Understanding America – The New conservative mandate and the Bush administration－ Kin-ichi Yoshihara Executive Director Asian Forum Japan

Before starting my presentation, let me give you some sense of my involvement in CIISS. Since 1999, CIISS and the Sasakawa Japan-China Friendship Fund (SPF) have collaborated on an integrated project to promote private-sector exchange in the field of security. CIISS and SPF shared views on strengthening Japan-China security exchange with former Chinese President Jiang Zemin, former Minister of National Defense Chi Haotian, and others connected with the People’s Liberations Army (PLA), after which the Japanese and Chinese sides agreed to work together to develop a track-two security exchange. Although the importance of private-sector promotion of security exchange was recognized as a track-two initiative, there had been few such initiatives between Japan and China. So, this project was a groundbreaking.

Asian Forum Japan, my organization, has worked with the SPF from the start of this project. AFJ is analyzing the Japan-U.S. defense guidelines, territorial disputes, other security-related issues, Japanese politics, economy, culture and American politics.

Two years ago, AFJ compiled a comprehensive text book for PLA officers to understand Japan and even American politics. I am not an expert on security issues. I was in charge of American politics in this text book. I have been very happy to have had opportunities to give my perspective about recent drastic changes in American politics to CIISS members and PLA officers for two years through this project. Through these exchanges, I have been strongly convinced that we must consider American conservative way of thinking when we analyze the American foreign policy. In other words, we must understand the firm conservative base of the Bush administration in order to understand its policy. So, today, I will try to bring up this conservative element in the Bush administration.

How to better understand the U.S.

Now, as I started the heart of my presentation about the new conservative mandate in America. I want to impress you with a very important point – a kind of truism about the U.S. or any other nation for that matter. What I want to say is that the U.S. must not be viewed as “one”. The U.S. is not that simple. But having said this, as we can note with the last presidential election 2000 results-the U.S. was largely divided into the two, conservative and liberal segment. At that time, the famous “National Journal” magazine issued a special number titled “50-50 country”. But, the mid- term election held in November 2002, results-the U.S. is currently conservative surpassed liberal. Republican rules White House, the Congress and even the Senate from January..

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Of course, even within the liberal and conservative groups there are differences and levels- but still the segments are divided into these two. And in understanding America today, it is imperative that we focus our efforts on the American conservatives that we have thus far largely neglected.

President Bush not only regarded the September 11 terrorist attacks as an act of war but he expanded the scope of retaliation to include nation-states and government institutions that sponsor terrorists. These attitudes of the Bush administration toward terrorists were reconfirmed in the State of the Union address of January 2002 and so-called “” of June 2002. In his speech before Congress January 2002, President Bush criticized North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, calling them an axis of evil, and conveyed his administration’s determination to fight a long and difficult battle against terrorists and their state sponsors.

2 President Bush – New Reagan -

The Bush administration’s counterterrorism measures represent a sea change from the policy of containing terrorism pursued by previous administrations, particularly the Clinton administration. The new measures can be understood as the declaration of an all-out and total war to exterminate terrorism. At the beginning of the Cold War, anti-communist conservatism in the United States criticized the policy of as being too soft on Communism. They called for the extermination of Communism and the liberation of Communist states. Today, militant conservative (including neo-conservative) strongly criticize the counterterrorism measures of the Clinton administration as being too soft. This attitude brings to mind hard-line anti-Communists like James Burnham, who, at the start of the Cold War, castigated the containment policy advocated by George F. Kennan of the State Department; instead, the hard-liners championed liberation. A common thread in the attitude of the anti- Communists was a deep distrust of liberal senior State Department officials, a feeling that had originated with the Alger Hiss case (if you recall, this is the case where the State Department official’s Mr. Hiss was accused of been communist). Many of these hard-liners regarded the State Department’s policy toward Communism as an appeasement and they kept their guard up as a result.

One characteristic of the Bush administration in ideological and political terms and in management style is its close ties with Reaganism and the way it models itself after the Reagan administration. The Bush administration has been well managed from the start. That is because key positions have been filled by experienced business leaders or by former cabinet members who supported the first Bush administration or the Republican administrations of Gerald Ford or Ronald Reagan. In addition, it is important to keep in mind the fact that President Bush’s leadership style -- one that could be mistaken for Reagan’s -- is contributing to the smooth management of the Bush administration, which consists of delegating administrative authority to the cabinet.

