the brave Communist Party of India and the unity and struggle of all Indian patriots, India will certainly not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators. Like free China, a free India will one day emerge in the Socialist

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 43 foreign policy between 1949 and 1952 was first characterised by a nationalistic militancy determined to eliminate foreign influence and unify the country and then, with the Korean crisis, entered another wartime period with an all-out defence of what China considered to be its threatened rights and interests. No one except Chou En-lai and some officials around him, knew much about India; there were only vague ideas about India’s political position or historical development, mixed with a certain romantic interest in that country.92 The Indian Ambassador gave the following appreciation of the relations between his country and China:93

I knew, like everyone else, that with a communist China cordial and intimate relations were out of the question, but I was fairly optimistic about working out an area of co-operation by eliminating causes of misunder- standing, rivalry, etc. The only area where our interests overlapped was in Tibet, and knowing the importance that every Chinese Government, including the Kuomintang, had attached to exclusive Chinese authority over that area I had, even before I started for Peking, come to the conclusion that the British policy (which we were supposed to have inherited) of looking upon Tibet as an area in which we had special political interest could not be maintained. The Prime Minister had also in general agreed with this view.

China Occupies Tibet

On 1st January, 1950, two days after recognition by India, Peking announced that the liberation of Tibet was one of the basic goals of the People’s Liberation Army. The Lhasa Government, which up to then had enjoyed virtual independence and in July, 1949 had already requested the nationalist Chinese mission and traders to leave Tibet, subsequently sent delegations to India, Nepal, the United Kingdom and the United States to appeal for support; the communist Chinese Government denounced them as illegal and they were unable to obtain access to officials in the countries visited.94

and People’s Democratic family.” Mukherjee, A.N., Sino-lndian relations and the communists, p. 1. 92 Panikkar, K. M, In Two Chinas, p. 100. 93 Ibidem, p. 102. 94 Peer, Mark C., “Tibet in Sino Indian Relations”, India Quarterly, ix (1953) 367–381.

44 chapter 2

In the meantime, India had put its relationship with the countries along its northern border on a new basis: in June, 1949, Sikkim was taken over as a protectorate, August brought a treaty in which Bhutan agreed to be guided by India in its foreign affairs, and the King of Nepal received hospitality and support when he fled from his country during the revolt against the feudal Rana regime in November. A seven man Tibetan mission came to India in April, 1950 with the purpose of meeting the Chinese Government somewhere in neutral territory; it wanted to proceed to Hongkong but could not do so, as the British Government, which had already recognised the communist government and did not want to accentuate the delicate position of the colony, refused visas. Peking Radio, in an appeal to the Tibetan Government on May 22 invited plenipotentiaries to conduct peace talks in Peking in order to save their people from unnecessary loss.95 A meeting with the newly arrived Chinese Ambassador in Delhi proved fruitless, and before the mission could follow up the Indian suggestion to go directly to Peking the invasion of Tibet had started. India made an unfruitful attempt to forestall the action by a note to Peking expressing the opinion that an incautious move, “even in a matter which is within its own sphere”, would be used by those unfriendly to China to prejudice her case in the u.n. and generally before neutral opinion. This approach has been criticised for extending an untimely recognition to Chinese claims over Tibet, thereby weakening the Indian position in the diplomatic correspondence which was to follow.96 It was consistent, however, with the decision to forego political interests in Tibet, but to consolidate the Indian position in the border states. Perhaps the Indian leaders had been reminded of the tremendous impression created by the Soviet “Karakhan manifesto” of 1919 which announced the voluntary renunciation of all Czarist rights and concessions in China. The first memorandum gives the impression that India had already conveyed to Peking, through diplomatic channels, that it would not insist on maintaining the rights Britain enjoyed in Tibet; the Indian Embassy stated that the Chinese Government were “fully aware of the views of the Govern ment of India on the adjustment of Sino-Tibetan relations.”97 The sudden reduction of Tibetan autonomy must nevertheless have come as a most unpleasant surprise.

95 Sen, C., op. cit., p. 18. 96 Jain, Girilal, op. cit., p. 45. 97 Memorandum of Oct. 21, 1950. Sen, C., op. cit., pp. 69–70.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 45

The Chinese military campaign against Tibet started on 24th October, 1950 and led to a sharp exchange of notes between Delhi and Peking. The Indian note of 26th October reminded the Chinese Government of their assurances to solve the problem by peaceful means and stated that the invasion could not but be regarded as deplorable and not in the interest of peace.98 The Indian Government deeply regretted that “in spite of friendly disinterested advice repeatedly tendered” China had decided “to seek solution of the problem of their relations with Tibet by force instead of by the slower and more enduring method of peaceful approach.” The note assured that no foreign influences were responsible for the delay in the Tibetan mission’s departure for Peking. After Tibet had requested Indian mediation and diplomatic aid on 28th October, the Peking Government sent a reply to New Delhi on 30th October stating that Tibet was a domestic problem of China and that no foreign interference would be tolerated. It maintained that the delay in the voyage of the Tibetans was due to outside instigation, while India’s viewpoint must have been “affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet.” The next day a further protest was lodged by India repudiat- ing the Chinese charges and making it clear that India had no political or territorial ambitions, but only a natural interest in a peaceful solution of problems concerning her neighbours, “adjusting legitimate Tibetan claims to autonomy within the framework of Chinese suzerainty”; use of force “could not possibly be reconciled with a peaceful settlement.” On 16th November China replied that she had “sovereign rights in Tibet” and charged India with obstructing them.99 The Lhasa Government had requested India to sponsor its case before the United Nations, but received the reply that the appeal should be sent direct to the u.n. Eventually it was El Salvador which filed the request for a debate and submitted a draft-resolution to establish a committee entrusted with a study of appropriate measures that could be taken by the General Assembly against

98 Text of the notes in The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law by the International Commission of Jurists, pp. 132–138. Also Karunakaran, K.P., India in World Affairs, p.76. 99 Patel, S.R., claims in his Foreign Policy of India, p. 269, that Panikkar made a deliberate mistake in decoding and used the word sovereignty instead of suzerainty to oblige the Chinese. Sen gives the more plausible explanation that Chinese translations of the English word suzerainty constantly used the equivalent of sovereignty, op. cit, pp. 74–77. Criticism of Panikkar was first voiced by The Statesman, New Delhi, Oct. 29, 1950.

46 chapter 2 this “act of unprovoked aggression.”100 A cablegram from the Tibetan delegation, then residing at Kalimpong, was circulated which blamed British persuasion for the signing of a treaty by Tibet “which superimposed on it the nominal (non-interfering) suzerainty of China” though that country was strictly forbid- den to meddle in the internal affairs of Tibet; it argued that while the 1914 Treaty was still guiding Indo-Tibetan relations, China had renounced the benefits otherwise accruing to it by not being a party to the treaty. “Tibet’s status thereby reassumed de jure status.” The General Committee101 considered the question on 24th November, 1950. The British representative could not participate in a general discussion on the question of Tibet, as the legal position of the country was not very clear. He thought it wise to wait until the Committee had a better idea of the possibilities of a peaceful settlement. The Indian delegate, the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, declared that he had no desire to express an opinion on the difficulties which had arisen between China and Tibet but would point out that the Peking Government had not abandoned its intention to settle those difficulties by peaceful means; it would seem that the Chinese forces had ceased to advance after the fall of Chamdo and he was certain that a peaceful settlement “could safeguard the autonomy which Tibet had enjoyed for several decades while maintaining its historical association with China.” With Indian, Australian and Russian support for the British proposal it was unanimously decided to adjourn consideration sine die. The delegate from Nationalist China remarked that Sino-Tibetan relations had not been cordial for many years but that for seven centuries all Chinese regarded Tibet as part of China. He claimed that Tibet participated in the drafting of the Chinese constitution in 1946 and the election of a President in 1947. After the u.n. debate the Chinese advance was not halted but became somewhat freakish. The army fanned out in various directions and established its control without major clashes. The Dalai Lama left Lhasa for the Chumbi valley near Sikkim one month after assuming full powers and negotiations with the Chinese were carried out by Ngabo the captured governor of Chamdo. On May 23, 1951 Peking announced the signing of the Seventeen Point agreement with Tibet, which gave the Central People’s Government of China the centralised handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet102 while the autonomy and political system of Tibet would not be altered. Except

100 u.n. Doc., A 1534 and A 1549. 101 u.n. General Assembly, 5th session, General Committee, 73rd meeting. 102 Point 14, see The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law, pp. 139–142. Mehra, Parushotam, “India, China and Tibet,” India Quarterly, xii (1956) No. 1, pp. 3–22.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 47 for a vague assurance to neighbouring countries that fair commercial and trading relations would be established and developed the agreement did not refer to India. Chinese sensitivity concerning Western intentions in Tibet was understandable, particularly at the time of the Korean war. There are, however, no indications of Western plans to intervene. The American mission to Lhasa under Lt. Col. Tolstoy stayed there from September, 1942 until March, 1943 and was mainly intended to explore a new supply route, although the opportunity to establish the first semi-official contacts may have been welcome. Towards the end of 1949 the radio station at Lhasa broadcast statements in English to deny that the Panchen Lama had been properly recognised and to emphasize the actual independence of Tibet, but the Western wireless operators served in a strictly private capacity. In the same year the first Indian Political officer in Sikkim visited Lhasa and received a request for arms and ammunition. India sent a favourable reply but the Tibetans did not want to commit themselves to a thorough training programme.103 The Dayal Mission of 1949 inspired The Times to report closer liaisons between India and the Dalai Lama’s Government which some sources interpreted as a gratifying indication that an important bulwark against the spread of communism was being created. The New York Times favoured recognition of Tibet as a separate country which would make it possible for the United States to make available some of its funds to help foreign countries arm themselves against communism. The most realistic assessment appeared in The Economist, which advocated an Indian lead in support of Tibetan independence, to be followed up by British and u.s. recognition, but admitted that, if India preferred to abandon Tibet to its fate, the Western powers were in no position to object to a Chinese re- conquest of Tibet.104 Initiating a debate on foreign affairs in the Lok Sabha, Prime Minister Nehru said that he had been shocked by the news of the Chinese advance into Tibet, as India had always understood that a peaceful solution would be found. Since Tibet could be no threat to China there was another way than violence. “It is said that other countries might intrigue in Tibet. I cannot say much about it, because I do not know. It is certain, however, that there was no immediate threat.” Similarly he pointed to an inconsistency in Chinese statements which on the one hand said that they were prepared for a peaceful solution, but

103 Richardson, H.E., op. cit., p. 178. 104 The Times, July 29, 1949; The Economist, Dec. 10, 1949.

48 chapter 2 talked persistently of liberation on the other. “From whom they were going to liberate Tibet is, however, not quite clear”.105 Parliamentary reactions showed that anxiety was fairly widespread. Many writers have emphasized the consensus underlying Indian foreign policy, which is undoubtedly correct as far as the general principle of non-alignment is concerned. Although Nehru’s conduct of foreign affairs and his influence on Congress parliamentarians continued to command strong support, dissenting voices could be heard on many occasions. The resignation from the Cabinet of Dr. Ambedkar, the untouchable leader who took an important part in the framing of the Indian constitution, was caused by his attack on the policy of friendship with China, on the grounds that it alienated the u.s.’ Disagreement with the official view on Kashmir was the other motive for his departure.106 One of the speakers in the debate in 1950 was another ex-member of the Cabinet, Dr. S.P. Mukherjee, later to die in detention in Kashmir, who pointed to incorrect Chinese maps of the boundary with India, and stated that Indian security had been affected by China’s action. Prof. N.G. Ranga, at one time a secretary of the Congress Party but a founder of the Swantantra Party in 1959, criticised the repeated professions of friendship, not only to the Chinese people and Government, but also to China’s claims to sovereignty over Tibet. Acharya Kripalani, leader of the Praja Socialist Party, felt that Indian advocacy of China for u.n. membership was premature. M.R. Masani, a Congress member who later sat as an independent and a leading authority on Com munism in India, mentioned Mao’s message to Ranadive of good wishes for the liberation of India and his hope that India would go the Chinese way. He stated that thereby China had destroyed “any illusions about friendship, about cordiality and about comradeship in Asia” and cut Asia in two parts, communist and non-communist Asia. M.A. Ayyangar of the Congress Party, who later became Speaker of the Lok Sabha and Governor of Bihar, thought that India as far as her defences were concerned, ought not to bite, but should at least hiss sometimes. Another Congress member blamed the Korean affair for China’s jittery state of mind, and the appointed Anglo-Indian representative, Frank Anthony, said that China had not been told sufficiently that “this cynical and unprovoked attack on Tibet has outraged the conscience of every self-respecting Indian.”

105 Speeches on December 6 and 7, 1950. Nehru’s speeches 1949–53, p. 174. Sen, C., op. cit., pp. 109–119. 106 Brecher, M., op. cit., p. 454.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 49

In his winding-up speech Nehru replied that India must try to understand China “and try as far as we can to divert them into right channels and prevent them from going into wrong ones.” He disagreed with members who seemed to think that he should issue an ultimatum to China, but he saw no difficulty in saying to her that, whether she had suzerainty or sovereignty over Tibet, according to any principles the last voice in regard to Tibet should surely be the voice of the people of Tibet and of nobody else. Earlier in his speech he emphasized that he had used the word suzerainty, not sovereignty: “There is a slight difference though not much.” Restating his views in a b.b.c. broadcast Nehru defended his endeavour to maintain friendly relations with China “this great neighbour of ours, for the whole of Asia depends on these relations.” China, in her new-found strength, had acted sometimes in a manner which he deeply regretted, but should be viewed against the background of the long period of struggle and frustration and the insolent treatment it – and other Asian countries – had received from imperialist powers. It was no longer safe to ignore the feelings of hundreds of millions of people. India, with two thousand years of friendship with China behind her, had some “differences of opinion and even small conflicts,” but was aided by that long past in understanding China.107

The Search for a New Relationship

The communist occupation of Tibet so soon after the defeat of the nationalist regime, followed by an uncompromising denial of Indian interests in the area, underlined the great importance Peking attached to the realisation of an ancient pretension. Although New Delhi had reaffirmed the Simla Convention as governing its relations with Tibet only two years earlier, it gave up serious efforts to vindicate the legal origins of its claims in the face of Chinese determination. After 1950 India made no attempt to define her attitude towards the former connection with Tibet and suffered from this omission during the border dispute. The feeling of disappointment was widespread and undoubtedly marred, even if temporarily, the cordiality of relations between the two countries. When it became clear, however, that the Chinese did not interfere with Indian interests in Tibet and that there was no infringement of the frontiers, these reactions faded out surprisingly quickly. The same development appeared to take place in China as it gradually appreciated India’s standpoint in the Korean conflict.

107 “The Temper of Peace,” Jan. 12, 1951. Nehru’s speeches 1949–1953, p. 153 ff.

50 chapter 2

The impression gained ground that China had at last been convinced of the independent character of India’s foreign policy.108 Other aspects of the Korean problem, however, hardly seemed to warrant this optimism. Mrs. Pandit, India’s representative in the General Assembly had to defend her country against the “outrageous lie” of the communist countries that India was a “tool of the Anglo- American bloc” in proposing the compromise resolution on the repatriation of prisoners of war.109 Peking added that Krishna Menon’s claim to speak on behalf of the Asian countries “only has the support of the u.s. dominated bloc.”110 When China requested New Delhi to withdraw the military guards from the trading posts in Gyantse and Yatung the Indian Government refused, but intimated its desire to discuss the regularisation of relations with regard to Tibet. The immediate answer was that China would not keep any unequal treaties,111 a reaction which Nehru explained as a symptom of the Chinese fear complex of u.s. actions to bring Tibet in the Western camp. Panikkar again brought the matter up during his farewell visit to Chou En-lai and was told that China recognised the legitimacy of the Indian trade and cultural interests in Tibet. The Chinese foreign minister suggested that the political agency at Lhasa should be transformed into a Consulate-General in exchange for a similar Chinese office at Bombay; this was acceptable to India. The trade agencies would be brought within the framework of normal consular relations, details of which would be taken up when the circumstances became ripe. Mr. Panikkar left Peking with the exclamation that there remained no outstanding issues between India and China.112 A press communique unob- trusively announced the change in the status of the mission, which, it said, resulted from the fact that the foreign relations of Tibet were now conducted by the People’s Republic of China. Yet, it marked the change-over from the 1950 stand of “natural interest” in Tibet to the concession that Tibet had no right to deal directly with its neighbours.113 After having been fully engaged in securing a cease-fire in Korea, India took up the larger question of Sino-Indian relations. Preparations were made by only publishing official maps showing an unambiguous delimited boundary. Old maps were burned. In 1953 it was decided to reject the

108 Karunakaran, K.P., op. cit., p. 80. 109 g.a.o.r., 7th Session, p. 301. 110 Dec. 14, 1952. Ross and Bedi, The Diplomacy of India, p. 134. 111 Levi, W., op. cit., p. 99; The Hindu, Madras, Dec. 8 and 28, 1950. 112 Panikkar, K.M., op. cit., p. 175. 113 Press note of September 15, 1952. See Mehra, P.L., op. cit., p. 15.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 51

Macartney-Macdonald alternative boundary in Aksai Chin and to regard the whole of that area as properly Indian.114 Negotiations started in Peking on 31 December, 1953 and a treaty was signed on 24 April, 1954, just before the Prime Ministers of the Colombo Powers ended their meeting, a coincidence which gave rise to speculation that China wanted to give evidence of its reasonableness.115 India agreed to the name “Tibet region of China”, thereby recognising it for the first time as an integral part of the People’s Republic. She also handed over her post and telegraph installations in Tibet free of charge and the rest-houses against payment. The Chinese would be entitled to open trade agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong in return for Indian agencies at Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok. The Consulate at Kashgar in Sinkiang remained closed. On the other hand the Chinese wish to obtain a consulate in Almora or Simla in north-western India was not fulfilled, which seems to have been a reason for the long duration of the negotiations.116 The treaty provisions dealt mainly with facilities for trade routes and markets which had been in existence for many years, yet their wording referred to their establishment as if they were something completely new. The notes dealing with the withdrawal of Indian escorts and the transfer of properties again contained no reference to their origin or on what treaty they were based. Among the gains for India was the designation of 13 customary marts for Indian traders against only 3 in the past. Upgrading the seasonal agency at Gartok to a permanent one would never happen. Nehru started his defence of the agreement in the Lok Sabha by saying that it dealt with a large number of problems, each one of them perhaps not very important in itself, but important for Indian trade, pilgrim traffic, trading posts and communications. It had taken so long, not because of any major difficulty but because so many small points had to be discussed in detail. Regarding Tibet the agreement recognised the existing situation there, as done already a few years ago. The real importance of the document was its wider implications, emanating from the preamble containing the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.117 At the same time Nehru gave some firm directives in an internal memorandum. New maps should be printed of the Northern and North-Eastern frontier

114 Steven A. Hoffman, India and the China Crisis, quoted by A.G.Noorani, p. 224. 115 Eastern Economist, New Delhi, May 7, 1954, p. 741. 116 Hindustan Times, New Delhi, May 4, 1954. 117 Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. v., No. 70, May 15, 1954, col. 7495 ff. Nehru said that “he was not aware of Chinese sovereignty, or if you like suzerainty”, being challenged by any outside country during hundreds of years. Moraes, F., p. 125.

52 chapter 2 without reference to any ‘line’. “Both flowing from our policy and as a consequence of our Agreement with Chine, this frontier should be considered a firm and definite one which is not open to discussion with anybody. There may be very minor points of discussion. Even these should not be raised by us. It is necessary that the system of check-posts should be spread along this entire frontier. More especially, we should have check-posts in such places as might be considered disputed areas.”118

118 Quoted by A.G. Noorani from 18 para. memorandum, op. cit., p. 225.

chapter 3 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

The Sino-Indian treaty of 1954 stated in its preamble that the two governments, being desirous of promoting trade and cultural intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India, and of facilitating pilgrimage and travel by the peoples of China and India based their agreement on the following principles:

1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. 2. Mutual non-aggression. 3. Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. 4. Equality and mutual benefit. 5. Peaceful co-existence.

Nehru told the Lok Sabha that it was a matter of importance to India that the two countries, which had almost 1800 miles of common frontier, should live on terms of peace and friendliness and should agree “in fact, though it is not formally stated as such, but practically speaking, not to commit aggression on each other.” His words lacked precision, since the inclusion of “mutual non-aggression” as the second principle seemed quite sufficient to amount to a formal renunciation of aggression. Perhaps he realised that principles appended to an agreement on trade were not the same as an express provision in a treaty of non- aggression or similar scope. The agreement, Nehru continued, to a very large extent would ensure peace in a certain area and it was his earnest wish that this area of peace should be spread over the rest of Asia. Collective security, good as it was and essential to aim at, became rather a preparation for collective war. A healthier approach would be that of collective peace.1 Replying to the debate Nehru added that if these basic principles were accepted by every country and if every country were left to progress as it liked and no one else interfered, a climate of peace would gradually be established. Continuing in Hindi the Prime Minister said that India’s foreign policy was not born out of a sharp intel- lect, but was the direct result of the old ways and the old mind that had moulded policy during the freedom movement. It could be defined as an attitude of friendship for all nations while maintaining independence of action.2

1 Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. v, No. 70, col. 7496 ff. 2 As reported in The Hindu, May 19, 1954.

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On other occasions, too, Nehru repeatedly stressed that peaceful coexistence was not a new idea for Indians, but part of their way of life and their thought and culture.3 To underline this point he often mentioned Emperor Ashoka who after many bloody campaigns denounced war and practised tolerance for all religions during the third century. He thought it difficult to imagine how anyone could oppose the Five Principles or dislike them “unless one thinks that behind them is hidden some evil motive.”4 During the debate Kripalani repeated his view that communist China had committed an act of aggression on Tibet. The ancient right of suzerainty was antiquated and theoretical and, in his opinion, a nation which abolished a buffer state could be considered to have aggressive designs on its neighbours. Joachim Alva said that India could not afford to have a quarrel with China and Brajeshwar Prasad, a lonely advocate of a united front with the Soviet Union and China in the Congress ranks, congratulated Nehru on the preamble, which he regarded as a non-aggression pact in embryo; “A mutual defence pact with China and Russia is the urgent need of the hour.” The international situation was debated further on September 29 and 30. The prominent Praja Socialist Asoka Mehta remarked that the Five Principles were undoubtedly welcome, but lost much of their motive power when it was realised that Tibet was described in the agreement as the Tibet region of China, thus defining sovereignty over Tibet as resting with China. Kripalani put it more bluntly: “We have failed in arresting the march of communist China to our borders.” Similar criticism came from the rightwing Hindu Mahasabha, whose leader N. C. Chatterjee referred to the betrayal of Tibet and the surrender to the aggression of China. From the Congress benches came the defence that the joining of Tibet with China was a historical fact, which had to be realised without a voice of protest if India wanted to be good neighbours with China.5 Press comment was generally optimistic and tended to gloss over possible loopholes in the agreement. Satisfaction was expressed over the guarantees for Indian pilgrims to Tibet – 5000 in 1953 – and over the fact that Tibet, unlike Sinkiang, had not been isolated completely. Disappointment was reported from Ladakhi traders who regretted that the route Leh-Gartok had not been included in the approved schedule. The Amrita Bazar Patrika was farsighted with its observation that it would have preferred a clear designation of the McMahon line as the border of north-eastern India.

3 Speech at Calcutta, Nov. 30, 1955. Panchsheel, Publications Division, New Delhi, p. 13. 4 Speech at banquet for the Indonesian Premier, Sept. 23, 1954. 5 Sen, Chanakya, Tibet Disappears, p. 127–128.

Five Principles Of Peaceful Coexistence 55

During the visit of Chou En-lai to New Delhi the word “mutual” was omitted in the second and third principles as restated in the official communiqué.6 This text, which also advocated application of the Five Principles to the conflict in Indo-China, continued: “If these principles are applied not only between various countries but also in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and security and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would give way to feeling of confidence.” Having been confirmed in a series of meetings of Asian statesmen and passed in a modified form by the Bandung Conference the Five Principles underwent another change in Moscow in June 1955. The Bulganin-Nehru communique amended the third principle to read: “Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs for any reason of economic, political or ideological character”.7 In this form it was incorporated in the treaty between China and Nepal signed on August 1, 1955. The origin of the term Panchsheel can be traced to Pandit Nehru, who said that he had heard the “happy phrase” in Indonesia, but that it had its roots deep in Indian moral tradition.8 Literally it means Five foundations or Five rules of conduct, “sheel” being the expression used for the rules preached by the Buddha. The implied reference to Buddhist ethics, however, is farfetched, as originally these had nothing to do with political ideology. Emperor Ashoka attempted in vain to transfer Buddhist rules of conduct from the sphere of individual morality to international relations and his empire subsequently disintegrated. Buddhism, moreover, has long ceased to be a frame of reference for individual conduct, both in India and in China, which is certainly true for Nehru and Chou En-lai.9 Panchsheel is, therefore, better regarded as a catch-word, suggestive of ancient concepts but without any real links with the past other than a spirit which can be found in the heritage of all known religions.

6 June 20, 1954. 7 Panchsheel, op. cit., p. 40. 8 The Hindu, Madras, April 16, 1955. Fisher and Bondurant, Indian views of Sino-Indian relations, p. 17. The Indonesian Pantjasila was less concerned with international relations and consisted of belief in God, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy and social justice, and helped alleviate Muslim extremism. The Buddhist “sheels” imposed the duty to avoid destruction of life, theft, unchastity, lying and the use of intoxicating liquor. In this study we use the term Panchsheel to denote the Indian principles to avoid confusion with the Indonesian or Buddhist concepts. 9 See Bozemann, Adda B., “India’s foreign policy today: reflections upon its sources,” World Politics, Vol. x, No. 2, p. 265–266.

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As the material contents of the Five Principles can be easily traced in the Charter of the United Nations,10 the need for their reaffirmation may be questioned. Indian spokesmen replied to such reasoning that reaffirmation of these primordial principles could never be superfluous, and – more importantly – that not all Asian countries were members of the world organisation. If they accepted Panchsheel it would both reinforce the u.n. and provide them with the basic norms of international behaviour.11 Hammarskjoeld’s statement that Panchsheel was helpful to the u.n. by reaffirming its obligations and aims was used in support of this argument.12 Such rationalisation does not, however, seem to be completely accurate. Many Indians are unable or unwilling to per- ceive the parallel between what they consider a new statement of policy and the old Western political and legal tradition. The desire for a fully independent position blurred the acknowledgement of Western values which had been quite frank during the colonial period. It will be necessary to define in greater detail where the individual principles originated. On the Chinese side they are credited to the triumvirate Nehru, Chou and U Nu, but this can only be accepted in the general sense that the three statesmen in separate communiqués expressed their agreement at an early stage. Nehru denied the fatherhood of any individual; the Sino-Indian treaty was the result of long correspondence between the two governments and the Chinese Prime Minister was, in his opinion, not personally concerned though undoubtedly consulted, like he himself had been in India.13 The phrases mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit stem, although in somewhat different order, from communist terminology. The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference drafted its “Common Programme” in September 1949, which contained the preamble that the central government was authorised to establish diplomatic relations with other foreign governments on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.14

10 The first principle in Art. 2, par. 1 and par. 4; the second in Art. 2, par. 4 and Art. 1, par. 1; the third in Art. 2, par. 7; the fourth in Art. 2, par. 1 and peaceful coexistence in Art. 1, par. 1 and par. 3. 11 Rajan, M.S., “Indian Foreign Policy in action”, India Quarterly, xvi (1960) 203–236. 12 The Hindu, April 15, 1956. 13 Fifield, R.H., “The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” a.j.i.l., 52 (1958) 504–510. 14 Karunakaran, K.P., India in World Affairs, p. 67–68. The words “mutual benefit” occurred in Patel’s Presidential address to the 45th session of the Congress Party: independence did not exclude the possibility of equal partnership for mutual benefit, dissolvable at the will of either party. Bimla Prasad, op. cit., p. 100.

Five Principles Of Peaceful Coexistence 57

The Indian note of 31 October 1950 on the Tibet issue said: It has been the basic policy of the Government of India to work for friendly relations between India and China, both countries recognising each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and mutual interests. The Chinese reply of 16 November converted this paragraph in their own semantics: The Government of the Republic of India has repeatedly expressed its desire of developing Sino-Indian friendship on the basis of mutual respect for territory, sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit, and of preventing the world from going to war. The same formula in addition to the words peaceful co-existence occurred in the Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet:15

The Central Peoples Government shall have centralised handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with neighbouring countries and establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.

The underlying ideas, however, can hardly be called original for communist China as they have appeared before in different formulations. The American note to Japan of 26th Novermber, 1941, for example, could not have come closer to Panchsheel when it proposed the adoption of four “fundamental principles” in a draft Mutual Declaration of Policy which would embody a settlement for the entire Pacific “upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations”:16

1. The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations. 2. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. 3. The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. 4. The principle of reliance upon international co-operation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Japanese memorandum of 7th December, 1941, which broke off negotiations with the United States, accused Washington of advocating in the name of

15 Point 14 of the 17-point agreement of May 23, 1951, The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law, p. 141. 16 Keeton, G.W., China, the Far East and the Future, p. 283.

58 chapter 3 world peace those principles favourable to itself; although Japan was ready to accept some in principle it seemed “only a Utopian idea…to attempt to force their immediate adoption.”17 It is one of the ironies of history that here we had America proposing a system of co-existence which was rejected by an Asian country. Thirteen years later the West would be suspicious of a similar initiative by Asia, because of its assumed communist connotations. Point 4 of the United States note even contained a very positive definition of what amounted to peaceful coexistence. The only difference from Panchsheel was the omission of non-aggression, although this could be taken to be implicit in the principle of the inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty. Yet, this difference may be a pointer to the significance of the Sino-Indian agreement of 1954. While its preamble was not substantially different from the friendly generalisations which normally preface treaty provisions, it could be regarded as a formal pledge of Chinese non-interference and non-aggression. As Asian statesmen were particularly concerned with the internal threat of communism they attached importance to a written renunciation of subversive activities. Panchsheel thus became a careful balance between a guarantee to China not to interfere in Tibet or to join alliances against China and a promise by Peking not to meddle in its neighbours internal affairs.18 The Five Principles also dealt with external aggression, but this danger seemed less immediate at the time of their enunciation. In both cases great importance was attached to the creation of an aroused public opinion whose alienation China would not care to risk. The moral censure involved in any violation of Panchsheel was expected to be strong enough to dispel the constant threat to the security of the smaller countries and to relax tensions that would otherwise feed on themselves.19 This approach of “collective peace” as the only alternative to preparation for war was primarily concerned with attempts to resolve world tension hoping that coexistence would ultimately build up into agreement. Would Panchsheel be sufficient to procure this? Western observers were critical and wrote that it was left to China’s discretion if it would think it worthwhile to humiliate India by violating the Five Principles; others described them as impeccable principles to which any would-be aggressor would subscribe, the problem of preserving peace being rather to assure that practice accords with professions.20

17 Ibidem, p. 288. 18 Zinkin, Taya, “Indian foreign policy: an interpretation of attitudes”, World Politics, vii (1955) 203–204. 19 Poplai and Talbot, India and America, p. 132. 20 The Economist, May 17, 1956; Daily Telegraph, Dec. 24, 1954; Sharma, S.R., India’s Foreign Policy, p. 126.

Five Principles Of Peaceful Coexistence 59

Although Russian politicians leave the honour of the first formulation of the Five Principles to Nehru and Chou En-lai,21 it is possible to trace them in the writings of Soviet experts on international law. Professor Krylov listed six “elementary notions” in the Soviet conception of International Law.22

1. The obligation of assuring peace and security and of maintaining international co-operation. 2. Maintaining economic relations on the basis of equality. 3. Recognition of the equality of the rights of nations and states, of their sovereignty, and of the principle of non-intervention in the internal matters of another State. 4. The obligatory character of international treaties. 5. The inviolability of the territory from external aggression. 6. The criminal character of aggression, the punishment which the aggressor should suffer and the legitimacy of just war.

In the Soviet draft of 1954 for a European Security Treaty these points are comprised in the preamble as follows: With a view to strengthening international cooperation in conformity with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states and of non-interference in their internal affairs.23 It has even been argued that a model for the Five Principles was given in the Litvinov note to President Roosevelt on the establishment of relations between the ussr and the United States, prompted by the Russian desire in the thirties to have peace, coexistence, mutual assistance and allies.24 “Peaceful coexistence” can be found in the communist ideology of Lenin and Stalin around 1925 and was later defined in Khrushchev’s article in Foreign Affairs.25 Small wonder then that Soviet writers seized upon Panchsheel as the essence of modern international law. The only important rule it did not mention, that of pacta sunt servanda, was such a basic and generally understood condition for the maintenance of law that they saw no need for restating it.26 The Five Principles would apply to contacts between countries with differing social

21 New York Times, Feb. 15, 1956, “Krutshev mentions coexistence principles.” 22 Krylov, Prof. Serge B., “Les notions principales du droit des gens.” Academic de Droit International, Recueil des Cours, 1947, p. 407. 23 New York Times, Feb. 11, 1954. 24 Note of Nov. 16, 1933. Thayer, Ph.W. (ed.), Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia, p. 314. 25 “On Peaceful Coexistence,” Foreign Affairs, 38 (1959) 1–18. 26 Durdenewski, W.N. and Lasarew, M.L., Fuer den Frieden zwischen den Volkeren. Die fünf Prinzipien der friedlichen Koexistenz, p. 24.

60 chapter 3 systems, as socialist states went beyond mere coexistence. Their relations were governed by brotherly friendship, mutual aid and cooperation based on socialist internationalism. Formulas of Western origin also contain the combination of sovereignty and territorial integrity, the idea being that an attack on territory diminishes the power of the state and therefore the sphere of its sovereignty. But modern international law is built up by the limitations of sovereignty, freely accepted by sovereign states. The difference with Soviet theory becomes apparent when the latter applies the concept of absolute sovereignty and rejects any diminu- tion. It then opposes military bases abroad, because they affect the power of the host government. Similarly the idea of world government is discarded as a negation of peaceful coexistence which would lead to liquidation of the United Nations and the veto principle. The inability to conceive of half-sovereign states added to the Chinese desire for the complete integration of Tibet with the rest of their country. Their reinterpretation of ancient relationships in the Himalayan area may yet cause great difficulties. The various forms of vassals and tributes, which suggest a subordination of one group to another are already difficult to place in Western international law, let alone in Marxist theory, which tends to innate limited legal rights to full sovereignty. The interdiction of aggression is extended by the Soviet writers to include preparations, threats and war-propaganda. They also read into it the solution of disputes through negotiations and other peaceful means and cite with approval the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1931 in which each party undertook to refrain from entering into alliances which were directed against the other.27 The duty of non-intervention, including indirect forms like subversion and sabotage, is qualified by the condition that the activities of the other state do not threaten world peace and international security. But states derive from it the right to follow a neutral course which is recognised as a form of peaceful coexistence.28 At this stage of their analysis the suggestion that attempts are made to export the Russian revolution are dealt with as pure nonsense. The possibility is denied of waging revolutions from outside; to quote Lenin, ‘they cannot be made to order’. In communist thinking equality and sovereignty are closely related and both lead to a rejection of unequal treaties. Only mutual benefit, without any discrimination, forms a satisfactory basis for international relations. The trade conference in Moscow of April, 1952 is mentioned for its declaration that differences between social systems do not constitute an obstacle for closer

27 Ibidem, p. 38, 44, 48. 28 Ibidem, p. 50, 54.

Five Principles Of Peaceful Coexistence 61 economic contacts which rest upon equality and mutual benefit. Mikojan added later that lasting peaceful coexistence would be inconceivable without trade.29 But these considerations do not apply to aid for dependent peoples. Then “brotherly and unselfish” help is given to establish freedom and equality without political strings attached. Finally, peaceful coexistence as a separate principle is not deemed superfluous, because it is positive where the previous four tend to restrain only. It aims at finding common, binding elements to broaden contacts and to hold the warmongers in check. The realisation that Panchsheel could easily be fitted into the communist theoretical framework made Western statesmen hesitant to voice approval. As they became aware of the generality of the Five Principles and also of the value which India attached to this attempt to formulate an Asian contribution to political philosophy, stress was laid on their compatibility with Western thinking. Addressing Indian Members of Parliament Anthony Eden referred to them in the context of the need for recognition by nations of the sovereignty and independence of others and commended these principles as a path towards coexistence in the world today.30 Similarly the American Ambassador declared that his country had always practised Panchsheel in word and deeds,31 and a lecture by Lord Home in New Delhi compared Nehru’s “principles of living together in world society to which all will subscribe” with the objectives of the Common wealth and interpreted them as identical.32 The Interparliamentary Union at its Helsinki meeting passed a resolution on juridical and moral principles of coexistence, requiring the loyal observance by all governments of the rules of International law and particularly the following principles:

(a) Mutual respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and equality of each country; (b) Renunciation of all interference in the internal affairs of other countries; (c) Non-aggression.33

Materially these precepts differed little from Panchsheel, except that they did not lead up to peaceful coexistence as a separately stated principle. The absence of “peaceful coexistence”, which in the Indian concept was the

29 Ibidem, p. 66. Mikojan before 20th Congress of the c.p.s.u. 30 Times of India, March 4, 1955. 31 Ambassador Sherman Cooper, September 27, 1955. Panchsheel, op. cit., p. 8. 32 Oct. 22, 1955. Panchsheel, p. 25. 33 Helsinki, August 29, 1955. Ibidem, p. 23.

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culmination of strict observance of the other four principles, may be explained by Western disapproval of the term because it had different meanings in Eastern and Western vocabularies; for the communists it would signify “a temporary detente during which they can build up communist strength and sap the will of the free world, a state of what has been called provisional non- belligerency.”34 The same reluctance to use communist terminology was apparent in the Indo-Chilean joint statement, which otherwise closely followed the order of Panchsheel:

1. Equality of states and respect for their integrity and territorial sovereignty. 2. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. 3. Aggression shall not be an instrument of national and international policy. 4. Necessity and the benefits of collaboration between the two countries. 5. International problems should be solved by peaceful means.35

In the communiques, statements and agreements between Afro-Asian countries among themselves or with members of the communist bloc the espousal of the Five Principles, sometimes including the codeword “Panchsheel,” was much more frequent. They appeared in the joint statements between Nehru and Tito, Sihanouk, Bulganin, the Polish Premier, King Ibn Saoud and Emperor Haile Selassie, but also in the treaty of friendship between China and the ddr and the declarations by the Soviet Union and Sweden or Cambodia and Poland. Later the Bandung principles, which will be treated in the next chapter, reached temporary prominence, particularly in statements involving Middle Eastern and Soviet statesmen. In 1957 the Five Principles turn up again in communiques, first by Chinese leaders visiting European communist capitals, but subsequently also in other texts. Since then we may find Panchsheel and the Bandung declaration side by side or used separately, without any obvious reason for the choice. Pro-Western countries in Asia, however, referred only to the ten points of Bandung. Despite accusations that the border dispute had demonstrated Chinese violations of Panchsheel, Peking continued to include the Five Principles in its statements. The non-aligned Summit conference at Belgrade in 1961 supported the Five Principles as “the only alternative to the cold war and to a possible general

34 Sir Roger Makins in Foreign Affairs, 33 (1954) 1–16, preferred “modus vivendi”, as it more closely expressed the idea of a balance resting on peace through strength. 35 Statement of April 16, 1957 signed by Nehru and Oswaldo Sainte Marie. Panchsheel, op. cit., p. 35.

Five Principles Of Peaceful Coexistence 63 nuclear catastrophe” but, as a result of the prevalent anti-colonialist mood, also gave them a wider interpretation. The principles were not enumerated exhaustively and the press statement only said that they included the right of peoples to self-determination, to independence and to the free determination of the forms and methods of economic, social and cultural development.36 The new additions gave expression to the dilemma, faced by many who were sympathetic to the ideas behind Panchsheel, that it implied recognition of the status quo.37 They could not accept it as meaning contentment with a state of affairs in which people were not free and nations not independent everywhere. For Nehru this difficulty never seemed to weigh heavily. His anti-colonial record was unblemished, but he regarded colonialism as a thing of the past and wanted to concentrate on the larger problem of East–west relations. Communist suppression in Eastern Europe was too remote for him and too much of an established fact to influence his fundamental thinking. Nehru’s speech attached primary importance to the threat of nuclear conflict which the non-aligned states alone could not substantially alleviate. “We must not overestimate our own importance” he stated while refusing to suggest any specific course of action in big power issues, for instance the Berlin question. He impressed upon the delegates the following definition of their task:38

We cannot really lay down any terms on which they should negotiate. But it is our duty and function to say that they must negotiate, and any party that does not do so does tremendous injury to the human race.

Mrs. Bandaranaike added that the conference should not pose as the guardian of international morality, and U Nu showed a similar restraint. Their interven- tions averted the danger of the formation of a third bloc which had no cohesion except the desire to remain outside military blocs and which could easily have drifted towards a demagogic anti-colonialism. Its creation would have complicated the international situation without changing the existing power- relationships. At Belgrade it even proved to be impossible to establish any permanent institutions.

36 Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries. Belgrade, Sept. 6, 1961. 37 Chacko, C.J., “Peaceful coexistence as a doctrine of current international affairs” i.y.i.a., p. 35. 38 Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries, pp. 111–113.

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The counsel of moderation met with considerable resistance, which may have induced Nehru to agree to enlarging Panchsheel with some obviously acceptable points. Their sudden emergence, however, did not contribute to give precision to already vague concepts. The declaration that the Five Principles “must be the only basis of all international relations” would lose much of its meaning if it became possible to deduce new rules from them more or less at will. If Bandung constituted, as we shall see presently, the end of an Afro-Asian inferiority complex, Belgrade marked almost excessive self-confidence. Bandung prohibited intervention in the internal affairs of another country. Although refraining from substantial interference in international disputes, Belgrade went a step further and acknowledged a duty to intervene in the interest of world peace.39 The importance of the conference in the light of the present study lies in the maintenance of the Five Principles by the uncommitted world after the Sino-Indian conflict had produced its first clashes. While China claimed continuing allegiance to the Principles (seldom calling them Panchsheel) the non-aligned leaders did the same and were not deterred by the lack of protection India had experienced from its adherence. Since 1988 the Five Principles regularly were referred to in the bilateral statements and agreements between India and China, thus creating the impres sion that they were being adhered to, while in fact each side had accused the other of violating them. The Principles fitted in the semantic structures of both countries as new norms of state behaviour with universal applicability. They even cropped up in paragraph 8 of the famous Sino-US Shanghai Communiqué40 by Nixon and Mao of 28 February 1972 and obtained a slot in the verbosities of foreign policy.

39 “De Bandoung a Belgrade”, Etudes Méditerranéennes, No. 10 (1961) 44–78. 40 The communiqué was unique in its kind by first stating the positions of China and the us in very strong terms, followed by paragraphs they agreed on.

chapter 4 Panchsheel and Afro-Asian Cooperation

Before the principles of peaceful coexistence were discussed at Bandung they figured at the conferences of Colombo and Bogor. At the invitation of the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Sir John Kotelawala, his colleagues from Burma, India, Indonesia and Pakistan joined him at Colombo during the last week of April, 1954. In his autobiography Sir John wrote that originally he did not intend to include Indonesia but was persuaded by the argument that its cultural and political background was similar to that of the four former British colonies.1 It happened to be the Indonesian Prime Minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo, who put forward the idea of holding a conference of Asian and African nations, which later was embodied in one of the conclusions, requesting the Indonesian representative to explore the possibilities of such a meeting.2 To the outside world the five Premiers showed a large degree of agreement, though mainly concerned with relatively abstract matters, but between them serious difficulties seem to have arisen before the final communique could be agreed upon.3 The timing of the meeting – during the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, which showed one of the rare détentes between East and West – added to its importance, but also provided a stimulus to reach agreement. The announcement of the conclusion of the Sino-Indian agreement on April 29 came just before the closing session, a coincidence, which some Indian peri- odicals interpreted as a Chinese propagandist move to show goodwill to the countries of Asia.4 Prime Minister Nehru used his visit to Ceylon to explain the agreement in a broadcast from Colombo,5 in which he emphasised its broader significance. Although the political and economic structures of India and China were different, India had nevertheless been able to achieve this agreement, which, in his opinion, would help in the maintenance of peace in Asia. “It is from this wider point of view that I have welcomed this agreement and I would like you also to consider it in this wider context.” During the summer of 1954 the Indonesian Premier elaborated his proposal for an Afro-Asian conference, to be preceded by a preparatory meeting at

1 Kotelawala, Sir John, An Asian Prime Minister’s Story, p. 118. 2 Ibidem, p. 174. 3 Ibidem, p. 124. 4 Eastern Economist, May 7, 1954, p. 741. 5 May 2, 1954; Nehru’s speeches 1953–1957, p. 253.

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Bogor in December. According to Professor Kahin immediate enthusiasm came only from Pakistan while Ceylon was willing to attend, but Burma and India were reluctant.6 His statement about Nehru’s scepticism seems quite correct; in fact, India only was persuaded to attend the preliminary Bogor conference after the visit of Ali Sastroamidjojo to New Delhi in September, 1954, while a positive assessment of an Afro-Asian meeting seems to date from Nehru’s return from China two months later. It is doubtful, however, whether Pakistan’s attitude is correctly described as enthusiasm. Mohammed Ali was last in announcing his participation in the Bogor meeting and had strong apprehensions concerning possible invitations to China and Israel as well as efforts towards institutionalisation of the gathering. It seems, therefore, more correct to say that none of the four countries approached by Indonesia was entirely without reservations, but that Ceylon as convener of the Colombo conference could not object to an extension of its own idea, while the other countries were persuaded by the personal visits of the Indonesian Premier, whom they did not want to confront with an outright refusal. Contrasting with his earlier reluctance, Nehru took an active and even leading part in the meeting at Bogor. The Indian draft for the final communiqué included a reference to the Five Principles which was omitted, however, after Mohammed Ali had declared that he could accept them only if the right to collective self-defence were added. At the Bandung conference the same argument would prevent the adoption of the original formula of Panchsheel. The list of invitations for Bandung caused considerable difficulties to the five sponsors: U Nu, supported by Nehru, championed China’s participation against opposition from Pakistan and Ceylon, but also from Indonesia; he seems to have treated this point as a condition for Burma’s participation in the conference. Initially Indonesia was against an invitation to Japan, but yielded to Ceylonese insistence. The initiative of Burma and India to invite Israel failed as it would keep the Arab countries away from the conference. The joint statement by the five sponsors mentioned four points for consideration by the Asian-African conference.

1. to promote goodwill and cooperation among the nations of Asia and Africa, to explore and advance their mutual as well as common interests and to establish and further friendliness and neighbourly relations; 2. to consider social, economic and cultural problems and relations of the countries represented;

6 Kahin, George McT., The Asian African Conference, p. 2. Kahin was present at the Bandung Conference.

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3. to consider problems of special interest to Asian and African peoples, e.g. problems affecting national sovereignty and racialism and colonialism; 4. to view the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples in the world of today and the contribution they can make to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.

The sponsors made it clear that participation in the conference would in no way constitute a change of position with regard to the status of any other country present, and the possibility of the formation of a regional block was rejected in advance. The Indian press was not over-enthusiastic about the prospect of Bandung. The Amrita Bazar Patrika had the feeling that the Bogor Conference “was held against the better judgment of some Prime Ministers and yet it had to take place because an initially unmanageable and farfetched idea had to be endowed with some sense of logic.” Nevertheless, the paper thought, Nehru wanted the a.a. conference to be diplomatically successful and not “a Jamboree for agitation.”7 The Pioneer wrote that Afro-Asian solidarity rested too much upon negative elements such as racial feelings and anti-colonialism; the paper welcomed, however, the suggestion for economic cooperation. The reservations held by these two papers were a reflection of India’s reluctance to participate. The awareness of the limited nature, if not decrease, of Asian cohesion originated from the Asian Relations Conference held at Delhi in 1947, to be confirmed by the Asian Conference on Indonesia in 1949 and the extension of the Cold War to Asia. The hopes cherished by several Indian leaders at the time of independence that free Asia could be united in some form, possibly under Indian leadership, had evaporated. The shift in Nehru’s attitude deserves more attention in connection with the Indian relationship to China. He had always been conscious of the need for friendly relations with China; his inaugural broadcast as de facto Prime Minister outlined the programme of his government and emphasized the need for close ties with the countries of Asia, notably with South East Asia and China.8 Yet, personal contacts with the Chinese leaders were rather slow to materialise and were usually left to other members of the Indian Cabinet, especially to Krishna Menon, at that time Minister without Portfolio. The first meeting between Chou En-lai and Nehru took place at New Delhi on June 25, 1954, in response to an invitation forwarded by Krishna Menon. The time for his visit was set by Chou En-lai himself and Nehru had to postpone his holiday; again there

7 Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, Jan. 3, 1955. 8 Sept. 7, 1946. Brecher, M., Nehru – a political biography, p. 321.

68 chapter 4 may have been a significance in the date as it coincided with the Churchill- Eisenhower talks in Washington. After Delhi, Chou called on U Nu of Burma in the company of N.R. Pillai, Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. On each occasion the communiqué contained the Panchsheel principles in full, which is the reason why from the Chinese side Burma is mentioned as one of their founding fathers. The communiqué after the talks with Nehru encountered certain difficulties of translation,9 thus giving India her first taste of different meanings of seemingly similar expressions. In the context of the present study the most significant aspect of the Delhi talks was Nehru’s reported resistance to pressure from Chou En-lai to set up permanent machinery through which Asian nations could consult among themselves.10 One Indian commentator11 concluded that for the first time Nehru had experienced pressure against his mediatory role from the East as there had constantly been from the West, but that he had deftly refused to be drawn into a position wherein he would appear closer to China than to America. The opposition to the creation of a permanent organisation followed from his repudiation of any block-formation; moreover, the Chinese proposal would have gone much further than the idea of an Asian conference about which he already harboured serious reservations. India attached great importance to the visit which provided an opportunity not only to explain her policies, but also to voice certain anxieties. In a conversation between the Chinese guest and India’s outspoken Vice-President and philosopher, Dr. Radhakrishnan, the latter emphasised that a country is judged according to its non-aggressiveness towards its neighbours and to the degree of civil liberties accorded to its citizens.12 At the official banquet Nehru said that “what mattered most to the peace of Asia and the world was how India and China behaved towards each other and on the degree of cooperation they could show in mutual relations.”13 In one of his periodical letters to the Congress leaders of Ministries in the States of the Indian Union, he pointed out that the Peking Government had to be given a chance to prove whether or not it would honour the pledge to follow a peaceful course as given by its adherence to Panchsheel.14 Although he had a “margin of doubt” he believed that

9 Hindustan Times, Sept. 9, 1954. Bondurant and Fisher, op. cit., p. 72. 10 Ibidem, pp. 15–16. Instead Chou En-lai found himself in the position of commending India’s association with the Commonwealth. 11 Dr. Krishnalal Shridharani in Amrita Bazar Patrika, June 7, 1954. 12 The Hindu, Sept. 28, 1954. Bondurant and Fisher, op. cit., p. 69. 13 Ibidem, p. 73. 14 Kahin, G.M., op. cit., p. 8.

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China would actually maintain this policy. The press described the Chinese motive for the visit as an examination of the extent to which its most important neighbour, India, carried out a truly independent foreign policy.15 Chou En-lai’s repeated use of the phrase “principal Asian countries” in which he included India and China, was considered flattering, but not quite in agreement with his emphasis on equality. Nehru paid his return visit to China in October 1954. Like his trip in 1939, the moment came at an important juncture in internal politics. As a result of criticism and lack of the desired rate of progress Nehru had offered to resign, perhaps partly in an effort to rally his people and party behind his programme, but certainly to a large degree as an expression of disappointment concerning its realisation. His offer was countered by a wave of popular support, like it would be in similar circumstances in 1958, but the personal feeling of staleness was not removed until after his return from China. Brecher writes in his interesting biography: “The China tour served as a tonic, as well as a challenge”16 which can be applied both to the domestic and international spheres. Internally the Indian National Congress was ready to adopt the “socialist pattern of society” at its annual conference at Avadi (January 1955). Nehru had denied that China had anything to do with it17 or that he was thinking in terms of competition with China,18 but the impressions gathered during his tour could hardly have failed to influence his assessment of the direction in which India should be moving. Chinese energy, discipline and the effective use of masses of labourers all contributed to awe him. In the field of foreign policy the trip had an effect, though perhaps more of a confirming nature, on Nehru’s assessment of Chinese communism: “They have evolved a political and economic system which is partly based on their Marxist ideas, and partly adapted to conditions in China. We all know that it is not full-blooded communism.” The problems China and India were facing had more similarities than those of the thinly populated Soviet Union, so that India would have more to learn from China.19 In short, Nehru saw the Peking regime as the culmination of a century long revolution: finally China was united after years of chaos. The country must be so occupied with internal problems that there should be no serious threat to India, although in the long run a certain rivalry could become inevitable. For the present the Indian Prime Minister was convinced that Chinese nationalism played a far

15 The Hindu, Sept. 30, 1954. 16 Brecher, M., op. cit., p. 506. 17 Ibidem, p. 529. 18 Mende, Tibor, Conversations with Nehru, p. 104. 19 Press Conference, New Delhi, Nov. 13, 1954. Nehru’s Speeches 1953–1957, pp. 274–278.

70 chapter 4 more important part than communism and that Chinese civilisation was too old to succumb completely to Marxist dogma. Present Chinese rulers were undoubtedly communists, but partly adapted to local conditions. In his reasoning it was Western policy which had brought China so close to the Soviet Union,20 on which it relied heavily for technical advance. Nehru had no intention of asking for or giving any guarantees because he would strongly resent any country asking him for a promise of good behaviour. Asked about the effect of Panchsheel on international communism and its subversive activities Nehru replied that internal interference naturally referred to any kind of encouragement or help given in such manner. He was convinced however, that China wanted peace and thought of three or four 5-year plans to lay the foundations of a socialist state. “So the question of aggression, internal or external, has to be seen in that context and their desire not to get into trouble.”21 India’s northern border was not discussed as everybody knew that India administered the area south of the McMahon Line. In a letter to the Presidents of the Pradesh Congress Committees Nehru had earlier referred to his communiqué with Chou En-lai as only giving “expression to something that has been happening for some time, something that is giving Asia a place of her own in world affairs.” His policy was not a passive or merely neutral policy, but a dynamic one based on certain definite principles and objectives, as well as certain methods. Its emphasis on peaceful coexistence was not only a natural ideal for India, but was dictated by every consideration of intelligent self-interest.22 While the Indian Prime Minister, neither at the time of Chou En-lai’s visit, nor at that of Sastroamidjojo’s, was keen on a meeting of Asian countries, it seems likely that his trip to China gave him the conviction that an environment should be created in which it should be difficult or at least awkward for China to flout the principles of Panchsheel. This could best be done by a reiteration of China’s pledge of adherence before a forum of Asian public opinion.

The Bandung Conference

When the invitations were issued there seemed to be a chance that various countries, particularly those linked with the West through security pacts, would not attend the Bandung Conference. Gradually, however, their position

20 Brecher, M., op. cit., p. 590, 591. 21 Sunday Statesman, New Delhi, Nov. 14, 1954. 22 Nehru, J., Letters to the p.c.c. Presidents, pp. 8–12.

Panchsheel And Afro-asian Cooperation 71 changed towards acceptance as the presence of communist countries could best be counteracted by as large a representation of pro-Western countries as possible. It is, therefore, difficult to state the objectives of the conference in general terms, except the ones mentioned in the Bogor communiqué. Kahin distinguished three main purposes:

(a) to avoid an armed conflict between the United States and China; (b) to encourage the development of China’s diplomatic independence of Soviet Russia; (c) to contain the Chinese and Vietminh military power at the southern border of China and to combat subversive communist activities.23

This interpretation seems to centre too much on the China problem, which left the countries of West Asia relatively unaffected. It also seems an exaggeration to suggest that an attempt was made to bring about a loosening of the ties between China and Russia. This was rather a traditional Western objective while the Asian interests centred around the elimination of the dangers inherent in Chinese proximity or the existence of a large Chinese minority. Moreover, well before the conference Peking had drawn attention to the joint Sino- Russian declaration of October, 1954 stating their desire to build relations with Asia and other countries on strict observance of Panchsheel. “From this it will be seen that the position maintained by the Soviet Union in international relations is consistent with the aims of the Afro-Asian Conference.” From its side Moscow was quick in showing that there was no disagreement in the communist camp by a statement approving the conference, while at the same time expressing what it considered essential: the equality of states, non-intervention in internal affairs, non-aggression, non-interference with the territorial integrity of other states and ceaseless respect for their sovereignty and national independence.24 The fact that both sides in the cold war realised the importance of Bandung was further demonstrated by Eisenhower’s announcement of his Presidential fund for aid to Asia on the eve of the opening session. A better analysis of Asian motives would say that faced with the necessity to accept China’s presence in Asia the countries at Bandung were prepared to underplay the communist aspects if they could extract a maximum of promises which would commit her to a peaceful course towards her neighbours. Chou’s talent for diplomacy capitalised on this anxiety and his assurances, even to pro-Western delegations, accounted for the sudden increase in goodwill for

23 Kahin, G.M., op. cit., p. 5. 24 Sasse, H., Die asiatisch-afrikanische Staaten auf der Bandung-Konferenz, p. 13.

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China. In a larger context Bandung was plainly a political demonstration to show that from now on the voice of Asia should be reckoned with. The Afro- Asian countries had the immense satisfaction of seeing their first great council held in an atmosphere of dignity and sanity. This success and the reasonable attitude of China raised high hopes of finding common solutions for Asian problems. Various proposals were made concerning the future of Formosa. Kotelawala suggested a trusteeship by the five sponsoring powers and Nehru, aided by Krishna Menon, arranged a number of private meetings with the Chinese delegation. These seemed unsuccessful when suddenly Chou En-lai announced at Sir John’s luncheon table that he did not want war with the United States and that he was willing to start negotiations to relax tension, particularly on the Formosa question. There may have been some significance in the fact that Chou chose to make his statement independently of Indian mediation, although later it was reported that Menon would go to Peking to continue talks on Formosa. Indian attempts to have Panchsheel accepted did not succeed. At a press- conference the Prime Minister of Ceylon expressed “doubts and misgivings” concerning the Five Principles. Pakistan introduced the “Seven Pillars of Peace,” which added the right of self-defence, exercised solely or collectively, and the obligation to settle all international disputes by peaceful means, namely negotiation or arbitration. Turkey apparently saw some Wisdom in these Pillars and supported the principle of collective self-defence arguing that to coexist a country must be prepared to defend itself which, for the smaller countries, meant collective arrangements. President Nasser had a different set of seven principles, including the reduction of all armaments and armed forces and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Only U Nu pleaded for a strengthening of the United Nations by compensating for its deficiencies through adoption of Panchsheel. The Colombo powers tended to fall apart in two groups with Ceylon and Pakistan against Burma, Indonesia and India.25 Nehru passionately replied to his critics that India – regardless of her military weakness – could not be conquered and would rely on herself and no one else. If the world were entirely divided between the two power blocks, war was inevitable and each step which reduced the non-aligned area would increase this danger. He maintained that every pact had brought insecurity instead of security and that his Five Principles were “not a magic formula which will prevent all the ills of the world,” but could serve to reduce tension. Later Nehru admitted that the Cominform could not fit in with peaceful coexistence as any organisation with the object of carrying aggressive and interfering propaganda

25 Kahin, G.M., op. cit., pp. 21–23. Keynes, Mary K., The Bandung Conference, p. 366.

Panchsheel And Afro-asian Cooperation 73 in other countries obviously went against the principle of non-interference.26 To Jamali of Irak, who had asked if India would be prepared to form a third power block which could give the desired protection, he said that this stage had not yet been reached. At the present time it would bring its members in common danger, while small, unattached states would have greater chance of survival in the event of war. The Indian Prime Minister undoubtedly antagonised some of the delegates. Kahin called his first speech “rather intemperate,” while later in the conference Nehru’s qualification of Iran’s address as “full of irritation, hatred and disregard”27 was not in keeping with his normal moderation. The great concili- ator of Bandung was Chou En-lai: if the term “peaceful coexistence” were unacceptable to some delegates, he proposed to replace it by the words from the preamble of the u.n. “live together in peace.” China supported the Five Principles but they could be added to or subtracted from; he suggested seven:28

1. Respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (China was prepared to enter into peaceful border settlements and to preserve the status quo in anticipation thereof). 2. Abstention from aggression and threats (Chou had given relevant assurances to Prince Wan of Thailand and Romulo of the Philippines). 3. Abstinence from interference in internal affairs. 4. Racial equality and non-discrimination. 5. Equality of all nations. 6. Right of the people of all countries to choose freely their political and economic systems; and 7. The abstention from doing damage to each other; relations between countries should be mutually beneficial. (In the political committee Chou added “As to the determination of common borders, which we are going to undertake with our neighbouring countries, we shall use only peaceful means and we shall not permit any other kinds of methods. In any case we shall not change this.”)

The points made by Chou were embodied with a somewhat different wording in the Burmese resolution introduced in the political committee.29 Nehru lent

26 Kahin, G.M., op. cit., p. 30. 27 Ibidem, p. 72. 28 On April 23, 1955. Kahin, G.M., op. cit., p. 60. 29 “The nations assembled at the a.a. conference declare that their relations between themselves, and their approach to the other nations of the world, shall be governed by

74 chapter 4 his support as Panchsheel had “more or less been included.” Work in the drafting committee almost ended in a stalemate which was only avoided by Chou’s acceptance of the right of self-defence and by changing the condemnation of colonialism in all its forms into “colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil…” The recognition of collective self-defence, which was included at the insistence of the pro-Western participants and ran counter to Nehru’s conception of the undesirability of military alliances, apparently presented no problem to communist theorists. Soviet writers thought the increase in the number of principles meaningful since the political and juridical basis of international relations expanded to the same extent as the growth of mutual agreement and friendly contacts. It would, therefore, be logical to add to the basic rules of such active cooperation.30 In the final declaration on the promotion of world peace and cooperation, however, ten points were listed, which included the principles added by Pakistan:

1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the u.n. 2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations. 3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small. 4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country. 5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively in conformity with the Charter of the u.n. 6. (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers. (b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressure on other countries. 7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country. 8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial sentiment, as well as

complete respect for the national sovereignty and integrity of other nations. They will not intervene or interfere in the territory or the internal affairs of each other or of other nations, and will totally refrain from acts or threats of aggression. They recognise the equality of races and of nations, large and small. They will be governed by the desire to promote mutual interest and cooperation, by respect for the fundamental Human Rights and the principles of the Charter of the u.n.” 30 Durdenewski and Lasarew, Fuer den Frieden zwischen den Volkern, op. cit., p. 18.

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other peaceful means of the parties’ own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the u.n. 9. Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation. 10. Respect for justice and international obligations.

Indian press comments on the Bandung Conference varied. The vernacular papers were less reserved, but more anti-Western in their assessments: Ujala wrote that China had “made it plain that she was fairly quite different from Russia in many matters” and “if she were not given to a constant fear of attack from the u.s. side she would have behaved still more differently”; China was “essentially an Asian country, and her interests lay primarily on the side of Asia.” Aj accused the pro-American members of the conference of attempts “to create an unsavoury atmosphere by their exciting speeches,” which fortunately were foiled by the supporters of Panchshila. The paper concluded “the conference may seem to some to have been lost to imperialist manoeuverings today, but its real effect will come in a few years’ time.”31 A moderate view was presented by Swatantra Bharat which saw no cause for bitterness in the unfavourable criticism levelled against China by Pakistan and Ceylon; China would do best to tell the world that in the matter of foreign relations she had her own independent policy and peaceful intentions.32 Among the English language papers the Pioneer took the most sceptical line when writing about Bandung that it was “doubtful whether in the political sphere it can venture beyond the fence of the lowest common denominator – colonialism – without impairing even that surface unity which has been so precariously forged.”33 A week later the same paper wrote “Panch-shila was diluted beyond danger point by the unanimous approval of the right of any nation to defend itself singly or collectively under the United Nations Charter. Pakistan’s Ali must have grinned…”.34 In addition, the paper wrote that the conference should make India more circumspect and cautious in her moves as intermediary as there was “no particular reason why we should be coaxed into pulling Peking’s chestnuts out of the fire for the doubtful benefit of getting our fingers burnt.” The Amrita Bazar Patrika accepted the sincerity of the Peking Government in its profession of peaceful coexistence, particularly because of Chou’s

31 Both papers of April 22, 1955. 32 April 19, 1955. 33 The Pioneer, Lucknow, April 21, 1955. 34 Ibidem, April 26, 1955.

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willingness to enter into negotiations with the u.s. Government.35 The Statesman made up the “Bandung Balance” and concluded that the Asian- African Conference appeared to have been well worthwhile; whether any participants had “seriously modified their opinions remained to be seen, but at any rate references to some subjects may henceforth be more realistic”.36 The Times of India’s editorial was a little pompous in observing that Bandung stood for “human and international decency, for faith in the intrinsic goodness of man and the belief that only through peace can men know and achieve progress.” Its Bandung correspondent was on firmer ground when writing that it remained to be seen whether the participating nations would live up to the spirit of the 10-point peace declaration. “But the conference itself has made a powerful impact on public opinion in the two continents, which would make it difficult for any leader to break away from it”. The same paper was convinced that Nehru had attempted to create an Afro-Asian area of peace including a China which would build up its own Marxist structure of society conditioned entirely by Chinese needs. “The Chinese, Nehru believes, will always be Chinese.”37 The Eastern Economist wrote that the first Colombo conference should have underlined that Indian foreign policy in its attempt to lean towards China was out of step with the feeling in South East Asia, and in particular with two, or even three, of the Colombo Powers. The second conference had shown even more the danger of India’s ideological line removing her from her South East Asian neighbours. “The maintenance of the least common factor of agreement now implies inevitably that a new restraint has been placed on us – at least on blunt statements of Indian foreign policy.” It continued that this time, however, there was an advantage, too, in the fact that a similar restraint now applied to China, which could not “afford to pursue its characteristic propaganda line denouncing its neighbours and creating difficulties by the hostile line which seemed to be a weapon of militant communism much more than of peaceful coexistence.”38 Political scientists realised that the new declaration did not contain much which was significantly new, but welcomed it as the first crystal- lisation of common agreement on fundamental and realistic principles for the promotion of peace. Bandung even constituted an improvement on the u.n. Charter by stating that collective defence arrangements should not serve the

35 Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, May 2, 1955. 36 The Statesman, New Delhi, April 26, 1955. 37 Times of India, New Delhi, April 26 and 28, 1955. 38 Eastern Economist, New Delhi, April 29, 1955.

Panchsheel And Afro-asian Cooperation 77 particular ends of any of the big powers.39 In the end the Indian Government acknowledged that the exuberant clamouring for an identity of belief had been superficial and that the unanimous enthusiasm which made Bandung possible had evaporated.40 India was not keen on having another gathering on a geographical basis only and preferred a non-aligned context where differences between the Asian participants would be less pronounced and, after the eruption of the border dispute in 1962, she would not be forced to meet a Chinese delegation. Nonaligned summits were held in Belgrade and Cairo in 1960 and 1964,. The agenda of the Cairo conference contained as its second item “Safeguarding and strengthening of world peace and security and the promotion of positive trends and new emerging forces in international affairs”. Sub-item (A) mentioned “peaceful coexistence and the codification of its principles by the u.n., respect for sovereignty of States, and their territorial integrity, and problems of divided nations”. The preparation of a second Afro-Asian conference met with considerable difficulties. A preliminary meeting at ministerial level was held in Djakarta from April 10 to 15, 1964, which decided to postpone the conference till March 10, 1965 and to convene it in Africa. The membership issue again turned out to be the most controversial matter. It was decided to invite not only all participants of the Bandung conference and other Afro-Asian states which had become independent since that time but also representatives of all national freedom movements in countries in the area, which had not yet attained independence. Serious conflict arose, however, over the Indian and Ceylonese proposal to invite the Soviet Union and over Indonesian insistence to postpone an invitation to Malaysia, and no final decisions were taken. Interest in the meeting was mainly shown by Indonesia, Pakistan and China, who jointly opposed Russian membership. Moscow reacted by pressing for participation of all states of Asia and Africa but Peking asserted the European character of the ussr.41 The movement fractured when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and Cuba hosted the Havana Declaration. It became even more divided after the ending of the Cold War. At the 1992 Jakarta summit, India took a middle position between those advocating confrontation with the developed world, led by Malaysia, and those favouring a cooperative approach. India

39 Appadorai, A., The Bandung Conference, pp. 29–30. 40 Mrs. Lakshmi N. Menon, “Our Policy”, Seminar, No. 19, pp. 17–19. 41 Soviet Government’s statement to the Afro-Asian countries. Soviet News, London, May 5, 1964 declared speculation on slogans of racial solidarity “tantamount to trying to erect some sort of ‘great wall of China’.” Chinese statement of May 30, 1964, Press Release 64039.

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formulated the resolution opposing the linkage between foreign aid and human rights. The next year India recognised the fundamental changes in South Africa by restoring diplomatic relations with a country in which many inhabitants had Indian roots. At the Belgrade summit of 1989 India had joined the ‘Group of 15’ aimed at facilitating the dialogue with the industrialised nations. Under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao it played host to this group , then focusing on concern about the raising of new trade barriers. In August 2012 the Non-aligned summit was held at Tehran and Egypt was succeeded as chairman by president Ahmedinejad, hardly a figure to promote mutual understanding on these issue. Yet, 120 countries attended and 17 observers. The next summit was planned for Venezuela in 2015, but interest in the movement was slipping further. Non-alignment became irrelevant as a general policy after having been high-jacked by Cuba and other countries with their own axes to grind, usually against the us. On certain issues countries prefer not to take sides, but that is normal diplomacy. Today, we live in a different world, influenced by a wave of globalization with new centres of economic power, but little political organization, certainly in Asia.

chapter 5 India’s Position in International Conflict

India had a difficult start. The cost of partition in human lives was tremendous. It also left an intellectual scar: two contrary movements had collided A popular nationalist movement, unique in the history of independent nations (and made possible to develop under British rule) collided with its underbelly of sectarian antagonism. Independence was a cause for great celebration, partition caused deep anguish, tearing the sub-continent asunder on religious lines.1 From the start the conflict between India and Pakistan had a great impact on Indian foreign policy and the way it was perceived internationally. In its directive principles the Indian constitution contains the provision that the state shall endeavour to promote international peace and security, maintain just and honourable relations between nations, foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized people with one another and encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration. Little has been done to carry out the final obligation. India did not accede to the revised General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, as she was not prepared to accept any rigid rules in this matter. Similarly, no arbitration agreements were entered into, because issues involving fundamental political interests were better left to settlement through negotiations.2 In general, India welcomed those methods of pacific settlement which did not involve an element of compulsion.

Junagadh and Hyderabad

The integration of the 500 princely states within the Indian Union was a vital issue with international implications at a time when the principles of its foreign policy still needed definition from the various Congress Party resolutions adopted under British administration. Sardar Patel as deputy Prime Minister completed this herculean task. The next job was to define the areas of the administrative states the Union would be divided in. There the principle would be language, not religion.

