ong after the pulled In a campaign speech in 1980, presi- to achieve those objectives; (5) there out of Vietnam, the memory of dential candidate said, is reasonable assurance of support of the conflict hung over the nation “For too long, we have lived with the American people and Congress; and like a cloud. The armed forces Vietnam syndrome.” Moments later, (6) other options have been exhausted left 58,178 dead there in the first however, Reagan added that “there is before US forces are committed as a Lwar the US had ever lost—and which a lesson for all of us in Vietnam. If we last resort. the nation did not fight to win. are forced to fight, we must have the Weinberger said he was charting a The war was micromanaged from means and the determination to prevail course between two extremes. “The Washington, where political leaders— or we will not have what it takes to first—undue reserve—would lead us fearful of escalation that might draw in secure the peace. And while we are ultimately to withdraw from interna- China or the —imposed at it, let us tell those who fought in tional events that require free nations all sorts of crippling restrictions. The that war that we will never again ask to defend their interests from the ag- enemy operated from sanctuaries that young men to fight and possibly die gressive use of force,” he said. “The US forces were not allowed to strike. in a war our government is afraid to second alternative—employing our The conflict dragged on, prosecuted let them win.” forces almost indiscriminately and with varying intensity, until 1973 when , nominated by as a regular and customary part of the US declared “peace with honor” Reagan to be Secretary of Defense, our diplomatic efforts—would surely and withdrew. picked up the theme in Senate con- plunge us headlong into the sort of The national consensus was that the firmation hearings in January 1981, domestic turmoil we experienced nation should never again be drawn declaring that the United States should during the , without ac- into such an open-ended conflict so not go to war unless vital national complishing the goal for which we lacking in direction and commitment. interests were at stake. committed our forces.” A new term, the “Vietnam syndrome,” Weinberger famously codified his It was dubbed the “Weinberger described a situation in which the armed position in a speech at the National Doctrine” two days later in a Wash- forces supposedly were left combat shy Press Club Nov. 28, 1984, when he ington Post editorial. “In a sense, by the defeat in Vietnam. announced “six major tests to be ap- Mr. Weinberger is simply distilling The War Powers Resolution of 1973 plied when we are weighing the use the post-Vietnam consensus,” it said. curtailed the President’s authority to of US combat forces abroad.” send forces into areas of “hostilities” Forces should be committed, he said, without a declaration of war or statutory only if (1) vital national interests are authorization, except in cases of dire at stake; (2) the nation is prepared to national emergency. Even then, the ac- commit enough forces to win; (3) clear tion had to be terminated within 60 days political and military objectives have unless it was extended by Congress. been established; (4) forces are sized The Weinberger

A terrorist truck filled with explosives destroys the Marine Corps barracks at the airport in Beirut, on Oct. 23, 1983. The attack killed 243 Americans. Above right: Rescuers comb through the rubble of the barracks.

62 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2014 Doctrine AIR FORCE Magazine J. William Fulbright, former chair be raising the specter of nuclear war.” it should be remembered that he could going all out to ‘win’ wars nowadays, “when a Defense Secretary talks about leapt to the strange conclusion that McCartney inthe simmering in .” James ish, and dangerous idea that has been Weinberger “has surfaced a naïve, dov President Lyndon B.Johnson,said tenberg, aformerspeechwriterfor out doctrine.” promulgating a “hunker-down, lash- advocating only the “fun wars” and William Safire accused Weinberger of lovable war.” In the trayed Weinberger as “in search of the Chicago Tribune, ridicule. Inasatiricalpieceinthe and commentatorswas disdainand prevailing reaction from columnists received in the armed forces but the Scorn From theCommentators must respond.” the central text to which the others stylish way. His speech now becomes but he has reopened it in a serious and the debateontheseessentialquestions, “Secretary Weinberger has not ended Political critics weighed in, too. Syndicated columnistBen Wat The was well- Philadelphia Inquirer Michael Kilian por / March 2014 New YorkTimes, By JohnT. Correll - - - -

