October 2013
Monthly Forecast
2 In Hindsight: Chapter Overview VII 3 Status Update since our September Forecast Azerbaijan will preside over the Council in October. likely respectively by Ladsous and Assistant Sec- 4 Democratic Republic of At press time, the Council was poised to adopt a retary-General for Political Affairs, Tayé-Brook the Congo resolution on the Syrian chemical weapons issue. Zerihoun; 5 Visiting Mission to The situation in Syria will likely continue to garner • UN Interim Security Force for Abyei by its head, Africa a significant level of Council activity in October. Yohannes Tesfamariam (via videoconferencing); 6 Sudan and South In early October, Council members will be • the implementation of resolution 1559 con- Sudan on a visiting mission to several locations in Africa, cerning Lebanon by Special Envoy Terje Rød- including Addis Ababa, Kigali, Goma, Kampala Larsen; and 8 Sudan (Darfur) and Kinshasa. • Western Sahara, by Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber, 9 Somalia Azerbaijan is planning three open debates on: the head of the UN Mission for the Referen- 11 Mali • Council working methods; dum in Western Sahara and by the Secretary- 12 Western Sahara • women peace and security, with a briefing by General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, 13 Lebanon the Secretary-General and the new head of UN Christopher Ross. Women, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka; and The annual private meeting with the President 14 Israel/Palestine • the Middle East, most likely with a briefing by of the International Court of Justice, Peter Tomka, 16 Afghanistan Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs is also planned. 17 Haiti Jeffrey Feltman. Additionally, formal sessions will be needed to 18 Cooperation Briefings are expected: adopt resolutions: with Regional • by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and • renewing the mandate of UN Stabilisation Mis- and Subregional Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Secretary- sion in Haiti; Organisations General Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu on cooperation • renewing the authorisation of the International 19 Security Council between the UN and the OIC, with a high-level Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan; and Working Methods representative of Azerbaijan presiding; and • modifying the mandate of the UN Integrated 20 Women, Peace and • on the visiting mission to Africa, by the various Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Security leaders of different legs of the trip. Republic. 22 Annual Report of the Briefings, followed by consultations, are likely A formal session will likewise be needed to adopt Security Council on: the introduction (drafted by the US) to the annu- 23 Security Council • the situation in the Great Lakes region and the al report of the Security Council to the General Elections 2013 work of UN Organization Stabilization Mission Assembly. 24 Notable Dates for in the DRC (MONUSCO) by the Secretary- On 17 October the General Assembly is sched- October General’s Special Representative and head of uled to hold elections to fill five seats on the Secu- MONUSCO, Martin Kobler, and the Secre- rity Council for the period from 1 January 2014 Supplement Security Council tary-General’s Special Envoy to the Great Lakes through 31 December 2015 to replace exiting Deadlocks and Uniting Region, Mary Robinson; members Azerbaijan, Guatemala, Morocco, Paki- for Peace: An Abridged • the situation in Mali by the head of the UN stan and Togo.• History Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mis- sion in Mali, Albert Gerard Koenders; • the latest Secretary-General’s report on the AU/ UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, by Under- 30 September 2013 Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations This report is available online at securitycouncilreport.org. Hervé Ladsous; and • the situation in Somalia and three related reports For daily insights by SCR on evolving Security Council actions please by the Deputy Secretary-General, Jan Eliasson. subscribe to our “What’s In Blue” Briefings in consultations are likely on: series at whatsinblue.org or follow @SCRtweets on Twitter. • Sudan and South Sudan issues, twice, most
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 1 In Hindsight: Chapter VII
Permanent members have worked overtime to constitute a threat to international peace should additional measures be necessary”, for nearly two weeks to codify into a Security and security” although Resolution 1970, as well as resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803 and Council decision the 14 September Russia-US likewise adopted under Chapter VII, con- 1929 on Iran. agreement to secure and dismantle chemical tained no explicit Article 39 determination. • Although the UN Charter does not express- weapons stockpiles in Syria. With the issue of • Even when the Security Council does use ly prescribe a particular form for adopting whether the Council acts under Chapters VI or its Chapter VII powers, it is not essential binding decisions, Security Council prac- VII of the UN Charter, and whether it does so for the decision to be binding to have an tice suggests that resolutions are the pri- in a binding manner, at the core of these nego- explicit reference to Chapter VII or a par- mary vehicle for binding decisions. Presi- tiations, it may be worthwhile to take a closer ticular article thereof. In an apparent effort dential statements and press statements are look at this matter. There seems to be some to increase clarity, however, the Council has not used as vehicles for such decisions. uncertainty as to the difference between Chap- of late prefaced resolutions or provisions • Security Council decisions bind mem- ters VI and VII, and also about what makes a under Chapter VII with an explicit refer- ber states and the UN itself—but there is Council decision binding under international ence to its “acting under Chapter VII”. uncertainty regarding non-member states law. • Resolutions adopted under Chapter VII and regional organisations. Sometimes Interpretation of Security Council resolu- may also (and usually do) include provi- decisions address individuals and non-state tions is a complex art. As determined by the sions which are non-binding. actors with the intent to bind such parties. International Court of Justice in its advisory • Chapter VII powers must be used to autho- It remains to be seen how this practice will opinion of 21 June 1971 (Namibia), “the lan- rise Security Council-mandated sanctions evolve over time. guage of a resolution of the Security Council regimes—although an explicit reference to • Uncertain consent by the party concerned, should be carefully analysed before a conclu- Chapter VII or Article 41 more specifically unease about legal ambiguity and deploy- sion can be made as to its binding effect. In is not essential. ment in increasingly hostile operational view of the nature of the powers under Article • Chapter VII powers must be likewise used environments have increasingly led the 25, the question whether they have been in to authorise the use of force, either by a Security Council to authorise UN opera- fact exercised is to be determined in each case, UN peacekeeping operation or by member tions and the use of force with explicit refer- having regard to the terms of the resolution to states—but again an explicit reference to ence to Chapter VII. be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Chapter VII or Article 42 more specifically • The practical conduct of UN peacekeep- Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all is not essential. ing operations—and whether force is actu- circumstances that might assist in determining • At times, the Security Council has sought ally used or not—is typically more strong- the legal consequences of the resolution of the to include a precise reference to the article ly influenced by other factors such as the Security Council” (para. 114). With the above on which the measures imposed are based, concept of operations and the rules of in mind, the following guidelines may therefore most frequently Article 41, to exclude any engagement rather than the language of the be helpful in determining whether a particular inference that the Council might be includ- mandate itself as expressed in the relevant Council decision or provision is binding: ing measures under Article 42. Recent Council decision. • Decisions of a binding nature can be adopt- examples include resolutions 1718, 1874, • Since the end of the Cold War, the Security ed by the Security Council using its general 1928 and 2094 on DPRK, which read Council has shifted its emphasis markedly powers under Articles 24 and 25 of the UN “acting under Chapter VII… and taking increasing its adoption of Chapter VII reso- Charter without reference to either Chap- measures under its Article 41”, as well as lutions or resolutions with Chapter VII pro- ters VI or VII. resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803 and 1929 on visions. Whereas only 10 of the 37 resolu- • Chapter VII is usually invoked following an Iran, 1970 and 2009 on Libya and 2048 on tions adopted in 1990 were under Chapter Article 39 determination by the Security Guinea-Bissau. VII (27.0 percent), 32 of the 53 resolutions Council that there has been a “threat to • At times, the Security Council has like- adopted in 2012 made reference to Chapter the peace, breach of the peace, or act of wise sought to exclude any inference that it VII (60.4 percent). aggression”. An explicit reference to Article might be including measures under Article 39 or to the nature of the determination 42 in underlining that a further Council For a more detailed analysis, see our 23 is not essential, however, for the Council decision is required for the use of force. June 2008 Special Research Report entitled to use its Chapter VII powers. Resolution Recent examples likewise include resolu- “Security Council Action under Chapter VII: 1973 on Libya, for example, interestingly tions 1718 and 1874 on DPRK, which Myths and Realities”. stated that the situation in Libya “continues reads “further decisions will be required,
2 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 Status Update since our September Forecast
Syria report from the Panel of Experts assisting the on the government’s new poverty reduction On 4 September, in a horizon scanning brief- Committee (S/2013/331) along with other out- strategy launched in July (S/PV.7034). On 27 ing in consultations, Jeffrey Feltman, head of standing issues. However, the Committee had September, Council members welcomed the the Department of Political Affairs, reported not been able to agree on any of the recom- judgment of the SCSL appeals chamber that on his discussions with Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Sau- mendations and remained divided on a num- upheld the fifty-year jail term of former Libe- di Arabia and Qatar on the situation in Syria ber of other issues, including over whether the rian President Charles Taylor (SC/11133). and preparations for Geneva II peace talks. On ballistic missile launches during the so-called 16 September, the Secretary-General briefed “Great Prophet” exercise in July 2012 were in Golan Heights Council members on the results of the UN violation of resolution 1929. Council members were briefed in consultations investigation into the alleged use of chemical on 19 September by DPKO on the Secretary- weapons in Syria on 21 August (S/2013/553). Liberia General’s report on UNDOF (S/2013/542). Although the UN inspectors’ mandate did not On 10 September, the Council was briefed (S/ Council members were informed that the cover the attribution of blame for the attacks, PV.7029) by Karin Landgren, the Special Rep- ceasefire between Israel and Syria was gener- many Council members, particularly the P3, resentative and head of UNMIL, on the most ally maintained although there were violations in remarks to the press following the consul- recent UNMIL report (S/2013/479). Ambas- attributable to the ongoing conflict in Syria. tations were of the view that the report pro- sador Staffan Tillander (Sweden), the chair of vided detailed information on delivery systems the Liberia configuration of the Peacebuilding Small Arms which pointed to government culpability. Also Commission, also briefed the Council, as well On 26 September, the Council held a high- in September, there was a flurry of high-level as Defense Minister Brownie Samukai of Libe- level meeting (S/PV.7036) and adopted reso- diplomatic activity, particularly between Rus- ria. The briefing was followed by consultations. lution 2117 on small arms by a vote of 14 in sia and the US, regarding Syria. On 19 Sep- On 18 September, the Council adopted resolu- favour and Russia abstaining. It was the first tember, Russia and the US transmitted to the tion 2116 renewing the UNMIL mandate for thematic resolution on small arms adopted Council their framework for the elimination of a year and authorising the second phase of the by the Council and the first formal meeting Syrian chemical weapons agreed in Geneva on drawdown plan to further reduce the military on this issue since April 2008. Australia circu- 14 September (S/2013/565). On 24 September, component by September 2014. lated a concept note on 6 September to guide Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and the discussions (S/2013/536). The meeting US Secretary of State John Kerry met on the Libya was chaired by Australian Foreign Minister sidelines of the General Assembly to discuss a On 16 September, the Council was briefed by Julie Bishop and featured a briefing by the draft resolution on the destruction of the Syr- Special Representative Tarek Mitri and by the Secretary-General on his 22 August report on ian chemical weapons arsenal. At press time, chair of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee, small arms (S/2013/503). ICRC Vice-Presi- it seemed the Council was poised to adopt a Ambassador Eugéne-Richard Gasana (Rwan- dent Christine Beerli also spoke. The resolu- resolution on the chemical weapons issue by da), followed by consultations (S/PV.7031). tion focused on the illicit transfer, destabilising month’s end. Mitri presented the latest UNSMIL report accumulation and misuse of small arms and highlighting the internal and regional dynam- light weapons. Its main provisions included Guinea-Bissau ics that continue to place a huge strain on the strengthening the implementation of Coun- On 5 September, Council members were political processes in Libya, as well as the dete- cil mandated arms embargoes; encouraging briefed in consultations by Special Represen- riorating security situation (S/2013/516). Gas- greater coordination and information-sharing tative Jose Ramos-Horta on the latest report ana briefed on the interim report of the Panel among key stakeholders; supporting stock- of the Secretary-General on the restoration of Experts, including the establishment of the pile management and DDR programs; and of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau first end-user certificates for security assistance strengthening capacity-building. Moreover, (S/2013/499). On 11 September, the Security by the Libyan government. He also transmit- the resolution stressed the need for full imple- Council issued a press statement urging cred- ted the Panel’s concern over arms prolifera- mentation of the UN programme of action on ible and transparent presidential and legislative tion within Libya and the increasing reports of small arms and urged states to consider signing elections to be held within the established tran- arms trafficking to Syria by sea and air. and ratifying the Arms Trade Treaty adopted sitional period by the end of 2013 (SC/11118). by the General Assembly earlier this year. Sierra Leone Iran The Council had a briefing, followed by con- Yemen On 5 September, the chair of the 1737 Iran sultations, on 18 September on the most On 27 September, the Council was briefed by Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Gary recent UNIPSIL report (S/2013/547). Brief- Special Adviser Jamal Benomar and the Secre- Quinlan (Australia) presented his 90-day ers were Jens Anders Toyberg-Frandzen, the tary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council report on the work of the Committee to the Executive Representative and head of UNIP- Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani (S/PV.7037). Council (S/PV.7028). He said the Commit- SIL, and Ambassador Guillermo Rishchynski Both Benomar and Al-Zayani addressed the tee on 8 August had adopted its programme (Canada), the chair of the Sierra Leone con- last stages of Yemen’s National Dialogue Con- of work for the period 1 July to 31 December figuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. ference and challenges to the political transi- 2013 and had otherwise continued to consider Foreign Minister Samura Kamara of Sierra tion, including threats posed by Al-Qaida in the recommendations presented in the latest Leone also addressed the Council, focusing the Arabian Peninsula.