3 An even more noteworthy characteristic of the Bush administration is its stance toward national security and foreign policy. In a phrase, it is based on “peace through strength,” the philosophy of Reagan diplomacy. The main players in the development of the Bush administration’s national security and foreign policies are Vice president Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State . With the exception of Powell, the ideology of this team is militant-conservative (neo-con), and they can be called disciples of the Reagan School. The underlying awareness of the Bush administration’s foreign policy team as led by Cheney, Rice, and Rumsfeld is a profound distrust of the State Department comparable to that which existed at the start of the Cold War. For this reason, the State Department’s influence on national security and foreign policy has declined when compared with liberal administrations of the past. I believe that President Bush’s forceful quest for a department of homeland security is not unrelated to the conservative’s strong distrust of the State Department.

The Bush administration’s war against Afghanistan following 9/11 caused great apprehension among a large section of the mass media, who worried that the war would become prolonged and turn into a quagmire like the . Such commentary was particularly dominant in Japan, and there was a strong tendency to view the Bush administration as being oblivious to the lessons of the Vietnam War.

In the face of such commentary, Secretary of State Powell acquired an enormous presence. Powell was seen as one of the few cabinet members who had tasted firsthand the bitter fruit of the Vietnam War and who was keenly aware of its lessons.

Powell is the author of the Powell Doctrine, which specifies that the use of military force abroad must involve the vital interests of the United States, have clear political objectives, and enjoy public support. Accordingly, in preparing for the , Powell clarified political objectives, developed a careful plan, and, through a strategy of invading Iraq with

4 overwhelming military force, prevented a drawn-out war, minimized damage to U.S. forces, and became a hero who led the United States to victory.

Powell promptly recognized the terrorist attacks of 9/11 as an act of war and immediately afterward expressed firm resolve that the terrorist leaders would be captured and brought to justice. He did not forget to add, however, that the U.S. should proceed carefully with retaliatory action. In contrast, President Bush not only stated that the terrorists and their leaders should be captured and brought to justice; he further declared that the United States would go after all governments and government institutions that sponsor such terrorism. What is extremely important here is the fact that President Bush not only regarded the terrorist attacks as an act of war but that he expanded the scope of retaliation to nation-states and government institutions sponsoring terrorism. As is widely known, war with Iraq is an issue that has been vigorously debated in the Bush administration, and it is a fact that Powell, who is viewed as a dove, has been at odds over this issue with those cabinet members viewed as hawks, military conservative.

An issue worth examining in this context is the relationship between the Powell Doctrine and the .

President Reagan is widely viewed as a hawkish hard-liner who promoted a military buildup centering on strategic weapons and who favored a foreign policy based on the conservative ideas, peace through strength. As a result, Reagan is commonly thought to have disregarded the lessons of the Vietnam War. Such a view of Reagan, however, is not entirely accurate. While it is true that Reagan extolled an anti-Communist and hawkish foreign policy, it should not be forgotten that he was also a president who reflected the lessons of Vietnam in his foreign policy.

5 This is clearly evident in the Weinberger Doctrine, advocated by Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, . On November 28, 1984, Weinberger used the forum of the National Press Club to specify six principles for the use of military force by the United States. (1) The commitment must be deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. (2) It should be made "wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning." (3) Political and military objectives and the ways to meet them must be clearly defined. (4) As conditions change, it must be reasserted whether such the commitment to war remains in the national interest. (5) Before a commitment is made, there must be "some reasonable assurance" of popular and congressional support. (6) A commitment to arms must be a last resort.

It should be noted that the Weinberger Doctrine outlined the Reagan administration’s response to international terrorism at that time. It is widely acknowledged that severe discord divided Caspar Weinberger and George Schulz in the Reagan administration. This is evident in the clear differences between the Weinberger Doctrine and George Shultz’s hard-line counterterrorist policies. At that time, Powell strongly supported the Weinberger Doctrine.

It is therefore possible to say that the substance of the Weinberger Doctrine was inherited by the current Bush administration and is reflected in the Powell Doctrine. Given the consistent philosophy underlying the Powell Doctrine and the Weinberger Doctrine, we can conclude that while Powell may at times appear isolated, his position and role are quite secure in the Bush administration.

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