1 Mushirul Hasan, op. cit., p. 90. 2 India and the United Nations, pp. 120–135. The Constitution of India, Art. 51.

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In the case of Junagadh, which had acceded to Pakistan despite its predomi- nantly Hindu population, India moved very cautiously. Her suggestion of a referendum was not accepted by Pakistan, which considered the accession to be a matter between the Nawab and his subjects only. For a short time the dispute centred on the secondary issue of two small areas which had acceded to India but were also claimed as coming under the suzerainty of Junagadh. Sardar Patel took the view that Junagadh’s action in sending troops to one of these areas was no less than an act of aggression which must be met by a show of strength. He rejected the proposal of the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, to refer the question to the u.n., because he saw a great disadvantage in being a plain- tiff in such cases. British pressure was effective in delaying military action, but ultimately the two disputed areas were taken over. A campaign against Junagadh herself became unnecessary after the flight of the Nawab, soon to be followed by a request from the remaining authorities for Indian assistance to the administration pending an honourable settlement of the issues involved in the accession. Three months later a referendum was held which showed only a minute number in favour of joining Pakistan. The Indian Cabinet had originally decided against a joint Pakistan-India plebiscite though they would have no objection to one held under u.n. auspices. In February 1948 a senior judicial official of the Indian Civil Service, who was neither Hindu nor Muslim, was asked to supervise it. The failure to persuade Hyderabad to accede to India did not directly involve Pakistan and was treated by New Delhi as a purely domestic issue. Hyderabad had never enjoyed a fully independent status and since its creation in 1724 had either relied on the Mogul Emperor’s support or leaned heavily on the British. In modern circumstances independence could not be allowed in an enclave with a population of 85% Hindus, but governed by a militant Muslim minority engaging in terrorist activities. An economic blockade followed by a 5-day military campaign in September, 1948 forced the Nizam to accept the Indian constitution. Eight hundred casualties, mainly on the Hyderabad side, served as the first example that India would use to force to protect her vital interests.3

Kashmir

In the Kashmir dispute India based her case on the contention that the original accession of Kashmir was legal and that therefore Pakistan committed

3 Menon, V.P., The story of the integration of the Indian states, Chapter vi, Junadagh, Chapters xvii–xix, Hyderabad.

India’s Position In International Conflict 81 aggression by allowing her nationals to invade the state. India’s representative in the Security Council repeatedly demanded that Pakistan must openly be declared an aggressor. Before any concessions could be expected from India this aggression should be “vacated” and Pakistani troops withdrawn. Never theless, substantial Indian concessions were made in the early stages of the dispute. India modified her original position during the negotiations leading up to the cease-fire agreement, particularly in accepting the principle of a plebiscite to determine the future of Kashmir. Later her stand hardened continuously, discarded the suggestion of a plebiscite and opposed Security Council resolutions. India rejected the proposal of the u.n. Commission for India and Pakistan to submit the points at issue to arbitration, mainly those concerning the dis- arming of the Azad Kashmir forces and provisions for the defence of the northern area. The suggestion was taken up in the joint appeal by President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee for all points of difference to be settled by arbitration. New Delhi resented that the u.s. and u.k. were informed even before the parties to the conflict had received the text of the proposals. Arbitration was again opposed by India when she rejected the Security Council Resolution providing for the appointment of a second u.n. Representative to effect the demilitarisation of the state and calling on the parties to accept arbitration if discussions with the representative failed to result in full agreement.4 The efforts of subsequent mediators met with little enthusiasm. Only direct negotiations between the two countries could, it was felt, lead to a satisfactory settlement. Under American and British pressure a series of such meetings finally took place after the Chinese attack on India. The divergence between the two negotiating positions proved to be too wide to make success possible. Pakistan continued to claim the whole of Kashmir and most of Jammu, while India was only prepared to accept the cease-fire line as a basis for partition with minor changes in Pakistan’s favour. The Kashmir issue played a part in the formulation of the Indian position in all subsequent international crises. The aims of anti-colonialism and of preventing the growth of tension between the great powers could normally take precedence over the preoccupation with Kashmir. Self-determination was demanded for people under colonial rule, but discouraged for a non- selfgoverning territory which, as in the case of West New Guinea, was claimed by a successor state to the former colonial power. As time progressed, however, and various Indian minority groups grew in strength, a plebiscite in Kashmir

4 uncip proposal Aug. 30, 1949. unsc Res. March 30, 1951, accepted by Pakistan.

82 chapter 5 became increasingly unattractive, for it would constitute a precedent for other disintegrating forces within the Union.

Korea

In June 1950 India voted for the first Security Council resolution which determined that the armed attack by forces from North Korea on the South constituted a breach of the peace. In the absence of instructions from Delhi the Indian representative abstained on the resolution recommending such assistance as might be necessary to repel the attack; during the next meeting of the Council he announced his acceptance because India was “opposed to any attempt to settle international disputes by resort to aggression.” The halting of aggression and the quick restoration of peaceful conditions were essential preludes to a satisfactory settlement. At the same time it was made clear that this did not involve any modification of Indian foreign policy and the hope was expressed that even at this stage it might be possible to end the fighting and settle the dispute by negotiation.5 India did not share the American view that North Korean aggression, if not repelled, posed an ultimate threat to the whole of Asia and that it represented a chapter of a worldwide communist plan for expansion.6 The first instance of aloofness from the western position in the conflict was India’s withdrawal as a sponsor of the eight-power resolution of the General Assembly establishing the u.n. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.7 This text also recommended “that all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea,” including elections under u.n. auspices for a unified, independent and democratic government, and that u.n. forces should not remain in any part of Korea except in so far as necessary for achieving these objectives. Initially the Indian delegation showed interest in sponsor- ship but was deterred by the extension of u.n. authority to North Korea and finally introduced its own resolution to create a special subcommittee for the examination of all draft resolutions. The latter could not obtain the necessary two-thirds majority but was supported by the communist members and almost all Asian countries.8 India abstained on the eight-power resolution.

5 Security Council Records, 5th Year Nos. 15, 16, 17, meetings of June 25, 27 and 30, 1950. 6 Poplai, S.L., and P. Talbot, India and America, p. 117. 7 Resolution 376 (V) Oct. 7, 1950.“Uniting for peace” came in the next Res 377 of 3 Nov. with the General Assembly taking over from the Security Council. 8 De Koreaanse Oorlog en de Verenigde Naties, Netherlands mfa, No. 26, p. 34.

India’s Position In International Conflict 83

Korea became the object of India’s most determined mediation effort, inspired by anxiety to localise the conflict. This meant a growing opposition to measures which could result in prolonging North Korean resistance, particularly the crossing of the 38th parallel. After the Chinese military intervention India worked actively for a cease-fire agreement. Her representative, Sir Benegal Rau, on behalf of thirteen Afro-Asian countries proposed a request to the President of the Assembly to appoint a Commission of three members to recommend a basis on which a cease-fire could be reached. This resolution was adopted against the opposition of only the communist delegations and the commission was composed of Assembly President Entezam, Rau and Pearson from Canada.9 Rau had several meetings with the Chinese Ambassador Wu, who refused to meet the commission officially and soon returned to Peking. Chou En-lai subsequently declared the commission illegal and identified its efforts with American interests. He objected to making a cease-fire a condition for further negotiations and demanded a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. The Chinese Premier later proposed a seven-nation conference to be held in China and including the Big Five, India and Egypt; at its first meeting a cease fire of limited duration could be agreed. On behalf of twelve Afro-Asian delegations Rau tabled a resolution calling for a meeting of these seven powers to elucidate the Chinese replies and to make “any incidental or consequential arrangements towards a peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern problems.”10 His defence included the argument that the American proposal to brand China an aggressor was hardly an indication of a serious desire to negotiate afterwards. The twelve power resolution did not even obtain a simple majority, but the American resolution was carried overwhelmingly with only India, Burma and the communist states dissenting.11 India declined to participate in the u.n. forces under the pretext that her army was barely sufficient for her own defence and only sent a symbolic field ambulance unit. This aloofness enabled India to dissociate herself from the actual fighting. It also produced an attempt to distinguish between the United Nations as a world organisation and as a participant in the military action in Korea.12 The fact that the u.n. were taking enforcement action against some powers should not, in the Indian view, detract from its world-wide basis.

9 Resolution 384 (V) of Dec. 14, 1950. 10 Draft resolution of Jan. 24, 1951, later amended to include that a cease-fire would be the first measure of the conference. 11 Resolution 498 (V) of Feb. 1, 1951. 12 See in particular the Indian proposals on the prisoners of war. g.a.o.r. 7th session, Annexes, Vol. i, Agenda item 16, pp. 32–35.

84 chapter 5

Collective measures under the “Uniting for Peace” resolution of the General Assembly carried the risk of marshalling nations against one of the big powers, thereby disrupting the organisation.13 India abstained on the resolution recommending an embargo on shipments of arms and petroleum to Chinese controlled territory, but declared that she did not export any of these commodities to China. In the autumn of 1952 India saw a new opening for a cease-fire agreement when the problem of the prisoners of war appeared to be the only stumbling block. She considered that their repatriation should be effected in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1949 and that “force shall not be used against prisoners of war to prevent or effect their return to their homelands.” Seventeen points were listed to elaborate these principles, which aimed at a compromise between western rejection of forced repatriation and communist objections to forced detention by removing the prisoners from the control of both parties and entrusting them to the Repatriation Commission. The Soviet delegate, however, severely criticised the Indian suggestion which in his opinion only served American interests and would lengthen the hostilities. In the debate Krishna Menon dissociated himself sharply from American policy but also rejected Soviet amendments. Despite Western irritation caused by Menon’s self-righteous manner, his resolution was adopted and only the communist bloc cast five negative votes.14 Soon after Stalin’s death Chou En-lai changed his position on the issue of the prisoners and proposed their transfer to a neutral power. This was acceptable to the u.n. command, which suggested Switzerland, but the communist nego- tiator preferred an Asian custodian and suddenly switched back to a neutral nations repatriation commission showing many similarities to the Indian plan which had been subjected to fierce communist criticism five months earlier. While the u.n. resolution provided for membership of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland, India was now added as a fifth member. The armistice agreement was signed on July 27, 1953 and attention switched to the preparation of a political conference. The United States preferred participation of belligerents only, the United Kingdom and France wanted inclusion of the Soviet Union and India, while the Soviet Union attempted to invite even more non-belligerents to the conference. No decision was taken until the Four Power meeting of January-February 1954 at Berlin proposed a conference at Geneva of representatives of the u.s., u.k., France, u.s.s.r., Chinese People’s Republic, the Republic of Korea, the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea and the

13 India and the United Nations, p. 153. 14 Resolution 610 (vii) of Dec. 3, 1952.

India’s Position In International Conflict 85 other countries, whose armed forces participated in the hostilities in Korea and which desired to attend. India was thus excluded from membership.15 General Thimayya, the Indian Chairman of the Repatriation Commission showed great independence in the execution of his task. The exchange of prisoners willing to return to their homeland produced no difficulties, but the commission was divided over the methods in respect of the anti-communist North Koreans. These prisoners first refused to appear before the propaganda teams from the North, but Thimayya was successful in convincing large groups of the necessity of listening to the communist speakers. He was, however, very firm in rejecting the use of force to take them to the interviews. At the end of the period of 60 days prescribed for the information campaign the chairman terminated it even though as a result of communist procrastination only a small number of the prisoners had been addressed. When both sides failed to reach agreement about what to do next with the prisoners, Thimayya returned those desiring to stay in the South to the u.n. command, which freed them soon afterwards. The communist refusal to accept those wishing to go to North Korea did not prevent the withdrawal of the Indian guards. The role of India in the Korean question was the most successful example of her policy of positive neutralism exploring the narrow field where compromise seemed possible. Her concept of a solution remained open to reasonable western amendments but did not yield to the barrage of fundamental Soviet objections, which was particularly heavy during Stalin’s lifetime. The inclusion of the Indian suggestions into a Chinese and North Korean proposal outside the sphere of the United Nations yielded little credit to India beyond membership of the repatriation commission. It further demonstrated that if communists decided on a change of policy they were prepared to make use of the spadework done by others but did not contemplate any formal mediation by a third party. The tricky problem of the prisoners was solved by general Thimayya with a combination of realism, humanitarian considerations and a strictly legalistic interpretation of his mandate, which left few opportunities for communist attacks and received wide praise in the West.

Suez and Hungary

India, and particularly Nehru, were noticeably slow in condemning Soviet interference in Hungary, which contrasted sharply with the cry of alarm at the

15 Joint statement of Feb. 18, 1954.

86 chapter 5

Suez crisis. Suez was a reminder of Western dominance in Asia. Nehru was genuinely shocked and found it difficult to deal with “this record of unabashed aggression and deception.”16 It concerned a non-aligned country and was likely to bring the great power struggle to a strategic area. Moreover, progressive Arab nationalism as practised by Egypt should be upheld as minimising the danger of unqualified Muslim support for Pakistan and an anti-Indian course. Indian efforts towards obtaining the withdrawal of foreign troops and her participation in unef stemmed from anti-colonial policy and fear of great power intervention. It was also consistent with her stand on Kashmir where she had consented to u.n. supervision of the cease-fire line. Participation in the u.n. forces in the Congo, which had a wider mandate than the supervision of armistices, went a step further. Prompted by the same desire to keep the big powers out of Africa India worked towards the elimination of foreign control and the promotion of the unity and development of the country, which resulted for the first time in her participation in collective measures by military forces. Support for the United Nations, which were then threatened by the Russian Troika proposal, took precedence over possible implications for the Kashmir issue.17 In the Hungarian question India was the only non-communist country to oppose the resolution asking for free elections. Earlier she had abstained on the u.s. sponsored resolution calling upon the Soviet Union to desist from all armed attacks and to withdraw its forces without delay. Krishna Menon pleaded for confining the discussion to practicable matters and to avoid actions that would aggravate the situation. He rejected a call for free elections because this would be an infringement of Hungarian sovereignty. Another member of the Indian delegation seemed to forget his country’s stand on Kashmir when he regretted the fact that the u.n. were unable to hold plebiscites; in his opinion there would be many members of the free world who would hate to hold plebiscites in their own countries or in various territories under their control.18 At first Nehru only regarded the Hungarian uprising as a civil war. His description was rapidly adopted by Menon, who lectured to the General Assembly on the objectionable character of violence, whether applied by the

16 Lok Sabha Official Records, Part ii, Vol. 9, No. 3, Col. 260–267. 17 Moreover, the Indian case against a u.n. force to effect the demilitarisation of Kashmir had already been strengthened by the Soviet veto, cast in October 1958 on the grounds that this task would exceed the powers granted by the Charter. 18 Harrison, S., India and the United States, p. 42; Sarbadhikari, P., India and the Great Powers, pp. 37–39.

India’s Position In International Conflict 87 government or by the people of a country.19 The blind spot India appeared to have for this case of Soviet suppression of a popular movement was slow in disappearing. Attempts to adjust his position started with Nehru’s argument that he had no objection to a resolution asking for a withdrawal of Russian troops, but that in New York this demand had been improperly worded. He also opposed the paragraph on the organisation of elections under u.n. auspices, but this could be explained from his anxiety to avoid a precedent with obvious implications for the Kashmir problem. In his own parliament Nehru expressed concern with an attack on freedom anywhere in the world. He stated that the Hungarian people should be allowed to determine their own future according to their own wishes and that foreign forces should be withdrawn. In a message to unesco he wrote: “We see today in Egypt as in Hungary both human dignity and freedom outraged by the force of arms to suppress peoples.”20

Goa

Before India achieved independence the Congress Working Committee agreed that Goa must inevitably be part of India and share the freedom of the Indian people; its future status could only be determined in consultation with the people of Goa and not by any external authority.21 Soon afterwards the continued existence of any foreign possessions in India was declared anomalous and opposed to the conception of India’s unity and freedom. The annual session of the party trusted that their political incorporation could be brought about by peaceful methods and with the friendly cooperation of the governments concerned. Any change-over would allow for a gradual adjustment and, whenever possible, for a preservation of the cultural heritage of those areas.22 In 1954 a friendly settlement was reached for the de facto transfer of the French establishments to India, although formal ratification by France did not

19 Krishna Menon in General Assembly on Nov. 9, 1956. See Wigbold, H.A., “Tien jaar India.” Int. Spectator, xii (1958) 291–336. 20 Nehru’s speeches – Eastern Europe, Publications Division, 1961; Sarbadhikari, P., op. cit., p. 91. 21 Meeting at Wardha, August 1946. Portuguese rule dated from 1510 when Affonso d’Albuquerque carried by storm a small coast town of Bijapur State, founded by horse- dealers from Bhatkal. 22 Resolution at Jaipur Session, December 18–19, 1948.

88 chapter 5 take place until 1962. Indian initiatives to discuss the transfer of the Portuguese territories produced no result and were terminated in 1953 with the withdrawal of the Indian Legation from Lisbon. The Portuguese Government refused to “negotiate on its inalienable rights in Goa, Daman and Diu.”23 The first crisis occurred in July, 1954, when Indian volunteers occupied the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Portugal demanded the recall of the Indian consular officials from Goa as their activities constituted “a serious threat to the internal security of Portuguese India.”24 Despite the publicity which had been given to it, the march on Goa on Independence Day, organised by the Praja Socialist Party received negligible support. Nehru had stated that he was against non- Goans entering the settlements, and Indian border guards made sure that only Goans took part in the peaceful demonstration. All these activities, however, induced Portugal to propose supervision of the frontier by an international team of neutral observers.25 India accepted that there should be an impartial observation in the settlements, but did not consider the Portuguese proposals entirely practical and therefore suggested a meeting of representatives of both governments to consider steps to implement the principle of impartial observation. After a Portuguese objection that the Indian note only referred to the settlements instead of both sides of the frontier, India reaffirmed her acceptance in principle of the Portuguese proposals; the meeting of representatives should discuss “terms of reference, the composition of observation teams, methods of operation of the principle of impartial observation and all other relevant questions.” Portugal agreed, but, after both sides had nominated officials, rejected the date suggested by India and insisted that India should either agree that the terms of reference were solely those specified by Portugal or indicate what other matters should be the object of international observation. The Portuguese note also consented to separate negotiations on “certain problems arising from the co-existence and vicinity of the Portuguese state of India and the Indian Union,” provided that India accepted certain conditions in advance and that the negotiations took place in Lisbon or in a third state. India could not agree

23 Statement of June 10, 1953. 24 Portuguese note of July 30, 1954; consular relations were restored on January 18, 1955 until the break of diplomatic relations by India on July 25 and of consular relations on August 18, 1955. 25 They should report on: a. the nature, nationality and activities of any groups entering or proposing to enter the other country’s territory against the will of the authorities; b. whether or not these groups were armed; c. whether they received protection or help from the authorities and armed forces of the country in which they originated; d. any frontier incidents.

India’s Position In International Conflict 89 to conditions which should themselves be the subject of discussion and also refused a later request for a draft agenda. Again the meeting of officials had to be postponed. Matters were complicated by the Portuguese announcement that, as its officials had been refused transfer facilities, it would appoint observers from third countries to examine the situation in the enclaves. New Delhi regarded this as a departure from the principle of impartial observation and denied Portugal’s right to demand transit for nationals of other countries. It remained prepared to receive a Portuguese delegation but, probably as a result of the quiet situation on the border, the exchange of notes was not resumed by Portugal.26 Portuguese action against the three thousand satyagrahis who entered Goa on August 15, 1955, resulting in at least 13 casualties, led to the complete break of relations by India. Further entries of peaceful demonstration were considered undesirable under present circumstances and New Delhi re-imposed the controls which had been lifted temporarily. Earlier Nehru had declared that the Portuguese were in Goa only because India was patient; this was not because it could not deal with the situation “but because we do not wish to do anything, even in a small way, which may have bigger repercussions.”27 India would take such action as it considered proper; “a great country should not allow itself to be coerced into thoughtless action.”28 A relaxation of the ban on trade with Goa, although described as a variation and not an abandonment of the policy of economic sanctions, would be the last lull in the dispute.29 Firing from the island of Anjadev was described by New Delhi as “aggressive action taken by the Portuguese against Indian shipping” which together with “intensified oppression and terrorism” inside Goa necessitated Indian precautionary troop movements.30 Nehru called Portu guese interference with shipping “a clear case of aggression and deliberate provocation” which created an “intolerable” situation; India was prepared for any contingency that might arise.31 Lisbon ascribed the incident to Indian preparations for an attack on Anjadev. To show its “good intent and peaceful purposes” Portugal proposed the despatch of an international mission to study the situation and to determine the responsibility for the incidents. The offer

26 Portuguese notes of Aug. 8, 13, 22, 30, Sept. 6; Indian notes of Aug. 10, 19, 24, Sept. 2 and 11, 1954. 27 During debate in the Lok Sabha on March 31, 1955. 28 Statement of May 24, 1955. 29 Announcement by Nehru in Lok Sabha on April 1, 1961. 30 Statement by Ministry of External Affairs, Dec. 5, 1961. 31 Lok Sabha, Dec. 7, 1961.

90 chapter 5 was ignored. In the Rajya Sabha Nehru exclaimed “our patience is certainly exhausted.” In reply to a question he stated that no formal offer of mediation had been received; there had only been vague talk by one or two countries, presumably Mexico and Argentina and later the United States.32 Messages from u.n. Secretary General U Thant urged both Nehru and Salazar “to ensure that the situation does not deteriorate to the extent that it might constitute a threat to peace” and to enter into immediate negotiations with a view to an early solution in accordance with the principles of the Charter.33 Premier Salazar replied that he was always ready to negotiate on problems arising from the vicinity of the territories, including a guarantee that Portuguese territory would not be utilised against the security of India. His terminology recalled the fruitless exchange of notes of 1954. Prime Minister Nehru thought it hardly possible to negotiate on the basis of the Charter with a government that stood by 16th century concepts of colonial conquest and ignored the United Nations resolutions on ending colonialism. At midnight between December 17 and 18, 1961, India launched a massive invasion with approximately 30.000 troops. Goa surrendered within two days. When the campaign was over it appeared that Indian reports on repression of nationalists, a breakdown of administration and a military build-up were either base- less or greatly exaggerated. The captured garrison was only 3240 strong and did not include African troops.34 In the Security Council debate India maintained that, as Goa was part of India, there could be no aggression against one’s own territory. Moreover, u.n. Resolution 1514 (xv) authorised and compelled action against Portugal to aid the people of Goa in their struggle for freedom and against aggression. Liquidation of the last remnants of colonialism was a “matter of faith” for India, “charter or no charter, council or no council.” Two draft resolutions were introduced. The proposal by Ceylon, Liberia and the u.a.r., which was defeated, invoked resolutions 1514 and 1542, rejected the Portuguese complaint of aggression and called upon Portugal “to terminate hostile action and to cooperate with India in the liquidation of her colonial possession in India.” Another text, put forward by France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, deplored the use of force by India, called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and an immediate Indian withdrawal, and urged

32 Rajya Sabha, Dec. 11, 1961 33 Messages of Dec. 15, 1961. 34 The Times Dec. 20, The Guardian Dec. 26, 1961. The allegations were contained in the letter dated Dec. 12, 1961 from the Permanent Representative of India to the President of the Security Council. Doc. si 5020.

India’s Position In International Conflict 91 the parties to work out a permanent solution by peaceful means. This draft resolution obtained the necessary seven votes, but was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The United States representative regarded the Indian invasion as clearly an act of aggression. He pointed out that India had not presented the problem to the Security Council, as was required by the Charter for any dispute which could endanger international peace and security, and had not accepted an American offer of good offices to institute or assist in negotiations. The means available for peaceful settlement were therefore not exhausted. As for the Indian arguments, Adlai Stevenson saw a contradiction in simultaneously rejecting Portuguese sovereignty and invoking resolution 1542, which applied to non-selfgoverning territories.35 It was an apologetic Nehru who told the press that he had been extremely reluctant to use force because he knew that it might open a door to similar action by other powers. The matter had been taken out of his hands by the compulsion of events and had become a choice of a lesser evil after 14 years of waiting. Krishna Menon declared that India was forced to adopt means which were not of her own choice.36 The Indian press realised the implications for foreign policy. The Times of India wrote that it would become difficult to extend a moderating influence on countries which felt agitated over injustice by a stronger power. The Hindu expected criticism not so much about the taking over of the colonies, but of doing it in a way which went against past professions and principles. Former Governor-General Rajagopalachari said that India had totally lost the moral power to raise her voice against militarism.37

Conclusions

In the Security Council debates on Kashmir and Goa a Soviet veto saved India from adverse resolutions. Although it seems an exaggeration to suggest,38 that it was their attitude to the Kashmir question which brought India closer to the communist states, she undeniably received a concrete benefit from her non- aligned position. In this connection one wondered what would happen when, as advocated by India, Peking would be admitted to the United Nations. Signing

35 Security Council debate of Dec. 19, 1961; Press Conference by Adlai Stevenson, Dec. 21, 1961. 36 Press conferences of Dec. 28, 1961. 37 Times of India, Dec. 26; The Hindu, Dec. 20; Rajagopalachari in Swarajya, Dec. 27, 1961. 38 Sarbadhikari, P., op. cit., p. 25.

92 chapter 5 a border agreement with Pakistan in May 1962, China for the first time publicly refused to recognise Kashmir’s accession to India. Shortly after independence Indian deference to United Nations opinion concerning her vital issues was considerable, but diminished with the increase in national self-confidence. This finally led to an unyielding stand on Kashmir and an emotional and almost disdainful defence of the invasion of Goa. Insis tence on declaring Pakistan an aggressor was not consistent with the general approach of emphasising the conciliatory functions of the United Nations. The occupation of Goa could not be justified as a rightful recovery of areas belonging to India by claiming perpetual aggression on the part of Portugal.39 Regardless of the dubious nature of this argument in view of 400 years of Portuguese rule originating in a period when the present Indian unity had not yet taken shape, unilateral use of force was contrary to the provisions of the Charter. The Indian departure from non-violence which came as a shock to large segments of world opinion, should, however, not be overemphasized. As has been explained earlier, India was not unconditionally committed to non-violent methods. She resorted to a military campaign against Goa after all means to obtain peaceful cession had failed as well as the hope that Portugal would show some understanding of the signs of the times. Possible motives for the Indian action were the desire to make a show of her military capabilities in view of the Chinese threat, but also the resistance Nehru’s moderation had experienced at Belgrade. Faced with a resurging wave of anti-colonialism, India may have considered it useful to show that her own determination to eliminate colonialist remnants from her soil had not flagged. In connection with the border dispute with China her argument that she never was a willing partner to the arrangement by which the Portuguese hold over Goa was established,40 carried dangerous implications. It was a repetition of Nehru’s refusal announced shortly after independence that India would not feel bound by treaties about which she had not been consulted,41 which came very close to China’s constant rejection of “unequal” treaties including those concluded with British India. An assessment of India’s position in international conflict should do justice to her valuable and constructive role in the Korean crisis, where her persever- ance led to an agreed solution in spite of initially unfavourable reactions from

39 See Bains, J.S., India’s International Disputes, p. 197, who rigidly adhered to the principle ex iniuria ius non oritur and refused to recognise continuous occupation as a valid title for a colonial power. 40 Press Conference in New Delhi. Times of India, Dec. 22, 1961. 41 Zinkin, Taya, “Indian foreign policy, an interpretation of attitudes,” p. 179.

India’s Position In International Conflict 93 both parties to the dispute. India became less involved in the Indo-China problem and, because of the immediate interest taken by China, limited her involvement to neutral chairmanship of the International Control Commission. In the Congo her support of the enlightened policies of Hammarskjoeld formed the backbone of the u.n. operations. All these examples related to problems which could lead to an increase of tension between the great powers. India showed little enthusiasm to play a part in the disputes of other countries.42 And in cases affecting her immediate self-interests India found it difficult to maintain her moral posture and resorted to a realpolitik of considerable rigidity. In Kashmir and Goa the realities of power were in India’s favour, so that she could afford to neglect allegations of inconsistency between the principles and practice of her foreign policy. The biggest challenge to her approach to international conflict was to emerge when her own border dispute with China was hotting up.

42 Direct Indian intervention remained limited to convening a conference in New Delhi to support Indonesia, Jan. 20–23, 1949. Announcing that he had issued invitations on Jan. 2, Nehru declared “we have seen the most naked and unabashed aggression and use of armed might to suppress a people and a government.” Inspired by a joint rejection of colonialism this meeting of like-minded nations enhanced Indian leadership in Asia.

chapter 6 The Border Dispute with China

The Chinese way is to do something rather mild at first, then to wait a bit, and if it passes without objection, to say or do something stronger. But if we take objection to the first statement or action, they urge that it has been misinterpreted, and cease, for a time at any rate, from troubling us further.1

China Probes the Boundary

The Sino-Indian border incidents which occurred during the summer of 1959 led to the publication of a series of White Papers containing the official correspondence between the two countries. Not only did they reveal that Chinese intrusions into the north-eastern corner of Ladakh had been discovered prior to July, 19582 and the construction of a motor road as part of the Sinkiang-Tibet highway three months later,3 but they also contained an exchange of notes concerning the disputed grazing grounds of Bara Hoti in the central sector, in which each side kept referring to the principles of Panchsheel from July, 1954 onwards. Three notes are dated shortly after Chou En-lai’s visit to New Delhi, but prior to the Bandung Conference.4 The Chinese maintained that Indian troops had crossed the border into the Tibet region of China, which was “not in conformity with the principles of non-aggression and friendly coexistence between China and India, and the spirit of the joint communiqué issued recently by the Prime Ministers of China and India.” The Indian reply stated that on the contrary Tibetan officials had tried to cross the border without proper documents and it literally returned the Chinese phrase just quoted. Later the terminology became considerably harsher. India described the presence of Chinese soldiers south of the border who tried to stop an Indian detachment as “a violation of the Five Principles” which “may well have grave consequences.” After a similar incident India directed “a protest against this

1 Quotation from Xlllth Dalai Lama. Bell, Sir Charles, Portrait of the Dalai Lama, p. 99. 2 Note by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, July 2, 1958. White Paper i, p. 22. 3 Note by the Indian Foreign Secretary to the Chinese Ambassador. White Paper i, pp. 26–27. 4 Notes from the Chinese Counsellor of July 17, 1954 and August 13, 1954; Indian note of Aug. 27, 1954. White Paper i, pp. 1–3. See Map 1.

The Border Dispute With China 95 clear violation” of the Five Principles; failure of immediate withdrawal of the Chinese troops “may lead to serious incidents which would mar the friendly relations between India and China.”5 In Bara Hoti a kind of uneasy neutralisation was reached. In 1956 both Governments agreed that they would refrain from sending troops into the area, but then the dispute shifted to the despatch of civilian officials. A Chinese party moved in as soon as the Indian revenue officers had left the place before the onset of the winter of 1958–59. The following spring the Indians made sure they were back first. Bara Hoti, or Wu Je as it is called by the Chinese, was only a minor issue in Sino-Indian relations and, as the only grazing ground on a trans-Himalayan route, a classic example of a border dispute. In 1959 Nehru declared that “even with the Tibetan authorities, these arguments about a mile of grazing ground here or there have been there.”6 It may have been for this reason that Nehru did not attach sufficient importance to this quarrel to influence his views on Chinese behaviour. There is even a possibility that it has strenghtened his conviction that China, if properly treated, would confine her territorial aspirations to technical claims of a limited nature. It is significant, however, that the appearance of the Panchsheel principles in the diplomatic notes from both sides, thus demonstrating their potentiality as an unexpected boomerang in practical politics, did not keep Nehru from advocating them in a wider context than bilateral relations with China. Until the summer of 1959 no publicity was given to the disputes, as it was thought that progress could be made through correspondence.7 That, at least, is the official explanation for the Government’s failure to keep Parliament informed, an omission which has been duly criticised by the opposition. There is more reason to suppose that India’s wish to solve her problems with Peking without drawing attention, either internally or externally, to the aggressive character of Chinese policies was a determining factor. Another issue arose before the Tibetan rebellion and the subsequent increase in Chinese military activity resulted in incidents at various points of the border. This related to Shipki La, one of the passes opened for trade and pilgrims under the 1954 Agreement, where a Chinese patrol refused to vacate Indian territory in September, 1956. In their Aide Memoire the Indian Government considered “any crossing of this border by armed personnel as aggression which they will resist” and added that they attached great importance to the

5 Note given to the Chinese Counsellor, Nov. 5, 1955; note of May 2, 1956 concerning Nilang, which belongs to the same sector. White Paper i, pp. 10–11. 6 Lok Sabha, Aug. 28, 1959. Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, Vol. 1, p. 94. 7 Ibidem, p. 101.

96 chapter 6 matter.8 The Chinese patrol eventually withdrew, but the Indian protests against this incursion remained unanswered.9 In 1958 the tempo of the exchange of notes through diplomatic channels quickened and led Nehru to address a personal letter to Chou En-lai. By that time the construction of a Chinese road across eastern Ladakh as part of the Sinkiang-Tibet Road had been established10 and even earlier another border violation had been established at Khurnak Fort, somewhat further south. The frontier in the latter area had not been agreed during a conference of Kashmiri and Tibetan representatives in 1924, but India maintained that her jurisdiction over the Fort had never been disputed.11 On November 1 the Chinese Foreign Office announced the arrest of two Indian border patrols and protested against “unlawful intrusions of Indian armed personnel” at places on the Sinkiang- Tibet Road and reconnoitring and surveying activities of Indian aircraft, which were considered “inconsistent with Sino-Indian friendly relations and the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence initiated jointly by the two countries.”12 Concern over the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations was accentuated by forebodings of the Tibetan revolt, which was to acquire large scale proportions a year later. Nehru’s visit to Lhasa was cancelled and he only crossed a narrow strip of Tibetan territory adjacent to Sikkim on his journey to Bhutan. China requested India “to repress the subversive activities against China’s Tibetan region carried out in Kalimpong by American and Chiang Kai-shek clique special agents, Tibetan reactionaries and local special agents.”13 The note added that the Chinese Government was confident that India, pursuing a consistent policy of defending peace and opposing aggression would accept its request and take effective measures. The Indian reply confirmed the recognition of the

8 Sept. 24, 1956. White Paper i, p. 19. 9 White Paper ii, p. 48. 10 Informal Indian note of Oct. 18, 1958. White Paper i, p. 26. 11 Indian note verbale of July 2, 1958. White Paper i, p. 22. See Map 3. 12 Chinese memorandum. White Paper i, p. 28. Nehru later explained that between 1950 and 1959 India had sent 16 expeditions to various parts of Ladakh. They did not object to Chinese use of caravan routes as this was common practice and was not supposed to imply sovereignty over the area. Suspicions that the Chinese road was crossing Indian territory were raised by a small map published in Peking in 1957 and two patrols were despatched to locate its extremities. They discovered the road, which was a levelled caravan track, but reported that there were no Chinese posts established to the west of it. Further advances took place after the Tibetan revolt and were situated between June and October, 1959. Lok Sabha Debates, Feb. 23, 1961. Vol. l., col. 1699–1700. 13 Note from the Foreign Office of China to the Counsellor of India, July 10, 1958. White Paper i, p. 62.

The Border Dispute With China 97

Tibetan region as part of the People’s Republic of China, but said that the contents of the Chinese note must have been based on a complete misunderstand- ing of facts, as India would never permit any portion of its territory to be used as a base for disruptive activities against China’s Tibet region.14 Nehru’s first letter to Chou En-lai was mostly concerned with the publication of Chinese maps which drew the border right across Indian territory in several places.15 After two complimentary paragraphs about China’s achievements and its agreement to receive Indian technical delegations, he stated that at the time of the conclusion of the Sino-Indian agreement no questions regarding the frontier had been raised “and we were under the impression that there were no border disputes between our respective countries”; India thought that the agreement had settled all outstanding problems between the two neighbours. During his visit to China in 1954 Nehru mentioned that he had seen recent Chinese maps which gave a false borderline, but Chou told him that they “were really reproductions of old pre-liberation maps” and that China had not yet had time to revise them. Nehru also recollected Chou’s words of 1956 when they met in New Delhi that, although neither liked the term McMahon Line, he proposed to recognise this border with India, as he had done with Burma, but that he had not yet consulted the Tibetan people about it. Nehru continued “I then mentioned that there were no disputes between us about our frontier, but there were certain very minor border problems which were pending settlement.” It was decided to have these “petty issues” settled at lower levels “on the basis of established practice and custom as well as watersheds.” Unfortunately the discussions (concerning Bara Hoti) with the Chinese delegation had not resulted in an agreement; new instances of Chinese maps with wrongly placed borderlines had occurred and Indian protests had been answered with the puzzling statement that the Chinese Government had “not yet undertaken a survey of China’s boundary, nor consulted with the countries concerned, and that it will not make changes in the boundary on its own.”16 Chou En-lai replied six weeks later that first of all “the Sino-Indian border has never been formally delimitated.” It was true that the border question was not raised in 1954, but “this was because conditions were not yet ripe for its settlement and the Chinese side, on its part, had had no time to study the question.” The Chinese Prime Minister believed that “following proper preparations

14 Note from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to the Chinese Embassy, Aug. 2, 1958. White Paper i, p. 48. 15 Letter of Dec. 14, 1958. White Paper i, pp. 48–51. 16 Memorandum from the Foreign Office of China to the Counsellor of India. White Paper i, p. 47.

98 chapter 6 this question, which has been carried over from the past, can certainly be settled reasonably on the basis of the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence through friendly talks.” On the subject of the McMahon Line, the letter gave a description of the Chinese position which contradicted Nehru’s summary of the 1956 discussions. It was a product of the British policy of aggression and “I have told you that it has never been recognised by the Chinese Central Government.” On the other hand, India and Burma had become states friendly with China, and in view of the various complex factors involved the Chinese Government needed time to deal with the matter, but was confident that a friendly settlement could eventually be found. In order to prevent further incidents China proposed, as a provisional measure, to maintain the status quo, which meant that “each side [would] keep for the time being the border areas at present under its jurisdiction.”17 India’s Prime Minister wrote back admitting that the frontier had not been demarcated on the ground in all sectors, but maintained that it followed the geographical principle of the watershed on the crest of the high Himalayan range, and moreover had the sanction of specific international agreements. By saying “I agree that the position as it was before the recent disputes arose should be respected by both sides and that neither side should try to take unilateral action,” and “if any possession has been secured recently, the position should be rectified,”18 Nehru gave a twist to the Chinese proposals which went beyond their original intention. Chou’s wording of the status quo as relating to the areas “at present” under the jurisdiction of either side implied a Chinese annexation of parts of Ladakh, while Nehru declared that only the situation existing before any Chinese expansion could form a starting point for negotiations. His letter closed with the remark that, as both countries had evolved the principles of Panchsheel “which has now found widespread acceptance among the other countries in the world,” it would be most unfortunate if the frontier questions should affect the friendly relations existing between them.

Revolt in Tibet

A precise date for the outbreak of the Tibetan revolt is difficult to give. Various disturbances occurred since the inauguration of the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet on October 1, 1955, which, it seems, largely

17 Letter of Jan. 23, 1959. White Paper i, pp. 52–54. 18 Letter from Prime Minister of India to Prime Minister of China, March 22, 1959. White Paper i, pp. 55–57.

The Border Dispute With China 99 accounted for Mao Tse-tung’s announcement that Tibet was not ready for the introduction of communist reforms during the Second Five Year Plan.19 When he visited India in December 1956, Chou En-lai assured Nehru that Tibet would enjoy autonomy and that China would not force communism on Tibet. His stay in India coincided with that of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas who took part in the celebration of the 25th centenary of the death of Buddha. It has been rumoured, that the Dalai Lama was reluctant to go back to his country and asked for sanctuary, but that he finally returned on the assurance of Chou En-lai, obtained through the intervention of Nehru, that no repressive measures would be taken.20 Nehru denied this version vigorously and said that only the question whether it would be safe for the Dalai Lama to go to Kalimpong, the Indian market town near the borders of Sikkim and Tibet, had been discussed with the Chinese Premier; ultimately the Dalai Lama had decided to go there after the Indian authorities had warned the people of Tibetan origin that demonstrations would not be permitted. During the same conversation Nehru had assured his Chinese guest that Indian soil would not be used for subversive activities against a friendly country.21 The long duration of the Dalai Lama’s visit to India, which lasted more than four months, could hardly be interpreted as an indication of a desire to remain in voluntary exile, as he had spent six months in China two years earlier. Nevertheless, there must have been some truth in the story. The Dalai Lama’s own account, preceding a press conference at Mussoorie, stated that he had practically made up his mind not to return to Tibet until there was a manifest change in the frustrating attitude of the Chinese authorities. Nehru had advised him to change his decision after a talk with Chou En-lai and on the strength of Chinese assurances.22

Reactions in Parliament Official Indian pronouncements on the situation in the spring of 1959 tended to play down its seriousness. Replying to the Lok Sabha on March 17, Nehru stated that, although there was large-scale violence in places, it was more a clash of wills than a clash of arms. Little did he realise that he was, in fact, speaking on the eve of the Dalai Lama’s departure from the Potala Palace

19 Mao’s speech on “Contradictions”, Feb. 27, 1957. The plan period referred to was 1958–62. 20 Richardson, H.E., Tibet and its history, p. 203, wrote that the Dalai Lama requested the removal of Chinese troops, the restoration of the status quo existing at the death of the XIVth Dalai Lama, reinstatement of the Chief Minister who was dismissed in 1952 and abandonment of the programme of communist reforms. 21 Nehru in Lok Sabha, April 2, 1959. Prime Minister on Sino-Indian relations, Vol. i, pp. 24,27. 22 Dalai Lama’s press conference, June 20, 1959. Dalai Lama and India, p. 159.

100 chapter 6 which was to be followed by serious bombardments. Nehru described the outbreak of violence in Lhasa as a new development, since previous conflicts had been restricted to the Khampa region in southern Tibet. He appealed to the House to appreciate the delicate situation: India had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of China and should avoid anything which would worsen the situation; on the other hand there was the long tradition of cultural and religious ties with Tibet. Concluding the Prime Minister felt still able to say “We earnestly trust that the present troubles will be resolved peacefully.”23 Chinese comment was illuminating: Hsinhua wrote that “in the fundamental interests of the two countries both parties have no reason at all not to adhere to these principles (of Panchsheel) both at present and in the future”; China had never interfered in India’s internal affairs or discussed them at the People’s Congress: “It considers such discussion of the internal affairs of a friendly country to be impolite and improper.”24 Protests in several newspapers against the alleged decision not to admit refugees from Tibet were mentioned in Parliament, but Nehru declined to commit himself: all these questions would be of no service to the people who might seek political asylum. Any comments he might make, would make the position more difficult for them.25 Whatever the intentions of the Indian Government may have been, the high position of the Dalai Lama and the obvious political nature of his flight left no choice. The Chinese Ambassador was informed that on March 31 “in accordance with international usage” the Dalai Lama had been allowed to cross into Indian territory and to stay there.26 Care was taken to add that he was not expected to carry on any political activities from India. An incident in the Lok Sabha on April 1 had shown that the mood of Parliament was definitely more anti-Chinese than the Prime Minister had realised. His absence on that day – he was away from Delhi on a short visit to Bikaner – caused the flow of criticism against a Chinese Embassy hand-out charging that Kalimpong was the commanding centre of the rebellion in Tibet, to go almost unchecked. A statement by the Communist Party of India also had referred to this accusation adding that the principles of Panchsheel “enjoin on us strict neutrality and non-intervention in each other’s affairs. This also means that we should not allow our territories to be used for hostile or prejudicial acts against each other.”27 The c.p.i. concluded by sending warm greetings to the

23 Lok Sabha, March 23, 1959. Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations,Vol. i, p. 5. 24 Hsinhua, March 28, 1959. 25 March 30, 1959. Ibidem, pp. 7–8. 26 His arrival in India was, curiously enough, first announced by Peking. 27 Secretariat g.p.i. March 31, 1959. Sen, Chanakya, Tibet Disappears, p. 305.

The Border Dispute With China 101

Communist Party and Government of China which were leading the Tibetan people “from medieval darkness to prosperity and equality.” Both statements were the subject of adjournment motions, although the c.p.i, statement, objectionable and irritating as it may have been to many members, did not go as far as the article circulated by the Chinese Embassy; the c.p.i, actually praised the Government for taking the proper attitude and refusing “to oblige the reactionaries.” It therefore seems more likely that the parliamentarians seized the opportunity to censure somewhat indirectly the attitude of the Prime Minister which they thought to be too passive, particularly because the quick succession of events had given them the impression that Nehru’s statements were made without proper inquiries. The Deputy-Minister of External Affairs, Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, took strong exception to this allegation, but was equally outspoken on what she qualified as a challenge to the Prime Minister’s integrity in the Chinese hand-out.28 Pandit Pant, the Home Minister, did little to refute the arguments of the critics and sounded almost apologetic in his defence: it would be a matter of regret if Nehru, who had “ushered into existence” the words Panchsheel which had now been accepted by many sovereign states, were to be repudiated by some of his own countrymen. The next day Nehru was quick to calm down the “exhibition of a certain lack of restraint” in the House with fairly typical reasoning. First he admitted that for the last few years there had been espionage and counter-espionage by various nationalities at Kalimpong and that the Government was keeping a close watch on these activities. Then he rejected the accusation that Kalimpong was the commanding centre of the rebellion. Thus he integrated a possible explanation of Chinese behaviour with a sufficiently strong denial of their allegations.29 At a subsequent press conference Nehru added that he had deliberately suppressed himself in order to avoid adding to the heat of the cold war, although he felt strongly enough about some matters.30 Correspondents at the same conference asked whether China had observed Panchsheel scrupulously in regard to Tibet and whether the disappearance of autonomy there affected the Sino-Indian agreement about Tibet. Nehru thought that the question of Panchsheel did not arise directly; there was hardly a country which could not be criticised on the ground that these principles had not been observed but in this particular case it was the Sino-Tibetan agreement which, according to both parties, had broken up, not the treaty between China and India. Nevertheless, the consequences of developments in Tibet could

28 Prime Minister on Sino-Indian relations, Vol. i, pp. 16–17. 29 Ibidem, pp. 16–29. 30 April 5, 1959. Ibidem, Vol. ii, p. 11.

102 chapter 6 affect trade and pilgrim traffic and thereby the contents of the treaty. On Panchsheel the Prime Minister followed a line of thought which was often to recur: if the Five Principles were good, they remained so whatever any individual or country might do:

It is a basic approach to international affairs and life generally. It may have to be adapted because of changing circumstances. If we believe in Panchsheel, we follow it, even if no country in the wide world follows it. Of course, it cannot be easily followed in a one-sided way, but that is a different matter. But our attitude will be to follow it.

Speeches at the Second National People’s Congress in Peking claimed that the Dalai Lama had gone to India under duress and that a statement made on his arrival at Tezpur had been imposed on him by foreigners. Delegates, including the Panchen Lama, pointed at the exchange of letters between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese military commander in Lhasa, in which the former declined an invitation to attend a cultural performance on the ground that it was difficult to leave his palace; they also referred to the distribution of the Tezpur statement which, perhaps unwisely, had been undertaken by an official of the External Affairs Ministry, and questioned whether this accorded with the Five Principles. “Criminal anti-Chinese activities carried out by Tibetan traitors in India in collusion with Indian expansionists” was another recurring theme.31 In these circumstances further information on the position of the Indian Government became desirable, particularly because the Tezpur statement con tained mainly an account of conditions in Lhasa and the journey to India, although one paragraph stated categorically that the Dalai Lama “left Lhasa and Tibet and came to India of his own free will and not under duress.”32 Nehru saw the Dalai Lama at Mussoorie, a hill-station north ol Delhi and met the press afterwards: the letters to the Chinese General were authentic, but written at a highly troubled time when the Dalai Lama was still hoping that a break with the Chinese could be avoided. Reacting to his provocative references to India, Nehru invited the Panchen Lama to come to India and ascertain the truth for himself; he could also send others, including the Chinese Ambassador, to meet the Dalai Lama. This was interpreted by the press as an invitation to the Chinese Government to take the initiative and reach an

31 Hsinhua, summaries of April 22 and 23, 1959. The Question of Tibet and the rule of law, pp. 163–170. 32 April 18, 1959. Dalai Lama and India, p. 155–158.

The Border Dispute With China 103 understanding directly with the Dalai Lama.33 Nehru confirmed that a peaceful settlement was still possible and expressed the hope that the Dalai Lama would return to Lhasa sometime or other as he “did not want this tremendous tension to continue.” The offer to the Chinese Ambassador was formally repeated in an Indian note, which also expressed distress over the furious campaign in press and radio in Peking. Because of old contacts, it said, recent events in Tibet had affected the people of India considerably, but there was no question of any interference in its internal affairs. The Government considered it most unfortunate that the grant of asylum to the Dalai Lama “should have led responsible persons in China to make serious allegations which are unbe- coming and entirely void of substance.”34 Reporting to the Lok Sabha Nehru stated that his broad policy was governed by three factors: (1) the preservation of the security and integrity of India, (2) our desire to maintain friendly relations with China and (3) our deep sympathy for the people of Tibet. Referring to the Five Principles he mentioned in particular mutual respect for each other: “Such mutual respect is gravely impaired if unfounded charges are made and the language of the cold war used.”35 In the Rajya Sabha, the Upper House, a member objected to debating a motion on Tibet under the item Foreign Affairs as Tibet was part of China:

It will infringe the provisions of the Panchsheel which we have accepted… to discuss the affairs pertaining to another country, will amount to our conceding the dangerous precedent of other foreign countries discussing our internal affairs.

This argument, which received support from the Communist leader Bhupesh Gupta, was an obvious echo of the Chinese agency report of March 28 quoted earlier. Dr. Kunzru, the appointed independent member, dealt with it by saying that friendly relations could be based only on frankness and free expression of opinion, the absence of which would constitute national cowardice. Parliament had never been reproached for going out of its province in expressing an opinion about the policies of countries in respect of their colonies; a discussion of Tibet was even more warranted by India’s recognition of Chinese suzerainty

33 The Hindu, April 25, 1959. Chou En-lai had expressed the hope that the Dalai Lama would be able to free himself from the grip of the rebels and return to the motherland. Speech of April 18, 1959. Doc. on Internatl. Affairs 1959, p. 173. 34 Statement by Foreign Secretary to Chinese Ambassador, April 26, 1959. White Paper i, pp. 68–69. 35 April 27, 1959. Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, Vol. i, p. 37.

104 chapter 6 subject to regional autonomy. An influential Congress member, B. Shiva Rao, added “no matter where human rights are trampled, our foreign policy should be such that there is no room for the charge that we observe different standards in different parts of the world.” In his main speech Gupta declared that the situation had come as a godsend to some people to strike at the foundation of Panchsheel and he invited members at least to mention whether they stood by Panchsheel or not.36 These exchanges caused Nehru to elaborate on the Five Principles. Gupta’s rhetorical statement had made him wonder whether the words had the same meaning to all who used them, but nevertheless he would act upon the Five Principles even if others did not. Events on the border would not make him give up the policy of non-alignment, because the moment he did that “we lose every anchor that we hold and we simply drift.” Similarly he rejected a common defence policy with Pakistan. But he called it a tragedy that something India had laboured for had suffered very considerably in people’s minds: the words Bandung and Panchsheel began “to lose their shine and to be hurled about without meaning…just like even the word ‘peace’ becomes almost like a thunderbolt or a minor war the way it is used.” The way of using them counted most and that was why he was aggrieved beyond measure at the charges made against India.37 In the next debate Kripalani recalled a speech delivered in 1958 when, talking about Panchsheel, he had said that this doctrine was born in sin, because it was enunciated to put the seal of approval upon the destruction of Tibet. Now he questioned how it was possible to stick to Panchsheel after China had broken it. There could be no respect for the principles and no coexistence unless the idea applied to more nations than one. It should be noted, however, that Kripalani reiterated his support for the continuation of the policy of non-alignment. Coming from a principled socialist this attack on Panchsheel was directed against what appeared as a soft policy towards an aggressive communist state and against over-emphasing the importance of the Five Principles in a world of power politics. With his usual cynicism he related how nation after nation having sworn by Panchsheel had later violated them. The communist leader Dange thought that the crack suffered by Panchsheel would be resolved through friendly debate and pleaded with the Prime Minister not to give it undue pro minence. He tried to demonstrate China’s goodwill by mentioning the absence of press reports, out of deference to Nehru, relating to Indian measures against

36 Debate of May 4, 1959. Sen, Chanakya, op. cit., pp. 217–228. 37 Prime Minister on Sino-Indian relations, Vol. i, pp. 14–45.

The Border Dispute With China 105 strikes,38 an argument which sounded rather irrelevant in view of the resolution of the People’s Congress at Peking which noted with regret the extremely unfriendly statements made by “certain people in Indian political circles.” This text further confirmed that China had consistently abided by Panchsheel.39 The Central Executive Committee of the cpi fell completely in line, welcomed the Chinese resolution and expressed regret that Nehru, who had played an outstanding role in building friendship between India and China – “one of the greatest events of our time” – had permitted himself to take positions “which cannot be reconciled with his own foreign policy and its guiding principle, the Panchsheel, on whose basis alone India’s relations with the People’s Republic of China can be upheld and carried forward.”40

Diplomatic Notes Returning to the exchange of official notes we find a most peculiar statement by the Chinese Ambassador to the Indian foreign secretary on May 16. It complained of the appearance, before and after the outbreak of the rebellion, of “large quantities of words and deeds slandering China and interfering in China’s internal affairs”; most of the political parties in India went so far as to form organisations in support of the Tibetan rebels; responsible members of the Indian Government had asserted that the basis of the Tibetan rebellion was not limited to upper strata reactionaries and that the agreement between Tibet and China had not been kept. The Dalai Lama, the note asserted, was still being surrounded and under control and it would therefore be futile to send someone to see him; this would be even more inappropriate if, as India alleged, he were entirely responsible for the statements betraying his motherland. On the whole India was a friend of China, the enemy of China being in the east – the u.s. imperialists; China would not be so foolish as to antagonise the u.s. in the east and India in the west. “Friends! It seems to us that you too cannot have two fronts. Is it not so? If it is, here then lies the meeting point of our two sides. Will you please think it over?”41 The Indian reaction was concise: it called the statement wholly out of keeping with diplomatic usage and the courtesies due to friendly countries, a serious lapse which could only be considered as an act of forgetfulness. It appeared that according to China Panchsheel might or might not be applied according to con- venience or circumstances. India, on the other hand, adhered to the principles

38 May 8, 1959. Sen, Chanakya, op. cit., pp. 235–257. 39 Resolution of April 28, 1959. Ibidem, p. 313. 40 Resolution of May 12, 1959. 41 White Paper i, pp. 73–76.

106 chapter 6 as a matter of basic policy and not of opportunism; its policy of non- interference with China’s internal affairs should not be understood to mean that India would discard or vary any of its own policies under pressure from outside.42 The prepared statement which opened the first press conference of the Dalai Lama implied that his cabinet was still functioning as the lawful government of Tibet by saying that he and his government were fully prepared to welcome a peaceful and amicable solution, provided that it would guarantee the preservation of the rights which Tibet enjoyed prior to 1950.43 After careful consideration, the Indian Government decided that it could not allow this statement to go unnoticed, if it wished to avoid further Chinese reactions. The spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry made clear that the Government did “not recognise any separate Government of Tibet and there is, therefore, no question of a Tibetan Government under the Dalai Lama functioning in India.”44 This clarification apparently had the desired effect and the name of the Dalai Lama temporarily disappeared from the diplomatic notes, which subsequently dealt chiefly with two main subjects: the treatment of Indian representatives and nationals in Tibet and border issues. The incidents along the border had no direct connection with the disappearance of Tibetan autonomy, except when Tibetan refugees were fleeing to India; in some cases China complained of abduction of people who were considered as refugees by India. The increased frequency of the incidents, however, could partly be explained by Chinese military activity against the rebels, demanding a better system of frontier posts and thereby heightening the chances of unintentional trespassing. It was the toughness shown over these issues, contrasting sharply with Chinese overtures to Nepal and Burma for a rapid settlement of frontier problems, which caused a further deterioration of Sino-Indian relations.

Challenge to the Entire Border

The Chinese position regarding the McMahon Line crystallised as a result of incidents near Khinzemane, close to the Bhutanese frontier, where patrols from both sides claimed the area, and near Longju where an Indian forward

42 Statement to Chinese Ambassador of May 23, 1959. Ibidem, pp. 77–78. 43 June 20, 1959. Dalai Lama and India, p. 162. His Cabinet apparently had denounced the 1951 agreement on March 25, 1959 (i.e. before his arrival in India) because of persistent Chinese violations. 44 Statement of June 30, 1959. Sen, Chanakya, op. cit., p. 364.

The Border Dispute With China 107 picket was being fired at and arrested by a strong Chinese detachment. India’s Ambassador in Peking complained that this unilateral action was completely uncalled for, as it should be possible to settle any dispute about points on the frontier by negotiation.45 The Chinese Foreign Office accused the Indian troops of provocations necessitating the Chinese to return fire in self-defence. Although no Chinese had entered Longju they considered it to be an indisputable part of their territory and maintained that even on British maps Longju was clearly within their territority.46 India was determined to stand by the McMahon Line, which in her opinion departed from well recognised geographical features only at a few places. The Government was prepared to discuss its exact alignment in the disputed areas, but requested the maintenance of the status quo in the meantime and offered not to send her troops back to Longju if the Chinese withdrew their personnel. The note added that China would not have sought to send armed personnel into Indian territory if the principle of peaceful coexistence and the continuance of Sino-Indian friendship had been acted upon.47 This document must have crossed Chou En-lai’s reply to Nehru’s letter of March 22 in which the Chinese Premier advocated a settlement “taking into account the historical background and existing actualities and adhering to the Five Principles, through friendly negotiations conducted in a well-prepared way step by step.” While previously he maintained that China had not yet had time to revise maps of the kmt regime he now went into detail to show that the boundary shown therein was not without grounds and that early British maps drew the borderline roughly in the same way. Chinese policy was defined as affirming the fact that the entire boundary had not been delimited, but also facing reality in taking into consideration the friendly relationship between both countries. China did not recognise the McMahon Line but her troops had never crossed it. Until the beginning of 1959, the Chinese Premier continued, the atmosphere along the border had been fairly good; it had become increasingly tense only since the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet. “Immediately after the fleeing of a large number of Tibetan rebels into India, Indian troops started pressing forward steadily across the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary.” After casually remarking that the boundary drawn on current Indian maps cut even deeper into Chinese territory than the original McMahon Line, Indian troops were accused of invading Longju, Khinzemane and adjoining localities and “shielding Tibetan rebel bandits in this area.” Concluding with a paragraph on Panchsheel Chou En-lai wrote that the dispatch of guard units to the

45 Note of Aug. 28, 1959. White Paper i, p. 44. See Map 4. 46 Notes of Sept. 1, 1959. White Paper ii, pp. 1 and 3. 47 Note of Sept. 10, 1959. White Paper ii, pp. 8–10.

108 chapter 6

southeastern part of the Tibet region was undertaken merely to prevent rem- nant armed Tibetan rebels from crossing the border back and forth and in no way constituted a threat to India; “China looks upon its south-western border as a border of peace and friendship.”48 Nehru replied at length to every point raised by the Chinese Premier, but we shall leave his arguments till it is possible to discuss the various aspects of the border dispute more systematically. He agreed that until a settlement of the border disputes had been reached the status quo should be maintained, but if any party had trespassed into the other’s territory across the traditional frontier it should immediately withdraw. In this connection he declared that India had already withdrawn from Tamaden since careful inquiries had shown that it was somewhat north of the McMahon Line, but there could be no question of withdrawal at any other place. “No discussions can be fruitful unless the posts on the Indian side of the traditional frontier now held by the Chinese forces are first evacuated by them and further threats and intimidations immediately cease.” In his final paragraph the Indian Prime Minister regretfully wrote that in 1954 he had hoped that the main problems which history had bequeathed to India and China had been finally settled, but that now China had brought forward a problem which dwarfed in importance all that had earlier been discussed.49

Serious Incidents A serious incident took place near the Kongka pass in Ladakh on 20th October, resulting in heavy casualties to an Indian patrol. China accused Indian troops of intruding into her territory and opening fire. India described the incident as a sudden Chinese attack with mortars and handgrenades on a police party, which was looking for two missing men, well within Indian territory. After stating that this was the second armed attack on Indian personnel the External Affairs Ministry wrote:

These facts taken together with a continuance of aggressive attitudes in various parts of the frontier and the type of propaganda that is being conducted on behalf of the Chinese Government, are reminiscent of the activities of the old imperialist powers against whom both India and China struggled in the past. It is a matter of deep regret that the Chinese Govern ment, which has so often condemned imperialism, should act in a manner which is so contrary to their own assertions. It is a matter of even greater

48 Letter of Sept. 8, 1959. White Paper ii, pp. 27–33. 49 Letter of Sept. 26, 1959. White Paper ii, pp. 34–46.

The Border Dispute With China 109

regret that the Five Principles, as well as the Declaration of the Bandung Conference, should thus be flouted by the Chinese Government.50

The captured Indians and the bodies of the dead policemen were returned on November 14, but the accounts both sides rendered of the clash and Indian complaints that the treatment received was worse than that to which prisoners of war were entitled under the Geneva Convention continued for several months. In the meantime Chou En-lai replied to Nehru’s letter on 7 November, proposing that each side should at once withdraw its armed forces 20 kilometres from the McMahon Line in the east and from the line up to which it exercised actual control in the west. The Chinese Government further suggested discussions between the two Prime Ministers in the immediate future. Nehru reacted with a counter-proposal regarding Ladakh: India would withdraw all personnel to the west of the line shown as the boundary on Chinese maps of 1956 and Chinese personnel would be withdrawn to the east of the line India considered to be the international boundary. In view of the difficult terrain it was not possible for India to withdraw the border checkposts on the north-east frontier and to establish a new line of outposts in the rear, but as their personnel already had instructions not to send out any forward patrols the risk of new clashes would be eliminated if the Chinese would issue similar orders. Express ing willingness to meet his colleague at a suitable time and place Nehru felt that immediate efforts should concentrate on reaching an interim-understanding.51 Chou En-lai sent his next letter a month later agreeing to stop patrolling if this were not limited to the north-east but applied to the entire border. In addition he wanted to extend Nehru’s proposal to refrain from sending troops to Longju to ten other places under Indian occupation including Khinzemane and the Shipki Pass. The Indian suggestion of lines of withdrawal in Ladakh was rejected, because it would mean an evacuation of 33.000 square kilometres which had long been under Chinese jurisdiction; moreover, there was no need for making a special case out of Ladakh as the line of actual control was clear and China did not allege any major Indian occupation of her territory there. The proposal was, therefore, regarded as a step backward from the agreed principle that the status quo should be maintained. If, however, India persisted the Chinese Government would like to know whether India was prepared to apply her principle of withdrawal to the eastern sector and retreat from the McMahon line to the boundary shown on Chinese maps which followed the foothills of Assam. The letter also denied that China allowed herself

50 Note of Nov. 4, 1959. White Paper ii, p. 22. 51 Letter of Nov. 16, 1959. White Paper iii, p. 47.

110 chapter 6 to take “an attitude of big-nation chauvinism towards other countries, let alone encroach one inch upon foreign territory,” a subtle reminder of China’s power. China had vast areas which were only sparsely populated, so that it would be ludicrous to think that it wanted to seek trouble in some desolate areas of neighbouring countries. Finally, December 28 was suggested for a meeting of the two Prime Ministers. Nehru’s reply was curt, asking how the two Ministers could reach an agreement on principles if there were such complete disagreement about facts. He, therefore, preferred to wait for the promised reply to his letter of September 26 and the Indian note of November 4 as in any case he would be unable to leave the country at the time proposed.52 Coming, as it did, after only five days, the extensive Chinese reply, number- ing 23 printed pages, must have been kept in readiness. Many new arguments were advanced, supporting the Chinese position and increasing the extent of their claims. The note remarked that the negotiations of 1954 did not touch on the boundary question at all. At the time Chou En-lai had made it clear to the Indian delegation that the discussion should settle those outstanding questions which were ripe for settlement. The paragraph on the McMahon Line must have been even more disconcerting to Delhi, as it asserted that the Simla Conference at no time discussed the boundary between China and India and that the red line on the map attached to the Convention was presented as the boundary between Tibet and the rest of China. This implied the existence of a strip of Chinese, as distinct from Tibetan, territory in the mountainous area south of the McMahon Line. Again the right of Britain to conduct separate negotiations with Tibet was denied and several examples were given of k.m.t. protests to the British Embassy in China after the termination of the war with Japan.53 The Indian response contained an interesting change of position in so far as it maintained that there appeared to be no common basis for agreement, but nevertheless agreed to a meeting. Repeating that he was prepared to discuss specific disputes, but that he refused to determine afresh the entire boundary, Nehru wrote: “Although any negotiations on the basis you have suggested are not possible, still I think it might be helpful for us to meet.”54 This letter was written shortly before Khrushchev’s arrival in India. In view of Russia’s declared interest in a peaceful solution it may have been a necessary sign of goodwill. If Moscow was expected to bring some pressure to bear on Peking, it should be

52 Letters of Dec. 17 and 21, 1959. Ibidem, pp. 52 and 58. 53 Chinese note of Dec. 26, 1959. White Paper iii, p. 60. 54 Nehru’s letter of Feb. 5, and the Indian note of Feb. 12, 1960, were handed over together by the Indian Ambassador. White Paper iii, pp. 83 and 85.

The Border Dispute With China 111 enabled to argue that India had not cut off all possibilities of discussion.55 This peculiar invitation led to a meeting on April 19 in New Delhi lacking all preparations which normally should be regarded as a prerequisite for success. Instead both sides were equally keen to make their case as impressive as possible before the two Premiers had their discussions and the Indian statement was answered well before Chou’s arrival in Delhi. Their arguments will be discussed in combination with the Report of Officials which was compiled as a result of the decisions reached at this meeting. At this moment it is sufficient to say that the Chinese still did not reveal their own alignment, but concentrated on attacking the Indian evidence in an attempt to demonstrate the necessity of extensive negotiations on the frontier. Peking matched its conclusion that there were great differences between the two positions with a statement that China regarded the issue as of a limited and temporary nature which could be overcome, provided both sides adhered to “friendly consultations and the Five Principles, and adopt an attitude of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation.”56 Anxious anticipation by Indian observers of the forthcoming meeting between the two Premiers centred around two points. Firstly, China’s willingness to reach an agreement on the basis of the historical background and the present actual situation gave rise to the suspicion that China was aiming at a bargain to exchange her acceptance of the broad principles of the McMahon Line for Indian concessions on the corner of Ladakh. Although there is reason to believe that China never suggested such a deal in a concrete proposal, her emphasis on the status quo and the line of actual control implied that she was thinking of a compromise along those lines.57 The same impression was gathered from Chou’s press conference before departing when he said that as China was prepared to accommodate the Indian point of view in the eastern sector, India should accommodate China in the west; the McMahon Line was completely unacceptable, but he would not cross it. In practice, all that was available to India was a provisional agreement containing a standstill on China’s claims in return for conferring legitimacy on the Chinese occupation of Aksai

55 Bechtoldt, H., Indien oder China, p. 317. 56 Chinese notes of April 3, 1960. White Paper iv, pp. 8–16. 57 The Times of April 27 reported Nehru’s confirmation that the Chinese approach was to balance its possession of Ladakh against nefa. Lok Sabha debates, Vol. xliii, No. 57, col. 13791, however, quote him as saying that frequent attempts were made to “equate” the eastern sector with the western sector, which only refers to the nature of the disputes in these areas. See also Hindustan Times of April 27, 1960 and P.C. Chakravarti, India’s China policy, p. 121.

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Chin. Secondly, apprehensions concerning a possible agreement to exert pressure on the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet were caused by a paragraph in the latest Indian note stating that the Government were unaware of any deeper reasons behind the current tension over the previously tranquil borders; the note continued to say that apart from the boundary question nothing should be left undone to remove misunderstandings between the two countries.58

The Premiers Meet (April 1960)

In the prevalent mood of concern over Nehru’s allegedly soft policy few expected him to be adamant on India’s rights. Conversely the lack of agreement after 20 hours of talks strengthened his position and demonstrated that the traditional Indian attitude of willingness to enter into discussions could be consistent with his earlier warnings that no agreement could be forthcoming if there remained a fundamental difference on principles. The joint communi- qué was brief and conspicuously free of the usual gestures towards eternal friendship. It stated that officials of the two Governments should meet from June to September, alternately in the two capitals, to examine all historical documents, maps and other material relevant to the boundary question on which each side relied to support its stand. During the period of examination of the factual material “every effort should be made by the parties to avoid fric- tion and clashes in the border areas.”59 Nehru revealed in Parliament that his preference for immediate tabulation of material could not be realised, because the Chinese were unable to produce their documents at that moment. He did not imagine that the officials would make the border problem easy of solution, but at least it might make clear on what evidence the Chinese case rested. His talks with Chou En-lai had led to some relaxation of the high tension, but the basic conflict remained and the two statesmen had come up against “the hard rock of an entirely different set of facts.”60 Indian willingness to avoid clashes meant that no attempt would be made to eject the Chinese from Ladakh, but was conditioned by Nehru’s explanation that he could not immobilise the border patrols. Chinese comments expressed regret at the failure to reach agreement and accused “imperialism and reactionary forces in India” of

58 Dr. K. Shridharani in Amrita Bazar Patrika, Feb. 22, 1960. 59 Communique of April 25, 1960. 60 Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. xliii, No. 57, col. 13798.

The Border Dispute With China 113 obstructing the talks.61 Chou En-lai had tried unsuccessfully to establish six “common points or points of proximity”:

(1) There exist disputes with regard to the boundary between the two sides. (2) There exists between the two countries a line of actual control up to which each side exercises administrative jurisdiction. (3) In determining the boundary between the two countries, certain geographical principles, such as watersheds, river valleys and mountain passes, should be equally applicable to all the sectors of the boundary. (4) A settlement of the boundary question between the two countries should take into account the national feelings of the two peoples towards the Himalayas and the Karakoram Mountains. (5) Pending a settlement of the boundary question between the two countries through discussions, both sides should keep to the line of actual control and should not put forward territorial claims as pre-conditions, but individual adjustments may be made. (6) In order to ensure tranquillity on the border so as to facilitate the discussions, both sides should continue to refrain from patrolling along all the sectors of the boundary.

Particularly points 2, 3 and 5 must have been offensive to Indian sensitivities. The line of actual control only indicated the extent of military control and could have no connection with the task of deciding which country had a legitimate title to the areas in dispute. The Indian delegation refused to discuss its location altogether. The Chinese officials in their report stated that there were no marked differences over its present alignment, which they deemed of great significance to upholding tranquillity along the border and to the maintenance of the status quo.62 Thus they obviously attempted to shift the blame for any new incidents to the Indian side. In contrast with Delhi’s continuous insistence on the watershed as the underlying geographical principle of the traditional boundary China equated it with river valleys and mountain passes which, apart from being diametrically opposed to the Indian arguments was bound to create confusion over the Chinese alignment. The reference to national feelings towards the Himalayas could be interpreted as benefiting India’s case, which had previously emphasised that the mountain range was an intimate part of Indian culture. Nehru’s enumeration of the six points in parliament glossed over point 1 with the remark that of course there existed disputes, but

61 Peoples Daily, Peking, April 27, 1960. 62 Chinese report, p. 188.

114 chapter 6 his team of officials had second thoughts on this apparently harmless formulation; it could not be permitted to confer legality on the Chinese claims. Point 5 was, it seems, at first misinterpreted by Nehru, who said in the Lok Sabha that it could mean that nothing would be agreed unless the territorial claim was accepted. A few days later he added that it would be odd to say that the border dispute was something apart from territorial claims.63 The Chinese elaboration that the exchange of written descriptions and maps was only for the purpose of clarifying the location of the traditional boundary as understood by each government and should not imply territorial claims,64 was rather an indication of the continuing dualism in China’s policy. While objecting strongly to any alleged violation of her territory, she also hinted that a friendly settlement might include the vacation of occupied territory. China criticised the Indian position, but refrained from stating precise views on its own alignment. At his press conference of 25 April 1960 Chou defined the boundary in the West as the line which runs from the Karakoram Pass south-eastward roughly along the watershed of the Karakoram mountains to the Kongka Pass’. At the meetings of officials the Chinese side left many Indian questions unanswered and was generally less specific in its clarifications. They produced a map which differed from the map of 1956 which Chou En-lai had referred to as correctly showing the boundary, the principal divergence being the inclusion of the Galwan valley, where in the Western sector the encirclement of an Indian patrol almost provoked an armed incident in July, 1962. The Indian officials tried to point out the differences between the two maps, but the Chinese denied that there were any.65 Another extension of China’s claims became apparent only at the 15th meeting of the two teams when it was contended that Bara Hoti and two other localities, which previously had all been mentioned separately, formed one composite area of 300 square miles without any intervening wedges of Indian territory.66 The Indian officials did not accept the six points as basis for discussions since they had already been rejected by their Prime Minister and, moreover, dealt with matters within the discretion of the two Governments. The officials, it was argued, were required merely to offer documentary evidence in support of their stands, which could best be done by comparing official maps, ascertaining

63 Lok Sabha Debates, op. cit., col. 13791–96 and No. 60, col. 14784. 64 Chinese summary of statements leading to the adoption of the agenda. Report of the Officials, pp. 9–11. 65 Indian report, p. 262. See Map 2. 66 Ibidem, p. 94.