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 3 Democratic Republic of the Congo
Expected Council Action reach consensus and the press statement was Kampala talks, but for a period of no longer In October, the Security Council will be put aside. than 14 days rather than indefinitely. (The briefed by Special Representative Martin Fighting escalated during the following talks resumed on 10 September and were Kobler and by the Special Envoy for the Great days. On 24 August, three civilians in Goma ongoing at press time.) Lakes Region, Mary Robinson, on the imple- were killed by mortar shells fired by the M23, Despite the declared ceasefire, the M23 has mentation of the Peace, Security and Coopera- according to MONUSCO. A day later, peace- reportedly continued activities against civil- tion Framework for the DRC and the Region keepers shot and killed two civilians who were ians in the area of Rutshuru, to which it fell (PSC Framework). attempting to storm a MONUSCO base back after fleeing Goma. According to media At press time, the Council was scheduled during demonstrations against UN inaction. reports, M23 rebels are targeting vehicles load- to go on a mission to the region, including the Kobler announced that the DRC police and ed with supplies and imposing a curfew on Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in MONUSCO would conduct a joint investiga- civilians in the area. October. (For more on this, see the brief on the tion into the incident. Meanwhile, violence has also broken out Visiting Mission to Africa.) The “intervention brigade” joined the near Ituri in Orientale Province where the The mandate of the UN Organization Sta- FARDC in an offensive against the M23, FARDC and the Front de Résistance Patriotique bilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) including with the support of attack helicop- de l’Ituri have clashed since late August, caus- expires on 31 March 2014. ters, resulting in the death of two Tanzanian ing 80,000 civilians to flee their villages. Peacekeepers. Media reports suggest that at Kobler and Robinson briefed Council Key Recent Developments least 23 FARDC soldiers were killed in the members via video-teleconference on 12 August was marked by growing dissatisfaction fighting and the M23 suffered dozens of casu- September about their diplomatic efforts to of the local population with UN performance. alties as well. calm the situation. Kobler said that the mili- Several demonstrations took place protest- During a 29 August briefing to Coun- tary situation has stabilised and that the M23 ing against the newly declared UN ‘security cil members, Mulet reportedly said that had been pushed back from Goma. However, zone’ around Goma which they claimed did MONUSCO witnessed mortar shells being he added, the M23 was preparing for further not include areas in and around the city actu- shot from positions held by the M23 towards fighting, which might resume if the Kampala ally under the control of the rebel March 23 Rwanda as well as Rwandan troops crossing talks failed. Robinson insisted that the talks Movement (M23). the border into the DRC. Rwanda categori- were not to result in broad amnesties for M23 After a recent lull in fighting, clashes cally denied that its troops had crossed the rebels for grave violations of human rights between the M23 and the Forces Armées de la border and claimed that it had evidence that and international humanitarian law. Coun- République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) the FARDC and the Forces Démocratiques cil members then issued a press statement quickly escalated on 21 August when M23 de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) rebel taking note of the ICGLR declaration and rebels entered the security zone. The recently group had fired the mortars. Rwanda also calling for the implementation of the PSC formed MONUSCO “intervention brigade” requested that the Expanded Joint Verification Framework (SC/11119). fired its first shots when it responded with Mechanism (EJVM) for border issues between The regional oversight mechanism of the mortar shells on M23 positions. The following Rwanda and the DRC investigate the matter. PSC Framework, the “11+4”, met at the mar- day, four civilians were killed in the Goma area (The Ugandan coordinator of the EJVM was gins of the General Assembly on 23 September, by mortar shells reportedly fired by the M23. expelled by the DRC in August, alleging he with the Secretary-General and the Chairper- At the initiative of the Secretariat, Coun- was too favourable to Rwandan interests.) son of the AU Commission, Nkosazana Dlam- cil members received two separate briefings After the meeting, the Council issued a press ini-Zuma, co-hosting the meeting. The heads on the latest violence during consultations on statement condemning the recent attacks by of state of the 10 countries (a representative of 22 August from Assistant Secretary-General the M23 against civilians and MONUSCO CAR did not attend the meeting) adopted the for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet (SC/11108). Council members also expressed regional benchmarks developed by the Tech- under “any other business”. concern about reports of mortar shells and nical Support Committee assisting Robinson. France circulated a draft press statement bombs being fired repeatedly into Rwanda and Council members received the latest Sec- condemning the M23 attacks against civilians called for the EJVM to conduct a thorough retary-General’s report on the PSC Frame- and MONUSCO. Rwanda argued that both investigation of those incidents. work in late September. The report notes cer- sides should be called upon to cease hostilities On 30 August, the M23 suspended fighting tain progress in the DRC’s implementation of and the need to implement the PSC Frame- and withdrew from their positions. its commitments, but warns that the renewed work and the importance of the Kampala talks On 5 September the International Con- fighting dramatically increases the risk of a between the DRC and the M23 should be ference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) collapse of the political process. It also reports emphasised. Council members were unable to summit called for the resumption of the that a monitoring and evaluation mechanism
UN DOCUMENTS ON THE DRC Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2098 (28 March 2013) renewed the mandate of MONUSCO until 31 March 2014 and created the intervention brigade. S/RES/2078 (28 November 2012) extended the DRC sanctions and the Group of Experts to 1 February 2014. Security Council Press Statements SC/11119 (12 September 2013) expressed the Council’s support for the PSC Framework. SC/11008 (29 August 2013) condemned recent attacks by the M23 against civilians and MONUSCO. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2013/569 (24 September 2013) was the report on the PSC Framework. S/2013/388 (28 June 2013) was the latest report on MONUSCO. Group of Experts Report S/2013/433 (19 July 2013) was the interim report. OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission Martin Kobler (Germany) MONUSCO Force Commander Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz (Brazil) MONUSCO Size, Composition and Cost of Mission Strength as of 31 July 2013: 20,519 troops (including 512 military observers and 1,420 police), 994 international civilian personnel, 2,947 local civilian staff and 549 UN volunteers. Approved budget (1 July 2013-30 June 2014): $1.4 billion Mission Duration 30 November 1999 to present; mandate expires on 31 March 2014
4 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 Democratic Republic of the Congo (con’t)
headed by Robinson will be established to High Commissioner on the situation of human the current sanctions regime. ensure that the commitments under the PSC rights in the DRC from November 2011 to May Framework are met. 2013 (A/HRC/24/33). On 27 September, the HRC Council Dynamics decided that it will hold a high-level dialogue dur- In sanctions-related developments, the ing its 25th session on remaining challenges in At press time, with the fighting having appar- Group of Experts (GoE) assisting the 1533 the fight against sexual violence in the DRC. ently subsided, Council members appear DRC Sanctions Committee presented its report hopeful that the trip to the region will enable to the Committee on 19 July (S/2013/433). political momentum and send a message to the The report stated that the GoE had gathered Key Issues parties that the Council intends to follow up evidence that continuous but limited support The key issue is to ensure the implementation on the implementation of the PSC Framework was being provided to the M23 from within of resolution 2098, which demands the fulfil- and resolution 2098. Rwanda. The chair of the 1533 Committee, ment of the commitments made by the parties Recent events concerning press state- Ambassador Agshin Mehdiyev (Azerbaijan), in the PSC Framework. ments and the sanctions committee indicate briefed Council members about the Commit- Another issue is to closely oversee the that Rwanda’s presence on the Council has tee’s activities in consultations on 22 July. operations of MONUSCO, and particularly made consensus-based action more elusive at In August, the US put forward the names the “intervention brigade”, and how these times. Some Council members are concerned of two M23 members to be added to the affect the protection of civilians in the DRC. that the subsequent delayed reaction, and at sanctions list, but Rwanda blocked them times inaction, is not consistent with a “hands- (sanctions committees routinely operate by Options on” approach and effective follow-up on the consensus). The Council could issue a presidential or implementation of the PSC Framework and press statement either during or following its the operations of the “intervention brigade”. Human Rights-Related Developments visit to the region, supporting the implemen- While supportive of a negotiation process, Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights tation of the PSC Framework and the opera- Council members have nonetheless been Flavia Pansieri visited the DRC from 22 to 28 tions of the “intervention brigade”. ambivalent about the Kampala talks. Most August and said she was particularly affected by the situation of people in North Kivu and Ituri. She It may also expand sanctions—or indicate Council members oppose an agreement that was alarmed by the scale of sexual violence com- its willingness to expand them—if commit- would lead to the reintegration of M23 rebels mitted in Ituri, mainly by armed groups but also ments of the parties under the PSC Frame- into the FARDC without addressing issues of by security and defence forces and by civilians, work are not met. The 1533 Sanctions Com- accountability. Furthermore, there are con- with many victims awaiting justice. She witnessed mittee could likewise revisit some of the cerns that reintegrated rebels might not for- renewed fighting around the city of Goma and strongly denounced the indiscriminate bombings. unimplemented recommendations identified feit their allegiance to non-government forces, On 25 September, Pansieri presented to the by the GoE in its latest report, including sec- as has happened in the past. Human Rights Council (HRC) the report of the ondary sanctions against those undermining France is the penholder on the DRC.
Visiting Mission to Africa
Council members are planning to visit Addis missions, which started in 2007, continues for Forecast), with about 30 being split more or Ababa, Kigali, Goma, Kampala and Kinshasa most of this mission. France and Morocco will less equally among the P3, making it highly in early October. A briefing on the mission is co-lead on the DRC leg (Goma and Kinshasa) likely that the P3 would be involved in leading expected on 21 October with a written report while Azerbaijan and Rwanda will do so on on Council missions. to follow. the Addis Ababa leg. The US will lead on the Since 2000, Council members have trav- Rwanda leg (Kigali) and the UK in Uganda The DRC, Rwanda and Uganda Legs elled to Africa at least once a year. Some of (Kampala). In visiting the DRC, Rwanda and Ugan- these missions were to one location—for exam- From 1993 to 1999, only non-permanent da, Council members may be looking to ple, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) members led these missions. In 2000 the US encourage the political momentum of in 2006 and 2010—but recent visits have cov- was the first P5 member to lead a mission recent weeks in the DRC as well as fol- ered two to three places. Since 2007, the itin- when Council members visited the DRC. It is low-up on the 25 July high-level Council eraries of the visiting missions to Africa have now rare for the P5 not to lead Council mis- debate on the Great Lakes and the DRC included Addis Ababa every other year, for an sions when visiting destinations of which they (S/PV.7011 and Resumption 1). The visit annual consultation with the AU Peace and are the penholder of the relevant agenda-item. is also expected to send a key message to Security Council (PSC). Currently there are over 40 penholder arrange- all parties that the Council is closely fol- The practice of co-leads for African visiting ments (see our February 2013 Monthly lowing the implementation of the Peace,
UN DOCUMENTS ON COUNCIL VISITING MISSIONS Security Council Resolution S/RES/2098 (28 March 2013) renewed the mandate of MONUSCO and created the intervention brigade. Security Council Letter S/2012/444 (13 June 2012) was the communiqué of the last consultative meeting between members of the Security Council and PSC. Secretary- General’s Reports S/2013/387 (28 June 2013) was on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the region. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7011 and Resumption 1 (25 July 2013) was the high-level event on the Great Lakes.
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 5 Visiting Mission to Africa (con’t)
Security and Cooperation Framework for decisions on the DRC have been difficult, PSC and UN Security Council stated that the the DRC and the Great Lakes region (PSC often leading to a delayed reaction from the next consultative meeting would be held at Framework) signed in February. Meetings Council on the DRC. Some Council mem- the headquarters of the AU no later than July are expected with senior members of the bers may want to emphasise the importance 2013 (S/2012/444). While there was some talk government, including possibly the heads of stability for the eastern DRC and the need of a Council visiting mission to Africa in Feb- of state, of all three countries. for Rwanda and the DRC to work together ruary and in May, difficulties in agreeing on The visit to the DRC will be the first since with the UN to ensure this. Council visits for the year as well as scheduling the Council last visited on 13-16 May 2010. The visit to Uganda is expected to also problems appear to have led to this visit taking For a decade, between 2000 and 2010, the focus on relations between the countries in the place considerably later than anticipated. Council visited the DRC every year, making region and is likely to cover Uganda’s concerns Azerbaijan, as the President of the Coun- it the situation with the most Council vis- over recent developments, particularly in the cil in October, and Rwanda will co-lead the its. While in the DRC, Council members are DRC. Another area of discussion is likely to be Addis Ababa segment of the trip, which will be expected to visit both Kinshasa and Goma. A the UN regional strategy to combat the Lord’s focused largely on the institutional relationship key focus will be the security and humanitar- Resistance Army and the role of Uganda in between the two Councils. The AU PSC is the ian crisis in eastern DRC due to the activi- this effort. only international body with which members ties of the March 23 Movement (M23) and Council members may also want to dis- of the Security Council have regular interac- other armed groups. Council members are cuss the Kampala peace talks between the tion. They have been meeting since 2007, alter- expected to also want to show support for M23 rebels and the DRC, which re-started nating between their respective headquarters. the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission on 10 September, given that President Yow- On 17 September the AU sent a letter to in the DRC (MONUSCO) and follow-up on eri Museveni of Uganda is chairperson of the the Council on preparations for the upcom- resolution 2098, which called for the recon- International Conference on the Great Lakes ing consultative meeting with the members of figuration of MONUSCO and the creation Region and mediator of the talks. While sup- the Security Council, which contained a pro- of an “intervention brigade”. Of particular portive of the process, Council members are posed draft agenda. It contains a number of interest will be recent military operations somewhat ambivalent about the Kampala talks. issues of overlapping interest to both Coun- jointly conducted by the DRC armed forces Most Council members oppose an agreement cils. These include the situation in the Central and MONUSCO against the M23 and other that would allow the reintegration of M23 reb- African Republic, the Great Lakes, Mali and armed groups. Given the effects of the con- els into the DRC military without addressing the Sahel, Somalia and Sudan/South Sudan. flict in eastern DRC on civilians, Council accountability issues and are concerned that Recent Council decisions on some of these members may also focus on protection of reintegrated rebels may remain loyal to non- issues, notably Mali, have led to complaints civilians, sexual violence and child protection. government forces. from the PSC that Africa had not been proper- While in Rwanda, Council members may ly consulted. It is unclear if some of this discon- want to discuss the impact of the DRC situ- Addis Ababa tent might lead to a more contentious meeting ation on Rwanda. Since Rwanda came on The communiqué adopted at the end of the that could result in less productive discussions. the Council in January, consensus-based 2012 meeting between members of the AU
Sudan and South Sudan
Expected Council Action Key Recent Developments September 2012. They also underscored the In October, the Council expects to hold Presidents Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and Salva importance of establishing civilian institutions two meetings, likely in consultations, on Kiir of South Sudan held a summit in Khar- in Abyei and finding a final resolution to the compliance by Sudan, South Sudan and the toum on 3 September. Bashir said Sudan status of the region. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North would allow the transport of oil from South Notable developments in domestic politics (SPLM-N) with resolution 2046. The Coun- Sudan through Sudan to continue, counter- in both Sudan and South Sudan have occurred cil also expects to discuss in consultations the manding a threatened oil shutdown sched- recently. On 1 September, the ruling National most recent report of the UN Interim Security uled to begin on 6 September. It appears that Congress Party in Sudan said that it had been Force for Abyei (UNISFA), whose mandate Kiir also promised that South Sudan would holding consultations with opposition parties expires on 30 November. not support rebels in Sudan. The presidents with the goal of forming a new, more inclu- At press time, no outcome was anticipated reiterated their commitment to implement sive cabinet. Nonetheless, it stressed that this on these matters. the cooperation agreements on oil, security should not be interpreted as meaning that it and economic issues that they signed on 27 will initiate a transitional government with the
UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2013/14 (23 August 2013) expressed concern about the challenges facing implementation of the 27 September 2012 agreements. Security Council Letters S/2013/560 (17 September 2013) was a letter from Sudan containing a brief report on the steps that Sudan and South Sudan had taken since the 3 September summit to enhance cooperation between the two countries. S/2013/528 (3 September 2013) was a letter from Sudan con- taining the communiqué of the 3 September summit.
