Defense Reform and the Russian Navy1

NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE 1 COLLEGE DE DEFENSE DE L’OTAN

DEFENSE REFORM AND THE RUSSIAN NAVY1

by Yuri KRUPNOV2

Introduction

The objective of this study is to elucidate the essence of the reforms underway in the Russian armed forces (and in the Navy in particular), to analyse the current political-military and socio-economic conditions of their implementation, and to make suggestions about how the pace and effectiveness of reforms may be increased. Because of specific economic and political-military factors in Russia, defence reform in the Russian Navy will take a distinct form and will require many years. NATO-Russia partnership could be a constructive factor in carrying the defence reform process forward. It should be recalled that as recently as 1991 Russia maintained one of the world’s largest military establishments. Moscow’s powerful armed forces included one of the largest nuclear weapons arsenals. Owing to the profound political, economic and geostrategic transformation that Russia has experienced since 1991, the Russian armed forces have gone through a terrible crisis. Thorough analysis of recent military operations in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya focused the attention of Russian government authorities on the need for military reform. Rapid economic growth since 2000 has given Russia a unique opportunity to pursue reforms in the air force, army and navy. Since the

1 The views expressed in this paper are the responsibility of the author and don’t reflect the opinions of the NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 2 From September to December 2005, Dr Yuri Krupnov (Captain, Russian Navy) was a Visiting Fellow with the NDC Academic Research Branch within the framework of the NATO-Russia Fellowship Program.

2 NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE COLLEGE DE DEFENSE DE L’OTAN end of the Cold War in 1989-1991 Russia and NATO, as well as Russia and the United States, have normalized their relations and established programs of cooperation. This cooperation in dealing with the challenges of the twenty-first century provides favorable conditions for the implementation of Russian defence reforms.

1. The Essence of Defense Reform and the Distinctive Attributes of Reform in the Navy

Russian defence reform is a process of far-reaching changes in the state military establishment designed to adapt it to developments in politics, the economy, military technology, and society at large. Russia’s defence reform is being implemented in accordance with generally accepted principles. Russia needs mobile forces that are not too large. Whether operating independently or within multinational forces, Russia’s forces must be appropriately sized, trained and equipped to deal with 21st century threats, without burdening the national economy, and relying increasingly on the contract principle for the recruitment of military personnel. At the same time the defence reform program takes into account distinctive factors affecting Russia’s decision-making. These factors include the following considerations: 1- Russia’s armed forces constitute a significant component of the Russian state and a major element in the balance of power in the world. 2- The situation in Russia differs fundamentally from that in the West because the post-1991 changes in international politics coincided with the collapse of Russia’s political, economic, and value systems. 3- Russia differs from the non-Soviet former Warsaw Pact states because from the beginning it had no prospect of early integration into Western institutions such as NATO. 4- Russia is unlike any of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union because it is not a nascent state, and has had continuity of state sovereignty extending over a thousand years. It is not the radical nature of Russian military reform that matters, but rather its conformity with current and foreseeable significant changes in internal conditions and the world security environment.

NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE 3 COLLEGE DE DEFENSE DE L’OTAN Russian defense reform is an element of broader state reforms. Key factors in the reform’s success include the recruitment of progressive managers, the formation of public support, the optimization of the strategic concept, and the strengthening of the economic and technological base. It would be unrealistic to expect Russia to deal with these questions quickly. Military restructuring is in any case a continuous process, as commanders redesign forces to perform the tasks required of them. All the principles of Russian defence reform apply to the Russian Navy as well as to the other services. At the same time there are some factors specific to the Navy, such as the following: - The most important and powerful naval force groupings are based in northern littoral regions with inclement climates, far from cultural and scientific centers, and also far from places of rest and recovery for the health of personnel. - The hazardous northern seas neighborhood, with numerous operating and decommissioned surface ships and submarines with nuclear weapons and reactor facilities waiting for utilization or (in some cases) dismantlement, exercises a significant additional influence on both conscripts and professional servicemen. - The traditional dominance of the Russian ground forces over naval forces in budgets, doctrine and force acquisitions hinders the Navy in competing for resources. The deficient budget is a particularly nagging problem for the Russian Navy, because objective factors - such as the costs of acquiring and maintaining ships and of sustaining personnel and conducting operations in harsh climates - require a higher level of expenditures than will be necessary for equivalent improvements in the other services of the Russian armed forces. This is a key distinctive factor complicating the implementation of reform in the Russian Navy.

2. Military-Political and Economic Conditions of Reform

As a result of President Putin‘s ambitious program of recentralization, the strengthening of the Russian “vertical” executive power in the last 3 to 5 years has countered the weakening effects of unchecked regionalism on the Russian state. The situation in Chechnya has been partly stabilized, and internal threats have been decreased.