The Border Dispute With China 115 the alignments claimed by the two Governments and then bringing forward evidence to sustain their claims on overlapping sectors.67 Five meetings were required to reach agreement on an agenda providing for discussion of the location and terrain features of the boundary, treaties and agreements, tradition and custom, administration and jurisdiction. The boundary was divided in a western, middle and eastern sector, the Indian side adding a fourth sector for the boundaries of Bhutan and Sikkim with Tibet, which were not discussed by the Chinese officials. Similarly the Chinese team refused to consider the boundary between Kashmir and Sinkiang west of the Karakoram Pass, which it was to take up later with Pakistan. The instructions to the officials envisaged that they should complete their assignment by the end of September, but after rounds of talks at Peking and Delhi a third session was held at Rangoon, where the report was signed on December 12, 1960. The part which was drafted jointly only comprised three pages, the remainder of the long document being taken up by summaries of the statements brought forward, each drafted by the side concerned, and by comments on the evidence produced by the other side. Deadlock prevailed on almost every item, as shown below.

The Officials Report

In the exchange of notes India never contended that the boundary had been marked on the ground, but deduced the general principle that “formal definition or demarcation is not necessary for recognition of a boundary so long as it is fixed by custom and tradition and is well known.” Where there was a series of mountain ranges, the watershed rather than any other crest became the traditional boundary. In connection with Aksai Chin the argument was rejected that the area was more easily approached from the Chinese side, because accessibility was not a criterion for determining the alignment of boundaries. China did not accept that the boundary ran along the main watershed and also rejected the claim that a customary boundary which followed such unchang- ing natural features stood defined and did not require formal definition by the two sides. Instead the principle was advanced that “an international boundary signifies a demarcation line up to which neighbouring states exercise their sovereignty over their respective territories and must be jointly defined by the states concerned.” Even Britain, it was argued, had never asserted that there

67 Indian summary, Ibidem, pp. 4–8.

116 chapter 6 was no need to define formally the Sino-Indian boundary but had discussed it with China.68 The Chinese officials maintained that the entire boundary had never been formally delimited by treaty or agreement. The traditional customary line, reflected in their map, was formed gradually through a long historical process, mainly by the extent up to which each side had exercised administrative jurisdiction; it could not be mechanically defined by some geographical principle. For mountain people the Himalayan range did not necessarily constitute an absolute barrier to their activities or a limit of administrative jurisdiction. It was deemed inconceivable that in early periods of history the border was already fixed at its present alignment, especially as traditional boundaries tended to change continuously when strong control was exercised by one state in the border area. Without admitting any inconsistency they also argued that the line of actual control differed from the traditional customary line because of British imperialism and the recent pushing forward of India. These factors apparently could not contribute to the continuous process of change. As the border was not delimited and the Chinese officials did not want to get entan- gled in minute details it was not possible for them to be precise at every point, although they considered their alignment to be basically clear.69 The Indian officials argued that the boundary with China was a striking instance of a process of historical delimitation along the watershed in all sectors; such traditional boundaries did not naturally change, for if they did, they became artificial boundaries. Formal delimitation of a traditional boundary was an optional process, particularly when it had taken shape on the basis of natural features and had been recognised through custom. The vast discrepancies between the two alignments, which were much more extensive than those between China and Burma or Nepal, made demarcation and joint surveys impossible as part of formal delimitation “unless the Chinese side understood by this process negotiations for large scale adjustments of national territories.”70 Where the Indian and Chinese alignments coincided they followed the watershed, but when they diverged the Chinese line always swung towards India and never towards Tibet. India advanced as a “well-recognised principle of customary international law with innate logic” that when two countries are separated by a mountain range and there are no specific boundary agreements, the traditional boundary tended to take shape along the crest which divided

68 White Paper iii, pp. 87, 89; iv, p. 9. 69 Chinese report, pp. 3–5, 178, 186–187. 70 Indian report, pp. 285–286 and 281.

The Border Dispute With China 117 the major volume of the waters flowing into the two countries.71 In the western sector China claimed the lower Karakoram range, which was the highest crest in the area, but the watershed ran more to the east. In the middle sector the Chinese alignment had no correlation to natural features and on the whole lacked precise indication, while in the east it continued from the southern border of Bhutan along the foothills. The Chinese rejected the Indian definition of a watershed as equivocal and different from what had been internationally acknowledged, but failed to give a definition of their own. They used the fact that in the eastern sector rivers originating in Tibet broke through the watershed to show that the Indian alignment did not follow this criterion either.72 This fact as such was recognised by the Indian officials, who emphasised, however, that it did not make the ranges any less watersheds, dividing the greater part of the waters on either side. But the Chinese team called the entire Indian method of deduction untenable; China could similarly ask why, with the Indian boundaries with Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan following the foothills of the Himalayas, the boundary in the eastern sector alone could not do so. The principle of the watershed having been adopted in most places when the McMahon Line was drawn, it became of great importance to India to establish the treaty-making power of Tibet and the validity of the Simla Convention. Article iii of the 1956 treaty between China and Nepal stating that all treaties and documents which existed in the past between China and Nepal were thereby abrogated, was mentioned to show that Tibet had been in a position to sign treaties and that China recognised such treaties, and particularly the treaty of 1856, as valid. The argument that in 1904 the Chinese Amban in Lhasa assisted the British in concluding the Anglo-Tibetan agreement, which was specifically recognised by China in the Convention of 1906, was less convincing, as it could be said that his presence demonstrated Chinese authorisation to sign the treaty.73 The Chinese side, however, refuted this point in a different manner by listing the Convention under treaties forced upon China by the British and therefore an unacceptable product of imperialism. In general they claimed that Tibet had no right to conclude treaties with foreign countries unless authorised and consented to by the Chinese central government. The 1842 agreement concerning Ladakh mentioned the Chinese emperor by name and the treaty of 1856 with Nepal also was said to have been dealt with by the Chinese Amban; at any rate both were quite different from the Simla

71 Ibidem, pp. 236–237. 72 Chinese report, pp. 177–178. 73 Indian report, pp. 111–115. In fact, the Amban, though well disposed towards the British mission never signified acceptance of the Convention and showed great skill at evasion.

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Convention which China had definitely declined to recognise. The trade regulations of 1914 concluded at Simla and followed in practice for almost fifty years likewise were declared null and void because of their relationship to the “illegal” convention. Earlier China had already maintained that the Simla Convention did not touch on the Sino-Indian border and challenged India to point to any particular page in the conference records as proof of the line being discussed; it was considered inconceivable that ownership of territory involving such a large area could have been determined without any previous discussions. In addition the incompetence of the Tibetan authorities to conclude treaties on their own was demonstrated by British efforts in the past to acquire the Chinese signature under the Convention.74 India found several inconsis- tencies in the Chinese case. Arguing that the red line on the map of 1914 only represented the boundary between China and Tibet, the Chinese officials also attempted to show that the area south of this line traditionally belonged to Tibet. To dispute Tibet’s power to have direct dealings with India regarding their boundary also was to jettison most Chinese evidence as the majority of the records produced came from Tibetan sources, referring to a Tibetan Government. But the Chinese officials denied any ambiguity since India was mixing up the right to conclude treaties separately with the right of local authorities to function within their competence. India further complained that China used parts of western maps and travellers accounts to support her claims, but repudiated other parts of the same publications. The Chinese delegation openly admitted doing so,75 but saw no contradiction because these reports generally reflected a policy of aggression; if even in those accounts certain specific portions could be found which were consistent with the Chinese view, this would all the more prove the strength of their position. This rejection of everything which could be regarded as a left-over of British imperialism constituted the best example of the divergence in the basic approach of both sides. India being the successor to a colonial power could not but stick to the boundaries of British India or else there would be no criteria to determine her territory. Soon after independence she had announced that she would change unequal treaties and followed this up by relinquishing her extra-territorial rights in Tibet. But that was as far as she could go. The acceptance of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet made it much more difficult for India to defend her position than if she had been dealing with an independent Tibet. The controversy over the Simla Convention is a case in point. India condemned the Younghusband expedition as imperialist intervention, but intervention in Tibet and not in China. Her officials wrote that towards the end of the 19th century and around 1914 Chinese suzerainty had virtually disappeared and that Britain, far from

74 Chinese report, p. 25; White Paper iv, p. 14. 75 Chinese report, p. 173.

The Border Dispute With China 119 intimidating China, had helped to restore her influence in Tibet; British fears of Tsarist Russia also made her anxious that Chinese authority should push southwards, right up to the traditional boundaries of Ladakh and Kashmir. Therefore, if China wanted to substantiate her charges of British imperialism it would be necessary to show that the areas concerned had traditionally been a part of China, and that certain British individuals had deliberately altered the traditional alignment because of imperialist ambitions; every item should be considered on its merits and not be set aside on the basis of general allegations.76 At the border talks at Beijing of June 27, 1960 the Chinese casually produced a map incorporating an additional 2000 square miles of Ladakh compared with their claim on the 1956 map, which repeatedly had been declared to represent accurately the Chinese concept of the traditional border. Questioned about this discrepancy the Chine first tried to dismiss the differences as trivial, but then surprisingly took the position that the two maps were ‘equally valid’.

Chinese acquiescence? A Chinese note of November 5, 1947 had inquired whether the Government of India had replaced the former Government of British India “in assuming the treaty rights and obligations hitherto existing between British India and Tibet,” which question had been answered in the affirmative. The reference to Tibet instead of China was interpreted by India as proof of the acceptance by China of the treaty-making powers of Tibet, and also of the recognition of the Anglo- Tibetan boundary agreement of 1914. In 1950 India, replying to the Chinese Government’s expression of their anxiety to stabilise the “Chinese-Indian border,” stated that the “recognised” boundary between India and Tibet should remain inviolate.77 If the Chinese Government did not accept the Indian boundary it was, in the opinion of the Indian officials, impossible that they would not have said so on this occasion. The Chinese objection that the situation on the boundary in 1950 was in conformity with the alignment now being shown on Chinese maps was refuted with the argument that no evidence had been furnished to establish Chinese or Tibetan presence in the disputed areas of the western sector; the Chinese side could not base any claim on unlawful intrusion by the Liberation Army which passed through Aksai Chin in 1950. A third instance of Chinese acquiescence in the Indian alignment was deduced from the Five Principles in the 1954 agreement. India felt that the principle of territorial integrity could only have been confirmed if the two Governments had clear and precise knowledge as to the alignment of their common frontier. The question of the boundary had actually been discussed in

76 Indian report, p. 157. 77 Foreign Minister Ch’en Yi in December 1961. Fisher, Rose and Huttenback, op. cit., p.130. See Map 3.

120 chapter 6 connection with the passes and the compromise reached could only be interpreted to mean that their use did not involve ownership, because they were border passes. In addition, India had made it explicitly clear that there were no outstanding questions with the Tibet region, let alone uncertainty regarding the alignment of the boundary. China must have been aware of Nehru’s authoritative statement on the McMahon Line in 1950 and of the inclusion of n.e.f.a. in the Indian constitution. It would have been a violation of the Five Principles if China, having in mind large claims to Indian territory, had given no indication of them at all. Since, despite frequent opportunities, China had not till September 1959 disputed the traditional Indian alignment, it was estopped from doing so.78 The Chinese team brushed aside the principle of estoppel as “absurd”. Although they did not give any reasons why, it was clear from their case that they denied any acquiescence in the Indian alignment: the exchange of notes of 1950 concerning stabilisation of the frontier could not be interpreted as recognition of the Indian alignment, because it had not yet been marked on official maps. Regarding the negotiations of 1954 they argued that the agreement was one of trade and intercourse not touching on the boundary question, which therefore had not been mentioned during the discussions. Nor did the acceptance of the Five Principles mean that the boundary was clearly delimited; Burma and Nepal had all accepted them, but still agreed to settle the question of delimitation through consultations. Finally, they quoted Nehru’s offer of signing Panchsheel with Pakistan to demonstrate that he did not think that countries must first have a commonly recognised boundary before they could declare their acceptance of the Five Principles.79 The Indian officials pointed out that one could sign a Panchsheel agreement if there were well-known and recognised disputes with the other party, but that this would be impossible if one had vast undisclosed claims to the territory of the other. We shall return to these arguments in Chapter 7, which discusses the legal aspects of the border dispute.

78 Indian report, pp. 98–100 and 271–276. See also White Paper iii, pp. 60, 91–92. China argued that the passes could not be regarded as points on the border. Her draft for the 1954 agreement had read “The Chinese Government agrees to open the following passes in the Ari district of the Tibetan region of China for entry and exit by traders and pilgrims of both parties,” but India had proposed to say that “Traders and pilgrims…may travel by routes traversing the following localities and passes.” Finally, agreement was reached on “Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and routes.” Peking interpreted her concession only as consent to a wording which did not involve a decision on ownership of the passes. 79 Chinese report, pp. 30–31.

The Border Dispute With China 121

China’s Agreement with Burma The Sino-Burmese agreement of October 1, 1960 confirmed the boundary along both the watershed and the McMahon Line in most places. It was quoted by the Indian side as an example of erroneous alignments on Chinese maps, which prior to 1953 had shown a large part of Burma as Chinese territory. Their case was complicated, however, by uncertainty over the exact location of the tri-junction of the borders between the three countries. Nehru revealed in parliament that an informal note had been sent to the Burmese Government specifying the coordinates of this tri-junction at Talu Pass. The Chinese negotiators, however, had proposed the Diphu pass, five miles to the south of the watershed and the result was that the text of the treaty did not give any coordinates of the western extremity of the Sino-Burmese frontier. The line drawn on the map annexed to the agreement, however, did show the tri-junction at Diphu pass and consequently was “likely to have prejudicial effects on 75 square miles of Indian territory.”80 In diplomatic correspondence between India and China, Peking stated that the Diphu Pass was only a dividing point on the Sino-Burmese boundary and not its western extremity; the traditional tri-junction was located far south of the pass. The implication that the boundary could still be extended southwards was rejected by India by pointing at the caption of the annex to the agreement “Map showing the entire boundary between Burma and China.”81 The Burmese Government tried to keep aloof from the controversy and, admitting that the line on the treaty map ran down to Diphu Pass, stated that if and when India and China should agree on a tri-junction at another place that point would have to be entered in the treaty and the map would also have to be altered.82 The principles underlying the Sino-Burmese alignment nevertheless tended to support the boundary claimed by India in the eastern sector. There China asserted that the Inner Line along the foothills, proclaimed in 1873 by the Government of British India as the limit beyond which people were prohibited from going without special permission, really constituted the international boundary. The agreements with the hill tribes who promised “to act up to any orders we may get from the British authorities” and often received annuities conditional on their good behaviour83 were not accepted by China as sufficient

80 Lok Sabha Debates, Feb. 15, 1961, Vol. L, col. 149. 81 Indian notes of Dec. 30, 1960, March 30, June 16, Sept. 19, 1961; Chinese notes of Feb. 21, May 4, Aug. 6, 1961. White Paper v, pp. 20–37. 82 Reply to parliamentary question on March 6, 1961. Burma Weekly Bulletin March 16, 1961, Vol. ix, No. 46, p. 428. 83 Indian report, p. 203.

122 chapter 6 proof of British sovereignty and jurisdiction. In her opinion British payments were only compensation for tribes giving up their traditional income and interests in the Indian plains. China attempted to show that parts of n.e.f.a. had contributed religious dues to Tibet and, through the Tibetan system of “political-religious unity” had thereby recognised her jurisdiction. Ivan Chen’s admission at the Simla conference that religious influence did not necessarily imply temporal power was thought to have applied only to the dividing line between Tibet and China, which Tibet wanted to push eastwards.84

Deadlock

The vast differences of opinion emanating from the reports of the officials left the chances of an agreement very slim. Their contents were laid before the Lok Sabha immediately after its session had been opened by the President’s Address, which contained the following paragraphs:

In spite of present unwillingness, or even intransigence, my Government hope that sooner rather than later China will persuade herself to come to a satisfactory agreement with our country in regard to our common frontiers. … My Government will, however, seek to adhere firmly to the principles which this nation regards as basic in our relations with nations.85

Several members objected to the passive formulation of the government’s policy and remarked that China would never vacate occupied territory unless she knew that India was strong enough to force her out. Nehru tried to soothe feelings by saying that the position could be regarded as stabilised since August, 1959, and that India was fairly well protected against new intrusions.86 The Government refrained from indicating what further steps they might take and maintained this silence after considering the report. Replying to parliamentary questions the line was taken that continued endeavours would be made to get the Chinese to agree to the facts of the Indian report and once the facts were accepted a peaceful solution would be possible.87 But the Prime Ministers never discussed the evidence together and China released extracts from the reports only a year and a half later. In any event they had some value

84 Indian report, p. 124, Chinese report, p, 173. 85 Lok Sabha Debates, Feb. 4, 1961, Vol. L, No. 1, col. 1–24. 86 Kami Singhji (Bikaner). Ibidem, Feb. 20, 1961, Vol. L, No. 5, col. 944. Nehru in No. 8, col. 1702. 87 Mrs. Lakshmi Menon in Lok Sabha. Ibidem, Aug. 10, 1961, Vol. lvi, col. 1159.

The Border Dispute With China 123 in so far as the Chinese assertions had been pinned down to a greater extent than ever before. Although Peking’s alignment remained less precise than the maps submitted by the Indian officials, it would be more difficult to extend its claims later. Except for a dispute which arose concerning the interpretation of the McMahon Line, new historical and legal arguments no longer played a preponderant role in the diplomatic exchanges, which would henceforward deal mainly with concrete grievances and proposals for interim measures to avoid incidents or military clashes. On the basic issues China had succeeded in building up a case which, regardless of its inherent value, was extensive enough to demonstrate that a compromise could be reached only through prolonged negotiations. Any satisfaction which India might have derived from the consolidation of both positions was severely affected by this conclusion, which ran counter to her argument that only minor adjustments of the frontier could be the subject of discussions. In the summer of 1961 R.K. Nehru, Secretary- General in the External Affairs Ministry, passed through Peking on his return from the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of Mongolian independence. Delhi emphasised that there was no question of negotiations, but the fact that he talked with various Chinese personalities whom he knew from his term as Ambassador there was apt to create the impression that the Indian stand was weakening. Meanwhile bilateral relations between Indian and China had deteriorated even further. The Chinese Embassy made a big case out of the expulsion of the correspondent of the Hsinhua News Agency and requested that his “legitimate right” to stay in New Delhi be restored in the interest of upholding the Five Principles and to preserve the principle of freedom of the press. Indian notes complained about obstacles put in the way of the pilgrim traffic, the itinerary of the Indian trade agent in western Tibet and the construction of his office at Gartok, which Tibetans were not allowed to visit by their local authorities. These impediments, the note said, “render virtually nugatory” the provisions of the 1954 agreement.88 Even Nehru’s assessment of stability along the borders proved too optimistic. Returning from his tour of the u.s.a. and Mexico he announced fresh incursions, intensive patrolling and the construction of new military roads by China. The establishment of three Chinese posts, one farther inside Ladakh than previous ones, notwithstanding, he thought that the military balance had changed in favour of India, although not as much as the Government would have liked.89 The Chinese advances were mainly in the

88 Chinese note of Aug. 1, 1960. White Paper iv, pp. 43–45; Indian note of Nov. 9, 1960. Ibidem, pp. 77–80. 89 Lok Sabha Debates, Nov. 20 and 28, 1961. Vol. lix, col. 151–153, 1858.

124 chapter 6 area which was claimed by their officials in 1960 in excess of the alignment shown on the maps of 1956. But China asserted that they had kept their patrols from going within 20 kilometres of the boundary, thereby unilaterally carrying out an earlier proposal which had been rejected by India. At the same time the Chinese note clearly hinted that if India considered it right to send troops to the areas which she claimed, China might have to take steps by despatching troops across the McMahon Line.90 This challenge was immediately taken up: “If the threat materialises and Chinese forces attempt to cross the McMahon Line, the Government of India would regard it as a further instance of aggression and take such action as may be necessary to meet this further aggression.”91 For the time being, however, most attention was given to Ladakh and it was China which did most of the complaining by protesting against Indian troops pressing forward. The Chinese now claimed that in 1950 Chinese troops entered the Ari District of Tibet from Sinkiang via the “traditional route” through Aksai Chin. India replied that the Chinese were “obviously antedating their aggression,” as there was evidence to show that Chinese forces did not pass through this area in 1950. This assertion was, however, not substantiated.92 At the end of April, 1962, China ordered her frontier guards to resume border patrols in the western sector, an activity which, according to India, had never been interrupted. If India continued to intrude into Chinese territory Peking would be compelled to do likewise along the entire boundary. This extension was in fact ordered in September.93

Expiration of the 1954 Agreement In 1954 India had proposed a long-term agreement for at least 20 years, but the Chinese Government, wanting a much shorter period, with considerable reluctance consented to an 8 year term only.94 Confronted with a deadlock in the border dispute and the virtual disappearance of trade with Tibet, Delhi showed little enthusiasm to enter into negotiations for a renewal of the 1954 treaty. A first essential for such talks was considered to be a reversal of Chinese aggressive policies and the restoration of a climate which assured strict observance of the Five Principles both in letter and in spirit. Proposing negotiations on a new agreement on trade and intercourse, China saw no reason to link this

90 Chinese note of Nov. 30, 1931. White Paper vi, pp. 3–7. 91 Indian note of Feb. 26, 1962. White Paper vi, pp. 10–13. 92 Chinese note of March 22 and Indian note of April 30, 1962. White Paper vi, pp. 22 and 33. 93 Chinese notes of April 30, 1962 (White Paper vi, p. 39) and Sept. 20, 1962. White Paper vii, pp. 80–81. 94 Indian notes of July 11, and 17, 1962. Ibidem, pp. 213, 216.

The Border Dispute With China 125 subject with the boundary question. The ensuing exchange of notes shed more light on Chinese attitudes towards India and the considerable influence exercised by events in Tibet: “If one respects the objective historical facts one cannot but acknowledge that there has been a dark side to the Sino-Indian relations since their very beginning.”95 This statement became less cryptic by enumerat- ing examples of Indian interference in China’s internal affairs since the Chinese army advanced into Tibet in 1950. “Obviously the Indian Government is not reconciled to the fact that the Chinese Government is exercising its sovereignty in Tibet.” India retorted coolly that if there were a dark side to their relations “it could only have been because the Government of China secretly nurtured undisclosed and unwarranted claims to indisputable Indian territory.” By taking the initiative on an extension Peking evaded responsibility for the termination of the agreement and created a dilemma for India. Its abolition would entail the loss of the only formal text in which the two countries subscribed to Panchsheel. Its continuation would carry the unpalatable implication that the Five Principles had been faithfully observed by both sides. Since, moreover, Delhi regarded the imposition of arbitrary regulations on Indian officials, traders and pilgrims as a clear violation of the treaty, in its opinion not only the preamble but also its detailed provisions had been violated and rendered useless. The agreement lapsed on June 3, 1962 and India withdrew her trade agents from Yatung and Gyantse. The consulate-general at Lhasa was maintained for another six months until India decided upon the closure of consular missions in both countries from 15th December.

Further Proposals

While India was adamant in its refusal to negotiate a new agreement, a careful effort was made to break the deadlock on the boundary question. India repeated Nehru’s offer of November, 1959 to withdraw Indian personnel to the west of the line indicated in the Chinese map of 1956, provided China withdrew to the east of the international boundary shown on Indian maps; this would apply not only to armed, but also to unarmed and administrative personnel. To demonstrate her desire for a peaceful settlement India added the concession that pending negotiations she was prepared to permit the continued use of the Aksai Chin road for Chinese civilian traffic. These suggestions, however, were rejected by Peking because they would require China to make a

95 Chinese note of May 11, 1962. White Paper vi, p. 198. China proposed negotiations on Dec. 3, 1961. Ibidem, p. 188.

126 chapter 6 one-sided withdrawal, while India was not prepared to apply the same principles to the eastern sector and withdraw to the foothills of Assam.96 The skilful manoeuvring of the Indian Prime Minister to make an opening for talks with China which would be acceptable to Indian public opinion suffered a setback. Instead the military situation grew extremely tense with an incident in the Galwan valley on July 10 when troops came within a hundred yards of each other in an area which was part of the strip added to the Chinese claim in 1959 as compared to their alignment of 1956. Both sides claimed that previous patrolling had not encountered posts of the opponent in the valley. An armed clash was narrowly averted as the Chinese withdrew a short distance just at the time that the Indian Cabinet was said to have authorised the surrounded patrol to use force. But several weeks later two Indian patrols came under Chinese fire, one on the Chipchap river, the other in the vicinity of Pangong lake. Peking and New Delhi lodged protests on the same day, each accusing the other of opening fire. The situation seemed serious. India, though faced with tremendous supply problems, had managed to establish some posts behind the Chinese forward positions and continued to probe into the area. Armed clashes were possible at any time. Nevertheless an unexpected lull occurred, which some attributed to contacts between the Chinese Minister Chen Yi and Krishna Menon during the conference on Laos at Geneva. An Indian note announced willingness to discuss the boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials drawn up in 1960 “as soon as current tensions have eased and the appropriate climate is created.”97 China approved the suggestion for further talks and proposed to hold them as soon as possible. Her note began, however, by asserting that “China had never crossed its national border” and that she could give no consideration to the Indian suggestion to make a one-sided withdrawal “neither in the past nor in the future”. The addition that “there need not and should not be any preconditions for such discussions” formed a further indication that no measures for an improvement of the climate, as considered essential by India, would be forthcoming.98 The Indian press and opposition leaders criticized their government’s latest note for failing to emphasize that the Chinese should withdraw from the 12.000 miles they had occupied. They showed concern over the paragraph stating that India could not understand why the Chinese forces were not restrained from going beyond even the 1956 claim line. It was interpreted as Indian

96 Indian note of May 14, 1962, and Chinese note of June 2, 1962. White Paper vi, pp. 43, 57. 97 New York Times, Aug. 7. Indian note of July 26, 1962. White Paper vii, pp. 3–4. 98 Chinese note of Aug. 4, 1962. White Paper vii, pp. 17–18.

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preparedness for further concessions provided China would limit her claims to the line of 1956. Yet, the offer to enter into discussions was followed by an expression of hope that China would give a positive response to the concrete suggestions for relaxation of the current tensions. And these included the demand for a withdrawal from occupied territory. In parliament Nehru confirmed that India had not abandoned her old position that any talks should be preceded by the withdrawal of the Chinese, although he did not specify the extent to which this would be a prerequisite. He would, however, say that the present situation was such that India could not have serious talks with the Chinese; “For the rest I want freedom of action.” Apparently convinced by his exclamation “We would prefer to be reduced to dust than submit to dishonour of any kind”, the Lok Sabha was prepared to grant him such freedom. The Prime Minister also made a distinction between talks and negotiations and explained that he only proposed talks to determine what should be done to ease tension and to create a suitable climate for proper negotiations on the boundary question.99 The next Indian note attempted to turn the Chinese rejection of preconditions against Peking: its refusal to consider mutual withdrawals was described as “laying down impossible preconditions and asking for acceptance of the Chinese claim regarding the boundary in this region before further discussions start.” India added that she would be glad to receive a Chinese representative to discuss essential preliminary measures. China subsequently repeated the proposal for withdrawals of 20 kilometres on both sides of the line of actual control along the entire border and proposed October 15 as the starting date for discussions on the boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials, first in Peking, later in New Delhi. Although it was clear that there was considerable difference of opinion concerning the subject of these talks India agreed to the meeting in Peking.100 But complications in the eastern sector were to cause the Indian Government to change its mind. In September India was accused of sending troops into Che Dong and “actively extending the tension to the entire Sino-Indian border” by crossing the McMahon Line.101 Che Dong or Dhola was south of the Thagla ridge which, being the watershed, was identified with the McMahon Line by the Indian side. In crossing this ridge China, in Indian eyes, had violated the McMahon Line and was thereby responsible for the armed incidents which occurred.

99 New York Times, Aug. 14; Lok Sabha Debates, Aug. 14, 1962. Vol. vi, col. 1776, 1753. 100 Indian note of Aug. 22; Chinese note of Sept. 13; Indian note of Sept. 19, 1962. White Paper vii, pp. 36–37, 71–73, 78. 101 Chinese note of Aug. 4, Indian note of Aug. 8, and Chinese note of Sept. 16, 1962. Ibidem, pp. 14–15, 22, 74.

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Chinese actions, however, could also be interpreted as a retaliation against Indian moves behind Chinese lines in Ladakh earlier that summer. China moved south to demonstrate her claim and did so at a point where there could be a discrepancy between the McMahon Line as shown on the map of 1914 and that indicated by the watershed. This difference arose because the coordinates calculated from the 1914 map did not correspond with the actual location of the places and terrain features indicated. India saw no reason to attach less importance to the Simla alignment, as it inevitably was only a sketch map of small scale with a grid based on incomplete scientific surveys. In the case of Dhola the coordinates would work to the advantage of Tibet, but in other places the Indian boundary would be advanced further north. Delhi therefore did not adhere strictly to the coordinates of the map, but only to the underlying principle of the highest watershed ridges. In any event China knew that India regarded the Thagla ridge as the border. India, therefore, made her consent to discussions dependent upon termination of the latest intrusions.102 As the Indian position on the scope of these discussions remained unchanged, Chinese withdrawal to the north of the McMahon Line became a precondition for talks on a relaxation of tensions and an improvement of the climate.

The Fighting Starts

Before leaving for a visit to Ceylon in October 1962 Nehru confirmed that the Indian army had been ordered to clear the Chinese from the territory they were occupying south of the McMahon Line.103 They did not get far as China released a major offensive. On October 20 Chinese personnel overran Dhola, surrounded Khinzemane and simultaneously launched a series of attacks in Ladakh. Action of this size could not have been undertaken without extensive planning. In the Pangong Lake area of the western sector the Chinese even managed to bring up tanks. Broadcasting to the nation Nehru called on the people of India to face united “the greatest menace that has come to us since independence.”104 While Indian forces were continuing to fall back Peking issued a statement that China did not want a single inch of India’s territory. Although relations were very tense, there was no reason to abandon the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the spirit of the Bandung Conference,

102 Indian note of Oct. 6, 1962. Ibidem, pp. 100–102; Nehru’s letter of Nov. 14, White Paper viii, pp. 15–16. 103 The Times, Oct. 13, 1962. 104 The Times, Oct. 23, 1962.

The Border Dispute With China 129 and China listed three proposals. Both countries having agreed to seek a peaceful settlement should respect the line of actual control and withdraw their forces 20 kilometres from that line along the entire border. If India agreed to this, China would be willing to withdraw her frontier guards in the eastern sector to the north of the line of actual control and both countries could undertake not to cross this line in the middle and western sectors; finally, talks between the two Prime Ministers should be held at once and Chou En-lai would be prepared to come to Delhi. An appeal was directed towards the Afro- Asian countries for efforts to bring about the realisation of these proposals.105 The Indian Government ascribed only one objective to their opponents: to force India to accept a settlement on Chinese terms. This India refused categorically; she could never agree to talk under threat of force and stood by her earlier position that there must be a restoration of the position of September 8, 1962, the day when China first crossed the McMahon Line as interpreted by India.106 In a personal letter Nehru added that he was not able to understand “the niceties” of the Chinese proposals which mentioned lines of actual control. Chou En-lai replied that he meant basically the line existing between the two sides on November 7, 1959 and that he would not “force any unilateral demand on the Indian side on account of the advances gained in the recent counter-attack in self-defence.” The Chinese Prime Minister did not wish to restore the state of the boundary existing prior to September 8, 1962 as it was “unfair and pregnant with the danger of border conflict,”107 because of recent Indian encroachments and the establishment of military strongpoints on Chinese territory. Chou also wrote at length to the leaders of Asian and African countries to explain the dispute. Such boundary questions between Afro-Asian countries were a legacy of history and not the same as issues between Afro-Asian countries and the imperialist powers. India, he continued, inherited Britain’s covet- ous desires towards Tibet “or sought at least to transform it into a buffer zone between China and India.” Interpreting China’s sincere desire for conciliation as a sign of weakness, India had crossed the line of actual control first in the west, then in the east. “Casting off the cloak of ‘non-alignment’ the Indian Government has openly begged for military aid from the United States of America and is receiving a continuous supply of u.s. arms.” Finally, the letter

105 Statement of the Government of China, Oct. 24, 1962. The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, pp. 1–5. The three proposals were communicated to the Indian Prime Minister in a personal letter from Chou En-lai of the same date. White Paper viii, p. 1. 106 Indian note of Oct. 26, 1962. White Paper vii, pp. 125–127. 107 Letters of Oct. 27 and Nov. 4, 1962. White Paper viii, pp. 4–10.

130 chapter 6 expressed the hope that the Afro-Asian leaders would continue to exercise their “distinguished influence to promote a peaceful settlement of the Sino- Indian boundary question on a fair and reasonable basis.”108 A series of maps enclosed with this communication provided useful information concerning Chinese interpretation of the line of actual control. This line appeared to coincide with the Chinese claim line of 1960 except in the Parigas area of the western sector, which was then under Indian occupation, and four similar areas in the middle sector; in the east it followed the McMahon Line. According to India the Chinese forces were nowhere near the western claim line in November, 1959 and reached it only after the massive use of force in October– November 1962.109 Earlier Nehru had written to various Heads of Government to ask for their sympathy and support because India’s struggle “is in the interests of world peace and directed to the elimination of deceit, dissimilation and force in international relations.” The issue involved, he said, was not one of small territorial gains, one way or the other, but of standards of international behaviour between neighbouring countries, and whether the world would allow the principle “Might is Right” to prevail in international relations.110 When the Indian President declared a state of national emergency on October 26 the initial Chinese advance was almost at an end, leaving their forces in possession of Tawang while the Indians reinforced their defences on the Se La ridge. In Ladakh the Indian posts behind Chinese lines had been wiped out, but the occupation of territory beyond the Chinese claim line seemed limited to posts like Daulet Beg Oldi just below the Karakoram Pass from which Indian counter attacks could be mounted. In parliament, recalled to discuss the crisis, Nehru associated himself with the unanimous mood of angry resolution and declared that he accepted the Chinese challenge and all its consequences. He conceded, however, that it was not yet clear whether China meant the attacks as bargaining counters or intended further aggression. Closing the debate he spoke more moderately and, reaffirming that a cease-fire could only be negotiated on the condition of a Chinese withdrawal, he went on to point out that ultimately neither side could bring the other to their knees so that “some way must be found to finish the war in a way honourable to us.”111 The same day a successor was announced to Krishna Menon who had resigned from the Cabinet, first as Defence Minister then as Minister of

108 Letter of Nov. 15, 1962. The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, pp. 6–36. 109 Comments on Premier Chou En-lai’s letter to Heads of Afro-Asian states, pp. 10–11. 110 Letter of Oct. 24, published by Indian Ministry of External Affairs. 111 The Times, Nov. 9 and 15, 1962.

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Defence Production, because of the heavy criticism against his policy of directing India’s defences against Pakistan rather than China. In the eastern sector Indian forces attempted to seize the initiative by active patrolling and attacked a Chinese hill position. On November 15 the long lull ended when China launched a massive attack which quickly developed into a pincer movement with one prong close to the Burmese border in the direction of the Brahmaputra valley and the other via Se La and Bomdi La towards Tezpur. When its momentum was at its heaviest and nothing seemed to prevent a Chinese penetration into the plains of Assam, cutting them off from the main body of India, Peking announced that its troops would observe a cease- fire and, from December 1, would withdraw to positions 20 kilometres behind the line of actual control existing on November 7, 1959. On the Chinese side of this line a number of civilian checkposts would be set up.112 There were three contingencies for which China reserved the right to fight back in self-defence: if Indian troops continued their attacks after the Chinese frontier guards had ceased fire; if, after the Chinese had withdrawn 20 kilometres, the Indian troops should again advance to the line of actual control in the eastern sector, or refused to withdraw, but remained on the line of actual control in the middle and western sectors; and if Indian troops crossed the line of actual control and recovered their positions prior to September 8, Peking made it plain that the McMahon Line must be that shown on the map of 1914 and not the alignment claimed by Delhi. This meant that India should not attempt to move into the Thagla ridge area; in the west she should give up any hope of recovering the 43 forward posts and in the middle sector Wu Je or Bara Hoti was mentioned as an area which must not be reoccupied. China, on the other hand, would not leave troops in these places either and would vacate a much larger area than demanded by India as a condition for preliminary discussions, provided that India agreed to observe the demilitarised zones of 20 kilometres. The Chinese announcement of the establishment of civilian posts in the zone north of the border could be understood to allow India to do the same on her side, so that she would have some posts at the high passes as an alarm chain against renewed Chinese forays. All Indian opposition parties except the communists issued a joint statement expressing the conviction that the Chinese offer of a unilateral cease-fire was only another manoeuvre, calculated to cause confusion and gain time for consolidation to build up another offensive. Feeling within the Congress Party, though hardly expressed in the Lok Sabha, also seemed to be overwhelmingly

112 Statement by Chinese Government, Nov. 21. The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, pp. 39– 46; White Paper viii, pp. 17–21.

132 chapter 6 against acceptance of the Chinese offer.113 Peking’s move, however, was not an offer but a statement of intention, which would be implemented as long as Indian actions did not obstruct it openly. As Indian troops were under instruction to observe the cease-fire unless fired upon, nothing impeded the Chinese withdrawal, which got under way slowly. While India twice requested clarification of the alignment of the line of actual control Chou En-lai warned the Indian Prime Minister that the disengagement of troops could not be achieved merely by the Chinese pulling back without a reciprocal withdrawal by the Indian side. If the Indian side refused to cooperate even the cease-fire was liable to be upset. He suggested that officials from both sides should meet to discuss matters relating to the 20-kilometres withdrawal of the armed forces, the establishment of checkposts by each party on its own side of the line of actual control and the return of captured personnel; such a meeting would in itself be of great positive significance, as it would mean the return from the battle field to the conference table. Nehru’s reply attempted to combine points made by both sides in recent correspondence from which, it was thought, five principles emerged:

1. We should create a proper atmosphere for peaceful settlement of our differences. 2. We should settle our differences in a friendly way through peaceful talks and discussions. If we fail, we can consider what other agreed peaceful method of settling our differences should be adopted. 3. There should be no attempt to force any unilateral demand on either side on account of the advances gained in recent clashes. 4. The necessary preliminaries for talks and discussions suggested should be consistent with the decency, dignity and self-respect of both sides. 5. The implementation of these proposed arrangements will not in any way prejudice either side’s position in regard to the correct boundary alignment.

The Chinese disengagement proposals were incompatible with the Indian interpretation of these principles. Nehru regarded their suggestions as clearly aimed at securing physical control of areas which were never under Chinese administrative control; their line of actual control was only a series of isolated military posts and needed positive clarification without unilateral definition.114

113 The Times, November 22, 1962. 114 Letter of Chou En-lai of Nov. 28; Nehru’s reply of Dec. 1, 1962. White Paper viii, pp. 24, 28.

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A waiver of Delhi’s insistence on returning troops to the forward posts in Ladakh would leave little of substance between Peking’s intentions and India’s demands, particularly if India were allowed to send civilian police to at least some of these posts. Observers in Delhi were hopeful that the conference of six African and Asian Governments, which were to discuss the dispute at the invitation of the Premier of Ceylon, might be able to provide a compromise in this direction.115 Such optimism could, however, hardly be derived from official Chinese statements.

The Colombo Proposals

On the eve of the Colombo Conference Peking demanded a clear and definite reply from India to three questions: did India agree to a cease-fire, did she agree to a withdrawal of 20 kilometres from the line of actual control and did she agree to a meeting of officials to discuss these withdrawals to form a demilitarised zone, the establishment of check-posts by each party on its side of the line and the return of captured personnel?116 A spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a long statement to underline the reasonableness of its position leaving little doubt that flexibility in the Chinese proposals should not be taken for granted. In typical Chinese fashion Chou En-lai simultaneously sent a courteous telegram to Colombo welcoming a conference to promote the reopening of negotiations between China and India and wishing it success. The Indian approach to the conference was more reserved. In the Lok Sabha the Prime Minister expressed his hope “that they will appreciate that there can be no compromise with aggression and expanding imperialism, and that the gain of aggression must be given up before both parties try to resolve their disputes.” In the same speech he replied to the three Chinese questions by saying that India accepted the cease-fire and had done nothing to impede implementation of the cease-fire declaration. He favoured disengagement on the basis of a commonly agreed arrangement, which could only be the restoration of the line of September 8. Answering the third question Nehru said that before a meeting could take place the officials must have clear instructions regarding cease-fire and withdrawal arrangements which, therefore, must be arranged first. Consequently there was no meeting ground for the time being. Yet, illus- trating his willingness to explore all avenues of careful approach Nehru added

115 The Times, Dec. 5, 1962. 116 Chinese Memorandum of Dec. 1963. White Paper viii, pp. 31–35.

134 chapter 6 that, with parliamentary approval, he would even be prepared to refer the basic dispute to the International Court of Justice, though this also could only come when aggression was abandoned.117 The proposals agreed to at the Colombo meeting between representatives of Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, the United Arab Republic, Ghana and Ceylon remained a carefully guarded secret until they were formally published on January 19, 1963, well after Mrs. Bandaranaike had explained their contents both in Peking and New Delhi. The joint communique after the conference only stated that the members had reached unanimity regarding suggestions to India and China “in their attempt to bring these two countries together for negotiations to consolidate the cease-fire and to settle the boundary dispute between them.”118 Their efforts to bring about negotiations should continue until the final settlement of this problem could be negotiated directly between India and China. Mrs. Bandaranaike added that it was not the intention to adjudicate on the disputes of others but to create the necessary climate for bilateral negotiations. The conference, she said, had shown that the policies of non-alignment were still a living force: “our task today is to save non-alignment because that is the only way of ensuring world peace.” Two delegates substantially revealed their approach to the problem in their public opening statements. Speaking for the u.a.r. Ali Sabry suggested as a basic principle in conformity with the spirit of the Bandung Conference that there must not be any territorial gain on account of military operations. While this opinion stressed an important point in the Indian case, the delegate from Ghana, although objecting to the offer to settle disputes between Afro-Asian countries, seemed favourably disposed towards Chinese ideas about disarmed zones and quick negotiations on the fundamental issue. He thought it necessary to establish an area of disengagement “on mutually acceptable terms” in order to make a cease-fire effective until agreed frontiers had been successfully demarcated. The conference should, therefore, call on the two parties to meet and to determine the area of disengagement now.

117 Lok Sabha Debates, Dec. 10, 1962, Vol. xi, col. 5088–92. China was informed on Dec. 19. White Paper viii, pp. 35–38. 118 Ceylon Newsletter, London, Jan. 2, 1963 with communiqué of Dec. 12, 1962. The conference was attended by General Ne Win, and after his departure on Dec. 11 by Foreign Minister U Thi Han; Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio; H.R.H. Prince Norodom Sihanouk; Aly Sabry, Chairman of the Executive Council of the u.a.r.; Minister of Justice K.A. Ofori Atta; and Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike. The Ceylonese Ambassador to Burma, G.S. Peiris, visited New Delhi and Peking to hand over the proposals of the conference. Text also in White Paper ix, pp. 184–187.

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While the conference had mandated Mrs. Bandaranaike to convey the result of the deliberations to New Delhi and Peking she put Peking first on her itinerary. If Delhi had been reluctant to receive her before the visit to China because it expected a Chinese rejection, then its assessment proved to be wrong. A joint Sino-Ceylonese statement declared that the Chinese Government had given “a positive response to the proposals”.119 Immediately before her arrival the Chinese case had been restated in a published memorandum to India. The main new arguments were that the state of the border of September 8, 1962 could not be a common base-line for separating the armed forces since at that time the positions of the two sides were “interlocked in a jigsaw puzzle fashion.” In defence of the Chinese interpretation of the line of actual control of November 1959, Peking added that the extent of administration should not be confused with the location of frontier posts. China had continually exercised effective jurisdiction over Aksai Chin and Indian troops had only been able to establish positions on the Chinese side of this line because they were taking advantage of the Chinese cessation of patrols.120 In these circumstances it was clear that the Indian preconditions would not be fully met, however much the Colombo formula conceded the substance of Delhi’s case. Carefully balancing the responsibility which rejection of the formula would squarely place upon India, against the rigid demands of an incensed public opinion, Nehru informed the visiting delegations that he welcomed the initiative of the Colombo conference and would place their proposals before the next session of the Indian parliament.121 Publication took place a few days later together with the text of further clarifications given to the Indian Government. With regard to the western sector the conference appealed to China to carry out her proposed 20 kilometres withdrawal and to India to keep her existing military position. Pending a final solution the area vacated by the Chinese would be “a demilitarised zone to be administered by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon, without prejudice to the rights of the previous presence of both India and China in that area.” For the eastern sector it considered that the line of actual control recognised by both countries could serve as a cease-fire line and for the middle sector it urged a solution by peaceful means. Once implemented, these proposals would pave the way for discussions “for the purpose of solving problems entailed in the cease-fire position.”

119 Communiqué of January 8, 1963 at Peking. 120 Chinese memorandum of Dec. 29, 1962. White Paper viii, pp. 39–46. 121 Communiqué of Jan. 13, 1963, India News, London, Vol. 16, No. 3. In addition to the Ceylonese delegation, led by Mrs. Bandaranaike, talks were held with delegations from the u.a.r. and Ghana.

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A positive response to these suggestions would not prejudice the position of either government with regard to the final alignment. According to the expla- nations given in Delhi Indian civilians could go up to the Chinese line of actual control in Ladakh and to the McMahon Line in the eastern sector, with the exception of the Thagla ridge and Longju. The administration by civilian posts of both sides would be restricted to the demilitarised zone of 20 kilometres on the Chinese side in Ladakh. This was defined as a substantive part of the Colombo proposals and the two governments would only have to reach agreement on the location, the number of posts and their composition.122 Arguing that the Colombo formula offered certain advantages over the Indian demand to restore the position of September 8, Nehru defended his intention to approve it entirely. Except for 2 or 3 posts in south-east Ladakh, Chinese forces would be withdrawn from the entire area in which Indian forward posts existed previously and in the southeastern corner of Ladakh they would even go beyond the international boundary. He further emphasized that if bilateral talks resulted from mutual acceptance of the Colombo formula these would only be about various preliminary matters and would not consider the merits of the case. In view of Chinese reservations regarding the clarifications offered to the Indian Government the Prime Minister declared that both parties should express their willingness to accept formula and clarifications in toto before the stage of settling the remaining issues could be reached in direct talks. Rejecting an amendment of the non-communist opposition which stated that the Colombo proposals went against the honour, sovereignty and integrity of India, parliament approved the government’s policy of accepting them.123 On the same day Peking released the letter to Mrs. Bandaranaike in which the Chinese Premier consented to the publication of the full text of the Colombo formula. Chinese withdrawal having created favourable conditions for direct negotiations he accepted the proposals “as a preliminary basis” for meetings of Chinese and Indian officials, but maintained two points of interpretation: firstly, the stipulation regarding Indian troops keeping their existing military position should be applied to the entire border and not to the western sector alone; secondly, China would refrain from setting up civilian posts in the 20 kilometres zone on her side of the line of actual control provided that Indian troops or civilian posts did not re-enter this area.124 At a banquet in Peking in honour of Prince Sihanouk President Liu Chao-chi accused India of attempting to use the Colombo proposals to block the road to

122 White Paper ix, pp. 184–186. 123 Lok Sabha Debates, Jan. 23, 1963, Vol. xii, col. 5878–99. 124 Hsinhua, Jan. 25, 1963.

The Border Dispute With China 137 direct negotiations and to place the six participating countries in the difficult position of arbitrators.125 Around that time an ominously familiar pattern developed in the resumed exchange of notes between Peking and Delhi with China complaining of repeated incursions to the west of Spanggur Lake and India replying that the area was well within her territory. China also alleged Indian defence constructions on the wrong side of the Nathu Pass on the Sikkim border and India protested against the establishment of a new Chinese post south of the Karakoram pass, which subsequently appeared to have been demolished. Peking used its complaint concerning Nathu La for another request to India to dispatch officials for a joint investigation, but Delhi did not see the slightest need for this.126 Many notes were delivered but there was no significant increase of tension along the border. Although in parliament Nehru declared that India would not be debarred from sending troops to areas in nefa vacated by China and that this as well as the establishment of civilian posts in the demilitarised zone in Ladakh would be entirely a matter for the military to decide, it could fairly be assumed that the Indian army was under orders not to cross the Chinese claim line in Ladakh.127 Meanwhile China not only completed the announced withdrawals but also refrained from establishing civilian posts in four disputed areas. Shortly after the cease-fire announcement she had declared her intention to station civilian checkposts at five places in the eastern sector including Walong, but soon limited them to Dhola and Longju. Now Peking even omitted these two posts from a list of 16 in the eastern sector, all clearly on Chinese territory. Similarly Wu Je was dropped in the middle sector. In Ladakh civilian posts were announced at the seven places where, according to China, frontier posts had been maintained prior to November 1959 and which would be outside the area where India once established her forward military strongpoints; but they included Hot Springs, Kongka Pass, Khurnak Fort and Spanggur.128 The eased border situation, Chou En-lai wrote, would not become tense again provided the Indian side refrained from provocations and from re-entering the four areas where there was a dispute about the cease-fire arrangement. The Chinese stand for direct negotiations would not change, but the government was willing to wait with patience if – and this addition was much resented in Delhi – the Indian Government “owing to the needs of its internal and external

125 Feb. 12, 1963. Press Release 63005. 126 White Paper ix, pp. 25–27. 127 Lok Sabha, Feb. 25, 1963, India News, London, Vol. 16, No. 9. 128 Chinese note of March 2, 1963. White Paper ix, pp. 27–28.

138 chapter 6 politics” was not yet prepared to hold such meetings.129 Such pronouncements seemed to hint that no Chinese action would be taken against the re- establishment of Indian authority in other areas, although formally Peking maintained its reservation against Indian military advances. China’s real objection to the clarifications given by the three Colombo powers in New Delhi went against allowing Indian civilian posts on her side of the line of actual control. The 20 kilometres withdrawal from that line had put the Chinese troops behind their positions of September 8, thus satisfying one essential Indian condition, but any Indian presence there was consistently rejected. The exchange of notes, once again conducted at the level of the Prime Ministers, dealt mainly with the difference of interpretation of the Colombo proposals. India argued that first China should accept these proposals without reservations; after that the officials of both sides could meet to settle various matters left by the Colombo powers for direct agreement and to decide their implementation on the ground. The boundary question itself would then be taken up in one or more stages and if no settlement resulted India would be prepared to refer the differences to the International Court of Justice or to “some sort of international arbitration by a person or a group of persons.” Peking, on the other hand, did not recognise the Delhi clarifications as part of the Colombo proposals and considered the Indian position as an ultimatum to accept its interpretation of the original formula. Chou En-lai questioned why Nehru always advised other countries to settle disputes peacefully through negotiations, but took a diametrically opposed attitude towards the present dispute. The suggested reference to an international body was rejected categorically, because complicated questions involving sovereignty such as the boundary question could be settled “only through direct negotiations between the two parties concerned and absolutely not through any form of arbi tration.”130 With most of India’s original conditions satisfied and Peking having reservations only about a point which in any case would still have to be worked out, both sides were close to the substance of the Colombo proposals. Paradoxically, however, willingness to accept a solution under their aegis was decreasing. Indian statements concerning a fresh review of the position by the six countries and a renewed attempt to persuade China to accept their proposals were hardly realistic. The chances of the Colombo powers reaching agreement again on the same principles, let alone an elaboration of the earlier proposals, were extremely slim. Basically, the Indian government expected

129 Letter of March 3, 1963. Ibidem, p. 3. 130 Nehru’s letter of March 5; Indian note of April 3; letter from Chou En-lai of April 20, 1963. Ibidem, pp. 5, 34, 10.

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little from bilateral negotiations which could be justified as a reasonable success of its diplomacy and, therefore, showed no real interest in efforts to bring about such meetings. But China was determined to obtain bilateral talks which she had conducted with a fair amount of leniency with Burma, Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Her show of force had been intended primarily to bring India to the conference table. When this failed the Colombo interlude was accepted as a possible way towards direct negotiations although the internationalisation of the dispute must have raised doubts from the beginning. When the conference unexpectedly took a line which demanded more concessions from China than from India, its usefulness diminished although it could still serve as a background for showing the reasonableness of China’s actions. At the same time Peking did not want to give the full credit for its conciliatory moves to the Colombo powers as this would appear too much as a submission to international pressure. It subsequently turned away from their efforts and towards an exclusively bilateral approach. The visit of Aly Sabri to Peking in the second half of April produced no result. During the visit of the Chinese Head of State to Indonesia the joint communiqué expressed “resolute opposition to foreign intervention in the dispute since this would only undermine Asian- African solidarity.”131 The tour of President Liu could not erase the impression that China had gone back on her positive reaction to the Colombo formula. His hosts in Indonesia, Burma and Cambodia praised China for releasing Indian prisoners, but simultaneously expressed the hope that China and India would negotiate on the basis of the Colombo proposals. These meager political returns probably warned Chou that his own success could only be enhanced by reverting to the suggestions of the six non-aligned mediators. In Cairo he declared that he would back their continued efforts to bring about direct talks between China and India at an early date and to settle the border dispute peacefully,132 but added that Chinese measures had far exceeded the requirements of the Colombo proposals. His visit to Burma was one long tribute to peaceful coexistence, and the boundary of peace and friendship jointly delimited by the two countries was held high as a vivid manifestation of the Five Principles. The joint communique could imply a change of Chinese attitudes when the two sides “expressed the hope that China and India would find it possible to enter into direct negotiations on the basis of the Colombo proposals so as to remove

131 New Statesman (1963) 700–701. 132 Press conference on Dec. 20, 1963. Press Release 63062.

140 chapter 6 progressively the differences between them and finally achieve a friendly settlement.”133 Chou no longer spoke of acceptance “in principle.” The Prime Minister of Ceylon continued her mediatory efforts. When she visited Cairo it was rumoured that she had suggested a policing of the demilitarised zone in Ladakh by the neutral powers. Similar stories that in Colombo Chou offered a withdrawal of Chinese posts in this area remained unconfirmed.134 They coincided with official hints in India that an arrangement might be acceptable whereby neither side would maintain posts of any kind in the 20 kilometre zone on the Chinese side of the line of actual control. Such a proposal had earlier been made by two of Lord Russell’s representatives during their interviews with Nehru and Chou. At that time China rejected it, because the continued relaxation of the border situation would be assured as long as India did not cross the line of actual control; and Nehru declared that the suggestion did not originate with him, but with the British visitors.135 In April, 1964 Nehru informed the Lok Sabha of his commitment to Mrs. Bandaranaike that, should China offer a withdrawal of her civilian posts from the demilitarised zone, India would be prepared to consider it. Shortly before his death he was even more explicit in confirming to the All India Congress Committee that while India stuck to the Colombo proposals as a basis for negotiations with China, she was willing to negotiate, if neither side maintained any posts in the proposed demilitarised zone in Ladakh.136 China did not react to these overtures and quietly proceeded to set up stone- cairns marking her line of actual control. She remained extremely sensitive about private Indian contacts with Formosa/Taiwan and pronouncements of the Dalai Lama. She even held the Indian Government responsible for a trip to Formosa by a leader of the Swatantra party and for proceedings at a Moral Rearmament meeting, which were said to reveal deliberate support for the “u.s. imperialists plot of creating two Chinas.” A statement by Minister Shastri that details of the Dalai Lama’s intended visit to Buddhist countries in South East Asia would be discussed with him was the subject of a protest against interference in China’s internal affairs.137

133 Communiqué of Feb. 18, 1964. 134 The Times, Oct. 21, 1963; Feb. 27 and March 2, 1964. 135 The Times, Feb. 25, 1964. White Paper x, pp. 3–6. 136 Lok Sabha Debates, April 13, 1964. a.i.c.c. session at Bombay, May 17. See India News, London, Vol. 17 (1964) No. 16, 21. Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, Minister of State for External Affairs, declared in Colombo in June, 1964 that the Colombo powers should also take the next step to break the stalemate. Ibidem, No. 26. 137 White Paper x, p. 109, 112; Chinese note of March 23, 1964. Press Release 64029.

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The Question of Prisoners

During the few weeks between the Chinese advance to Se La and their massive penetration further south, India promulgated the Foreigners Law Ordinance, 1962, enabling the internment of Chinese citizens who were security risks. Approximately 3000 persons were detained in a camp at Deoli. At first Peking protested against the “persecution” of her nationals, then it accused India of holding them as hostages for blackmailing the Chinese Government and finally a dispute developed about their repatriation which resembled the prisoners of war issue in Korea. Delhi agreed to Chinese ships coming to Madras to fetch those persons who held passports of the People’s Republic and who desired to go to the Chinese mainland. But it refused to provide the names of other detainees and did not allow consular officials to visit them. Chinese notes used some of their strongest language on this issue:

The Indian Government is even acting in guerilla warfare collusion with Chiang Kai-shek gang elements to pressurize Chinese nationals into betraying their motherland. The Chinese Government and people cannot but pay close attention to all these treacherous schemes of the Indian Government.138

China particularly objected because the Indian measures were taken against “peaceful law-abiding Chinese nationals” while diplomatic relations were still maintained. The absence of a declared war was also used to explain Peking’s refusal to agree to a reciprocal exchange of information on prisoners through the International Committee of the Red Cross or to allow visits from its observers. Direct talks on captured personnel had already been proposed by Peking in one of its attempts to establish bilateral negotiations, but in its opinion there could be no question of putting them on the same level as detained civilians. India argued that her measures were necessary to prevent acts of subversion and sabotage or fifth column activities as well as to protect enemy agents from the wrath of the people. She replied to the Chinese note in kind:

It is the avowed objective of the Chinese Government to overthrow by war and violence the lawfully constituted Government of the independent peoples of Asia and Africa. War is as surely its gospel as peace is its bugbear.139

138 Note of April 27, 1963. White Paper ix, p. 124. 139 Note of June 10, 1963. Ibidem, p. 146.

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By the middle of 1963 three batches of interned persons had left India and China had released most military prisoners. Peking wanted to send another ship, but India replied that no more Chinese nationals desired to repatriate. While this debate continued India switched to the problem of cremating her dead which China had buried in the demilitarised zone. Peking was prepared to take care of their cremation but remained adamant in refusing Indian Red Cross parties accompanied by priests to cross the line of actual control. It was infuriated by an Indian announcement fixing a date and place for these parties to enter the Chinese demilitarised zone and stated that it was “absolutely impermissible to enter them without the consent of the Chinese authorities.”140 China seemed anxious to avoid creating any precedent by allowing an Indian presence on her side of the line as this would weaken her position on the only remaining difference over the Colombo proposals.

China’s Agreements with Other Neighbours

The increase in tension over the Sino-Indian border was in sharp contrast with the smooth conclusion of China’s border agreements with other neighbours. Details of the agreement with Burma relating to the tri-junction with India have already been discussed in this chapter. Here we should add that it contained a significant compromise in recognising Burmese sovereignty over the Namwan Triangle, but returning the area of Hpinaw, Gawlun and Kangfang (‘forcibly seized by Britain’) to China. It was signed by U Nu and Chou En-lai in Peking in September 1960 and ratified with great pomp, 1.2 mln Burmese receiving pieces of cloth and porcelain plates.

Nepal In March 1960 the Nepalese Prime Minister, B.P. Koirala, paid a visit to Peking which led to the creation of a joint commission to enquire into the grounds of dispute over some relatively important areas. Nepal further agreed to a demilitarised zone of 20 kilometres on each side of the boundary. In spite of this measure an armed incident was to occur in June, promptly followed, however, by a Chinese apology. After his unsuccessful talks with Nehru in New Delhi, Chou En-lai returned the call in April of the same year and went a step further by charging the commission to settle the boundary question. The Nepalese submitted 150 place names which were first disputed by the Chinese, who claimed 19 of their own but ultimately conceded most points including the

140 White Paper x, p. 78.

The Border Dispute With China 143 sentimental issue of Mount Everest.141 On 5 October 1961 King Mahendra signed a treaty confirming the traditional boundary along the watershed with some deviations in favour of Nepal and providing for joint demarcation. Its preamble read:

Noting with satisfaction…that the two parties have, in accordance with the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence and in a spirit of fairness, reasonableness, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, smoothly achieved on overall settlement of the boundary question between the two countries through friendly consultations.

The obvious allusion to India not possessing these virtues was carried further in the joint communiqué at the end of the visit. It included an oblique reference to Nepalese resentment against what was felt to be patronizing behaviour on the part of India:

The Chinese side…solemnly declared that all nations, big and small, must treat each other as equals and that China would never adopt an attitude of great nation chauvinism towards Nepal.142

The border commission worked surprisingly fast and on 20 January 1963 a protocol was signed at Peking declaring that the alignment described in an attached map had been demarcated in mutual agreement.

Pakistan Except for Pakistani protests in the United Nations that India had no right to settle the border between Ladakh and China there seemed to be no reason to suppose that a seato member like Pakistan would complicate the Indian border dispute by concluding an agreement with China. Delhi began to feel uneasy when the Chinese officials refused to discuss the alignment west of the Karakoram pass and Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir subsequently remarked that China had agreed in principle to a demarcation of her frontier with Pakistan,143 but its apprehensions were confirmed only a year later. A press release announced agreement between China and Pakistan to attain an understanding of the location and alignment of the boundary between Sinkiang and “the contiguous areas, the defence of which is under the actual control of

141 Patterson, G.N., Peking versus Delhi, p. 152. 142 Press releases 61055 and 61057. 143 The Times, Jan. 18, 1961.

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Pakistan.” The agreement would be provisional, to be replaced by a formal treaty after settlement of the Kashmir issue. This text also affirmed that the border “has never been formally delimited and demarcated in history.”144 India promptly asserted that there was no common border between Pakistan and China. She had so far believed that Peking had unreservedly accepted Indian sovereignty over Kashmir because Chou En-lai told the Indian Ambassador in 1956 “that the people of Kashmir had already expressed their will” on the issue of accession and conveyed the same expression to Secretary General Nehru in 1961. India now raised a protest against Chinese interference with her sovereignty.145 Peking made the most of its diplomatic success. After stating that the Chinese Government had never accepted without reservation the position that Kashmir came under Indian sovereignty and that, on the contrary, it had always refrained from making any remarks on the historical background of the problem, she wrote that the provisional agreement did not involve the question of ownership at all. The latter part of the note revealed why Peking attached so much importance to border negotiations with Pakistan.

Anyone in the world with common sense will ask: since the Burmese and Nepalese Governments can settle their boundary questions with China in a friendly way through negotiations and since the Government of Pakistan has also agreed with the Chinese Government to negotiate a boundary settlement, why is it that the Indian Government cannot negotiate and settle its boundary question with the Chinese Government?146

The Chinese desire to demonstrate that India alone of all southern neighbours had picked a quarrel over border alignments was underlined by the “speedy attainment of the agreement in principle on the boundary question left over by history.”147 The terminology of the agreement also had a bearing upon the Indian position. Article i stated “In view of the fact that the boundary…has never been formally delimited the two parties agree to delimit it on the basis of the traditional customary boundary line including natural features in a spirit of equality, mutual benefit and friendly cooperation.” The alignment followed the main Karakoram watershed, but once left it for another spur and a river bed to accommodate Pakistan in her desire for the pocket of Sokh Bulaq. Since the maps produced by the two sides were not fully identical it was agreed that the actual features on the ground should prevail and that they would be

144 Press Release 62009. 145 Note of May 10, 1962. White Paper vi, p. 96. 146 Note of May 31, 1962. Ibidem pp. 99–102. 147 Joint communique of Dec. 28, 1962. Press Release 62054.

The Border Dispute With China 145 determined as far as possible by joint surveys in the field. Wherever the boundary crossed a pass the water-parting line should be the boundary.148 The area in which the original claims overlapped was about 3400 square miles. The compromise border left about two thirds on China’s side, but while Pakistan in the main had given up only claims on maps, China would be withdrawing from about 750 square miles.149 The terms of the agreement seemed equitable, but the timing of their announcement on the eve of a round of talks between India and Pakistan decreased the already slim chances of finding a solution for the Kashmir problem. Delhi accused China of deliberately pursuing a policy intended to destroy the accord and amity which had been developing between India and Pakistan. Earlier it had called the joint communiqué a brazen attempt at legitimisation of the gains of aggression in the hope that the Chinese Government would thereby secure Pakistan’s support. While the Indian assessment of the growing amity with Pakistan could hardly be genuine, Peking exaggerated even more in writing that India, encouraged by certain Western powers, had redoubled her efforts to entice Pakistan into a joint anti-China campaign. It conveniently did not mention that several years ago, when the border dispute began in earnest, President Ayub Khan had offered a joint defence agreement which was refused by India.150

Afghanistan, Outer Mongolia and Bhutan A treaty with Afghanistan was signed on November 22, 1963, in Peking, which in many details was similar to the agreement with Pakistan. The boundary line followed the Mustagh range watershed and was drawn on Chinese and Afghan maps, which apparently showed no obvious differences. As in the case of Pakistan, disputes would be settled by the two parties through friendly consultations.151 To the surprise of Western observers China also formally fixed her 2500 mile border with Outer Mongolia, but no details were available of the agreement which followed secret negotiations and an exchange of delegations.152

148 Agreement signed on March 2, 1963 in Peking. Press Release 63009. 149 The Times, March 4, 1963. 150 Indian notes of Dec. 31, 1962 and March 2, 1963; Chinese note of Feb. 21, 1963. White Paper viii, p. 48; ix, pp. 1–3. 151 Press Release 63053. 152 Agreement of Dec. 26, 1962. The Times, Dec. 27. The history of Outer Mongolia (o.m.) shows an interesting parallel with Tibet. In December 1911 she declared herself independent, but a Sino-Russian declaration of 1913 (accepted by o.m. in 1915 with the treaty of Kiachta) limited her freedom. China recognised her autonomy and would refrain from sending troops (except a representative at Urga and an escort); Russia declared that o.m. was under the suzerainty and formed part of the territory of China. Political and

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All these agreements were concluded at a time when China’s perception of its security environment was rather tense, leading to a ‘fighting-with-two-fists’ strategy against both Soviet and American imperialists. Clarifying China’s own borders became a priority, but Nehru did not want to take the risk of opening negotiations. With Nixon Sino-us relations normalised and the demise of the Soviet Union removed that threat for China. Among the neighbouring countries Bhutan takes a special place. After repeated Bhutanese raids into Cooch Behar, Britain had occupied the border passes by force and, with the Treaty of Sinchula of 1865, made Bhutan cede the whole of the Douars and certain Hill Posts against an annual payment. Over the years relations improved and in 1904 Bhutan assisted the British campaign into Tiber. Rumblings of the coming Chinese revolution enhanced interest in regularising the situation along the borders with Tibet. With Bhutan the Treaty of Punakha of 1910 updated the arrangements by doubling payment to Bhutan to 100.000 rupees and revising art. viii to:

The British Government undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Bhutanese Government agrees to be guided by the advice of the British Government in regard to its external relations. In the event of disputes with or causes of complaint against the Maharajahs of Sikkim and Cooch Behar, such matters will be referred for arbitration to the British Government which will settle them in such manner as justice may require and insist upon the observance of its decision by the Maharajas named.

The agreement on being advised on foreign policy by Britain was taken over by India but changed substantially in February 2007. The India Bhutan Friendship Treaty adopted an element of equality in the following wording:

In keeping with the abiding ties of close friendship and cooperation between Bhutan and India the Government the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India shall cooperate closely with

territorial questions would be settled in tripartite negotiations. In the absence of detailed maps there was no definition of boundaries and o.m. was only said to comprise a number of regions. In 1919 the Chinese President cancelled her autonomy and sent troops across the Gobi desert. In 1921 the Mongolian People’s Republic was founded with Soviet help; it was recognised by nationalist China in 1946 after a plebiscite. The declaration of 1913, which was known to McMahon at Simla, influenced his proposals at the conference for a distinction between Outer and Inner Tibet.

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each other on issues relating to national interests. Neither government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interests of the other. Both countries also reaffirmed their respect for each other’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Bhutan had changed the policy of isolation largely as a result of the Chinese suppression of the Lhasa uprising in 1959, which made more than 2000 Tibetans flee to Bhutan. Faced with the need to maintain their national identity, already under pressure by Nepali’s in the south of the country, the government closed the border with Tibet, imposed a ban on the lucrative trade in rice and wool, and offered the refugees Bhutanese citizenship. Most of them refused, which after a long discussion in 1979 led to the stark alternative of leaving the country. Bhutan has only a few embassies of its own, including in India, Bangla Desh, Kuwait, Thailand, the un at New York and Geneva, and the European Union in Brussels. Relations with India have become essential for the independence of Bhutan. Indians train the Bhutanese army and economically the country is fully dependent on India. Beijing has been pushing for an exchange of embassies and offered economic aid, but Bhutan followed a policy of ‘neither friend nor enemy’. Yet, after the Indian defeat of 1962 contacts with China could not be avoided completely. The way Bhutan developed them reminds one of a cord dancer. They have to appear correct, but should not become too close. In June 1974 China was invited to the coronation of King Jigme Singyi Wangchuk and in 1981 agreed to conduct regular annual talks on the border in their respective capitals, but through special delegations. In 2015 these meetings completed their 20th round. Little is known about their content, except that Bhutan has little enthusiasm for the watershed concept favoured by India: it would lose a good chunk of territory if that criterion were adopted. Comparing these border talks with the Sino-Indian conflict we find several similarities. The fifth round produced a list of guiding principles on 14 May 1988:

1. Observing the five principles of peaceful co-existence… 2. Treating each-other on an equal footing and entering into friendly consultations on the basis of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation with a view to reaching a just and reasonable settlement; 3. Taking account of the relevant historical background based on traditions, custom, usage and administrative jurisdiction while accommodating the national sentiments of the people and the national interest of the two countries;

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4. Pending final settlement of the boundary question, maintaining tranquillity on the border and status quo of the boundary as before March, 1959, and refraining from unilateral action or the use of force to change the status quo of the boundary.153

The sixth round took place in Beijing in 1989 where the concrete issue of demarcation was broached Both sides claimed the 495 square kilometres of the Pasamlung and Jakalung valleys, Bhutan arguing that they were below the source of the Bazarguru chu of Kutote Dzongkhang of Bhutan. The next year in Thimpu the Chinese came back with a package proposal: Bhutan could get the two valleys if she conceded the 269 square kilometres which were disputed in the western sector and China considered of great strategic significance.154 The Bhutanese reply wanted to ensure that traditional grazing rights were not affected and that the border would be demarcated according to traditional lines. During the twenty years of talks China showed remarkable patience and was prepared to reduce her claims substantially, but the lack of results produced further uncertainty. By and large the status quo was maintained, although in November 2005 China caused an incident by building a bridge and a road on Bhutanese territory. The guiding principles of 1988 were more elaborate and thereby more favourable to Bhutan than the similar Sino-Indian set of April 2005. The reference to the Five Principles must have got an ironic reception in India where Panchsheel no longer was the obligatory paragraph in diplomatic language.

153 The Times of India, 15 May 1988, quoted by K.R. Shrikrishna, Foreign Policy of Bhutan: with special reference to its relations with neighbours since1952, p. 154. 154 In detail this area is made up of 89 km2 in Doklam, 42 km in Sinchulunpa and 138 km in Shakhatoe.

chapter 7 Legal Aspects of the Border Dispute

Traditional international law has often been regarded as an obstacle by the newly independent states since its limited scope for peaceful change tended to retard their emergence. The present legal system, including the results of a long process of authoritative prescriptions, had emerged without the active participation of the new states. Their recent colonialist past was regarded as a dark, illegal and even immoral episode and often an attempt was made to find a new and unprejudiced basis for their statehood in their history of several centuries ago. The Chinese border disputes with India and Burma even produced arguments which went back to the second and third centuries. Actual practice in Asia showed a preference for conciliation rather than application of a legal rule, but the amazing array of doctrines advanced in the Kashmir dispute provided an example of an extensively legalistic approach. In general, recently acquired sovereignty was guarded jealously, acquiring a connotation of absolute authority independent of any control by the world community.1 This characteristic placed the Asian states halfway between the western concept that modern international law is largely made up of limitations of sovereignty and the communist emphasis on absolute sovereignty. Marxist ideology regarded international law as a weapon in the struggle for peace and real sovereignty of nations but – besides being vague – these objectives are always seen in the political perspective of spreading communism. It was difficult to see how this approach could contribute to any real growth of a legal system and to a Western observer inconsistency in the interpretation of international law seemed to be characteristic of communist regimes. The border dispute provided several examples. Excessive stress on national sovereignty and the absence of jurisprudence almost excluded the communist bloc from the sphere of western concepts. Convinced of ultimate communist victory Marxism regarded any earlier system of world order as unrealistic. In anticipation of this victory the chief function of international law became that of ensuring peaceful coexistence, which Moscow regarded as the basic problem

1 Syatauw, J.J.G., Some newly established Asian states and the development of international law, pp. 222–230. He analysed the Burmese-Chinese boundary dispute, the Kashmir conflict and the Indonesian position on territorial waters. In the case between India and Portugal on the right of passage India raised no less than six preliminary exceptions to contest the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

150 chapter 7 of current politics.2 We are still without a comprehensive analysis of the Chinese approach to international law and the voluminous diplomatic exchanges between India and China may help in providing one. The border dispute left the impression that China adopted the Marxist concept of absolute sovereignty and for the rest used principles of international law when suitable to her case, but on other points renounced them as imperialist relics. Examples of this attitude have already been encountered in Chapter 4 and will be amplified in the following pages. Apart from differences in assessing the value of international law it is not surprising that India appealed to legal principles more frequently than China, since she considered the entire length of the boundary to be defined by treaty, tradition and administrative usage. China, on the contrary, denied that there had been any valid definition in the past and demanded negotiations on the entire alignment while at the same time advancing evidence from maps, Chinese and Tibetan administrative records and travel accounts to establish the validity of her interpretation of the traditional boundary. Our analysis of the legal aspects of the border dispute starts with an examination of the status of Tibet and its alleged competence to conclude international agreements without the consent of China, with particular reference to the Simla Convention and the McMahon Line. This part is based on the historical description given in Chapter 2 and the arguments advanced during the border dispute. It is followed by a discussion of mountain boundaries and more particularly the watershed principle which was made the basic criterion of the Indian alignment. Next come the other factors involved in a disagreement over borders: the significance of maps and the extent of effectiveness of the alleged territorial sovereignty. Finally, the various sectors of the boundary are examined in detail.