6 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 Sudan and South Sudan (con’t)
aim of producing a new constitution. On 23 solution” in its 24 October 2012 communiqué, September 2012 proposal on Abyei; September, protests broke out when the Suda- although it has not endorsed the proposal as a • reiterated its belief that there cannot be a nese government removed fuel subsidies result- final and binding decision, while the UN Security military solution to the conflict in South Council has merely decided that the parties should ing in the death of at least 29 demonstrators. resolve the final status of Abyei through negotia- Kordofan and Blue Nile and that “there is Meanwhile, in South Sudan, on 2 September tions under the auspices of the AUHIP.) Although no alternative to…[Sudan and the SPLM- the parliament approved Magok Rundial as its South Sudan has accepted the proposal, Sudan N] engaging in direct negotiations towards new speaker, replacing James Wani Igga, who refuses to do so alleging concern that the vote a political settlement…;” became vice-president on 23 August. Media will exclude the migratory Misseriya community • extended the mandate of the AUHIP until and would likely vote for Abyei to become part of reports have indicated that Kiir threatened to December 2014; and dissolve the assembly if it did not endorse Igga Sudan. • expanded AUHIP’s responsibilities to as vice president and Rundial as speaker. On 31 August, the SPLM-N announced a include the Horn of Africa. South Sudan Interior Minister Aleu Ayieny unilateral cessation of hostilities for one month At press time, the Sudan/South Sudan Aleu announced on 27 August that the govern- to assist in humanitarian efforts related to Consultative Forum was expected to hold a ment had determined that there were more flooding in Sudan, notably in South Kordofan ministerial-level meeting on 27 September on than 11,000 ghost police in South Sudan, with and Blue Nile states. It added that the cessa- the margins of the General Assembly. It seems salaries for these fictitious police siphoned off tion “does not include…moving targets and that the meeting will focus largely on efforts to in a corruption scheme involving high-level does not prejudice acts of self-defence”. How- implement the 27 September 2012 coopera- police officers. Aleu suspects that further inves- ever, Sudan dismissed the pledge as “propa- tion agreements. tigation could uncover an additional 16,000 ganda”, arguing that the SPLM-N does not fabricated police officers. have the capacity to help flood victims. Key Issues On 5 September, Under-Secretary-Gen- In early September, the Office for the Coor- One key issue for the Council is what role it eral for Peacekeeping Hervé Ladsous briefed dination of Humanitarian Affairs announced can play in quelling the heightened tensions Council members in consultations on Sudan/ that Sudan had consented in principle to per- between the Misseriya and the Ngok-Dinka South Sudan issues. Ladsous said that the mit a polio vaccination campaign for children communities in the Abyei area and in exerting 3 September summit was a positive devel- under five in areas controlled by the SPLM-N influence on Sudan and South Sudan to play opment, albeit expressing concern about during October, after the SPLM-N retreat- a constructive role in this situation. the tense situation in Abyei. He noted that ed from its request that the vaccine be deliv- Another key issue is how to support the Ngok-Dinka community in the region had ered from a third country such as Ethiopia or recent thaw in relations between Sudan and begun discussing preparations for an October Kenya. (The vaccine would be delivered via South Sudan that seems to have developed referendum on the final status of Abyei (to Sudan; however, the details of the delivery— since the 3 September summit and assist the determine whether Abyei belongs to Sudan including the terms of a cessation of hostilities, two countries in implementing the cooperation or South Sudan), in accordance with the 21 the exact timing and how security will be pro- agreements of 27 September 2012. September 2012 proposal of the AU High- vided—have yet to be determined.) An additional important issue is whether Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP). He Sudan submitted a letter to the Security the Council can use its leverage to promote added that South Sudan had begun releas- Council on 17 September in which it stated direct talks and a ceasefire between Sudan and ing civil servants to return home to Abyei to that Bashir and Kiir, inter-alia, requested the SPLM-N. A related issue is whether Sudan participate in a referendum. (These actions “debt relief for the Sudan and support for the and the SPLM-N can reach agreement about have elicited strong criticism from Sudan, and development in South Sudan,…and…[lifting the delivery of the polio vaccine and how nego- the Misseriya community in South Kordofan of] unilateral economic sanctions against the tiations on this matter can be facilitated. state has threatened violence if the referen- Sudan” (S/2013/560). dum is held under current conditions). On 18 September, Haile Menkerios, Options briefed Council members in consultations in The Council may consider adopting a state- Abyei Area Referendum his capacity as Special Envoy of the Secretary- ment that: Although Sudan and South Sudan committed to a General for Sudan and South Sudan. He not- • welcomes recent progress in Sudan-South referendum in Abyei in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Sudan continues to express ed that relations between the two countries Sudan relations; reservations about eligibility criteria for voting. As had improved in recent weeks but expressed • calls for debt relief for Sudan and a lifting of a result of these reservations, a final status refer- concern at the rising tensions in Abyei. economic sanctions against it; endum for Abyei, scheduled concurrently with the The AU Peace and Security Council • urges Sudan and the SPLM-N to success- 9-15 January 2011 referendum on independence (PSC) met at the level of heads of state and fully conduct the polio vaccination cam- in South Sudan, was delayed. On 21 September 2012, the AUHIP proposed that the referendum government in New York on 23 September paign for children in SPLM-N controlled be rescheduled for October 2013, with residents and adopted a communiqué [PSC/AHG/ areas; of the Abyei area (including the Ngok-Dinka and COMM/2.(CCCXCVII)] on the situation • encourages international development other Sudanese permanently residing in Abyei) eli- between Sudan and South Sudan. In the com- assistance for South Sudan; and gible to vote. (The AU Peace and Security Council muniqué, the PSC inter-alia: • urges the Ngok-Dinka and Misseriya to called this proposal a “fair, equitable, and workable • reiterated its acceptance of the AUHIP’s 21 refrain from violence.
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 7 Sudan and South Sudan (con’t)
Another option the Council might consider implementing the cooperation agreements of Council members have been divided on the is holding an Arria formula meeting on Abyei 27 September 2012. issue of the Abyei referendum for quite some with the participation of leaders of the Ngok- Some members—including Azerbaijan, time. A growing number of Council members Dinka and Misseriya communities (via video- Pakistan and others—believe that encouraging believe that holding a referendum without buy- conference, if required) to learn more about debt relief for Sudan and the removal of eco- in from Sudan would be a futile exercise whose the situation on the ground and to hear their nomic sanctions would provide incentives for results would exacerbate the situation on the perspectives on final status discussions. Bashir to pursue constructive negotiations with ground. However, other members note that South Sudan. Others appear less amenable to Sudan, as a party to the 2005 Comprehensive Council Dynamics endorsing the removal of economic sanctions. Peace Agreement, committed itself eight years Council members are generally encouraged by The most immediate concern among ago to hold a referendum on Abyei. the improvement in relations between Sudan Council members is the potential for violence The US is the penholder on Sudan/South and South Sudan in recent weeks. There is in Abyei, given reports that some members Sudan issues. hope that the parties can build on this positive of the Ngok-Dinka community have been momentum and continue to make progress in planning a unilateral referendum in the area.
Sudan (Darfur)
Expected Council Action The security situation in Darfur has Al-Nabi further alleged that the Sudan Libera- In October, the Council will hold a brief- remained volatile since the briefing. Heavy tion Army-Abdul Wahhid rebel faction had col- ing and consultations on the quarterly report fighting broke out between the Rizeigat and laborated with the demonstrators in an effort on the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur Ma’aliya communities on 9 August over land to take control of Nyala. (UNAMID). At press time, no outcome was and cattle in East Darfur. By mid-August, Between 22-27 August, Chambas met anticipated. media reports indicated that 209 had died and with two Darfur-based rebel groups, the Jus- Some Council members are planning to 305 had been injured as a result of the vio- tice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the visit Darfur in October in their capacity as lence. Although the two groups signed a peace Sudan Liberation Movement-Minni Minnawi members of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Com- agreement on 22 August, sporadic outbreaks (SLM-MM) in Arusha, Tanzania. During the mittee, although the precise dates had yet to be of violence between them continued in Sep- talks, the JEM and SLM-MM expressed finalised at press time. tember. In early September, OCHA reported the view that a peace agreement with Sudan The mandate of UNAMID expires on 31 that approximately 134,000 people had been should be “holistic” in nature, including not August 2014. displaced by the clashes in the Abu Karinka just the Darfur-based rebel groups, but also and Adila areas of East Darfur. the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement- Key Recent Developments Attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers were North (SPLM-N), which is fighting Sudan The Council was last briefed on the situation also reported in late August. On 26 August, in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, as in Darfur on 24 July (S/PV.7010). During the unidentified assailants wounded three peace- well as political parties opposed to the regime briefing, AU-UN Joint Special Representative keepers while they were on patrol some 22 in Khartoum. They also argued that negotia- for Darfur and Joint Chief Mediator Moham- miles outside El Daein, the capital of East tions should have as their goal the creation of med Ibn Chambas told Council members Darfur. On 27 August, peacekeepers were a democratic government. (The SLA-Abdul that he was concerned about the rise in inter- fired upon, also by unknown attackers, in Wahhid, another important Darfur-based reb- communal conflict in Darfur. While Cham- West Darfur near the Chad border with no el group, did not attend the talks because the bas believed that UNAMID has sufficient casualties reported. SPLM-N was not invited.) troop strength to carry out its mandate, he Hundreds of demonstrators protested On 28 August, Amin Hassan Omer, the stressed that “what is required is better train- in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, on 19 Sudanese official responsible for implementa- ing and equipment and more flexibility within September after Janjaweed militia report- tion of the Doha Document for Peace in Dar- our current deployment”. The mission is col- edly murdered Ismail Wadi, a well-known fur (DDPD), told Chambas that Sudan would laborating with “troop and police contribu- Zaghawa businessman, and two family mem- not accept a single, all-encompassing negotiat- tors to address and improve pre-deployment bers. Two people died and several others were ing process, including both the Darfur rebel training…and contingent-owned equipment injured in the protests. Adam Mahmoud Jar groups and the SPLM-N. Instead, he high- issues,” he added, noting as well that “a tacti- Al-Nabi, the governor of South Darfur state, lighted the importance of the DDPD, which cal helicopter for hot-pursuit purposes would declared a curfew that evening and claimed focuses specifically on the situation in Darfur. provide an additional deterrent to ambushes”. that unknown assailants had been responsible. The indictment of President Omar
UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN/DARFUR Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2113 (30 July 2012) extended UNAMID’s mandate until 31 August 2014. S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC. Secretary-General’s Report S/2013/420 (12 July 2013) was the latest UNAMID report. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.7010 (24 July 2013) was the latest briefing on UNAMID.S/PV.6974 (5 June 2013) was the latest briefing on the ICC’s work in Sudan.
8 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 Sudan (Darfur) (con’t) al-Bashir of Sudan on charges of genocide, Council can help to address some of the con- in collaboration with the AU Peace and Secu- war crimes and crimes against humanity by cerns about UNAMID’s capacity. rity Council, to reconsider the mandate given the ICC has apparently hindered his travels in A fundamental issue is whether the Coun- to Chambas to allow him to mediate between recent months. Bashir attended a 15-16 July cil should begin to modify its approach to Sudan and all rebel groups in the country, not AU meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, but departed Sudan. Some analysts have argued that Coun- just those in Darfur. This would require close prematurely. Some have suggested that he cil engagement with Sudan is flawed because it coordination among Chambas, Special Repre- may have left out of concern that he would be tends to treat the various conflicts in the coun- sentative to the AU Haile Menkerios and AU apprehended, as the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber try in silos rather than addressing the inter- High-Level Implementation Panel Chair Tha- had requested Nigeria to arrest and surren- connected challenges more cohesively. bo Mbeki to ensure that they work together der Bashir to the court on 15 July. Sudan has A related issue is what institutional frame- coherently in their engagement with the parties. argued that the timing of the departure had work could be developed to implement such a nothing to do with the concern about pos- “comprehensive” approach. Council Dynamics sible arrest. An additional issue is what impact the 1591 While there has been widespread concern In mid-September, Bashir applied for a visa Sanctions Committee’s trip to Sudan may among Council members about the signifi- to travel to the US to attend the opening of have in enhancing the Committee’s under- cant deterioration in security in Darfur, there the 68th UN General Assembly. Speaking at standing of the situation on the ground and in are nonetheless different perspectives regard- the Security Council stakeout on 16 Septem- helping Committee members to generate ideas ing Sudan’s commitment to the peace process. ber, Ambassador Samantha Power (US) said for improving the effectiveness of the sanctions Some members have been critical of the slow that such a trip “would be deplorable, cynical regime. pace in implementing the DDPD and have and hugely inappropriate”. On 18 September, argued that the government has been respon- the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued a public Options sible for numerous attacks on civilians during decision in which it invited US officials to One option would be to request the Secre- the past year. Other members are less critical apprehend and surrender Bashir to the court tary-General to launch an inquiry to inves- of Sudan, believing that it is making an honest if he enters the US. In the decision, the ICC tigate the sources of the upsurge in inter- effort to implement the DDPD under chal- noted that while the US is not a state party to communal violence in Darfur and report to lenging circumstances. These members tend to the ICC, the Council “‘urge[d] all States…to the Council before the next regular report on emphasise the role of rebel groups in creating cooperate fully’ with the Court” in resolution UNAMID is due. instability in Darfur. 1593, which was adopted under Chapter VII. Another option would be for Council mem- Council members are divided as well about Ultimately, however, Bashir decided to call off bers to make a special request to member the role of the ICC on Darfur. While some his trip. states to provide a helicopter to UNAMID in members believe that Bashir and others should order to help deter ambushes. be brought to justice, others are concerned that Key Issues The Working Group on Peacekeeping Bashir and other officials are being pursued to One key issue is how to regain its sustained Operations could also develop strategies for suit political interests. focus on Darfur in order to address the signifi- enhancing UNAMID’s ability to protect civil- The UK is the penholder on Darfur. cant rise in inter-communal violence in Darfur. ians and share these with the Council. A related immediate issue is how the Another option would be for the Council,
Somalia
Expected Council Action Secretary-General regarding piracy. Council and head of the UN Assistance Mission in In October, the Council will be briefed by members will also hold consultations. An out- Somalia (UNSOM), and Mahamat Salah Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson on come is not expected as reauthorisation of anti- Annadif, the Special Representative of the three reports: from Somalia regarding develop- piracy measures, which expire on 21 Novem- AU and head of AMISOM (S/PV.7030). The ments since modification of the arms embargo ber, will not be taken up until November. briefing discussed the first report of the Sec- in March; from the AU and the UN regard- retary-General on UNSOM (S/2013/521) ing a review of the AU Mission in Somalia Key Recent Developments and was followed by consultations.Council (AMISOM) and benchmarking for a poten- On 12 September, the Council was briefed members issued a press statement on 13 tial UN peacekeeping operation; and from the by Nicholas Kay, the Special Representative September expressing support for the recent
UN DOCUMENTS ON SOMALIA Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2111 (24 July 2013) reauthorised the mandate of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group until 25 November 2014. S/RES/2102 (2 May 2013) created UNSOM and authorised its deployment for one year. S/RES/2093 (6 March 2013) authorised AMISOM deployment until 28 February 2014 and partially lifted the arms embargo. Secretary-General’s Report S/2013/521 (3 September 2013) was the Secretary-General’s UNSOM report. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7030 (12 September 2013) was the briefing on UNSOM. Security Council Press Statements SC/11129 (21 September 2013) condemned the terrorist attack by Al-Shabaab in Nairobi, Kenya. SC/11121 (13 September 2013) expressed support for the agreement regarding the Interim Jubba Administration. USEFUL ADDITIONAL RESOURCES Communiqué: A New Deal for Somalia, EU, 16 September 2013. The Somali Compact, Federal Republic of Somalia, 16 September 2013. Agreement between the Federal Government of Somalia and Jubba Delegation, IGAD, 27 August 2013.