4 NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE COLLEGE DE DEFENSE DE L’OTAN At the same time Russia continues to face a range of security challenges. Having 13,000 kilometers of new, porous, and in some places totally unsupervised borders in the South, Russia requires the greatest possible protection. Terrorism and regional conflicts in the South are the most realistic threats to Russia. Russia might be also attacked by a state or a coalition of states pursuing significant political and economic goals, and these goals might endanger the survival and sovereignty of Russia. Russia is a top-priority factor in inter-state rivalry today. Many countries wishing to improve their economic situation are interested in Russia’s resources and pursuing strategies aimed at weakening Russia as a military and naval power. The level of military confrontation with the West has decreased since 1991. However, the enlargement of the NATO alliance with its superior conventional forces to the East has led Russians to think about potential threats and about preparations to deter them in case current partnership relations become unreliable. Four factors seem to be the most important political-military considerations affecting the implementation of defence reform in Russia: 1- Russia’s conventional military weakness; 2- NATO’s conventional military superiority; 3- Russia’s fear of NATO’s intentions; 4- Russia’s military doctrine concerning the importance of nuclear forces. In the foreseeable future Russia needs to maintain a defence capability that can address real threats and conceivable contingencies but that will not over-burden the national economy. The quantity of military personnel, combat units, weapons, defence sites, and military production facilities must not be sacrificed for higher-quality arms and equipment, housing, standard of living, training and combat readiness. Russia needs to spread its strategic contingency planning from the Western theaters to theaters in the south (i.e., the Transcaucasus and Central Asia) and the Far East. The huge Soviet defence machine was created in a comparatively poor country with a command economy. In the end, Russia proved with its own experience the accuracy of the law of the rise and fall of great empires through military over-extension, expounded by the famous historian Paul Kennedy. Since the 1990s the Russian Federation has been

NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE 5 COLLEGE DE DEFENSE DE L’OTAN so weakened, and has faced so many threats and challenges, that the highest Russian government authority had to choose whether to live within the state’s means and to renounce the status of a super power in the near future, or to freeze today’s situation in the expectation of rapid economic growth. Fortunately, forecasts of an improvement in the world oil market and in Russian economic development were justified in the event, and the GNP began to grow rapidly in 2000. Nevertheless the economic growth has not been sufficient to provide all the requirements of defence reform, because other demanding priorities are on the state’s agenda. Moreover, the prerequisite for efficient defence reform is not only rapid and stable growth, but also accelerated growth in high-technology and science-intensive key industries. The improvements in this sphere of the Russian economy have to date not been substantial enough to meet the objective, and this is the most important problem in both the economy and defence reform. In view of this situation, Russia cannot yet permit itself the powerful armed forces (in size and effectiveness) that would correspond in full measure to current security challenges, but it has a chance of making some reasonable compromise arrangements. In the near future Russia will be able to spend for defence no more than 3.5% of GNP or 20% of the state budget. Acceleration of defence reform would require increasing the military budget, and this could have a negative influence on the economy as a whole. Research, development and procurement should cost about 60% of the defence budget. The advisable correlation of officers and other military personnel should equal 1:3 to 1:2.5, while the scope for further reductions in the armed forces below the level of 1,000,000 servicemen has been exhausted. The Russian Navy has not remained unchanged in the course of the nation’s continuing profound upheavals. The overall strength of the Russian Navy has declined from 450,000 to 155,000, the number of aircraft from 1,666 to 556, submarines from 317 to 61, and surface ships from 967 to 186. Despite the fact that Russia is washed by three oceans, the economic instability since 1991 has negatively affected not only the Navy, but also all the Russian Federation’s maritime potential, including transport, fishing and ship-building. The environment in the Russian Navy began to change in 2000 with increased defence budgets and a new maritime doctrine and other

6 NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE COLLEGE DE DEFENSE DE L’OTAN policy directives. In recent years Russia has not managed to begin serial production of warships, but it is realistic to plan for active construction of new ships beginning in 2006. In 2000-2005, after a decade of inactivity (that is, 1991-1999), Russian ships finally went to sea in increased numbers and for longer missions. Therefore the most important factors influencing military reform in Russia include the limited resources available for national defence and the unpredictable ways in which these resources may be expected to change over time. Current rapid economic growth has given Russia a unique opportunity to implement reforms in the air force, army and navy. At the same time, even in the current favorable world oil market the Russian Federation faces some difficulties in pursuing rapid defence reform, including the creation of all-professional armed forces capable of dealing with present and future threats and challenges.

