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Defense Reform and the Russian Navy1 NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE 1 COLLEGE DE DEFENSE DE L’OTAN DEFENSE REFORM AND THE RUSSIAN NAVY1 by Yuri KRUPNOV2 Introduction The objective of this study is to elucidate the essence of the reforms underway in the Russian armed forces (and in the Navy in particular), to analyse the current political-military and socio-economic conditions of their implementation, and to make suggestions about how the pace and effectiveness of reforms may be increased. Because of specific economic and political-military factors in Russia, defence reform in the Russian Navy will take a distinct form and will require many years. NATO-Russia partnership could be a constructive factor in carrying the defence reform process forward. It should be recalled that as recently as 1991 Russia maintained one of the world’s largest military establishments. Moscow’s powerful armed forces included one of the largest nuclear weapons arsenals. Owing to the profound political, economic and geostrategic transformation that Russia has experienced since 1991, the Russian armed forces have gone through a terrible crisis. Thorough analysis of recent military operations in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya focused the attention of Russian government authorities on the need for military reform. Rapid economic growth since 2000 has given Russia a unique opportunity to pursue reforms in the air force, army and navy. Since the 1 The views expressed in this paper are the responsibility of the author and don’t reflect the opinions of the NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 2 From September to December 2005, Dr Yuri Krupnov (Captain, Russian Navy) was a Visiting Fellow with the NDC Academic Research Branch within the framework of the NATO-Russia Fellowship Program. © NDC 2006 ACADEMIC RESEARCH BRANCH 2 NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE COLLEGE DE DEFENSE DE L’OTAN end of the Cold War in 1989-1991 Russia and NATO, as well as Russia and the United States, have normalized their relations and established programs of cooperation. This cooperation in dealing with the challenges of the twenty-first century provides favorable conditions for the implementation of Russian defence reforms. 1. The Essence of Defense Reform and the Distinctive Attributes of Reform in the Navy Russian defence reform is a process of far-reaching changes in the state military establishment designed to adapt it to developments in politics, the economy, military technology, and society at large. Russia’s defence reform is being implemented in accordance with generally accepted principles. Russia needs mobile forces that are not too large. Whether operating independently or within multinational forces, Russia’s forces must be appropriately sized, trained and equipped to deal with 21st century threats, without burdening the national economy, and relying increasingly on the contract principle for the recruitment of military personnel. At the same time the defence reform program takes into account distinctive factors affecting Russia’s decision-making. These factors include the following considerations: 1- Russia’s armed forces constitute a significant component of the Russian state and a major element in the balance of power in the world. 2- The situation in Russia differs fundamentally from that in the West because the post-1991 changes in international politics coincided with the collapse of Russia’s political, economic, and value systems. 3- Russia differs from the non-Soviet former Warsaw Pact states because from the beginning it had no prospect of early integration into Western institutions such as NATO. 4- Russia is unlike any of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union because it is not a nascent state, and has had continuity of state sovereignty extending over a thousand years. It is not the radical nature of Russian military reform that matters, but rather its conformity with current and foreseeable significant changes in internal conditions and the world security environment. © NDC 2006 ACADEMIC RESEARCH BRANCH NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE 3 COLLEGE DE DEFENSE DE L’OTAN Russian defense reform is an element of broader state reforms. Key factors in the reform’s success include the recruitment of progressive managers, the formation of public support, the optimization of the strategic concept, and the strengthening of the economic and technological base. It would be unrealistic to expect Russia to deal with these questions quickly. Military restructuring is in any case a continuous process, as commanders redesign forces to perform the tasks required of them. All the principles of Russian defence reform apply to the Russian Navy as well as to the other services. At the same time there are some factors specific to the Navy, such as the following: - The most important and powerful naval force groupings are based in northern littoral regions with inclement climates, far from cultural and scientific centers, and also far from places of rest and recovery for the health of personnel. - The hazardous northern seas neighborhood, with numerous operating