Secularism and Foreign Policy in Turkey New Elections, Troubling Trends Soner Cagaptay Policy Focus #67 | April 2007 All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any infor- mation storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2007 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Published in 2007 in the United States of America by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036. Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and Communication Front cover: Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad speak through a translator during a meeting in Tehran, December 3, 2006. The photos above them depict the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and current Supreme Leader Ali Hossein Khamenei. Copyright AP Wide World Photos/Vahid Salemi. About the Author Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of The Washington Institute’s Turkish Research Program. His extensive writings on U.S.-Turkish relations and related issues have appeared in numerous scholarly journals and major international print media, including Middle East Quarterly, Middle Eastern Studies, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, Reuters, Guardian, Der Spiegel, and La Stampa. He also appears regularly on Fox News, CNN, NPR, Voice of America, al-Jazeera, BBC, CNN-Turk, and al-Hurra. His most recent book is Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk? (Routledge, 2006). A historian by training, Dr. Cagaptay is the Ertegun Professor in Princeton University’s Department of Near Eastern Studies. He also serves as chair of the Turkey Advanced Area Studies Program at the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute. n n n The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. Table of Contents Acknowledgments. v Executive Summary . vii The AKP’s Foreign Policy: Erosion of the Secular Mindset and Rise of Muslim Nationalism. 1 Turkish Secularism as It Has Been . 5 Successful Islamist Challenge to Secular Parties: Enter the AKP. 20 From Foreign to Domestic Policy: Implications for the United States. 22 Illustrations Muslim nationalism in Turkey (photo) . 4 Ottoman military high school in Istanbul (photo) . 6 Alevi Population by Province (map) . 14 Figure 1. Alevi Self-Identification. 17 Figure 2. Generational Difference in Alevi Self-Identification. 18 Figure 3. Students at Imam-Hatip Schools, 1995–2005. 26 Figure 4. Turkish Women and Head-Covering Practices. 27 Turkish head coverings (photo). 27 Acknowledgments I WOULD LIKE to thank the many individuals who took time to read the text during the drafting process. Their insights proved invaluable in the preparation of the final paper. All errors in this work are, of course, mine. I would also like to thank my assistants Zeynep Eroglu, Daniel Fink, and David Jacobson for their help in bringing this Policy Focus to fruition. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy v Executive Summary TURK EY IS OF teN said to offer a counterexample secular Turkish parties are largely responsible for this to every cliché regarding Muslim-majority countries stance. They have made a convincing argument to the and the Middle East. For starters, the country has been Turkish people that Turkey’s interests lie in the West, westernizing since the days of the Ottoman Empire. leading an otherwise uncommitted public to support Second, Turkey has been staunchly secular since the Western foreign policy objectives, including U.S. poli- interwar-era reforms initiated by its founding presi- cies in the Middle East. dent, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Third, Turkey has been In contrast, the AKP has taken an avid interest in a multiparty democracy since 1950. And last but not Middle Eastern Muslim causes. Because the AKP gov- least, Turkey has maintained a pro-Western political ernment has not supported Turkish foreign policy orientation since the end of World War II. moves paralleling those of the country’s Western allies, Yet today, Turkey bows to the ultimate Middle East instead putting a premium on Turkey’s ties with Mus- cliché: the rise of a strong religion-based movement, lim countries and emphasizing solidarity with Muslim the AKP (Justice and Development Party) govern- causes, the Turks are turning to the Muslim Middle ment. The AKP, which came to power in 2002, has East. This transition is feeding into new and powerful since undermined Turkey’s traditional pro-Western political sentiments in the form of Muslim national- foreign policy orientation. ism, with many Turks concluding—in line with the To date, 2007 is perhaps the most important year AKP’s arguments—that their interests lie with other of the twenty-first century for Turkey. First, the coun- Muslim-majority countries. try prepares for two crucial elections, presidential in For the time being, Turkey is still a U.S. ally, known April–May and