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 9 Somalia (con’t) agreement between the Federal Government goals: inclusive politics, security, justice, arms embargo, authorised in resolution 2093 of Somalia (FGS) and Jubba leader Ahmed economic foundations and revenue and of 6 March, will be an area of focus for the Madobe (SC/11121). services. It further includes cross-cutting Council as it reviews the six-month report from The pact signed on 27 August in Addis issues—gender, capacity development, peace the government of Somalia due 7 October. Ababa, titled “Agreement between the Fed- dividends, human rights and external rela- Other issues of particular interest will be eral Government of Somalia and Jubba Del- tions. There is also a separate section detail- the conclusions and recommendations regard- egation”, was brokered by Foreign Minister ing a “Somaliland Arrangement”, although ing the recently conducted joint UN/AU stra- Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus of Ethiopia the self-declared, unrecognised country was tegic review of AMISOM and benchmark- in his capacity as Chair of the Council of not represented in Brussels. ing exercise for a potential UN peacekeeping Foreign Ministers of the Intergovernmental On 21 September, Al-Shabaab initiat- operation. Authority on Development (IGAD). The ed a terrorist attack on a shopping mall in agreement puts Madobe in charge of a new- Nairobi, Kenya. Council members issued a Options ly created Interim Jubba Administration for press statement condemning the attack and Depending on the content of the government’s two years, establishes federal control over the reiterating their resolve to combat terrorism report regarding implementation of changes Kismayo port and airport, states that militias (SC/11129). The four-day siege resulted in to the arms embargo, the Council may wish to should be integrated into the national army the death of at least 61 civilians, six Kenyan consider modification of the regulatory frame- and contains language on national reconcili- security and five Al-Shabaab militants. Al- work to improve monitoring, reporting and ation. The agreement was welcomed by Kay, Shabaab has stated the attack in Nairobi is other procedures. the AU and the EU. in retribution for Kenya’s involvement in The Council could also reiterate the need Improving the security situation in Moga- AMISOM, which is similar to the claim made for increased financial donations to the UN dishu and other areas remains a challenge. following the group’s terrorist bombing in Trust Fund for AMISOM. Council members On 7 September, a terrorist bomb attack Kampala, Uganda on 11 July 2010, which might also individually consider contributing on a Mogadishu restaurant killed at least 15 killed 74 people. AU-requested military assets to AMISOM, people according to media reports. Five days such as helicopters. later, there was an assassination attempt on Human Rights-Related Developments Madobe in Kismayo which killed at least 10 On 27 August, the FGS endorsed a human Council and Wider Dynamics rights roadmap for the period 2013-2015 and people and left Madobe reportedly unharmed. announced the creation of a Ministry for Human The partial lifting of the arms embargo, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for both Rights. The UN Independent Expert on the which was strongly advocated by the US but attacks. situation of human rights in Somalia, Shamsul had been opposed by most Council mem- Bari, who last visited the country from 26 to 29 On 12 September, a promiment Al-Sha- August, hailed the endorsement but urged the bers, may re-emerge as a fault-line within baab member, Omar Hammami—also known authorities to broaden the consultation process the Council. Given the limited institutional by his nom de guerre Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki to ensure implementation. On 24 September, capacity of the FGS, reasonable questions and one of 13 individuals designated for UN during the 24th session of the Human Rights regarding the current regulatory framework Council (HRC), Bari participated in a stand- sanctions under resolution 1844 (2008)— alone high-level meeting to discuss how to persist. On the other hand, the attention of was reportedly killed by fighters loyal to Al- guarantee maximum effectiveness of assistance the Council has largely shifted toward build- Shabaab leader Ahmed Godane. The death to Somalia as well as ensuring implementation ing the fighting capabilities of the Somali of Hammami, who was apparently allied to of the roadmap. The following day, he presented National Security Forces. For some Council a breakaway faction of Al-Shabaab that once his report to the HRC (A/HRC/24/40 and Corr.1) members, this might imply a more passive On 10 September, the chair-rapporteur of the included Hassan Dahir Aweys (now in govern- working group on the use of mercenaries, Anton approach toward oversight on small arms. ment custody), seems to indicate that Godane Katz, presented to the HRC a report on its visit Regarding the forthcoming joint UN-AU is consolidating control over the Islamist last December to Somalia (A/HRC/24/45/Add.2). strategic review of AMISOM and bench- insurgency. The report raised concerns about the influx of for- marking exercise for UN peacekeeping, On 16 September, the EU hosted an eign security companies without sufficient regula- Council members are likely to be in agree- tion and control by the government and the use international donor conference in Brussels, of private military security companies (PMSCs) ment on three points: first, a lack of appetite called “A New Deal for Somalia”. Donors by shipping companies to guarantee the safety for the immediate establishment of a UN pledged $2.4 billion in new assistance for of their crews and cargo. As Somalia is one of peacekeeping operation as the security con- Somalia to be dispersed under a three-year three states in which the UN has hired PMSCs, ditions in Somalia are not yet appropriate; plan. The conference issued a communiqué the working group called on the UN to consider second, limited backing at best for the partial applying the principles contained in the Human that announced the endorsement of a com- Rights Due Diligence Policy when hiring private re-hatting of AMISOM to create a UN-AU pact based on the New Deal principles for security contractors. It also informed the HRC hybrid mission, at least in part because the development in fragile and conflict-affected that it recently launched a study of the use of precedent in Darfur has not been generally states agreed at the High Level Forum on PMSCs by the UN. perceived as a success; and third, potential- Aid Effectiveness held in Busan, Republic ly growing support for increased financing, of Korea, in November 2011. The compact Key Issues troops and weaponry for AMISOM (as the for Somalia has five peace and statebuilding Implementation of the partial lifting of the evidence has been mounting that it remains
10 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 Somalia (con’t) under-resourced to fully accomplish its man- among Council members for enhancing and the Republic of Korea is the chair of date). The recent terrorist attack in Nairobi AMISOM’s military capacity. the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions by Al-Shabaab is likely to increase support The UK is the penholder on Somalia Committee.
Mali
Expected Council Action given responsibility in resolution 2100 to work in neighbouring countries and that the list of In October, the Council is expected to receive closely with MINUSMA on threat assessment, registered voters was based on a 2009 census, a briefing by the Special Representative of the has recently visited Nigeria and Niger. therefore excluding those who have come of Secretary-General and head of the UN Mul- The signing of the Ouagadougou Agree- age since then.) tidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mis- ment on 18 June was instrumental to the Keita was sworn in on 4 September and sion in Mali (MINUSMA), Albert Gerard peaceful presidential elections on 28 July and appointed Oumar Tatam Ly as prime minister Koenders. The briefing will be followed by 11 August and the return of state authority in on 5 September. Ly introduced a 34-mem- consultations. Kidal. The agreement called for the deploy- ber cabinet on 8 September. On 18 Septem- MINUSMA’s mandate expires on 30 June ment of the MDSF in Kidal along with French ber, the government decided that the first 2014. and MINUSMA troops and the establishment round of legislative elections will take place of two mechanisms—a Follow-up and Evalua- on 24 November and the second round on Key Recent Developments tion Committee and a Joint Technical Security 15 December. Even though there has been important prog- Commission, chaired by Koenders and the MINUSMA has faced considerable chal- ress in the return of state authority to the MINUSMA force commander respectively— lenges to achieve its full operational capability. north and in the overall security environment to work on the implementation of the accord On 10 September, Under-Secretary-General in Mali, the situation in the north remains and make arrangements for the ceasefire and for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous tense. There have been reports of intra-com- other security matters. The agreement also said there are shortfalls in operational capac- munal violence in the north as well as sporadic established a 60-day deadline after the estab- ity, which is expected to be fully reached by skirmishes between the Malian Defence and lishment of the new government for the sec- the end of 2013, six months after deployment. Security Forces (MDSF) and supporters of ond phase of the political process to start. The Despite pledges, key gaps remain, mainly the Mouvement National pour la Libération de Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad and the Coordi- due to the lack of critical force enablers, such l’Azawad (MNLA). The ill-equipped canton- nation des Forces Patriotiques de Résistance sub- as logistics, engineering and transport units. ments where the members of the MNLA and sequently joined as signatories of the agree- Initial assessments found that before their re- the Haut Conseil pour l’Unité de l’Azawad are ment. (At press time, it was reported that the hatting to MINUSMA, battalions of the Afri- supposed to be resettled and the lack of opera- three main signatories pulled out of the agree- can-led International Support Mission to Mali tional capabilities of MINUSMA are having a ment claiming the lack of its implementation did not include the required enabling units, negative impact on the implementation of the by the government.) such as contingent-owned equipment and 18 June Ouagadougou Agreement (Prelimi- The first round of the presidential elections sufficient military aviation capabilities. The nary Agreement to the Presidential Election took place on 28 July. Former Prime Minister pace of deployment of civilian staff (such as and Inclusive Peace Talks in Mali). Further- Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, the leader of Ras- human rights and other protection staff) is also more, the threat of terrorist attacks remains as semblement pour le Mali, and former Finance being affected by the lack of operational capac- reflected in the Council’s 16 July presidential Minister Soumaïla Cissé, the candidate of the ity. The grace period of four months set by statement that it “continues to be gravely con- Union pour la République et la Démocratie, got 40 the Department of Peacekeeping Operations cerned about the activities in the Sahel region percent and 20 percent of the votes respectively. for the force to reach the required UN stan- of terrorist organisations” (S/PRST/2013/10). Turnout amounted to 49 percent of the regis- dards through national, bilateral or multilateral On 22 August, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the tered voters, 10 percentage points more than in assistance ends on 31 October. In addition to leader of the terrorist group Al-Mulatham- the presidential elections of 2007. After an 11 other challenges, Nigeria decided in July to oun announced a merger with the Mouvement August run-off election, Keita was proclaimed withdraw its troops from MINUSMA, and in pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest to president with 77 percent of the votes. In a 16 mid-September, a group of 160 peacekeepers form a new group called Al-Mourabitoun. To August press statement the Council commend- from Chad stationed in Gao deserted in a dis- address concerns over terrorist attacks in the ed the electoral process (SC/11096). (Some pute over pay. Also in September, MINUSMA Sahel, the Monitoring Team assisting the 1267 local and international NGOs have noted that received allegations of serious misconduct by Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, which was few voter cards were distributed to refugees its peacekeeping troops, including an alleged
UN DOCUMENTS ON MALI Security Council Resolution S/RES/2100 (25 April 2013) established the mandate for MINUSMA. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2013/10 (16 July 2013) reaffirmed the Council’s concern about the situation in the Sahel. Security Council Press Statement SC/11096 (16 August 2013) commended the peaceful elections. Secretary-General’s Report S/2013/338 (10 June 2013) contained an assessment of the security situation in Mali. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6985 (25 June 2013) was the first briefing by Koenders.OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative of the Secretary-General Albert Gerard Koenders (Netherlands) MINUSMA Duration 25 April 2013 to present
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 11 Mali (con’t) incident of sexual abuse. immediate key issue. crime in Mali and the Sahel, with the pos- As of 26 August, the Office for the Coor- Ensuring that MINUSMA’s mandate is not sibility of imposing targeted sanctions, as dination of Humanitarian Affairs said there compromised and the mission is provided with recommended in the Secretary-General’s were 1.4 million people in need of immedi- appropriate equipment and key force enablers report (S/2013/189). ate food assistance, 342,033 internally dis- is a pressing issue. placed persons (IDPs) and 175,282 refugees Ensuring that all MINUSMA troops meet Council Dynamics in neighbouring countries. Even if access has the UN’s human rights standards is a further Despite the challenges that Mali still faces, generally improved, other challenges remain: related issue. Council members were pleasantly surprised only 37 percent of the $477 million pledged with the conduct of the presidential elec- as a result of the Consolidated Appeal Pro- Options tions. However, some Council members have cess has been received, and the spontane- The Council could receive the briefing and expressed concern over the sluggish deploy- ous return of IDPs and refugees to northern take no action, or it could issue a statement: ment of MINUSMA, the lack of key force Mali (around 137,000 people so far) is put- • recalling the need for inclusive and cred- enablers and the limited capacity to effectively ting people in a situation of further vulner- ible peace talks open to all communities in carry out its mandate. ability due to damaged social infrastructure, northern Mali in the time frame set out by One of the controversial issues during limited delivery of basic services, the pres- the Ouagadougou Agreement; the negotiations on resolution 2100, which ence of unexploded ordnance, the destruc- • looking forward to the upcoming legislative established MINUSMA, was the definition tion caused by military operations. elections; of “robust” peacekeeping. The language final- • encouraging the government to deepen its ly agreed in the mandate—“to deter threats Key Issues commitment to the reform of the MSDF; and take active steps to prevent the return of A key overarching issue is to stabilise the secu- • urging the government to establish an inter- armed elements to those areas”—seems to rity situation in northern Mali. national commission of inquiry to investi- be understood by Council members in dif- A key issue will be the effective imple- gate international crimes as per the Ouaga- ferent ways. Although most Council members mentation of the Ouagadougou Agreement dougou Agreement; agree that the security situation is much bet- without further deferring the peace talks with • reaffirming the need for MINUSMA to ter than expected, future developments that communities in the north. reach its full operational capacity as quickly might require MINUSMA to be more aggres- Ensuring that citizens in the remote areas as possible, asking member states to con- sive might divide the Council again about the of the north, IDPs, refugees and people who tribute key force enablers and troops; and kind of operations MINUSMA is mandated came of age since 2009 are allowed to vote • establishing an expert group to identify to undertake. in the upcoming legislative elections is an those involved in transnational organised France is the penholder on Mali.