and decommissioned surface ships and submarines with nuclear weapons and reactor facilities waiting for utilization or (in some cases) dismantlement, exercises a significant additional influence on both conscripts and professional servicemen. - The traditional dominance of the Russian ground forces over naval forces in budgets, doctrine and force acquisitions hinders the Navy in competing for resources. The deficient budget is a particularly nagging problem for the Russian Navy, because objective factors - such as the costs of acquiring and maintaining ships and of sustaining personnel and conducting operations in harsh climates - require a higher level of expenditures than will be necessary for equivalent improvements in the other services of the Russian armed forces. This is a key distinctive factor complicating the implementation of reform in the Russian Navy. 2. Military-Political and Economic Conditions of Reform As a result of President Putin‘s ambitious program of recentralization, the strengthening of the Russian “vertical” executive power in the last 3 to 5 years has countered the weakening effects of unchecked regionalism on the Russian state. The situation in Chechnya has been partly stabilized, and internal threats have been decreased. © NDC 2006 ACADEMIC RESEARCH BRANCH 4 NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE COLLEGE DE DEFENSE DE L’OTAN At the same time Russia continues to face a range of security challenges. Having 13,000 kilometers of new, porous, and in some places totally unsupervised borders in the South, Russia requires the greatest possible protection. Terrorism and regional conflicts in the South are the most realistic threats to Russia. Russia might be also attacked by a state or a coalition of states pursuing significant political and economic goals, and these goals might endanger the survival and sovereignty of Russia. Russia is a top-priority factor in inter-state rivalry today. Many countries wishing to improve their economic situation are interested in Russia’s resources and pursuing strategies aimed at weakening Russia as a military and naval power. The level of military confrontation with the West has decreased since 1991. However, the enlargement of the NATO alliance with its superior conventional forces to the East has led Russians to think about potential threats and about preparations to deter them in case current partnership relations become unreliable. Four factors seem to be the most important political-military considerations affecting the implementation of defence reform in Russia: 1- Russia’s conventional military weakness; 2- NATO’s conventional military superiority; 3- Russia’s fear of NATO’s intentions; 4- Russia’s military doctrine concerning the importance of nuclear forces. In the foreseeable future Russia needs to maintain a defence capability that can address real threats and conceivable contingencies but that will not over-burden the national economy. The quantity of military personnel, combat units, weapons, defence sites, and military production facilities must not be sacrificed for higher-quality arms and equipment, housing, standard of living, training and combat readiness. Russia needs to spread its strategic contingency planning from the Western theaters to theaters in the south (i.e., the Transcaucasus and Central Asia) and the Far East. The huge Soviet defence machine was created in a comparatively poor country with a command economy. In the end, Russia proved with its own experience the accuracy of the law of the rise and fall of great empires through military over-extension, expounded by the famous historian Paul Kennedy. Since the 1990s the Russian Federation has been © NDC 2006 ACADEMIC RESEARCH BRANCH NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE 5 COLLEGE DE DEFENSE DE L’OTAN so weakened, and has faced so many threats and challenges, that the highest Russian government authority had to choose whether to live within the state’s means and to renounce the status of a super power in the near future, or to freeze today’s situation in the expectation of rapid economic growth. Fortunately, forecasts of an improvement in the world oil market and in Russian economic development were justified in the event, and the GNP began to grow rapidly in 2000. Nevertheless the economic growth has not been sufficient to provide all the requirements of defence reform, because other demanding priorities are on the state’s agenda. Moreover, the prerequisite for efficient defence reform is not only rapid and stable growth, but also accelerated growth in high-technology and science-intensive key industries. The improvements in this sphere of the Russian economy have to date not been substantial enough to meet the objective, and this is the most important problem in both the economy and defence reform. In view of this situation, Russia cannot yet permit itself the powerful armed forces (in size and effectiveness) that would correspond in full measure to current security challenges, but it has a chance of making some reasonable compromise arrangements. In the near future Russia will be able to spend for defence no more than 3.5% of GNP or 20% of the state budget.
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