The Legal Status of Tibet

Elementary qualifications of statehood are the possession of a sufficient and permanent population, a defined territory and an organised government which exercises factual control. Lauterpacht added the requirement of a sovereign government which has supreme and independent authority within the borders of the country.3 Hyde did not consider it essential that the state should be independent, but it should have and use the right to enter into foreign

2 Stuyt, A.M., Gespleten Volkenrecht, The Hague, 1962. 3 Lauterpacht, H., International Law, pp. 118–119.

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relations either with or without restrictions.4 His opinion, which Korowicz5 explained as a willingness to conciliate the colonial system of administration with international law, found support when the British House of Lords judged the transfer of the control of foreign affairs consistent with the maintenance of sovereign power.6 Faced with the existence of states which obviously did not possess full sovereignty Lauterpacht’s system included them as imperfect subjects of inter national law, which he described as non-full sovereign states to indicate that they had supreme authority with regard to a part of the functions of the state, but came under the authority of a different state in respect of other matters. He admitted, however, that imperfect international personality and non-full sovereignty were an anomaly, but avoided further difficulties by saying that statehood alone did not imply membership of the Family of Nations and that a state became an international person through recognition only and exclusively.7 A protectorate, like suzerainty a kind of international guardianship, was characterised as a relationship in which the protected state always retained a position of its own as an international person, the extent of which would depend on the terms of the particular treaty. But recognition of the protectorate on the part of third states was considered necessary to enable the superior state to represent the protected state internationally. Suzerainty normally implied that the vassal state had no relations with other states since they were entirely absorbed by the suzerain. Again, the exact nature of the relationship between vassal and suzerain depended upon the details of each individual case and examples could be quoted of vassal states enjoying some treaty making power.8 General definitions of suzerainty similarly were subject to qualification. They normally considered the vassal to be a mere portion of the suzerain state; treaties concluded or wars declared by the suzerain would ipso facto apply to the vassal and the suzerain would bear a certain responsibility for the actions of the vassal state.9

4 Hyde, C.C., International Law, (1922) 16–17. 5 Korowicz, M.S., Introduction to International Law, p. 71. 6 Duff Development Cy. v. Government of Kelantan (1924). a.c. 797, 814. Hackworth Digest i, p. 51. 7 Lauterpacht, H., op. cit., p. 125. 8 Ibidem, p. 190. As a vassal of Turkey, Egypt could conclude commercial and postal treaties and, like Bulgaria, send and receive diplomatic agents and consuls. The first South African Republic could conclude treaties provided Great Britain did not interpose a veto within six months after receiving a copy of the draft treaty. In 1885 Bulgaria fought a war against Serbia independently of her suzerain and in 1898 Egypt conquered the Sudan conjointly with Great Britain and acquired condominium. 9 Sen, D.K., “La situation internationale du Thibet,” r.g.d.i.p. xxii (1951) 417–438

152 chapter 7

In a list of present international persons Lauterpacht’s edition of 1955 still mentioned Tibet as a half-sovereign state, although the author seemed to be aware of the 1951 agreement which reduced Tibet to a region of China.10 The concept of half-sovereignty seems to lack precision and to be a contradiction in terms; it assumes that the other half rests with a different country. This has inherent dangers in a period in which attempts are made to inflate the concept of national sovereignty. Nothing should be done to facilitate the identification of the exercise of a few specific rights with full sovereignty. As their exact nature would still have to be determined in each individual case, it would be useless to conceal certain political situations in an artificial and legally inconsistent manner. In a case of delegation of powers the main point to be determined is whether this is a permanent abandonment or temporary and revocable according to the sovereign will. If the transfer is revocable, sovereignty may be upheld; if not, there is no independence and thus no sovereignty.11 A definition of the relationship between Tibet and China comes up against the difficulty that China has never considered herself as a suzerain over Tibet. Her claim was based on the Manchu occupation of 1720 undertaken to evict a Mongolian army and imposed without any Tibetan opposition. There was no treaty or exchange of letters. The principal change was the disappearance of the King and the recognition of the temporal powers of the Dalai Lama assisted by a council of ministers. In practice, however, the early demise of four Dalai Lamas placed supreme authority in the hands of Lama regents for over a century. The Chinese Ambans played some part in Tibetan government until the collapse of the Manchu dynasty, but their authority was subject to great fluctuations and in 1890 and 1893 proved insufficient to implement the Sino- British agreements. The Dalai Lama owed personal allegiance to the Emperor in what Richardson called the old, unwritten, flexible bond between Patron and Priest.12 He paid tribute once every three years and the Emperor’s representatives sometimes participated in his election and inauguration. There was no express cession of rights. The relationship was far more vague than that between the Emperor and the Mongolian Kings, who yearly did homage and paid tribute, were obliged to assist the emperor in war with troops and received a subvention from him.13 There is also no firm historic evidence that Tibet ever was a province of China nor are there Chinese claims to this effect before 1911.

10 Lauterpacht, H., op. cit., p. 258. 11 Korowicz, M.S., op. cit., “Some present aspects of sovereignty in international law,” p. 89. 12 Tibet and its history, p. 103. 13 Sen, D.K., op. cit., p. 427.

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Nationalist Chinese writers rejected the argument that Tibet was a vassal of China and asserted China’s claim of sovereignty.14 Li presented as a historical fact that Tibet had long been an integral part of China and quoted with approval a notice posted by the Chinese Amban at Lhasa in 1904 proclaiming that “for more than 200 years Tibet has been a feudatory of China.” He also asserted that during the negotiations for the Anglo-Chinese convention of 1906 Britain refused to go further than recognising Chinese suzerainty but that China insisted on full sovereignty. In the end the convention, which confirmed the Lhasa text of 1904, included neither concept and registered a British engagement not to annex parts of Tibet while China undertook “not to permit any other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.” The next year the Anglo-Russian convention recognised Chinese suzerainty, but this neither benefited China nor detracted from her (or Tibet’s) rights. The Simla Convention of 1914, already described in Chapter 2 and discussed further presently, provided for recognition by Britain and China that Tibet was under the suzerainty of China, but Peking’s refusal to sign the agreement debarred her from invoking this concession. The International Commission of Jurists has drawn attention to the fact that sovereignty, being an essentially western term, entered Chinese vocabulary only after the 1911 revolution.15 Previously China had only occasionally described her claim that Tibet was a part of China as a feudal link, which was not necessarily identical to sovereignty but could not have implied more than a very limited degree of independence for Tibet. Her claim could have been consistent with suzerainty in so far as the territory of the vassal is considered as a mere portion of the suzerain state, but this very concept has always been rejected by Peking. The fact remains that Tibet independently concluded agreements with Nepal after the second Gurkha war and with Great Britain after the Young husband expedition. The peace treaty of 1856 with Nepal was signed by Lamas of the Lhasa government who agreed to the annual payment of 10.000 Rupees to Nepal, and to the admission of a Nepalese representative and trading-post to Lhasa. It granted extraterritorial rights to Nepal in so far as it provided for Gurkha jurisdiction in disputes between her nationals and joint adjudication of quarrels between Gurkha and Tibetan subjects. The Gurkha invasion had violated the stipulations exacted by China in 1792, but this did not prevent both sides from stating “The States of Gurkha and of Tibet have both respected

14 Li, Tieh-tseng, Tibet, today and yesterday, p.ii; The legal position of Tibet, pp. 394–396. Shen, Tibet and the Tibetans. 15 The question of Tibet and the rule of law, p. 85.

154 chapter 7 the Emperor of China up to the present time.”16 An acknowledgement of the mystical aura of the empire which four times had despatched an army to quell the international or internal troubles of Tibet, was an inexpensive safeguard against possible complications. Yet, this lipservice to China could not be a substitute for her participation in the agreement, so that this text supplied the major argument in favour of Tibet’s power to conclude international agreements on her own. The same applied to the Lhasa Convention of 1904, but that was expressly modified and confirmed by China in 1906. Both agreements illustrated the inapplicability of the traditional concept of suzerainty, which considered that the vassal state had no relations with others, these being absorbed entirely by the suzerain,17 or at the utmost allowed some subordinate international position. Other traditional aspects of suzerainty equally failed to be relevant: international treaties concluded by China did not ipso facto apply to Tibet which even remained neutral during the last war against Japan, nor did China bear a responsibility for any actions of Tibet. In any case suzerainty would not have continued after the fall of the Manchu dynasty, as China’s hold over Tibet could not have been more than a feudal derivative of that rule. Their relationship was mystical, feudal and remote from modern international law and “we only darken counsel by trying to cast it into western political or legal terms.”18 After the suppression of the Tibetan revolt Malaya and Ireland sponsored a resolution in the u.n. General Assembly, which “mindful…of the autonomy which they have traditionally enjoyed” called for “respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life.”19 The debates shed little light on the juridical position of Tibet. The Malayan delegate had no intention to raise the issue of Chinese sovereignty or suzerainty and concentrated on the violation of human rights. The French representative thought “that there actually has been some sort of dependent relationship between that country [Tibet] and China.” Nationalist China repeated that Tibet had been a part of China, in one fashion or another, for many centuries, and Britain regarded the status of Tibet far from clear, as some of the important facts were in doubt. The Turkish representative explained that Tibet had always been a semi-sovereign state and never a province of China; he

16 Richardson, H.E., op. cit., p. 247. 17 Lauterpacht, H., op. cit., p. 190. 18 Fawcett, J.E.S., Intervention in international law, p. 413. See also Syatauw, op. cit., p. 131 concerning Sino-Burmese relations. 19 Resolution 1353 (xiv) of Oct. 21, 1959. g.a.o.r., 14th Session, Verbatim records of 831st-834th meetings. See Chapter 2 for the debate of 1950.

Legal Aspects Of The Border Dispute 155 regarded her as a sui generis case. When a vote was taken France, India and Britain abstained on account of their doubts concerning the compatibility of the resolution with Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter which prohibited intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state.

The Simla Convention of 1914 Green applied the Western view of suzerainty to Tibet and argued that an agreement signed with a vassal state has no validity under international law, although it may be valid between the parties concerned.20 It is true, as he continued, that in the text of the Simla convention Britain indicated that she did not regard Tibet as an independent entity, but his addition that this meant a denial of Tibet “enjoying international personality” is open to questioning. Lord Curzon’s statement regarding his recognition of Tibet as an autonomous state clearly allowed for some international personality as distinct from complete sovereignty.21 Green’s suggestion that the Tibetan delegate merely acted as an expert adviser to the Chinese representative has already been countered by others in pointing at the equal status of the three plenipotentiaries.22 The Simla Convention remains one of its kind. In my paper for the 100th anniversary I called it ‘Almost abrogated, Never signed, Still relevant’. If McMahon had received his instructions in time, not only China, but also Britain would have quit. In the end London could live with his behaviour, but it was a narrow escape. Few conferences are studied so long after they were held. That is partly due to the absence of official publication of the contents, which made Aitchison’s Collection of Treaties and Sanads doubt whether it would qualify for inclusion. It finally appeared in a second printing of the 1929 edition, but issued much later.23

The McMahon Line The bilateral exchange between the British and Tibetan representatives and the Simla Convention, stripped from all concessions to China, were certainly binding between Tibet and Great Britain. China was debarred from enjoying any privileges under the agreement, including the recognition of her suzerainty, until she signed it. Could the Convention also have effect in respect of the state which had rejected it at the time of conclusion and later became the

20 China Quarterly, No. 3, p. 44. 21 See Chapter 2, for the history of this period. 22 China Quarterly, No. 5, 150–152 by Richardson, No. 8, 202–207 by “S.G.” 23 Confirmed at a 2014 conference by ICCS and IIAS. See also Chapter 10, note 3.

156 chapter 7 recognised successor-state to Tibet, which it had never regarded as independent. The Indian point that China never protested against the McMahon Line is well taken, but is of doubtful value for the Kuomintang period. Between 1911 and 1950 Chinese influence came nowhere near the Indian border and it was logical that objections to the Convention dealt with the more immediate problem of China’s own demands concerning the limits of Inner Tibet. This does not deny that nationalist China would probably have accepted the McMahon Line if her own demands had been granted. But juridically it seems sufficient that the Convention was not signed and that concrete objections to it, though not to all individual provisions, were repeatedly made clear. According to international law the treaties of an extinct state concerning boundary lines devolve on the absorbing state and after the subjugation of Tibet Communist China would thus seem bound by the separate bilateral McMahon agreement with Tibet. If this were true it would not be necessary to devote much attention to the Simla Convention at all. But here again we meet with the difficulty of the undefined status of Tibet. China did not entertain any suggestion of suzerainty and stated that without the authority and consent of China the Tibetan local authorities had no right to conclude treaties and that such an important question as the conclusion of treaties concerning the boundary with foreign countries was always handled by the Central Government itself.24 During his exile the Dalai Lama attempted to place the Indian Government on the horns of a dilemma: “if you deny sovereign status to Tibet, you deny the validity of the McMahon Line.”25 The Indian External Affairs Ministry, however, saw no connection between the line and Tibet’s juridical status and emphasized the absence of Chinese objections to it, following the Simla Con vention and its acceptance by the authorities controlling the frontier on either side. Our reaction to the Dalai Lama’s views would be that Tibet possessed treaty making powers, but that these did not amount to full sovereignty. The validity of the McMahon Line should be argued primarily on the basis of the letters exchanged between Britain and Tibet at Simla prior to the Convention. The Simla Convention itself was significant in announcing the alignment to China, which would henceforward be aware of British and Tibetan acceptance of the McMahon Line as their frontier. The bilateral exchange became even more important by its express reference to a boundary between India and Tibet, while the Simla Convention only dealt with the limits of Tibet, without mentioning India. The extent to which it also constituted an effective boundary will be discussed later in this chapter.

24 Chinese report, p. 25. 25 “The International status of Tibet.” Address at Indian Council of World Affairs, Sept. 7, 1959.

Legal Aspects Of The Border Dispute 157

Mountain Boundaries

In this study no distinction is drawn between the terms border, boundary and frontier which are all used to denote a dividing line between two states to delimit their territorial sovereignty. We shall not follow those geographers who are trying to standardise a difference by defining frontier as a zone and boundary as a line,26 even though history lends them some support. Originally two communities used to be separated from each other by a strip of no-man’s land, but in modern times such neutralised zones have become extremely rare. In the case of India the zonal concept belongs to the period of British colonial policy which often aimed at establishing a “three-fold frontier”,27 each line marking the limits of different degrees of claims and responsibilities of the Indian empire. The Inner Line defined the territory for which the government was directly responsible, the Outer Line showed the extent of authority claimed over tribes in the border area and a third line represented the limits of an outward strategic frontier. Britain was hesitant to fix an international boundary unless the absolute need arose on account of a forward policy by neighbouring countries. While avoiding complete administrative responsibility for the tribal zone this pragmatic attitude left open the possibility of further annexations later. The best example of British frontier policy was provided by the solution of the Afghan problem in 1893. Durand explained the line which would be named after him as follows:

I was to try to induce him (the Amir) to stand back behind a certain line: that is to say, he was to agree that he would not interfere beyond a certain line. It by no means followed that we were to advance up to that line. We were, however, free to do so if we saw fit; he was not to interfere with us.28

South of the Durand line a vague system, devised by Sandeman, of goodwill towards the tribes was based on giving them large allowances for comparatively little work. This method was fairly expensive but assured their allegiance while making it possible to employ a tribe to keep a pass open. On the other side of Durand’s line the strategic frontier against Russia was identified with

26 Stamp, L.D., “International status of Tibet.” Address at Indian Council of World Affairs, Sept. 7, 1959. See also his A glossary of geographical terms, Longmans, London, 1961, p. 75. 27 Boggs, S.W., International boundaries, p. 140. 28 Report of minutes of evidence of a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence appointed by the Prime Minister to consider the military requirements of the Empire as affected by the defence of India, 1907, p. 148.

158 chapter 7 the northern boundary of Afghanistan. These concepts were not applied to the princely State of Kashmir, where British interference was minimal, but in the east the situation was not very different from the North-West Frontier. The Inner Line skirted the foothills north of the Brahmaputra valley and the Outer Line was gradually pushed further northwards until it was regarded as the international boundary when embodied in the McMahon Line. Strategic considerations included Tibet, like Afghanistan, in the area in which Russian penetration should be prevented. International boundaries are based on treaties or effective occupation. Absence of a frontier treaty does not invalidate a border nor are boundary markers a prerequisite for the validity of a frontier provided it is well-known by tradition, marked by natural characteristics or described in an agreed map of sufficient accuracy. The Chinese argument that it “must be jointly defined” by the states concerned should be rejected as it would imply the necessity of negotiating all those frontiers which are not based on a formal agreement. Particu larly in a sparsely populated area a natural boundary following mountain ranges or rivers has much to commend itself, as it is capable of verbal definition without complicated arguments relating to the demarcation of the limits of effective occupation. It nevertheless has to yield to the stronger argument of display of sovereignty. If such a natural boundary exists along a mountain range the question arises whether in the absence of further indications the highest crest or the watershed should be regarded as the border line. International law has accepted the watershed principle,29 which was adopted in several awards relating to boundary settlements and implemented in border agreements. But Lauterpacht cautiously added that it is quite possible for boundary mountains to belong wholly to one of the states which they separate.

The Watershed Principle The term watershed is causing some confusion because of the difference between British and American usage. In British terminology it is equivalent to water-parting, but in America to river basin. In this study it is used in the British

29 Lauterpacht, H., op. cit., p. 534. The Boundary Question between China and Tibet, p. 1 OS-109. Krishna Rao, K., op. cit., pp. 404–406. We only take issue with the latter’s contention that it was adopted in the boundary settlement between Guatemala and Honduras, when in fact the tribunal concluded “that the mere physical fact of the existence of a watershed cannot be regarded as fixing the line of uti possidetis” (i.e. the divisions existing under the colonial regime); priority in settlement in good faith would appropriately establish priority of right. Award of Jan. 23, 1933, as far as it relates to the Motagua sector. Hackworth, Digest i, pp. 742–744.

Legal Aspects Of The Border Dispute 159 sense of the line separating two contiguous drainage areas.30 India defined it as “the line which divides the major volume of waters of two river systems”31 and did not claim all the territory draining towards the Indian Ocean. That would have taken her far into Tibet and also would have been inconsistent with her stand in the dispute with Pakistan concerning the distribution of water from the Indus and its tributaries. Her interpretation discounted the fact that several rivers broke through the Himalayan range and claimed that this did not affect the distinct character of her alignment as the watershed. In India the principle of the watershed, belonging to modern scientific geography, was something of an innovation introduced by the British administration.32 Previously, tribal penetration southward along routes through the passes or in river valleys had been a not uncommon feature of Himalayan trade contacts. The first instance of formalising the watershed in this area was the Anglo- Chinese convention of 1890 defining the frontier of Sikkim as “the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet.”33 The agreement also constituted an example of India having title to territory to the north of the main Himalayan axis as Kanchenjunga, the third highest top in the range, was situated well to the south.34 Military circles generally had little sympathy with a frontier following the highest range, whether a watershed or not, and aimed at “keeping our enemy from any possibility of establishing herself in the glacis, occupying those longi- tudinal valleys and thus preparing to surprise the passes.”35 Despite these objections the Anglo-Tibetan map which was agreed in 1914 was based on the ridge which combined watershed and highest crest. It deviated only from this principle to accommodate Tibetan religious sentiments regarding Migyitun and some other areas. The minutes of the Simla conference leave no doubt that the watershed and not the highest crest was generally regarded as the determining factor. Even the Chinese delegate accepted the British arguments in

30 Stamp, L.D., op. cit., p. 482. See Ch. vi for the arguments advanced by India and China in 1960. 31 A wider definition would have been inconsistent with international legal opinion. Only the Labrador Boundary Case resulted in adoption by the Privy Council of a whole territory drained by the rivers which empty into a certain coastal area. Hackworth, Digest i, p. 720. 32 Round Table, Dec. 1962, pp. 31–39. 33 Aitchison, Vol. xii, p. 66. 34 Caroe, O., Geography and ethnics of India’s northern frontier, p. 305. 35 Sir John Ardagh, Director of Military Intelligence in 1896–7, quoted by Lamb, A., r.c.a.j., xlvi (1959) Pt i.

160 chapter 7 favour of a watershed frontier between Inner and Outer Tibet, but suggested that this policy would be more consistently followed if the boundary was drawn along a more westerly mountain range. McMahon had argued that watersheds should be used as frontier limits wherever possible, as they were permanent and intelligible to the minds of local tribesmen, whilst avoiding the necessity of frontier commissions.36 In the border dispute China dismissed the Indian interpretation of a watershed as arbitrary, although her own engagements in the past had included a similar definition.37 Her agreement with Burma formalised the eastern end of the McMahon Line defining it not as the watershed, but as the traditional customary line. In his correspondence with Nehru Chou En-lai wrote that the watershed was not the sole or main international principle for the delimitation of boundaries and that the line claimed by India actually cut across the Karakash river system in the western sector.38 When discussing the individual parts of the frontier we shall see that this argument possessed considerable force. The situation in Ladakh was further complicated by its location to the north of the Himalayan axis which is generally taken to cross the Zoji pass east of Srinagar. The watershed being anomalous, i.e not coinciding with the highest crest, India followed those ranges which she considered to be the main watershed in the area. Choosing one which cut across the headwaters of the Yarkand and Karakash rivers, her case became less watertight than it might have been and could not rest upon a mere exposition of the watershed principle without considering her other arguments.39

Maps and Boundary Disputes

Maps are significant as claims and as evidence for claims.40 Unofficial, private maps do not represent national claims no matter how accurate they are from

36 The Boundary Question between China and Tibet, p. 108. Bell noted that the Tibetans often had a different concept of a boundary, which did not necessarily follow mountain ranges or rivers. At the tri-junction of Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim he had encountered an “upland- tree, lowland-tree boundary,” i.e. the pine forests belonged to Tibet and the bamboo forests to Bhutan. Tibet Past and Present, p. 5. 37 Sino-Russian treaty of Aug. 27, 1689; Sino-French Convention of June 20, 1895, relating to the boundary between Tonkin and China; Sino-British Convention of 1894 and 1897 concerning the Sino-Burmese border. 38 White Paper iii, p. 69. 39 In the middle sector China did not dispute that the Indian alignment followed the watershed between Sutlej and Ganges, but rejected it on other grounds. 40 Kirk, W., The Inner Asian frontier of India, p.

Legal Aspects Of The Border Dispute 161 the geographical point of view. Even an alignment on an official map will be little more than political propaganda if it is not supported by treaty or effective occupation. Its publication during a border dispute, however, is the most precise way of registering the maximum extent of territorial claims, provided they are of sufficient scale and accuracy. As evidence for claims in an area where the boundary is not formally delimited or demarcated unofficial maps may be significant as indications of the traditional alignment, depending on the accuracy of geographical knowledge at the time and on the consistency of the maps of various authors over a substantial period. Official maps acquire their greatest value when appended to frontier treaties or based on revenue surveys indicating the extent of effective administration. Both official and unofficial maps may point to the principles which governed the delimitation of the boundary even if the precise alignment could not be based on accurate surveys. Inter national tribunals have been reluctant to attach great importance to maps when contradicted by other trustworthy evidence of title. In his award on the Palmas case Huber rejected any maps which did not precisely indicate the political sub-divisions unless they contributed to the location of geographical names and were not merely copied from already existing maps. He further considered them to be of special interest in cases where they did not assert the sovereignty of the issuing country.41 In case of conflict maps annexed to a treaty generally were taken to yield to the written provisions of the agreement. Recent jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, however, has enlarged the significance of official maps which now may be treated as binding admissions and as possessing a force of their own.42 In the Frontier Land case between the Netherlands and Belgium a map of a Delimitation Commission, which was incorporated by reference in a treaty but was inconsistent with its text, still prevailed over the written article.43 In the Temple of Preah Vihear case the Court treated a map, which was not prepared or approved by the Mixed Commission, as if it were part of the treaty because the respondent state had accepted or acquiesced in the erroneous map by giving it wide distribution and was therefore precluded from contesting its validity. In the interest of certainty and stability of frontiers an unsigned map which derogated from a treaty provision, superseded the text as a matter of treaty interpretation. Parties “had adopted an interpretation of the treaty settlement

41 Hyde, C.C., “Maps as evidence in international boundary disputes,” a.j.i.l., 27 (1933) 311–316. 42 Weissberg, G., “Maps as evidence in international boundary disputes: a reappraisal”. a.j.i.l., 57 (1963) 781–803. 43 i.c.j. Reports, 1959.

162 chapter 7 which caused the map line, in so far as it may have departed from the line of the watershed, to prevail over the relevant clause of the treaty.”44 Until the 19th century most maps of the Sino-Indian border area were Chinese rather than Indian and of an unofficial nature.45 Even if they depicted the limits of Sinkiang and Tibet accurately, they did not necessarily constitute the northern borders of India. They made clear, however, that Sinkiang was never conceived as extending south of the Kuenlun range and that Ladakh never was a part of China. The Kashmir Survey of 1868 showed great accuracy south of Pangong Lake but was manifestly unreliable in the Aksai Chin area and extended the border far to the north of the present Indian claim line.46 A good unofficial map published by Drew in 1875 showed the boundary between the Karakoram Pass and the Changchenmo valley as ‘not defined’, as in this uninhabited area there had been no authoritative demarcation nor guidance by actual occupation. During the meetings of the Officials in 1960 India asserted that the Chinese side could not produce a single published official map in support of their alignment, even though it alleged to have administered these areas for centuries. Only two previously secret military maps drew the border in accordance with the Chinese claims. They provided interesting information regarding Chinese ambitions around 1918 but should not be admitted as evidence in view of their confidential character for more than forty years. China’s best argument was derived from the Survey of India map of 1950, “India, Showing Political Divisions in the New Republic”, which depicted the boundary in the western and middle sectors only by a colour wash, marked as Frontier Undefined, and in the eastern sector described the McMahon Line as Undemarcated. The existence of these two different terms on the same map suggested that the western boundary was inferior to the McMahon Line and still needed definition. The Indian argument that “this only indicated that the boundary had not been demarcated on the ground, or defined in detail from point to point” was not very convincing, although it should be granted that the map of 1950 carried a colour wash right up to the line which India was to present as the traditional boundary.47 The McMahon Line only appeared on offi cial Indian maps in 1938, first as undemarcated, but this symbol was omitted in

44 i.c.j. Reports, 1962, 6. 45 Kirk, W., op. cit., p. 150. 46 Lamb, A., op. cit., p. 43. 47 Chinese report, p. 9; Indian report, pp. 150, 162; India has also stated “formal definition or demarcation is not necessary for recognition of a boundary so long as it is fixed by custom and tradition and is well-known,” White Paper iii, p. 87.

Legal Aspects Of The Border Dispute 163

1954 in view of the Indian decision that no demarcation on the ground was necessary along this prominent watershed.48 China also referred to a map entitled “The northern frontier of British Hindoostan,” published by the Office of the Surveyor General at Calcutta in 1862, showing the north-eastern boundary of Kashmir in close agreement with the present Chinese claims.49 Apart from it being published before the Kashmir Survey its official character was virtually nullified by the acknowledgement that it had been extracted from Keith Johnston’s Atlas of 1860. India pointed to the Chinese Postal Atlas of 1917, 1919 and 1933 which provided evidence in her favour. The Chinese argument that their postal services were under foreign control and Lamb’s conclusion that the map had been copied without consideration from a non-Chinese map50 diminish their importance as an official admission, but could not completely wipe out their value as support for the Indian case, particularly because they were consistent with previous Chinese maps in regard of the Sinkiang boundary. While Indian maps issued since 1945 consistently drew the boundary along the Karakoram pass, the Oxford Atlas of 1956 still included a sizeable strip north of the pass in Indian territory. The United States Army Map Service excluded Khurnak Fort and the entire Demchok area from Indian territory in its 1955 series on India and Pakistan. The Map of China of 1945 by the National Geographical Society equally showed Demchok in Tibet. Maps of the eastern sector were complicated by the distinction between the administrative boundary or Inner Line, signifying the extent of tax collection, and the international boundary of British India. As both of them are not always shown it is often difficult to draw precise conclusions from the symbols on the maps. Lamb has argued51 that in 1908 the international boundary followed the foothills, but that the tribal areas to the north, excepting Tawang, were nevertheless considered as falling within the British sphere of influence and certainly not as part of Tibet. A map of Asie Meridionale published by Andriveau-Corijon in Paris in 1876 equally showed the tribal areas outside Tibet and separated them from Tibet and Assam with the same type of dotted line. The British proposal for the McMahon Line was prepared by special survey parties sent out to examine the less known areas, but we shall see that their activities did not cover the entire territory. They went far enough, however, to determine the approximate alignment of the highest Himalayan

48 White Paper iii, p. 94. 49 The Sino-Indian boundary question, Map i. 50 Lamb, A., op. cit., p. 46. The Chinese report, p. 58, stated that the Chinese people attached no importance to maps drawn up by westerners and looked upon them with disdain. 51 Op. cit., pp. 126–127.

164 chapter 7 crest, which they adopted as a convenient boundary: “For great lengths of it [the Indo-Tibetan boundary] lofty mountain ranges and watersheds buried in eternal snow facilitated verbal definition and rendered demarcation on the ground (except in a few small and more inhabited areas) either impossible or superfluous.”52 The Simla Convention was published only in a second printing of the next edition of Aitchison’s Treaties, Engagements and Sanads both of which bore the date of 1929 (see p.251). It was only after World War ii that western maps drew the McMahon line as a defined boundary and there remained exceptions to the contrary including rather embarrassingly a small map in Nehru’s own “Discovery of India.” Previous maps often conceded the Tawang area east of Bhutan to Tibet, although no boundary was indicated apart from a colour wash covering the tribal areas. A Chinese map of Tibet in the “New Atlas and commercial gazetteer of China” published in Shanghai after 1917 approximated the Indian alignment, but also showed Tawang as part of Tibet.53 The Survey of India map of 1917 entitled “Tibet and adjacent Countries”, however, did not yet incorporate the result of the Simla Conference and only drew the Inner Line, which it identified at least partly with the international boundary.54

Effective Occupation

The Indian assertion that her boundary has been confirmed by treaty raises the question whether a treaty should still be supported by effective occupation. India was in a position to point out that boundary treaties create real rights which, like in Frontier Land case, are not displaced by acts of administration or levy of taxes.55 She also derived an argument from the Eastern Greenland case where it was stated that acts displaying state activity “have legal significance only if the territory concerned was either previously res nullius or was already the subject of a title held by the state committing the acts”; if the territory was subject to the sovereignty of another state such acts were

52 McMahon, Sir A .Henry, “International boundaries.” Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, 84 (1935) 2–16. 53 Rose, A., Chinese frontiers of India. Kirk, W., The Inner-Asian frontier of India, p. 147, concluded the same for pre-1912 Chinese views of the limits of the Empire. 54 The Sino-lndian boundary question, Reference Map 2A. 55 i.c.j. Reports, 1959, pp. 229–230.

Legal Aspects Of The Border Dispute 165 plainly illegal.56 The Permanent Court maintained a fiction of territorial sovereignty even if the alleged sovereign exercised no power either in fact or in law. In the Lighthouses in Crete and Samos case this led Judge Hudson to protest against recognising the theoretical sovereignty of the Sultan of Turkey as “a ghost of a hollow sovereignty cannot be permitted to obscure the realities of this situation.”57 Modern writers are inclined to follow Hudson in attaching greater importance to the factual situation. Schwarzenberger considered that de facto exercise of jurisdiction also prevailed over a naked title of sovereignty if such a title remained unimplemented by any actual display of state sovereignty.58 In the opinion of J.S. Bains titles to territory, even those originating from treaties, remain inchoate “unless the law of the State concerned is made effective after formally taking over the area”. Applying this doctrine to the border dispute he initially suggested that Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin could support a valid claim if India had not shown continuous and effective interest in the area. He was subsequently persuaded by K. Krishna Rao that India had continued to exercise some form of jurisdiction and that the kind of corpus et animus occu- pandi possible in such a difficult terrain were present.59 Occupation as an act of acquiring sovereignty is not possible with regard to the territory of another state even if it is entirely outside the international community.60 It must concern a res nullius but, in order to be effective, occupation does not have to extend to every nook and corner. It has been said that the occupying state should dispose at some points of a force strong enough to guarantee a minimum of legal order “and to exclude any interference from a third state.”61 If this were correct the Indian position in Ladakh would be affected as she had not been able to exclude Chinese interference. But the Permanent Court of International Justice did not go so far and admitted that a

56 p.c.i.j. Series AjB, 1933, No. 53; Krishna Rao, K., op. tit., p. 410. In the Minquiers and Ecrehos case the International Court was prepared to consider acts subsequent to the critical date, unless the measure in question was taken with a view to improving the legal position of the party concerned. i.c.j. Reports, 1953, pp. 47–109. 57 p.c.i.j. Series A/B, No. 71, pp. 126–7. 58 “Title to territory: response to a challenge”, a.j.i.l. 51 (1957) 312. He also attached more importance to the display of sovereignty, if only in isolated cases, than to contiguity of territory or the existence of natural boundaries. International Law, p. 314. 59 Bains, J.S., India’s international disputes, pp. 160–162; Krishna Rao, K., “Title to territory”, I.J.I.L., 1962; Bains partially retracted his opinion in National Herald, Lucknow, Oct. 17, 1962. 60 Lauterpacht, H., op. cit., p. 555. 61 Von der Heydte, “Discovery, symbolic annexation and virtual effectiveness in international law,” a.j.i.l., 29 (1935), 463.

166 chapter 7 relatively backward territory did not require the same elaborate control and government as a more developed and civilised area. International tribunals were satisfied with very little in the way of actual exercise of sovereign rights, provided the other state could not make out a superior claim.62 Activities like the erection of huts and assessment of taxes were among the facts which the International Court of Justice accepted as evidence of possession in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case.63 Effective sovereignty may further appear from census reports, the making of topographical surveys, regular control by police and military patrols or the grant of concessions. State authority must, however, possess a permanent character in order to demonstrate its intention to be considered as sovereign.64 In the boundary dispute there is a difference between the eastern and western sectors. In the east the McMahon Line is fairly clear from the Anglo-Tibetan map of 1914, but the validity of the agreement is contested by China. As there is no verbal definition of the alignment it becomes important to discover whether there is supporting evidence of the Indian title or a superior Chinese claim. In the absence of both, India would still have a better case, as China would have to show that Indian sovereignty did not obtain. In Ladakh the existence of treaties confirming the traditional boundaries cannot be seriously disputed, but their contents did not define a specific alignment. India, therefore, has to make good her interpretation of the traditional boundary by prov- ing effective possession up to that line.

Prescription

Contrary to occupation, which relates to a res nullius, acquisitive prescription concerns acquiring territory which was subject to the sovereignty of another state. It assumes that on certain conditions rights can be acquired by passage of time. India does not invoke this concept as she considers her title to be in accordance with general rules governing territorial sovereignty. Prescription would only apply after the invalidation of her other arguments. It is defined as a claim to continuous and undisturbed exercise of territorial sovereignty during a period which is long enough to create, under the influence of historical

62 Digest i, p. 405; Legal status of Eastern Greenland, p.c.i.j. Series A/B, No.53, p. 46. 63 i.c.j. Reports, 1953, p. 47. 64 At the Simla conference China included evidence of “effective occupation” in her statement on the limits of Tibet. The Boundary Question between China and Tibet, op. cit., p. 15.

Legal Aspects Of The Border Dispute 167 developments, the general conviction that the present condition of things is in conformity with international order.65 The rational basis of prescription rests on considerations of stability and order, but no general rule can be laid down regarding the length of time and other requirements for creating a legitimate title. Much depends on the undisturbed possession and the absence of repeated protests and claims by other states. In the treaty of 1897 between the United Kingdom and Venezuela a period of 50 years was laid down as sufficient for effecting prescription but the development of modern communications and the possibility for an injured state to lay its case before the United Nations may shorten the period required.66

Protest, Acquiescence and Estoppel

When a state objects to the territorial claim of another state it may protest against the violation of its rights or take effective measures which clearly imply a rejection of the claim. In challenging the encroachments of a neighbour, protest interrupts the adverse claim and stops the running of the prescriptive time. Repetition of a simple diplomatic protest suffices to prevent acquisition of a prescriptive title only if the circumstances were such that it constituted the only feasible method of asserting rights. In other cases further proof is required of the seriousness of the protest, for instance by severing diplomatic relations or proposals for negotiation or arbitration.67 There is no unanimity as to whether states are under an obligation to protest if they want to preserve their rights, but a failure to do so may lead to a successful plea of right by the claimant state. A lasting silence can easily be interpreted as acquiescence in circumstances which generally call for a positive reaction signifying an objection.68 Absence of protest in the face of open acts of occupation may thus confirm that the territory was regarded as a res nullius. Silence does not always signify acquiescence. To be regarded as acquiescing the silent state must be fully aware of the claim concerned and be free from the fear of coercion by the claimant state. Knowledge of a certain claim may be deduced from a notification by the claimant state or repeated manifestations

65 Lauterpacht, H., op. cit., p. 576. 66 See for a full discussion of effectiveness and prescription Bouchez, L.J., The regime of bays in international law. Sijthoff, Leiden, 1963. 67 MacGibbon, I.C., “Some observations on the part of protest in International Law”, b.y.i.l., 1953, pp. 306–315. Bouchez, L.J., op. cit., pp. 268–273. 68 McGibbon, I.C., “The scope of acquiescence in international law”, b.y.i.l., 1954, p. 143.

168 chapter 7 in an international context. Notification generally is not obligatory for acquiring territorial rights. In the case of an optional notification there is no necessity for the state receiving this communication to raise objections within a relatively short period. Even if a presumption of acquiescence arises which takes into account the multiplicity of motives leading to silence, counter- proof will always be possible.69 There is no general rule for the appreciation of silence of states Therefore all concrete circumstances have to be taken into consideration. If acceptance of a claim can be deduced from clearly manifested acts we enter the sphere of operation of estoppel. A state may be barred from alleging or denying a fact because of its own previous actions by which the contrary has been admitted, implied or determined.70 Estoppel used to be regarded as primarily a procedural rule, but is gradually fulfilling the criteria demanded of a principle of international customary law. The few writers who discussed estoppel accepted that acquiescence tended to establish an estoppel, provided that the acquiescence could be equated with recognition or consent and be subjected to the limitations normally put on acquiescence. International tribunals are reluctant to refer to this concept by name and prefer a terminology which declares a state to be “precluded” from denying or alleging certain statements or facts. If estoppel results from a treaty it only applies to the contracting parties. Estoppel by conduct may have a wider application provided the meaning of the statement concerned is clear and unambiguous, voluntary, unconditional and authorised. Considerable reliance must be placed upon the good faith of the parties which made and invoked the statement.71 The possibility remains that the defending party is able to prove that the question in dispute was deliberately left open by the parties concerned.

The Critical Date As soon as a state has registered a protest against the actions of another state all subsequent evidence in support of the claim must be set aside. The arbitration on the Island of Palmas established the need to show that the display of sovereignty existed openly prior to the period when the dispute was precipi- tated. In the Eastern Greenland case the Permanent Court of International Justice rejected Norway’s claim because she had not been able to establish any

69 Bouchez, L.J., op. cit., p. 277. 70 Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary gives this definition of estoppel. 71 Bowett, D.W., “Estoppel before international tribunals and its relation to acquiescence”, b.y.i.l. xxxiii (1957) 176–202.

Legal Aspects Of The Border Dispute 169 proof of administration prior to 1931 when she first occupied the contested territory.72 India referred to the principle of the “crucial date,” which correctly should be called the “critical date”, to show that no evidence could be deduced from Chinese advances after the start of the border dispute. Both sides accepted that trespassing across the traditional boundary could not confer a legitimate title, but China claimed the unhindered crossing of the Aksai Chin by their army in 1950 and the survey and construction of the motor road prior to 1958, while India gave a list of patrols carried out in the same period.73 India never gave a precise time as the critical date, but it could only be October 1, 1958 when India protested against the Aksai Chin road, or July 2, 1958 for the incident at Khurnak fort. Since the extent of Chinese penetration at the time could not be ascertained indisputably the importance of these dates remains very limited. The report of officials would be the only practical means of preventing China from registering substantial new claims, even though she might have made considerable advances since the first Indian protest. The critical date being in the recent past, its introduction in the discussion may confuse the basic issues. For it could convey the impression that before that time the case could be decided on the basis of evidence of effective possession, which would favour the Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin. It is, therefore, not surprising that Krishna Rao dropped this argument from his legal defence of the Indian position.74

Further Application to the Border Dispute In view of the negative attitude of communist states towards customary international law it is not surprising that Peking dismissed the concept of estoppel as absurd. While the Indian report tended to identify estoppel with acquiescence, China made the general statement that the contention that silence meant acquiescence did not reflect an accepted principle of international law and asked: “Can it be said that a sovereign state has no right to reserve its position concerning questions of its own sovereignty and to raise it on suitable occasions?”75 Our reply would be that in this case such reservations are in order only if they are formally and promptly stated. We should also distinguish between Chinese acquiescence in 1950 and the estoppel resulting from the conclusion of the 1954 agreement. In 1950 India stated that the recognised boundary should remain inviolate. The unfortunate wording later invited the Chinese retort that

72 Indian report, pp. 257–258; Chinese note in White Paper iv, p. 10. 73 Indian report, p. 143. 74 Krishna Rao, K., op. cit., p. 410. 75 Chinese report, p. 31. For other arguments of both sides see Ch. vi.

170 chapter 7 she had never recognised any boundary claimed by India.76 But by 1954 China must have been aware of what India regarded as her frontiers. In the absence of a request for border negotiations the signing of an unconditional Panchsheel agreement precluded her from quietly occupying territory claimed by India. If the objection were raised that in 1954 India did not mention the border either, for fear of provoking Chinese demands for concessions,77 it may be said that she had given an official intimation of what she regarded as the traditional boundary in her maps and statements while up to 1954 China had produced no official maps or claims which substantially conflicted with Indian interests. In the context of a bilateral agreement specifically relating to Tibet and respecting each other’s territorial integrity, the un-contested Indian position could not later be challenged unilaterally. The wording of the undertaking in the Panchsheel treaty seemed sufficiently clear and unambiguous to estop China from entering the Aksai Chin. There is no room for the plea that the border question was deliberately left open by the parties concerned, as neither side made a reservation to this effect. The treaty of 1954 implied recognition of the broad outline of India’s frontiers and would estop China from challenging the McMahon Line or entering Aksai Chin. This argument must not be extended, however, to deduce Chinese acceptance of the detailed alignment claimed by India, as the Indian statements were insufficiently specific. Only the McMahon Line constituted a well- known and recognisable boundary which for nine years the PRC seemed to accept. This period was long enough to soothe Indian apprehensions but too short for a process of authoritative prescription. A detailed discussion of the eastern sector will show that the prescriptive time, if applicable, cannot be considered to commence much before 1947 as effective occupation up to the entire McMahon Line only dated from the emergence of independent India. For the same reason the application of the principle quieta non movere also has only limited value. The statement of the Permanent Court of Arbitration “that a state of things which actually exists and has existed for a long time should be changed as little as possible,”78 in our case is relevant to the major part of nefa, but not to the precise alignment of the McMahon Line.

76 Panikkar told the Rajya Sabha that as Ambassador to Peking he had brought Nehru’s parliamentary statement of 1951 confirming the McMahon Line to the attention of the Chinese authorities, but that he had never received a reaction. Official Report, Vol. xxvii, No. 12, Dec. 8, 1959, col. 1811. 77 See also Chapter 9. 78 Grisbadarna Case. Hague Court Reports, 1916, p. 130.

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Before we pass on to a discussion of the various sectors of the dispute it should be pointed out that India has taken every possible step to protest effectively against Chinese possession of Aksai Chin. In this connection India’s offer to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice acquires special importance. China was unlikely to assent to a case before an organ of the United Nations as long as she did not belong to this organisation, but India made certain that all methods of asserting her rights were explored, even when this implied adjudication which normally she did not favour for solving disputes.

The Western Sector

The dispute regarding the boundary of Ladakh was complicated by differences concerning the tri-junction with the Sinkiang-Tibet border, which India pinpointed on the Kuenlun crest while China drew it at the Kongka Pass. The practical importance of the disagreement was that China regarded the disputed Aksai Chin area as part of the Chinese province of Sinkiang and not of Tibet. India contested this because Chinese maps had never shown Sinkiang to extend south of the Kuenlun range, which separated it from Tibet. The Indian alignment followed those ridges which were considered to be the main watershed in the area. The Kuenlun mountains were interpreted as performing this function with regard to Aksai Chin. Further west minor ranges constituted the watershed, which, after crossing the Karakoram Pass, continued along the Mustagh range. Geographical terms in this area easily lead to confusion as the Karakoram range runs across Kashmir and does not include the Karakoram pass. Only the pass, about which there is no dispute, marks a point on the border and sometimes the watershed mountains have wrongly been described as the Karakoram range. The Chinese alignment first laid along one of the lower Karakoram ranges and, below the Kongka Pass, followed various geographical features.

The Border with Sinkiang The occupation by Kashmir of a fort at Shahidullah in the Kuenlun mountains between 1865 and 1867 provided the basis for claims of sovereignty far to the north of the Karakoram Pass which are still reflected in some of the most modern maps. The Kashmir government pressed its request to be allowed to reoccupy the Shahidullah area, but after twenty years of silence the Indian Government held that the fort should be considered to be within Chinese

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territory. By 1890 the prospect of a Russian advance into Sinkiang had become very real and necessitated a properly denned border with China. Instead of occupying the territory which was lying defenceless and unclaimed by China and over which Hunza and Kashmir had genuine claims, the British wanted to limit their responsibilities to a strategically sound and politically safe frontier. They attempted to induce China to occupy the territory involved. The Viceroy of India advocated this policy as follows:

The country between the Karakoram and Kuenlun ranges is, I understand, of no value, very inaccessible and not likely to be coveted by Russia. We might, I should think, encourage the Chinese to take it, if they showed any inclination to do so. This would be better than leaving a no-man’s land between our frontier and that of China. Moreover, the stronger we can make China at this point, and the more we can induce her to hold her own over the whole Kashgar-Yarkand region, the more useful will she be to us as an obstacle to Russian advance along this line.79

Younghusband, later to become well-known for his Lhasa campaign of 1904, was deputed to Yarkand and Kashgar in 1889 and 1890 to implement this policy. The Chinese immediately showed interest in the area and in 1892 crossed the Suket pass near Shahidullah to establish a boundary-mark 64 miles further south at the Karakoram pass.80 In the meantime a lively discussion took place regarding the boundary Britain should propose. Ardagh, Director of Military Intelligence, and Younghusband preferred an alignment across the Suket pass but were overruled by the Government of India, then headed by Lord Elgin. From the military point of view it saw:

79 Memorandum by Lord Lansdowne, the Viceroy. File s.f. Oct. 1889, Nos. 182–197. 80 Lamb, A., The China-India border, p. 101; Times Litt. Suppl, “Peking and Delhi,” Jan. 2, 1964. Both sources point at the confusion created by the term “64 miles south of Suket,” which led G.F. Hudson to believe that Chinese administration had not yet crossed the Kuenlun; “The Aksai Chin” p. 15. Lamb identified the location of the pillar as the Karakoram Pass. It is, however, unfair to the Indian case to imply that it disguised the Chinese advance up to the Karakoram Pass. The Indian Report, pp. 155–156, only states “but it was only towards the end of the 19th century that Chinese authority reached up even to the traditional northern alignment of Kashmir,” i.e. the Karakoram Pass. It went on to say that if no earlier administration could be proven by China this would also signify that she could not possibly have had check-posts south of the Kuenlun mountains for the last 200 years, as claimed by her officials. Govt. of India, File S. F., Jan. 1898, No. 168. S. F. stands for Secret Frontier.

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no strategic advantage in going beyond mountains over which no hostile advance is ever likely to be attempted… No invader has ever approached India from this direction where nature has placed such formidable barriers.81

In 1899 Macdonald, the British Minister in Peking, was instructed to propose that China would relinquish her shadowy claims to suzerainty over Hunza which in return would forego territorial claims to two Chinese districts. A boundary was suggested which approximated the present Indian claim line but in the Aksai Chin area conceded the territory between the Kuenlun mountains and the so-called Lokzhung range to the Southwest. The proposal has often been misquoted82 to show that the frontier was intended to run along the Kuenlun mountains but, in fact, it did not follow this range at all. The proposed alignment conceded the headwaters of the Karakash to China and then ran generally southeast, following the Lokzhung range “until that meets a spur running south from the Kuenlun range which has hitherto been shown on our maps as the eastern boundary of Ladakh.”83 In his explanation Macdonald stated that it was unnecessary to mark out the alignment since this natural frontier was the crest of a range of mighty mountains. Due to Chinese passivity nothing came of the proposal and Britain soon reverted to claiming Aksai Chin up to the Kuenlun mountains and upholding the rights of Hunza. After the Chinese revolution McMahon revived the Ardagh suggestions and received support from the General Staff which had previously opposed them. It was now stated that:

the extended frontier would be an advantage provided we have not to occupy the portion beyond our present frontier by posts, but merely aim at keeping it undeveloped.84

81 Govt of india, sf (Secret File), Jan. 1898, No. 168. 82 Indian report, p. 55. 83 Ibidem, pp. 102–105. See map 2. British note of March 14, 1899. F. O./17/1373. 84 File S. F. Feb., 1913, 0. 5/n. The revival of the Ardagh line was caused by expectations of a Russian advance into Kashgaria. On Sept. 12, 1912 the Viceroy cabled to London that in dealing with the Russians the “first essential is to demand as a preliminary to negotiations, recognition of a line which will place Tagdumbash, Raskam, Shahidullah and Aksai Chin outside Russia and within our territory… A good line would be one commencing from Baiyik Peak running eastwards to Chan Pass, leaving Tagdumbash and Dehda on British side, thence along crest of a range through Sargon Pass and crossing Yarkand river to crest of Kuenlun range, north of Raskam, and along crest of that range (through passes named in map of Indian Survey Department, 1891)…, thence, crossing Karakash river

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Independent India found that in practice an international boundary had crystallised along the line up to which effective occupation had been realised and revised the maps which still showed the border according to pre-1890 conceptions. Lamb ascribed the suggestion for a border along the Lokzhung range to the research of Macartney, the British representative at Kashgar, who was alleged to have noted it as the division between the northern wasteland of Aksai Chin and the Lingzi Tang plateau further south. But the reference which Lamb gives – Elgin’s letter to Hamilton of December 23, 1897 – makes no allusion to any suggestion by Macartney. In other documents Macartney only pointed out that Aksai Chin was a vast area which was partly in Chinese, partly in British territory.85 There is reason to believe that the Lokzhung range as a border originated from a map prepared by Trotter in 1874 and was accepted by the Indian Foreign Secretary without much discussion.86 The willingness to abandon a Kuenlun boundary in Aksai Chin should not be as closely related to the relinquishing of Kashmiri claims to Shahidullah as

along Kuenlun watershed to Tibetan frontier, including Aksai Chin plain in our territory.” Lamb, A., op. cit., pp. 108–109. 85 File S. F. Jan. 1898, No. 162. In 1895 Macartney had proposed the creation of a neutral state in the no-man’s land between India and China, but this had no connection with the Aksai Chin boundary. Moreover, a distinction between the two plateaux had already been made. Edward Balfour’s Cyclopedia of India (1885) Vol 2, p. 651, included in Ladakh “the bleak and almost uninhabited plateaux of the Kouen Lun and Linzhithang plains.” 86 File S. F. Nov. 1898, No. 110-114/notes. Lamb advocated the alignment as an obvious compromise for the present dispute and compatible with Indian principles as it followed the watershed between the Indus and Tarim basins. It is necessary, however, to point out that the description of this line was far from accurate. The Indian survey map of 1875 showed a gap of more than 20 miles between the southeastern end of the Lokzhung range and the spur constituting the boundary. The edition of 1938 showed a connection between the two ridges by a semi-circle of various and often parallel ranges. All these mountains are situated west of 80° east longitude, while the British proposal mentioned a meeting point east of this meridian. The contention that late nineteenth century maps showed an eastward displacement of the watershed by some twenty miles is not born out by the Survey of India maps and in any case would make the argument too involved. It is also highly improbable that adoption of the Macartney alignment would leave the entire Sinkiang- Tibet road in Chinese territory. See Lamb, A., op. cit., pp. 103–104, 173–174; Times Litt. Suppl. Feb. 6, 1964. India appears to take the view that modern surveys show the absence of any Lokzhung range. The u.s. Army Map Service series U 502, ni 44-1 printed the “Western Loqzung Mountains” with summits around 20.000 feet. It did, however, make no use of Indian Survey Maps, No. 52 M (Aksai Chin) and 52 N (Lanak La) of 1939, which reduced the mountains to a maximum of 16340 feet and split up the ranges.

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Lamb seems to suggest. It is perhaps tempting to conclude that withdrawal from the Kuenlun in one area would also imply abandonment of the range in the other, but Indian title to Aksai Chin has never been based on occupation of the Shahidullah fort. Moreover, the two sectors are not one continuous area but separated by the Qaratagh range. In any case the British suggestions for a political compromise could not significantly prejudice the Indian case since the offer lapsed and concessions made in the course of negotiations do not rank as admission of rights. It could only provide evidence that other watersheds have been considered in the past. India, moreover, would be able to point to the text of the proposal as confirmation that before 1899 Britain already considered the traditional boundary to follow the eastern limits of Aksai Chin up to the Kuenlun mountains.87 The foregoing historical excursion will have shown that ideas concerning the northern frontier of Kashmir including that of Aksai Chin underwent several changes. There is also some truth in the Chinese criticism that it did not consistently apply the watershed principle. It would be more accurate to say that the Indian alignment followed one of several plausible watershed divisions, while China made no serious attempt to determine any guiding principle. Neither party exercised a great extent of administration in Aksai Chin, but the occasional explorer, big-game hunter or nomad from India may be sufficient to establish continuity of title. After 1947 these activities were reinforced by military patrols and the preparation of fresh maps to clarify the extent of Indian territory.

87 Hudson, O.F., The Aksai Chin, p. 20, concluded from the list of Indian reconnaissance parties since 1951 (Indian report, p. 143) that “for seven years Indian military patrols were crossing the tracks of the Chinese in West Aksai Chin.” He assumed that there was Indian collusion in what the Chinese were doing and that news of the Chinese road was deliberately kept from the Prime Minister. The names of the places visited by the patrol do not bear out his conclusion. Only the expedition of 1951, which was loosely described as going “from Leh to Lingzi Tang and Aksai Chin” was relevant to the eastern corner of Ladakh. In 1958 patrols went to Haji Langar, east of the Amtogor salt lake and to the southern extremity of the Chinese motorroad, but those parties were sent out for the purpose of locating this road. Earlier patrols did not go beyond Lanak La (1952, 1954 and 1956) or the QaraTagh pass (1957) and provided no evidence of effective Indian jurisdiction over Aksai Chin. It seems likely that construction of the Chinese road went unnoticed partly because the work involved in improving an old caravan route across the plateau was minimal and partly because the closing of Sinkiang to Indian traders and the reduction of the period of operations of the Indian agency at Gartok prevented news of the road from reaching India earlier, See also Fisher, M.W., Himalayan Battleground, p. 8.

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Ladakh’s Border with Tibet Historical material for the disputed areas around the Pangong and Spanggur lakes was comparatively meager, but India submitted many references from travel reports and revenue records to support the Lanak rather than the Kongka Pass as the border. The Chinese could not quote a single document confirming that the Kongka Pass constituted the boundary. Both sides pointed at the traditional usage of the intervening lands for grazing purposes, but again China was unable to substantiate her claims with official documents. The thorough approach of the Indian side generally contrasted with an inconsistent and almost careless presentation by the Chinese officials. Perhaps India tended to overstate her case: grazing rights sometimes exceed a natural boundary and scattered holdings or rights should not be judged to give title to all the territory between them. Similarly many settlements paid dues to both India and Tibet88 but the fact remained that India had some documental proof of effective administration while China had almost none. The first Indian protest regarding the western sector concerned a Chinese incursion up to Khurnak Fort. In view of Chinese tactics in the east where they started their attack in an area which could reasonably be considered as situated to the north of the McMahon Line it may be significant that the Khurnak area had been the subject of inconclusive talks in 1924. There even may have been an element of provocation in the occupation of the ruined fort to precipi- tate an Indian realisation of the necessity to renegotiate the boundary. The 1924 meeting of officials disagreed on a few pasture grounds north of Pangong Lake and a joint statement was signed to register the alignments claimed by both sides. The Indian claim line in this area followed two river banks while the Tibetan representative wanted to fix the boundary along the crest of the hills further west. While the Tibetan line may have been consistent with the watershed principle underlying the Indian frontier it certainly was not as extreme as the present Chinese claim.89 The treaties of 1684 and 1842 confirmed the traditonal boundaries between Ladakh and Tibet, but did not specify their alignment. The former text only referred to the point where the Lhari stream met the Indus, but the two sides could not agree on its whereabouts. British attempts at a joint demarcation failed because of Chinese procrastination and the boundary commissions of 1846 and 1847, which defined a number of points south of the Panggong Lake,

88 Kirk, we., op. cit., p.58. 89 The very fact that a dispute had arisen with regard to a point on the frontier indicated recognition of its general alignment. See Advisory Opinion regarding delimitation of the Polish-Czechoslovak frontier, p.c.i.j., Series B, No. 8, pp. 20–21.

Legal Aspects Of The Border Dispute 177 were an unilateral affair. India quoted the Chinese Viceroy at Canton as saying that it would be best to adhere to the ancient arrangements as the borders were “sufficiently clear and distinctly fixed,” but this probably was no more than evasive tactics to avoid British pressure for the dispatch of boundary commissioners. The Chinese officials argued that the British intention to delimit the boundary so soon after the Opium War was highly suspect and therefore rejected as a possibly expansionist move. The Chinese admission obviously cannot be denied, but impartial observers should not regard it as positive confirmation of an alignment which in any case was only based on tradition and custom.90

The Eastern Sector

In the course of the border dispute, China argued that the Simla conference never discussed the Sino-Indian frontier and only dealt with the border between Tibet and the rest of China. This allegation is not supported by the Simla Convention nor by the Tibetan acceptance of the McMahon Line. The existence of a strip of Chinese territory between Tibet and India was rendered even more improbable by the adoption of the basic McMahon alignment in the Sino-Burmese agreement which would have made the Chinese claim an enclave south of Tibet. Moreover, while China did not regard her rights as limited by the geographical area of Tibet, she had to rely on Tibetan sources for evidence regarding their existence. Did the McMahon Line, besides indicating the borders of Tibet also constitute the effective northern border of India? The Tibetan letter said so, but the text of the Convention was silent on this point. China sought support from those maps which drew the frontier along the Inner Line of Assam skirt- ing the foothills. Due to the outbreak of the first World War and to efforts aimed at obtaining Chinese consent to the alignment the Simla Convention was not published until 1929 and appeared on maps only in 1935.

90 White Paper ii, p. 36, iii, p. 86; Indian report p. 54; Chinese report pp. 15–16. The Chinese officials dismissed the significance of the 1842 treaty with three arguments: in their view the treaty did not define any specific location of the boundary and, in fact, was not a boundary agreement at all; it only meant that each side should administer the territory under its jurisdiction and commit no aggression on the other; even if the boundary was actually confirmed at that time, how could India maintain that it was the line now claimed by her and not the Chinese alignment?.

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During the meeting of the officials India quoted the acknowledgement of the Tibetan Prime Minister that Tawang was not a part of Tibet and his specific request that the income which Drepung received in return for the services of its agents might be considered as the income of private individuals.91 Never theless Lhasa appeared to have entertained second thoughts about its concessions in 1937 when it told the British that the McMahon Line had only been agreed in conjunction with a satisfactory Sino-Tibetan boundary.92 To counter this argument the governor of Assam ordered a mission to Tawang to collect a tax, which met, however, with protests from Tibet and the local authorities. But the Government of India was averse to “any action which would commit them to permanent occupation and further expenditure” and decided that the political officer should not press for the withdrawal of the Tibetan officials; it also refused a second expedition.93 In 1944 the Tibetan Foreign Office, though not wishing to dispute “the validity of the McMahon Line as the limits of the territory…in which India and Tibet respectively are entitled to exercise authority,” requested the British Government to postpone extension of their regular administration up to the McMahon Line. They had, however, not registered any protest against the open demarcation of the boundary by the joint Indo- Bhutan Commission of 1938.94 China made much of the collection of taxes by Tibetan monks, which was dismissed by India as payment of religious dues not involving any recognition of sovereignty; spiritual influence should not be confused with temporal authority.95 When India achieved independence the British had not yet pushed their administration all the way up to the McMahon Line. Tawang was still under Tibetan control including the collection of taxes and it was necessary to obtain permission from Tibetan authorities there to travel in the area, but the region south of Se La was administered by the Delhi government. During the war armed posts were placed up the Lohit as far as the McMahon Line96 In 1947 India realised the importance of consolidating her

91 Indian report, p. 220. 92 Reid, Sir R., op. cit., p. 295. 93 Ibidem, pp. 297, 300. 94 Indian report, pp. 229, 221. 95 Indian spokesmen quote a letter from the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the British Minister in Peking on June 13, 1914, stating that “the Lamas might have ecclesiastical authority, but this does not mean that these places belong to Tibet.” This source is not yet available to the public. The Chinese report (p. 71) limited its significance to places which were administratively under the jurisdiction of other Chinese provinces and maintained that Tibet practiced a system of combining political and religious authority. 96 Mills, J.P., “Problems of the Assam-Tibet Frontier” r.c.a.j. xxxvii (1950) 154. He “was allotted the task of making the Convention boundary good” and added (p. 158) that this line “is not in fact the natural boundary, whereas the frontier along the base of the

Legal Aspects Of The Border Dispute 179 position in the North East Frontier Agency and, giving it priority over Ladakh, quickly pushed her effective administration up to the McMahon Line. The Indian opinion that this line “only applied the coping-stone to the actual ethnic, natural and administrative frontiers as established by British-Indian control prior to 1914,”97 therefore seems an untenable exaggeration. Britain had acquired certain powers of jurisdiction, but no territorial rights. Even if the (partially massacred) expeditions of 1911 form a ground for prescriptive claims it is doubtful whether the subsequent period of time was sufficient to create a good title. India’s only consolation was that Chinese or Tibetan claims of effective control were even less valid. India’s case was not aided by the comments of some of her former civil servants. One wrote that although the peaks were the obvious and accepted frontier, in some cases Tibetan administration penetrated a short distance southwards along river valleys and he added that during a visit to Tawang in 1913 he had seen a purely Tibetan administration in force. Sir Henry Twynam, who was acting Governor of Bengal in 1945, deemed the McMahon Line obviously too vague a criterion when the frontier had become controversial. Sir Olaf Caroe tried to put matters in their proper perspective by replying that the existence of Tibetan settlements and culture on Indian territory did not warrant their inclusion in political Tibet.98

The Thagla Ridge The map embodying the McMahon Line suggested that the Thagla Ridge east of Bhutan, though forming the watershed, was included in Tibet. Nevertheless India claimed the ridge as the boundary because McMahon had based his proposals on the main watershed,99 which could only be approximated on the map. His alignment made clear, however, that the boundary ran between the villages of Le in Tibet and Pangchen in India. In this connection India was able to point to an exchange of correspondence between the Chinese official at Tsona and the Indian Assistant Political Officer at Tawang in August, 1953. In 1951 the villagers of Pangchen had put up a boundary stone to mark their claim to pastures, which was accepted by the Tibetans. Although they were not very clear concerning the correct position, the Tibetans were prepared to pay for

plains is the natural one.” Hopkinson, A.J., The position of Tibet, ibidem, p. 232, “owing to other preoccupations, we forgot, or omitted to vindicate the boundary allotted to us.” See also Lamb, A., op. cit., pp. 148–167; Patterson, G.N., Peking versus Delhi, pp. 173–174. 97 Krishna Rao, K., The Sino-Indian boundary question and international law, p. 403. 98 F.M. Bailey, The Times, Sept. 9, 1959. The others ibidem, Sept. 2 and 4, 1959. 99 Memorandum by McMahon of March 28, 1914.

180 chapter 7 the use of pastures claimed by the Indians. This correspondence did not, however, mention by name either the Thagla ridge or the pastures concerned. Its significance should therefore be limited to Chinese recognition of Pangchen as an Indian village, thereby supporting the McMahon Line as depicted on the map. Only if the boundary marker could be shown as lying on the Thagla ridge, the grazing dispute could support the Indian interpretation of the boundary. If not, the Indian case depended on giving priority to the watershed principle over the map of 1914.

chapter 8 Political Motives in the Border Dispute

In the years immediately after gaining power the new Chinese regime grossly overrated the military strength of the communist bloc. With regard to the United States this self-confidence resulted in Chinese intervention in the Korean war. In respect of neutralism Peking, like Russia at that time, saw the world divided into two camps which left no room for a third. It assumed too easily that the emerging nations could be swayed into opposing the West by Chinese verbal support for their anti-colonial struggle. After a stalemate had been reached in Korea the Chinese communists adopted a cautious attitude towards the Americans and, realising the importance of maintaining a buffer zone around China as long as the non-aligned could not yet be included in the communist orbit, attempted to gain admission to the Afro-Asian community. At Bandung the Chinese Prime Minister scored a major diplomatic success with his persuasive demonstration of friendly intentions. The pendulum was not long, however, in swinging back to a more radical outlook, coinciding with the appearance of a group of men devoted to extremist internal policies which produced the Great Leap Forward. In foreign affairs this change may have been a result of frustration as no tangible result had yet accrued from the soft approach. Faced with a situation in which she had soon lost favour with all her neighbours, China again returned to a more moderate approach in the autumn of 1959, which has been attributed to Khrushchev’s visit in October of that year.1 These fluctuations were also reflected in Sino-Indian relations.

China Changes Her Evaluation of India

When they came to power, Chinese communists showed little friendship for the Indian Government and concentrated their attention on the Soviet Union. After 1951 they started to cultivate Indian visitors, although not the Congress leaders, but by 1954 cordial relations seemed firmly established even at governmental level. By that time the Chinese armed “liberation” of Tibet and the Korean war, both dating from 1950, had receded into the background. The two Prime Ministers met frequently in 1954 and stressed areas of common agreement, while glossing

1 Halpern, A.M., “The Chinese communist line on neutralism,” United Asia, 13 (1961) 165–173; A.D. Barnett, y.b.w.a. (1961) 67–92.

182 chapter 8 over basic differences in ideology and foreign policy. China seemingly ignored Nehru’s opposition to internal communism and made conciliatory statements on overseas Chinese, thus facilitating the belief that China was genuine in her desire not to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries. China’s handling of India remained cautious until the Tibetan rebellion and the flight of the Dalai Lama. Compared with the vehement campaign which was later to be directed against Nehru personally, propaganda statements showed some restraint even then. Two long commentaries on Nehru’s philosophy by the editorial department of the People’s Daily, published in May 1959, and October, 1962, offered an interesting comparison. The first article described Nehru as the respected Prime Minister of a friendly neighbour, one of the statesmen who enjoyed prestige in the world and an opponent of the imperialist policy of war and aggression. It also acknowledged that the Indian Government had all along recognised Tibet as a part of China and would not send its armed forces to intervene in Tibetan affairs. However, interference could take diverse forms and Indian diplomatic moves in connection with the Chinese march into Tibet in 1950 were quoted as one example, the impressive welcome to the Dalai Lama was another. Nehru was further criticised for simply referring to “mutual respect” in a statement of April 27, 1959, and omitting the words “for each other’s territoria1 integrity and sovereignty.” But the analysis ended with the assurance that a democratic and pros- perous Tibet would be a factor for consolidating friendship between China and India and would never constitute a menace to the Indian Republic. It quoted Nehru’s words, spoken in China in 1954, that the well-being of Asia and the whole world would depend on the extent to which the two countries understood each other. The second article covered a wider field than the Tibetan question. Going back to his “Discovery of India” it attempted to show that Nehru’s philosophy all along had been expansionist with the ambition to establish a regional grouping with India at the centre of economic and political activity. At one time the actions of his Government had been helpful to world peace, like sponsoring the Bandung Conference, but on many important questions Nehru had stood on the side of imperialism even in that period; the Indian proposals during the Korean war were brought up again as evidence of support for the forcible reten- tion of prisoners of war by the United States and the continued presence of Indian troops in the Congo was condemned. Nehru now was also attacked as the representative of the bourgeoisie and big landlords who had seized the fruits gained by the Indian people in their struggle against Britain. There was no longer any reluctance to criticise Nehru’s treatment of internal communism; he was accused of using violence to suppress the masses of the people and the progressive forces. Two parallels with Chinese history were drawn to exemplify the present situation. Sino-Indian current relations were said to bear a certain resemblance

Political Motives In The Border Dispute 183 to Sino-Soviet relations of more than thirty years ago, when the Kuomintang mistook Russian self-restraint for weakness. Interestingly enough the allusion was to the entrance of a Soviet army into Manchuria in October, 1929 after the Chinese Eastern Railway incident had led to the arrest of hundreds of Russian nationals at Charbin and the termination of diplomatic relations by Nanking. The People’s Daily interpreted the conflict as a resolute Soviet counter blow to an armed attack by Kuomintang reactionaries. As it had ended with the restoration of the original system of administration of the railway, the comparison may have been carefully chosen to imply to India that China’s incursion in the border area did not aim at changing the status quo and that an honourable settlement remained possible.2 Nehru’s socialism was now openly labeled as a farce, his basic approach condemned as an attempt to reduce the evils of capitalism by the methods of planning while leaving intact the capitalist system of production. In order to beg for u.s. aid, it was alleged, the Indian government had resorted to every possible means ranging from anti-communist campaigns to the provocation of the border conflict. As more imperialist aid came to India, the colonial character of her economy had become even more marked, particularly through the establishment of joint enterprises.3 A variation of this theme was the accusation that Indian monopoly capital, “in dire need of a war atmosphere,” was attempting to fatten itself by making blood profits from the militarisation of the frontier.4 Although minor incidents along the border occurred prior to the Tibetan revolt, Sino-Indian relations deteriorated significantly only after the Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959. When Delhi appeared to be unable or unwilling to persuade him to return to Tibet, there was nothing to restrain Chinese propaganda. Anti-Indian feelings were inhanced by Peking’s sensitivity to everything which could be interpreted as Indian support for a Tibetan government in exile. Nehru’s course was regarded as two-faced tactics which, by permitting submission of the Tibet question to the United Nations, allowed the Dalai Lama to “exceed by far what is permissible under the international practice”.5 Criticism was directed at the “rebel clique” claiming to act on behalf of the Dalai Lama or at the Indian Government, which was accused of setting him up

2 The Editorial Department of People’s Daily, “The revolution in Tibet and Nehru’s philosophy,” Peking Review, May 12, 1959, pp. 6–15; “More on Nehru’s philosophy in the light of the Sino- Indian boundary question,” Oct. 27, 1962, in The Sino-Indian boundary question, Foreign Languages Press, Peking pp. 93–134. 3 Commentator in Peking Review, April 12, 1963, pp. 6–11, “Farce of Nehru’s Socialism.” 4 Peking Review, Nov. 30, 1962. The term “blood profits” was taken from the Indian weekly Blitz. 5 Speech by Foreign Minister Chen Yi. Peking Review, Sept. 15, 1959.