Western Sahara
Expected Council Action confirmed the willingness of the parties to monitoring in the camps near Tindouf, but by In October, the Council members expect a engage in a period of bilateral consultations the time the draft was distributed to all Council briefing in consultations on the UN Mis- and shuttle diplomacy. Weisbrod-Weber updat- members this language had been withdrawn. sion for the Referendum in Western Sahara ed the Council on MINURSO’s activities. The adoption of resolution 2099 without (MINURSO) by Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber, On 25 April, the Council adopted resolu- including a human rights monitoring mecha- the Secretary-General’s Special Representa- tion 2099, extending MINURSO’s mandate nism was followed by a wave of pro-indepen- tive and head of MINURSO, and Christo- for another year. A draft resolution prepared dence rallies from 26 April with Sahrawi dem- pher Ross, the Secretary-General’s Personal by the US had been discussed earlier by the onstrators asking for self-determination and Envoy for Western Sahara. Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, the respect of human rights. The demonstra- MINURSO’s mandate expires on 30 April Russia, Spain, the UK and the US) and by tions peaked on 4 May and took place mainly 2014. the US and Morocco in bilateral consultations. in Laâyoune, Smara and Boujdour. Security The initial draft apparently included language forces and protestors were reportedly wounded. Key Recent Developments giving MINURSO a mandate to monitor and On 10 June, Secretary-General Ban Ki- Weisbrod-Weber and Ross last briefed the gather information on human rights viola- moon met with Mohammed Abdelaziz, the Council in consultations on 22 April. Ross tions as well as a reference to human rights Secretary-General of the Frente Popular para
UN DOCUMENTS ON WESTERN SAHARA Security Council Resolution S/RES/2099 (25 April 2013) renewed the MINURSO mandate for 12 months. Security Council Letters S/2013/508 (26 August 2013) and S/2013/507 (22 August 2013) were on the appointment of Major General Imam Edy Mulyono (Indonesia) as MINURSO force commander. Secretary- General’s Report S/2013/220 (8 April 2013) was on the situation in Western Sahara. OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINURSO Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber (Germany) Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara Christopher Ross (US) MINURSO Size, Composition and Budget Strength as of 31 August 2013: 27 troops; 199 military observers; 6 police; 94 international civilians; 167 local civilians; 12 UN volunteers Budget (July 2013-June 2014): $60,475,700 MINURSO Duration April 1991 to present
12 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 Western Sahara (con’t) la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y Río de Oro visits in 2014 and additional seminars, with the briefing and take no action. (Polisario Front), in New York and encouraged the next to take place in October in Portugal. Another, though unlikely, option is to adopt the Polisario to remain constructively engaged A new wave of pro-independence demon- a press statement expressing support for the with Ross. Ban expressed concern over the strations started on 26 August, with approxi- mediation efforts by Ross. increasing frustration and vulnerability among mately 100 participants gathering in close young people in the refugee camps near Tin- proximity to a Royal Moroccan Army strong- Council and Wider Dynamics douf caused by the absence of a settlement point in the Mahbas Teamsite, in the north- Council members engaged on the issue remain and the instability of the Sahel region. On 25 eastern part of the territory controlled by supportive of the shuttle diplomacy undertak- June, Ban received Taib Fassi Fihri, an advi- the Polisario. The demonstrators dispersed en by Ross. At press time, however, it was still sor to King Mohammed VI of Morocco. While peacefully on 30 August. too early to tell how the outcome of Ross’s Ban commended Morocco for its efforts to Ross’s next trip to the region is scheduled next trip to the region might impact Council promote human rights, he called on both par- in October. members’ positions. ties to observe international human rights Bilateral discussions between the US and standards and stressed the need for sustained Key Issues Morocco played a key role in the drafting of monitoring both in Western Sahara and in the A key issue for the Council to consider is the resolution 2099, while the role of Council refugee camps. He also called on Morocco to nature of its role in encouraging progress in members who are not part of the Group of continue to engage in the confidence-building the negotiating process, particularly regarding Friends was limited. As a government reshuffle measures run by the UN Office of the High Ross’s current approach of bilateral discus- was carried out in Algeria on 11 September, Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and sions with each party. with Ramtane Lamamra, the former AU Com- expressed his hope for an improvement in rela- A growing issue is to ensure that instability missioner for Peace and Security, appointed tions between Morocco and Algeria. in the Sahel does not contribute to radicalising foreign affairs minister, it remains to be seen The UNHCR, Morocco, the Polisario, refugee camps in light of the fragile situation of if the appointment of Lamamra, an official Algeria and Mauritania attended a session in young people in the camps. deeply familiar with the Security Council and Geneva on 2 July to review the confidence- An ongoing issue for the Council is to well respected by most of its members, will building measures. They agreed on 3 July ensure that all parties fully commit to, and affect Council dynamics with regard to West- to expand the UNHCR programme, which observe, the human rights of all individuals ern Sahara. Lamamra could also be of help offers separated families in Western Sahara caught in the conflict. arranging a visit by Ross to the AU. and refugee camps in Tindouf a range of ser- The US is the penholder on Western Sahara. vices to help them reconnect. An agreement Options was reached on a new flight schedule for One option for the Council is to simply receive
Lebanon
Expected Council Action He described worsening sectarian tensions in The security situation has continued to In October, Council members expect to Tripoli, the influx of Syrian refugees and Israeli decline in Lebanon. The 25 May announce- receive the semi-annual briefing in consulta- aerial attacks on Syrian weapons depots. He ment by Hezbollah of its military involvement tions from Special Envoy Terje Rød-Larsen on also correctly assessed that Lebanese parlia- in Syria on behalf of the Syrian government the Secretary-General’s forthcoming report mentary elections slated for June would not marked a turning point in the heightening sec- on the implementation of resolution 1559. take place. (Elections were postponed to tarian tension in Lebanon and analysts have Adopted in 2004, resolution 1559 urged the November 2014.) noted the recent series of attacks is a signal of disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Leba- On 10 July, the Council adopted a presi- increasingly severe sectarian reprisal violence. nese militias and the extension of government dential statement expressing growing con- The Council issued three press statements control over all Lebanese territory. cern about the spillover effects of the Syrian in July and August in response to serious crisis on Lebanon’s political, security and security incidents. On 9 July, 53 people were Key Recent Developments humanitarian situations (S/PRST/2013/9). injured when a bomb exploded, and on 15 Rød-Larsen last briefed Council members Aside from the regular UN Interim Force in August a car bomb killed 27. Both attacks tar- on 8 May, reporting that the spillover from Lebanon (UNIFIL) renewals, this was the geted Dahiyeh, a predominantly Shi’a neigh- the conflict in Syria was having alarming and Council’s first substantive outcome on Leba- bourhood of Beirut. On 23 August, 47 people destabilising effects in Lebanon and the region. non since 22 May 2008. were killed when bombs targeting two Sunni
UN DOCUMENTS ON LEBANON Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2115 (29 August 2013) renewed the mandate of UNIFIL for a year. S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and extension of the government’s control over all Lebanese territory. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2013/9 (10 July 2013) expressed growing concern regarding the spillover effects of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon’s political, security and humanitarian situations. Security Council Press Statements SC/11101 (23 August 2013) condemned the attacks in Tripoli. SC/11095 (15 August 2013) and SC/11055 (9 July 2013) condemned attacks in Beirut. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2013/381 (26 June 2013) was the most recent 1701/UNIFIL report. S/2013/234 (18 April 2013) was the most recent 1559 report.
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 13 Lebanon (con’t) mosques in Tripoli exploded. To increase and the 14 March political bloc has refused to statements and adopting the 10 July presiden- security, Lebanese security forces deployed in participate in a cabinet that includes Hezbol- tial statement expressing concern about the Dahiyeh on 23 September. A similar security lah. Meanwhile, parliament has not met due spillover effects of the Syrian crisis on Leba- plan is expected in Tripoli. to a lack of a quorum, and national elections non. However, since the security situation in Meanwhile, Israeli air strikes in Syria, fears have been postponed until late next year. In Lebanon and along the border with Syria has that Syria might transfer its chemical weap- this context, the reconvening of the Lebanese continued to deteriorate, the Council could ons to Lebanon and other cross-border inci- National Dialogue—a forum for political lead- adopt a statement reiterating its condemnation dents have sparked concerns that Hezbollah or ers to address the issue of Hezbollah’s arms— of such incidents. In a similar vein, a statement other extremist groups might retaliate, poten- seems highly unlikely. addressing the Syrian refugee situation and tially drawing Lebanon further into a broader On 29 August, the Council adopted resolu- subsequent humanitarian crisis in the country regional conflict. On 7 August, four Israeli tion 2115 renewing the mandate of UNIFIL might also be an appropriate demonstration of soldiers were injured in a blast after alleged- for an additional year. support given the challenges Lebanon is facing. ly crossing the blue line between Israel and Regarding the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Finally, the Council could also issue further Lebanon into an area known for landmines. 13 January 2014 has been set as a tentative statements encouraging Lebanon to form a Media reports indicate that Hezbollah claimed start for the trial in absentia of four individuals government and hold its parliamentary elec- responsibility for the blast. An Al-Qaida-linked charged in the 14 February 2005 assassination tions in order to maintain political stability. group, the Azzam Brigades, said it launched of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. four rockets into Israel from southern Leba- Council Dynamics non on 22 August. Israeli jets retaliated the Key Issues There is agreement among all Council mem- next day in Tyre in south Lebanon, bombing The key issues are the fact that Hezbollah bers that the international community should a base of the Popular Front for the Liberation maintains a significant arsenal not controlled support Lebanon in its efforts to contain the of Palestine, which denied any connection with by the Lebanese government and the delinea- spillover from the conflict in Syria. This con- rocket launches or the Azzam Brigades. The tion of the border between Lebanon and Syria sensus was repeatedly displayed in the recently Secretary-General urged maximum restraint has not taken place and will not in the foresee- issued press statements that underscored the on both sides. able future. Another key issue is that the con- importance of Lebanon’s disassociation policy The humanitarian situation has also dete- flict in Syria, and Hezbollah’s unambiguous in order to preserve national unity in the face of riorated sharply. In September 2013, the UN involvement there on behalf of the regime, has attempts to undermine the country’s stability. High Commissioner for Refugees estimated negatively impacted Lebanon. The 10 July presidential statement dem- that there were approximately 764,000 Syr- onstrated the Council’s agreement on the ian refugees in Lebanon. Lebanon estimates Underlying Problems importance of preserving Lebanon’s sover- that the actual figure is 1.2 million. Lebanese Lebanon’s official policy is one of disassocia- eignty, national unity, territorial integrity and President Michel Sleiman, at his 24 September tion from the Syrian crisis. However, Hezbol- political independence. However, there remain address to the General Assembly, appealed for lah’s overt involvement in Syria on behalf of the strong divisions, particularly between the P5 direct aid to fund the humanitarian response regime, sectarian violence, and the burgeoning members, on how to characterise the impact and provision of essential services. On 25 Sep- refugee situation throughout the country pro- of the Syrian conflict on Lebanon, Hezbollah’s tember, the Secretary-General convened the vide evidence of the pressures such a policy participation in the Syrian conflict, Syria’s role inaugural meeting of the “International Sup- must withstand. The ongoing conflict in Syria in cross-border attacks and Israeli airstrikes on port Group” for Lebanon on the side-lines of will most likely indefinitely stall any effort to Syrian weapons depots. the General Assembly. implement resolution 1559 fully. Such divisions may also be reflected in a The political situation remains frozen since Furthermore, the flow of armaments across desire by Council members, particularly the Prime Minister Najib Mikati resigned on 22 the border between Syria and Lebanon has P3, to manage the spillover effects from the March. He now heads a Hezbollah-led govern- contributed to the expansion of arsenals out- Syrian crisis by using a mechanism outside ment in a caretaker capacity as Prime Minister- side the control of the Lebanese government. the Council, as demonstrated by the forma- designate Tammam Salam has been unable to tion of an “International Support Group” for form a new government. Hezbollah has insist- Options Lebanon. ed on a share of ministerial portfolios propor- The Council is unlikely to take any action on France is the penholder on Lebanon in the tionate to its parliamentary representation, Lebanon so soon after issuing the recent press Council.
Israel/Palestine
Expected Council Action featuring a briefing by Under-Secretary- direct talks between Israelis and Palestinians, In October the Council is expected to hold General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman. though they may also cover other develop- its quarterly open debate on the Middle East Discussions will likely focus on the current ments in the region.
14 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 Israel/Palestine (con’t)
Key Recent Developments parties, it was agreed that US participation in New York, its first meeting since April On 17 September, UN Special Coordinator “should be increased somewhat” in order to 2012. On 30 July the Quartet welcomed the for the Middle East Peace Process Robert Ser- help facilitate that. announcement that direct talks had resumed ry delivered the latest monthly Middle East In his September briefing, Serry warned and expressed its hope that the negotiations briefing to the Security Council (S/PV.7032). that both sides ought to refrain from activi- would set a clear path towards a two-state Serry’s briefing focused on the renewed peace ties that risk undermining negotiations and solution and the end of conflict. process, which he stressed “should not be noted in particular the August killing of five neglected, even against a backdrop of turmoil Palestinians in Jenin and Qalandia refugee Human Rights-Related Developments elsewhere in the neighbourhood.” camps by Israeli forces; settlement activity in On 13 August, a group of UN independent human rights experts expressed deep concern at the Speaking about the 29 July resumption of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which he alleged ongoing judicial harassment, intimidation direct final status negotiations, Serry acknowl- deemed counterproductive and illegal; and and abusive treatment of Issa Amro, a prominent edged that momentous and sustained efforts clashes between Palestinians and Israeli set- Palestinian human rights defender. would be necessary to successfully conclude tlers and settler attacks on Palestinian farmers. In opening the 24th session of the Human negotiations within the nine-month deadline The situation in the West Bank has been Rights Council (HRC) on 9 September, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay set for achieving a comprehensive settlement. tense, following the 22 September shooting expressed concern at Israel’s continued policy of The US-brokered peace talks are underway death of an Israeli soldier at a Jewish festival forced evictions and demolitions. She was also and both parties have agreed not to disclose in Hebron. In response to the apparent sniper concerned by the excessive use of force by both the substance of negotiations in an effort to attack, Netanyahu issued an order to permit Israeli and Palestinian security forces in refugee increase chances of success. According to this settlers to move into a once disputed build- camps in the West Bank which led to the death of civilians. agreement, US Secretary of State John Kerry ing in Hebron near the scene of the attack. A On 23 September, the HRC considered the is the only actor authorised to comment on the day earlier, the body of another Israeli soldier report of the Secretary-General on the human talks. He has mostly refrained from doing so. who had reportedly been killed by a Palestin- rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Ter- There have been numerous leaks, however, ian co-worker was discovered in a well in the ritory, including East Jerusalem (A/HRC/24/30). indicating that Palestinian officials are frus- West Bank. The US condemned the killing of trated on multiple fronts. They are displeased both soldiers. Key Issues with the lack of direct US involvement. Isra- On 20 September Israeli forces reportedly The key issue is determining what, if anything, el had objected to the US having a seat at forcibly seized a truck from European diplo- the Council can do to enhance the efficacy of the table, but the Palestinians believe a US mats who were attempting to deliver aid to 120 direct negotiations and encourage parties to presence is required for fruitful negotiations. Palestinians whose homes had been demol- reach a comprehensive final status agreement. Palestinian officials are also believed to have ished four days earlier in the Jordan Valley, after divulged information on the substance of the an Israeli court ruled they did not have proper Options talks and on contentious proposals made by building permits. The final status of the Jor- The Council has very few options on the Mid- Israel on such issues as future borders, dates dan Valley remains a contentious issue. dle East peace process, and it is likely that the for the next prisoners’ release and future secu- Meanwhile the relationship between Egypt open debate will again feature the reiteration of rity arrangements. Israel has largely held to and Gaza’s Islamist government, Hamas, is previously stated positions. the agreement not to disclose details of the under increasing strain. Egypt has intensified Council members may also take the oppor- talks but has publicly challenged the veracity its military campaign against an Islamist insur- tunity to voice support for the negotiation of some of the leaked information. It has also gency in the northern Sinai, which it believes to process or encourage parties to refrain from reportedly complained to the US about the be supported by Gaza militants. On 1 Septem- undertaking actions that could threaten the leaks, which it believes are a pressure tactic ber, Egyptian security forces destroyed more viability of negotiations, or both. that violates the terms of the talks. than a dozen homes along the border with Despite the lack of direct US participation, Gaza in an apparent effort to build a buffer Council and Wider Dynamics US officials are continuing to engage with zone to reduce weapons smuggling and illegal Council members, while acknowledging the the parties bilaterally. US President Barack militant crossings. Egypt has also intensified tremendous challenges, are generally sup- Obama met with Palestinian Authority Presi- efforts to close tunnels along the border. Israel portive of the current direct negotiations. In dent Mahmoud Abbas on 24 September and has reportedly urged the US to support Egypt the event that the talks conclude without any at press time appeared set to meet with Israeli in its fight against militants, warning that losing major developments, there may be impetus for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 30 Egypt to Islamists would endanger the peace more direct Council action. However, for the September on the sidelines of the UN Gen- process. time being members are unlikely to pursue any eral Assembly. Kerry met with Netanyahu in At press time it appeared that the Quar- action that might upset the course of the talks. Jerusalem on 15 September and with Abbas tet—the EU, Russia, the UN and the US— Most members also believe that no Council six days earlier in London. On 25 Septem- would meet at principal level on 28 Septem- activity would be possible without the active ber, Kerry said that in his meetings with the ber alongside the General Assembly events support of the US.