parliamentary in November. Second, to fulfill its international obligations—from NATO Turkey’s European Union (EU) accession appears to participation to Afghanistan, the War on Terror, and be stalled. On December 14, 2006, the EU froze acces- Iraq. Yet these immediate issues notwithstanding, the sion talks with Turkey on some of the immediate chap- AKP is moving Turkey in a direction where growing ters to be negotiated. What is more, it appears that the anti-Western public opinion increasingly checks Tur- EU will not finalize chapters that are being opened for key’s commitment to the West. negotiations unless Turkey normalizes its ties with the Five years of AKP rule has undermined not only the Greek-majority government of Cyprus, a political non- Turks’ commitment to the West but also Turkish secu- starter in Turkey at the moment. These developments larism. Pro-Western foreign policy and secularism are have effectively brought Turkey’s EU train to a grind- the Siamese twins of Turkish politics. Inevitably, weak ing halt. Finally, in 2007 the future of Turkey’s commit- political support for the West translates into stronger ment to the West seems to be at stake. Since the AKP Turkish identification with Islam as well as with Mus- came to power in 2002, Turkish popular commitment lim countries. According to a recent poll by TESEV, a to the West has weakened significantly. According to a Turkish nongovernmental organization (NGO) based 2006 poll by the Pew Center, Turkey has seen a drop in Istanbul, the number of people identifying them- in pro-American and pro-Western sentiments, while a selves as Muslims has increased by 10 percent since the 2006 German Marshall Fund survey shows that Turk- AKP’s rise to power in 2002, and the number of people ish public attitudes toward Muslim issues and coun- declaring that they are Islamists now includes almost tries, among them Iran, have warmed significantly. Tur- half the Turkish population, a whopping 48.5 percent. key is a Muslim-majority country. Yet, for a long time, Hence, not just Turkey’s traditional pro-Western the country looked to the West, identifying with West- foreign policy but also Turkish secularism is at stake ern foreign policy objectives, especially after 1946. The in 2007. The Turkish parliament will elect a new presi- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy vii Soner Cagaptay Secularism and Foreign Policy in Turkey: New Elections, Troubling Trends dent during a one-month period before the term of ingly, only the ballots cast for the AKP and CHP, 53 current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer ends on May percent of the votes, are represented today in the Turk- 16. The president appoints judges to Turkey’s secular ish parliament. Moreover, because the AKP received judiciary, which has so far provided a check on the seats that would have otherwise gone to parties failing AKP’s power, and selects university presidents from to meet the threshold, it took control of dispropor- a list voted on by the academic personnel of the uni- tionately more seats in the parliament than its share of versities. The judiciary (especially the high courts) and votes: a two-thirds majority rather than one-third of universities are bastions of Turkish secularism, which all votes cast. mandates firewalls thicker than those in the United Since 2002, the AKP has ruled Turkey alone States between religion and politics. The courts review through a supermajority in the legislative branch and legislation on issues concerning secularism, including control over the executive branch, with the exception the turban (a specific headscarf that the courts regard of the presidency. The AKP’s domination over the as a sign of political Islam) and imam-hatip schools legislative and executive branches—the president can (vocational religious schools created to train Muslim slow legislation but not veto it—has weakened the religious leaders, now providing an alternative track to Turkish democracy. As a result of the 2002 election Turkey’s universal secular education system by enroll- twist, which left 47 percent of the popular vote unrep- ing and graduating many more students than Turkey resented in the legislature, today opposition to the needs religious leaders). Currently, the courts ban the AKP is increasingly carried out not by political parties, turban on university campuses, while Turkey’s secular but by institutions, such as the military and the courts. higher education system directs graduates of imam- This fact undermines the Turkish democracy. hatip schools to become theology majors in university. Turkey has traditionally suffered from a “majori- Thus, the stakes in the presidential elections are high, tarian malaise,” with right-wing parties—such as the with the judiciary and universities as rewards for the Democrat Party in the late 1950s, National Front winner.