184 chapter 8 against China, rather then at the Priest-King personally. Theoretically these statements could be read as leaving a possibility for his return to Tibet although they may merely have been a tactical device to facilitate the subjugation of the Tibetan people by blaming India for the continued absence of their leader.

Marxist Ideology

The emergence of non-committed nations was never satisfactorily fitted into Marxism, which concerned itself primarily with the transition from capitalism and imperialism towards socialism. This also explains why the ideological dispute between China and the Soviet Union dealt with the non-aligned nations indirectly only when it touched upon the treatment of revolutionary movements. While Peking advocated resolute support for wars of national liberation and people’s revolutionary wars, Moscow took a more pragmatic line: it was the task of the proletariat of every country to decide what forms of struggle should be used in concrete historical conditions.6 Moscow welcomed the newly independent countries as a force for peace, but China only recognised the short term significance of their policy of non-alignment for providing a buffer zone where American bases would not be admitted. China divided external relations into three categories: those with socialist friends, imperialist enemies and the combined group of newly independent and colonial peoples. Each socialist country should develop relations of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with the other countries in the socialist camp in accordance with the principle of proletarian internationalism; it should resolutely oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war; it should strive for peaceful coexistence with countries of differing social systems on the basis of the Five Principles and resolutely support the revolutionary struggles of all oppressed peoples and nations. These aspects were held to be interrelated. It was not permissible to reduce socialist foreign policy to peaceful coexistence alone or to interpret this concept as consisting merely of ideological struggle and economic competition; it was thought to be even less

6 People’s Daily, Dec. 31, 1963; Pravda, Jan. 7, 1963. The ideological dispute can be traced to Khrushchev’s speech at China’s anniversary celebrations on Sept. 30, 1959, in which he opti- mistically reported on his conversations with China’s arch-enemy, the American President, and said: “we, on our part, must do everything possible to preclude war as a means for settling outstanding questions. These questions must be solved through negotiations.” Current History, 37 (1959) 365. The first serious incident on the Sino-Indian border was to occur at the Kongka Pass only three weeks later.

Political Motives In The Border Dispute 185 permissible to extend peaceful coexistence to the relations between oppressed and oppressor nations instead of supporting revolutionary struggles;7 and finally, it was argued that the class struggle had shown that no capitalist government would topple unless it was pushed. In other words, while in the relationship with capitalist states peaceful coexistence could be applied, the communist parties within those states should continue their class struggle, “life and death revolutionary struggles which aim at changing the social system.” The theoretical view taken by Moscow was basically similar:8

The peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems pre supposes an unremitting ideological, political and economic struggle between the two social systems, the class struggle of the working people inside the countries of the capitalist system – including armed struggle when the people find that necessary – and the steady advance of the national-liberation movement of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries.

The Russian position has developed further, however, in so far as it came to consider the development of independent national economies in the new countries which are still exploited by capitalist monopolies “a new heavy blow against imperialism.” It admits the possibility of reactionary rightwing regimes in such countries, but regards them as short-lived because of their obstruction of progress and the solution of vital national problems. Both China and Russia separated support for local communist parties from relations at state-level, but Peking carried this to a point where it became obviously contradictory. Its relations with Afro-Asian states were officially guided by peaceful coexistence, but at the same time the local communists were encouraged to employ violent means in their revolutionary struggle. In her compartmentalised system of analysis it was sufficient for China to point out the difference between state and party relations to dismiss any suggestion of inconsistency. Soviet policy was less dogmatic and showed a closer correlation between foreign policy and instructions to those communist parties, which took their guidance from Moscow. Accordingly Russian support for a new country with a non-communist

7 Par. 16 of Chinese letter to cpsu of June 14, 1963; Joint Statement of Chairman Liu Shao-chi and President Choi Yong Kun of North Korea, Peking, 23 June, 1953; also People’s Daily, June 17, 1963. 8 Letter of the Central Committee of the cpsu to the Central Committee of the cpc, March 30, 1963, Soviet Booklet Mo. 109, pp. 10 and 14.

186 chapter 8 regime was less compromised by contradictory behaviour of the local communists. When Nehru published “The basic approach” in 1958 and again associated communism with the necessity for violence, the Soviet Ambassador in Peking, Pavel Yudin, wrote a lengthy rebuttal.9 His article held significance for both China and India and the function of the author tended to emphasise this dual character. From a Marxist point of view Nehru had to be contradicted on his statement:

But we see the growing contradictions within the rigid framework of communism itself. Its suppression of individual freedom brings about powerful reactions. Its contempt for what might be called the moral and spiritual side of life not only ignores something that is basic in man, but also deprives human behaviour of standards and values. Its unfortunate association with violence encourages a certain evil tendency in human beings.

Academician Yudin noted “Nehru’s partiality for abstract deliberation” and objected to his new concept of socialism which favoured flexible planning and encouraged private enterprise that would fit in the national plan. He thought that Indian individualist philosophy would be unable to offer a way out of the grave economic situation and compared the country with China which had “vastly outstripped India.” But the most significant remark in the present context was his protest that Nehru vilified socialism by comparing it with fascism in pointing to its alleged characteristics of violence and lack of individual freedom. This rejection of violence was an early reminder to Peking how Soviet policy should be interpreted. In this period, however, Yudin was careful not to suggest any overt criticism of another communist state:

…if struggle against reaction is a necessity it should be kept in mind that the choice of means, whether peaceful or non-peaceful, violent or non- violent, hardly ever depends on the progressive forces. A situation may arise when these forces will be unable to refrain from the use of violence unless they choose to give up the fight altogether.

This apologetic attitude was later replaced by a fellow-academician in an open attack on the Chinese “theory of violence” which “inexorably leads to

9 “Reply to Shri Jawaharlal Nehru’s ‘The Basic Approach’ ”, World Marxist Review, 1 (1958) No. 4. See also p. 3, note 1.

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adventurism” and is “closely interlinked with the ideology of militarism” and inseparable from chauvinism. Fedseyev regarded as legitimate and necessary the use of violence by the masses of the people against oppression in their own countries, but no longer considered the use of arms in order to enforce revolution in other countries to be part of Marxist ideology.10 The Chinese accusation that Moscow wanted to cover all foreign relations with the concept of peaceful coexistence led to a clear denial. The Central Committee of the cpsu claimed to be the first to testify to friendship and com- radely mutual assistance as the most important principles in the relations between socialist countries.11 Soviet writers did not hide their view that non- alignment was a gain only as an alternative to and compared with a pro- imperialist foreign policy. Their refusal to consider it as a permanent lever for lessening international tensions, remained basically contradictory to Nehru’s concepts as embodied in Panchsheel. Indian arrests of communists were seen as the result of manoeuvres of influential reactionary groups inside the country:

while the imperialists did not succeed in diverting India from the path of neutralism, the events in that country showed that the balance of political forces in a number of neutralist states has still not taken final shape, and that under certain circumstances it can shift in a direction unfavourable to peace and national liberation.12

On the theoretical level the two communist powers did not show open diver- gencies in their attitude towards the non-committed. Both sides expected the ultimate conversion of the non-aligned to communism but, as a short-term objective, competed for the championship of their cause. Despite its often bellicose protestations Chinese foreign policy has been extremely cautious and resorted to action only when vital interests were thought to be affected. Peking continued to extend aid to non-committed regimes, which would have been inconsistent with provocation of a quick polarisation of world forces.

10 P. Fedseyev, “Theory of violence,” Communist, May 1964; extract in Soviet News, London, No. 4987 (May 11, 1964). 11 “Open letter to all party organisations and all the communists of the Soviet Union,” July 14, 1963. 12 Mikhail Kremnyev, “The non-aligned countries and world politics,” World Marxist Review, Vol. 6, No. 4, April 1963, pp. 28–34.

188 chapter 8

The Chinese campaign against India could, therefore, not have been moti- vated primarily to score an ideological point over Moscow by demonstrating the unreality of non-alignment. The effect of the Indian border question upon Sino-Soviet relations was great for a different reason: it produced a Russian refusal of unquestioned support for Chinese policies. China, like India, experienced that her allies were reluctant to take sides in her boundary disputes. The Chinese reacted, however, by resenting the Russian lack of solidarity which they required from communist nations under all circumstances. But this lack of support was a result, not the cause of Chinese aggressive actions against India. Peking exploited the situation by accusing Moscow of forsaking the Marxist principle of mutual assistance, but, again, it is difficult to see how the border dis pute could be intended exclusively to provoke Russia into choosing between China and India. The short duration of the invasion and its limited character did not necessitate such an explicit choice. In the same way as the Chinese campaign stopped short of a general war with India and thus avoided the risk of western intervention, it also enabled the Soviet Union to remain aloof and to continue her assistance to India on the old footing. As far as the question of aid is concerned Sino-Soviet disagreement seemed more practical than theoretical and found its cause in different assessments of the Nehru government. Study of Nehru’s philosophy had convinced the Chinese leaders that India was no longer properly non-aligned, but was in reality a bourgeois capitalist state which did not deserve assistance from communist countries. The Soviet Union on the contrary was prepared to give such aid and sell arms. To Peking this consideration was more important than the link with “revisionism” which Nehru established at the non-aligned summit in Belgrade. Other sponsors of that meeting such as Ceylon or even the United Arab Republic, which suppressed communism internally, experienced no significant repercussions from their contacts with Tito in the way they were treated by China. In the ideological Sino-Soviet dispute the border conflict was significant because China employed violent means to further aims of foreign policy. To other communist states China had proved herself capable of successfully fulfilling her revolutionary mission in her own sphere of interest without provoking nuclear war; aggressive action had succeeded unchecked, contrary to theories from Moscow. The coincidence of the invasion with the Cuban crisis, in which the Soviet Union had to retreat when faced with Western determination, added to the importance Peking attached to the victorious completion of her own initiative. China only failed in forcing Russia to abandon India in favour of the communist ally. But she succeeded in demonstrating that there

Political Motives In The Border Dispute 189 are problems which could not be settled in east-west contacts without Chinese participation.

The Soviet Union and the Border Dispute In 1959 a Tass statement deplored the border incidents and urged both parties to settle their dispute peacefully.13 How much this neutral position was resented in Peking did not become clear until much later when it was condemned as “the first instance in history in which a socialist country, instead of condemning the armed provocations of the reactionaries of a capitalist country, condemned another fraternal socialist country”. Tito’s suggestion of a pacifying role for the Soviet Union also was indignantly refused. One writer traced Chinese anxiety about Soviet relations with India even further back to the Iraq crisis of 1958 when Khrushchev proposed a summit conference, first at Security Council level, then as a separate meeting with India present, but without China.14 When during the Cuba crisis there was every possibility of serious difficulties with the West, Moscow veered slightly away from India and urged acceptance of the Chinese proposals. It declared that the conflict served not only the interests of imperialism, but also of certain reactionary circles in India, and described the McMahon Line as a legacy of imperialism. But Russia soon reverted to her original position. Ten days later a member of the Presidium was reported as simply calling for a cease-fire and discussions on a reasonable basis without mentioning the Chinese position.15 Shortly afterwards Russia reaffirmed her promise to supply India with Mig fighter aircraft; the immediate military value of this commitment was probably not very significant, but it invalidated China’s argument that India had become a satellite of capitalism. The Russian offer in fact allowed India to continue her policy of non- alignment; by accepting aid from both East and West she could continue to dissociate her quarrel with China from the ideological struggle between communism and western democracy. As Sino-Soviet differences grew in intensity and became the subject of public statements there was less reluctance in Moscow to voice sympathy for the Indian position. The Soviet Union was faced with potential Chinese border claims not dissimilar to the dispute over the Indian frontier. Chinese maps

13 Tass, Sept. 9, 1959; Reply to Thorez, People’s Daily, Feb. 27, 1963. 14 Hugh Seton Watson, “The Great Schism, on Sino-Soviet conflicts,” Encounter, May 1963, pp. 61–70. 15 Pravda, Oct. 25 and Nov. 5, 1962.

190 chapter 8 marked parts of the border with Russia in the Pamir region as awaiting final demarcation. Originally Kuomintang maps of the area had incorporated a large slice of territory which was claimed by the Soviet Union. These were continued during the first years of communist rule, but later changed to follow roughly the Russian alignment, the remaining difference being that the Russian line was detailed and final while the Chinese showed the same “undefined” markings as the border with India and Afghanistan. In the course of their argument with the Russians the Chinese also mentioned, among other “unequal” treaties, the agreements of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860) by which they had ceded two large tracts of Siberia, including the Amur basin. The third and for the dispute possibly most important area was the Ili valley, north of the Tien Shan mountains, which the Russians occupied in the 1870’s and was only partly regained by China in 1881. Against this background a Pravda article on the Sino-Indian border acquired special importance.16 It stated:

We have always considered and still consider that there were no reasons for starting a border conflict between India and China, and especially for bringing this conflict to an armed clash.

The paper also spoke of the damage done to Afro-Asian cohesion and the opportunity it provided for reactionary forces to rouse chauvinistic passions for pushing India off her neutral course. New bloodshed could be started by an accidental rifleshot, particularly as there was “accumulating evidence that the conflict may again be aggravated.” For the first time Moscow seemed to relate the situation on the Indian frontier to Sino-Soviet differences. The Soviet Union, the article said, treated with respect the countries bordering on her and understood “that good- neighbourliness is possible only if the frontiers existing between states are respected.” In warning China against renewing trouble on the Indian frontier, which would harm relations with her Russian neighbour, Moscow also indicated that it would not tolerate disrespect to the existing Sino-Soviet border. Pravda further supported Indian policy by urging China to accept the negotiating position proposed by the Colombo conference. A possible explanation for the Russian shift may be found in growing concern at India’s dependence upon

16 Pravda, Sept. 19, 1963. “A serious hotbed of tension in Asia”; Victor Zorza in The Guardian, Oct. 12, 1959 and Sept. 6 and 20, 1963; “Where China and Russia meet,” The Times, Sept. 10, 1963. See also Wiens, H.J., “China’s north and northwest boundaries,” in Contemporary China, Hongkong University Press, v (1961–62) 33–56.

Political Motives In The Border Dispute 191 western supplies of arms which, in a new clash with China, could hardly be matched by Soviet aid. The implied warning of Soviet action on the Chinese border could then be intended to make up the difference. Peking reacted17 by attacking the Soviet leaders for betraying proletarian internationalism and exploiting the Sino-Indian question to sow dissension between China and other Afro-Asian countries. Contrary to the strict neutrality observed by those countries, the Soviet Union had stepped up her aid to India after October 1962:

The sole purpose of a socialist country in aiding newly independent countries is to help them develop independent national economies, elimi nate colonial influence and free themselves from imperialist control – it is definitely not to help them oppose another socialist country.

Khrushchev’s message to Heads of Government proposing an international agreement rejecting the use of force for the settlement of territorial disputes and frontier questions18 also had implications for the Sino-Indian conflict. The Soviet Premier referred to the harmful effect of the frontier disputes existing between some Asian states on their economic development, but did not mention any by name. More interesting was his remark that in many cases no real solution could be found by basing positions on thousands of years of history, as it would be virtually impossible to find a way out of the numerous evidence of national, ethnographic or racial ties; it should not be forgotten that a reference to history was often a camouflage for open aggression. The proposed treaty would contain a recognition that the territory of a state should not even temporarily be the object of an invasion, attack, military occupation or other coer- cive measures, either direct or indirect. The Soviet suggestions were denounced by Chou En-lai as “a new fraud serv- ing the imperialist policies of aggression and war”, which confused “imperialist aggression and occupation of other countries territories” with “territorial

17 People’s Daily, Nov. 2, 1963. The article also stated that, far from being a minor problem, the dispute with India was a major issue involving 125.000 km of Chinese territory. It was, however, no hotbed of tension like South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, South Vietnam and Laos. 18 Message of Dec. 31, 1963. Khrushchev did not apply his proposals to liberation from colonialism or foreign occupation. In this context he mentioned that the illegal occupation of Taiwan should be terminated and military bases should be withdrawn from foreign countries. Western states showed little enthusiasm because in their view the Soviet principles should apply to all territorial disputes and also to subversive activities, while in general a more precisely worded text would be necessary.

192 chapter 8

disputes and boundary questions left over by history.”19 According to the Chinese view boundary questions between Afro-Asian countries and between socialist countries “should and could find a fair and reasonable solution through peaceful consultations.” This would be impossible in respect of imperialist countries which remained in illegal possession of territories of many countries on the strength of unequal treaties. Peking obviously regarded Moscow’s proposal as primarily a propaganda manoeuver against China. In respect of the Sino-Indian border dispute its contents certainly went against Chinese policy. In addition to condemning implicitly the temporary occupation by China of parts of nefa, it thwarted the basic Chinese aim of extending her authority to every area which had once belonged to China. It seems probable that the Soviet Union will not go further in identifying herself with the Indian position. The border conflict presented her with a real dilemma: increased support for the Indian views could give cause to criticism of Russian leadership within the communist bloc, while acceptance of Chinese claims would lead the Afro-Asian nations to suspect that in the final analysis communist ties outweigh all other considerations. In both cases Peking would gain from the Russian predicament. In 1964 overall Soviet policy tended to avoid upsetting the status quo in Asia as an increase of tension would endanger the East-West detente and enable China to increase her influence in the area. Moreover, as far as India was concerned, there was no need for further commitments as the Soviet Union was sufficiently sympathetic to her in the border dispute while economic assistance continued to be provided as before with a gradual increase in military aid.

The Communist Party of India The precarious balance within the c.p.i., which was outlined in Chapter 2, did not survive the eruption of the border conflict and the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. The party was still united in support of Chinese actions to suppress the revolt in Tibet,20 although this forced it into a defensive position. When its leaders endorsed Peking’s accusation of Kalimpong being a centre of command for the rebellion, Nehru associated himself with fierce parliamentary reactions by declaring that the Indian communists had their roots in different thinking. The border incident at Longju led to an expression of concern which attributed the clash to confusion regarding the precise alignment. The

19 Speech published belatedly in Peking on April 25, 1964. 20 On March 31, 1959, the c.p.i, stated that serfowners and reactionaries had “conspired with foreign imperialists to stage a revolt.”

Political Motives In The Border Dispute 193

resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the c.p.i., adopted on September 29, 1959, continued:

But these differences can be resolved through friendly discussions and negotiation without either side making prior acceptance of its own claims, viz. the McMahon Line in one case and the Chinese maps in the other, the precondition for commencing negotiations.

In November the National Council affirmed the McMahon Line as India’s border and rejected as irrelevant the question of its historical origin. As to Ladakh, use was made of Nehru’s description of the situation there as less clear, to urge acceptance of the traditional border as defined through negotiations. Support for the Chinese position in this sector was also given by not making Chinese withdrawals from Indian territory a pre-condition for talks. The party was fairly prompt in accepting the Colombo proposals which would “create conditions for an honourable settlement through negotiations.” Under Marxist dogma it was inconceivable that a communist state would commit aggression and this explained the continuing appeals by the c.p.i. to reach a negotiated settlement and the great reluctance to look upon China as an aggressor. Yet the rift between nationalist (pro-Indian) and internationalist (pro-Chinese) elements became unavoidable by Chou En-lai’s refusal to recognise the McMahon Line. Regional delegates expressed widely different views, but in order to maintain a facade of unity official policy adopted no clear cut line on the boundary dispute. West Bengal continued to raise doubts about the validity of the McMahon Line for all practical purposes, but Dange (Bombay), Namboodiripad (Kerala) and Ahmed (Uttar Pradesh) expressed support for the Nehru government in resisting aggression. But even Dange maintained that the border problem could only be ended by the two governments negotiating on a political level. He was impressed by the conclusion of the Sino-Burmese agreement and saw no reason why a similar solution could not be applied to the Indian case. After the invasion he sought further integration with nationalist sentiments and, as many members of the pro-Chinese fraction had been arrested, the party leadership managed to condemn Peking’s resort to military measures and appealed to all Indians to unite in defence against Chinese aggression.21 In the meantime the debate within the c.p.i. concerning cooperation with the Congress government had been reopened. It had been closed temporarily when in 1958 the Indian communists attempted to improve their status as a

21 Mukherjee, A.N., Sino-Indian relations and the communists, pp. 54–57; Dange in Lok Sabha Debates, Feb. 20, 1961. Vol. L, col. 898.

194 chapter 8 party free from international supervision by paying lip-service to the Indian attachment to non-violence. In that year the conference at Amritsar adopted a peaceful course to gain power in collaboration with progressive bourgeois elements. Both the Sino-Soviet rift and the dismissal of the communist government in Kerala by the Indian president in 1959 served to focus attention again on the advisability of a peaceful and cooperative policy and even caused a realignment of factions. The left-wing Ranadive group rejected cooperation, arguing that Nehru’s policies only tended to consolidate the reactionary bourgeoisie at the expense of the national bourgeoisie. The “nationalist” faction in the border dispute identified itself with the decisions of Amritsar and, under the leadership of Dange, advocated qualified support for the Nehru wing of Congress and refused to believe that foreign influence in India had grown. Differences came to a head at the Sixth Congress of the C.P.I., at Vijayawada in April, 1961, where a Russian delegation under Mikhail Suslov attempted to throw its weight behind Dange’s position by pointing out that the Indian party had to work in “specific complicated conditions.” Against strong opposition from the left, which forced the inclusion of amendments in a Dange draft, his views prevailed in the official resolution calling for a “national democratic front” in which “anti-imperialists and anti-colonial sections of the national bourgeoisie would find a conspicuous place.” It was significant that the delegations of West Bengal and the Punjab were highly critical of the result as they, together with communists in other states adjoining Tibet, took a pro-Chinese line in the border conflict. The old distinction within the c.p.i, between right, left and centre22 was increasingly superseded by a division between a pro- Indian group, incorporating the former centrists and supporting the Soviet interpretation of Marxism, and those who followed China both in the border dispute and in her argument with Russia. The latter found support from extremists of both left and right. Efforts to create a new centre position were made by Bhupesh Gupta who agreed with putting emphasis on revolutionary struggle, but would not blindly accept everything Peking stood for. In October, 1963 the National Council, aided by the absence of the imprisoned pro-Chinese leaders, managed to condemn China for causing disunity in the communist movement and for harming, by its challenge to the Indian border, the democratic forces in the country and Afro-Asian solidarity in general. The acrimoni- ous debates made it extremely difficult to maintain discipline – never an outstanding characteristic of Indian communists – and the national leadership was unable to prevent pro-Chinese successes in some of the states. In West Bengal, after Kerala the biggest communist stronghold, the pro-Moscow

22 See Chapter 2.

Political Motives In The Border Dispute 195 faction could not maintain its control after the central executive had ceased to intervene. The visit of Chou En-lai to Pakistan again strengthened the anti-Chinese wing of the party and the Central Secretariat was able to issue a statement noting “with amazement and shock” that the Chinese premier had “thought it fit to publicly support the discredited plebiscite formula for Kashmir.” In July the c.p.i. drafted a report which condemned the approach of the Chinese leaders to border questions as chauvinistic; China was accused of claiming in a self- righteous manner all territory conquered by past emperors, but rejected the legacy of imperialism and expansionism inherited by other countries.23

Indian Assessment of China’s Motives

As Chinese attitudes towards India turned full circle from hostile criticism at the time of communist take-over through a period of apparent rapprochement to the present state of violent attack, Indian evaluations of China were reversed. Soon after 1949 Indian leaders viewed the communist revolution in China primarily as one of agrarian reformers rather than as a part of an expansionist world-wide movement. Until a very late stage of the border dispute Nehru refused to believe that China would invade a non-aligned power. To him the claims on Indian territory were a continuation of traditional Chinese policy and not the sort that are pressed upon a friendly nation. His efforts to play down the issue and to avoid arousing public opinion were made not only to maintain his freedom of manoeuvre, but also in the genuine belief that the dispute was relatively unimportant and could eventually be settled through negotiations. Nehru’s assessment of Chinese motives changed suddenly with his much quoted admission that the massive invasion had made India realise she had been out of touch with reality and had shocked her out of the “artificial atmosphere of our own creation.”24 Abandoning his earlier reluctance to admit any competition with China, he now believed that she wanted to demonstrate her superior strength to the countries of Asia. As speeding economic progress had become a matter of comparison between democratic and communist countries, China wanted to force Russia to help only China and none of her rivals. Under attack India was expected to show that in reality she was allied

23 India News, London, Vol. 17 (1964) No. 9, 28. 24 The Times, Oct. 26, 1962.

196 chapter 8 with the West, while internally some disruptive influences would side with China.25 Nehru’s article “Changing India” in Foreign Affairs26 interpreted Chinese policy as flowing from a general analysis of the international situation, which would not permit non-alignment; if the non-committed could be dislodged from their unstable and anomalous position, either by cajolery or coercion, China expected an accentuation of the polarisation of world forces and a has- tening of the communist world revolution. Indian policy would, therefore, be governed by the following considerations:

First, it would be wrong and inexpedient, and also repugnant to every sentiment of national honour and self-respect, to acquiesce in aggression, as plainly established as it is in this case. We must, therefore, insist that the aggression be undone to our satisfaction before normal relations can be restored. … Secondly, despite our friendliness, China’s behaviour toward us has shown such utter disregard of the ordinary canons of international behaviour that it has shaken severely our confidence in her good faith. We cannot, on the available evidence, look upon her as other than a country with profoundly inimical intentions toward our independence and institutions. Thirdly, the Himalayan barrier has proved to be vulner- able. If it is breached, the way to the Indian plains and the ocean beyond would be exposed; and the threat to India would then, likewise, be a threat to the other countries of South and Southeast Asia. India’s determination to resist aggression and retain her territorial integrity is, therefore, a vital factor in the safeguarding of peace and stability throughout this whole area.

In deference to the Soviet Union, Nehru did not blame communism, but traditional Chinese expansionism for the attack on India. References by other Indians to competition with China similarly did not concern communist methods in general, but the particular Chinese pattern. Against a total mobili- sation of manpower and an agrarian reorganisation to provide a surplus for industrial growth in China the Indian model was described as industrialisation with the assistance of foreign economic aid and without imposing a heavy burden on the rural sector. In the days of cordial relations Indian visitors had a genuine interest in China’s achievements, but even then the more perspicacious

25 Nehru’s speech to Allahabad High Court Bar Association, India News, London, Vol. 16, No. 2, Jan. 12, 1963. 26 Foreign Affairs, April 1963, 453–465.

Political Motives In The Border Dispute 197 among them soon discovered a deliberate failure on the part of their hosts to provide their people with correct knowledge about India.27 After the attack Indian assessments of Chinese motives ranged far and wide and very few commentators regarded them as limited to obtaining a border settlement. Distrust of the Chinese implementation of the cease-fire induced New Delhi to increase its request for western military aid, which had been rapidly extended during the fighting. But India’s opinion that a new invasion was imminent was not shared in Washington and London and the applications were trimmed accordingly. When it became clear that for the time being Peking was satisfied with the de facto settlement it had enforced on its own terms, the public alarm subsided. The unrealistic demands to throw the Chinese out, which were frequent during the earlier stages of the dispute, virtually disappeared. More credit was given to those writers who dismissed earlier generalisations concerning Chinese intentions. They rejected the contention that China wanted to show her force to the world, because her military strength had unmistakably been demonstrated long before the n.e.f.a. invasion. If India had been written off as an imperialist stooge, why should Peking attempt at great cost to transform its de facto control of the territory it had seized in Ladakh into de jure possession? The fact that China, having taken what it wanted there, still wished to bring about a formal settlement was interpreted as a desire to normalise relations. Peking, in this view, counted on being able to impose a compromise upon a broken and harassed country, but could not realise its objective because India successfully combined foreign military assistance with non-alignment, while the Colombo formula required further Chinese concessions.28

Conclusions

There is no support for the view that the Chinese leadership created crises in external affairs mainly for the purpose of boosting domestic morale. A controlled propaganda machine would hardly need such measures to put across its position. Fluctuations in Chinese policy seem to depend more on changes in the assessment of the outside world and the usefulness of short term action for long range communist objectives. It has been suggested that the original clashes on the border were intended as a mere show of force against Indian interference in the internal affairs of

27 Gupta S., Seminar, No, 19. Chandrasekhar, S., Communist China today, p. 185. 28 Nanporia, N.J., Times of India, Jan. 28 and Feb. 11, 1963.

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China, but that local commanders were over-zealous in carrying out their instructions. In the middle of personnel changes at the top, including the emergence of a new Chief of Staff, no one would have been willing to take responsibility for stopping incidents for fear that his rivals might accuse him of giving away Chinese territory.29 At that time Chou En-lai’s position was said to have been weakened by his advocacy of more prudent economic development than the Great Leap Forward, so that he would not have been fully effective in a critical phase of Sino-Indian relations.30 In view of the scarcity of reliable information these arguments remain speculative. Even if they were applicable to the first round of the conflict, later developments indicated a united Chinese policy with regard to India in which Chou personally seemed to play a forma- tive part. An analysis of Chinese motives depends to a large extent on the point of departure. If it is assumed that the Sino-Indian struggle is essentially a border dispute its importance to China would not exceed a purely bilateral and local issue. It could then be explained as one more example of hurt national pride built up over half a century, which induced Peking to restore its sovereignty over parts historically belonging to China and to exclude foreign influence from areas vital to Chinese security. And a refusal to keep “unequal” treaties would be the primary reason for a series of border agreements with Burma, Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan, in which China asserted the need for a formalisation and demarcation of the boundary, but proved to be flexible with regard to the actual alignment. The fact that a new treaty was negotiated acquired more importance to China than its contents. After five years of bick- ering the agreement with Burma was hurriedly concluded in 1960, just before Chou paid his visit to New Delhi. After the abortive report of the Chinese and Indian officials, China went through with a settlement of the border with Pakistan, which had the additional advantage of forestalling an Indo-Pakistan rapprochement in the face of Chinese aggression. To force India to the conference table seemed to be the immediate objective of Peking’s actions, which were executed in stages allowing India time to offer concessions after each new Chinese measure. Therefore, the massive attack across the McMahon Line was made to hit India in the area to which she attached the greatest importance. The three American authors who examined the western sector of the disputed border suggested that the Chinese objectives could not have been attained without heavy cost in a campaign limited to

29 Lindsay, M., “Chinese foreign policy: recent developments,” y.b.w.a. (1961) 86. 30 Burton, B., Van ‘Entente Cordiale’ tot de konfrontatie in de Himalaya, p. 156.

Political Motives In The Border Dispute 199

Ladakh.31 This is possible, though hardly plausible. Chinese forces in Ladakh were equally superior and even had tanks at their disposal. There is more reason to suppose that Peking needed to check Indian advances in Ladakh which began to challenge Chinese positions, but wanted something more spectacular than an offensive up to its claim line, which already was well within its reach. The incident in the Galwan valley in July, 1962 may have been of crucial importance in convincing China that action should be taken against Indian attempts to establish posts behind her lines. For that reason an attack in the east was planned to demonstrate China’s ability to realise her entire aspirations unilaterally if India continued to refuse negotiations. The immediate cause for the outbreak of fighting was the Chinese occupation of the Thagla ridge which provoked Nehru’s order to expel the intruders. The Indian operations made some headway until they received a stunning blow from the Chinese “counter attack in self-defence.” The same pattern was later repeated at Se La after Indian deployments had started to affect the Chinese positions. The timing of the invasion in October made a long campaign unlikely as this would have involved extremely difficult supply problems during the coming winter. The absence of air raids also pointed to the limited nature of Chinese aims. Apparently Peking was convinced that increased military pressure would make Nehru change his mind and accept its proposals for a settlement.32 Pressure should not be maintained too long, however, as this would probably widen the scope of the conflict. A challenge to the concept of non-alignment may have been a collateral motive of Chinese action, but she had nothing to gain from all-out Indian alignment with the West. Her penetration should, therefore, be stopped before vital Indian interests outside the border area were affected. It would have been easy to occupy the Digboi oil fields in northeast Assam, but Chinese troops stayed within the limits of their claims to n.e.f.a. The sudden cease-fire followed by a withdrawal from the whole of n.e.f.a. confirmed that China had intended a show of force in the traditional Chinese manner of a punitive expedition, which would prevent further Indian forward movements. Immediately thereafter she aimed at creating an image of generosity by foregoing the gains of military action. This phase of the border conflict coincided with renewed Chinese interest in Afro-Asian opinion. While the endeavour to obtain a conference was her primary motive, China’s desire for talks abated when the Colombo-proposals, which originally appeared acceptable to Peking, changed their character through the clarifications offered in Delhi. Having stabilised the frontier in accordance with its interpretation of

31 Fisher, M., a.o., Himalayan Battleground, p. 135. 32 People’s Daily, Nov. 11, 1962, quoted in Karnik, V.B., China invades India, p. 247.

200 chapter 8 the line of actual control, Peking lost interest in a more permanent solution if this required further Chinese concessions. Under these circumstances it became tempting to argue that China never really wanted to reach an agreement with India and was always a step ahead in asking more concessions than Delhi was prepared to grant. This impression could be reinforced by Peking’s lack of response to the offer Nehru made shortly before his death in connection with the demilitarised zone on the Chinese side of the line of actual control: India was prepared to drop her demand for civilian posts in the area if China did not enter it either. She thereby gave up part of the advantage gained from the clarifications of the Colombo formula, although it had never been credible that the 20 kilometre zone could be controlled by civilian posts from both sides. The Indian proposal nevertheless constituted an attempt to break the immobility of the dispute and implied a willingness to negotiate, which now China did not seem to reciprocate. It should be remembered, however, that acceptance of Nehru’s offer would still involve a partial Chinese retreat from what she had put down as her negotiating position. China, or any other communist power, would not lightly consider making concessions once her terms for a settlement had been announced. Only a major change in her assessment of the situation could induce her to make a policy shift without regarding it as a sign of weakness. If such a change were to occur, for instance, in a further effort to make an impression on the Afro-Asian countries, China would be able to time the opening of negotiations on the basis of the Colombo proposals by accepting a compromise on the demilitarised zone in Ladakh. But so far Peking showed no inclination to yield any further. The success of its military campaign and its changed evaluation of India had hardened the Chinese position. Vituperation against Nehru’s government “supported and encouraged by the imperialists” could hardly be an appropriate preparation for detailed negotiations. Peking seemed to be prepared to wait for a final settlement as long as India did not attempt to change the status quo. There was no incentive to modify its hard policy towards Delhi as the side-effects of the Chinese victory had fulfilled a number of objectives which exceeded the scope of the border conflict. With regard to Nepal and Bhutan the Chinese invasion of n.e.f.a. served to undermine Indian influence by showing that the Himalayas neither constituted an impregnable barrier nor could be effectively defended by India. In a recent publication Patterson33 went as far as to predict a Chinese coup de

33 Patterson, G., Peking versus Delhi, p. 290. Reports of the Chinese press advocating an independent Gurkhastan date as far back as the n.y. Times of Feb. 2, 1955. Hinton, H.C., The myth of traditional Sino-Indian friendship.

Political Motives In The Border Dispute 201 grace by moving into Bhutan, where her historical claims were much more firmly based than in n.e.f.a., which would enable her to isolate Assam from the rest of India at any desired moment. His preoccupation with the eastern sector tended to dismiss Ladakh as a sideshow and to doubt the strategic value of the Aksai Chin road. It is, however, not very convincing to base this argument on the exposed situation of the long supply route between Sinkiang and Tibet, which could be interrupted in the same way as the eastern approaches were destroyed during the Tibetan revolt. The fact that communications between China and Tibet are only possible through long and difficult roads is no reason to doubt the importance of establishing another route from an entirely different direction. In the relationship with India this road which, east of Aksai Chin, runs somewhat parallel to the frontier would also have a military significance by enabling both the control of the Tibetan population in the area and the logistic support of border posts. Seen in a regional context China had given an impressive demonstration of her power by inflicting a defeat upon her main rival in Asia. Its repercussions would be felt long after the gains of the military campaign had been vacated by her voluntary withdrawal. The economic development of India, which could be regarded as a test case for non-communist methods in an Asian country in need of rapid social change, would be compromised if expenditure committed under the five year plans had to be diverted substantially to defensive purposes. If, on the contrary, western assistance were forthcoming to meet her increased military needs, India would lose her independent position and speak with less authority for the non-aligned states. This aspect of Chinese policy was illustrated by her subsequent attempt to re-invigorate the Afro-Asian movement under her own leadership. Efforts in this direction were made during the solidarity conference at Moshi in (then) Tanganyika in 1963 and Chou En-lai’s African tour. They would tie in with Chinese initiatives to woo the Asian membership of communist front organisations with, perhaps, the ultimate aim of setting up separate bodies rivalling those dominated by Russia. Their success, however, would necessarily remain limited as the non-aligned countries became increasingly hesitant to associate themselves too closely with China at the time of deepening of the Sino-Soviet crisis. In the multitude of motives outlined above no single one should be discounted. We take the view that the Sino-Indian conflict essentially remained a border dispute in which China wanted to press upon her neighbour the necessity of fresh negotiations concerning the boundary. When this failed and India even probed into territory held by Chinese troops, Peking felt obliged to uphold her status as a great power by teaching India a lesson to refrain from

202 chapter 8 further encroachments. But China’s policy carefully calculated the additional advantages of her action against India in respect of both the Afro-Asian and the communist worlds. It fitted Rostow’s definition34 as “a mixture of political aggression with those limited forms of military action which minimise the risk of major war and which cost little in resources.”

34 Rostow, W.W., The prospects for communist China, p. 310.

chapter 9 Conclusions (1964)

The Boundary Question

Discussions of the boundary dispute often put a somewhat exaggerated emphasis on the Indian predicament of being forced to maintain frontiers inherited from British imperialism. Most of the new countries were faced with similar circumstances and took it as a matter of course that their administration should cover the entire territory left by their colonial masters. Moreover, Nehru himself has pointed out that the borders of China also were the result of prolonged and violent conquest.1 Yet, it has taken India many years to shed her apologetic attitude. Emotional and imprecise slogans condemning colonialism as “permanent aggression” had produced a false impression of a dilemma concerning the legitimacy of the territorial legacy. By stressing China’s peaceful intentions Nehru was prevented from giving wide publicity to security measures on the Indian borders, but ever since the “liberation” of Tibet there was profound concern about the possibility of a Chinese threat. The question was considered whether India should press the frontier question at that stage, but in consultation with Ambassador Panikkar the Government decided on a policy of “you need not raise it, but declare it openly”. Nehru later admitted that he had a lingering doubt concerning the problem of the frontier, but hoped that “the lapse of time and events will confirm it and by the time, perhaps, when the challenge to it came, we would be in a much stronger position to face it”.2 Yet, it seems almost incredible that in 1954 India gave up her treaty rights in Tibet without trying to obtain Chinese endorsement of the McMahon Line. It is not quite relevant to argue that India was virtually powerless, as a refusal to recognise the Chinese occupation of Tibet would have meant nothing to Peking and would only have created immediate trouble on the border. But the necessity of ceding Indian privileges in Tibet should not have prevented an attempt to regularise the boundary. At that time China was interested in establishing normal relations with India as was illustrated by the fact that the proposal to convert the Indian mission at Lhasa into a consulate-general (in exchange for a Chinese consulate-general at

1 In Rajya Sabha on Sept. 10, 1959. Prime Minister on Sino-Indian relations, Vol. i, p. 146. 2 Rajya Sabha, Official Report, xxvii, No. 13 (Dec. 9, 1959) col. 1984–5.

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Bombay) emanated from Peking.3 Nehru misjudged Chinese intentions and consented to an agreement which offered respectability to China while receiving in return only the vague precepts of Panchsheel. He was insufficiently aware of the traditional Chinese policy of playing down unresolved questions until they could be advanced at a suitable time. Meeting the Chinese premier in 1956 he was equally taken in by Chou’s masterful statement on the McMahon Line which suggested its acceptance, but fell short of a formal commitment.4 India thus acquired the false conviction that she had been successful in delaying Chinese pressure and in dividing spheres of influence so that China would be content with Tibet and leave the Himalayan states to India. Her main weakness was to ignore the fact that Chinese tactics aimed at expanding influence step by step, carefully consolidating each gain. Nehru found each step expli- cable against the background of China’s history and her legitimate interests after the revolution. If the border crossings after 1954 were meant to test Indian reactions, Nehru showed sufficient determination to stand by his interpretation of the frontiers. But his attempt to keep them as a separate and even secret issue as distinct from other Sino-Indian relations may have induced Peking to continue its probing. Nehru continued to believe that the unsurmountable barrier of the Hima layas left China no choice but to follow a policy of Panchsheel. The writings of Panikkar on problems of defence similarly concentrated on the exposed nature of the Indian flanks and the long coast line and took the northern frontier for granted. In 1951 a Border Committee was appointed in India to examine the northern frontier and many of its recommendations were accepted including the extension of administration in n.e.f.a., the development of communications, check-posts and intelligence and the expansion of the Assam Rifles. It is difficult to find fault with these measures but they were inadequate without a political follow-up to eliminate any doubt on the international boundary. In the absence of Chinese confirmation of her views, India committed the error of setting up indefensible posts to stake her territorial limits. Looking back at the development of the border conflict, which gained momentum after each interruption, a few Indian concessions might have been

3 Panikkar, K.M., In two Chinas, p. 175. Examination of the Rajya Sabha report does not warrant the conclusion that Nehru admitted having expected Chinese demands for further concessions in exchange for recognition of the McMahon Line (Johri, S., Where India, China and Burma meet. Reviewed by K. Gupta in India Quarterly xix (1963) 279–282). He asked “what exactly was the quid pro quo”, but referred only to India’s inability to prevent Chinese consolidation of the annexation of Tibet. 4 See Ch. 6.

Conclusions (1964) 205 sufficient to forestall escalation towards the point of no return in the autumn of 1962. But it is not surprising that Delhi found them difficult to contemplate. If it admitted that the boundary had never been delimited it ran the risk of vast new Chinese claims. Up to 1960 China had not been able to conclude border agreements with any of her neighbours and clouded her ultimate aims in mystery while her maps changed silently. Perhaps Delhi could have made constructive suggestions instead of mere protests preceding the abrupt announce ment of the discovery of the Chinese road through Ladakh, but we have seen that Peking had temporarily abandoned its efforts to appear reasonable and sympathetic in Afro-Asian eyes. The next opportunity could have arisen at political discussions on the basis of the report which the officials from both sides drew up in 1960. Then China could have made a formal proposal to exchange Indian cession of Aksai Chin for recognition of the McMahon Line. Yet the report had demonstrated the wide differences between the two sides and again Delhi, now carefully watched by an aroused public, saw no prospect of an acceptable settlement. Indian demands for a withdrawal of Chinese troops from her territory before negotiations could start were consistent with her stand in the Kashmir dispute, but seemed a deviation from her counsel in other international conflicts. When these showed signs of leading to an intensification of the cold war India used to strive for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the opening of discussions between the parties regardless of the justification of their claims. But in quarrels which involved her own territory she took a rather uncompromising position. In the border dispute India came very close to refusing any talks while China occupied parts of Ladakh, but in February 1960 suddenly agreed to a meeting of the Prime Ministers. After the invasion the opening of negotiations was made dependent upon acceptance of the Colombo proposals. Nehru sought to dispel the impression of inconsistency by drawing a distinction between talks and negotiations. As far as he was concerned there was nothing to negotiate, but he was always prepared to talk “because the alternative to that is not to talk, just to keep in your shell and fight.”5 Another point of comparison with the Kashmir problem is the significance of the line of actual control, which in the dispute with Pakistan is the cease-fire line. Formalisation of the status quo with Pakistan, it seems, would be acceptable to public opinion in India. Would the passage of time make it equally resigned to the loss of Aksai Chin? In both cases there is little chance of retriev- ing territory without resorting to major war and a sensible boundary could be achieved on the basis of the status quo without compromising security

5 Press conference of January 18, 1961. Prime Minister on Sino-Indian relations, Vol. ii, p. 102.

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considerations. In 1964 there was little prospect of reaching agreement on either dispute, but a solution of one was bound to affect positions on the other. Lamb has suggested the British proposals of 1899 as a reasonable compromise for Aksai Chin which, according to him, would leave China in possession of her strategic road between Tibet and Sinkiang. Even if India consented to a boundary approximating the Lokzhung alignment of 115 years ago its acceptability to China would be most doubtful.6 On the contrary, the construction of new roads parallel to the original highway with branches to the forward military posts suggested a determination to claim a larger area. The same conclusion presented itself from the Chinese refusal to agree to Indian civilian posts in the demilitarised zone on her side of the cease-fire line as suggested in the clarifications to the Colombo proposals. While in negotiations China might be expected to insist on retaining at least a sizeable corner of Ladakh, in the eastern sector she would probably agree to confirm the alignment followed by the McMahon Line. The Indian claim to the Thagla ridge could be disputed with justification and Longju, where the British had not yet established administrative control in 1947, may become the subject of hard bargaining. If China were to acquire the latter area permanently she would have an advantage in possessing a base to the south of the highest crest where the Subansiri river breaks through the Himalayas. Its strategic importance should not be exaggerated, however, as the ridge separating it from Migyitun in Tibet is only thousand feet higher and the terrain further south remains extremely difficult. More embarrassment to India in the eastern sector would result from pressing the historic Tibetan claims to Tawang and the salient of territory contiguous to the eastern border of Bhutan. Hudson and Patterson consider Chinese intentions in n.e.f.a. as serious as in Ladakh, but the unilateral withdrawal to the north of what Peking considers the proper McMahon alignment would not suggest this. On the whole the McMahon Line seems a logical boundary and China might accept it in an overall-settlement. So far her attitude apparently has been governed more by a denial of the treaty making power of Tibet in the past than by an examination of the suitability of the 1914 line as a boundary. Yet, as long as no formal agreement is reached China might revive her claims in an acute form. In the meantime her unilateral withdrawals behind her “line of actual control” in practice have confirmed this alignment as the de facto boundary.

6 In its note of Dec. 26, 1959, Peking mentioned the British proposal and added “…but nothing came of it. It is also inconceivable to hold that the territory of another country can be annexed by a unilateral proposal.” China regarded the alignment, proposed by Britain in 1899 as a concession on her part, as an expansionary move.

Conclusions (1964) 207

Indian spokesmen tended to regard 1966 as a crucial year because of the completion of the Chinese road building programmes (including one to Kathmandu), while India would possess five new mountain divisions by the end of 1964. A new military clash would certainly acquire larger proportions than the invasion of 1962, but neither side would gain from provoking one. Even if India really believes that her defences are sufficiently strong to retaliate in the event of China launching another attack across the boundary,7 she is likely to refrain from fresh probes of the Chinese positions.

The Implications of the Border Dispute

Shortly before the Chinese invasion Nehru declared that in his opinion India would not maintain her independence for long “if we go about seeking military aid from others to defend ourselves.” That would be fundamentally opposed to the policy of being non-aligned. In the same speech he thought it quite absurd to talk about China invading India because India was not that weak.8 Pursuant to his conception of non-alignment India’s ambitious programme of defence production aimed at avoiding a direct dependence upon military assistance. There is, however, legitimate doubt as to whether expenditure for this purpose would not unduly tax economic development and whether India would ever be able to equip a completely modern army on her own. In any case, when the clash with China came the Indian government was faced with an immediate shortage of small arms in addition to the strategic error of insufficient preparedness along the northern frontier. Western assistance was requested and promptly received while the crisis lasted, but afterwards India’s elaborate esti- mates of weapons needed were cut down. The main impact of the conflict on Indian attitudes seems to have been the realisation that the West did not ask India to become aligned in exchange for the supply of arms and that the Soviet Union did not object to her receiving Western military aid. Nehru had to admit that the old concept of non-alignment was undergoing a change, which he attributed mainly to the Sino-Soviet rift. He argued that India should remain non-aligned but must also take all necessary measures to defend herself. This justification for accepting arms was not carried to the point of agreeing with a western “air umbrella” over India. His reason for rejecting that suggestion, however, did not link it immediately with non-alignment but argued the undesirability of creating the impression that

7 Defence Minister Chavan in Lok Sabha, Feb. 24, 1964. India News, London, Vol. 17, No. 9. 8 Lok Sabha debates, Aug. 14, 1962. Vol. vi, col. 1754–5.

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“other people are doing our job” and the danger of a “Maginot line mentality”.9 Formally speaking the reliance upon Western aid had of course not been exclusive, as the sale of several mig aircraft and promises to construct a production plant constituted a small, but symbolically important Russian contribution. If China would decide on another advance, however, it was clear that India would have to rely on outside help, which it could only expect in sufficient quantities from the West. Assuming that massive assistance would be forthcoming in a real crisis, while moderate aid would be granted under more normal circumstances, a new kind of relationship with the West has developed, without formal ties and compatible with non-alignment. For Indians this new possibility has arisen by distinguishing between Chinese and communist aggression. They did not share Kripalani’s argument that India, being the victim of communist aggression, could no longer be non- aligned, because communism was no longer united. Therefore, Nehru has always been careful to blame Chinese, not communist, expansionism for the border dispute. Only if the Soviet Union openly backed Chinese aggression would India be forced to seek alignment with the West. Although non-alignment remained a feasible policy its limitations had been made apparent by the border dispute. The Chinese attacks had dispelled the unwarranted assumption that non-alignment was a safeguard to security and a substitute for defence preparedness. It was realised that, generally speaking, non-alignment alone would not prevent a member of either bloc from attacking when it thought it possible to do so without provoking a world war. India had wrongly believed that the balance between the Soviet Union and the United States was global and had insufficiently appreciated that China’s freedom of manoeuver in regard to her might still be very considerable. In the absence of any power to balance China in the Himalayas the neutralist strategy did not work, because India was not outside the sphere of Chinese ambitions. Under these circumstances a non-aligned nation should either provide for an adequate defence or accept the necessity of calling on one of the blocs in a crisis. A second conclusion to be drawn from the Sino-Indian conflict is that despite all protestations of Afro-Asian solidarity India was shown to have more friends in the West than in her own region. Many Asians even derived a macabre satisfaction out of India’s humiliation. Neutralism had added to the prestige of India internationally, but had given her leaders such a sense of achievement that they did not find it urgently necessary to solve vital problems with the nations around her. Among them sensitivity to real or imaginary signs of Indian arrogance was coupled with a sober assessment of national interests;

9 Ibidem, Dec. 10, 1962; Jan. 25 and 27, 1963. Vol. xi, col. 5092; xii, 6512; xiii, 1328.

Conclusions (1964) 209 as many smaller nations of south Asia received more assistance from China than from India, and more important, were concerned with possible Chinese threats to their frontiers or through the overseas Chinese minority, they were hesitant to take sides in a dispute which did not immediately affect them. They were hardly impressed by the words of the Indian representative in the Security Council that if India failed there would be nothing to control the Chinese forward policy.10 These experiences did not fail in their effect upon Indian policy, which started to pay more attention to problems of immediate national interest. A non-aligned nation by definition runs the risk of finding itself without allies on questions which have no immediate bearing upon the interests of other countries. The bitter realisation of having to face China without unequiv- ocal Afro-Asian support shocked India into an information campaign, but she remained consistent in refusing to solicit collective action. Under present conditions this would have made little difference, while limiting her freedom of independent action and widening gaps between the countries in her region. In international organisations India continued to play an important part, which suffered little from the confrontation with China. If she was less vocal as a spokesman for the Afro-Asian group it was partly because her counsel of moderation did not yet appeal to the younger states, and partly as a result of other countries achieving her level of active participation. Therefore, India´s decline, if any, seemed more relative than absolute. The ideal of regional consolidation had been lost long before the border dis pute erupted. The Asian pattern of communist, non-aligned and pro-Western states has been complicated by the multiplication of differences among the neutrals themselves. Basically, India was reluctant to participate in any new international political grouping, but preferred a meeting of the non-aligned as at Belgrade to a repetition of Bandung where Chinese presence would inevitably limit the extent of Indian participation. Increased attention was given to the United Nations as the new alignments were less obvious in an almost universal organisation. Already in 1964 one could ask the question how much the position of India in the United Nations, despite her advocacy of communist China’s membership, would suffer from the admission of the Peking government. India would no longer enjoy the prestige of the natural leader of Asia in the assemblies of the world and her influence would be challenged by strong claims to Asian leadership by a nation of very old standing and very modern forcefulness.

10 Eastern World, xviii (1964) No. 3.

210 chapter 9

Panchsheel

Based on tolerance and an attempt to be fair to all ideologies the concept of Panchsheel assumed that coexistence would be possible if there were no interference by any country to impose its political or economic will upon others. With gradual inevitability it should evolve into better international understanding, non-political relations such as trade and cultural contacts being an important intermediary stage. This attitude seemed to suggest a political aloofness as the Five Principles would amount to a confirmation of the status quo, however inequitable. Panchsheel provided no solution for a conquered nation or one under colonial domination, which could hardly be expected to agree to coexist peacefully with their masters. Coexistence in such cases would be that of “the lamb with the lion, when the lamb is safe in its belly”11; the independence of nations should be recognised or realised before there was a possibility of peaceful coexistence or respect for each other’s sovereignty. India did not admit to any dilemma between the desirability of change and peaceful coexistence because membership of the United Nations provided a forum for active international participation. This organisation enabled India to pursue her traditional objectives of racial equality and the elimination of colonialism by marshalling majority opinion in their support, thus avoiding a conflict between her policy of active anti-colonialism and the principles of coexistence in her bilateral relations. But in the important questions of East–West relations she refused to take sides until the absolute need arose, partly because she did not see enough difference between the two parties in what, in her view, amounted to a mere clash of rival imperialisms, partly in the hope not to be faced with the difficult task of “judging every issue on its merits” which would have been implicit in making non-alignment a matter of high principle. She easily acquiesced in Soviet or Chinese domination in eastern Europe and Tibet because of the obvious impossibility of changing the situation without recourse to war. The maintenance of peace became the essential condition for rapid economic development and India concentrated on its promotion, defining peace – perhaps negatively but realistically – as the sum total of averted and arrested wars. At a time when the West was highly doubtful whether it could reach an understanding with the East that was more than a transient stage of non- belligerency, India signed a Panchsheel agreement with China, which was subsequently adopted by all other communist powers. When Panchsheel first appeared there was little reason to suppose that to communists its value would exceed the Leninist meaning of coexistence as a

11 Kripalani, J.B., “For principled neutrality,” Foreign Affairs, 38 (1959) 46–60.

Conclusions (1964) 211 delaying action with a protective function in the form of non-intervention. It was definitely an aim of Indian policy to obtain such a breathing spell or truce with regard to China in the hope that in the meantime either friendly relations would emerge, or India would reach a better position to safeguard her security. In a wider context, of course, she sought to create an area of peace which would keep a large part of Asia out of the cold war. But she seemed insufficiently aware of the very limited nature of peaceful coexistence as a theoretical communist concept. Khrushchev’s statement12 that the alternative to coexistence would be war with its disastrous consequences could not alter the fact that to communists peaceful coexistence was a form of conflict and not of rec- onciliation. Nehru defended Panchsheel by saying that it was not a question of believing the other party’s words, but of creating conditions in which it would become difficult for it to break its word. Yet preciously little was (and could be) done to create these conditions except signing a series of Panchsheel agreements on paper. Asian opinion keenly watched Chinese behaviour, but could do nothing to exert real influence. In the years 1954–57 and again occasionally after 1962 China decided that it would suit her to show respect for Afro-Asian sentiments, but these changes were determined autonomously and did not come as a response to policies of the countries in the area. The border dispute has clearly shown the failure of moral containment as a practical instrument of foreign policy. Moreover, the partial adoption of communist phraseology reduced the utility of the Five Principles to a slogan which could always be thrown back at the party using it first. China applied peaceful coexistence only in the orthodox Leninist manner of establishing a buffer zone without imperialist bases. Khrushchev amplified it in relation to neutralism, which he no longer regarded as an anomaly in a polarising world. For him coexistence lost most of its defensive meaning and became the battlefield for non-violent competition. Only in Europe it served to maintain the status quo, which was clearly marked by the Iron Curtain, but in the underdeveloped world peaceful coexistence was intended to facilitate new entries into the communist camp. Transition to the new social system would not need to involve armed struggle or civil war, but was nevertheless identified with a period of intense class struggle and socialist revolution.13 This

12 At Peking on Sept. 30, 1959. Current History, 37 (1959) 366. 13 Kallai, G., “Some questions of peaceful coexistence and class struggle.” World Marxist Review, 4 (1961) No. 10. See also E. Dennis, “On peaceful coexistence: a critique of ‘A Western View’,” Ibidem, 3 (1960) No. 4; M. Reimann, “Peaceful coexistence and the class struggle.” Ibidem, No. 1.

212 chapter 9 elaboration of Soviet theory coincided with Indian attempts to give wider currency to Panchsheel than their application in relation to China. It is perhaps understandable that Nehru welcomed this evolution in Soviet thinking as it would help to exclude war and the threat of a violent internal uprising by the cpi, while providing an additional safeguard for the observance of the Five Principles by Peking. He was confident about India’s capacity to restrain local communists as long as they pursued peaceful methods and saw no objection to allowing some competition between East and West in providing the economic assistance his country urgently required. Criticism may be levelled, however, at Indian efforts to convert plausible reasons of self-interest into a code of conduct for the world. Looking back upon her foreign policy between 1954 and 1964, reliance upon Panchsheel seemed almost doctrinal. Though sincere in searching for a mode of living between the power blocs, the emphasis on the Five Principles was misleading as they could not form a guarantee against communist subversion for countries with a less developed political structure. Within India it led to underem- phasizing the threat from China as compared with Pakistan and, despite the existence of a considerable military budget, a wrong deployment of the forces available. Nehru concluded from the Five Principles that there should be no aggression nor interference, not even ideological interference.14 The border dispute demonstrated the extensive interpretation a communist power may put on non-interference, going as far as raising official protests against Indian press editorials and statements made at private functions. At the same time Chinese mass media, which could be taken to voice official opinion, conducted a vilifi- cation campaign against the Nehru Government with constantly increasing intensity. Communist sensitivity to criticism generally led India to condone acts which it would not have accepted from the West. The Chinese invasion only partly terminated this “political myopia.” The more India became involved in international problems, the more difficult it became to remain objectively neutral. As experienced by all statesmen who felt the urge to address homilies to a sinful world, Nehru laid himself open to the riposte that he did not always practice what he preached.15 The occupation of Goa was seen as such a contradiction even by observers who had little sympathy for the Portuguese regime. Here the desirability of demonstrating both India’s anti-colonialism and her military efficiency superseded political principles. It was even said that by the

14 Mendc, T., Conversations with Nehru, 1958, p. 72. 15 The ophthalmological diagnosis is from J.P. Narayan. The Economist, Feb. 10, 1962, traced a line of succession from Gladstone through Woodrow Wilson to Pandit Nehru.

Conclusions (1964) 213 standards India applied in commencing this campaign China would not be an aggressor on the Himalayan frontier, but simply a rectifier of borders established under colonial rule.16 But India was in little danger of hearing this accusation from Peking, as all communist states warmly supported the ejection of Portugal. When China laid claim to Indian territory, Nehru stuck to Panchsheel and declared his adherence to its principles even if no one else did. The remark was revealing, because it illustrated that, true to its literal meaning, Panchsheel was primarily a guide for one’s own policy and not a practical formula which could usefully be included among treaty provisions. Indian experience in the border dispute carried the lesson that the solemn adoption of vague and widely acceptable principles is no substitute for a detailed understanding on points of mutual interest based on a position of strength. Writing in 1964 the era of Panchsheel seemed to be over as far as India was concerned and the debate shifted to the desirability of maintaining non- alignment. After the Chinese war the advocacy of Panchsheel would meet with a cool reception from a sceptic Indian public, but powerful reasons remained for keeping a non-committed position. Chinese leaders, on the contrary, continued to refer to the Five Principles and included them in the communiqué’s issued in conjunction with Afro-Asian statesmen. Each time this happened China succeeded in receiving the implied recognition of her policy as non- aggression and non-interfering and Delhi must have regretted that it ever started the process of building up Chinese respectability in Asia. Far from alienating neutral opinion from China, the invasion of India impressively demonstrated her military power and the necessity of staying on good terms with her. In the border dispute the Five Principles had been flying across like a mul- tiple boomerang and Asian reluctance to support the Indian position in the border dispute was the final proof that Panchsheel was inadequate in creating a containment of China. The mediation effort by the Colombo powers was true to Nehru’s traditional approach to international problems by refusing to take sides. The clarifications of the proposals given in Delhi were not unfavourable to the Indian case, but there was no expression of opinion on the vital question of aggression. The neutral powers were more interested in bringing the parties together again than in apportioning the blame and they probably regarded India’s hesitation to negotiate a boundary as an unwise prolongation of a source of tension. Although he no longer determined Burmese policy a realistic assessment by U Nu may be quoted which put the relationship between

16 New York Times, Jan. 2, 1962.

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Panchsheel and the boundary dispute in their proper perspective. Signing the Sino-Burmese boundary treaty he said:

…it is of the utmost importance that even the best of neighbours whose relationship is firmly founded on the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence, should know where the territory of one ends and the other begins, so as to be in a position to apply faithfully the principle of respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.17

Burmese willingness to accept a new settlement of the borders paid better dividends than the Indian policy of unilaterally clarifying the limits of her territory. Regardless of the feasibility of either course, Panchsheel alone could not be a substitute for mutual agreement on a detailed boundary. Strict observance of the Five Principles would only be possible if an agreed boundary clearly curtained off one country from the other,

Prospects, a 1964 Assessment

Even if the Colombo proposals were suddenly accepted by Peking the elaborate agreement necessary to embody a compromise between the two widely different points of view undoubtedly could be found only by arduous bargaining. Assuming that an agreed solution could only be arrived at by India ceding at least part of Aksai Chin and that her public opinion still was a long way from contemplating such substantial concessions, Sino-Indian relations would remain unsettled for some considerable time. Although Asian countries have learned to be patient and persevering and show little of the western zeal for quick, clear cut and watertight solutions, the unsettled border dispute should have a continuous effect on Indian policy. Previously her aims were relatively simple and non-controversial with only the conflict with Pakistan as a constant factor in the background which often had a predetermining effect on foreign policy. Now India was receiving impulses from two directions, each involving a complicated dispute with an important neighbour, and a new equilibrium had not yet been found. At the time of the Chinese attack Western insistence made India agree to a series of conferences on the Kashmir problem but high hopes for a settlement proved to be ill-founded. The issue had its roots too deeply in the history of the two countries to allow a quick settlement under

17 Jan. 28, 1960. Whittam, D.E., “The Sino-Burmese boundary treaty.” Pacific Affairs (1961) 174–183.

Conclusions (1964) 215 foreign pressure. Subsequently the lull on the border with China made conciliation with Pakistan less urgent and the pendulum of Indo-Pakistan relations swung back to one of its lowest points, speeded by the conclusion of a boundary treaty between Peking and Karachi. Yet, more and more Indians seemed to realise that they cannot shoulder the burden of two separate conflicts with neighbouring countries and may ask the question which would be easiest to solve. The release of Sheikh Abdullah in the spring of 1964 had again broken the immobility of the Kashmir situation, but no quick solution was to be expected and the current complicated and paradoxical situation was not likely to be easily untangled: India originally objected to Pakistan’s membership of military alliances with Western powers, but was most incensed when independent of her allies she signed a treaty with China. In the Kashmir issue Delhi depended on the Soviet veto, with China appearing more favourable to the Pakistani position. In the border dispute military aid from the West was needed (although Soviet assistance seemed to be on the increase) to an extent which caused a great deal of apprehension to seato member Pakistan. To top it all, as a result of the Sino-Soviet quarrel, the end of colonialism and the reasser- tion of national ambitions everywhere, it was no longer clear just what the aligned countries are aligned against.18 At the end of the Nehru era the crumbling of the criteria guiding foreign policy for fifteen years presented a new challenge to India. In 1964 it only seemed safe to predict a continued refusal to join military alliances. It was possible that the new leaders also would pay more attention to matters of immediate self-interest, which should be defined in more realistic terms than had happened in the past. Closer attention to relations with the smaller neighbouring countries could yield fruitful results. The Kashmir dispute remained the major obstacle to shaking off the immobility in foreign policy. It basically was far more difficult to solve than the dispute with China, which could be terminated by a concession, though humiliating, of worthless territory in Ladakh. Nehru, who regarded the Kashmir issue as a trial of the secular concept of the Indian state, seemed resigned to the impossibility of reaching a solution. His successors have not been able to slowly manoeuvre towards a rapprochement, for improved relations with Pakistan would change the entire situation in southern Asia, while a termination of the border dispute would still leave much suspicion of China’s future intentions. It seems probable that in the early stages of the conflict with China Nehru regarded himself as the only Indian able to reach agreement with China. After the invasion and the occupation of part of the border area he accepted the

18 The Economist, (1963) 992–993.

216 chapter 9 long term nature of the problem. But his policy of non-alignment was always anchored on satisfactory relations with China so that, should he have lived, any overtures could sooner have been expected in the direction of China than of Pakistan. Even a man of his stature would have had to tread carefully, for the border dispute was the most important case where he had to follow public opinion more than he could lead it. His successors benefitted from Nehru’s own confession that his earlier China policy had been framed in “an artificial atmosphere of our own creation”, which could have pointed the way towards a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy without undue belief in moral force as a motive power in forcing states to change their behaviour.19 His successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, then still minister without portfolio, confirmed non-alignment as the basis of Indian policy but added “there are, however, different situations, different conditions and different times and sometimes we might do things which might appear to others as if they do not fit in with our policy of non-alignment”.20 In the same year I concluded the first edition of my book by writing that international affairs would suffer a loss if India did not preserve some of Nehru’s ideals, for his message of peaceful and democratic means was a sincere attempt to promote peace in a constructive way which could find a positive response among the non-aligned nations. In 2014 at a session of the Indian Institute of Chinese Studies and with the privilege of hindsight, I summed up my own assessment of the shortcomings of Indian policy:21

1. After independence India created a false dilemma concerning the legitimacy of the territorial colonial legacy. It criticized this legacy abroad, but stuck to its own borders as inherited from the British. 2. India gave up her treaty rights in Tibet without trying to obtain Chinese endorsement of the common borders and particularly the McMahon Line. 3. Nehru believed the Himalayas to be an insurmountable barrier for China and did not want to submit to negotiations on the border, which he believed to be clear.

19 Thompson, K.W., Political realism and the crisis of world politics. Princeton University Press, 1960, p. 127. 20 Press Club Luncheon, March 28, 1964. India News, London, Vol. 17, No. 14. Shastri decided to vote for unga Res. 2079 of 18 December 1965, regretting the continuing violation of human rights and freedoms of the Tibetans. 21 New Delhi, 9 April 2014.

Conclusions (1964) 217

4. Later Nehru did not want to negotiate before Chinese troops had been withdrawn (from Aksai Chin) 5. In fact, the China border is a mix of the ridge of high peaks combined with local watersheds. Indian claims on Thagla Ridge and Longju are weak and China exploited that. 6. Panchsheel should be more a guide for personal behaviour and less for treaty language (more like the Indonesian Pantjasila). 7. Burma did better by agreeing a new settlement with China, than India by unilaterally clarifying her border, but India did not want to run the risk of negotiations unsettling the entire boundary.

chapter 10 Three Post Mortems…and More

The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.1

After the 1962 war no public inquiry was held and the Operational Review ordered on 14 December by the new Chief of the Army Staff Lt general J.N. Chaudhury has never been officially released. The Australian author Neville Maxwell got hold of a copy and published much of this Henderson Brooks/ Bhagat Report (hb/b) on his blog on 7 February 2014, having earlier written an introduction in 2001.2 The History Division of the Ministry of Defence finally compiled the “History of the Conflict with China” in 1992, with a Foreword by Defence Secretary N.N. Vohra on 31 March 1993. He wrote that “For various reasons and continuing sensitivities we should not as yet publish the history of the 1962 conflict. After further consideration, it was agreed that this record may be circulated on restricted basis, so that the various military training institutions are able to derive benefit”. On the web only the introduction by Chief editor Dr. S.N. Prasad is available. A Top Secret report declassified much later was a cia report on the crisis of 1963. In addition a number of key players have published their own versions of the operations. Equally interesting and now fully available is the scholarly study “The India-China Border Question” written in April 1963 by the British diplomat (and later ambassador to China) J.M. Addis during a sabbatical at the Harvard Institute for International Affairs. At the time it did not become public knowledge for the impact would have been explosive. The Indian government got a copy and hotly complained to London about the ‘anti-Indian activities’ of its diplomat. According to Neville Maxwell in his introduction to the study, Addis was sternly rebuked by his superiors and kept his silence. If he had been allowed to publish, much of the present writer’s own study of 1964 would have become a duplication!

1 Field Marshall Roberts, quoted in the Henderson Brooks/Bhagat report. 2 For the blog click www.indiandefencereview.com/news/the–henderson-brooks-report-is-out -by-neville-maxwell/. Maxwell could not find a publisher and put it on his blog. In 1970 he had written India’s China War and followed it up by many articles.

The Addis Paper

Consisting of 182 typewritten pages the Addis paper started with setting out the background to the border dispute in the three sectors based on the “Report of Officials” of 1960, analysed the effect on the border of the Chinese occupation of Tibet, and then gave a narrative of the exchange of letters, notes and memoranda between the two governments up to 21 November 1962. His description of the Simla Conference of 1914 is not fully correct as he thought that the second version of the Convention of 3 July also was initialled by the three representatives, while that applied only to the first version dated 27 April, when Chen also initialled a map of the borders of Tibet including the McMahon Line. During his research Addis discovered that the 1929 edition of Aitchison’s Treaties, Engagements and Sands, the official Government of India record, happened to have two editions with the same date of 1929.3 One which only mentioned the initialling of a Convention on the Sino-Tibetan frontier and the Chinese refusal to proceed to full signature; no mention was made of the McMahon Line. The other edition, inserted in 1939, had a different editorial comment and published for the first time the texts of the Simla Convention and the exchange of letters of March 1914. The first publication of the relevant map, however, was by the Chinese Government in November 1962. In 1936 the Survey of India showed the north-eastern border in conformity with the McMahon Line, drawn with the legend’boundary undemarcated’. Its map of 1945 marked it as the ‘approximate’ boundary. Not until 1954 the frontier was printed along the McMahon Line without qualification. Describing the factual administration in the disputed areas, Addis concluded that after 1914 the Government of India continued their policy of abstaining from direct administration in the hill-tracts between the Inner Line at the foot hills and the McMahon line running at the crest of the Himalayas, and contented themselves with rare expeditions to a few places within this area. The Political Officer of the Government of Assam toured part of nefa in 1918–19 and again in 1939. During the same period the Tibetan government also continued to exercise some jurisdiction in some parts of the hill tracts. “As the Indians have pointed out, it is not always easy, in the Tibetan set-up, to distinguish

3 In his Introduction to the Addis Paper Neville Maxwell makes much of this ‘dramatic discovery’ which in his opinion revealed British diplomatic forgery to induce China/Tibet to cede a broad tract of territory. P. Mehra, p. 419, saw the reason in the sensitivity of the Trade Regulations of 1914 and the policy of ‘letting sleeping dogs lie’. Noorani, p. 199, thought the change unnecessary and clumsy as Bell’s Tibet Past and Present of 1924 p. 155, had already given the story and map.