UN DOCUMENTS ON ISRAEL/PALESTINE Security Council Resolutions S/RES/1850 (16 December 2008) declared Council support for the Annapolis peace process and its com- mitment to the irreversibility of bilateral negotiations. S/RES/1515 (19 November 2003) stated the necessity for a two state solution and unanimously endorsed the Quartet’s Road Map. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.7032 (17 September 2013) was a briefing on the Middle East by Serry. S/PV.7020 (20 August 2013) was a briefing from Assistant Secretary- General Oscar Fernandez-Taranco on the Middle East
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 15 Israel/Palestine (con’t)
The US has a vested interested in the fur- to the Syrian crisis recently, Council members it remains to be seen what they will do if no therance of the talks and does not want to see are cognisant of the need to continue to keep progress has been made at the end of the nine- the Palestinian Authority explore other ave- a close eye on the peace process. month timeline. At that time, the Palestinian nues, such as the campaign for statehood at the The Palestinians have voiced frustration Authority may choose to pursue other avenues UN or a referral of Israel to the ICC. The US over both the structure and substance of the at the UN or the ICC. is not generally amenable to Council outcomes current talks. While they have committed to The US is the lead on Israel/Palestine in on Israel/Palestine. following the course of US-brokered nego- the Council. While significant energy has been diverted tiations for reaching a final status agreement,
Afghanistan
Expected Council Action separate attacks by insurgents in Helmand which was condemned by President Hamid In October, the Council is likely to extend the and Kandahar provinces. On 10 September, Karzai. authorisation of the International Security in Ghazni province, a roadside bomb exploded Karzai travelled to Islamabad for a two-day Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan ahead killing seven civilians and injuring 17 others. summit on 26-27 August with Prime Minister of its expiry on 13 October. On 28 August, Taliban fighters attacked Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan. The leaders pledged Given that the Council discussed Afghani- an ISAF base in Ghazni province. At least to continue to promote cooperation between stan in a debate on the UN Assistance Mission seven people, including an ISAF soldier the two countries and to cooperate on the rec- in Afghanistan (UNAMA) on 19 September, a and six Afghans, were killed in the assault, onciliation process in Afghanistan. In an effort wider discussion is not anticipated at this point. along with seven attackers, and 34 others to assist the intra-Afghanistan reconciliation UNAMA’s mandate expires on 19 March were injured. In an apparent “green on blue” process, on 7 September Pakistan released 2013. attack, three ISAF troops were shot dead in seven Taliban fighters from prison. Then, on Paktia province on 21 September, before the 21 September, it released Mullah Abdul Ghani Key Recent Developments assailant was killed by Afghan security forces. Baradar, a founding member of the Afghan The Council debated the situation in Afghani- Several Taliban fighters launched an assault Taliban who had served as a key aide to Taliban stan on 19 September. While praising the cour- on the US consulate in Herat on 13 September. leader Mullah Omar. Given Baradar’s stature, age and growing capability of Afghan security Seven people, including five insurgents and some are hopeful that he may be able to exert forces, Special Representative and head of two Afghan police, were killed and 20 were influence on the Taliban to participate in peace UNAMA Ján Kubis stated that they would injured in the assault. The Council issued a negotiations with the Afghan government. Pre- need international support for at least five press statement condemning the attack on 13 viously, on 6 September, Afghanistan swapped additional years to achieve requisite capacity. September (SC/11122). 11 Taliban prisoners for Fariba Ahmadi Kakar, Regarding the preparations for the 5 April Members of the fledgling Afghan police a female parliamentarian who was abducted 2014 elections, Kubis noted that the passage have been particularly targeted in violent by the Taliban in August in Ghazni province. in July of two critical pieces of electoral legisla- attacks in recent weeks. On 15 Septem- Australia, the penholder on Afghanistan, tion—the “structure law”, which determines ber, Lieutenant Negara, the highest ranking circulated the draft resolution reauthorising the structure and activities of the Independent female police officer in Helmand province, ISAF to the wider Council in mid-September. Electoral Commission and the Electoral Com- was shot and later died of her wounds. Insur- An initial read-through of the draft was held plaints Commission, as well as the wider elec- gents had assassinated her predecessor, Islam on 17 September. Given the intense activity toral law, which governs the conduct of the Bibi, in July. Between 18 and 22 September, related to the opening of the General Assem- elections—represents a sign of progress. How- 29 Afghan police officers were killed in two bly during the week of 23 September, Council ever, he underscored the importance of ensur- separate Taliban attacks in Badakhshan and members planned to reconvene in early Octo- ing that appropriate security measures are in Kandahar provinces. ber to negotiate the text. place for the election. A drone strike on a truck in Kunar prov- The security situation in Afghanistan ince on 7 September resulted in the deaths Human Rights-Related Developments remains volatile with attacks throughout the of as many as 16 people. ISAF confirmed the On 17 September, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay held a press confer- country claiming the lives of large numbers attack, claiming that 10 insurgents had been ence in Kabul on her two-day visit to the coun- of civilians, Afghan security forces and ISAF killed, but Afghanistan alleged that many civil- try and meetings with the government and civil soldiers. ians, including women and children, were also society. Her visit focused mainly on the impor- On 30 August, 18 people were killed in two travelling in the vehicle and died in the strike, tance of ensuring that the human rights gains of the past 12 years are not sacrificed to political
UN DOCUMENTS ON AFGHANISTAN Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2096 (19 March 2013) renewed UNAMA’s mandate until 19 March 2014. S/RES/2069 (9 October 2012) renewed the mandate of ISAF in Afghanistan until 13 October 2013. Security Council Press Statement SC/11122 (13 September 2013) condemned the attack on the US consulate in Herat. Secretary-General’s Report S/2013/535 (6 September 2013) was the latest UNAMA report. Security Council Letter S/2013/558 (17 September 2013) contained ISAF’s report on its operations from 1 May 2013 to 31 July 2013. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7035 (19 September 2013) was the latest UNAMA debate.
16 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 Afghanistan (con’t)
expediency during the period leading up to the not marred by violence and intimidation or Council Dynamics presidential elections next April. She noted the fraud. While some Council members believe that slow implementation of the law on the Elimination An additional key issue is whether and how progress is being made in the security tran- of Violence against Women. She also expressed concerns about the future of the Afghanistan the reconciliation process between the govern- sition from ISAF to Afghan forces, there is Independent Human Rights Commission, and in ment and the Taliban can gain traction and considerable alarm among several Council particular, the recent flawed process which led what role the Council can play in this process. members about the deterioration of securi- to the appointment of its five newest members. ty in different parts of Afghanistan and the Options impact of the violence on civilians, especial- Key Issues The most likely option for the Council is to ly women and children. There is also wide- Several inter-connected security issues war- extend the authorisation of ISAF through the spread recognition that the holding of free rant Council attention. These include how end of the 2014 calendar year, given that the and fair elections in 2014 will be critical to to address the heightened violence against military drawdown is expected to be com- the legitimacy of the incoming government civilians, how well Afghan security forces will pleted by that point. and to the country’s future success. perform as they assume primary responsibil- The Council could also contemplate acti- Russia is particularly concerned about the ity for security and what kind of post-2014 vating the Military Staff Committee as a long-term security situation in Afghanistan. security arrangement may be struck between forum to consult on strategies for enhanc- It has argued that there needs to be greater Afghanistan and the US. (Afghanistan and the ing security in Afghanistan and the broader clarity regarding the potential presence of US have been negotiating a long-term security region, especially considering that several of international forces in Afghanistan after 2014, deal for the past year, but have yet to reach an the permanent members have a strong nation- including the size of such a residual force and agreement.) al interest in a positive future for Afghanistan. the objectives of these forces. A related issue is ensuring that the 5 April Australia is the penholder on Afghanistan 2014 presidential and provincial elections are
Haiti
Expected Council Action the Electoral Council. that the senate, and by extension the parlia- In October, the Council is scheduled to renew Despite these divisions, the chamber of ment, would become “dysfunctional” if elec- the mandate of the UN Stabilisation Mission deputies on 9 September approved the draft tions were not held by January 2014 given in Haiti (MINUSTAH) before it expires on 15 law with provisions ensuring that the terms of the controversy surrounding the expiration October, most likely with a 15 percent reduc- the senators elected in 2009 would continue of the mandate of senators elected in 2009 tion in troop numbers. until January 2015 and granting the president (S/2013/493). the authority to appoint the director gen- With regard to MINUSTAH, the report Key Recent Developments eral of the Electoral Council. The minister recommended a further reduction of the Political tensions between the executive and for relations with parliament, Ralph Theano, authorised military strength from 6,270 to legislative branches of government continued immediately contested the vote claiming that 5,021 by June 2014, but no change in the to hamper progress in the preparations for the procedure had been flawed. At press time, number of police. (This was in line with the partial senatorial, municipal and local elec- it appeared that the Senate was still in the 2013-2016 consolidation plan presented in the tions in Haiti. Following the submission on process of reviewing the proposed draft and Secretary-General’s 8 March report.) 27 August to parliament of the draft elector- had yet to vote on it. The Council considered the Secretary- al law, the chamber of deputies established a Meanwhile, on 6 September, 13 opposition General’s report in a debate on 28 August special commission to analyse the draft. The deputies submitted a motion calling for the in which the new Special Representative for commission was divided on two issues in par- indictment of the president, the prime minister Haiti and head of MINUSTAH, Sandra Hon- ticular. While some argued that the mandate and the justice minister on allegations of high oré, briefed the Council for the first time since of senators elected in 2009 would end in Janu- treason, abuse of power and crimes against the assuming her post on 15 July. In addressing the ary 2014, as provided by the 2008 electoral constitution, among others. difficult political situation, she said there was law, others viewed 2015 as the end of term, as In his latest MINUSTAH report, the widespread scepticism about the likelihood of provided by the constitution. There were also Secretary-General expressed deep concern elections taking place in 2013 and speculation opposing views on whether the president held about the continuing delays in the prepara- among legislators that the executive was inten- the authority to appoint the director general of tion for elections and warned of the possibility tionally delaying the process to ensure that the
UN DOCUMENTS ON HAITI Security Council Resolution S/RES/2070 (12 October 2012) renewed MINUSTAH’s mandate until 15 October 2013. Security Council Press Statement SC/10901 (28 January 2013) called for the holding of elections by the end of 2013. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2013/493 (19 August 2013) was the latest MINUSTAH report. S/2013/139 (8 March 2013) contained the consolidation plan for MINUSTAH. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7024 (28 August 2013) was the most recent debate on Haiti. USEFUL ADDITIONAL RESOURCE Peacekeeping without Accountability: the UN’s response to the Haitian Cholera Epidemic, Yale Law School, Yale School of Public Health and Association Haitienne de Droit de L’Environnment, August 2013.
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 17 Haiti (con’t) parliament would become dysfunctional. She Key Issues situation in Haiti to signal that the Council was engaging with all the relevant actors to pro- A key issue is the renewal of MINUSTAH’s is following the situation very closely. mote dialogue and move the process forward. mandate and whether to authorise the Secre- During a trip to Haiti on 14-15 August, the tary-General’s recommended troop reduction. Council and Wider Dynamics operational director of the Office for the Coor- A second key issue is the delay in hold- Council members are united in their concern dination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ing elections and whether and possibly how about the political situation in Haiti and the John Ging, said humanitarian and develop- the Council should put additional pressure delayed elections, as was evident from the ment efforts were showing significant results on local stakeholders to act responsibly. In a 28 August debate. While there are some who but emphasised the importance of continued 28 January press statement (SC/10901), the still maintain that elections might happen this donor support. OCHA reported in August that Council called for elections to be held by the year, they also acknowledge that it now looks there had been a steady decline in funding for end of 2013, but this now seems increasingly increasingly unlikely. At the same time, how- cholera response activities since 2012. As of unlikely. ever, there is an understanding that elections 1 September, the number of cumulative cas- Another issue is the negative impact of are not an end in and of itself and should not es of cholera and the number of deaths since the political stalemate between the executive be the only focus in the current situation as the epidemic began in October 2010 stood at and legislative branches of government on there are other, more fundamental problems 674,326 and 8,253, respectively. MINUSTAH’s ability to implement its man- that must be dealt with. According to a report published in August date to promote the rule of law and advance With regard to the future of MINUSTAH, by the Yale Law School and School of Public good governance and human rights. all Council members seem to agree that the Health, a scientific study about the origins of proposed drawdown must be closely linked the cholera epidemic in Haiti “overwhelming- Options to progress on the ground as measured by the ly demonstrates that UN peacekeeping troops The most likely option for the Council is to indicators in the mission’s consolidation plan, from Nepal introduced the disease into the adopt a resolution renewing MINUSTAH’s although some members appear to be more country”. mandate for another 12 months and authorise cautious than others, in particular countries a troop reduction. In addition, such a resolu- from the region and other troop- and police- Human Rights-Related Developments tion could: contributing countries. It seems the proposed The bi-annual report on human rights in Haiti • emphasise the importance of holding elec- 15 percent troop reduction is balanced enough prepared by MINUSTAH’s Human Rights Sec- tions and strongly urge political leaders to be acceptable to all. tion and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was released in September. The to avoid further delays, in particular with While the US is the penholder on Haiti, the report, which covers the period from January regard to the adoption of the electoral law; Group of Friends of Haiti plays an influential to June 2013, documents allegations of exces- • highlight the ongoing need to strengthen role. (Current members are Argentina, Bra- sive use of force by the police and by the prison the capacity of the police; zil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Gua- administration, with the majority of cases remain- • express continued concern about the temala, Peru, the US and Uruguay.) At press ing unpunished on the judicial level. According to the report, the numerous cases of corruption and impact of the cholera epidemic and call for time, the Group had started drafting a resolu- out-of-court settlements constitute obstacles sustained international support to fight the tion, with Council negotiations anticipated to to the fight against impunity in Haiti. Lynchings, epidemic; start towards the end of September. In addi- prolonged pre-trial detention in prisons and poor • emphasise the importance of ensuring tion to questions related to MINUSTAH and prison conditions remain of great concern. The accountability for serious human rights the political situation, it seems discussions have independent expert on human rights in Haiti, Gus- tavo Gallón, will visit the country from 23 Septem- violations and welcome the 13 May decree focused on gender issues as there are concerns ber to 1 October and report to the Human Rights establishing an inter-ministerial commis- about widespread impunity for sexual and gen- Council in March 2014. sion on human rights; and der-based violence. • request more regular briefings on the
Cooperation with Regional and Subregional Organisations
Expected Council Action Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). A İhsanoğlu. A presidential statement is a likely In October, the Council will hold a briefing high-level representative of Azerbaijan will pre- outcome. on cooperation between the UN and region- side over the meeting. The UN Secretary-Gen- al and subregional organisations, focusing eral is expected to brief the Council, along with Background on strengthening the partnership with the the Secretary-General of the OIC, Ekmeleddin The UN Charter establishes the Security
UN DOCUMENTS ON COOPERATION WITH REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL ORGANISATIONS Security Council Resolution S/RES/1631 (17 October 2005) was the first reso- lution adopted by the Security Council on regional organisations. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2010/1 (13 January 2010) was on the importance of developing effective partnerships with regional and subregional organisations. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2012/614 (9 August 2012) was on cooperation between the UN and regional and other organisations. S/2006/590 (28 July 2006) A regional-global security partnership: challenges and opportunities. A/59/2005 (21 March 2005) In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all. S/1995/1 (25 January 1995) Supplement to an Agenda for Peace. S/24111 (17 June 1992) An Agenda for Peace. General Assembly Resolution A/RES/67/264 (17 May 2013) was on the cooperation between the UN and the OIC.