3. Prospects for Defence Reform and NATO-Russia Partnership

Like the state itself, Russia’s armed forces have survived the upheaval and have reached a point of stabilization. Further radical changes are unlikely in the short to medium term. If Russia’s economic growth continues, it will provide more resources for the military. The next important objective, according to the government’s stated priorities, is defence modernization (that is, the optimization of the armed forces structures, and the reequipment of the military). Russian strategic deterrence forces remain a potent basis for the armed forces. If NATO as a military alliance with an offensive military doctrine and continuing enlargement program remains unchanged, Russia will probably have to reconstruct its military planning system and modify fundamentally the principles guiding the state’s military formations, including its nuclear strategy. In this case the nuclear forces will be streamlined and the deterrence of the United States will become a higher military security priority. Russia will also support the principle of using preventive strikes and will understand prevention as meaning not only strikes against criminal organizations and terrorist groups, but also other preventive actions to block the emergence of various threats before the need arises to take extreme measures to neutralize them.

NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE 7 COLLEGE DE DEFENSE DE L’OTAN The defence reform requires the reconstruction of the national military-industrial complex (MIC). Among the significant problems in this sphere that have to be addressed on a priority basis is the need for advanced and efficient management and control mechanisms. This will require the consolidation of the military-industrial complex, stripping it of excessive structures, and the organization of more economically efficient state enterprises and holding corporations. The increasingly efficient operation of the Russian military- industrial complex will be stimulated by priority financing of research and armament requirements. Russia has enough time for planned, deliberate and systematic activity in the development of new armaments. In the process of developing new 21st century weapons Russia has a considerable reserve of equipment and resources remaining from the Soviet period. At sea Russia will attempt to regain its status as a world maritime power. It intends to protect its interests not only in its coastal zone but also in the World Ocean. After the extensive damage suffered by Russia during the Cold War more is required than to reduce the armed forces to a minimum dimension, to combat a defeatist mood, and to focus on the reconstruction of the nation's economic potential. The goal of such reform is to create conditions for increasingly rapid economic development, notably in dual- use high technologies. Defence reform in the United States and other NATO armed forces is designed especially for war and other types of military operations, accompanied with a threat of war. This interpretation of defence reform in NATO has been supported by its enlargement to the East and its unbroken prosecution of wars and other military operations since the early 1990s. Therefore NATO and the Russian Federation are implementing their own defence reforms. The conditions and objectives of these reforms differ significantly, and this fact minimizes Russia’s options to make use of U.S. and NATO experiences. At the same time, the coordination of efforts by NATO and Russia may make Russia’s defence reform more effective and less expensive. The United States and Russia are partners and have seemingly no reason to engage in a costly arms race with each other. In fact, however, arms races have continued in some specific forms. The level of trust in

8 NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE COLLEGE DE DEFENSE DE L’OTAN the relationship between the United States and Russia is not high enough to enable these countries to abandon hedging strategies. As a result of continuing uncertainty about the future course of U.S. policy, Russia’s military policy requires that the armed forces be ready “to deter armed attack and, if necessary, to inflict ‘pre-determined damage’.” It should be recalled that, according to the NATO Alliance’s Strategic Concept, “The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the Alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained”. Since this reference to “powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance” can only refer to Russia, it is evident that NATO also has a hedging strategy that is comparable to Russian policy about strategic and tactical armaments programs. The reorientation of the NATO enlargement process and the development of new U.S. – Russian understandings about strategic armaments policy might in the future become important components of NATO-Russia cooperation. Improved cooperation will make the natural NATO-Russia (and US-Russia) competition less expensive and dangerous. Russia-NATO cooperation in combating terrorism, piracy, and other illicit activities at sea, decommissioning nuclear powered submarines, integrating logistics and sealift activities, and in other different functional areas should be prolonged and intensified. Given that the geopolitical and regional objectives of NATO and Russia may be in close agreement regarding some issues, Russia and NATO will probably recognize the considerable need for alignment and for more intensive partnership.

Conclusions

An analysis of the current strategic environment, the state of the national military-industrial complex and some economic forecasts have led to some suggestions about how the pace and effectiveness of reform may be increased. The suggestions are fivefold: - First, to prevent security threats from growing great and truly menacing; - Second, to reconstruct the national military-industrial complex; - Third, to balance the Russian armed forces structures;

NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE 9 COLLEGE DE DEFENSE DE L’OTAN

- Fourth, to unify and standardize Russia’s armaments programmes. - Fifth, to intensify cooperation with NATO.

Like the Russian state itself, the armed forces have survived the upheaval and turmoil and have reached a point of stabilization. Russia now needs time and resources. Because of the resources deficit, further radical changes are unlikely in the short to medium term. Therefore Russia has to implement defence reforms deliberately, thinking over each step, and thereby avoiding errors and saving money. If Russia’s economic growth continues, it will provide more resources for the military, and this will ensure successful pursuit of constructive defence reforms.