220 chapter 10 between ecclesiastical and civil-administrative jurisdiction, but it seems clear that in Tawang, in the corner with Bhutan and Tibet, there was pretty effective Tibetan administration right up to 1944”. In 1938 the British geographer/bota- nist, F. Kingdon-Ward noted that Tawang was controlled by Tsona Dzong. When India became independent in August 1947, there were no checkposts on the frontier in the western sector. There was something of a void between Indian administration in Ladakh and Chinese administration in Sinkiang. In the middle sector there was contact between the two administrations and a legacy of disputed areas (four in all and small in size). In the eastern sector there was a combination of both situations: an extensive administrative void, but points of contact and inherited disputes with the Tibetan administration in a few places. Addis concluded that the Chinese government, like all its predecessors, in practice observed the McMahon Line as the boundary and that from 1950 to 20 October 1962 its troops were under orders not to cross it: “It was certainly the intention of the authors of the McMahon line that it should follow the main ridge of the Himalayas except where it was permitted to descend the slope in order to include places of religious pilgrimage in Tibet. This principle of watershed was not however stated in the exchange of letters of March, which defines the frontier by the line on the map”. He also was aware of the ‘dispute within the dispute’ which had gradually emerged as the result of an Indian correction of the 1914 map at the western end of the McMahon Line at the Bhutan border, where India had found that a ridge 3 minutes North was higher than that on the map, and corrected the Line accordingly. At the time this was apparently done without any notification to the Tibetan and Chinese governments. In any case, in spite of their repudiation of the Simla conference, the Chinese stuck to the alignment on the map of 1914 (which Chen had initialed) and India to its correction. The small strip of territory between the two interpretations included most of the places of combat in 1962: Dhola, Che Dong, Thagla, the Kecilang river and earlier already Khinzemane. A similar dispute in the middle of the eastern sector concerned the border at or near Longju and its distance to Migyitin to the north. China had occupied Longju and Nehru in his letter of 16 November 1959 had asked Chou to withdraw, then India would not re-occupy it. In the summer of 1961 the Chinese withdrew from Longju, thus taking their troops everywhere north of the McMahon Line as it was interpreted by India. But then India started strengthening her positions, moving up to the Line in many places and re-occupying Longju in May 1962. Earlier Nehru had slipped up a bit on recounting history. In his letter of 26 September 1959 to Chou En-lai he had written: “As settled between the British

Three Post Mortems…and More 221 and Chinese representatives at the time of the Simla Conference, the boundary was to follow the natural features…” In fact, the McMahon line was agreed by British and Tibetan representatives (but known to the Chinese) on a map, without mentioning any criteria. Nehru gave a full account of the border dispute in the Lok Sabha on 12 September 1962 in which he defended the watershed as main principle, but added that “if by evidence or facts, whatever it is, a light deviation in the alignment of the McMahon Line is necessary, that is not a major matter. … By and large apart from minor variations, that is a fixed line”. In the same letter he announced the Indian withdrawal from the recently established post at Tamaden which subsequent enquiries had shown to be somewhat north of the McMahon Line. Late 1959 was regarded by Addis as a crucial moment in the border dispute: Should India negotiate or should they not?4 Negotiation implied compromise, compromise implied concessions. India could get Chinese agreement on the McMahon Line if it gave up their claim to the Aksai Chin area, but the key question was: Could the Chinese government be trusted? By this time Nehru’s answer was No and he stuck to that in his lengthy meeting with Chou En-lai in April 1960. Addis commented that proven bad faith of one party does not rule out the possibility of a useful agreement. Therefore, the key question should have been: would the Chinese have been content with Aksai Chin or would they later have gone on to ask for more? He felt a limited agreement should have been given a try, especially since Aksai Chin had no practical use for India and was already in Chinese possession.

The Forward Policy

The Forward Policy got its name at a meeting chaired by Pandit Nehru on November 2, 1961, but in practice dates back to 1954 when Nehru instructed to set up posts all along the Indian claim lines and ‘especially in such places as might be disputed’. At first these posts were set up by the Intelligence Bureau. Its director (dib), B.N. Mullik was later accused of pursuing a private war with China through Tibetan refugees, rebellious Khampas inside Tibet and by allowing overflights by us aircraft going to Tibet. In January 1959 he wanted to push forward in Ladakh and set up new posts in the Aksai Chin area, but his book The Chinese Betrayal also recorded dissenting voices. In a meeting at the External Affairs Ministry General Thimayya, Chief of Army Staff, stated that the Aksai

4 Addis, op. cit., p. 90.

222 chapter 10

Chin road was not of any strategic importance, nor was he willing to open any post at Palong Karpo and Sarigh Jilganang because small army posts would be of little use and in any case, he had no means of maintaining them from his base at Leh. The attitude of the External Affairs Ministry was that this part of the territory was useless to India. Even if the Chinese did not encroach on it, India could not put it to any use. The boundary had not been demarcated and had been shifted more than once by the British.5 Mullik has also been accused of engineer- ing the Kongka pass incident of 21 October 1959 in which nine members of an Indian patrol were killed and ten taken prisoner. The first armed clash in the Eastern Sector had taken place a month earlier at Longju on 25 August. At the 1961 meeting the dib Mullik, repeated his oracle truth that the Chinese were not likely to use force against any of our posts, even if they were in a position to do so. Army Intelligence had come to the opposite conclusion: the Chinese would resist by force any push towards Tibet and take back any territory held by them. The meeting took the decision to end the freeze on provocative forward patrolling which was instituted at the Army’s insistence after the clash at Kongka pass in Ladakh. Three operational decisions were laid down:

(a) So far as Ladakh is concerned, we are to patrol as far forward as possible from our present positions towards the International border. This will be done with a view to establishing our posts which should prevent the Chinese from advancing further and also dominating from any posts which they may have already established in our territory. This must be done without getting involved in a clash with the Chinese, unless this becomes necessary in self-defence. (b) As regards up and other Northern areas, there are not the same difficulties as in Ladakh. We should, therefore, as far as practicable, go forward and be in effective occupation of the whole frontier. Where there are any gaps, they must be covered either by patrolling or by posts. (c) In view of numerous operational and administrative difficulties, efforts should be made to position major concentration of forces along our borders in places conveniently situated behind the forward posts from where they could be maintained logistically and from where they can restore a border situation at short notice.

5 Quoted by A.G. Noorani, “Negotiating with China”, Frontline, Vol. 15, No. 17, 15 August 1998, and by Guruswamy and Daulet Singh, India China Relations, p.70.

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In his inquiry into the 1962 war Henderson Brooks added6 that the point sub (c) “was obviously a prerequisite for any forward move. Without this there could be no balance in our forces and any move forward would be at the mercy of the Chinese from the start. With the meagre forces then in Ladakh, there was no question of there being major bases or for that matter any base worth the name to withstand any sizeable attack, let alone restore the situation. Thus, if the Government’s decisions had to be implemented in its entirety, it could only be done after induction of a sizeable force. Western Command had already indicated that a minimum of a division was required for the effective defence of Ladakh”. By August 1962 some 60 posts had been set up in Ladakh, mostly manned by less than half a dozen soldiers, all under close threat by overwhelmingly superior forces. Western Command (Lt Gen. Daulet Singh) requested heavy reinforcements, arguing that ‘it is imperative that political decision is based on military means’. This probe forward also activated the Chinese. With their much greater resources and easier communications, they set up stronger posts adjacent to ours, and, in many cases, virtually surrounded our posts.7 By July 1962 the Chinese had a well equipped division against thinly spread out Indian forces in Ladakh which had no supporting forces worth the name and poor communications between the sectors. “Thus, in case of hostilities we would be defeated in detail”. The Prasad Report, which will be discussed later, contains another memo by Lt Gen. Daulet Singh referring to the forward policy:

Assessments were undertaken before we embarked on the ‘forward policy’, since the inception of which, Chinese reaction has been sharp and significant. This reaction, I estimate, has led them to build up to a full division in Ladakh. Against this we have been able, in three years, to build up to only two regular and two military battalions. It is obvious, therefore, that if we continue the present race for the establishment of posts, they will outrun us at every sector and at every stage. In fact, with the present quantum of forces and military capabilities on either side, it will be immeasurably to their advantage to entice us to continue this race … The present assessment, therefore, is an attempt to bring military logic to bear on a problem. Here, so far, military means have been grossly out of step with political needs. Our forward posts in Ladakh are nowhere tactically sighted, whereas the Chinese everywhere are. Our forward posts

6 hb/b, Chapter 1, Section 2, pp. 8–9. 7 hb/b, p.13, paragraph 23.

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anchored to their dzs (demilitarized zones), are tactically dominated by Chinese posts on higher ground. … The Chinese deployment and build- up, on the other hand, shows clear evidence of a tactically sound military plan, in support of a declared objective. We do not as yet appear to have a clear-cut aim in Ladakh, or, if there is one, it is not served by adequate military means. While there can never be a proper military plan to support a non-defined aim, the military assessment now made is based on the assumption that we must deny to the Chinese at all cost, territory to the west of their 1960 claim line. General Daulet Singh had earlier given an overarching political assessment, deducing “that China does not wish war with India on the border issue provided we do not disturb the status quo. The Aksai Chin road was a vital strategic link for the Chinese and they would react forcefully to Indian moves which threatened it”.8

The Henderson Brooks / Bhagat Report

Soon after succeeding General B.M. Kaul, but without the title of Chief of the General Staff, General Chaudhury did not want to dig too deeply in faulting most members of the top military echelon. That was his reason for deciding that the functioning of Army hq during the crisis should lay outside the inquiry. Similarly, Brigadier D.K. Palit, Director of Military Operations, refused to give documents relating to the civilian side of crisis management. Nevertheless Henderson Brooks and Bhagat (henceforth referred to as hb/b) managed to find out what had happened from documents found at lower levels, but these did not provide information on the political directions given by the civil authorities.9 Their report contained such harsh judgments that it has never been officially released and we have to rely on the partial copy published on the blog of Neville Maxwell.10

8 Guruswamy/Daulet Singh, op.cit., p.75; Maxwell, op.cit., p.254. 9 Neville Maxwell, India’s China War, op. cit., p. 254. 10 Maxwell obtained a copy from friends but waited till April 2001 to write an introduction and till April 2014 to publish it on his blog, after having offered it in vain for publication in five different media. His version lacks pages 104/110 and 112/157 but contains the important Chapter 3 on 4 Corps, which was hastily created in the middle of the crisis for general Kaul to implement his vision on the forward policy but was fully routed. Kaul left his post as cgs vacant, but after fallen ill in the mountains, returned to Delhi and gave instructions from there. His erratic behaviour of visiting posts without telling his staff contributed to the chaotic situation. Kaul resigned after the Chinese withdrawal.

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On the forward policy the Report made the comment that it had been intended for the Ladakh region but found its demise in the eastern sector along the McMahon Line. Its failure to conduct regular reappraisals in the light of continuous Chinese reinforcements in all sectors led to complacency in the belief that China would not retaliate militarily. The action to evict the Chinese from nefa was likely to have repercussions in Ladakh and all posts there were alerted. Their defences should be strengthened as far as possible and if attacked “posts will fight it out and inflict maximum casualties on the Chinese”. hb/b wrote that these orders to such far-flung, tactically unsound and uncoordinated small posts brings out vividly how unrealistic these orders were. Their report even expressed doubt whether the General Staff Branch Army Headquarters were in touch with the realities of the situation. And indeed, India suffered reverses in Ladakh, but the Chinese did not exceed their claim lines. In nefa the crisis centred along the Western end of the McMahon Line. Tragically, a serious mistake was made by realising too late that the Thagla ridge with the Dhola post was north of the McMahon line and that the border on the map did not run along the watershed, but was an arbitrary one running due West from Khinzemane. The watershed tri-junction with Bhutan was some four miles north of the one given in the map then existing. India tried to clarify the error in the maps, but the Chinese did not accept the contention of the External Affairs Ministry.11 Nehru’s statement that the Chinese would be evicted from Thagla related to one of the few points along the Line where the Chinese case had merit. Subsequently general Kaul, apparently believing that he could finish the job where his predecessor as Corps Commander had failed to take decisive action, moved forces up, without adequate logistics and underestimating the difficult terrain. By taking forces away from Tawang in the rear he violated the principles of the Forward Defence policy which had made ‘Major Bases for restoring a military situation’ a prerequisite. Subsequent indecision about where to organize the main defences ultimately led to total defeat. hb-b was highly critical of the military adventure near Dhola without the requisite forces and wrote: “It is unplanned actions like these carried out in haste and hurry that changed disciplined men into rabble, and an Army into a mob”.12 The full summary of the hb-b Report is given below:

149. The unbalanced posture of our forces in the KAMENG Sector on the eve of the Chinese offensive needs NO elaboration. Towang, which should

11 hb/b, Chapter 2, Section 2, p. 54, paragraph 35. 12 Ibidem, Paragraph 36.

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have been the main centre of strength, lacked troops; the bulk having been inveigled to a flank in the NAMKA CHU valley, without adequate logistic support and in tactically unsound positions. That we continued to oblige the Chinese in this unbalanced posture till they struck was as grave an error as the initial sending of 7 Infantry Brigade into the valley. These two can be combined and categorized as ‘FUNDAMENTAL ERROR NO. 1’. The responsibility for this lies with the Corps Commander, though both Army Commander and General Staff Army Headquarter could easily also have changed it, had they been decisive. 150. The rout of V Infantry Brigade was a foregone conclusion, but, in its wake, it started the snow-ball of defeat, which was to stop a month later and that also at the instance of the Chinese. 151. It is clear that much of this would have been averted had a clean break been made at TOWANG and the withdrawal to BOMDILA had been carried out as planned. The holding of sela was accepted by the Army Commander, presumably, at the dictates of the General Staff at Army headquarters. That sela was a strong natural tactical position there is NO doubt, but it required both extra troops and logistic support to hold it. Neither of these were planned or provided for by the General Staff or Eastern Command. Instead the lull between the two Chinese offensives brought about a sense of complacency and iv Corps was given troops haphazardly and in fits and starts. Little provision was made for adequate logistic support. 152. It is agreed that the nefa battles were the concern of the Corps. It must, however, be made clear that this applied only to the tactical sphere. The overall defensive planning and the provision of logistic support must and always should be the concern of the Command and the General Staff at Army Headquarters. Unfortunately, the reverse happened. There was interference in the tactical level and the overall planning and provision of logistic support was conspicuous by its absence. The decision for holding sela and the lack of overall planning and providing of logistic support can be grouped as ‘FUNDAMENTAL ERROR NO 2’. The responsibility for this lies jointly with General Staff Army Headquarters and Eastern Command. 153. The dispersal of forces in penny-packets, the complacency shown in the allotting of defence sectors to brigades, and the lack of urgency in developing defences during the lull period was ‘FUNDAMENTAL ERROR NO 3’. For this the major responsibility was that of the division. It also partly reflects on the poor leadership of the Corps who could have stopped the dispersal and energized the preparation of defences.

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154. The pendulum swung the other way, once the second Chinese offensive started. There was frenzied reactions to the Chinese approach to BOMDILA from the NORTH. A battalion was hurriedly ordered up from the main defences of BOMDILA with inadequate ammunition and fire support, and rushed to THEMBANG to meet the enemy halfway. In the first instance, the sending of this battalion to fight it out in hurriedly prepared defences against a regiment or more was a mistake. Besides, even if the battalion had to be sent, this should have been planned and organized earlier. In spite of these handicaps the Battalion fought well till its ammunition was spent. That it had to withdraw and then got disintegrated is neither the fault of the Battalion nor of the Brigade. The loss of this Battalion, 5 GUARDS, lies squarely with the Division. 155. On the fall of Thembang and the possibility of the road BOMDILA – DIRANG DZONG being cut and DIRANG DZONG itself being infested brought about a complete frenzy in Divisional Headquarters. Troops from Brigades were rushed for the protection of Divisional headquarters. Withdrawals were planned and stories concocted to make the withdrawal case stronger. Indeed it reached the pitch when 623 Infantry Brigade was led to believe it was in danger. A withdrawal on it was forced so that Divisional Headquarters could withdraw. 156. NOT content with that, the Division committed the Brigade to withdraw, within a matter of hours on night 17|18 November, the battalion holding the KAILA pass. This was the turning point in the fall of sela. The withdrawal of this battalion led to the panic in 1 Sikh and the abandonment of sela and eventual disintegration of 62 Infantry Brigade. 157. The last role of the Divisional Headquarters was its flight. A strong force of all arms of over 2500 vanished within a matter of minutes. This was NOT the fault of the troops or the units but of the lack of centralized leadership and control in the face of the enemy. A coordinated force of that size had more than an even chance of getting to BOMDILA. Efforts of a few officers, particularly of Captain NN RAWAT, could NOT, however, replace disintegration of command. 158. All the above Divisional reactions can be grouped under ‘FUNDAMENTAL ERROR NO 4’ and was fairly and squarely due to the acts and omissions of Headquarters 4 Infantry Division. 159. The Division dissolved and the last of its brigades was next broken up by Corps hq or more accurately, by a ‘Triumvirate’ comprised of the Army Commander, the Corps Commander and the Director of Mili tary Operations. Ignorant of the tactical layout, out of touch with the

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situation in BOMDILA, they planned and ordered the moving out of a sizeable force from the already bare BOMDILA defences. NOT that they were NOT warned, and “irrespective of what happened to BOMDILA” they ordered a force to open the Road BOMDILA – DIRANG DZONG. For what purpose and for whom on the morning of 18 November is NOT clear. 160. The ordering out of the forces was directly responsible for the fall of BOMDILA. There were four companies left in the BOMDILA defences. Indeed, on the flank where the Chinese attacked, there was one platoon, where there should have been a battalion. This was ‘FUNDAMENTAL ERROR No 5’ and it sealed the fall of BOMDILA. The planners and order- ers must take the blame for this. 161. BOMDILA fell. It was now the Corps Commander’s turn to give orders and counter-orders as to where the Chinese should be held. It was first BOMDILA, then right back to FOOT HILLS, then forward to RUPA, and, finally midway to CHAKU. To blame the hapless Brigade Commander for NOT being able to restore the situation is to find a scapegoat. Under the circumstances, the resistance that was offered and that the brigade remained a fighting force, despite these orders and counter- orders – some direct to units – was due to the Brigade Commander keeping his head and striving till the last to organize what little forces he had. 162. This was the story of the famous “Fighting Fourth”. In the end all that could be mustered for the last fight were six infantry companies out of a total force of sixteen battalions and countless other troops of the supporting arms and services.

After the fall of Bomdila the disarray of the Indians was complete. There was no plan for holding Assam and some considered a complete withdrawal. India was saved by the sudden unilateral withdrawal of the Chinese forces from the whole of nefa, even from the Towang area with its historic links with the Drepung monastery in Tibet. India did not immediately reoccupy it but eventually did. The Thagla Ridge was held by China and the Line of Actual Control was along the Namka Chu, but up to the present day there has not been an exchange of maps giving detailed views of the alignment of the Line of Actual Control. Most of the military leadership dealing with nefa was replaced. General Thapar, Chief Army Staff wanted to resign but was persuaded to avoid publicity by accepting retirement due to ill health. General B.M.Kaul had failed mis- erably on several accounts. His assumption of the task of Commander of the

Three Post Mortems…and More 229 new iv Corps, taking over the xxxiii Corps and sidelining its commander, while leaving his job as cgs vacant, was most peculiar. Apparently he was under the illusion that he would be able to quickly do the job of evicting the Chinese. Moreover, his authoritarian style of leadership was too overpowering for his colleagues and staff, he was frequently absent on personal reconnaissance without telling anybody and, when ill due to mountain sickness, flew to Delhi and tried to conduct his command from there. The third person criticized most was the Director of Military Operations, Brigadier D.K.Palit, regarded as one of the ‘Kaul boys’, but allowed to remain in the army. On the civilian side, B.N. Mullik, Direcor Intelligence Bureau, was seen as the main culprit by saying that the Chinese were not likely to use force against any of our posts even if they were in a position to do so.13

The Prasad Report

On 31 March 1993, more than thirty years after the war, the Indian Ministry of Defence released the report “History of the Conflict with China”, compiled by its History Division and edited by S.N.Prasad. It was circulated on a restricted basis with a brief foreword by Defence Secretary N.N.Vohra saying: “For various reasons and continuing sensitivities in certain quarters, it was felt that we should not as yet publish the history of the 1962 conflict. After further consideration, it was agreed that this record may be circulated on restricted basis, so that the various military training institutions are able to derive benefit”. The authors had access to the Henderson Brooks / Bhagat Report and could supple- ment it by the voluminous records of the Army, Air Force and Ministry of Defence, many of which had been closed to hb/b. Only the introduction, which joined hb|b in its major criticisms, has been made available to the public. Prasad concluded at the tactical level that, while Tawang was lost to the blunder of pushing up 7 Infantry Brigade to the Namka Chu, the humiliating debacle on the Sela – Dirang – Bomdila front was caused entirely by the failure of the military commanders on the spot. Maj.Gen A.S.Pathania and Lt Gen. B.M.Kaul share the major blame. But Gen.Thapar and Lt Gen. Sen were also guilty of abdicating their responsibilities by refusing to issue orders to Pathania when Kaul was not available at the Corps hq. Strategically, Walong, Tawang and the forward areas in Ladakh in 1962 were indefensible against a major attack. Yet he thought the Forward Strategy to be

13 Mullik and Palit (retired as Major General) published their own books. See bibliography.

230 chapter 10 fully justified by preventing the Chinese to occupy the vacant areas east of the Upper Shyok river and Chushul all the more easily, without firing a shot. “But it went too far, got too reckless, and lost its balance in the later stages, and a serious reappraisal of the new situation should have been undertaken.” Whereas the earlier intention was to prevent further advance by the Chinese into any empty area, it was now decided to push back the Chinese from posts they had already occupied, as on the Namka Chu. This ‘push them back’ was simply not possible as the Chinese were much stronger along the Line of Actual Control, both in Ladakh and in nefa. This report underlined that, as the Chinese were also quickening the forward movement of their posts, the basic assumptions behind the Forward Policy were no longer valid and a serious reappraisal of the new situation should have been undertaken by Army hq and the Government of India. This never took place and the situation was allowed to drift. Criticism on the political and strategic side of the issue focused on the lack of institutionalized support for decision-making at the national level: Well-established and well-respected agencies providing politico-military linkages were just not there. It was personality-oriented decision making in the vital area of national security. That is how Krishna Menon, the Defence minister, and B.N.Mullik, the Intelligence Bureau Chief, acquired near total control over the national defence policy, and even the disposition of troops in the forward areas. Prasad regarded the decision not to use the air-force against the Chinese as another serious mistake. Air attacks on the advancing Chinese columns and bases in Tibet would have been advantageous to India, not only militarily but also psy- chologically and in the politico-military field. This was not done, because even a few Chinese raids on Calcutta, Guwahati or elsewhere might result in panic and large scale exodus. “The decision-makers felt that the citizens in their ignorance would take such enemy air raids as proof of Indian defeat”. Here Prasad’s judgment seems ill-founded. Using the airforce would have been an escalatory move, provoking another Chinese riposte which would have made the war difficult to stop. Rahul K. Bhonsle, writing in 2012, indicated three factors that may have played an important role in not using offensive air support:

“First, the Intelligence Bureau assessment of superiority of the plaaf; second, division of opinion in the Indian Air Force Headquarters on effectiveness of tactical air support due to terrain in nefa and lack of ground-to-air communications; and third, influence of then American

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ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith on political leadership to prevent escalation with the bait also keep Pakistan out of the war.”14

As it happened, the Indian rout back to the plains was enough for the Chinese to teach the Indians a lesson and to withdraw without occupying the whole of Assam. The balance of forces in the air was uncertain, including the Chinese availability of anti-aircraft guns and the training of Indian bomber- pilots in high-altitude terrain.

A cia Report

A cia Report of 2 March 1963 commenced by saying that “developments between late 1950 and late 1959 were marked by Chinese military superiority which, combined with cunning diplomatic deceit, contributed for nine years to New Delhi’s reluctance to change its policy from friendship to open hostility toward the Peiping (=Peking) regime. It emerges that above all others Nehru himself…refused to change this poicy until long after Peiping’s basic hostility to him and his government was apparent”. It was basic Chinese policy early in Peiping’s relations with New Delhi not to claim territory in writing or orally, but only on the basis of maps. When India complained Chou En-lai answered that old maps handed down from the from the previous mainland regime had ‘not yet’ been corrected. In the view of the cia the course of the dispute pointed up a curious suspicion which developed in the Chinese leaders’ thinking about Nehrus’s intentions and the forces at work on him. At first they were aware that Nehru was more conciliatory towards them than the opposition, or the press, and even some members of his cabinet. By late April 1959, however, they turned on Nehru himself, and suspected him of having abetted some of the anti-Chinese criticism regarding the Tibetan revolt. A great leader like Nehru could certainly prevent anti-Chinese outbursts and the press was a propaganda machine at his disposal.15

14 Rahil K. Bhonsle, former Brigadier Indian Army, “Strategic lessons of 1962. A contemporary perspective”, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol.6, No. 4, October 2012, pp. 155–170. Bhonsle believed that in 1962 India enjoyed exceptional advantages and regarded the inability of the Army leadership to persuade the iaf and political hierarchy to use airpower as a “grave strategic omission”. 15 People’s Daily, 6 May 1959.

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By the fall of 1959 the Chinese leaders were convinced of the need for negotiations with Nehru in order to prevent their international prestige from deteriorating. Chou Em-lai was conciliatory by saying that China had stopped patrolling in Ladakh following the Kongka Pass incident, and used a constructive border settlement with Burma to make it difficult for Nehru to reject similar talks. In February 1960 there were some indications that Nehru might accept Chinese use of the Sinkiang-Tibet road while retaining nominal Indian sovereignty over the Aksai Chin Plain. Thus Chou came to Delhi in April with a real hope of gaining agreement in principle that the border was not delimited and was therefore subject to negotiation, but was confronted by an Indian prime minister who had already rejected bargaining. The April 1960 talks were Peking’s last chance to obtain a negotiated settlement with Nehru. The subsequent report of officials convinced the Indian experts that the vaunted Chinese case was in fact a weak one. That China had some doubts was shown by their failure to publish the report. In 1960 Chairman Mao repeated his instruction of ‘unity and struggle’, giving some leeway to the opponent. China regarded this policy to be flexible but to India China became its most important enemy. By early 1961 Mao still believed there was room for diplomatic maneuvering with New Delhi, when in fact such room no longer existed.

Conclusion

The Post Mortems analysed here created most uproar by their dismissal of the forward policy, conducted without any military backup, and the unfounded belief that China, even if provoked, would not resort to military means. In that respect Nehru and his Defence Minister Krishna Menon clearly were to blame. India failed to devise a strategic military doctrine while China did. And how was it possible to mishandle the gap between the border on the map of McMahon and the terrain features on the ground? The line on the map did not correspond with the ridge of highest peaks/watershed which India had elevated to its guiding principle. While China did not recognize the validity of the McMahon Line, it respected its alignment in practice, but reacted strongly when India literally changed the goalposts and moved them up north. A dispute within the larger dispute became a major bone of contention and acquired the proportions of a Greek drama. Apparently it was no longer possible to set aside this strip of territory near the Thagla ridge from the much wider issue covering thousands of miles of frontier.

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A different kind of post mortem came with Mao, the untold story by Jung Chan and Jon Halliday, who made a link with the Cuban missile crisis.16 Given the danger of a confrontation with the us, Khrushchev wanted to ensure that Mao would not stab him in the back and threw him a bone: a blessing for China to attack India. Mao had been planning to attack India for some time but hesi- tated until on 14 October 1962 Khrushchev told the departing Chinese ambassador that Russia would stand by in a Sino-Indian border war and would delay the sale of MiG-21s to India. He revealed his missile plan for Cuba and hoped for Chinese support. The horse trade was undone immediately after the missiles had been recalled. China accused Moscow of selling out and denounced Khrushchev as a ‘revisionist’. According to Chang and Halliday, China came very close to intervention in the 1965 Bangla Desh crisis on the side of Pakistan. Mao had been counting on a leadership role at the Afro-Asian summit in Algiers, but the meeting was postponed after president Ben Bella was overthrown in a military coup. Looking for another chance to beat India, Mao moved troops up to the border and issued two ultimatums, demanding India to remove two outposts within three days by 22 September. Keen to avoid a war on two fronts, Delhi replied in a conciliatory vein, denying the existence of the posts but willing to make a joint investigation and prepared to remove any if found in the claimed area. Mao’s war scheme collapsed when Pakistan accepted the un call for a cease- fire with India before China’s deadline had expired.

16 Anchor Books, New York,2005/6, 801 p. See pp. 447, 458–459,487. They also claim that Mao had cabled an order to let the Dalai Lama escape in March 1959 after a revolt had broken out in Tibet over a rumour that China was kidnapping him.

chapter 11 Sino – Indian Relations after the War of 1962

Writing in 2015, half a century after the first edition of this book, the border dispute between India and China virtually remains as it was after the 1962 war. Dozens of rounds of talks did little more than stating the claims of both sides and agreeing some Confidence Building Measures. Rather surprisingly in comparison with other border disputes, overall relations normalised and even led to mutual visits at the level of presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers. Differences over the border were not allowed to hamper progress in other fields, yet professions of Sino-Indian amity continued to be clouded by the boundary question and the ability of China to raise it at will in connection with other foreign policy issues. To a visitor from Mars, a solution would not appear to be too difficult, with a swap between Indian acceptance of the Chinese occupation of the Aksai Chin area in the West and the Chinese giving up their claim to Arunachal (formerly the North East Frontier Agency) in the East. At one stage the notion of a “package deal” was mooted by Deng Xiaoping but rejected by Indian insistence on sector-by-sector talks. The Indian parliament’s resolution of 1963, stating that not an inch of Indian territory should be given up, made any negotiation very difficult. Yet, Indian authors increasingly have criticised the sector-approach for removing any bargaining flexibility on either side.1 The Joint Declaration signed in New Delhi by the presidents of China (Hu Jintao) and India (Abdul Kalam) of 21 November 2006 seemed to bridge this controversy by stating in paragraph 21 that the Special Representatives appointed in 2003 “shall complete at an early date the task of finalising an appropriate framework for a final package settlement covering all sectors of the India-China boundary”.2 Shortly before the visit China had made clear that it maintained its claims to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh. Whether influenced by this sobering news or not, India adapted its position, but many years have passed without any sign of a useful framework emerging. With every high level meeting positive statements were made and progress seemed possible, but to no avail. In the years immediately following the 1962 war two major events occurred: firstly the armed clash between India and Pakistan, which was settled with Soviet mediation while China strongly supported the Pakistani position; and

1 Deepak, op. cit., p. 441. 2 Alka Acharya, op. cit., p. 230.

Sino – Indian Relations After The War Of 1962 235 secondly, the explosion of nuclear devices by China.3 The situation on the Sino-Indian border remained relatively quiet and the exchange of notes between the two countries dealt mainly with mutual accusations concerning minor intrusions and violations of air space.

War with Pakistan – Tension on the Sikkim Border

During the 1962 war with China some skirmishes occurred on the border with Sikkim and the Nathu La at the end of the Chumbi valley (where in 1959 a start was made in building a ropeway) was closed for trade. The Sikkim border was not the focus of the dispute, being the only stretch of the boundary which had been clearly described in a treaty. In August 1964 it gave rise to some concern when India protested against a Chinese intrusion,4 but it was this sector which Peking used for an ultimatum during the fighting between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Skirmishes in Kashmir started in early August 1965, when raiders from Pakistan crossed the armistice line. Indian troops went into major action on September 6, 1965 and the next day China accused Delhi of aggression and disregarding Kashmir’s right to self-determination: “It is entirely proper that people in India-occupied Kashmir should rise up in resistance.” Peking further declared that it was strengthening the defences along its border. Its next note included accusations of intrusions, not only in the Sikkim-area, but also in the Western sector, and it again proposed joint investigation. Delhi replied with a proposal for inspection by an independent and neutral observer.5 On September 16, China served an ultimatum on India demanding withdrawal of her posts on the Nathu La and Jelep La and the return of allegedly kidnapped border inhabitants and livestock. India had observation posts on both passes, but the main defences of the 17 and 27 Mountain Division were at Changgu and Lungthu respectively. The divisional commanders had authority to vacate these posts in case of hostilities. Jelep La was abandoned and promptly occupied by the Chinese, but Major General Sagat Singh, goc 17 Mountain Division, refused to vacate Nathu La, arguing that it was on the watershed and thus the natural boundary. Moreover, Indian artillery posts on adjoining high terrain overlooked the Yatung valley and could bring down accurate fire. The Chinese

3 India reacted by accusing China of a reversal of her stand at the Bandung conference, which had appealed for a suspension of nuclear experiments. White Paper xi, p. 80. 4 Documents on China’s ultimatum to India, p. 8. 5 Deepak, op. cit., p. 277. Jagat Mehta, op. cit., pp. 106–108.

236 chapter 11 made threatening postures, advancing in large numbers, but always stopped near the border and withdrew. They made regular broadcasts from loudspeakers near the pass, conducting a psychological warfare, pointing out to the Indian troops the pathetic conditions in which they lived and their low salaries compared to those of their officers. General Sagat answered by installing similar loudspeakers with daily broadcasts in Chinese. The ultimatum was extended with another three days. India denied the existence of military installations, while the four Tibetans involved were said to be refugees, but finally agreed to joint inspection. Her reason for refusing had been the fear that China would use this as a precedent for negotiations on other sections, although – as we have seen – in the Sikkim-area there is no territorial dispute involved. Now, at pistol point, India agreed to what it better had accepted freely somewhat earlier. The ultimatum itself petered out with a Chinese statement that India had demolished the military works and withdrawn her intruding troops.6 We owe some interesting information on these years to C.P. Srivastava, biog- rapher of Nehru’s successor Lal Bahadur Shastri, prime minister for only nineteen months till his sudden death on 11 January 1966 at the end of the Tashkent conference, which ended the war with Pakistan.7 The honourable outcome for both sides was a major achievement of the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin, who had convened president Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri without a specific agenda. In spite of sceptical comments he managed to restore peaceful relations, the renunciation of the use of force and withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions held before Pakistani infiltrations into Indian Kashmir had started on 5 August 1965. The fighting which had erupted further south on the Kutch – Sind border was ended by a ceasefire mediated by Harold Wilson and the u.k. High Commissioners in Delhi and Rawalpindi. There also the status quo ante was restored, but in addition it was agreed to demarcate the border by a three-man tribunal. India nominated a Yugoslav, Pakistan an Iranian and the un Secretary General a Swede as chairman. At the time Shastri made clear that the sole task of the tribunal would be to demarcate the boundary between the

6 Deepak, op. cit., p. 37. Incidents on the Sikkim border continued in November and December, possibly to stiffen Pakistan’s determination. The Tashkent agreement of Jan. 10, 1966, provided for withdrawal of armed personnel to positions held on Aug. 5, the date of the dispatch of the raiders. Restoring the status quo was welcomed by India, but its relevance to the Sino- Indian border is small as Peking takes the view that its own unilateral withdrawal went as far as the “line of actual control.” 7 C.P. Srivastava, op. cit., p. 197. He compared notes with ambassador Leonid Zamyatin, who was the spokesman of prime minister Kosygin at the Tashkent Conference.

Sino – Indian Relations After The War Of 1962 237 provinces according to the relevant records. There was no question of a territorial dispute. During all these talks China hovered in the background. The Kutch – Sind agreement had implications for a possible settlement of the border with China, but it was on the Kashmir issue that China delivered an ultimatum. Marshall Chen Yi visited Pakistan on 4 September 1965 and declared his full support to Pakistan, condemning “Indian imperialism for violating the Ceasefire Line”. The People’s Daily took on all Chinese adversaries by attacking Indian aggression, us imperialism and Khrushchev revisionists in one go. On 8 September China raised the temperature further by accusing New Delhi of amassing troops on the border between Tibet and Sikkim and building structures on the Chinese side and demanded that they would be dismantled. If not, India would bear the consequences. “India had not the slightest respect for its neighbours. But makes incursions, harassment and encroachments upon them when ever there is a chance”.8 On 12 September India replied that its forces had not crossed the border which had been formally delimited and was clearly discern- ible by well-marked natural features.9 Four days later China demanded removal of the installations within three days and, upon the oral question of the Indian Chargé d’Affaires Jagat Mehta to whom the note was handed over, confirmed that this was an ultimatum of war. His suggestion to ask an independent and neutral observer to ascertain the situation was dismissed with the statement that there was no neutral observer in the world. China wanted a joint inspection, which India subsequently accepted.10 In the meantime China extended the ultimatum by three days and finally concluded that the installations had been destroyed by retreating Indian soldiers, a statement which Shastri ascribed to their imagination. Srivastava saw a connection between the extension of the ultimatum and a Chinese attempt to bolster the Pakistani position in the pending session of the u.n. Security Council on 20 September to consider a cease- fire resolution. There had been some massing of troops and even some firing along the borders of Sikkim and Ladakh, but fortunately without casualties. The Sikkim issue seemed to calm down, but on 19 and 20 November 1965, India reported new Chinese intrusions into Sikkim, which was an important reason for Shastri to accept a renewed Soviet suggestion to meet Ayub in Tashkent. There the main hurdle for India was to vacate the Haji Pir pass which it had occupied with considerable loss of life “in self-defence” in order to prevent

8 The Pakistan Times, Lahore, 9 September 1965, quoted by Srivastava, p. 274. 9 Deepak, op. cit., p. 277. 10 Jagat Mehta, op. cit., pp. 106–108.

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further Pakistani infiltrations into its part of Kashmir. In their bilateral meeting Kosygin exerted pressure on Shastri with the argument that the unsc resolution demanded reciprocal withdrawal to the 1949 Ceasefire Line, but that if this pass would not be vacated neither side would withdraw anywhere else. Among his arguments, China figured prominently:

(3) India’s bigger enemy is China. During the recent war between India and Pakistan, China was threatening India. No overt action was taken by China, because there was unanimous pressure from all governments that no other country should intervene in the Indo- Pak conflict. If later India is held to be intransigent because of non-compliance with the Security Council resolution, China may be under no pressure. Any movement by China would create the possibility of a wider conflict.11

When the conference was stalling on the link between a “no-war pact” and the Kashmir problem, China was calling in from the sidelines by accusing India of “frenzied efforts to create tension” and adding ominously that “If the Indians continued their intrusions and provocations against China, the Chinese will strike back resolutely”.12 As far as can be ascertained, these threats had no effect on Shastri’s refusal to change his position on Kashmir. He would rather go home without an agreement. In the final night Ayub accepted the Indian formula that each side had “set forth its respective position”. Reaffirmation of “the obligation under the un Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes by peaceful means” was a success for Shastri. He was satisfied with the outcome as concluded on 10 January 1966, but would not live to continue his good relations with Ayub, for the next day he was dead.

Serious Clashes

The situation remained tense for two years. For a while pressure seemed to shift to the border of North Sikkim where in December 1965 the Chinese fired on a patrol of 17 Assam Rifles at a height of 16000 feet, killing two men. In 1967 attention again focused on the Nathu La. Thanks to veekay’s history book13 we know how an escalatory process developed, almost hilariously if the consequences

11 Srivastava, op. cit., p. 356. 12 Ibidem,, p. 372. 13 http://veekay-militaryhistory.blog.spot.nl/2013/04/nathula-1967-real-story.html, using the diary of 2nd lt. N.C.Gupta.

Sino – Indian Relations After The War Of 1962 239 had not been so serious. In the first week of August Chinese activities increased when the Indians were rotating their men in the border out-posts (bop’s). Chinese soldiers came to the crest line and dug trenches on the Indian side, but, when challenged, filled them again and withdrew, adding 8 more loudspeakers to the existing 21. The Indian corps commander decided to mark the crest line with a three strand wire fence which took three days in the midst of Chinese protests. On 23 August some 75 Chinese in battle dress carrying rifles with bayonets lined up, shouting slogans which the Political Commissar read out from a red book. Indian troops were ‘standing to’, watching, but nothing happened and after an hour the Chinese withdrew. Some minor incidents followed. Two Indian generals mistakenly took a few steps across the border and were warned by the Commissar. An Indian patrol was surrounded by Chinese, but could push their way back. During the night the Chinese dug out one shoulder and demonstrated that water poured on the other shoulder would now flow in their direction, thus changing the watershed. On 11 September the Indians started to replace the line fence by a concertina barbed wire one, using some 120 men at around six points of the slope and the pass, all posts being at full alert. The Chinese had around 150 troops opposing the wire laying in a hand to hand battle. Things appeared to be going well and the Chinese numbers were gradually reduced, but then the picture changed completely: “Just as we thought things are under control all hell let loose. The public address system started a speech by Mao Tse-Tung in Hindi. Every bun- ker and gun started firing on the troops laying the fence”. Also artillery was used. Most soldiers did well, but 90 soldiers of 2 Grenadiers had run away from their post. More than three dozen of them were later court marshalled. India “acting in self-defence” lost 65 dead and 145 wounded. China according to its own report 36 “killed or wounded”, but some 400 according to the Indian esti- mates. A cease fire was arranged five days later. Almost simultaneously another skirmish happened which became known as the Chola incident. Chinese soldiers had infiltrated into Sikkim and a minor scuffle occurred between 3 Sikh soldiers and an equal number of Chinese on a flat 5 meter patch of icy land on the unmarked boundary. It had a boulder about 30 cm high in the centre of the narrow crest which marked the dividing line according to the watershed principle. The Chinese were laying claims to the boulder and a Gorkha Naik Subedar was resting his right foot on the boulder during a heated argument with his counterpart, who kicked his foot away. He put it back and another Chinese bayoneted his arm. The Gorkha swiftly used his Khukri and chopped both arms off his assailant. A close firefight followed in which five heads were chopped off and mortar fire kept the Chinese away. Within 24 hours the post was retaken, complete with the boulder that started it all. Indian morale got a boost.

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When tension with Pakistan over Kashmir diminished, India seems to have tightened her position along the border with China, which may have provoked some Chinese reinforcements. As a result the two armies were again in often provocative proximity to each other in many sectors of the frontier. In China, however, the dispute received little public attention in contrast to India where it assumed exaggerated proportions. Sino-Indian relations remained in a deep freeze until well into the next decade. Cold peace if not cold war. India refused negotiations before the occupied territories had been vacated. China engaged in some pretty strong vocal slanging. Its People’s Daily accused India of selling out its national interest for aid from the us imperialists and of supporting the independence of Tibet and Taiwan. The lowest point in the relations came in June 1967 when Beijing declared an Indian third secretary persona non grata and expelled a second secretary for spying. India retaliated according to diplomatic custom by expelling two secretaries from the Chinese embassy in New Delhi.14 Ultimately China would give up its claim to Sikkim, which was integrated as an Indian State in 1975, and recognized it as such in exchange for Indian recognition of Tibet as an autonomous administrative region of China. Some expected China to stir up the border issue again in December 1971 when India assisted in the creation of Bangladesh, but then Beijing limited itself to vocal criticism of India’s “unbridled aggression against Pakistan”.15 Deepak attributed this non-military reaction to the facts that India had strengthened its border defences and that winter operations were unattractive. The latter calculation certainly played a role in the planning of the outspoken Indian Field Marshall Sam Manekshaw, who stood up to Indira Gandhi by refusing to start the operation in the spring of 1971 because his forces were not yet ready. His divisions were spread out all over the country and would take up all train-transport at a time the harvest had to be collected; the monsoon would make the terrain very difficult and the opening up of the Himalayan passes would lock up considerable forces against possible Chinese action. In his view, Indian intervention in Bangladesh in April 1971 would have been an open invitation to China to overtly assist Pakistan and justify its action on the pretext that India had committed aggression against a smaller neighbour.16 In

14 Ibidem, p. 275. 15 Deepak, op. cit., p. 281. In 1984 India moved up the Siachen Glacier in the coldest war ever, but the line of control with Pakistan remained virtually unchanged. 16 See lt.gen. Depinder Singh’s biography of Manekshaw, p. 229 and Appendix v reproducing the lecture of the Field Marshal on leadership and discipline of 11 November 1998. The author recounts his own intelligence gathering on the early snow in the Himalayas and

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December Pakistan provided an alibi by attacking Indian airfields. The military campaign launched in response by India reached Dacca in a couple of weeks. Together with the war of 1965 the self-esteem of the Indian Army had been restored. A more important explanation for Chinese restraint, however, seemed to be the wider political re-alignments in Asia. The People’s Republic of China had become a member of the United Nations in 1970 and was engaged in a rapprochement with the us. This was not the time for stressing military might. Both China and the us gave support to Pakistan, which made India sign a treaty of friendship and mutual cooperation with the Soviet Union in August 1971, thereby departing for all practical purposes from Nehru’s policy of non- alignment in spite of all professions to the contrary. Indian diplomacy was faced with isolation and looked for some form of normalisation of the relations with China, but as will be seen on the following pages, events outside the immediate bilateral context often had a direct impact on diplomatic postur- ing, and continued to lead to occasional military movements. In 1969 Mrs Gandhi as prime minister had made it known that she would welcome negotiations with China, beginning with economic cooperation. The next year at the May Day parade Chairman Mao told the Indian Chargé d’Affaires that the Chinese and Indian people should live as friends, “they should not always quarrel”. Yet, the Bangladesh issue postponed any follow-up. In 1974 Mrs Gandhi again expressed her desire for talks, but the merger of Sikkim into the Indian Union as associate state in 1975 led to a storm of Chinese criticism, dubbing it “naked aggression”, stalling progress once again.17 In 1976 at the initiative of India diplomatic relations were restored at the level of ambassadors, K.R. Narayanan filling that post in Beijing. It was a year of change in China, where three of its old leaders passed away: Chou En-lai, Zhu De and Mao. The next year the Janata party with Morarji Desai won the Indian elections and, although of the opinion that the main onus for sorting out the border problem lay with China as the occupying power, sent foreign minister A.B.Vajpayee to China in February 1979. His visit was cut short by the Chinese attack on Vietnam – where the Indian delegation took offence to the presumed parallel of “teaching them a lesson” – but he saw Deng Xiaoping who told him that they should “seek common ground while resolving differences” and take time in talking them over.18 On

the absence of Chinese troop movements in the Chumbi valley with the help of Soviet pictures, pp. 175–176. Manekshaw’s obituary appeared in The Economist, 5 July 2008, p. 91. 17 Acharya, op. cit., p. 36. 18 Ibidem, p. 37; Deepak, op. cit., p. 304. Indira Gandhi met Hua Guofeng at Tito’s funeral in May 1980, the first prime ministerial meeting in 20 years.

242 chapter 11 this occasion Deng proposed a “package deal” of swapping the Eastern Sector for the Western and made it more precise than the hint of Chou En-lai in 1960 to apply mutual reciprocity to existing realities. He also mentioned the package to an Indian journalist. Deng also travelled to Washington and favourably impressed president Carter, who outlined five basic factors that shaped us opinion: (a) enhance- ment of us strength and influence for the benefit of our people and those in the rest of the world; (b) awareness of an increasing desire throughout the world for a better quality of life, more political participation, independence or liberation for peoples, and a desire for freedom from domination of outside influences; (c) power shifting from a few nations like ourselves and the Soviets to be shared among many nations, with regional leaders emerging … ; (d) our future American security was tied to good relations with the developing nations; and (e) the rapid increase in Soviet military strength. … We wanted to join with China to use the positive elements in the world to deal with the negative ones.19 Deng replied that the world was “untranquil” and that the us and the prc had many common interests. He supported salt ii but did not believe in a Soviet build-up. The us should join the Second and Third worlds to oppose the Soviet Union. In those days, Carter and Paul Warnke were doing everything possible to expedite the comprehensive test ban, but India was difficult: Prime Minister Desai took the position of adopting safeguards only if the major nuclear powers agreed a comprehensive test-ban and drastically reduced their commitment to nuclear weapons. In April the Indian cabinet instructed foreign minister Vaypayee not to yield on safeguards inspections for their nuclear power plants, upon which president Carter cut off all nuclear trade. The issue would come up again many years later when under president Reagan his security adviser Condoleezza Rice had several “near death” experiences before a framework agreement was concluded. putting existing civilian reactors and any new reactors under iaea supervision. Foreign Minister Natwar Singh was in favour, but Prime Minister ManMohan Singh was not sure he could sell it in Delhi: the cold war was over, and non-alignment was a relic of the past, but for many Indians the idea of close technological cooperation with the us was still too much to swallow. In March 2006 India came on board and the agreement would bring all existing civilian reactors and all new reactor construction under the iaea.20

19 White House Diary, 29 January 1979. 20 Condolezza Rice, No Higher Honor, Crown Publ., ny, 2011, pp. 436–440.

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Unfortunately the Vietnamese complications did not allow a well-considered resumption of contacts. It would take the then foreign minister Narasimha Rao till July 2, 1980, to revert back to the Deng proposal of the Chinese giving up claims. He explained that the Chinese were giving up claims on territory in the Eastern Sector, while India should accept the Line of Actual Control in the Western Sector, thus leaving Aksai Chin to China. The minister welcomed the prospect of the Eastern sector being settled without any particular difficulty, but stuck to his position that the boundary line was well defined by customs, treaties and geographical features. He dropped, however, the precondition that China should evacuate Aksai Chin before any negotiations would be possible. Deepak21 argues that both proposals, having been mooted in mere discussions, had no legal basis and could be withdrawn by China at any time. That is true, but that would always be the case in this sort of negotiations, which have to start somewhere. Huang Hua as foreign minister was supposed to return the visit of his Indian counterpart in late 1980, but postponed it after India had recognised the Heng Samrin regime in Cambodia which was seen in China as an approval of Soviet encirclement of the prc. Huang finally landed in Delhi on 25 June 1981 and proposed annual talks at vice-ministerial level. He did not refer to a package deal, but stated that the two sides must adopt:

an attitude of treating each other on an equal footing, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation and seek through negotiations a fair and reasonable overall settlement of the problem, taking into consideration the historical background and the present actualities as well as the national feelings of the people of both countries.22

One positive result of the visit was the permission for pilgrims from India to visit Mount Kailash the following September, the abode of Shiva and holy to Hindus and Buddhists alike. Between December 1981 and November 1987 eight rounds of talks were held in the two capitals respectively, falling within the periods of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi as prime minister. During the first round China repeated the package deal approach, and India the sector-by-sector proposal, apparently hoping that once the legality of the McMahon Line was ascertained China would make concessions in the Western Sector.23 The following sessions did not fare any better, but the logjam did not prevent a number of scientific delegations

21 Op. cit., p. 306. 22 Beijing Review, July 13, 1981:7, quoted by Deepak, p. 309. 23 Wang, 1988, p. 308 quoted by Deeepak p. 311.

244 chapter 11 exchanging visits, one of them being received by Deng and hearing him again defend the package deal approach. During the talks India remained adamant and defended her refusal by saying that each sector was different in character. During the fourth round India proposed that China would state that it was in favour of a comprehensive settlement but did not oppose separate discussions on the East, Middle and West sectors of the boundary if this might lead to overall settlement.24 Soon after the fifth round Mrs Gandhi was murdered by soldiers of her bodyguard. Deputy Premier Yao Yilin attended her funeral and invited Rajiv Gandhi to visit China. That visit did not take place until 19–24 December 1988, but prior to that Rajiv met Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang in New York in October 1985 when both were attending the un General Assembly. At the sixth round the Chinese agreed to discussing the border sector-by- sector, but India accepted that ultimately this approach would be dovetailed into an overall settlement. When asked to elaborate on the “package deal” suggested earlier, the Chinese emphasized that there was dispute in all sectors, the biggest being in the Eastern Sector. Therefore, the only way out was a mutual adjustment. So no longer a swap but a stiffening of positions, which could be attributed to the ongoing Sino – Soviet rapprochement alleviating Chinese concerns about Soviet encirclement.25 The Chinese repeated this position during the 7th round and asked India to make concessions in the Eastern Sector. Only then could China make concessions in the West. In the meantime, however, a new crisis was developing with potentially serious implications.

Sumdorong Chu

When in 1980 Indira Gandhi returned to power, the Chief of the Army, general K.V. Krishna Rao presented her with a strategic military plan, operation Falcon, to convert the patchy forward presence against China into a heavy forward deployment all the way from Ladakh to the border with Myanmar, with special attention to Arunachal, North Sikkim and the Trans-Ladakh range. The plan would take 15 years to complete and include the (still lacking) servicing road network and viable lines of communications. The new plan had come to the conclusion that the only feasible way to defend the Tawang salient would be the Hathung La ridge, south of the Thagla ridge and separated from it by the east-west running Namka Chu. There the 1962 war had started with the erroneous Indian claim that Thagla formed the watershed. In 1984, apparently

24 Beijing Review, November 14, 1983, quoted by Deepak, op. cit., p. 314. The two sides signed a trade agreement in 1984. 25 Deepak, op. cit., p. 319.

Sino – Indian Relations After The War Of 1962 245 without informing the Army, the Intelligence Bureau of India set up a post at Sumdorong Chu (Wangdong in Chinese) a pasturage north-east of the conflu- ence of the Namka Chu and the Nyuang Chu. The purpose was to monitor Chinese movements, but the location was tricky. Yet, for two years the Chinese did not react and Indian troops came for the summer and went back before the winter. In mid-June 1986 the Indian detachment, having collected salaries and rations, wanted to return to the post but found it occupied by the pla with helicopter support.26 India openly condemned the Chinese action on 15 July 1986, but China retorted that India had crossed the Line of Actual Control and the McMahon Line as well. Increasing the tension, the new chief of the army, General K. Sudarji, obtained permission to conduct an exercise, Operation Chequerboard, to see how quickly troops based in the Assam plains could take up their positions on the McMahon line. As part of the exercise in late 1986 the army landed a brigade at Zimithuang, south of Hathung La, using its new Mi-26 helicopters, and occupied that ridge. At the peak of their deployment three mountain divisions of 4 Corps were pushed up to the McMahon Line, two to defend Tawang and most of the rest to the Lohit district in the East to defend Walong. The Chinese responded quickly by moving their troops forward, all along the Line of Actual Control. Clashes seemed imminent, but the forces, which now were face to face at places like Sulu La and Bum La, did not engage in combat. In December 1986 India raised the temperature further by introducing a bill in Parliament to establish Arunachal as a state, which came into effect on 20 February 1987. China responded by a vituperative tone reminiscent of 1962. The Chinese foreign ministry would not accept the incorporation and denounced it as violation of Chinese territorial sovereignty, gravely injuring feelings of the Chinese people. In spite of all this, defence minister K.C. Pant paid an informal visit to Beijing in April 1987 on his way back from North Korea, the first one ever by an Indian defence minister, apparently with a soothing message from Rajiv Gandhi that Delhi had no intention to aggravate the situation. A formal military ‘flag meeting’ was held on 5 August 1987 at Bum La, the first since 1962, but a real thaw set in only in September 1988 when Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing, returning the 1960 visit of Chou En-lai. Both sides agreed to a symbolic gesture of disengagement in the Sumdorong Chu area. Again the question arises why China opted for waiting two years before protesting against the Indian detachment. Obviously there were international connotations. India was heavily engaged against Pakistan on Siachen glacier in Kashmir. It had also committed considerable forces to Operation Pawan in

26 Ibidem, pp. 320–321; Sawhney 2002, p. 29; Wikipedia 1987 Sino-Indian skirmish.

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Sri Lanka. But Deepak is probably right in assuming that China wanted to build up its claims in the Eastern Sector after having giving up its proposals for a “package” deal and the inherent leverage it could have derived from an overall approach.27 Under these circumstances the seventh and eighth rounds of talks were doomed to failure. The atmosphere remained courteous, but the arguments stayed repetitious. Moreover, several other events did not promote a convivial atmosphere. In China indignation was caused by the fact that the incorporation of Arunachal as a state would make it difficult for any government to cede this territory. India had taken a leaf out of China’s own book on Tibet which had been made an Autonomous Region of China. Yet, in any border settlement some issues would have to be resolved in the Eastern Sector, even if China relinquished its claim to the entire area of Arunachal. The sensitive Thagla and Hathun La ridges and the Longju area would be first among them.

A New Beginning?

Rajiv Gandhi changed Indian foreign policy by focusing more on good relations with neighbouring countries and, in the case of China, by no longer tying the improvement of relations in other fields to the solution of the border problem. In this way he heeded the messages from the Chinese leaders, especially Deng Xiaoping, who repeatedly stressed doing what was possible while leaving aside what was not yet ripe. Of course there was risk involved in leaving it to the Chinese to determine what was possible and ripe, but the Indian domestic political scene was not ready either for a grandiose overall settlement, which would necessarily involve some painful, albeit realistic concessions. Like his mother, Rajiv attached importance to making headway in the field of economic relations. Rajiv Gandhi visited China from 19–24 December 1988. Highlight of the trip was his conversation with Deng, almost twice his age, who told him to forget the past and to do everything with an eye to the future. Deng used his speech, broadcast on radio, to advocate a new world order and a new economic order in the “Century of Asia Pacific”, and sent an unmistakeable message of a new beginning in Sino-Indian relations, de-linking the border dispute from the other areas of contact.28 Concrete results, however, were a bit

27 Deepak, op. cit., p. 323. 28 Ibidem, p. 331. The joint press communiqué of 23 Dec. 1988 is Appendix 1 in India China relations. The border issue and beyond by M.Guruswamy and Z. Daulet Singh of 2009, which also contains the communiqués up to 14 Jan. 2008.

Sino – Indian Relations After The War Of 1962 247 meagre. The meetings at the level of Vice Ministers, already taking place since 1981, were institutionalised in a Joint Working Group (jwg) to deal exclusively with the border question, and to try to resolve it within a definite time-frame, thus separating it from more promising bilateral issues. Agreements were signed on civil aviation, science and technology and a 3-year cultural exchange programme. The first jwg meeting took place in Beijing from 30 June to 4 July 1989, hardly four weeks after the Tian’anmen Square suppression of the pro-democracy demonstrations. India remained silent and hid behind the principle of non- interference in domestic affairs, while the us and other western countries imposed sanctions on China. The jwg produced an agreement that military experts should work out measures to ensure peace and tranquillity along the lac, which led the second meeting to agree to regular meetings of military personnel in the border areas. The fourth meeting determined these areas to be Bum La in the Eastern and Spanggur Gap in the Western Sector for meetings in July and October. At the eighth round Nathu La in Sikkim was added. On that occasion the Sumdorong Chu issue was settled with an agreement to dis- engage the four controversial posts in the area but to retain one post each to facilitate dialogue on disengagement of troops along the entire line. In addition a number of “pockets of dispute” were recognised: Trig Heights and Demchok in the Western Sector, Barahoti in the Middle and Namka Chu, Sumdorong Chu, Chantze, Asaphila and Longju in the Eastern Sector.29 A few months later the Berlin wall fell, preceding the end of both the Soviet empire and the bi-polar power structure in the world. Both India and China were adjusting to the new situation and between 1991 and 1996 there was a brisk exchange of high level leadership visits, including the majority of members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist party.30 The jwg was supposed to first demarcate the lac and then implement a series of Confidence Building Measures, but in fact worked in reverse order and failed to agree on ways to reduce ‘close confrontation’. The Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace along the Line of Actual Control was signed on 7 September 1993 at the visit of Narasimha Rao:

29 Sawhney, 2002, p. 41, quoted by Deepak, op. cit.,p. 350. 30 M. Guruswamy and Z Daulet Singh, op. cit. p. 97. They regarded the 1993 text the first major agreement on conventional disengagement resulting in effective disarmament (?), and that without any role played by third countries. Others, notably I.K. Gujral and General Sudarji, regarded it as an exercise in political pragmatism, India Today, 30 September 1993, p. 38.

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Neither side shall use or threaten the use of force against the other by any means. The two sides shall strictly respect and observe the lac. In case personnel of one cross the lac, upon being cautioned by the other side, they shall immediately pull back to their own side. When necessary, the two sides shall jointly check and determine the segments of the line where they have different views as to its alignment. Each side will keep its military forces along the lac to a minimum level compatible with friendly and good-neighbourly relations. Neither side will undertake specified levels of military exercises in mutually identified zones. Each side will give prior notification of specified levels of military exercises near the lac.

Nice words, but of limited value as long as the lac had not been better defined. On 29 November 1996, during the visit of Jiang Zemin, the first ever of a prc president, a further agreement was signed on “Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the lac” which repeated wording of 1993, but was a bit more specific about reducing or limiting categories of armed forces and equipment, and on exchanging data. Both sides would avoid holding exercises involving more than a division (approximately 15.000 troops) in close proximity of the lac. In case of an exercise involving more than one Brigade Group (approx. 5000 troops) prior notification should be given about type, level, planned duration and aim of the exercise as well as the number and type of units participating. Adequate measures would be taken against air intrusions across the lac. Incidents shall be promptly investigated by the side operating the aircraft and the results shall be immediately communicated through diplomatic channels or at border personnel meetings. Combat aircraft should not fly within ten kilometres of the lac. No firings or blasts within two kilometres of the lac. Possibly more important was the expansion of the regime of scheduled and flag meetings between border representatives at designated places along the lac and tele-communication linking them. Recognising that much would depend on a common understanding of the alignment of the lac the process of clarification and confirmation would be speeded up, and maps would be exchanged indicating their respective perceptions of the entire alignment of the lac as soon as possible Deepak concluded that the border areas have remained comparatively peaceful due to the work of the jwg and that the Line of Actual Control had become a sort of de facto border since 1962 except for a few “geographical zones”. Yet, no progress was made on exchanging maps of the Eastern sector and overall relations remained chequered. When the bjp Hindu nationalist party came to power in 1998 it promised to establish a National Security Council which would undertake India’s first strategic defence review and re- evaluate nuclear policy. Previously the bjp had consistently argued that India required nuclear weapons to safeguard its national security. On 5 April India

Sino – Indian Relations After The War Of 1962 249 unveiled a supercomputer able to simulate nuclear test explosions. The next day Pakistan conducted a test-firing of its 1500 km range intermediate ballistic missile (ominously called the Ghauri after the 12th century Mogul invader of India). India’s defence minister George Fernandes accused China of proliferat- ing missile technology to Pakistan. He even claimed that China had constructed a helipad in Arunachal, but that allegation was withdrawn by prime minister Vaypayee. China had launched a strong protest, but exercised remarkable restraint and gave the green light for general Fu Quanyou, Chief of the pla, to visit Delhi, returning the visit General Malik had paid the previous October. After his call on minister Fernandes, the Indian defence ministry issued a statement: “In the context of regional peace and stability”, expressing concern about some recent developments which vitiated the regional security environment (referring to Chinese aid to Pakistan) and to “cartographic aggression” in Arunachal.31 Prime minister Vaypayee struck a nicer tone by stressing the need to resolve “some problems” along the lac in a “friendly atmosphere”. Early May minster Fernandes resumed his China bashing by calling China “potential threat number one”. A few days later Vajpayee surprised the world by announcing that India had conducted three nuclear explosions at its Pokhran test-site on May 11 (including a fission device, a low-yield device and a thermonuclear device) and two sub-kiloton devices on May 13, 1998. China’s initial reaction was somewhat measured by pointing out that the explosions ran counter to the international trend and were “detrimental to the peace and stability in the South Asian region”.32 Condemnation became strong, however, when Vaypayee referred to the China threat in his explanatory letter to president Clinton. Relations remained estranged for some nine months and the 11th jwg was postponed. South Asia was in disarray. Pakistan detonated its own nuclear devices on 27 and 30 May 1998. The un Security Council passed resolution 1172 on 6 June calling on India and Pakistan to refrain from further nuclear tests, to cease production of fissile material and to join negotiations banning it, to sign the npt and ctbt unconditionally and to resume bilateral talks on all issues including Kashmir. President Clinton postponed a visit to New Delhi and went to China instead. Russia expressed regret over the Indian tests,33 but China did not criticise Pakistan. Towards the end of the year India tested three Trishul missiles and conducted the largest military manoeuvres in ten years. Pakistan launched operation Badr in the Kargil area aimed at cutting the strategic Srinagar – Leh road and it took India till the end of July 1999 to evict the

31 Deepak, op. cit., pp. 357–358. 32 Ibidem, p. 371. 33 Ibidem, pp. 376–377.

250 chapter 11 last intruders. The Chinese press had a definite pro-Pakistan slant, but official pronouncements were moderate and advocated bilateral negotiations. Another bone of contention was India’s nuclear doctrine formulated by the new National Security Council in August 1999. It stated the requirement for an effective, credible nuclear deterrent and adequate retaliatory capability in the absence of global nuclear disarmament, consisting of a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets. India would not be the first to initi- ate a nuclear strike. Pokhran ii created mutual deterrence which prevented the emergence of a unipolar Asia, with a dominant China at the centre. China, in an article of the College of Military Science accused India of a hegemonic foreign policy and trying to squeeze into the ranks of nuclear states; it advocated unity among the big nuclear powers, who had a “relatively mature arrangement” among themselves, in order to isolate India.34 Relations improved again with the visit of External Affairs minister Jaswant Singh to Beijing in June 1999: contacts should be developed on the premise that neither side treated the other as a threat. It was agreed to start a ‘security dialogue’ to facilitate better mutual perception on issues of mutual interest. It would not deal with the border issue; that remained the competence of the Joint Working Group. The three rounds of the dialogue took place in Beijing between 2000 and 2002 and covered issues like Chinese cooperation with Pakistan, ter- rorists coming from Afghanistan, American plans for missile defence, but also the surprising flight of the 17th Karmapa and six senior monks from Tibet to India in December 1999, further discussed in appendix i. It was followed up by the ‘strategic dialogue which started in Delhi in January 2005, discussing Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran’s nuclear standoff with the West and way to exploit the energy resources of Central Asia. Highlight in the media was the joint military exercise near Kunming in 2006, which however involved less than 100 military personel from each side in an anti-terrorist wargame. The 2007 session seems to have included an attempt at triangular cooperation including Russia, which did not materialise because the participants concluded that the us had more comprehenve ties with ach of them than they had beteen themselves.35 The following years were free of incidents. Contacts multiplied at all levels, but little or no progress was made on the border issue. President Narayanan, who had been ambassador to Beijing in 1976–78, visited China in May 2000 at the invitation of Jiang Zemin. The Chinese president proposed a 4 point formula, which ended with “look to the future, seek commonalities and reach an

34 Deepak, op. cit., pp. 390–391. 35 Asia News Agency, Special Study October 2009, “India – China, accords and discords”, p. 15.

Sino – Indian Relations After The War Of 1962 251 appropriate solution to the problems left over by history”.36 But then water diplomacy acquired a new dimension. In August 2000 a massive release of a flood from Tibet – which India later condemned as premeditated – washed away 120 km of the Hindustan – Tibet Road and 98 bridges. Two months earlier the Siang river had devastated four districts of Arunachal Pradesh, without any flood warning being issued. These disasters led to an agreement in 2004 for a bi-annual sharing of flood data, which became a positive item in future joint statements. The subject remains delicate, however, as China might divert water to the dry Yellow River basin and is constructing a big power station in the bend of the Tsangpo/Brahmaputra. In November maps were exchanged on the Central Sector. Li Peng, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and number 2 in the Chinese hierarchy, came to India in January 2001, followed by Premier Zhu Rongji a year later. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh went to China in March 2002 and managed to put a timeframe on the exchange of maps of the Western and Eastern sectors (which would not be met). In addition a direct air corridor was agreed, an old objective of Nehru and Chou En-lai, but never realised due to the border conflict. In the meantime the Joint Working Group had resumed its rounds of meetings. The 11th session had been postponed because of the nuclear testing by India, but was reconvened in April 1999 after a lapse of almost two years. No substantial progress was achieved, as was the case at the next three meetings, which brought the process up to November 2002. Only at the visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee in June 2003 it was possible to move forward, albeit mainly in procedural terms. A lengthy ‘Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation’ contained the usual generalities about peaceful coexistence, peace and stability and stated once again that “common interests of the two sides outweigh their differences” and “the differences should not be allowed to affect the overall development of bilateral relations”. The two countries are not a threat to each other. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other. A new note was introduced on strengthening multipolarity internationally and enhancing the positive factors of globalisation.37 The jwg and the Joint Economic Group (also to meet at ministerial level) were reconfirmed and yet another compact Joint Study Group was created to examine the complementarities in expanded trade and economic cooperation for the next five years. Vaipayee might have been willing to go further, but lost the 2004 elections.

36 Deepak, op. cit., p. 400. 37 Alka Acharya, op. cit., Appendix i, pp. 220–224, Deepak, pp. 428–429.

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India made an important concession by recognising for the first time the Tibet Autonomous Region (tar) as a part of the territory of the prc (instead of previously “an autonomous region of China” which in Chinese eyes could be interpreted as enjoying a high degree of absolute autonomy) and reiterated that it will not allow the Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India. The MoU on border trade opened the Nathu La in Sikkim, closed after the 1962 war: “the Indian side agrees to designate Changgu of Sikkim State as the venue for border trade market; the Chinese side agrees to designate Renqinggang of the tar …” India took this wording as an indication of recognition of Sikkim as part of India. China did not formally do so, for that would depend on an overall border settlement, but in practice no longer showed Sikkim as an independent state on its website.38 Alka Acharya wondered why China was not more forthcoming on de iure recognition, particularly as there was no dispute about Sikkim. Now India could be apprehensive about the Sikkim issue being used as a bargaining counter and an opportunity was lost to dispel mistrust. She clearly has a point, but the entire history of the border issue seems to indicate that Beijing wants to maintain maximum leverage on India across the entire border and therefore is not prepared to agree to partial settlements. Nevertheless, the Guiding Principles seemed to point at maintaining the status quo. In 2005 the National People’s Congress installed the fourth generation of Chinese leadership, headed by President Hu Jintao. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited India on a South Asian tour in April 2005 and signed a joint statement describing the India – China relationship as “a strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity”, a change from the “constructive cooperative partnership” of earlier texts.39 The prc came around to depicting the state of Sikkim as part of India in a revised map, but the statement also contained ambiguities, such as the “emergence of India in the un Security Council” and cooperation with (not membership of) the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The most important outcome was the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question of 11 April 2005, awaited ever since the Vajpayee visit of 2003.40 It stated that an early settlement of the boundary question will advance the basic interests of the two countries and should therefore be pursued as a strategic objective. The guiding principles could be seen as a roadmap towards that objective. Article iii made clear that the objective would be a package

38 Alka Acharya, op. cit., p. 91. 39 Ibidem, 150. 40 Ibidem, Appendix ii, pp. 224–227.

Sino – Indian Relations After The War Of 1962 253 settlement, which must be final, covering all sectors of the boundary. This represented a further change in de Indian position, which earlier had advocated with varying intensity a sector-by-sector approach. Due consideration would be given to strategic and reasonable interests and the principle of mutual and equal security (Article iv) and account would be taken, inter alia, of historical evidence, national sentiments, practical difficulties and reasonable concerns and sensitivities of both sides, and the actual state of border areas (Article v). Pending an ultimate settlement, the two sides should strictly respect and observe the Line of Actual Control and work together to maintain peace and tranquillity in the border area (Article ix). Alka Acharya concluded that there was sufficient scope, and more, in the Guidelines to impart maximum flexibility in the negotiations that should follow, and that there were more than adequate safeguards that peace and tranquillity would be maintained. In addition, the modalities of military Confidence Building Measures also were agreed in case any confrontation or border crossing should occur. That might be true, but the perspective of an early settlement had moved further into the distance with such a multitude of criteria. India had moved a long way since its original position that the border was clear and determined by history and custom. Very little is known about what is actually happening in the working groups and how detailed the negotiations are becoming, but no further progress seemed to be forthcoming. Postponing a settlement indefinitely would be more to the disadvantage of India than of China. Letting the issue simmer on the backburner produces less heat at the moment, but it remains a burner which might flare up and put an eventual settlement at risk.41 Acharya reached a more positive conclusion by pointing at the rapid transition of a stagnant, though tension-ridden, state of cold peace to a dynamic and multi-dimensional engagement with increasing trade as its centrepiece. She asserted that the bone of contention, the disputed boundary, had moved into the post-conflict stage. In the absence of concrete progress the feeling of optimism generated by the guiding principles of 2003, the Indian initiative of December 2004 in aiding the tsunami victims and the strategic dialogue of 2005 did not hold. In fact, there were even retrograde signs. In August 2006 the pla was reported to have constructed a startingly accurate model of a highly sensitive part of the border, which could be used for training purposes, but the Indian Army played it down. Around the same time concern was raised by a story in the Hindustan Times, but not confirmed by China, about dam-building in the upper reaches of the Sutlej river, which enters India at the Shipki La, one of the trouble spots in the Central Sector.