18 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 Cooperation with Regional and Subregional Organisations (con’t)
Council as the principal organ charged with 57 member states on four continents, has never The resolution requested the Secretary-Gen- the maintenance of international peace and been the focus per se of a Council briefing, and eral to report to the General Assembly at its security, but it also envisions a role for “region- its relationship with the UN has mainly been 69th session in 2014 on the state of coopera- al arrangements”, especially in regard to the with the General Assembly and the Secretariat, tion between the UN and the OIC. peaceful settlement of disputes. In Chapter mainly on issues related to conflict prevention, VIII, the Charter encourages regional organ- inter-cultural dialogue and the fight against ter- Key Issues isations to contribute towards the maintenance rorism. In a 2012 report, the Secretary-Gener- The key issue is to have a fruitful discussion of peace and security insofar as such efforts al explained how the UN and the OIC agreed on cooperation with the OIC and to reflect the are subordinate to the Security Council. In on a one-year partnership aimed at “enhancing results in the expected presidential statement. addition, Article 54 provides that the Council their cooperation and exchange of experiences A further issue is to identify mechanisms for should “at all times be kept fully informed of in the area of mediation and at strengthening cooperation between the Council and the OIC activities undertaken or in contemplation” by the operational capacity of OIC in mediation in areas of common interest, such as conflict regional organisations for the maintenance of through the establishment of a mediation unit”. prevention and counter-terrorism. international peace and security. An area of increasing cooperation is counter- The relationship with regional organisa- terrorism, as reflected by the joint work with Options tions is featured in three important Secretary- the Counter-Terrorism Committee Execu- The most likely option is the adoption of a General’s reports that largely laid down the tive Directorate in areas such as the building presidential statement that: strategic vision of the organisation. of national capacity to fight against terrorism • recognises the role of the OIC in promoting The 17 June 1992 report An Agenda for and the role of cultural dialogue in countering peace and security and fostering a culture of Peace highlighted the role that regional organ- incitement to commit terrorist acts. peace at the global level; isations could play in preventive diplomacy, Furthermore, Azerbaijan seeks to highlight • identify ways cooperation with the OIC early warning systems, peacekeeping and post- the role of the OIC in supporting UN efforts could develop in areas of common inter- conflict peacebuilding. The Supplement to an in addressing conflicts on the Council’s agenda est; and Agenda for Peace, issued on 25 January 1995, and to explore how to make this cooperation • emphasise the important role of regional outlined modes of cooperation between the more effective by building on existing capaci- organisations in general and the OIC in UN and regional organisations, including con- ties and areas of expertise, such as preventive particular in the peaceful settlement of sultation, diplomatic support, operational sup- diplomacy. The OIC opened offices in 2011 in disputes. port, co-deployment and joint operations. The Kabul and Mogadishu, it has worked to sup- 21 March 2005 report In Larger Freedom: port mediation efforts in Darfur and Iraq and Council Dynamics towards development, security and human it has established development programmes in Council members are generally supportive of rights for all discussed the “establishment of an Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sierra Leone. On the initiative to have a briefing on this topic, interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities” the margins of the General Assembly in Sep- as it is the first time the Council will discuss a to allow the UN to work with regional organ- tember, OIC foreign ministers met on Somalia, relationship with the OIC. isations in predictable and reliable partnerships. Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jammu Some Council members might be wary that In initiating the upcoming debate, Azerbai- and Kashmir, Mali and Palestine. the general terms of the debate may allow par- jan seeks to consider the role of the OIC and its October’s briefing follows the 17 May ticipants to talk about conflict situations and experiences in promoting peace and security adoption of a resolution in which the Gen- issues that are not on the Council’s agenda. and fostering a culture of peace at the global eral Assembly expressed that strengthening Council members Azerbaijan, Morocco, level. The OIC has enjoyed observer status in the cooperation between the UN and the OIC Pakistan and Togo are members of the OIC. the UN General Assembly since 1975. “contributes to the promotion of the purposes Russia has had observer status since 2005. The relationship with the OIC, which has and principles of the UN” (A/RES/67/264).
Security Council Working Methods
Expected Council Action Ambassador Maria Cristina Perceval (Argen- what has become an annual practice since In October, the Council will hold its annu- tina) will brief. No outcome is anticipated. 2010 (previously, only two such debates were al open debate on its working methods. The held: in 1994 and in 2008). The Council’s Chair of the Informal Working Group on Doc- Key Recent Developments working methods have continually evolved, umentation and Other Procedural Questions, The debate in October will be the fourth in with a great outburst of developments in the
UN DOCUMENTS ON WORKING METHODS Notes from the President of the Security Council S/2013/515 (28 August 2013) focused on ways in which to improve the Council’s dia- logue with non-Council members and bodies. S/2012/937 (17 December 2012) supported a process of selection of chairpersons of subsidiary organs, with the participation of all members, in a “balanced, transparent, efficient and inclusive way”.Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6870 (26 November 2012) was an open debate on working methods presided by India, with a briefing by Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal), then chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and other Procedural Questions. Security Council Letters S/2013/568 (19 September 2013) welcomed the issuance of the 28 August Note from the President addressing a number of transparency issues.
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 19 Security Council Working Methods (con’t) early 1990s in response to the end of the Cold initiative of five states known as the “Small adopt its rules of procedure, and Article 10, War. More recently, since 2006, the Council Five” or the S5 (Costa Rica, Jordan, Liech- which states that the General Assembly may has made working methods an ongoing area tenstein, Singapore and Switzerland). During make recommendations to the Council on its of activity, mostly conducted in the framework the 61st session of the General Assembly, the powers and functions. of its Informal Working Group on Documenta- group circulated a draft resolution under the A key issue in this context is whether all tion and Other Procedural Questions. Under- agenda item “Follow-up to the Millennium members will be able to find a way to ease standings and commitments reached within Summit”, calling for measures aimed at bet- this tension and work jointly towards improv- the Working Group have been issued in succes- ter interaction between the Council and the ing the ability of the Council to function effi- sive Notes from the President of the Council. membership at large. That draft was not put ciently and negotiate effectively while satisfying The most recent Note on working meth- to a vote, but consultations on this initiative the desire of the larger membership for added ods was published on 28 August 2013 and continued for the next several years. transparency and accountability. focused on ways to improve the Council’s dia- In 2012 the S5 tabled a draft resolution Recurring important issues that non- logue with non-Council members and bod- (A/66/L.42/Rev.2) during the 66th session Council members are likely to want to address ies (S/2013/515). The document continues of the General Assembly. The draft acknowl- include: a series of commitments on the part of the edged the significant steps already taken by the • disseminating draft Council documents Council, including making more effective use Council to improve its working methods but sooner to non-members; of public meetings; maintaining regular com- emphasised the need for additional measures • encouraging the Council to hold more pub- munication with the Peacebuilding Com- aimed at enhancing its accountability, transpar- lic meetings; and mission and the chairs of its country-specific ency and effectiveness. It included 20 recom- • increasing both the frequency and the types configurations; expanding consultation and mendations to that effect. In the weeks leading of formats used for informal interactions cooperation with relevant regional and sub- up to the scheduled 16 May 2012 vote, the with non-members. regional organisations; continuing to provide S5 came under pressure, primarily from the opportunities to hear the views of the broader P5 (which have long asserted that the Council Council Dynamics membership on the working methods of the has exclusive responsibility to dictate its own Issues on which there has been considerable Council, including in open debates; and con- working methods) to withdraw the draft. After momentum and support from several Council sidering the methodology of wrap-up sessions the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs members include a willingness to critically and and informal briefing sessions. issued an opinion suggesting that a two-thirds proactively reflect on the Council’s work in the The wrap-up sessions have seen consider- majority would be needed and heeding various format of wrap-up sessions. able recent developments. In the early to mid- submissions to defer action, the S5 withdrew On some key issues, however, differences 2000s, the Council held several wrap-up ses- the draft to avoid a procedurally contentious have probably deepened recently between the sions to reflect on its work under a particular discussion in the General Assembly. permanent and elected members. Elected presidency. During that period, such sessions In early 2013 a new group of states members have been at times taken aback by were always organised by elected members, emerged as an informal caucus to advocate the fact that on many decisions, discussions and their formats included consultations, a for improved Security Council working meth- first occur within the P5 and that drafts are private meeting, a debate and an open debate. ods. Publicly launched on 2 May, Accountabil- shared with the full Council quite close to In 2013, Pakistan revived the practice, hold- ity, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) is a their adoption. Permanent members often ing a private meeting at the end of its Janu- cross-regional group of 22 small and medium argue that on some issues consensus among ary presidency. As of this writing, five more states aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the P5 is hard to reach and initial negotiations presidencies—including for the first time one the Council through the improvement of its in smaller groups is the only way to overcome permanent member, the UK—have followed working methods. the stalemate. (The decision by the Secretary- suit. The interest on the part of non-Council General to brief the P5 separately from the members has been remarkable: 28 members at Key Issues elected members on Syria on 30 August and large attended the January meeting. After that An overarching issue that has marked much 3 September respectively was apparently not first session, attendance at these meetings has of the working-methods discourse between well taken by some of the latter.) Tensions also ranged from 46 to 74 non-Council members. the Council and the membership at large is continue regarding the process of selection of In 2006, a renewed Council focus on its the tension between Article 30 of the UN chairs of Council subsidiary bodies. working methods was largely prompted by the Charter, which states that the Council shall
Women, Peace and Security
Expected Council Action The Secretary-General and the new head a civil society representative. The focus of In October the Council will hold its annual of UN Women, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, the debate will be the intersections between open debate on women, peace and security. are expected to brief, possibly along with the thematic agendas of the rule of law and
20 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 Women, Peace and Security (con’t) women, peace and security. that such programmes include a consistent • invite the head of UN Women to brief, in The Council has already received the Sec- gender dimension (S/2013/480). The small particular when considering a mandate to retary-General’s annual report (S/2013/525) arms report highlighted emerging concerns support post-conflict structures that should on the implementation of resolution 1325, about the issue of illicit small arms in armed ensure broad participation and decision- which in 2000 recognised that conflict has conflict and the linkages to sexual violence in making by women; a disproportionate impact on women and conflict (S/2013/503). • consistently incorporate a gender perspec- urged women’s participation in peace and The Council has held two formal meetings tive into its terms of references for visit- security processes. This report includes sev- on women, peace and security this year. On 17 ing missions and include related observa- eral recommendations that may be taken up April, the Council held an open debate on the tions in any briefings or reports following by the Council in an outcome document fol- annual report on sexual violence in conflict. a Council mission—as would be possible lowing the debate; however, at press time it On 24 June, the Council adopted resolution in relation to the expected visiting mission was unclear if it would be a presidential state- 2106, focusing on accountability for perpetra- to DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and the AU in ment or a resolution. tors of sexual violence in conflict and stressing Addis Ababa in October; and women’s political and economic empower- • improve the quality of gender analysis by Key Recent Developments ment as central to the long-term prevention of calling for gender expertise in all UN-led: The open debate will centre on women, rule of sexual violence. • commissions of inquiries; law and transitional justice in conflict-affected On 19 August, Mlambo-Ngcuka (South • transitional justice mechanisms; situations. Such a focus will provide an oppor- Africa) was sworn in as the new Executive • expert groups to relevant sanctions tunity to address the need for women’s equal Director of UN Women, replacing Michelle committees; rights, access to justice and participation to be Bachelet, who stepped down earlier in the year. • mediation processes, including in support placed at the centre of efforts to restore the of Special Representatives, Special Envoys rule of law and reform security and judicial Key Issues and mediation support teams; and sectors in post-conflict situations. A key issue for the Council is continuing to • political and peacekeeping missions, includ- The open debate will also be an opportu- work to ensure that the norms of the women, ing by the deployment of gender advisers nity to reflect on the most recent 1325 report peace and security agenda are integrated into and women protection advisers. (S/2013/525), which noted the increased atten- all aspects of its work. A further issue is iden- Finally, to address the gap between the tion from the international community to sex- tifying ways the Council could provide better women, peace and security framework and ual violence in conflict and called for greater guidance to Council-mandated peacekeeping its application, the Council could call for an attention to the full spectrum of threats faced and political missions to enhance implementa- independent review of the implementation of by women and girls. The report also highlight- tion of the agenda on the ground, in particular resolution 1325 in preparation for its high- ed that despite the emergence of improved on women’s participation. level review in 2015, as recommended by the practices in the implementation of resolution Another issue is to ensure that the expand- Secretary-General. 1325, there remains a deficit in opportunities ing focus on sexual violence in conflict does for women to exercise leadership and there was not unduly side-line the broader women, peace Council Dynamics continued underrepresentation of women in and security agenda or ignore that women’s Council members are generally supportive of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, protec- political and economic empowerment is essen- this thematic issue; however, most are aware tion and peacebuilding processes. As for the tial to any prevention and protection response. that pressing for better implementation of reso- Council, the report identified a gap in that link- lution 1325 may be an arduous undertaking in ages between security and women’s participa- Options the current Council climate. tion are often not made. An option for the Council is to adopt a presi- It has been difficult over the past two years Meanwhile, recent Secretary-General’s dential statement or resolution that reaffirms to advance the women, peace and security reports on other thematic issues demonstrate its commitment to advance the women, peace agenda, particularly due to the pushback by an improvement in the Secretariat’s own cross- and security agenda. The Council could adopt China and Russia against both the protection cutting approach to the women, peace and an outcome that identifies ways to put into and participation aspects. Council members security agenda. The report on the rule of law operation the robust framework established by expect that negotiations of any new text would included many such references, including an resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960 and likely be difficult and protracted. assessment completed by UN Women regard- 2106 in order to close the gap between Coun- The UK is the penholder on women, peace ing the extent to which women’s empowerment cil decisions and subsequent implementation and security in the Council. The US is the pen- and gender equality is considered in the work of on the ground—particularly where there is a holder on sexual violence issues. the UN on access to justice (S/2013/341). The UN presence or UN-led process. report on security sector reform recommended In this regard the Council could commit to:
UN DOCUMENTS ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2106 (24 June 2013) focused on accountability for perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict. S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000) recognised that conflict has a disproportionate impact on women. Security Council Presidential Statements S/PRST/2012/23 (31 October 2012) recognised the need in the Council’s own work for more systemic attention to the women, peace and security agenda. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6984 (24 June 2013) was a ministerial-level open debate on prevention of sexual violence. S/PV.6948 (17 April 2013) was the last annual open debate on sexual violence in conflict.S/PV.6877 (30 November 2012) was the last annual open debate on women, peace and security. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2013/525 (4 September 2013) was on women, peace and security. S/2013/149 (14 March 2013) was on sexual violence in conflict.
