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Navy News Week 18-4 NAVY NEWS WEEK 18-4 3 May 2017 Somali pirate gets life in prison for attack on US Navy ship A Somali pirate has been sentenced to life in prison for his role in attacking a U.S. Navy ship Federal prosecutors said Wednesday that 31-year-old Mohamed Farah was among seven pirates who tried to commandeer the USS Ashland in 2010. The men had mistaken the Ashland for a cargo vessel in the Gulf of Aden. After the pirates opened fire, U.S. sailors destroyed their skiff and killed one pirate. The sailors rescued the surviving pirates. Farah and the remaining attackers were prosecuted in federal court in Norfolk and sentenced to various jail terms. Farah's attorney, Jason Dunn, told The Associated Press in an email that the sentence was excessive but unavoidable. The mandatory sentence for piracy has been life in prison since 1909. Before that, the mandatory punishment was death. Source : Foxnews India’s Responsibility towards Somalia and Maritime Security The recent string of pirate attacks off Somalia signals resurgence of this menace to international shipping and trade. Even as the presence of Indian Navy in these waters helped mitigate some of the attacks, it is imperative for India to take lead and actively engage all the responsible stakeholders to direct international efforts in tackling the root causes of this threat to international maritime security. Over 700 attacks took place during the previous spell of pirate attacks off Somalia and Western Indian Ocean spanning 2008-2011 with about 750 persons held hostage in 2011, the peak year of piracy. The World Bank had estimated that the cost to global economy due to Somali piracy as $18 billion annually. Delays in shipping, ransoms to pirates, insurance premiums, changes in trade routes, installation of security measures onboard ships etc. contributed to this cost. The mobilisation of international navies of Europe, India etc. aided by United Nations resolutions helped mitigate this threat. However, observers have warned last year that piracy off Somalia would resurge owing to political instability in Somalia as well as the inadequacy of international community in addressing the root cause of this threat. Somalis are dependent on fishing for their livelihood. The civil war in the country had left no proper authority to safeguard the territorial seas and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) resulting in illegal fishing as well as dumping of hazardous waste material by foreign entities along Somalia‟s coast. The use of dragnets and other banned mechanisms to catch fish has also contributed to the decline of fisheries in Somalia‟s waters. Calling themselves as “saviors of the sea,” the Somali pirates started attacking these fishing trawlers stealing the produce as well as holding the crew for ransom as sort of a “tax.” The attacks got extended to commercial shipping vessels as well as luxury cruises eventually, with the fishing trawlers buying protection from local warlords. This ground situation seems to remain unchanged, which is re-fueling resentment amongst Somali population leading to the resurgence of pirate attacks. The naval forces were able to hot pursuit pirate ships even within the Somalian territorial waters, conduct special operations, trial and imprison the pirates in various countries. However, the desperate Somali youth unable to find meaningful jobs on land or the sea are compelled to resort to piracy again while the lack of proper enforcement authority to safeguard Somalia‟s territorial and EEZ waters is abetting the breeding conditions. Somalia had made several requests to the international community to help it combat piracy. In addition to contributions from individual countries, the United Nations Security Council has passed resolutions establishing United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia with a mandate to stabilise Somalia. Somalia‟s transitional federal governments as well as autonomous states – Somaliland and Puntland have entered into agreements with several firms and private organisations for thwarting piracy, but in vain. In this situation, it is incumbent upon India to engage all the responsible stakeholders, particularly different autonomous administrations in Somalia, to attain the twin objectives of combating ongoing piracy attempts as well as build partner capacity enabling Somalia safeguard its waters. This should be a specific interest based arrangement to negate any misperception in Somalia against India as influencing its domestic politics. India is undertaking various measures to combat traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard routinely exercises with their counterparts in the Indian Ocean building partner capacity enhancing the security of sea lines of communication and safeguarding the EEZs. India should also consider building partner capacity of Somalia by re-organising, training and equipping its coast guard. New Delhi can deploy a long- term task force to the region for this purpose. The task force could meet