41 Alka Acharya, op. cit., p. 203.

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More positive was the Memorandum of Understanding, signed by the ministers of defence in May 2006 when Defence Minister (and later President) Pranab Mukerjee visited the prc, providing for frequent exchanges and even developing a calendar for regular joint military exercises and training programmes. The MoU aimed at “ensuring a peaceful environment in which they can pursue their respective national development objectives.”42 The expectations of the visit of President Hu Jintao in November 2006 were not high. On the eve of the talks the Chinese ambassador to India had dispelled any ideas about acquiescing in the status quo in the Eastern Sector by saying in a television interview “the whole of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory and Tawang is only one of the places in it”. Alka Acharya asserts an ambassadorial impropriety,43 but such things are unlikely to happen in Chinese diplomacy. China wanted to make its position clear. In spite of the excitement raised by this statement, the visit maintained some positive momentum, largely by the priority addressed to economic aspects. The Joint Declaration of 21 November 2006, of course prepared in advance, contained 47 paragraphs and was described by Manmohan Singh as a “ten-pronged strategy”.44 It stated that the two countries did not see themselves as “rivals or competitors but partners for mutual benefit…. They agree that there is enough space for them to grow together”. They set a target of $40 billion of direct bilateral trade by 2010 and signed a Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion agreement. Energy security was regarded a vital and strategic issue for energy producing and consuming countries alike and it was a common interest for both countries to establish an international energy order that is fair, equitable, secure and stable, benefiting the entire international community. An expert level dialogue would be started to discuss interaction on transborder rivers, in which India would get hydrological data from China regarding the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej. All together thirteen agreements were signed including a hot-line between the two foreign ministries and the establishment of Consulates-General at Guangzhou and Kolkata. Regular Summit-level meetings would be held in each other’s country and in multilateral fora. On the border issue “it was agreed to complete the process of exchanging maps indicating their respective perceptions on the entire alignment of the lac on the basis of already agreed parameters as soon as possible” (§ 22). At the press briefing Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon, former ambassador to China and fluent in Chinese, stated:

42 Ibidem, p. 164. 43 Ibidem p. 169. 44 Ibidem, Appendix iii. M. Guruswamy/Z. Daulet Singh, op. cit., Appendix vii.

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Ever since the 1993 agreement, we have maintained peace and tranquillity all along the border and both leaders expressed satisfaction having achieved that. The second part of it is to work towards a boundary settlement. As you know we have made progress in those discussions. … But our basic approach to the boundary question, ever since the Rajiv Gandhi visit…is to deal with the boundary question, try and find a solution, but in the meantime to develop the rest of the relationship. It would be a huge strategic gain if we could settle it tomorrow and both sides want to settle it soon. But it is not holding up the rest of the relationship…

The Chinese spokeswoman in Beijing was less eloquent and stated that “China insists on seeking a just and rational solution to the China-India border issue. … China maintains its stance that both sides should seek a rational solution through friendly consultation”.45 In spite of these nice words, one could be surprised by the fact that after all these years no full exchange of maps had taken place in the Eastern and Western Sectors. The Indian position had been marked long ago, but the Chinese obviously wanted to maintain some flexibility and used general claims in order to convince India of the need to enter into a fresh and open negotiation framework. Their position hardened as shown at the meeting of the foreign ministers in Hamburg in June 2007 where Yang Jieqi conveyed the message that the “mere presence” of a populated area would not affect Chinese territorial claims. A few days later Prime Minister Manmohan Singh raised the matter with President Hu Jintao on the margin of the G-8 summit in Berlin, arguing that the Chinese view would contradict Article vii of the Guiding Principles which read: “In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas”. President Hu did not contradict his foreign minister, but stressed the need to uphold the spirit that had contributed to the Guiding Principles which reflected the mutual agreement regarding the border settlement.46 Nevertheless, what had appeared reasonable barely a couple of years ago, now seemed to be receding into the background. In Acharya’s opinion the border issue got stuck on account of Tawang, which is non-negotiable for India. She might be right, but on the other hand the point made on the Sikkim issue applies even more strongly to Arunachal. China has an interest in keeping issues open in all three sectors if it is to reach a satisfactory outcome of an overall settlement.

45 Both quotes are from Guruswamy/Daulet Singh, op. cit., p. 107. 46 Ibidem, p. 192.

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A negative element is likely to have been introduced by the growing conver- gence between India and the us with its de facto recognition of India as a nuclear weapon state in July 2005.47 Anyhow, the Chinese changed tack again at the East Asia Summit in Singapore on 21 November 2007 when Wen Jibao, the Chinese premier, told Manmohan Singh that India should be prepared to make substantial concessions in both the Eastern and Western sectors. Wen indicated that Beijing wanted to move away from the mutually agreed political parameters of April 2005, and instead sought a regional trade agreement with India as well as market status for China. Preceded by Congress president Sonia Gandhi in October 2007, Mohan Singh paid a three-day visit to China in January 2008, the fifth Indian prime ministerial visit after Pandit Nehru. With Wen Jibao he signed an ambitious vision document for the 21st century, resolving to promote the building of a harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity, but repeating much of the 2005 Joint Statement. The mood was friendly, but the outcome rather scant. It was illustrative of the ‘backburner approach’ to the border dispute. China was sup- portive of India’s “aspirations to play a greater role in the United Nations and in the Security Council”, whatever that might mean. The flowery content raised some eyebrows among sceptical observers. The “important objective” of “continuous democratisation of international relations”, and the “joint efforts in bringing about a new international political, economic and energy order” would hardly seem credible, let alone achievable. As an implicit rehabilitation of the Nehru area Panchsheel emerged again as basic guiding principles for creating the conditions for realising peace and progress of humankind. Drawing lines on the ground of ideologies and values was deemed to be not conducive to peaceful and harmonious coexistence. Both sides supported processes of regional integration; an open, fair, equitable, transparent and rule-based multilateral trading system, and energy order. On bilateral relations the document was much shorter:

The two sides will continuously promote confidence building measures through steadily enhanced contacts in the field of defence. The two sides therefore welcome the commencement of the China-India Defence Dialogue and express their satisfaction at the successful conclusion of the first joint anti-terrorism training between their armed forces in December 2007… The two sides remain firmly committed to resolving outstanding differences, including on the boundary question, through peaceful negotiations,

47 Shishir Gupta, op. cit., p. 39. He also referred to the Singapore meeting.

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while ensuring that such differences are not allowed to affect the positive development of bilateral relations. The two sides reiterate their determination to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution of the boundary question and to build a boundary of peace and friendship… The Special Representatives shall complete at an early date the task of arriving at an agreed framework of settlement on the basis of this Agreement.48

Poor representatives. What to do with such highfaluting phrases without any new concrete guidance? Economic cooperation did not go that smoothly, either. India stalled on the creation of a free trade area as its business community feared an influx of cheap goods, while India largely exported iron ore or low value-added items and already had a highly negative balance of trade with China.49 The issue of the trade gap remained a serious concern for India. The volume of trade was increasing considerably and was well on the way to being doubled between 2006 and 2010 to a level of $40 bn, but India put its trade deficit at $9 billion in 2007 and twice as much in 2009. China countered by promising frequent buying missions. Later, at the Rio Earth Summit of 2011 the target was raised to $100 bn, but then the Indian deficit would be $40 bn. In the summer of 2008 the Indian Ministry of Defence released new information about Chinese incursions into Indian territory. They cited 65 cases during this year, some of which could be due to the imprecision of the McMahon line, but one went as far as a 1 kilometre penetration in northern Sikkim. On its side India had reopened the airstrip of Daulat Begh Oldi (dbo) in the western sector, 8 km south of the Chinese border, which overlooked the Karakoram pass and had been closed 43 years ago as a gesture of goodwill. In Arubachal India was building 4 airfields for the growing number of su-30 frontline fighters.50 In September foreign minister Yang Jieqi paid a three-day visit to Delhi and stated that China was willing to work together with India toward reaching a mutually acceptable solution to the border issue. In the meantime the two sides should maintain peace along the border. “Under current circumstances where uncertainties in the global economy are rising and energy and food security issues are becoming more prominent, developing countries should take seriously the concerns of each other and take effective measures.” Prime Minister Manmohan Singh hoped to continue the high-level exchanges with China and to promote bilateral cooperation on climate change, disaster relief,

48 M. Guruswamy/Z Daulet Singh, op. cit, Appendix viii. 49 Financial Times, 22 November 2006 and 15 January 2008. 50 Defense News, 30 June, 2008.

258 chapter 11 financial stability and multilateral trade. He reiterated that India would not allow anti-China political activities by Tibetans living in India.51 In the run-up to the Copenhagen Climate Summit conference India and China cooperated in resisting legally binding caps on greenhouse emissions. India’s environment minister, Jajram Ramesh, went to China and discussed joint monitoring of the melting of the Himalayan glaciers, which feed seven of the world’s largest rivers. India was in the forefront of the critics denouncing the un expert report predicting the demise of the glaciers within 40 years as a result of climate change.52 The climatic entente across the Himalayas was soon to be disturbed by new mutual irritations. China tried to block a $2.9 bn loan of the Asian Development bank to India because it contained $60 mln for flood control in Arunachal Pradesh. India protested sharply against Chinese building activities in the Pakistan-administered part of Kashmir53 and Beijing was irritated by Manmohan Singh’s electioneering in Arunachal and furious about the visit, in November 2009, of the Dalai Lama to the Tawang monastery, the part of Arunachal Pradesh which once had provided a reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. An unconfirmed report about 2 Indian soldiers being injured in a China border firing was described as the first breach of the 1996 Agreement, and there were scuffles between Chinese and Tibetan students in a Chennai sta- dium. More important was that the optimism generated by the 2005 Agreement on Political Parameters was rather short lived: Article vii stated that both sides “shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas”. Delhi interpreted this as eventual acceptance of Arunachal as part of India, but at the meeting of the two foreign ministers in Hamburg Yang Jiechi did not regard this article not as a mandate. The ambit of mutual recriminations was wider and more severe than before with a variety of unfriendly think-tank analyses, academic discourse and blog-writing. ‘Incremental engagement’, the strategy of the past decade, was close to unravelling.54 In December 2010 Prime Minister Wen Jibao again visited India and his ambassador repeated the diplomatic novelty of issuing a negative message before his arrival. Ambassador Zhang Yan said relations between the two fastest growing large economies were ‘very fragile’ and once damaged would be difficult to repair.55 Wen Jibao was accompanied by a 400 strong business

51 China Daily, 10 September 2008. 52 Financial Times, 3 August 2009. 53 Financial Times, 15 October 2009. 54 A. Acharya, op. cit., 2009. Times of India, 15 Sept. 2009 on the shooting incident. 55 Financial Times, 14 December 2010.

Sino – Indian Relations After The War Of 1962 259 delegation (three times larger than the Obama delegation a month earlier) which signed contracts worth $16 billion. His proposal for a free trade agreement was rejected by India for fear of being swamped by cheap Chinese products, while Indian exports to China mainly consisted of raw materials. Bilateral investment remained minimal. Politically nothing was solved. Wen’s deputy stated that there was enough room in the world for two rising large powers. The border issue was an heritage of the past and ‘not easy to solve’ and confidence building measures should come first. But Indians had little confidence in a neighbour which claimed the territory of one of its states. In 2012 international attention focused on the maritime disputes adjacent to China. At the political level Beijing made an effort to ‘thaw frosty ties’,56 but at the same time took some actions which did little to improve the political climate in India. Defence minister Liang Guanglie visited his Indian counterpart A.K. Antony in September 2012, the first in eight years, and they agreed to restart joint military exercises (held at company level in 2007 and 2008, but postponed in 20110), cooperate on anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, conduct joint search and rescue exercises at sea and to promote mutual port calls. Minister Liang claimed that China had never established a military base overseas and denied that pla engineers had been used on infrastructure projects in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Minister Antony promptly announced that he knew of these projects and had asked China to cease them. Provocative to Indian public opinion was the Chinese policy not to recognize Indian passports of citizens of Arunachal Pradesh and to issue visas to them on separate pieces of paper. A few months later Chinese passports appeared to contain watermarks giving the size of the country as including Arunachal and the South China Sea. More positive was the Chinese invitation to Indian ambassador S. Jaishankar to pay a rare visit to Lhasa, Shigatse, Kailash and Shiquanhe, just across eastern Ladakh. He was impressed by the excellent road and rail infrastructure, a sentiment shared by all foreign visitors to China. But China concentrated on consolidating Tibet from an internal security point of view and rejected an Indian request to reopen the consulate in Lhasa, which was closed in 1959. Instead Beijing offered Chengdu, now a large city in Sichuan province. In Lhasa the only country with a representative remained Nepal. In April 2013 a serious incident occurred on the Depsang Plain next to the post of Daulet Begh Oldi (dbo), close to the Karakoram pass and hemmed in

56 Financial Times, September 5, 2012.

260 chapter 11 between Pakistan on the west and Chinese in north and east.57 During the 1962 war the post had been supplied by American built Fairchild Packets, but fell in disuse because it was in the range of Chinese artillery. Following an alarming report on the state of infrastructure on the lac by Shyam Saran, chairman of the National Security Advisory Board, Delhi decided in 2007 to revive the airstrips near the lac in Ladakh and Arunachal. An Antonov 32 aircraft landed at dbo in May 2008, reopening it after 42 years. The 2013 face-off started with the sighting of a pla patrol 19 km south of the Indian version of the lac. The Chinese also had put up five fairly large tents close to the Raki Nullah on the southern edge of the Depsang Plain. A picture showed a Chinese army truck and another vehicle next to it. India hastily brought in some reinforcements. In accordance with the 2005 disengagement procedure, flag-meetings were held on the spot, supported by intense diplomatic activity in the capitals. The Chinese showed the map which Chou En-lai had annexed to his letter to Nehru of November 1959 to buttress their claim. They also argued that India had sur- reptitiously constructed ‘live-in bunkers’ at Chumar, 250 km to the south. For India the situation was complicated by the Limits of Patrolling, approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (ccs), in between the two interpretations of the lac. This limit makes Indian patrolling of most of the Depsang plain only feasible through the gorge of the Raki Nullah. Hence the importance of the Chinese move. The incident fizzled out on May 5 with an agreement to pull back simultaneously and an Indian promise to dismantle the Chumar construction. It remained unclear whether the position before 15 April would be restored. Nevertheless, External Affairs minister Salman Khurshid did not cancel his visit to Beijing to prepare for prime minister Li Keqiang’s visit to Delhi later in May. China pursued a double-edged policy. On the one hand President Xi Jinping proposed acceleration of border resolution when meeting Manmohan Singh in Durban on 27 March 2013, but at the same time patrolling and incursions intensified. The Border Defence Cooperation Agreement was expanded during Singh’s last visit to China in October 2013: border personnel meetings would also take place at Kibuthu in the Eastern Sector and a hotline would connect the Indian Army and the pla in capitals. During the year the Chinese tone seemed to mellow. They did not refer to demands of large chunks of territory in the Eastern Sector, nor indicated that India would have to yield territory to reach a fair boundary resolution.58 Chinese leaders talked about closer

57 The post was named after a 16th century Yarkandi trader who lost his life on the South Silk Route. Shishir Gupta, op. cit., pp. 1–9 on the incident. 58 Shishir Gupta, op. cit., p. 35.

Sino – Indian Relations After The War Of 1962 261 cooperation with India in the region and beyond. Defence Minister Antony made it amply clear that he would not back down from any Depsang-like situation in future and that peace and tranquillity on the border would be an important guarantor of growing bilateral relations. Both sides were building roads up to the disputed border. Originally, India had followed a strategy of keeping the border region underdeveloped so that the Chinese could not easily come across, but finally created the Border Road Development Board in 1960, too late to match Chinese mobility during the 1962 war. As resources had to be divided between the Himalayan and Pakistani fronts the follow-up action was slow, but by 2006 India made serious efforts to improve infrastructure and at the same time to win the allegiance of the border tribes by development projects. It still is a work in progress and literally an uphill task in comparison with roads on the Tibetan plateau. An ambitious programme includes turning the road to Tawang into a highway by 2016 and the construction of 1800 km of roads by 2022, including 27 roads to link the border outposts and a two-lane Arunachal Pradesh highway from Tawang to Mahadevpur in Assam. India’s armed strength in Arunachal Pradesh now is estimated at more than 100.000 troops and including 2 mountain divisions and a “Strike Corps”, a type of offensive unit previously deployed only at the border with Pakistan. All along the border China possesses the high ground of the Tibetan plateau and will find reinforcement easier. In such a situation an un-demarcated and disputed frontier along high peaks, which is accessible mainly in summer, is a recipe for trouble. The number of disputed areas along the Line of Actual Control has been reduced and troops have filled in empty spaces, but actual incursions – albeit minor – also have increased substantially. Without the exchange of maps (and some demarcation) no status quo along the Line of Actual Control can be maintained, especially when troops come back in spring to re-occupy positions vacated before the winter. At the same time the dilemma arises of maps freezing negotiating position even more and ultimately making the lac the final boundary. Much will depend on the political control exercised by both sides and the effectiveness of the management procedures of the confidence building measures. In September 2014 President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to India and signed some 16 documents, including a five-year trade and development plan to realize $20 billion of Chinese investments in a “transparent, stable and investor friendly business environment”. Previous investments did not exceed $400 million as India had been reluctant to allow Chinese participation in key sectors of the economy. Now its new leader, Narendra Modi, seemed to accept the creation of dedicated industrial parks. Some comments suggested that India had expected more from China.

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On the border issue little became known except an MoU on the opening of a new Kailash – Manasarowar – Yatra route for Indian pilgrims. The meeting was marred by news that during the first 216 days of 2014 there had been 334 Chinese transgressions and a major one at the very time of the visit.59 Some reference was made to the need to demarcate the border or the Line of Actual Control (which basically would freeze the respective claims), but no action has yet been forthcoming. On Arunachal foreign minister Sushma Swaray got press coverage by her statement that as Beijing expected a One China policy from India on Tibet, she expected acceptance of an One India policy from China! This time the Chinese Embassy did not create negative publicity before the visit, but caused surprise by the sudden replacement of ambassador Wei Wei (who had come from Singapore only in January 2013 and had just sung an eulogy of praise on the 60th anniversary of the Five Principles) by Le Yucheng one day before the arrival of Xi Jinping. Yet, less than a week after the visit ambassador Le included the border dispute in the core interests of China, together with Taiwan, Tibet and Sinkiang. Like its 1989 edition Sinomaps of 2014 drew the border of the prc along the foothills of Assam and included Aksai Chin in Xinjang and Tibet. The personal chemistry between the two new leaders of India and China appeared to be good. Both have more powerful positions than their recent predecessors. In India Prime Minister Narendra Modi commands a clear parliamentary majority and no longer depends on coalition politics. The electoral loss of the Congress Party seems to have cut it loose from its dynastic obsession with the Nehru family after the lacklustre performance of Rahul Gandhi, the son of Rajiv. Xi Jinping is the most powerful leader since Mao and combines the triumvirate positions of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, President, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission plus heading ‘Small Leading Groups’ on national security and economic reforms. Both leaders aim at a wider role in Asia. The year 2014 had its highlights, but also its bizarre moments – the removal of the Chinese ambassador just before the arrival of President Xi Jinping in India, and military clashes in Ladakh at the same time. Nevertheless, it became the ‘year of friendly exchanges’ with visits of senior military officers, subscription in courses at army training insti- tutes, naval visits and, most important in preventing clashes, meetings of border personnel. The return visit of Narendra Modi to China in May 2015 produced deals worth $22bn, including a $2.5 bn credit line for an Indian telecoms group, and a

59 A comic minor mishap occurred when an Indian tv reporter lost his job when talking about President Eleven, mistaking Xi for roman numerals.

Sino – Indian Relations After The War Of 1962 263 climate accord reminiscent of the us-China text of the previous year. On the border basically nothing more than a repeat from the previous year to begin military exchanges and a hot-line linking local commanders, which could not dispel the realisation on both sides that their relationship remained contentious.

In October 2009 the Asia News Agency published an analytical backgrounder of “India – China, accords and discords” as a Special Study. It traces the history of bilateral relations, but often in an overly optimistic manner and not always entirely correct manner. It believed that the 21st century will be dominated by China and India, who all along had maintained close contacts. The latter point at least is open to question, for it primarily was Buddhism which made an impact on China. The study wrote that the prc soon after coming to power “announced its intention to reclaim Tibet from the British” (p.6), and that in 1954 India presented a frontier map which was accepted by China.(p.7) Similarly, it stated that during the Forward Policy initiated in 1959 there were 60 Indian military posts on the border, including 43 north of the McMahon Line. (p.8) In describing the Indian position in 2009, it held that in the Western sector the Chinese were occupying 43,180 sq. km, including 5180 sq. km of Kashmir ceded by Islamabad in its boundary agreement with China of 1963.

chapter 12 The Wider Context

On the ground the border dispute still is much like it was after the Sino-Indian war of 1962 put an end to Nehru’s dream of friendly relations between the two rising Asian powers. Since then China has firmed up her claim to the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh and on the Ladakh side incursions are frequent due to different interpretations of the Line of Actual Control. Both sides have pushed their forces into close proximity with each other, but the last Indian soldier to die was in 1989 after losing his way in fog. Otherwise much has changed. Fifty years ago China under Mao hardly was a player in world affairs and was an enigma to most. India tried to play an independent and mediating role. Economically neither country was in good shape. Today, both have surprised the economists by realising rapid growth from a low-income base, but their political role is not yet at corresponding level. India was lagging behind and only recently matched Chinese growth rates. Beijing is flush with cash and starts to forge a more balanced approach to international affairs, while at the same time trying to diminish the role of exports and investment and to increase domestic consumption. Hardly a day passes without the leading newspapers of the world paying attention to China. Globalisation has become a reality and with it the renewed importance of economic links and cooperation. Today that largely means with Asia. In 1962 we knew little about the internal debate in China. If there was one, it would not be carried out in public. Under Deng Xiaoping China opened up and a new security concept was formulated advocating mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation among nations, but also ‘keeping a low pro- file’ in foreign policy while unswervingly pursuing the reforms at home. Most remaining territorial issues were resolved, with China not being difficult in the negotiations. With Tajikistan it obtained only 1000 of the contested 28.000 sq. km in the Pamirs. In 2015 the academic debate is lively and ranges from Shi – the overall con- figuration of power and how it changes – to identity and strategy,1 but it still is hard to determine its concrete impact on policy and public opinion. Both the nationalist school and the ‘peaceful risers’ seemed to agree on the transitional character of the current phase, being simultaneously unipolar and multipolar

1 Zhu Liqun, “China’s Foreign Policy Debates”. Chaillot Papers, eu – iss, Sept. 2010.

The Wider Context 265 but ultimately leading to full multipolarity. Part of the debate was whether China should first be powerful or rich, or vice versa. Liu Mingfu of the National Defence University argued for the status of champion nation, ushering in the China era. Others were thinking in terms of a neo-internationalism, with cooperation benefiting China and others as well. Having reached the status of a major economic power, Deng’s policy guidance is being challenged. In particular, the preferred form of regionalism has become an issue. Should it be open regionalism stretching over the entire Asia- Pacific area where consensus would be difficult; or selective, raising adverse feelings among those being left out; or better still, nurturing the identity of an East Asian community? Conversely, extreme nationalism exists, as demonstrated by the book Unhappy China of 2009, which voices a confrontational attitude towards international society and opposes the notion of the country becoming a ‘stakeholder’ in development. Under Nehru India started out as a socialist economy with central planning and only since 1991 allowed significant liberalisation, though not in all fields. In China under Deng Chao-ping the communist system mellowed considerably. The spectacular economic rise of both countries is only twenty years old. China benefited greatly from foreign investment, partly through Hongkong and with Taiwanese money. India raised more money domestically. India is a democracy, which successfully practised alternation of political parties in government, but its economy is still hamstrung by too many rules and poor infrastructure. China is an autocracy with competent collegiate leadership, which makes and breaks the rules, but allows for rapid business decisions under the series of Five Year Plans. Its leaders have been tested as governors in provinces larger than most European countries, but once in Beijing find it increasingly difficult to impose their decisions on the provinces. China has become more decentralised than many people assume. Most Indian leaders are weaker as they have risen through the ranks of party politics and nepotism, surviving through their ability to compromise. Yet, Indian companies are more dynamic and more accustomed to international trade and financial services and less dependent on foreign investment. While East Asia is massively reverting to Western dress, Indian men and women kept their own, gracious but not always practical. China will see an explosion of domestic demand and, if things go well, develop an internal market of unprecedented size. Yet, the question remains whether this will happen before rising wages affect China’s position as the world’s prime exporter of manufactured goods. For it will face a greying population due to its one-child policy and, despite a fantastic savings ratio of 40% or more, China will be old before it gets rich. At the same time India will

266 chapter 12 have a huge contingent of young workers, part of whom will still be held back by the caste system and an educational practice geared too much to the ter- tiary phase. India is used to domestic unrest but managed to contain it. The Chinese leadership is highly sensitive about the effects of ‘splittist elements’ undermining their established positions – from Dalai Lama to Falung Gong to Uighur dissent – and embarked on harsh policies which made it unable to deal with grass-root discontent. So far, however, many more Chinese have been lifted out of poverty than Indians, which may account for the acceptance of their political system. Yet, aggregate figures of gdp say little of average personal income and the long way to go before catching up with the more egalitar- ian Western economies. Occasionally, India appeared unduly difficult in international fora, apparently out of a desire to feel respected, but Asian affairs were increasingly dominated by the triangular relations between China, the us and Russia. Internationally, respect for India is still forthcoming but, paradoxically, its close neighbours are uncomfortable with the lack of subtlety of the elephant at their doorstep. Neither India, nor China have many friends in their neigh- bourhood. India did poorly in intervening in Sri Lanka in 1987–90, first by dropping supplies to the beleaguered Tamils, then by an Indian Peacekeeping Force and finally an outright operation with heavy losses in a vain attempt to impose peace on the Tamil Liberation Tigers. Her army was withdrawn in humiliation in early 1990.2 Only recently did India give up her colonial hangover3 and is paying more attention to the asean countries – which have included Myanmar – by finally implementing the ‘Look East’ policy unveiled by Prime Minister Rao in 1995. There was talk of a Bay of Bengal Community (bob-com) consisting of the saarc countries minus Pakistan, but with Myanmar and Thailand, following the 1997 proposal for an economic bimstec with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand. As neither fired the imagination, India fell back on a Mekong-Ganga cooperation scheme including Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia emphasizing tourism, culture and education. In 2015 Mr Modi will visit Mauritius, to mark the first sale of an home-built warship, and go to the Seychelles and Colombo. India again played hardball in July 2014 by withdrawing from the ‘trade facilitation agreement’ concluded in Bali the previous December, being unhappy by the agricultural chapter but thus raising an existential question for

2 S.P. Cohen, “An Expedition to Sri L:anka”, Emerging Power India, pp. 148–150. 3 Shishir Gupta, op. cit., p. 39.

The Wider Context 267 the continuation of the wto. India already has a very low exports-to-gdp ratio (19th from the bottom out of 95 countries tracked by the World Bank) and will have a tough job shaking off its protectionist reputation, as shown by the great rise of food subsidies.4 In 1964 neither India nor Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons. Today, both are expanding the doctrine and scope of their nuclear arsenals. China’s commitment to its nuclear ‘no first use’ doctrine seems to be wavering and a con- ventionally weaker Russia turns towards a kind of ‘flexible response’ strategy. The bjp, which currently dominates the government, showed great interest in following up the 1974 test by actually developing nuclear weapons. Amartya Sen made the interesting point that the Indian government underestimated its own importance as a major country, a democratic policy, a rich multi-religious civilisation, with a well-established tradition in science and technology, and overestimated the persuasive power of the bomb. Personally, Sen felt that the belief nukes are useful, but should never be used, lacked cogency. He also questioned the chances of India obtaining permanent membership of the Security Council: “if countries could blast their way into the Security Council, this would give an incentive to other countries to do the same”.5 In June 2014, after a delay of 6 years, India made a move by ratifying an ‘additional protocol’ with the International Atomic Energy Agency giving its inspectors access to India’s civil nuclear sites (though not its military ones as India has not signed the Non- Proliferation Treaty). Relations with Washington have steadily improved and President Obama’s presence at Republic Day 2015 was a pinnacle. He called India a ‘natural partner’ and agreed cooperation in defence equipment (where foreign investment in India has been raised to 49%), civil nuclear power and the sensitive issue of climate change. Yet, India is unlikely to align fully with Washington. She will want to maintain a certain freedom of action, also with regard to Russia which still sells it arms. The pitiful situation in Pakistan, its terrorist activities in India and unhelpful attitude in Afghanistan will continue to fill the daily papers in India and provide some arguments in favour of its harsh regime in Kashmir. During the Fifties China sought support and arms from Moscow. Chinese intervention in Korea expanded the Cold War to East Asia and brought a lasting American military presence there. In the Sixties Soviet pressure on China

4 The Economist, Aug. 9, 2014, ‘Bailing out from Bali’. The subsidies are 1% of gdp. 5 Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian, p. 266. See also css Zürich Policy Perspectives, 2015, The Nuclear Weapons Comeback.

268 chapter 12 and their influence in Vietnam enhanced Beijing’s interest in an agreement with the us, ably negotiated by Henry Kissinger. The Americans left Vietnam, but Chinese relations with Hanoi remained difficult and even led to an unsuccessful Chinese military intervention. Relations improved after the demise of the Soviet Union. Conversely, Chinese concerns about us prominence – if not ‘hegemony’ – again resurfaced. American arms deliveries to Taiwan always remained a sore point, but the recent ‘Asian pivot’ of the Obama administration rekindled the feelings of distrust in Beijing. During one of their meetings State Councillor Dai Bingguo (who ranks higher than the foreign minister) asked Hillary Clinton “Why don’t you pivot out of here?” The answer came at an asean conference in Hanoi in 2010 where Hillary took the opportunity to state that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea was a “national interest” of the us, thus countering the Chinese assertion that its expansive territorial claims to the area constituted a “core interest”.6 For a while the two countries were in a peculiar bind: China financed much of the us deficit by buying its treasure bills with the dollars earned by huge exports to America. Severe losses seemed to follow a dollar devaluation, but in 2015 that risk is over. In spite of its debtor status, Washington did not shrink from critical statements concerning Chinese civil rights policies in general and in Tibet in particular. China remained constrained in her pronouncements (except on audiences granted to the Dalai Lama) and conveyed the message that there was enough place in the world for both of them. Unlike other parts of the world, the countries of Asia are increasing their military budgets and take no arms control initiatives.7 India and Saudi Arabia were the biggest spenders in 2014. China is increasing its defence budget by 10% a year and on 2 September 2015 held an impressive military parade, the first in six years and showing the new ‘carrier killer’ manoeuvrable interconti- nental ballistic missiles. President Xi announced a modernisation of the armed forces, cutting 300.000 from a total of 2.5 million, but added a peaceful note by promising that “China will never seek hegemony or expansion, it will never inflict its past suffering on other nations”.8 A recent rand publication warns against repeating the blunders of the past in terms of underestimating the us will to fight in keeping their commitments

6 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices. Simon & Schuster, London,2014, p. 79. Foreign Minister Yang Yechi was livid and warned against foreign interference. 7 Michael Pillsbury,’ The Sixteen fears: China’s Strategic Psychology’, Survival, Oct.–Nov. 2012, 149–182. The defence budget increases 10% annually to $145 bn. 8 Financial Times,4 September 2015, “The parade is a way for Mr Xi to show his authority and command over the nation”.

The Wider Context 269 to allies, and the Chinese view that a war would be short. In turn, it contests the Chinese thesis that the us hold them back in their development, ‘needs an enemy’ and will find another if one disappears. To the contrary, the book defines us interests as regional stability, compliance with international law, freedom of the seas and peaceful settlement of disputes.9

A Shift to the Sea

The maritime dimension has become a different story, for the Indian Ocean and the Pacific generally, but also for the relations between China and India. Both want to build “blue-water” navies and a clash would impact widely. Ultimately this may lead to a new balance of power, but for Asian security the main emphasis is likely to be on the role of the us and Chinese efforts to diminish it. An increase in Chinese power will tend to make the other Asian countries look more favourably at an American presence. So far the military element of the us ‘pivot’ to Asia mainly has been the establishment of a rotating presence of 2500 American troops near Darwin, Australia. Washington was more occupied with events in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Before the disputes around the reefs and rocks of the South and East China Seas escalated, most of the debate concerned China’s efforts to establish a ‘string of pearls’ of friendly harbours on the way to Africa in order to obtain safety of supply for needed raw materials. Experts were divided on the extent of pla Navy modernisation,10 until recent news related to the building of a second aircraft carrier. Did Beijing aim at building a line of naval bases from Cambodia to Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan and would this really ensure deliveries of oil, food and raw materials to China in a hostile environment? Chokepoints like the straits of Hormuz and Malacca would be more crucial, and shipping around the land mass of a hostile India would hardly be a safe journey. Moreover, as John Garver has pointed out, in a conflict with China India might be tempted to escalate from the land dimension, where it has suffered reverses, to the maritime environment where its nearby aviation and

9 David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk, Bonny Lin, Binders, Blunders and Wars. What America and China Can Learn. rand, 2014. 10 Bernard D. Cole, Asian Maritime Strategies: Navigating Troubled Waters. Annapolis, md, Naval Institute Press, 2013. Cole called modernization of the PLAN ‘relatively moderate’ and remaining a ‘capable coast-guard organization’, p. 208.

270 chapter 12 missiles could restrict China’s vital trade route through the Indian Ocean.11 In 2009 India unveiled the project of its first nuclear powered submarine, ins Arihant, and several more are under construction.12 China’s assertiveness in pushing territorial claims far into the South China Sea, even as far as Brunei, seemed contradictory to simultaneous charm offences towards its neighbours and antagonises them. The disputed areas possess valuable fishing grounds, but claims of oil and gas reserves still are largely unproven. In the words of The Economist “China itself does not see them as straightfor- ward territorial expansion. Chinese leaders believe their own rhetoric about the islands having always been part of their territory – a territory that, since the death of Mao, they have chosen to define as almost the empire’s maximum extent under the Qing dynasty, rather than its more modest earlier size”.13 In the Philippines a lecture by Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio led to a cartographic exhibit “Historical truths and lies. Scarborough shoal in ancient maps”.14 Its upshot was that since the start of the Song Dynasty in 960 ad until the end of the Ling Dynasty in 1912 the southern- most territory of China had always been Hainan Island. Moreover, as late as 1982 a Note Verbale of the Chinese Government to France had reiterated this publicly. A third argument was the fact that nobody had protested against the use of Scarborough Shoal as a bombing range for us and Philippine aircraft despite worldwide Notifications to Mariners distributed through the Inter national Maritime Organisation. Taking his case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Alberto del Rosario in his opening statement made clear that he was not asking the Court to rule on the aspect of territorial sovereignty but to clarify the maritime entitlement of his country in the South China Sea, and the rights and obligations of the State Parties within these respective zones, relating to the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. In essence he presented five principal claims:

11 Garver, John W., Protracted Context: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, 2001, p. 277. 12 Yogesh Joshi and Frank O’Donnell, “India’s Submarine Deterrent and Asian Nuclear Proliferation”, Survival, 56,4 Aug. Sept.,2014, pp. 157–173 . Some doubted whether India had managed to fit a nuclear weapon into submarine torpedoes. 13 The Economist, 23 August 2014. Essay ‘What China wants’, p. 41. 14 The Institute for Maritime and Ocean Affairs published the exhibit catalogue with copies of 60 maps.

The Wider Context 271

First, that China is not entitled to exercise what it refers to as ‘historic rights’ over the waters, seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of its entitlements under the Convention; Second, that the so-called nine-dash line has no basis whatsoever under international law insofar as it purports to define the limits of China’s claim to ‘historic rights’; Third, that the various maritime features relied upon by China as a basis upon which to assert its claims in the South China Sea are not islands that generate entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. Rather, some are ‘rocks’ within the meaning of Article 121, paragraph 3; others are low-tide elevations; and still others are permanently submerged. As a result, none are capable of generating entitlements beyond 12M, and some generate no entitlements at all. China’s recent massive reclamation activities cannot lawfully change the original nature and character of these features; Fourth, that China has breached the Convention by interfering with the Philippines’ exercise of its sovereign rights and jurisdiction; and Fifth, that China has irreversibly damaged the regional maritime environment, in breach of unclos, by its destruction of coral reefs in the South China Sea, including areas within the Philippines’ eez, by its destruc- tive and hazardous fishing practices, and by its harvesting of endangered species.15

China did not attend an introductory session of the Court, but sent a written communication that it regarded the dispute a political problem beyond the competence of the Court. Before the end of 2015 a decision of the Court is expected on its own discretion. It will greatly affect the scope left for arbitration and the rule of law if the larger countries in the world are free to escape litigation by turning every conflict into a political issue and only accepting bilateral negotiation. Earlier a group of Taiwanese scholars delved into the past of the island groups in the South China Sea, A Bridge over Troubled Waters: Prospects for Peace in the South and East China Seas. Several invasions took place: the Japanese occupation of the Pratas Islands in 1907–09, the Japanese and French invasion of the Paracel Islands in 1921–27, and a French occupation of the Spratly Islands in 1933–39. In 1934 a “Land and Water Maps Inspection Committee” listed the “Table of 38 islands, reefs and rocks”, and clearly divided

15 Press release of 7 July 2015 by Philippine Embassy in The Hague.

272 chapter 12 them into four groups. The government of the Republic of China subsequently drew the co-called “U-shaped Eleven Dash Line” in 1947 as a basis for protecting its fishing rights over the islands. Tsung-han Tai and Chi-ting Tsai explain the rough 9 dash-line as a preliminary boundary line, but the meaning of the ‘dash’ itself implied the unsettled nature of the maritime boundary which left the possibility of negotiations between the surrounding states. The southern- most tip of the line was the James Shoal. In the meantime the number of shoals, reefs and rocks has grown to some 180 and may of them might claim an economic zone and or territorial waters. In 2002 China and asean had agreed to exercise “self-restraint” and adopt a formal code for their activities, but little progress was made. In October 2004 Beijing announced construction of an airstrip on Woody Island in the Paracels and was dredging sand to raise the Johnson South Reef in the Spratlys, claimed by Vietnam. In 2011 Chinese patrol boats harassed Vietnamese and Philippine oil-exploration vessels near the Spratlys. In 2012 a clash came close when a Philippine naval vessel tried to chase away Chinese fishing boats from the Scarborough Shoal in the Spratlys. The us mediated, but only the Philippines ships withdrew as agreed. Manila then lodged a complaint with the International Court of Justice. In 2014 a Chinese state-owned company sent an offshore oil rig into waters claimed by Vietnam, leading to violent anti-Chinese protests with damage to Chinese property, and finally the withdrawal of the rig. In April 2015 at Kuala Lumpur the annual meeting of asean reacted unusually strongly to the news that China was creating facts on the ground by large land reclamation on more than a dozen disputed reefs. They declared that these measures had “eroded trust and confidence” in the South China Sea area and “threatened to undermine peace, security and stability”. Before the meeting President Aquino had repeatedly compared the island issue with German annexation of Sudetenland before World War ii, and now appealed to his colleagues “to stand up to China” but that sort of language was a bridge too far. Further news came in May 2015 with the release of satellite imagery of a runway under construction at Fiery Cross Reef. Pictures taken on board of a P-8 Poseidon intelligence plane by a cnn tv crew left little doubt about Chinese determination to hold on to the islands. At the Shangri La dialogue in Singapore us Defence Secretary Ashton Carter claimed that China had created 2000 acres of new land in 2014 and stated that “turning an underwater rock into an airfield simply does not afford the rights of sovereignty or permit restrictions on international air or maritime transit”.16

16 Financial Times, 1 June 2015. A participant called this a ‘passively assertive approach’ being provocative but putting the burden of escalation on other countries. China defended it as

The Wider Context 273

President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan repeated his ‘East China Sea Peace Initiative’ of August 5. 2012, urging self-restraint and dialogue among the parties. Natural resources could be developed jointly under the concept’sovereignty over national territory cannot be compromised, but natural resources can be shared’. This concept was applied to the Japan-Taiwan fishery agreement of April 10, 2013. China took time to develop a maritime strategy. Its fleet was becoming the largest in Asia with amphibious capabilities and long-range ballistic missiles, capable of at least limited Anti-Access and Area Denial operations. Commentators periodically called for a ‘strategic management of the sea’ knitting together all departments and services at the highest level and on the basis of well-defined goals. While economic development was consistently seen as the core objective, maritime security and ‘rights protection’ have always been key concerns.17 Yet, the concept was not official policy until July 30, 2013 when President Xi Jinping at the cpp Central Committee made a speech under the heading: We need to do more to take interest in the sea, understand the sea and strategically manage the sea, and continually do more to promote China’s efforts to become a maritime power.18 This was followed up on 26 May 2015 by what amounted to a maritime strategy, although still rather general: ensuring important sea-lines of communication, safeguarding national sovereignty, maritime rights and interests, and stability. It announced that the Chinese Navy and Airforce would no longer be restrained to defending the territorial borders, but would follow a combined defensive-offensive approach based on protection of the open sea. This had become necessary in order to react to ‘provocative actions’ of neighbouring countries and increasing reconnaissance flights and maritime patrols by some countries (read: the us). In the recent Sino-Japanese shadowboxing over the disputed Diaoyu/ Senkaku islands China has declared an Air Defence Identification Zone (adiz), which could easily escalate the conflict and impact on alliance commitments to Japan. That has not yet happened in the South China Sea, but uncertainty remains. Chinese arguments of ‘indisputable sovereignty’ are reminiscent of

providing search and rescue and meteorological services. Possession of an island entitles territorial waters of 12 miles and an economic zone of 200 miles, an uninhabited rock or reef only the territorial waters, and a submersible one nothing. 17 China Brief, vol. 15 issue 1, Jan. 9 2015, Ryan Martinson. Jamestown Foundation. 18 People’s Daily, August 1, 2013. Martinson sees an emphasis on coordinated peacetime pursuit of maritime dominance, the capacity to deter foreign infringement and to respond forcibly.

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Nehru’s refusal to negotiate over Aksai Chin in the 1950’s. Then Chinese claims also were vague and only gradually firmed up.

The Rise of China

During their stay in office most Chinese leaders have come up with a new security concept. Mao and Chou with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; Deng’s ‘One country, Two Systems’, following a ‘multidimensional policy’ with a growing military element, but shelving territorial disputes to allow cooperation in other fields; Jiang emphasizing economic interdependence and the role of international organisations; Hu stressing peaceful development and active participation in global public goods. Today, however, there are as many strategic visions as there are scholars, but ever since 1949 five objectives had been clear: control of strategic frontiers, reinforce the position of the Communist Party, respect for sovereignty, and recovery of lost territories. China became more peaceful, cooperative and constructive, but remained a revisionist power, aiming at a change in world order, albeit in a status-quo guise.19 Internally China, not unlike president Putin, has fulminated against an old bogeyman: the evil west, intent on subjugating China. In 2013 an internal government memorandum was circulated listing seven Western values and institutions that China must battle at all costs, including constitutional democracy, media independence, civil society and market liberalism. The ‘universal values’ of human rights were deemed unfit for Chinese consumption and instead President Xi elevated the Communist Party above any other institution, including the courts and constitution.20 The ideological campaign against liberal political influence intensified, which Beijing saw as a zero sum game, with the us as major opponent. In this ‘soft war’ the developing countries would be the main battleground. ‘Under new circumstances’ increasingly became the caption of Chinese statements and the April 2013 Defence White Paper described how new challenges and missions would lead to diversified force deployment. Chinese participation in un peace support operations dates only from the early 90’s but grew rapidly since 2003, most recently in Mali and South Sudan, becoming the largest contributor among the Permanent Five. India and Pakistan have traditionally been high on the list, partly because un pay

19 Jonathan Holslag, “The Smart Revisionist”, Survival, 56 (2014) 5, pp. 95–116. 20 Time, 17 November 2014. “The Power of One. Xi Inping-China’s strongest leader in years – aims to propel his nation to the top of the world order.”

The Wider Context 275 exceeded the national salaries of their soldiers. Since the Libya crisis China puts several conditions on its participation: a mandate from the un Security Council and agreement of the reigning government. For the West that would mean going back to pre-Bosnia days and be far removed from ‘robust’ peacekeeping. Traditionally China was in favour of impartial operations and accepted the use of force only in self-defence. Beijing rarely used its veto in the unsc, only when the draft was indirectly related to Taiwan or Tibet and repeatedly abstained. Much criticism was directed at the concept of Respon sibility to Protect, especially when in Libya it was linked to a ‘no fly zone’ which in turn implied the suppression of Qaddafi’s air defences. Yet, some voices in Beijing now advocate a concept of creative involvement and a larger role in world affairs.21 In Central Asia none of the countries in the region has done much to enhance stability in Afghanistan. At first Russia was in favour of a continued American presence there and so was India. Pakistan fears Indian influence and China is interested in the raw materials of the country. Iran had little sympathy for the Taliban before 9/11 but then was hit by international sanctions on account of its nuclear proliferation policies. Thus Afghanistan became a most unattractive burden for the us and nato to carry and was terminated as a fighting operation. In the meantime the emergence of the Islamic State movement with its cruel methods aiming at establishing a new Caliphate are upsetting the Middle East and led to new military involvement of the West in Iraq and Syria, mainly to protect the Kurds. All members of the un are struggling with the questions what legal mandate is needed to legitimise intervention, and with what strategic objectives. China has become an important trading partner of many countries and often has significant communities abroad. In the Libyan crisis China had to evacuate 35.000 workers. In the context of her ‘Mundial Dream’ she will spend up to $60 billion on linking Asian infrastructure under the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative. Such interests will impact on its action in regional crises, but a substantial differentiation of traditional principles, like sovereignty and the conditions for peacekeeping, is not expected. Over the years, India has profited immensely from the world order championed by the United States and continues doing so. The same could be said of China, although Beijing does not admit it. Before the word brics was created in 2001 by an American banker to indicate the rising economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China and recently including South Africa, India belonged to the ibsa group with Brazil and South Africa, which in Pretoria in October 2011

21 Beijing Review, 10 March 2012. “New Direction for China’s Diplomacy”.

276 chapter 12 stated their objective as ‘three large pluralistic, multicultural and multi-racial societies with a shared vision that democracy and development are mutually reinforcing and key to sustainable peace and stability.’ In March 2012 the fourth brics summit produced a large ‘Delhi Declara tion’22 insisting on better representation in the primarily economic and financial institutions of global governance. In the same way they saw the primary role of the G20 to facilitate enhanced macro-economic policy coordination in order to enable global economic recovery and secure financial stability. Political action remained limited to some cooperative measures against terrorism. In Delhi energy cooperation was among their common aims, but the contents remained vague. During the Ukraine crisis president Putin concluded a long-term gas deal with China, but had to lower his asking price. Moreover, China was decreasing its dependence on Russian exports of arms and energy. Its large oil suppliers now are Saudi Arabia, Angola, Iran, and Oman. India and Russia renewed their ties during the visit of president Putin to New Delhi on 11 December 2014 when Modi promised the construction of at least 10 more Russian nuclear power reactors over the next two decades. Despite complaints of cost overruns on existing plants and defective parts in arms sales, Modi declared that ‘Russia would remain our most important defence partner’. India had been careful not to criticise Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and its involvement in Ukraine.23 Yet, bilateral trade did not exceed $10 billion. At first China seemed to prefer to deal bilaterally with its neighbours and to reject a truly multilateral approach allowing much of a role for the smaller countries. In that respect its aspiration to become a superpower was not yet commensurate with the responsibilities it was prepared to assume. The Shanghai Cooperation Council (which Friedberg called ‘China’s own club for authoritarians in Central Asia’,24 but where India became an observer) was an anti-us move during the Bush administration and seems to have less rationale in the Obama period. China is observer in the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation and in 2005 was founding member with the us of the East Asia Summits. Until the island disputes spoiled the atmosphere, Beijing seemed to prefer the framework of asean-plus-Three, with Japan and South Korea but excluding the us and India.

22 Press Release of March 29, 2012. A “Delhi Action Plan” of 17 points including energy cooperation and a Youth Policy Dialogue. 23 Financial Times, 12 December 2014. 24 Aaron l. Friedberg, op. cit. p. 146. He suggested an Asian democratic community.

The Wider Context 277

In July 2014, frustrated by the meagre representation of the bric’s in international organisations (only 11% of the votes in the International Monetary Fund) and the delay in the us Congress in remedying this, China took its own initiative in the field of banking. She led the establishment of the New Development Bank with its brics partners and a Silk Road development fund to boost ‘connectivity’ with her Central Asian neighbours. The president would be an Indian and Johannesburg would become a regional centre. However, while lending is scheduled to start in 2016, only India and Russia have ratified its founding agreement and no consensus has yet been reached on the currency in which the capital will be held. The brics were losing cohesion when they experienced economic problems of their own. Brazil is in recession and so is Russia. China is unable to maintain its spectacularly high growth rates. India suffered high inflation but, in April 2015, for the first time in many years, was outpacing China’s growth figures, largely due to lower energy cost. The imf expected India to grow by 7.5% in 2015 and 2016 (which was greeted with scepticism by many analysts25) and China by 6.8% in 2015 and 6.3% in 2016. Yet, India will need a long time to catch up. Her labour productivity is low and infrastructure outdated. Unrest was created by a much higher than expected tax demand of $6 billion from foreign funds.26 In addition, the Modi government is increasingly criticised for its negative attitude towards humanitarian non-governmental organisations. In February 2012 the eu High Representative took the view that the eu must treat the brics as individual countries through their respective bilateral strategic partnerships. Comparing the elephant and the dragon there are similarities and differences in their recent past. The economic growth of China, and to a lesser extent of India, has been unprecedented, but personal income remains low: $4234 in 2010 for China and $1273 for India. The Gross Domestic Product of China and India are $5.73 trillion and $1.55 trillion respectively, and readjusted for Purchasing Price Parity $10 trillion and $4 trillion. India will overtake China in population, but her economic growth predictions seem far too optimistic. So are China’s, which have come down to 7%, but might get considerably lower. India had a period of high inflation, which is abating, but productivity still is low. Literacy is high in China with 94%, but low in India (63%). Military

25 Financial Times, “New Delhi data”, 30 June 2015. 26 The ‘minimum alternative tax’, a form of corporate taxation that had not been applied to international funds before. Finance minister Arun Jaitley defended his policy of ending ‘tax terrorism’ in the Financial Times of 27 April 2015.

278 chapter 12 expenditure in 2015 grows with 10% and 7.9% and in 2014 amounted to 4.3% and 2.5% of gdp respectively. No wonder this imbalance causes concern about future geopolitical relationships. China also founded the Shanghai-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to rival the Asian Development Bank of Manila (always directed by a Japanese official). Britain caused a minor uproar by announcing that it would become a founder-member of the new bank and was quickly joined by other European countries. These initiatives may harm imf and World Bank, which so far have functioned fairly well, but the financial world seemed to reason that additional credit would be welcome at a time of declining growth. Moreover, having 57 participants might enhance the’highest global standards’ for government lending. That at least was one of the objectives of the us Treasury, but the stalemate in Washington made it lose this banking battle.27 To use development banks as a policy instrument could be a bold reform aimed at giving the market a decisive role in resource allocation. Both China and India certainly need higher standards in view of the heavy state influence on their banks and the high level of bad debts. The World Bank took a wider view and stated that it no longer considered the Chinese currency as undervalued, thus removing a widespread argument about unfair competition and opening the way for inclusion of the renminbi in the basket of currencies forming the Special Drawing Rights at the next September annual meeting. The crisis of the summer of 2015 with its 40% fall of the Shanghai stock exchange came very soon after a set of important Chinese initiatives had given the impression that Beijing was on the way towards setting the rules in the world. The effects of the crash are still being felt around the world and especially among the emerging economies, but perhaps a bit less in India, which depends less on trade with China. In itself the fall might not be dramatic, as relatively few Chinese own shares, but the buying of stocks by the government and the devaluation of the currency have made a haphazard impression and did not confirm its management reputation. Rumours that the State Council, the ruling body of the C.P.C. had decided on a long-awaited reform of state- owned enterprises (SOE) did not materialise, while some of them were said to be unable to cover even the cost of capital in their returns. The plan revealed on 13 September 2015 called both for ‘mixed ownership’ and the need to ‘prevent the loss of state assets’ while maintaining the leadership of the party. The Economist weekly interpreted this as a move towards consolidation of the larger SOE’s, continuation of their micromanagement by the State Assets

27 Former president of the World Bank Robert Zoellick: “Shunning Beiijing’s bank was a ter- rible mistake”. Losing fights does not build confidence. Financial Times, June 8, 2015.

The Wider Context 279

Supervision and Administration Commission, while creating a chunk of minority SOE’s to be sold to other state firms rather than to private investors.28 The needed transition from investment to consumption does not pass smoothly as both local governments and banks face heavy debts and overcapacity in the building sector.

China’s Coming-out Party

In the summer of 2014, just before his visit to India, president Xi Jinping began developing a conceptual approach with both political, economic and develop- mental aspects. He demanded ‘a new architecture’ of Asia-Pacific security cooperation that would be open, transparent and equality based, and found it unacceptable to have security just for one country or some countries while leaving the rest insecure.29 In Delhi Ambassador Wei Wei urged “we should push the world towards the direction of multi-polarisation”. But what would that mean? And how would the poles interact with each other? In his latest book World Order Henry Kissinger wrote that in a legitimate order the basic arrangements are accepted by all the major powers and the quest for security is not pressed to its limits. It would be legitimate not because each power is perfectly satisfied, but because no one would be so dissatisfied that it would seek its remedy in overthrowing the existing system. One of his themes has always been that the stability of the international system depends on the degree to which it combines the need for security with the obligation of self-restraint. The lavish meeting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (apec) group of November 2014 in Beijing did something to quell the feeling of unease about mounting conflict. President Xi and prime minister Abe made news by shaking hands, albeit with averted faces, and agreeing to set up a crisis-management mechanism for the crowded seas and skies around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The biggest surprise was the agreement between the us and China on the emission of greenhouse gases; the us to reduce them by 26–28% by 2025 and China to peak around 2030. It will give a boost to the 2015 climate conference in Paris and put pressure on India. President Xi Jinping urged the 21 members to move towards a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (fteap) and to realize an ‘Asian Pacific Dream’ by forg- ing a partnership of mutual trust, inclusiveness and win-win cooperation,

28 The Economist, “A whimper, not a bang”, September 19–25, 2015 29 Quoted in Dawn, August 2, 2014.

280 chapter 12 jointly building an open economy. apec includes the us, but not India (which rejected an invitation to come to Beijing as an observer). and covers a larger area than the American initiative for the 12 nations Trans Pacific Partnership (tpp) which does not include China and India. tpp, the economic side of the Asian Pivot of the us, was successfully concluded in October 2015 but still faces a battle in the us Senate. Washington hopes to show Beijing that a rules-based system would benefit China more than great-power pressure politics, but then tpp should become more inclusive. China, India and Japan are member of the asean led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which focuses more than the tpp on market access and smoothing the supply chain. The next few years will see much jockeying for position in giving shape to these partially overlapping three initiatives. For the us the tpp is a major initiative with implications for Asia and Europe, but also for the domestic political scene. Important questions will be to what extent membership of one excludes association with another, and above all, will they lead to clear and binding commitments? Will China become the centre of regional economic integration, a kind of regional hegemon, or the key actor in a range of conflicts? Some of its new slogans lack precision, like the ‘One belt, One Road’, which refers to both overseas trade and Eurasian integration. China’s ambitions certainly are widening, as shown by increased investment 1n American and European companies, but if everybody wants to be a ‘global player’, the rules of the game will require more than photo opportunities.

Political Change in India

Narendra Modi made a good start by alleviating the fears of the Muslim and Christian communities about his Hindu oriented bjp party. He invited his Pakistani colleague to his inauguration, but in 2014 broke off negotiations. Prolonged mortar fire broke out, killing some twenty civilians. Modi paid his first foreign visit to Bhutan and the next to Nepal, followed by a whirl- wind of Asian diplomacy. He was not anti-Chinese like many of his bjp colleagues, having travelled to China four times. He received President Xi Jinping in Gujarat on his birthday, 17 September, and promoted the twin- ning of major cities, Mumbai with Shanghai, and Ahmedabad with Guangzhou. But he obviously wanted to balance his interests. In Tokyo he concluded a ‘strategic partnership’ with prime minister Abe, who also was keen to diver- sify his relations after his bouts with China. It would include both military and economic cooperation. There was some cheque-book diplomacy with both China and Japan interested in modernising the backward Indian railway

The Wider Context 281 system. In Tokyo Modi held an anti-Chinese diatribe against ‘those expansionists who with 18th century like ideas commit infringements and enter seas of others’. The Modi magic was a potent weapon in the battle for reform. But infrastructure, bureaucracy and corruption remain jaunting problems, which have not been fully tackled yet. The Financial Times wrote that Modi had not made many sweeping reforms, but did make some reforms about sweeping! Indeed, his ‘Clean India Mission’ would greatly enhance the image of India by removing the blight of rubbish at public spaces and bringing the higher castes to take care of their own garbage.30 His foreign policy mantra was more energetic: geo-economics, regional hegemony and global aspirations: geostrategic consolidation in South Asia, attracting foreign direct investment and aspiring to be a global power. He followed this up with his ‘Make in India’ campaign to turn the country into a global manufacturing hub. Delhi voters were not impressed and overwhelmingly voted for the aap Common Man Party of Arvind Kejriwal in February 2015. The Congress party did not obtain a single seat and its Vice-president Rahul Gandhi took a leave of absence to reflect on the future of his battered party and missed the budget session of parliament. Modi is keen for India playing an international role, but remains rather vague as to its contents. He was successful in signing an accord redrawing the border with Bangladesh, thus giving credibility to his eastward looking policies. In a swap of 111 Indian enclaves deep within Bangladeshi territory with a total area of 17,160 acres for 51 Bangladeshi enclaves amounting to 7,110 acres, involving some 51,000 people but without large-scale relocation of the resi- dents, a messy leftover of the 1971 independence of Bangladesh was corrected. For Modi the deal, plus the demarcation of 61 km of border and a credit of $2 bn, was an important demonstration of changed attitudes, for his Bharatiya Janata party had opposed giving up sovereignty in 2011.31 In the opinion of The Economist32 Modi has made some steady, if not spectacular progress in office so far, but needs a clearer vision for economic reform, a broader range of talent within his government and a convincing message of moderation. India is more concerned about China than Beijing about Delhi.33 There is little love lost between the two countries, but the tone of their

30 Financial Times, 21 November 2014 and David Piling in 11 December issue. 31 In 2011 Arun Jaitley, now finance minister, opposed the transfer of sovereignty. In May 2015 Modi obtained the necessary constitutional amendment. 32 “Special Report India. Modi’s many tasks.” May 23, 2015. 33 But W.A. Avery, India as the next global power, sees this as China’s nightmare.

282 chapter 12 communications has become less vituperative. They don’t depend on each other and nobody is going to attack China. On the Indian side a lingering distrust remains after the 1962 war and the many border incursions since then, and on the Chinese side a feeling of superiority over India which was falling back in the development race. At Modi’s return visit to China in May 2015 the Indian press made much of the Chinese insult of organising border violations in Ladakh at the very moment of Xi Jinping’s visit the previous September. Problems of territory often are intractable, even when the area is fairly useless, and certainly when the parties refuse arbitration. In itself the border dispute is not that special and compromise should have been possible. Both sides did not really negotiate, but instead tried to turn their claims over thousands of miles into settled history by presenting them unilaterally.34 For India the Tawang area clearly is non-negotiable. Will it be possible to overcome this ‘territorial imperative’ by a new political and economic imperative and do the advantages of closer cooperation not outweigh the equally rising dimensions of competition?35 Gradually both countries tried to put the border dispute on a separate low burner of their agenda and to focus on growing trade relations, India supplying software and raw materials and China a larger volume of consumer products.36 Will the growing economic interdependence, even if not fully balanced, be strong enough to weaken tendencies to resolve issues by the use of force, or will nationalism be whipped up to divert attention from domestic problems? Obviously both India and China will depend on imports of energy and raw materials, but their continued reliance on substantial exports (even if somewhat diminished) will require conditions of international stability and credible behaviour. China is aware of the vulnerabilities of its supply routes as shown by its creation of a ‘string of pearls’ of bases along the sea-lanes to Africa and by the construction of oil and gas pipelines from Kunming through Myanmar. Beijing is not very happy with the way Myanmar deals with its increasing minority problems. President Xi took a surprising initiative by invit- ing Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the opposition to the military government supported by China. Following his visit to India he went to the Maldives and Sri Lanka and found willing customers for his ‘Maritime Silk Route’. The general attitude in South-East asia seems to be one of wanting to keep good relations to China, but with a continued us presence.

34 Srinath Raghavan, op. cit., p. 319. 35 Alka Acharya and G.P. Deshpande, “India-China Relations. The Territorial Imperative: Past and Present.” Economic and Political Weekly, 38(2003), 472. 36 The Economist, 20-10-2012, estimated the total volume of trade at $74 billion with a heavy Indian deficit. ‘India and China. Unsettled for a long time yet’.

The Wider Context 283

The Sino-Indian border remains a peculiar dispute with the two sides enhancing trade and engaging in incidents at the same time. Yet, today the border is not in the limelight. Potential crises loom further East, where China tries to reduce us influence but in doing so raises tension with its neighbours. All of them are fanned by growing nationalism, multinational frameworks are weak, and bilateral issues have an unpredictable impact at other tables. With new and strong leaders in Beijing and New Delhi, both confidently aiming at a new role as global players and less constrained by the other neighbours, the future seems wide open. They might be able to normalise their relations further and push through an accommodation on the border. A swap of claims might still work in a better political climate, particularly if Beijing finds other reasons for linking up with India. It would save large amounts of military outlays, but conversely a sphere of competition and nationalist sentiments might make a settlement more difficult. And the Tibet issue does not help. Comparing the two positions, the border dispute remains somewhat of an Achilles heel for India, where China could administer a prickly warning whenever it wants to give a potent message to the next most populous country in the world.

Appendix 1 A Further Note on Tibet

For ages Tibet, that mysterious country on the Roof of the World, living in self- imposed isolation, has captured the imagination. Yet its history is just as chequered, violent and sometimes cruel as of most other countries, the main difference being the Buddhist practice of succession by reincarnation. Finding a boy born at the time of the demise of his predecessor led first to manipula- tion of his discovery and subsequently to a long period of the government being led by a Regent who usually was not keen to relinquish his powers when the God-King reached maturity. No wonder factions developed, murders happened and the world of Buddhism was not as peaceful as it was supposed to be. The period 1804–94 hardly knew any effective reign by a Dalai lama, for all four died young, probably murdered some time before or shortly after their investiture. The mystical past of Tibet is assumed to start in 1857 bc with the birth of the founder of the Bon tradition, thirteen hundred years before the birth of Buddha Sakyamuni. The royal Yarlung dynasty took power in 127 bc, which converted to Buddhism under Songsten Gampo (617–650 ac). He concluded matrimonial alliances by marrying a Nepalese and a Chinese princess in addition to his three Tibetan wives, codified Tibetan spelling and grammar, and constructed the famous Yokhang temple in Lhasa. Under the reign of Trisong Detsen (755– 797) an alliance was concluded with the Uighurs, which managed to capture Xian then the capital of the Chinese Tang dynasty. Buddhism became the religion of the state1 and the Tibetan monastery of Samye was constructed by Padmasambhava, born in the Swat valley, now in Pakistan, and known as the Second Buddha for his Tibetan Book of the Dead and his knowledge of ayurvedic medicine. At Samye on the Brahmaputra a great religious debate was held between the Chinese, more radical school and the gradual Indian school, but little good came of it. The Indian scholar was murdered, the king died from a fall of his horse and his three sons were killed in fratricide. Gilles van Grasdorff, author of La nouvelle histoire du Tibet remarked that such debates usually ended in a bloodbath.2

1 Tibetan Buddhism belongs to the Mahayana (Grand Vehicle) tradition but is divided in four schools: Nyingma, Kagyu, Sakyu and Gelug. 2 Perrin, France, op. cit., 2006, p. 72.

286 Appendix 1

The successor of Trisong Detsen signed a peace treaty with China, but internally a persecution was launched against the Bönpos, the adherents to the old religion. In return, under his successor (838–846?) there was a period in which Buddhists were repressed ferociously. Murders in the royal family multiplied and the country fell apart in clans with their own kings, but China did not assert its authority. Much later, in the thirteenth century, Genghis Khan near the end of his life called a Tibetan delegation in order to end their clan warfare. After his death, another one caused by a fall of his horse, the Empress issued a decree of tolerance, but Mongol influence would be established only under Prince Godan and Kubilay Khan by the appointment of Sakya Pandita and later the latter’s nephew Chogyal Phagpa as viceroy in Tibet, reigning over the regions of U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo. For long the Mongols remained pagan and relied on soothsay- ers, but Khubilai’s generation was becoming Buddhist, largely under Tibetan tutelage. The notion of ‘religious king’ provided legitimacy to Khubilai’s rule and also gave the Mongols access to a great body of learning that was not Chinese.3 Recognition of reincarnation of holy men started in 1110 with Düsum Khyenpa as the first Karmapa, following the prophecy of the Buddha that “One day a man of great compassion will be born, who in the course of his incarnations will be recognized under the name of Karmapa”. His line would be the black bonnets. The current 17th Karmapa caught the news by his surprise flight from Tibet to Dharamsala where he arrived on 5 January 2000. The other line, of the red bonnets, followed almost two centuries later with the Shamarpas, Trakpa Sengyé (1283–1349) being the first one. The second Karmapa had indicated that he would re-appear in two persons, the second being the Shamarpa, but both belonging to the line of Karma-Kagyupa. The title of Dalai - Ocean or in Tibetan Gyatso, Dalai Lama meaning Ocean of Wisdom - was conferred by Altan Khan (1505–82), the ’great Mongol raider of the Chinese empire’,4 on the Gelugpa monk Gyalwa Sonam Gyatso in 1587. In fact, he became the third Dalai Lama because his two predecessors were also endowed with the title posthumously at the same time. The first one was Guendub Drub, disciple of Tsongkapa, who founded the Tashilhunpo monastery in 1447 near Shigatse, the second city of Tibet. The second was Gendum Gyatso from the Nyingma school of Buddhism. The fourth was, what surprise, the great-grandson of Altan Khan, born shortly after the death of the third Dalai Lama. His Mongol origin caused resistance in Tibet, particularly from the powerful king of Tsang, who took advantage of his death in 1617 to occupy Lhasa.

3 C.L. Beckwith, Empires of the Silk Road, Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 194. 4 P.C. Perdue, China Marches West, Harvard University Press, 2005, p. 64.

A Further Note On Tibet 287

The Mongols soon came back and defeated the Tsang forces. The abbot of Tashilhunpo, playing a mediating role, went in search of the reincarnation and reported in great detail about the three possible candidates to the Drepung monastery, resulting in the ordainment of the boy who would later be known as the Great Fifth, Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso. In 1642, at the age of 25 he became the first worldly leader of Tibet since the Yarlungs, when Gushri Khan ended the Mongol occupation of Tsang and handed him the keys of the state at Shigatse, thus marking the end of the Tsang kings. Lobsang Gyatso wrote the Constitution of Tibet which would remain in force until the flight of the 14th Dalai in 1959, started the building of the Potala palace and – historically more surprisingly – created the institution of Panchen Lama (the great erudite) for his discoverer and tutor, the abbot of Tashilhunpo. The Panchen often became a rival to the Dalai Lama and the Chinese often excelled in playing one off against the other in a very complicated situation. The Dalai Lama had both religious and worldly powers, the Panchen had a spiritual role. The living Dalai had the duty of finding the reincarnation of the deceased Panchen, who had a reciprocal task when the Dalai Lama passed away. Neither one was the spiritual chief of all Tibetans, who were divided in different lines with their own leaders, such as the Sakya Rimpoche for the Sakya school and the Karmapa for the Kagyu. Although both Dalai and Panchen belonged to the Gelugpa school, another spiritual leader, the abbot of Ganden monastery held the leadership title. The highest authority of the state was the Kashag, consisting of four Kalons, three laymen and a religious one. A highly complicated system, but probably inevitable when succession is determined by reincarnation and consequently produces long intervals before the newly chosen reaches adolescence. Shortly before his death, the Fifth Dalai Lama replaced his prime minister by his natural son, a layman and bon vivant, but a good administrator. So good, that he managed to keep the death of the Great Fifth secret for fourteen years, but in the meantime asked the Panchen Lama and a small group of trusted lamas to start searching for the reincarnation. After two years they found an infant at Tawang, currently in Arunachal Pradesh in India, who was blessed by the Panchen Lama, but educated in secret. This ruse, not uncommon in Asia in times of instability, almost became fatal to the dynasty. The situation was unstable enough, as the Mongol tribes were fighting each other while the Dzungars of Galden Khan aimed at restoring the old kingdom, including the Qoshots of the Kokonor region. The Tibetans unsuccessfully sought his protection, for the Chinese Emperor Kangxi (1662–1722) taking the side of the Qoshots defeated Galden south of his capital Urga in 1696. Already suspicious of Tibetan behaviour, Kangsi sent two envoys to Lhasa to ascertain the rumours

288 Appendix 1 of the death of the fifth Dalai, which made it impossible to keep the secret much longer. The sixth Dalai Lama was duly installed by the Panchen, but would not live long to enjoy it. Best known for his beautiful poetry about love, but also for his mistress and his capacity for consuming large quantities of alcohol, he was deposed in 1706 by the Qoshots upon their capture of Lhasa and assassinated the next year, presumably upon orders from the emporer. The Khoshuts then installed their own pretender to the throne, but the Tibetans rejected him and asked the Junghars for help. They invaded Tibet from the northwest and defeated the Khoshuts in 1717.5 The seventh Dalai again was discovered by the Panchen, this time in Litang, being the two-year old son of a defrocked lama from the Drepung monastery, but nevertheless recognized by Kangsi in an imperial decree of 1710 and inaugu- rated in Lhasa in 1720. In between much had happened in the capital. The interference by the Emperor had been too much for the Gelugpa hierarchy. Even the Panchen, whom the Emperor had tried to bring closer to his side by giving him the title of Panchen Erdeni (Great Treasure) in 1713, plotted with the Dzunghars, who following a failed attempt at a matrimonial alliance, defeated the Qoshots and occupied Lhasa. Their troops got out of control, pillaged the country and even the Panchen had to defend his Tashilhunpo against them. The Chinese emperor, concerned about a possible revival of a Mongol empire on his borders, decided to intervene militarily and, after an initial defeat, the Manchu forces occupied Lhasa in 1720. A military governor was appointed, the new Dalai installed, but no formal treaty signed.6 Stability proved elusive, particularly when Emperor Kangxi’s successor launched a persecution against the Nyingma sect – the red bonnets – and then also against the sakyapas, the kagyapas and the bönpos. The governor of Ngari (West Tibet) was assassinated in a plot originated by the father of the Dalai Lama, which necessitated another Manchou intervention in 1727. By imperial decree the Dalai Lama and his father were sent into exile at the fortified monastery of Kahdag near Tachienlu in the Kham region. He would return to the Potala in 1735 when emperor Yongzheng died and was succeeded by Qianlong.

5 Jungharia was an impressive steppe-kingdom, which saw itself as the protector of the Dalai Lama, but was defeated and occupied by Ch’ing forces in 1744. Half the population was exter- minated, thus ending the power of the Western Mongols, the last free steppe people. In 1989 the treaty of Nerchinsk had settled the frontier between Manchu China and Russia and established strict trading rules. C.I Beckwith, op.cit., p. 239–40. 6 Only a stone was erected at the bottom of the Potala palace commemorating in Chinese and Tibetan the ties uniting Tibet and the Celestian Empire of the Manchu dynasty. G. van Grasdorff, op. cit., p. 181.

A Further Note On Tibet 289

After his exile a former Tibetan military commander, Pholanay, always pro- Qoshot, rose in the government and between 1728 and 1747 occupied the ambiguous position of regent-prime minister. Surprisingly he managed to persuade the emperor not to apply the persecution orders and to promise the withdrawal of the Chinese garrison. But he had to work under Chinese supervision, with envoys in Lhasa, Shigatse and Kokonor, and the assistance of three ministers with lifelong appointments, designated after consultation of the state oracles and approved by the Emperor. Peking had proposed to the Panchen to govern the west of Tibet and part of the central region, but he wisely refused to join a partition scheme. Pholanay, partly to reverse an economic crisis on account of the influx of cheap coins, invaded Bhutan and Nepal and forced those countries to pay tribute to Lhasa. He expelled the Capuccin monks from Lhasa for arrogant behaviour and aimed at an hereditary line of lay prime ministers, his oldest son already being governor of Ngari and a younger one being groomed to succeed his father. Although the Emperor confirmed him upon the death of Pholanay in 1747, the Ambans in Lhasa cut him down during a visit to their residence. He was suspected of working towards independence. The murder being discovered, a new revolt broke out. The Ambans preferred suicide to stoning and the Emperor sent two new ones with enhanced governing powers, together with a fresh army. The function of Desi, regent and prime minister, was abolished, the Kashag restored and the Sakya Rimpoche, who had retained the mystical title of King of Tibet, was made independent from the government in Lhasa. The seventh Dalai appointed a government but for the few remaining years of his life withdrew from the political scene. At this stage the system of reincarnation became further perverted. The regency was restored but entrusted to reincarnated lamas, which would give a preponderant voice to the major monasteries. The second novelty was that the mother of one reincarnation could also produce others. That was the case with the eighth Dalai whose brother became Drungpa Rimpoche. As a result, some thirty families would be privileged in filling most of the religious and secular posts in the country.7 An early example of this malpractice came with the selection of the successor of the sixth Panchen, who had died in Peking8 in 1780, from the family of the eighth Dalai lama. New protests broke out in

7 G. van Grasdorff regards this to be the great fiasco of the Tibetan theocracy, op. cit., p. 196. The mother of the current Dalaï produced sixteen children, three of whom were declared tulku, reincarnated lama. 8 The Panchen was invited by the emperor to explain his consent to the marriage of his niece to George Bogle, the first British visitor to Shigatse.