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 21 Annual Report of the Security Council
Expected Council Action that attempted to address the calls for more effectiveness is a closely related issue. In October the Council is expected to adopt analytical content. To make the annual report its annual report to the General Assembly more readable, its length was reduced from Options covering the period from 1 August 2012 approximately 600 to 300 pages. The report- Analysis of all the decisions taken annually through 31 July 2013. The US—which, as ing period was also adjusted to its current may be an impossible challenge. Still, there Council President in July is responsible for timeframe, amending the previous format are ways to produce a more substantial and drafting the introduction of the report—is that ran from 16 June to 15 June, thus split- useful report. This could include: expected to address the Council. It is unclear ting two monthly presidencies in half. • producing a more analytical introduction of whether other members will also speak at the Moreover, at the 2002 adoption, all 15 the reporting period, similar to that in 2002; adoption of the report, which is due to be pre- members intervened, reflecting on the Coun- • analysing the broader policy questions that sented to the General Assembly in November. cil’s effectiveness and suggesting ideas about the Council dealt with over the past year; how it could perform better. The debate was • analysing statistics or trends on Council Background seen as in line with the 1993 Note establish- resolutions and presidential and press state- Under Articles 15 and 24 of the UN Charter ing that Council members “who wish to do ments, by comparing this data with pre- the Council is required to submit an annual so may comment on the work of the Council vious years and assessing significant varia- report to the General Assembly on the “mea- for the period covered by the report”. The tions in the number of outcome documents sures that the Security Council has decid- interaction was cited, in addition to the new or favoured product formats; and ed upon or taken to maintain international introduction, as a further opportunity to eval- • reflecting divergent views to overcome peace and security”. For the wider member- uate the performance of the Council. At the the difficulty of producing a consensual ship, it is meant to serve as a transparency time Council members heralded the changes, analysis. and accountability mechanism of the Coun- and praised the introduction, describing it as • During the adoption of the report in Octo- cil, which as stated in the Charter “acts on an “analytical overview”. However, 2002 was ber the Council could: their behalf.” to date the only occasion when the report was • simply adopt the introduction following a Most member states, though, have over discussed publicly by the full Council. presentation by the US; or the years viewed the annual report as not In 2012 some members had considered • have members exchange views about the very useful. They have argued that the report having an exchange among all or most of the text and the performance of the Council should help them better understand the rea- 15 members about their views of the Coun- over the year in review. sons the Council made its decisions. Efforts cil’s work over the prior year. The adoption have been undertaken to improve its read- was scheduled for 30 October. However, this Council and Wider Dynamics ability and analytical content. was delayed due to Hurricane Sandy which Prior to the formal adoption of the introduc- Initial modifications of practices relating to struck New York and caused the UN to shut tion, the draft is circulated for comments the annual report were contained in a 1993 down for several days. The adoption was and approval to the full Council and to the Note by the President of the Council (S/26015). moved to 8 November and only its drafter, five elected members that left the Council at The Council decided to no longer regard the Colombia, spoke during the session. the end of the previous year. Many Council draft annual report as a confidential document members argue that consensus on an ana- up to the point of its adoption. Instead, the Key Issues lytical text about its decision-making is not Council agreed that the draft report could be A key issue is how to make the report more possible, or that the process is unnecessarily made available to member states prior to adop- analytical. In 2002, the introduction was eight time consuming. tion, and that the report would be adopted in pages and focused on the main aspects of the Some Council members contend that crit- a public session of the Council. The Note also Council’s work. Introductions in recent years icism of the report coming from the wider agreed to format changes and recommitted the have tended to be longer (the 2012 introduc- membership is unfair because the Council Council to a timely submission of the report to tion was 54 pages) and included a factual has in recent years made other improvements the General Assembly. summary of each meeting or Council decision, to enhance transparency. For example UN Largely at the initiative of Singapore, in largely based on end-of-presidency assess- members have access to all Council decisions 2002 the Council undertook its most con- ments prepared by the relevant member states. and other documents on its much improved certed effort to date to improve the report Whether the Council is currently prepared website, and internal debates can be followed (S/2002/199). An introduction was added to engage in assessing its performance and through a number of tools.
UN DOCUMENTS ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S ANNUAL REPORT Notes by the President of the Security Council S/2010/507 (26 July 2010) updated recommendations of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions. S/2002/199 (22 May 2002) indicated the inclusion of an introduction to the annual report. S/26015 (30 June 1993) indicated that the annual report would be adopted at a public session. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.4616 (26 September 2002) was the public discussion of the annual report in 2002.
22 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 Security Council Elections 2013
Expected General Assembly Action if all 193 UN member states participate. A are influential regional actors whose perspec- On 17 October, the General Assembly is member state can be prohibited from voting tives are likely to carry weight in the Coun- scheduled to elect five non-permanent mem- as a result of arrears in payment of financial cil. Chad and Nigeria, if elected, are likely to bers of the Security Council for the two-year contributions, in accordance with Article 19 maintain their strong engagement on Mali term beginning on 1 January 2014. of the UN Charter. where both have contributed a significant (Please see our 24 September Special Elections to the Council, as with other prin- number of peacekeepers to the UN Multidi- Research Report: Security Council Elections 2013 cipal organs of the UN, require formal bal- mensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in for more detailed information.) loting, even if candidates have been endorsed Mali. (It appears that Nigeria is drawing down by their regional group and are running on its peacekeeping presence in the country.) Background a “clean slate”. If no candidate obtains the Saudi Arabia will enter the Council at a time The five seats available for election in 2013 will required number of votes in the first round, of significant turmoil in the Middle East and be distributed regionally as follows: voting in the next round is restricted to the has an important stake in developments in • two seats for the African Group, currently candidates that received the most votes. In several neighbouring situations. Chile should held by Morocco and Togo; this restricted ballot, the number of countries find a strong ally in its support of Haiti in • one seat for the Group of Asia and the included is limited to twice the number of fellow GRULAC Council member Argentina. Pacific Small Island Developing States vacant seats; for example, if one seat is available Both are members of the Group of Friends of (Asia-Pacific Group), currently held by only the two countries that received the most Haiti, and jointly they contribute more than Pakistan; votes in the first round would contest the next 1,000 of the 8,690 peacekeepers serving with • one seat for the Group of Latin American round. (Any votes for other candidates dur- the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti. and Caribbean States (GRULAC), cur- ing this restricted voting round are considered There may be a larger number of elected rently held by Guatemala; and void.) This restricted voting process can con- Council members championing human secu- • one seat for the Eastern European Group, tinue for up to three rounds of voting. If, at this rity issues next year. Candidates such as Chile currently held by Azerbaijan. point, a candidate still fails to garner the mini- and Lithuania have underscored their support The Western European and Others Group mum number of votes, unrestricted voting is for agenda items such as the protection of civil- is not contending this election as its two seats reopened for up to three rounds. This pattern ians, children and armed conflict and wom- (currently held by Australia and Luxembourg) of restricted and unrestricted voting continues en, peace and security. Their perspective on come up for election every even calendar year. until a candidate is successful in securing the these matters is likely to resonate with several At press time, four of the candidates—Chad, required two-thirds of the votes. other elected members. Azerbaijan and Paki- Chile, Lithuania and Saudi Arabia—seemed to In theory, while unlikely, it is possible that stan, which take a more restrictive approach to be headed for a “clean slate” election as sole a country running on a “clean slate” may not these agenda items, will be leaving the Council, candidates for their respective regional groups. garner the requisite votes of those present which could provide an opportunity for prog- However, unlike Chile—a UN member state in the General Assembly in the first round ress in the eyes of those supporting human since 1945 that has served four terms on the of voting. Such a country may then be chal- security issues. However, it should be noted Council (1952-1953, 1961-1962, 1996-1997 lenged in subsequent rounds and ultimately that permanent members China and Russia, and 2003-2004), the other three have never not obtain a seat. which hold similarly conservative perspectives been members of the Security Council. Saudi Historically, there have been a number of on such matters, will continue to exert their Arabia also joined the UN in 1945, but it is one instances in which extended rounds of vot- influence. of four original UN member states that have ing were required to fill a contested seat. The Chad, which is in the annex of the Secre- yet to serve on the Council. (The others are the most recent such situation occurred in 2006 tary-General’s report on children and armed Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Haiti.) when Guatemala and Venezuela went through conflict for recruitment of child soldiers, has One race will likely be contested this year 47 voting rounds before both withdrew and signed an action plan that it is striving to as Gambia and Nigeria are competing for the Panama was elected in the 48th round. In implement in an effort to be delisted. It will be one seat allotted by the African Group to West 1979, Colombia and Cuba contested a seat interesting to see how it approaches children Africa. Gambia, a UN member state since for 154 rounds, a record for Security Coun- and armed conflict and other protection issues 1965, has had one term on the Council (1998- cil elections, before Mexico was elected as a as a Council member. 1999). Admitted to the UN in 1960, Nigeria compromise candidate in the 155th round. EU representation on the Council will has been a Council member four times (1966- increase from three to four countries, as Lith- 1967, 1978-1979, 1994-1995 and 2010-2011). Potential Council Dynamics in 2014 uania will join France, Luxembourg and the While it is difficult to evaluate how Council UK, which are also EU members. EU coun- Voting Procedures dynamics in 2014 will evolve with the new tries share similar perspectives on a number of A country must secure votes from two-thirds membership, the interests of the current can- agenda items and coordinate on some of them. of the member states present and voting at the didates provide some perspective on general However, it should be noted that at times the General Assembly session in order to secure patterns that might emerge. solidarity of the P3, or even the P5, can trump a seat on the Council, regardless of whether The candidates appear to have a strong coordination among EU Council members. the election is contested. This means that 129 national interest in Council agenda items votes are required at a minimum to win a seat within their respective regions. Several of them
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 23 Notable Dates for October Security Council Report Staff Bruno Stagno REPORT DUE REPORTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN OCTOBER REQUESTING DOCUMENT Executive Director
Joanna Weschler 4 September SG report on the implementation of resolution 1325 S/PRST/2012/23 Deputy Executive Director & (women, peace and security) Director of Research
24 September SG report on the Peace, Security and Cooperation S/RES/2098 Amanda Roberts Coordinating Editor & Framework for the DRC and the Region Senior Research Analyst
27 September SG report on MONUSCO (DRC) S/RES/2098 Shamala Kandiah Thompson What’s in Blue Editor & Senior Research Analyst 27 September SG report on UNISFA (Abyei) S/RES/2104 Astrid Forberg Ryan Senior Research Analyst & 1 October SG report on MINUSMA (Mali) S/RES/2100 Development Officer
7 October Somalia government’s report on the registration, S/RES/2111 Victor Casanova Abos distribution, use and storage of weapons by state Research Analyst security forces Charles Cater Research Analyst 10 October Joint AU/UN review of AMISOM (Somalia) S/RES/2111 Paul Romita Research Analyst 16 October SG report on UNAMID (Darfur) S/RES/2113 Eran Sthoeger Research Analyst 17 October SG report on the implementation of resolution 1559 S/PRST/2004/36 (Lebanon) S/RES/1559 Benjamin Villanti Research Analyst 21 October SG report on piracy off the coast of Somalia S/RES/2077 Robbin VanNewkirk Publications Coordinator MANDATES EXPIRE RELEVANT DOCUMENT Dahlia Morched Research Assistant 13 October ISAF authorisation (Afghanistan) S/RES/2069 Laura Coquard-Wallace 15 October MINUSTAH (Haiti) S/RES/2070 Research Associate Maritza Tenerelli OTHER IMPORTANT DATES Administrative Assistant
Lindiwe Knutson early October The Council will undertake a visiting mission to the Great Lakes Region (DRC, Rwanda Research Intern and Uganda) and will also hold its annual consultative meeting with the AU Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa. Stevenson Swanson Editorial Consultant
17 October The General Assembly will hold elections for five non-permanent members of the Security Council Report is a non- Security Council. profit organisation supported by the Governments of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 18 October The Council will hold its annual open debate on women, peace and security. Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, 22 October The Council will hold its quarterly open debate on the Middle East. Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey, the Ford Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. 28 October The Council will hold a briefing on cooperation between the UN and the Organisation of MacArthur Foundation, International Islamic Cooperation. Development Research Centre and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. 29 October The Council will hold its annual open debate on its own working methods. Design Point Five, NY
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24 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2013 Security Council Deadlocks and Uniting for Peace: An Abridged History
Uniting for Peace has been implemented 11 or 12 times since the adop- Situation Security Council Security Council Request General Assembly Outcome Stalemate tion of General Assembly resolution 377 (V) on 3 November 1950, Case 2 S/3710, S/3713/Rev.1 Resolution 119 (1956) First Emergency Special Session on “The Situation in the depending on how one characterises the first case see( case 1 below). The Middle East (1956) [FR and UK vetoed] [FR and UK voted against] Middle East” (Suez Canal) adopted seven resolutions, includ- Security Council has referred a majority of the cases, but has not done ing Resolution 1000 (ES-I) mandating the UN Emergency Force (UNEF). so since 1982 (see cases 2-8 to the right), while the General Assembly has Case 3 S/3730/Rev.1 Resolution 120 (1956) Second Emergency Special Session on “The Situation in done so most recently albeit not since 1997 (see cases 9-12 to the right). Hungary (1956) [USSR vetoed] [USSR voted against] Hungary” adopted five resolutions, including Resolution The first request from the General Assembly interestingly came from 1004 (ES-II) mandating a commission of inquiry into foreign intervention in Hungary. a permanent member of the Security Council, the USSR (see case 9), Uniting for Peace and all General Assembly requests have dealt with situations that place invoked by the Case 4 S/4050/Rev.1, S/4055/ Resolution 129 (1958) Third Emergency Special Session on “The Situation in the Security Council Middle East (1958) Rev.1 Middle East” adopted Resolution 1237 (ES-III) calling for early one or more of the P3 (France, United Kingdom, United States) on the [USSR vetoed] withdrawal of foreign troops from Jordan and Lebanon. spot. All the Security Council requests save two (see cases 2 and 8), on Case 5 S/4523 Resolution 157 (1960) Fourth Emergency Special Session on “The Situation in the Congo (1960) [USSR vetoed] [USSR voted against, Congo” adopted Resolution 1474 (ES-IV) confirming the the other hand, were in response to vetoes by the USSR. France abstained] mandate of the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC).
Case 6 S/10416, S/10423 Resolution 303 (1971) As the Twenty-Sixth Regular Session was in session no Resolution 377 (V) (1950) aka Uniting for Peace (3 November 1950) Bangladesh (1971) [USSR vetoed] [FR, UK and USSR Emergency Special Session was necessary and the issue “If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exer- abstained] was dealt with under the agenda item “UN Assistance to East Pakistan Refugees”. cise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, Case 7 S/13729 Resolution 462 (1980) Sixth Emergency Special Session on “The Situation in the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropri- Afghanistan (1980) [USSR vetoed] [USSR voted against] Afghanistan” adopted Resolution ES-6/2 calling for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops ate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of from Afghanistan. the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly shall Case 8 S/14832 Resolution 500 (1982) Ninth Emergency Special Session on “The Situation in the Middle East (1982) [US vetoed] [UK and US abstained] Middle East” adopted Resolution ES-9/1 declaring Israel a non therefore meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request. Such peace-loving state and calling on members to apply a number emergency special session may be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of of measures on Israel. any seven members [nine since 1965], or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations.”
Uniting for Peace Situation Security Council General Assembly General Assembly Outcome invoked by the Stalemate Request General Assembly Case 9 N.A. [USSR draft USSR (A/6717) and Fifth Emergency Special Session on “The Situation in the Middle East (1967) resolution failed to get General Assembly vote Middle East” adopted six resolutions, including Resolutions nine votes] (98-3-3) 2253 and 2254 (ES-V) calling on Israel to rescind unilateral measures in Jerusalem.
Case 10 S/13911 Senegal (A/ES-7/1) Seventh Emergency Special Session on “The Question of Case 1 Following three vetoes by the USSR on the situation in Korea [S/1653 (6 September 1950), S/1752 (12 Palestine (1980) [US vetoed] Palestine” adopted eight resolutions (ES-7/2 through ES-7/9) Korea (1951) September 1950), S/1894 (30 November 1950)], six Security Council members requested the General calling for the unconditional and total withdrawal of Israel from territories occupied since 1967. Assembly to consider the situation [A/1618 (4 December 1950)]. Although the Security Council removed the item from its agenda– a procedural issue not subject to the veto– enabling the General Assembly to Case 11 S/14459, S/14460/Rev.1, Zimbabwe (A/ES-8/1) Eighth Emergency Special Session on “The Question of freely discuss the matter under Article 11 of the United Nations Charter, in resolution 498 (V) [1 February Namibia (1981) S/14461, S/14462 Namibia” adopted Resolution ES-8/2 condemning South [FR, UK and US vetoed] Africa for occupation and calling for assistance to liberation 1951] the General Assembly nonetheless employed language from Uniting for Peace: “noting that the Secu- struggle. rity Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security with regard to Chinese communist intervention in Korea Case 12 S/1997/199, S/1997/241 Qatar (A/ES/10/1) Tenth Emergency Special Session on “The Question of Palestine (1997) [US vetoed] Palestine”, still in session, adopted inter alia, Resolution […].” Moreover, this is the case most frequently associated with Uniting for Peace as resolution 377 (V) ES-10/14 requesting an advisory opinion from the International was adopted in response to the 6 and 12 September 1950 vetoes by the USSR referenced above. Court of Justice.
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