its logistical requirements under the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the United States given the close proximity of Djibouti to the troubled region. The recent raids by Somali security forces freeing an Indian cargo ship as well as the crew taken hostage by the pirates shows the skill, seriousness and ambition on part of Somalia to combat piracy. This is a welcoming development for India to actively engage relevant agencies to safeguard the maritime global commons. The Indian Navy along with upgraded Somali coast guard could simultaneously thwart pirate attacks as well as illegal fishing trawlers and dumping of waste material in Somalia‟s waters. By apprehending such illegal ships and crews, India can establish trust with Somalia and work towards eradicating the social and economic conditions breeding piracy. India has growing interests in West Asia and Africa. The European and West Asian countries are mired with problems related to illegal migration, civil wars and power dynamics. Somalia requires a credible, assuring partner to combat piracy. These situations call upon India to make a practical assessment of its intentions and capabilities as a responsible power and take initiative in this situation. Source : defenceaviationpost It really was a pity that the functions of the task forces operating against piracy over the last few years, dids not include a function to patrol the fishing waters at the same time. This could have helped to create a more permanent solution to the piracy problem. Classicallly they were treatment the simptoms, not the cause. The US Navy treats the surface coating on their ships important The US Navy has awarded the International Marine & Industrial Applicators and QED Systems a $260.1 million joint contract for coating work on US Navy vessel surfaces. The work includes a variety of applications, including multiple-coating, ultra- high solids, epoxy and solvent based. It is also crucial to anti-fouling surfaces and structural repair for aircraft carriers, submarines, and assorted surface vessels. Initial funding of $2,000 dollars has been allocated for Fiscal 2017 to start the process, which is expected to be completed by May 2022. Saab Receives Order from FMV for Next Generation Anti-Ship Missiles Press release 28 April 2017 Defence and security company Saab has received an order from the Swedish Defence Material Administration (FMV) for production of next generation anti-ship missiles. The total order value amounts to SEK 500 million and deliveries will begin in the mid-2020s. In March 2017, Saab announced an order from FMV for development and production of the next generation anti-ship missile system. It will be delivered to the Swedish Armed Forces and will be integrated on both the new Gripen E fighters and the Visby class corvettes. This new order covers deliveries of additional missiles. “With these missiles the Swedish Armed Forces will have an outstanding capability to defeat any target, on both land and sea at long distances. The system also allows them to engage targets regardless of weather conditions and enemy countermeasures”, says Görgen Johansson, head of Saab business area Dynamics. The next generation anti-ship missile system combines proven capabilities from the RBS15 anti-ship missile family with new and enhanced capabilities. The RBS15 is a missile system that has been used by navies, coastal batteries and air forces for almost 30 years. The next generation missile system has an improved combat range, an upgraded missile seeker, and a lower mass compared to the earlier system. It also has an ability to combat a wide spectrum of naval and land-based targets, an all-weather capability and a new design enabling future growth potential. The RBS15 missile family is jointly produced by Saab and Diehl Defence. Source: http://saabgroup.com RBS15 Mk3 surface-to-surface missile (SSM) The power to act - the power to win With high-speed, long-range and unrivalled flexibility, the RBS15 Mk3 can provide a tactical advantage. The RBS15 Mk3 is the most modern surface- to surface missile system available on the market. As a long-range system, it is excellent as a main anti-surface armament for any type of naval vessel. It is designed to operate in a diverse range of scenarios, from antiship engagement in blue waters and littorals to land attack missions. The system is contracted by leading navies in international competition and in production and under delivery to Sweden, Germany and Poland. The missile is jointly produced and marketed by Saab, Sweden and Diehl BGT Defence, Germany. The RBS15 Mk3 allows for true fire-and forget operability in all weather conditions, thanks to its advanced prelaunch programmable active radar seeker. Mission planning is performed through the Missile Engagement Planning System (MEPS), which provides the operator with built-in decision support and advanced salvo firing management. In combination with high system readiness, the missile system facilitates rapid reaction response to any threat.
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