290 Appendix 1

Shigatse, from which the tenth Sharmapa escaped in order to incite the Gorkhas in Nepal to invade Tibet. At first to no avail, but in 1788 and 1799 two waves of attack reached Shigatse, stealing the treasures of Tashilhunpo. Again Emperor Qianlong decided to intervene and sent an army of 5000 men, reinforced by 2000 Mongols from Kokonor, under the command of one of his best generals, Fu Kiang-an. Arriving in Lhasa in February 1792, he conducted a vast campaign against the Gurkhas which brought him to the gates of Kathmandu within six months. The scheming Sharmapa was poisoned and for two centuries no incarnation was looked for. The selection of reincarnations of the other dignitaries was changed by imperial decree of 1793: names of pre- selected boys had to be deposited in two urns, one in Lhasa, one in Peking. The Amban drew a paper out of the urn, which was then examined by the high ranking living Buddhas in order to ascertain the authenticity of the boy. In this way the 39 tulkus have been selected in the period 1793–1904, including the 10th, 11th and 12th Dalai Lamas and the 8th and 9th Panchen Lamas.9 Those three Dalai Lama’s came in rapid succession. The 9th died at the age of nine, the 10th coming from Litang in the East became twenty-one, but died four years after pronouncing his vows. His regent stepped down after being impli- cated in his demise and the old Panchen was made regent and for a few months in 1844–45 even head of state by emperor Daogang, until the inauguration of the 11th Dalai. The Panchen passed away in 1854 at the age of 84 years. The sixteen year old Dalai Lama was enthroned the next year, but would exercise his functions only for two years, leaving this world during a pilgrimage at the age of eighteen. The twelfth Dalai Lama would live to become nineteen. For several decades both holy seats were occupied by infants, leaving much authority in the hands of regents and the abbots of the major monasteries. In the case of the Dalai Lama that period of ineffectiveness lasted almost seventy years. The 8th Panchen was nominated as a 5 year old novice by the regent, standing in for the infant Dalai Lama. He would head the Tashilhunpo till 1882. His successor was Choekyi Nyama, discovered in the south-easterly region of Dakpo as the son of a herdswoman and an unknown father. His selection disproved the growing elitist tendency; his life would be equally ambiguous (1882–1937). The life of the 13th Dalai Lama (1875–1933) would have a normal length again. During his time Tibet became the object of the Great Game between British India and Russia, largely due to the weakness of China most of that period. The British were suspicious of Russian influence in Tibet, largely through the intermediary of Georges Ivanovitch Gurdjieff (1877–1949) born

9 This procedure was not followed for the 13th and 14th Dalaïs, but reinstated by the People’s Republic for designating the 12th Panchen.

A Further Note On Tibet 291 among Mongol people but a regular guest at the Russian court due to his medical knowledge. Having come to Lhasa with the Russian explorer Prjevalski, he wanted to enter the Drepung monastery, but was soon called by the Dalai Lama to become his closest adviser. Apparently Gurdjieff aimed at transferring the Chinese-Tibetan chöyön relationship to the Russian Czar. Rumours abounded, which became a major reason for the Indian Viceroy, Lord Curzon, to mount the military operation to Lhasa. For several centuries the relationship between China and Tibet could be described as a symbiotic relationship of a protector and religious leader. Several times the Chinese came to the aid of the country against foreign invasion, but such assistance came to an end when the weakening Manchu dynasty proved unable to support Tibetan interests. The first evidence came in 1888, when the British kicked the Tibetans out of Sikkim,10 the second when China recognized the commercial treaty signed in Calcutta in 1893 giving the British commercial rights in Yatung in the Chumbi valley, and the third the punitive expedition by Younghusband to Lhasa in 1904. Van Grasdorff concluded that the Manchu dynasty by their aloofness deliberately broke the symbiotic relationship and confirmed once more that Tibet had no vassal status with regard to China.11 On the other hand, one could argue that the Chinese were quite happy with the British-Russia ‘hands-of-Tibet’ agreement which gave them a free hand. Peking became aware of the need of a firmer presence and from 1908 on aimed at effective control. Some representatives had a clear programme of modernising the country, but the last one, Zhao Erfeng, made himself unpopular by his disrespect of Tibetan culture. Much of this happened during the absence of the Dalai Lama, who had fled to Urga (now Ulan Bator) after the British intervention and was deposed by the Chinese on advice of their Amban. Upon requests by the major monasteries this decision was later rescinded, but the Dalai Lama returned only in 1909 after a visit to Peking. Notwithstanding this defrocking episode, Dowager Empress Cixi had invited him to attend her seventy-third birthday party. She was acutely aware of the need to keep Tibet in the empire in a mutually acceptable way and had rejected the advice of the Han official in charge, Chang Yintang, to run Tibet like the British did in India: keeping a strong army and a governor-general who treats the Dalai and Panchen Lamas like maharajahs, taking away their political power and paying them off handsomely. Protocol almost proved a hurdle. As a spiritual leader people would kneel before the

10 In 1861 the treaty of Tumlong had put Sikkim under British protection, which was contested by a Tibetan expeditionary force. 11 Op. cit., p. 211.

292 Appendix 1

Dalai Lama, but as a political leader he would have to kneel before Cixi and the emperor. Only foreigners were exempt, but China did not want to treat Tibet as a foreign country. After long palavers a solution was found in making a genu- flexion on entering the hall of the banquet in his honour, but kneeling at his seat – a low throne on which he sat cross-legged, but well covered by his wide robe. So there was no visible admission of vassal status. Cixi granted him the title of “Current Perfect Buddha of the Occident”, adding ‘sincerely loyal to the Empire’, but also treated him as a plain vassal, obliged to report to and await the decisions of the Emperor. It was a hectic period in Peking. Cixi felt that she was dying but feared that under her adopted son, Emperor Guangxu, the empire would fall into the hands of the waiting Japanese. So she ordered his murder by poisoning and died herself the next day.12 The Dalai Lama stayed on for the enthronement of the last emperor, the two-year old Puyi, and at the request of the regent conducted the funeral ceremonies for the deceased couple. Before leaving by train he conducted a public ceremony, but did not obtain any assurances of Tibetan independence. On the contrary, during the year it took the Dalai Lama to return to his capital, 1000 Chinese forces moved westward and, in spite of Nepalese efforts to mediate a lower number, were already present in Lhasa on his arrival on 25 December 1909. He escaped again on 12 February during the new year celebrations, this time to Sikkim, after appointing as regent the Ganden Tripa, head of the Gelugpa line. In reality the Chinese were in full control. In the meantime the Panchen Lama had been persuaded by the members of his council to pay a visit to India, under the guise of a pilgrimage to Buddhist shrines. Frederick O’Connor, the commercial agent at Gyantse, had assured him of assistance against possible Chinese reprisals. But the British political scene had changed. Curzon had been succeeded as Viceroy by lord Minto and in London Morley did not want any interference in Tibetan affairs, not even regular contacts between the agent in Gyantse and the Tashilhunpo. Disappointed the Panchen returned to Tibet where he had to cope with the double suspicion of the Chinese and the Dalai Lama for his presumed attempt to become sole master of the country. Yet, after the flight of the Dalai Lama to India, the Chinese attempted to lure the Panchen to take his place. Once again they deposed the Dalai Lama, this time even taking away his status as tulku. The Panchen agreed to come to Lhasa, but did not get any support from his compatriots. The Chinese Amban then tried to use him as an intermediary for

12 Jung Chan, Empress Dowager Cixi, pp. 434–438. Zaifeng became Regent. She also noted that the Amban in Lhasa never was a Han Chinese.

A Further Note On Tibet 293 communicating to the Dalai Lama that he would be re-instated if he returned to Lhasa. The Dalai Lama took the position that nobody could return something which they did not have the right to take away in the first place, but was saved by the gong of the Chinese revolution which ended the Manchu dynasty in 1911. After a meeting in the British Agency at Gyantse with Chinese, Tibetan and Nepalese present, the Chinese soldiers went back to Peking, selling their rifles to the Tibetans; the Dalai Lama returned in time to his capital to see the last of them leave.13 Shortly afterwards he issued a declaration of independence, which included some important reforms like forbidding the amputa- tion of limbs, some regulation of taxes and guaranteeing rights of the farmer. The new Chinese president, Juan Shi-kai, denied the independence and attempted to regain influence through emissaries traveling via Calcutta, which in turn was prevented by the Indian government. The prolonged absences of the Dalai Lama had allowed different factions to emerge and made it difficult for him to restore stability. Some had collaborated with the Chinese, right-wing elements opposed reforms and at the same time were anti-British. The army commander Tsarong was efficient, but had to resign. His opponent Lungshar reformed the tax system and conducted inquiries into the financial conduct of the monasteries.14 Being the main provider of income for the state, he became the favourite of the Dalai Lama. His imposition of heavy taxes to finance the army on Tashilhunpo and Gyantse, which previously had been the competence of the Panchen Lama, made a new conflict boil over. The Panchen left his monastery for the north of China after writing to the Dalai that he wished to avoid a civil war. Lungshar sent forces to capture him, but in vain. Initially engaging in grandiose schemes for recapturing Tibet, the Panchen later regretted his departure and hoped to be allowed to settle in Sikkim.15 In 1932 he sent negotiators to Lhasa, but his proposals were rejected. A year later the 13th Dalai Lama died before any compromise was reached. In 1937 the 9th Panchen passed away without having seen his Tashilhunpo again. A new long period of a double regency commenced with both incarnations being infants. In Lhasa the appointment of a regent was particularly difficult. The trusted collaborators of the Dalai Lama were discarded and the twenty-year old Rimpoche of the Reting monastery was rejected. With the help of the prime minister he moved against Lungshar who was blinded for his sins. The search

13 Prem R. Uprety, Nepal-Tibet relations 1850–1930, p. 125. 14 Lungshar had accompanied the four Tibetan boys to England in 1913. 15 Several contacts took place through British political officers. Col. Bailey suggested that Britain would grant him asylum in Kalimpong or Darjeeling, but his government felt that the Panchen would do less harm in Peking. See G. van Grasdorff, op. cit., p. 282.

294 Appendix 1 for the reincarnations touched on the grotesque. In 1937 one of the teams dis- patched for finding the 14th Dalai Lama happened to pass Jyekundo, where the 9th Panchen was living near the end of his life. The Panchen revealed a vision that there were three candidates, all living in the nomadic village of Takster in Amdo. In effect, they found a family where a boy was born on 6 July 1935 and two others, born later had died suddenly. One of them later was declared the Ngari Rimpoche; an older brother had already been selected as the reincarnation of the abbot of Kumbum. All very holy, but prone to leave some doubt concerning the authenticity of the selection. The young boy was transported to Lhasa from Kumbum after the Moslem ruler Ma Bufang had exacted a double ransom for allowing the convoy to pass through. During the years of World War ii Lhasa managed its own affairs. Its observance of strict neutrality raised suspicions by Chiang Kai-shek, who stationed troops on the Sino-Tibetan border.16 The last years before the communist occupation were not easy. In 1947 the father of the Dalai Lama was accused in a process before the National Assembly of having requisitioned food without payment and of inciting farmers to withhold their labour which they were obliged to render. He died soon after, probably from poisoning. When the communist danger became imminent, the Kashag advanced the enthronement of the Dalai Lama by two years to July 1951. Prior to the ceremony he had already appointed two prime ministers, both of whom advised him to go into exile and to put part of the state treasure into safe storage in Assam. In fact, he would stay in the Chumbi valley with part of his family; the treasure was taken away by a Sikkimese party and never seen again. The Dalai Lama reluctantly left Yatung for Lhasa on 21 July 1951 before his government had officially accepted the 17-Point Agreement negotiated in Peking. The State Oracle had advised him to go to Lhasa rather than to India.17 Later the Dalai Lama again was tempted to stay in India when he visited there together with the Panchen on the occasion of the celebration of the 25th centenary of the death of the Buddha, but was persuaded to return after Nehru had obtained some assurance of Tibetan autonomy from Chou En-lai, who happened to be in India at the same time. But the situation became untenable in 1959 when the Dalai Lama made his famous dash for the border above Tawang and was received by Indian representatives in Tezpur. He was allowed

16 Lin Hsiao-ting. “War or Strategy. Reassessing China’s military advance towards Tibet, 1942–1943”. China Quarterly, 17(2006)186, pp. 446–462. Churchill raised this with Roosevelt and T.V. Soong on 20 May 1943 at a Pacific Council meeting. 17 Warren W. Smith, Jr, op. cit., p. 315 and Patterson, Tibet in Revolt, p. 84.

A Further Note On Tibet 295 to settle in Dharamsala, where he built a Tibetan government in exile and a Tibetan assembly. The selection of the 10th Panchen became most controversial. Part of the entourage of the deceased wanted to return to Tashilhunpo, but a younger group did not wish to have anything to do with the current government in Tibet and perambulated Tibet with the embalmed body of the 9th Panchen. A team from Lhasa discovered a reincarnation in Litang, who lost against the pro-Chinese candidate born in a cave near the village of Zheduotang in Gansi province. The Kuomintang government, deeming the drawing of lots superfluous, approved of the choice and the 10th Panchen was also sent to Kumbum, where, as we have seen, the brother of the Dalai Lama was the abbot. He was enthroned there on 10 August 1949 at the age of eleven, much to the irritation of the Kashag in Lhasa. According to van Grasdorff there has been some talk of going to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek,18 but the Panchen stayed in Tibet and was persuaded by the communists to sign the 17 points which would put an end to any claims of Tibetan independence. In 1949 the Kashag shrewdly responded to the departure of Chiang from the mainland by severing all contacts with Peking and expelling the Chinese political commissioner and some three to four hundred Chinese citizens. Much later, in 1965 and back in Shigatse, the Panchen changed sites again and in a document of 70.000 characters denounced the way the Tibetan people had been treated by being put in communes, subject to severe food rationing and even forced abortions. Chou En-lai tried to reason with him, admitting that mistakes had been made, but denying the intention to extermi- nate the Tibetan race. In the end he was condemned for supporting a clandes- tine guerilla and sentenced to fifteen years labour camp and re-education. Pardoned and re-instated by Deng Xiao-ping, the Panchen continued to provoke the Chinese, for example by telling youth to preserve their culture and language and by stating in 1985 that there was not any difference between him and the Dalai Lama. He passed away in January 1989, due to a heart attack according to the Chinese, but being poisoned in the Tibetan version. Nevertheless, Peking allotted a considerable sum for his mausoleum and undertook an extensive search for his reincarnation under Chabral Rinpoche, the respected abbot of Tashilhunpo. The Dalai Lama tried to send a delegation to aid in the search, but the government refused. The Rimpoche was allowed to send him a letter in 1993 requesting his guidance and giving some details of the search. The Dalai lama consulted the Nechung oracle in Dharamsala on how to

18 G. van Grasdorff, op. cit., p. 327. He saw a connection between the expulsion and the enthronement of the Panchen.

296 Appendix 1 proceed. Twenty-eight were selected all over Tibet and adjoining provinces with Gedrun Choekyi Nyima, a six-year old boy from the village of Lhari in Nagchu province, being the most promising. While the Chinese were organiz- ing the drawing of lots, the Dalai Lama, wanting to avoid this procedure, conducted a coup by declaring the boy to be the 11th Panchen. The abbot and monks of Tashilhunpo were arrested, for they obviously had transmitted the results of their search to Dharamsala. The Chinese snatched the boy and his family away, who were not heard of again until suddenly in September 2015 a government official announced that “he was growing up healthily and did not want to be disturbed”.19 Following the method of drawing lots from a golden urn rather than leaving the decision to a college of high lamas, they declared another infant of the same age and the same village to be elected. Small difference, but the parents of Gyaincain Norbu happened to be members of the Chinese communist party. In the end Peking had its way and the enthronement took place in the Yokhang temple in Lhasa in 1995 after the tulkus who were members of the National People’s Congress had given their assent. He was raised in Beijing and occasionally appeared in public, including a speech in 2009 at the World Buddhist Conference in the eastern city of Wuxi. Currently Tenzin Gyatsu , the 14th Dalai Lama and head of the Gelugpa School of Tibetan Buddhism, resides at Dharamsala; the leader of the Nyingma School, Takling Tsetrul, has monasteries in Shimla and Ladakh; the primary monastery of the Kagyu or Black Hat School is at Rumtek near Gangtok in Sikkim, but currently out of bound for the contending leaders for the dignity of Karmapa; the Sakya School leader Sakya Trinzin is based in a monastery at Raipur near Dehradun. The Karmapa story rivals the best thriller in mystery and intrigue. Being the third in line after the Dalai and Panchen lamas, the sixteenth Karmapa fled from Tibet in 1959 at the same time as the Dalai Lama and entered Sikkim. Before leaving for the us, where he died in 1981, he managed to persuade the Dalai Lama to reïnstate a Shamarpa to act as representative of the Black Hats. In 1992 Ogyen Trinley Dorje was enthroned at Tsurphu monastery at the age of seven, after his proponents had sought the approval of the Dalai Lama On 28 December 1999 the boy, then 14 years old, escaped via Mustang on the Nepal-Tibet border, was airlifted to Kathmandu accompanied by a representative of the Dalai Lama and finally made it to Dharamsala, where he stays at the Gyuto Tantric monastery. A real escape, because security at Tsurphu had been extremely tight, so

19 Financial Times, September 7, 2015. The announcement was seen as a prelude to the succession of the 80 year old Dalai Lama.

A Further Note On Tibet 297 how had it been possible for the most revered Lama present in Tibet (except for the 11th Panchen Lama who is a minor and shrouded in controversy) to escape? In 1959 the Chinese claimed that the Dalai Lama had been abducted and was held under duress. This time they attempted to limit political damage by saying that the Karmapa had gone to get the famous “black hat”. This hat was kept in the Rumtek monastery in Sikkim, and as Sikkim had not yet been recognised as part of India by China, the matter was highly sensitive. India decided not to allow him to go to his spiritual seat in Sikkim in spite of an appeal from the Chief Minister that it would be good for the economy of the state by bringing in more tourists. India made it clear to China that the Karmapa would not be allowed to engage in political activities. The Karmapa was rarely allowed to move, but in 2008 visited Woodstock in the us where his predecessor had established an influential Dharma centre. Some doubted his credentials and suspected him of being a Chinese intelligence plant in the set-up of the Dalai lama. In any case, the 17th Sharmapa – Shamar Rinpoche – refused to recognize him and became the mentor of his rival Trinley Thaye Dorje whom he enthroned in New Delhi in 1994. Ogyen’s record suffered badly in 2011 when the police effected a cash seizure, being part of a deal to buy land struck by the Karmae Garchen Trust, previously headed by Ogyen. Criminal procedures were dropped and the Indian National Security Advisor Menon declared that India would not get involved in the internal politics of the Karma Kagyu school and would give equal status to Ogyen and Trinley, but neither would be allowed to take seat at Rumtek Monastery till the Karmapa reincarnation issue had been resolved. “As long as Ogyen is not a security threat, New Delhi would not be worried about his religious role”.20 On 19 March 2011 the Dalai Lama surprised the world by renouncing all political power and deciding that he and his followers would confine themselves only with the spiritual affairs of Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism. In his speech he compared the stability of Indian democracy with the inherent instability of Chinese authoritarian rule: “we have to follow the trend of the free world which is that of democracy”. A month later Harvard-educated and Darjeeling-born Lobsang Sangay took over as Kalon Tripa, head of the government in exile, after an election in which 49.000 votes were cast.21 His alternate leadership would remove the feudal trimmings of traditional Tibetan government

20 Shishir Gupta, op. cit., pp. 203–5 “Karmapa Controversy”. 21 According to the Indian Institute of Defence Studies and Strategic Analyses (idsa) there are 208 Buddhist monasteries in India with 27.451 monks and 17 nunneries with 1696 nuns as labrangs (affiliates) of Tibetan monasteries.

298 Appendix 1

Shishir Gupta makes the point that the Dalai Lama has acquired such a prestige in the world and throughout the Buddhist community that only he could moderate the pro-autonomy or independence movement. After his death the various schools might separate, not only damaging stability in Tibet, but also raising new problems at the border with India. President Xi Jinping seems to have realised this and, after at first taking a hard stand, is believed to have authorised new informal contacts with Dharamsala. These would be significant if the Dalai Lama proceeds with plans to avoid infighting between the various monasteries and appoints a successor soon, who could then be tutored by him personally and build a working relationship with the Karmapa. The rich Tibetan culture might have some flexibility on this point: there is a precedent of two simultaneous heads of the Gelugpa sect, and the 7th Dalai Lama was already born before the death of the 6th. The present Dalai Lama saw the very purpose of reincarnation in carrying out the unfinished tasks of the previous life, in his case seeking meaningful autonomy. He even could imagine a woman succeeding him, as there have been female lamas in the 700 years of Tibetan history.22 He opposed selection by means of a draw out of the Golden Urn, applied by Emperor Qianlong (1711–99, who inscribed on a stele in the Beijing Yonghehong temple that he favoured the Gelukpa sect ‘to maintain peace among the Mongols’) and advocated broad consultation.23 China reacted by imposing a “re-education campaign” and issued ‘Order number five’ concerning the control and recognition of reincarnations by the government, which took effect in September 2007. At municipal level reincarnation now requires approval of the local Bureau of Religious Affairs. In September 2014 the Dalai Lama took an important further step by declaring that he did not want a successor. In an interview with the Welt am Sontag he said that his institution had been important by the combination of religious and political power. But today the political part was no longer there, which meant the end of a tradition which had lasted for some 450 years. Tibetan Buddhism as such did not depend on a single individual, but possessed a fine organisation with well-trained monks and scholars. The Chinese reaction was strong: the (ethnic-Tibetan) governor of the ‘Special Autonomous Region of Tibet’, Padma Choling, accused the Dalai Lama

22 Discussion with Shishir Gupta in 2008, op. cit., p. 197, published by Indian Express. 23 In 1933 the Golden Urn selection was not applied. While he was on his way to Lhasa from his birthplace in what is now Qinghai province of China, the Tibetan government and assembly declared him the 14th Dalai Lama. Rather implausibly, China claims that it gave permission for waiving the procedure. The Economist, March 21, 2015, “Banyan. The golden urn. Even China accepts that the Dalai Lama can legitimise rule in Tibet”.

A Further Note On Tibet 299 of ‘profaning religion and Tibetan Buddhism’. The party paper Global Times wrote that he was ‘spouting nonsense’. Apparently, the central government had difficulty in dealing with the unexpected but also with making sense out of mix of imperial history and religious tradition, while maintaining stability in a potentially explosive society. The Dalai Lama did not name China, but obviously wanted to avoid Beijing controlling events after his death. That moment would not come soon as far as the Dalai lama was concerned, who joked about becoming 113 and had not given up hope of returning to Tibet one day after 55 years.24 In any case, he had made it much harder for Beijing to push for a leader – even if only in religious terms – against the wishes of the Tibetan people. In the same year the Chinese government stepped up efforts for international recognition of the situation in Tibet and demonstrated a new confidence in its control over the autonomous region. Tibet was opened up for 12 million tourists, funds were announced for the restoration of temples and monasteries, the world’s first Tibetan-language office software was released, the Lhasa – Xigatse extension of the railway was expected to start construction, and some more sensitive information was released: 2 out of 5 major gold fields were in Tibet and a very deep borehole was drilled at a secret place. Beijing openly admitted having talks with the staff of the Dalai Lama. Most spectacular was the fourth session of the Tibetan Forum on Development, which for the first time was held in Lhasa in August 2014 with participation of several parliamentarians from other countries, after previous meetings in Vienna (2007), Rome (2009) and Athens (2011). It ended with the “Lhasa Consensus”.25 Centring on the theme of “The Development of Tibet: opportunities and Alternatives” it covered sub- themes of sustainable development, Inheritance and protection of Tibetan culture, and ecological and environmental protection. The Consensus text was published in full with the addition that delegates to the forum conducted intense and in-depth discussions in a friendly and candid atmosphere and reached the following consensus:

24 Interview of 7 September 2014. China did not react immediately but took the opportunity of thanking South Africa for refusing a visa to the Dalai Lama, which Beijing “appreciated very much”. In December 2014 the Roman Catholic Pope refused the Dalai Lama an audi- ence when in Rome, for fear it would make his relations with Beijing even more difficult. 25 Text in Xinhua, 14 August 2014. The Forum was attended by 100 participants including 40 ‘representatives’ from 30+ countries, including the journalist Narasimhan Ram of The Hindu, and Lord Davidson of Glen Cova, Labour’s shadow Advocate General for Scotland.

300 Appendix 1

1. Participants notice that Tibet enjoys sound economic growth, social harmony, deep-rooted Tibetan culture and beautiful natural scenery, and the people enjoy a happy life. It is a place where the modern and the traditional meet and where man lives in harmony with nature. Tibet has embarked on an irreversible path of modern civilization. 2. Participants notice that ordinary people in Tibet are satisfied with their well-off lives, good education, sound medical care, housing and various social securities. All ethnic groups in Tibet have full confidence and moti- vation for building a better future. 3. Participants notice that Tibet’s traditional culture is apparent everywhere. Fine traditional culture and cultural relics have been well preserved. This is a result of the dedication and efforts of the Chinese Central Government and the People’s Government of Tibet Autonomous Region in protecting, inheriting, and advocating Tibetan culture, which should be encouraged and supported. 4. Participants notice that different religions co-exist in harmony in Tibet and the Tibetan people enjoy religious freedom. Prayer flags, pilgrims and people burning aromatic plants for religious purpose can be seen easily on the streets of Lhasa. The temples are crowded with worshippers and pilgrims. 5. Participants notice that most parts of Tibet are still in a natural state. While enjoying modern civilization, the Tibetan people are able to enjoy blue skies and white clouds, holy mountains and lakes, forests, grass- lands, clean water and fresh air. 6. Participants notice that a path of sustainable development in Tibet featuring coordinated and balanced economic, social, cultural development, ecological and environmental protection will not only be beneficial to the long-term development of Tibet but also offer a significant model for other countries and regions. Participants appreciated the substantial efforts and considerable achievements of the Chinese Central Government and the People’s Government of Tibet Autonomous Region in promoting economic and social development, improving people’s well-being, preserving the culture and improving the ecology and environment of Tibet. 7. Participants unanimously agree that what they have actually seen in Tibet differs radically from what the 14th Dalai and the Dalai clique have said. The Dalai clique’s statements on Tibet are distorted and incorrect. Many Western media reports are biased and have led to much misun- derstanding. Seeing is believing. Participants express the aspiration to introduce the real Tibet to the world.

A Further Note On Tibet 301

8. Participants notice that the forum, jointly held by the State Council Information Office of China and the People’s Government of Tibet Autonomous Region is of great significance for bringing Tibet to the world and helping the world have a better understanding of Tibet. Participants were satisfied with the considerate arrangements for the forum and looked forward to regularly holding the forum in Tibet.

Paragraph 7 obviously was contentious. At least one participant, Sir Bob Parker, former mayor of Christchurch, New Zealand, contested the unanimity, saying that he had “not at all” endorsed the Consensus.26 India gradually took more interest in a possible mediating role with regard to Tibet. For a long time it feared that this would be a lost cause, but took a cue from the us pushing for a new dialogue. The us Tibet Policy Act 2002 under the Bush administration had appointed a Special Coordinator on Tibet issues. Soon after Manmohan Singh became prime minister his foreign secretary Shyam Saran upgraded the contacts with the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala. They had been at the level of section officer or under-secretary to act as liaison, but also to keep watch of the visitors of the Dalai Lama and to ensure that no political activities against China were undertaken. In 2004 these contacts were raised to the director- level to keep Dharamsala informed about Sino-Indian relations. Moreover, an annual dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the foreign secretary was institutionalised. Manmohan Singh himself repeatedly said that the Dalai Lama was an honoured guest: “he is a religious leader and we do not allow Tibetan refugees to indulge in political activities.” On his side, the Dalai Lama was clear in his opinion that the resolution of the Tibet issue was directly linked to a Sino-Indian boundary settlement. Trust between India and China could only develop once the situation in Tibet returned to ‘absolutely normal’; the boundary issue could not be solved when there was fear and suspicion between the two countries.27 Beijing reacted by accusing India of training Tibetan guerrilla fighters. Looking into the future, the Tibetan issue will only be solved if the notion of autonomy acquires more substance and the Tibetans feel less discriminated by the Han people. Beijing so far seems highly sensitive about the ‘splittist’ effect of loosening central control, not only in Tibet, but even more in the Uighur region. In a vast country with hundreds of minorities that sentiment is understandable, but so is the opposite question whether permanent suppression will be tenable in the long run.

26 Quote Sir Bob Parker: Tibetan Review, 17 Aug. 2014. The Consensus followed a negative assessment in The Economist of 21 June. 27 Both quotes are from Shishir Gupta, op. cit., p. 191.

302 Appendix 1

At the start of the People’s Republic thinking was a bit different. Sun Yat-sen had underlined the oneness of China by stressing the need for assimilation and absorption of all non-Han minorities. Later, under the influence of Soviet Russia the Kuo-Mintang National Congress of 1924 not only accepted the ‘equality’ of all national minorities, but also recognised ‘their right of self- determination…in a free and united Chinese Republic’. The Chinese Communist Party followed similar logic in Article 4 of the November 1931 (Juijin) Constitution by stating that all nationalities living in China shall be equal before the law and citizens of the Republic. The right of self-determination was accepted, either joining the Union of Chinese Soviets or seceding from it and form their own state. Less than five years later the party changed its position. Mao expressed the hope that Outer Mongolia would ’automatically become part of the Chinese federation as an autonomous republic like the Mohammedan and Tibetan peoples.’ On the eve of the birth of the People’s Republic of China he talked of organising a sort of United States of China to meet Mongolian and Tibetan aspirations, but on 2 October 1952 the People’s Daily gave a quite different message: secession from the prc must be branded as reactionary, tantamount to undermining Han ‘interests’ and to the advantage of imperialism. The ‘Common Programme for the implementation of the regional autonomy for nationalities’ underlined them being an integral part of the territory of the prc. Its government therefore was only a local government which, while competent to draw up ‘special regulations’, must submit these to the higher eche- lons of the Republic for approval. Since the 1954 Constitution the autonomous regions are described as ‘inalienable parts’ of a single multinational state. Real power lies with the local party secretary, appointed from above, and not with the ‘Chairman’ of the government.

Appendix 2 Contacts between Dharamsala and Beijing

The Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala published a series of documents covering the exchanges with Beijing during the years 1981–1993 and the various missions which were allowed to visit Tibet. In 1979 China’s premier Deng Xiaoping told an emissary of the Dalai Lama, Gyalo Thondup, that “the door to negotiations remains wide open” and “except for the independence of Tibet, all other questions can be negotiated”. Thereafter five fact-finding delegations were allowed to visit Tibet. In July 1993, fourteen years later, two representatives of His Holiness got the same message, which was reaffirmed in August by a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman. Yet, very little had happened in the intervening years, which led the Tibetan Department of Information and International relations to compare political negotiations with China to “a long term exercise in futile expectations”.1 The first delegation left India on 5 August 1979 with the aim “to try to understand the new leaders of China and to greet the six million Tibetans in Tibet”. They stayed for three months, shot miles of film footage, but only gave oral reports in Dharamsala. In their view the people’s belief in Buddhism was far from shaken, the vast majority still cherished the Dalai Lama and dreamt of an independent Tibet under him, and their economic condition was incredibly poor.2 Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama in 1980 in his annual 10 March address on the anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising talked about “the present period of leniency”. In 1980 the second mission made a long journey into various parts and reported that 99 percent of all monasteries and temples had been destroyed. In towns there were more new houses than old ones, yet no ordinary Tibetan lived in those houses. In the same year a third delegation led by Jetsun Pema, sister of the Dalai Lama, was given a mass of educational statistics, which appeared to them as very uneven. The second mission ended with the Lhasa incident of 25 July 1980 when one of the delegates shouted to a crowd in front of the guest house “Tibet is independent” and the crowd responded emotionally. As a result the two delegation were asked to cut their

1 Dharamsala and Beijing. Initiatives and Correspondence 1981–1993, updated edition March 1996, published by the Department of Information and International Relations, Central Tibetan Administration, Gangchen Kyishong, Dharamsala-176215. 2 Dawa Norbu, Tibet, the Road Ahead, Prospero Books, 1997, pp. 279–284, covers the missions, but some dates seem- inaccurate.

304 Appendix 2 mission short and official contacts were suspended. On 10 March 1981 the Dalai Lama quoted the Tibetan proverb: “Before your eyes they show you brown sugar, but in your mouth they give you sealing wax”. A few days later, on March 23, 1981 the Dalai Lama wrote to Deng Xiaoping about the sad state of the Tibetan people as ascertained by the missions. His tone was conciliatory and even agreed with the Communist ideology “which seeks the well-being of human beings in general and the proletariat in particular, and in Lenin’s policy of equality of nationalities” and “If the Tibetan people’s identity is preserved and if they are genuinely happy, there is no reason to complain”. However, in reality ninety percent of Tibetans are suffering both mentally and physically and are living in deep sorrow. Therefore the time had come “to apply, with a sense of urgency, our common wisdom in a spirit of tolerance and broadmindedness in order to achieve genuine happiness for the Tibetans”. In a note attached to the letter some concrete issues were discussed. The first was the fourth fact-finding mission which was about to leave, but according to a message to Gyalo Thondup, the Special Envoy of the Dalai Lama, received through Xinhua in Hongkong, China wanted to postpone it that year. Equally, the opening of a liaison office in Lhasa should be deferred and instead more contacts should be made through Hongkong and the Chinese Embassy in Delhi. The Tibetans agreed on both points but made a plea for continuing with the envisaged attachment of fifty Buddhist teachers to Tibetan schools. The Chinese were backtracking on the agreement in principle (which they recognised) with the pretext that the teachers would find it difficult to live in Tibet where facilities were lacking at the moment. This could harm their morale. “For the time being, some teachers may be deputed to nationality schools inside China from where they could gradually be sent to Tibet”. Apparently, Beijing had vetoed the earlier concessions, which in themselves were quite remarkable, both in opening a formal channel of communications and allowing outsiders into the sensitive field of education. The note the Tibetans sent in reply refuted the Chinese anxiety: the teachers were already aware of the difficult conditions and they would be concerned solely with educational matters and not indulge in any political activities. Gyalo Thondup received a note from ccp General Secretary Hu Yaobang on July 28, 1981, entitled “China’s Five-point Policy towards the Dalai Lama”.3 It was succinct and read:

3 The English translation appeared much later in Beijing Review, No. 49, 3.12. 84.

Contacts Between Dharamsala And Beijing 305

1. The Dalai Lama should be confident that China has entered a new stage of long-term political stability, steady economic growth and mutual help among all nationalities. 2. The Dalai Lama and his representatives should be frank and sincere with the Central Government, not beat around the bush. There should be no more quibbling over the events in 1959. 3. The central authorities sincerely welcome the Dalai lama and his followers to come back to live. This is based on the hope that they will contribute to upholding China’s unity and promoting solidarity between the Han and Tibetan nationalities, and among all nationalities, and the modernization programme. 4. The Dalai Lama will enjoy the same political status and living conditions as he had before 1959. It is suggested that he not go to live in Tibet or hold local posts there. Of course, he may go back to Tibet from time to time. His followers need not worry about their jobs and living conditions. These will only be better than before. 5. When the Dalai Lama wishes to come back, he can issue a brief statement to the press. It is up to him to decide what he would like to say in the statement.

In spite of their apparent backtracking the Chinese reacted positively to the Dalai Lama’s question whether they really wanted to talk. A high-level three member delegation left for Beijing on 24 April 1982 and spent about a month in the Chinese capital. They had been briefed by the Dalai Lama personally and made clear that the conditions for his return were linked up with the future status of Tibet. Their main purpose was to sound out the various options and they were disappointed by the Chinese attempt to reduce the issue to the personal position of the Dalai Lama. In 1984 the March statement was more positive and admitted that during the past four or five years many Tibetans, who were imprisoned unjustly for about twenty years, had been released and that there had been a comparative degree of freedom of movement between Tibet and the outside world. In the summer of 1985, a six-member delegation was allowed to investigate the conditions in north-eastern Tibet (Amdo), the birthplace of the Dalai Lama. They brought back a frightening report of the prospect that within a few generations the Tibetan language and culture would be mere exhibits in a museum. This delegation seemed to be the last. In 1986 the Dalai Lama proposed to send a sixth one, but had to cancel because the Chinese insisted on them carrying overseas Chinese passports.

306 Appendix 2

The next document contained in the Dharamsala publication is an address by the Dalai Lama to the u.s. Congressional Human Rights Caucus on September 21, 1987, entitled “Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet”. Before coming to the peace plan, the speech had some tough passages concerning “China’s aggression condemned by virtually all nations of the free world” and “the holocaust inflicted upon our people”. It also argued that Tibet’s “occasional subjection to foreign influence never entailed the loss of influence” and that when Peking’s Communist armies entered it, “Tibet was in all respects an independent state”. The world should remember that though Tibetans have lost their freedom, “under international law Tibet today is still an independent state under illegal occupation” and “But for China’s occupation Tibet would still, today, fulfil its natural role as a buffer state maintaining and promoting peace in Asia”. The peace plan itself contained the following components:

1. Transformation of the whole of Tibet, including Kham and Amdo, into a zone of peace, requiring China to withdraw its troops and military installations, which would enable India to withdraw its troops from the Himalayan regions bordering Tibet. 2. Abandonment of China’s population transfer policy which threatens the very existence of the Tibetans as a people In the whole of Tibet 7.5 million Chinese settlers now outnumber the 6 million Tibetans; in Amdo Chinese statistics count 2.5 million Chinese and only 750.000 Tibetans. 3. Respect for the Tibetan people’s fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms, allowing them to develop freely culturally, intellectually, economically and spiritually. 4. Restoration and protection of Tibet’s natural environment and the abandonment of China’s use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste. 5. Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples.

This time Beijing reacted relatively quickly in a memorandum from Yang Minfu, Head of the United Front Work Department of the ccp Central Committee to “the Exile Tibetan Administration” of October 17, 1987. It con- nected the us visit of the Dalai Lama to the demonstrations in Lhasa around that time and saw them as the result of his “splittist campaigns conducted as a political exile”, a phrase which would repeatedly return in later pronouncements. This time the attack was made even more personal by stating that “to further his vested interests, the Dalai lama instigated and planned the Lhasa demonstrations.” The position of Gyalo Thondup as an intermediary also was put in doubt by quoting him as saying that “the experience of the past

Contacts Between Dharamsala And Beijing 307 decades has proved that there is no way one could walk the path of Tibet’s independence.” The only positive notes in the memorandum were the admission of past mistakes by ‘ultra-leftist’ influences which had crept in our Tibet affairs and the passage saying that “if the Dalai group gives up its splittist activities now, we will revert to the Central Government’s policy stated in the past.” The Tibetan response of December 17, 1987 refuted the Chinese accusations one by one. Beijing was reminded that in 1982 one of the fact-finding missions had conveyed a statement by the Dalai Lama that ‘In the changed historical situation, when nations are working for political, economic and military union, it may be better for the Tibetan people to live with one billion people, rather than separately as six million, provided this arrangement serves mutual interests better”. Numerous suggestions had been put forward since the revival of contacts in 1979, including the idea of a confederation, with all three provinces of Tibet in a self-governing entity.4 The response recognised that compared to the pre-1980’s some positive changes had taken place within Tibet. In the agricultural and nomadic sectors, families had been given full management responsibility as well as freedom to engage in private side-line production and petty business. Consequently, in Lhasa and some towns and villages, people’s livelihood had improved slightly. The Tibetan language had been restored and new publications in Tibetan were brought out. Towards the end the response included the following statement:

We have no desire to revive the old social system. In 1963 His Holiness the Dalai Lama promulgated a democratic constitution for Tibetans. As far back as 1969, His Holiness the Dalai Lama said: When the day comes for Tibet to be governed by its own people, it will be for the people to decide as to what form of government they will have. The system of government by the line of the Dalai Lamas may or may not be there. It is the will of the people that will ultimately determine the future of Tibet. As can be seen by any international observer, the exile Tibetan community practices democracy.

The March 10 statement of 1988 repeated those points: the future form of government was for the Tibetan people to decide, even the continuation of the

4 During the discussions China had cited its Nine-point Plan for Taiwan as an example of its flexibility, to which the Tibetans had replied that ‘it is only fitting that China comes up with a better deal for Tibet.’ In response Yang Jian Rin had told them that Tibet had already been liberated and that, therefore, its status could not be compared with that of Taiwan. The Tibetans responded that this seemed to presuppose that, since Tibet had already come under the sway of China, its freedom and right to equality must be suppressed. Op. cit. p. 34.

308 Appendix 2 role of the Dalai Lama. The Tibetans should have the opportunity to accept or reject the constitution of 1963. But at its beginning the statement was tougher: it referred to the current unrest in Tibet and accused the Chinese of contraven- ing the Fourth Geneva Convention which prohibited the transfer of civilians into occupied territory. On 15 June 1988 the Dalai Lama addressed members of the European Parliament and made the so-called Strasbourg Proposal for the constitutional setup of Tibet. The whole of Tibet, known as Cholka-Sum, should become a self-governing democratic political entity founded on a constitution of basic law. The Government of the prc could remain responsible for Tibet’s foreign policy, but the Government of Tibet should develop and maintain relations, through its own Foreign Affairs Bureau, in the fields of religion, commerce, education, culture, tourism, science, sports and other non-political activities. Tibet should join international organisations concerned with such activities. The Government should be comprised of a popularly elected Chief Executive, a bi-cameral legislative branch, and an independent judicial system. Its seat should be in Lhasa and its goal should be to transform Tibet into our planet’s largest natural preserve. A regional peace conference should be called to ensure that Tibet becomes a genuine sanctuary of peace through demilitarisation. In the meantime China could have the right to maintain a restricted number of military installations in Tibet, solely for defence purposes. In order to create an atmosphere of trust, China should abandon its policy of transferring Chinese to Tibet. The Dalai Lama took this opportunity to state that he did not wish to take any active part in the Government of Tibet. No negotiations ensued and in March 1989 the Chinese imposed martial law on Tibet. The Dalai Lama suggested a meeting in Hongkong as a measure of confidence building and to discuss ways and means for the start of negotiations on the basis of the Strasbourg proposal. In the absence of a Chinese reaction he declared on March 10, 1991 that he would consider himself free of any obligation under this proposal.5 He would, however remain firmly committed to the path of non-violence in finding a solution through negotiations and understanding.6 Martial law was lifted in May 1990 and Jiang Zemin, Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party visited Tibet in July.

5 The Strasbourg Proposal had been mentioned only in the 10 March 1990 Statement and not a year earlier. 6 These words are taken from the public address given in Dharamsala on September 2, 1991 by the Chairman of the Kashag, Kalon Gyalo Thondup, five months after the withdrawal of the Proposal. Op. cit. pp. 50–51.

Contacts Between Dharamsala And Beijing 309

On October 9, 1991 the Dalai Lama delivered an address at Yale University under the title “Embracing the Enemy”. He believed that, as events in the Soviet Union had shown, China could not remain the last totalitarian, communist empire for long and that freedom and democracy would come to China. But the Chinese refusal to start negotiations and its “demographic aggression”, which reduced Tibetans to a second class minority in their own country, increased tension . In this explosive situation violence might break out, which the Dalai Lama was keen to prevent. Therefore, he was considering an early visit to Tibet to ascertain the situation and to communicate directly with his people. It would be important that senior Chinese leaders would accompany him on such a visit and that outside observers, including the press, would be present. The Dalai Lama wished to advise and persuade his people not to abandon non-violence as the appropriate form of struggle. Of course, the visit only could take place if people were permitted to meet with him and to speak freely without fear of retaliation. For his part, he should be free to travel wherever he wanted to go. The developments in Beijing made the Dalai Lama more optimistic than ever, as he stated in the March 1992. Within 5–10 years changes would take place in China. On his side the celebration of the ‘Year of Tibet’ was successfully concluded and he announced the publication of “Guidelines for future Tibet. Its polity and the basic features of its Constitution”. Upon the return of the Tibetan Administration to Lhasa an interim government would take over and draw up the new constitution. In June direct contact with the prc was again established and Gyalo Thondup went to Beijing, but found the Chinese side inflexible. Nevertheless the Dalai Lama decided to send three representatives to deliver a note to Beijing. This information was given in the March 1993 Statement, which also noted that the Chinese had turned the Tibet Autonomous Region into a ‘Special Economic Zone’. The final document included in the Dharamsala and Beijing publication is a long memorandum from the Dalai Lama to Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin of September 1, 1992, and the statement issued to the press in New Delhi on September 4, 1993 when the memorandum was released. It contains a historic review of developments since 1951, which inter alia confirmed that in late 1956, when the Dalai Lama visited India to celebrate the anniversary of the birth of Buddha, many Tibetans advised him not to return to Tibet and to continue talks with China from India. The Dalai lama wrote that he himself also felt that he should stay in India for the time being, but that he was persuaded to return by Prime Minister Nehru, who told him that Chou En-lai “did not consider Tibet as a province of China. The people were different from the people of China proper. Therefore, the Chinese considered Tibet as an autonomous region which could enjoy autonomy.”

310 Appendix 2

The memorandum also gave details about the missed chance of negotiations in 1988. On September 23 the Chinese Government had issued a statement that they were willing to start negotiations and that the date and venue would be left to the Dalai Lama. The latter responded on October 25 and proposed January 1989 as the time and Geneva as his choices. On November 18 the Chinese rejected Geneva and preferred Beijing or Hong Kong. They also objected to the inclusion of a ‘foreigner’ (a legal advisor, but not a member of the negotiating team) and stated that the delegation should have older people, including Gyalo Thondup. The Tibetans agreed to send representatives to Hong Kong to hold preliminary meetings with the Chinese, but when this was finally agreed the Chinese refused to communicate any longer. The Dalai Lama further confirmed that in the future status of Tibet he would not assume any governmental responsibility or hold any political position. Tibet should not be influenced or swayed by the policies and ideologies of other countries, but remain a neutral state in the true sense of the term. The time had come for spelling out a detailed step-by-step outline regarding Tibet’s basic status. “If such a clear outline is given, regardless of the possibility or non-possibility of an agreement, we Tibetans can make a decision whether to live with China or not. If we Tibetans obtain our basic rights to our satisfaction, then we are not incapable of seeing the possible advantages of living with the Chinese”. The September 4, 1993 statement accompanying the release of the 1992 Memorandum repeated that the return of the Dalai Lama was not the issue, but the survival and welfare of six million Tibetan people. It also emphasized that any negotiations must include the whole of Tibet, not just the area which China called the Tibet Autonomous Region. Special concern was expressed about a secret meeting of the Chinese authorities on May 12, 1993 in Sichuan in which the Chinese allegedly had decided to transfer even larger numbers of Chinese to Tibet, and to manipulate important Tibetan religious persons in order to infil- trate religious institutions and to create divisions in the Tibetan movement. The March 1994 Statement made the important point that the Five Point Peace Plan and the Strasbourg Proposal envisaged a solution which does not ask for complete independence of Tibet, but should deal with the Chinese population transfer policy, fundamental human rights, demilitarisation and the natural environment. Unfortunately the situation in Tibet deteriorated again and the Chinese tightened political control, raided monasteries, and launched a program of ‘investigation and scrutiny’. According to the March 1995 Statement a total of 62 ‘economic development projects’ were announced, which gave rise to renewed fears of the Tibetan population being swamped by Chinese settlers.

Contacts Between Dharamsala And Beijing 311

The 1995 Statement also mentioned that many Tibetans had voiced unprecedented criticism of the suggestion that they should compromise on the issue of total independence. Moreover, the failure of the Chinese government to respond positively ‘to my conciliatory proposals’ had deepened their sense of impatience and frustration. Therefore the Dalai Lama proposed that this issue be submitted to a referendum. “However, as long as I lead our freedom struggle, there will be no deviation from the path of nonviolence”. The referendum should seek to clarify the political course of our struggle. Obviously, under the present conditions it would be impossible to hold a fair referendum in Tibet, but nevertheless, “we will be able to find ways to collect representative opinions from different parts of Tibet and to conduct the plebiscite among our exiled community”. The suggestion was not repeated and the Tibetan side would later make the shift to ‘genuine autonomy’. It was a substantial change in the negotiations, especially in comparison with the 10 March Statement of 1961, the first in an unbroken series, which had read: “On 10th March 1959 the Tibetan people reasserted their independence after suffering almost nine years of foreign domination”. Therefore, it was not surprising that criticism of the negotiating shift continued. It was strongest in the booklet published in 1998 “Tibet, The Issue Is Independence” with an introduction by Thubten Jigme Norbu, Director of the Tibetan Cultural Centre in Bloomington, Indiana.7 His main argument was that anything less than independence “will simply be an agreement for further suffering” and with formal Tibetan acceptance of being a part of China the question would cease to be of concern to other countries. This booklet also cast doubt on the integrity of Gyalo Thondup, who had revealed on several occasions that in his view Tibetan independence was unattainable: “this iconoclastic bombshell was not good for public morale”. This criticism was reinforced by complimentary Chinese comments on his “enthusiastic spirit” and the criticism that he was operating too independently, his two Tibetan ‘minders’ being unable to speak Chinese. On the other side of this argument stood the view, ultimately accepted by the Dalai Lama that, following Deng Xiaoping’s dictum, more could be done for the Tibetan people if the negotiations turned towards autonomy instead of independence. Informal contacts continued, which resulted in a resumption of formal direct meetings in 2002. Since then nine rounds of talks and one informal session have been held. Some of them seemed to show some positive developments regarding the position of the Dalai Lama and amounted to a substantial exchange of views and a rebuttal of arguments. At Shenzen in May 2008 the

7 Edited by Edward Lazar, Delhi, Full Circle, 1998, 92 p. The criticism of Gyalo Thondup is on pp. 26 and 67.

312 Appendix 2

Chinese side came out with the demand for “Three Stops”: stop separatist activities, stop violence and stop sabotaging the Beijing Olympic Games. During the subsequent seventh round in July this was followed up by “Four not to supports” i.e. activities that would disturb the Olympics; plots inciting violent criminal activities; not supporting and concretely curbing violent terrorist activities; and activity seeking Tibetan independence. During the eighth round in November 2008 the delegation presented a ‘Memorandum on genuine autonomy for the Tibetan people’, which argued that the specific needs of the Tibetan nationality for autonomy and self- government could be met by the application of the principles on autonomy contained in the constitution of the prc. The Chinese concerns were addressed in a point by point rebuttal:8

1. Respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the prc: the Dalai Lama was not seeking separation of Tibet from the prc and was not seeking independence. 2. Respecting the Constitution of the prc: the autonomy sought by the Dalai Lama is to be accommodated within the framework of the Constitution and its principles on autonomy. 3. Respecting the ‘three adherences’ (the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the socialism with Chinese characteristics, and the Regional National Autonomy System): The Dalai Lama in no way challenges or brings into question the leadership of the ccp. 4. At the same time it was reasonable to expect that in order to promote unity, stability and harmonious society, the Party would change its attitude of treating Tibetan culture, religion and identity as a threat. 5. Respecting the hierarchy and authority of the Chinese Central Government: the proposals of the memorandum in no way imply a denial of the authority of the National People’s Congress and other prc organs. 6. Chinese concerns on specific competences referred to in the Memorandum: (a) Public security: National defence and public security are two different matters, the former being the responsibility of the prc, the latter coming under regional control.

8 Note on the memorandum contained in Press release of 18 February 2010, www.tibet.net. Other information is obtained from the annual statements the Dalai Lama made on the Anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising Day, 10 March, starting in 1961 and also available at www.tibet.net.

Contacts Between Dharamsala And Beijing 313

(b) Language: the protection, use and development of the Tibetan language are one of the crucial issues of genuine autonomy. Moreover, the Chinese White Paper on Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet referred to “the Tibetan language as the major one” in the Tibetan Autonomous Region. The Memorandum should not be interpreted as excluding the Chinese language. In fact, the Tibetan leadership encourages Tibetans in exile to learn Chinese. (c) Regulation of population migration: the Memorandum proposed that the local government of the autonomous region should have the competence to regulate residence and settlement of non-Tibet- ans and work out measures for the control of transient, seasonal workers. (d) Religion: the Tibetans should be free to practice their religion according to their own beliefs. Article 36 of the Constitution of the prc guaranteed that no one can comply citizens to believe in, or not to believe in any religion. (e) Single administration: The Tibetans were only demanding that those areas already recognised as Tibetan autonomous areas come under a single administration. They pointed out that many Chinese leaders including Premier Chou En-lai and Vice Premier Chen Yi had supported bringing all Tibetan areas under one administration. (f) Political, social and economic system: no one has any intention of restoring the old system. Tibetans in the prc have also advanced under Chinese rule, but Tibetan human rights are not being respected. 7. Recognising the core issue: The Dalai Lama and other members of the exiled leadership have no personal demands to make. Their concern is with the rights and welfare of the Tibetan people. Therefore, the fundamental issue is the faithful implementation of genuine autonomy. 8. Co-operation of the Dalai Lama: he had offered, and remains prepared, to formally issue a statement that would serve to allay the Chinese government’s concerns.

The reasoning was astute but unfortunately for the Tibetans the Chinese leaders would not be content with the implicit recognition by Tibetans of the contemporary reality that Tibet is part of China. They also wanted public acknowledgement that what China did in 1950 was an historically valid and ideologically justified action and that Tibet had always been a part of China.9

9 Dawa Norbu, op.cit., p. 327.

314 Appendix 2

And that would be too much for the Dalai lama, but also for most non-Chinese historians, for the history of Sino-Tibetan relations has been ambiguous. Dawa Norbu seemed right in his conclusion that over the centuries Tibet was independent for 281 years (600–842 and 1911–50); neither dependent nor independent from China for 497 years ( 842–1247 and 1350–1642) and dependent on Mongol and Manchu empires for 378 years (1249–1358 and 1642–1911) with a special emperor-lama, or lay patron – priest relationship. But even during its dependency periods Tibet enjoyed a high degree of genuine domestic autonomy. The symbolic unequal relationship, which was the ideological basis of Confucian foreign relations, did not entail Chinese interference in Tibetan domestic affairs, nor an Chinese army presence (except when requested by lama rulers), or Han colonization, or integration of Tibet into China, either politically, economically or culturally. In June 2012 the two special envoys of the Dalai Lama resigned after nine rounds of unsuccessful talks, the last being in January 2010. Their letter referred to the deteriorating situation inside Tibet since 2008, and the growing number of self-immolations. One of their interlocutors had even advocated the abroga- tion of Tibetan minority status as stipulated in the Chinese Constitution, thereby seeming to remove any basis for autonomy.10

10 Shishir Gupta, op. cit., p. 193. Lodi Gyari and Kelsang Gyaltsen.

Bibliography (1964)

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Index

Acharya, Alka 251–253, 255 Boundaries 23, 30, 33, 115–119, 150, 157–158, acquiescence 119–120, 167–169 160, 166, 176, 190 Addis, J.M. 218–221 brics 274–276 Afghanistan 25, 37, 77, 139, 142, 145, 157, 189, Bum La 245, 247 198, 268, 274 Burma 8, 37–38, 40–41, 65–66, 68, 72, 83, aggression 5, 8, 13, 15, 22–23, 33, 41, 46, 97–98, 106, 116, 120–121, 134, 138–139, 53–54, 59–60, 70, 73–74, 80, 82, 86, 142, 149, 160, 198, 232 89–90, 92, 95–96, 98, 118, 124, 130, 133, 145, 182, 184, 191, 193, 196, 198, 202–203, Cairo Conference of non-aligned 77, 139–140 208, 212–213, 235, 237, 240–241, 249, Cambodia 62, 134, 139, 243, 269 302, 305 Ceylon 37–38, 65–66, 72, 75, 90, 128, 133–134, Aksai Chin 9, 111, 115, 119, 124, 125, 135, 162, 140, 188 165, 169–171, 173–175, 201, 205, 214, 217, Chamdo 19, 22, 24, 29, 46–47 221, 224, 232, 234, 243 Changchenmo valley 162 Ali, Mohammed 36, 66 Chaudhury, Lt. gen. J.N. 218, 224 Amban (Chinese) 9–10, 21, 24, 117, 153 Chen, Ivan (Chinese plenipotentiary at Anthony, F 49 Simla) 17, 20, 32, 122 Antony, A.K. 261 Chen Yi 126, 183, 237, 309 arbitration 72, 74, 79, 81, 138, 167–168 Chiang Kai-shek 29, 38, 40, 96, 141, 290–291 Ardagh, Sir John 172–173 China’s Five-point Policy 300 Ashoka, Emperor 54–55 Chinese incursions 257 asean 266, 268, 271, 275, 278 Chipchap river 126 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 276 Chola incident 239 Asian Relations Conference (New Chou En-lai x, 43, 50, 55, 59, 67–70, 72–73, Delhi 1947) 30, 39, 67 83–84, 94, 96–97, 99, 107, 109–110, 112, Assam 14–15, 29, 31, 35, 109, 125, 131, 163, 114, 129, 132–133, 137–138, 142, 144, 160, 177–178, 199, 201, 204, 219, 228, 231, 191, 193, 195, 198, 220–221, 231, 241, 245, 238, 245, 261, 290 251, 260, 291, 305, 309 Ayub Khan 145 Clinton, President Bill 249 Ayyangar, M.A. 49 Clinton, Hillary 268 collective security 1 Bandaranaike, Mrs. 63, 134–136, 140 Colombo Powers 51, 76 Bandung Conference 41, 55, 66, 70, 75, 77, Communist Party of India (C.P.I.) 41, 100, 192 94, 108, 128, 134, 182 Confidence Building Measures (cbm) Bangla Desh 147, 233, 240–241, 267, 269, 279 247–248, 252, 255 Bara Hoti (Wu Je) 94–95, 97, 114, 131 Congo 86, 93, 182 Belgrade Conference (1960) 62–63, 77 Consulates 254 Bhonsle, R.K. 230–231 Convention of 1890 (Anglo-Chinese) 10 Bhutan 10, 13, 15–16, 31, 33–35, 44, 96, 115, Convention of 1904 (Lhasa) 10, 154 117, 164, 178–179, 200, 206, 220, 225, Convention of 1906 (Anglo-Chinese) 10, 117 278, 285 Convention of 1914 (Simla Convention) x, bjp Party 248 15, 17, 25–26, 31–32, 50, 117–118, Bogor meeting 65–67, 70 122, 150, 153, 155–156, 159, 164, 177, Bomdi La 131 219, 220 Bose, S.C. 37 Crewe, Lord 24, 27

334 Index critical date 168–169 Gupta, Bhupesh 6, 103–104, 194, 197 Cuban crisis 188 Gupta, Shishir 256, 293–294, 298, 310 Curzon, Lord 11, 28, 155, 287, 289 Gyantse (trading post) 22, 28, 50–51, 125, 289

Dalai Lama x, 10, 12–13, 20, 29–30, 47, Hathung La 244–245 99–100, 102, 105–106, 112, 140, 152, 156, Henderson Brooks 218, 223–224, 229 182–183, 250, 258, 265, 283–284, hill tribes 121 286–290, 292–296, 299–309 Himalayas 113, 117, 200, 204, 206, 208, 216, Dange, S.A. 104, 193–194 219–220, 258 Darjeeling 10, 12, 18, 290, 294 Home, Lord 61 Dawa Norbu 299, 309–310 Hot Springs 137 Deepak, B.R. 240, 243, 245, 248 Hsinhua 100, 123 Demchok 163, 247 Hu Jintao 234, 252–253, 255, 259 Depsang Plain 260 Hunza 9, 172–173 Dharamsala xi, 283, 291–294, 297, 299, 302, Indian National Congress 2, 8, 69 304–305 Indo-China 55, 65, 92 Dhola (CheDong) 127–128, 137, 220, 225 Indonesia 38, 55, 65–67, 72, 77, 134, 139 Diphu Pass 121 Inner Line 121, 157–158, 163–164, 177, 219 Dorjieff 10 interference in internal affairs 57, 61, 74, 197 Durand, Sir Henry Mortimer 10, 157 International Commission of Jurists 153 International Court of Arbitration 270 Eastern Greenland case 164, 168 International Court of Justice viii, 133, 138, Eden, Sir Anthony 29, 61 161, 166, 171 effective jurisdiction (-occupation) 135, 158, Interparliamentary Union 61 160, 164–165, 170, 174, 222 Irak 73 Eisenhower, D.D. 67, 71 Israel 66 equality (principle) 26, 56–57, 59–61, 69, 71, 73–74, 100, 144, 210, 277, 300, 303 Jaishankar, S. 259 estoppel 120, 168–169 Jaitley, Arun 276, 279 extraterritorial rights 118 Japan 40, 57, 66, 110, 154, 191, 278, 281 Jaswant Singh 250 Falung Gong 266 Jiang Zemin 250, 304–305 Fernandes, G. 249 Joint Working Group (jwg) 246, 251 foreign aid to India 4, 77 Jordan, Sir John N., (Minister at France 84, 87, 90, 154, 282 Peking) 17–18 Frontier Land case 161 Juan Shi-kai, President 289

Galwan valley 114, 126, 199 Kalam, Abdul 234 Gandhi, Indira 240–241, 244 Kalimpong 46, 51, 96, 99–101, 192, 290 Gandhi, Mahatma 2–4, 30, 36–38, 41 Kangxi, Emperor 284–285 Gandhi, Rajiv 243–246, 254 Karakash river 160 Gartok 28, 51, 54, 123 Karakoram Pass 115, 130, 162, 171 Geneva Convention (Red Cross) 2, 65, 84, Karmapa 250, 283–284, 292–294 109, 126, 304, 306 Kashgar 9, 51, 172, 174 Ghana 134 Kashmir x, 4, 8–10, 31, 40, 48, 80, 81, 86, 87, Ghosh, Ajoy 43 91–93, 115, 119, 143, 145, 149, 158, 162, 163, Goa 87, 89–93, 212 171, 175, 195, 205, 214, 215, 235–238, 240, Gulab Singh 8 245, 249, 258, 259, 268

Index 335

Kaul, gen. B.M. 224–225, 229 Macdonald, Sir Claude 173 Kellogg Pact 37 Mahendra, King 143 Khinzemane 106–107, 109, 128, 220 Mao Tse-tung 40–43, 49, 98–99, 232, 233, Khruschchev 181 239, 241, 264, 270 Khurnak Fort 96, 137, 163, 176 Masani, M.R. 49 Khurshid, Salman 260 Maxwell, Neville 218–219, 224 Koirala, B.P. 142 McMahon line x, 31, 33, 54, 109, 164, 219–220, Kokonor lake 22 225, 245, 257 Kongka Pass 137, 171, 176, 184, 232 mediation 2, 6, 12, 45, 72, 85, 90, 213, 234 Korea 51, 82–85, 141, 181, 185, 191, 245, 268 Menon, Krishna 67, 72, 84, 86, 91, 126, 130, Kotelawala, Sir John 65, 71 224–225 Kripalani, Acharya 48, 54, 104, 208, 210 Menon, Mrs. Lakshmi 101 Kuenlun range 9, 162, 171, 173 Menon, Shivshankar 254 Kunzru, Dr. 103 middle sector 117, 130–131, 135, 137, 220 Kuomintang 31, 38–40, 42, 44, 155, 182, 291 Migyitun 159, 206 Minquiers and Ecrehos case 166 Ladakh 8, 26–27, 31, 34, 94, 96, 98, 108–109, Modi, Narendra 262–263, 267, 275–276, 111–112, 117, 119, 123–124, 127–128, 130, 133, 278–279 135, 137, 140, 143, 160, 162, 165–166, 171, Mongolia 10, 19, 145 173, 176, 179, 193, 197–198, 200–201, Moshi, solidarity conference 201 204–206, 215, 220–223, 225, 229, 232, Mukerjee, Pranab 253 237, 244, 259–260, 292 Mukherjee, Dr. S. P. 48 Lamb, Alastair x, 14, 24, 27, 33–34, 163, Mullik, B.N. 221–222, 229–230 174, 205 multipolarity 251 Lanak Pass 176 Mustagh range 145, 171 Laos 2, 126, 191 mutual benefit 53, 56–57, 60, 144, 254 Leh 8, 54, 221, 249 mutual respect 53, 61 Lhasa 8, 10–14, 16–18, 21, 22, 26, 28, 29, 31, 33, 35, 44, 46, 47, 50, 96, 100, 102, 103, 117, Namboodiripad, E.M.S. 193 125, 153, 172, 178, 203, 250, 259, 282–292, Namka Chu 225 299, 300, 302–305 Nasser, Pres. 72 Lhasa Consensus (2014) 296 Nathu La 137, 235, 238, 247, 251 Li Peng 250 national liberation 184, 187 Liang Guanglie 259 National Security Council 248, 250 Lighthouses in Crete and Samos case 165 nato 5, 274 line of actual control 109, 111, 113, 116, Nehru J. x, xi, 2–6, 30, 36–38, 40–41, 43, 127–129, 131–133, 135–136, 138, 140, 142, 48–50, 52–56, 59, 61–63, 65–74, 76, 199, 205–206, 228, 234, 243, 245, 85–92, 95–105, 107–110, 112–113, 119–123, 247–248, 252, 261–262 125–126, 128–130, 132–133, 135–138, 140, Lingzi Tang 174 142, 144, 160, 164, 181–183, 186–188, Liu Chao-chi 136 192–197, 199–200, 203–205, 207–208, Lok Sabha 5, 40, 48–49, 52–53, 99–100, 103, 211–213, 215–217, 220–221, 225, 231–232, 114, 122, 127, 131, 133, 140, 207, 221 236, 241, 250, 256, 260, 264–265, Lokzhung range 173–174 291, 305 Lonchen Shatra 23–24, 31 Nehru, R.K. 122 Longju 106–107, 109, 136–137, 192, 206, 217, Nepal 15, 17, 27, 37, 41, 44, 55, 106, 116–117, 220, 222, 246–247 120, 139, 142–143, 153, 198, 200, 259, Lungshar 290 285–286, 293

336 Index

New Development Bank 275 Ranga, N. G. 48 non-aggression 37, 53–54, 58, 71, 94 Rao, B. Shiva 103 non-alignment 2–3, 5–6, 48, 104, 129, 134, Rao, Rajeshwar 43 184, 187–189, 196–197, 199, 207–208, 210, Rau, Sir Benegal 83 213, 215, 241 recognition 6, 9, 12, 16, 20–21, 24–28, 35, non-violence 2–4, 38, 92, 193, 304–305 39–41, 44–45, 47, 52, 61, 63, 74, 96, 103, North East Frontier Agency (N.E.F.A.) 31, 34, 115, 119–120, 151–153, 155, 168, 170, 178, 178, 234 180, 191, 204–205, 213, 240, 251, 256, 283, 294, 309 Pakistan x, 4, 31, 66, 72, 74, 75, 77, 80, 81, 86, Renqinggang 251 91, 92, 104, 115, 120, 130, 139, 143–145, 159, Report of Chinese and Indian officials 136, 163, 195, 198, 205, 212, 214–216, 230, 198 234–238, 240, 241, 245, 248, 258–260, Richardson, Hugh x, 29–31, 35, 152 267, 269, 273, 274 Rosario, Albert L. 270 Palit, brig. D.K. 224, 229 Russell, Earl 140 Palmas case 161 Panchen Lama 30, 47, 102, 283–284, Sabry, Ali (U.A.R.) 134 289–290, 293 Sastroamidjojo, Ali 65–66, 70 Panchsheel (5 principles) x, 52, 55–59, seato 143, 215 61–64, 66, 68, 70–73, 94–95, 98, 100–105, Se La (Pass) 16, 34, 130–131, 141, 178, 199 107, 120, 125, 170, 187, 204, 210–214, self-defence 66, 72, 74, 107, 129, 131, 199, 222, 217, 256 237, 273 Pangong Lake 126 Shahidullah 171–172, 174 Panikkar, K.M. 39–40, 42, 50, 203–204 Shanghai Cooperation Council (sco) 275 Pant, K.C. 245 Shastri, Lal Bahadur 140, 236–238 Pant, Pandit 101 Shipki La 95, 253 Paracel islands 270 Sihanouk, Prince 62, 136 Patel, Sardar 80 Sikkim 10, 15, 22, 29, 31, 44, 47, 96, 99, 115, 117, peaceful coexistence 52, 54, 56, 58, 60–61, 137, 159, 235, 237–239, 241, 244, 247, 65, 70, 72–73, 75–77, 96–97, 107, 139, 143, 251–252, 255, 257, 287–288, 292–293 149, 184–185, 187, 210–212, 251 Simla Conference. See Convention of 1914 Pholanay 285 Singh, Manmohan 253, 255–257, 260, 297 plebiscite 80–81, 195, 307 Sinkiang 9, 51, 54, 94, 96, 115, 124, 143, Portugal 88–90, 92, 213 162–163, 171, 201, 206, 220, 232 Portugal. See Goa Soviet Union 41–42, 54, 62, 69, 71, 77, 84, 86, Prasad, Dr. S.N. 218, 229 90, 181, 184, 187–192, 196, 207–208, 241, Prasad, Rajendra 4 266, 268, 305 Prescription 166 Spanggur Gap 247 prisoners of war 50, 84, 109, 141, 182 Spanggur Lake 137, 176 protest 167 Spratly Islands 270 Putin, Vladimir, President 273, 275 Stalin 42, 59, 84–85 subversive activities 58, 70, 96, 99, 191 QaraTagh Pass 175 Suket 172 Suslov, M. 194 Radhakrishnan, Dr. S. 68 suzerainty 10–11, 13–14, 16–17, 20–22, Rajagopalachari 91 24–29, 45–46, 49, 54, 80, 103, 118, Rajya Sabha 4, 89, 103, 203–204 151, 153–156, 173 Ranadive, B.T. 43, 49, 194 Swaray, Sushma 262

Index 337

Tamaden 108, 221 United Nations 1, 46, 56, 60, 72, 75, 83, 85–86, Tashkent Meeting 236–237 90–92, 143, 167, 171, 183, 209–210, 241, 256 Tawang 14–16, 25, 33–35, 130, 163–164, U Nu 56, 63, 66, 68, 72, 213 178–179, 206, 219, 225, 229, U.S.A. 44, 48, 57–59, 71–72, 84, 90–91, 123, 244–245, 253, 255, 258, 261, 129, 163, 181–182, 208, 274 284, 291 Temple of Preah Vihear case 161 Vajpayee, A.B. 241, 249, 251–252 Tezpur 102, 131, 291 Vietnam 191, 241, 268, 272 Thagla ridge 127, 131, 136, 179, 199, 206, 225, Vohra, N.N. 218, 229 232, 244 Thapar, gen. 228–229 Walong 14, 137, 229, 245 Thimayya, gen. 85, 221 watershed 15–16, 19, 32–33, 98, 113, 115–117, Thondup, Gyalo 299–300, 302–307 121, 127, 143–145, 150, 158–162, 171, Thoreau 3 175–176, 179, 220–221, 225, 232, 239, 244 Tibet, five point Peace Plan 302, 306 Wen Jibao 256, 259 Tibet, Memorandum on genuine Wu Je. See Bara Hoti autonomy 308 Tito, President 62, 188–189 Xi Jinping, President 260–263, 272, 277, 278, Turkey 72, 90, 165 280, 294

U.A.R. (Egypt) 90, 134 Yatung 10, 28, 50–51, 125, 287, 291 Ukraine 274 Younghusband (expedition) 8, 10, 13, 16, 118, unequal treaties 50, 60, 118, 192 153, 172, 287 unclos 271 Yudin, P. 186