Photo by SSgt. Randy Gaddo use offorceismeasured. the yardstickagainstwhich Thirty yearslater,itisstill USMC photo 63 keeping force in Lebanon. Against the advice of Weinberger and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John W. Vessey Jr.—and at the urging of the Council staff and DOD photo by R. D. Ward D. R. by photo DOD the State Department—a contingent of 1,200 marines deployed in 1982 to the Beirut airport in the middle of a complicated civil war. The NSC staff, Weinberger said, seemed to “spend most of their time thinking up ever more wild adventures for our troops.” Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs wanted to bring the ma- rines home soon, pointing out that they had no defined objective in Lebanon and no mission other than providing a military presence. Reagan backed Shultz rather than Weinberger, and the marines were still in Beirut on Oct. 23, 1983, when a ter- rorist truck bombing of the barracks at the airport killed 241 Americans. The attack was carried out by elements of what would become the Hezbollah Islamic militant group. The remaining marines were with- drawn, over Shultz’s objections. In Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger holds a press briefing at the Pentagon in 1981. October 1984, a year after the Beirut truck bombing, Shultz said the United man of the Senate Foreign Relations intent was clear to all. There are many States had to maintain “the capability Committee, writing with professor instances in which military power can to act on a moment’s notice. There Seth Tillman in , be used legitimately, Shultz said, and will be no time for a renewed national said that Weinberger’s tests were “so “there is no such thing as guaranteed debate after every terrorist attack. We broad and subjective” that “it is hardly public support in advance.” may never have the kind of evidence likely they would have posed a seri- that can stand up in an American court ous obstacle to our involvement and Reagan, Weinberger, and Shultz of law, but we cannot allow ourselves escalation in Vietnam.” Weinberger and Shultz had locked to become the Hamlet of nations, wor- Leslie Gelb, who had been study horns previously over the use of US ma- rying endlessly over whether and how director for the Pentagon Papers in rines as part of a multinational peace- to respond.” the 1960s, said in a New York Times op-ed, “The Secretary’s was a classic statement of the traditional military point of view—black and white, win or lose—as against the blurred and gray world of the diplomat.” Army Times, a newspaper attuned to Cook Dennis by photo AP a different constituency, saw it from another perspective: “In his speech, Weinberger showed that he, at least, has learned the crucial lesson of the Vietnam War: that military force should never be used in a half-hearted pursuit of ill-defined ends. It is a lesson that must be etched in the consciousness of America’s political leaders as indelibly as the inscriptions of the 58,000 names on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.” The principal opponent of the Wein- berger Doctrine (and Weinberger’s great rival in the Reagan cabinet) was Sec- retary of State George P. Shultz. He Lt. Gen. (r) speaks at a ceremony for outgoing Defense Secretary Weinberger (l) did not mention Weinberger directly in November 1987 as President Ronald Reagan (c) listens. At the time, Powell was Reagan’s in a speech in December 1984 but his nominee for National Security Advisor. 64 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2014 AP photo by J. Scott Applewhite Scott J. by photo AP

That set the stage for Weinberger’s assistant. Weinberger had asked him to Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Press Club speech a month later, in take a look at the Press Club speech in Chiefs of Staff, visits an air base in Saudi Arabia in 1990. The 1991 which he declared the six tests for draft and Powell went along with him fully met Weinberger’s six tests, which committing US forces to combat. on the day he delivered it. Powell agreed Powell supported. Shultz took a final shot in his mem- with Weinberger on all points. oirs, published in 1993, in which he Writing about the Gulf War in the New force to achieve it.” said the Weinberger Doctrine “was the York Times in 1992, Powell said, “The It is questionable whether Powell’s Vietnam syndrome in spades, carried reason for our success is that in every point about decisive military means/ to an absurd level, and a complete instance we have carefully matched the overwhelming force constituted a new abdication of the duties of leadership.” use of military force to our political doctrine or if it was an amplification of For his part, Reagan later said that objectives. President Bush, more than the “sufficient forces to win” prescribed “the sending of the marines to Beirut any other recent president, understands by Weinberger. Powell did not otherwise was the source of my greatest regret the proper use of military force. In ev- add to the conditions for use of force. and my greatest sorrow as President,” ery instance, he has made sure that the In the run-up to the 1996 presidential and he listed a set of principles “to objective was clear and that we knew election, Powell’s opponents, seeking to guide America in the application of what we were getting into. We owe it to block his nomination as the Republican military force abroad.” They were a the men and women who go in harm’s candidate, misconstrued the Weinberger close paraphrase of the Weinberger way to make sure that their lives are Doctrine as weak and timid, relabeled it Doctrine. not squandered for unclear purposes.” the , and used it as an Increasingly, the underlying concepts instrument in a “Stop Powell” move- The “Powell Doctrine” were spoken of as the “Weinberger- ment. It was nothing but a contrived The Gulf War of 1991 met the con- Powell Doctrine” or even the “Powell political convenience, but it contributed ditions of the Weinberger Doctrine Doctrine.” According to Washington to the myth that the famous conditions completely. Persian Gulf resources had Post reporters Rick Atkinson and Bob for use of force had been established been defined as vital to the US since Woodward, Powell contributed what by Powell. January 1980 when President Jimmy they called the element of “invincible Carter pledged we would defend our in- force” in a combination described as Sending Signals terests there “by any means necessary, “Weinberger Plus.” Powell himself usu- The doctrine, by whatever name, including military force.” In contrast ally referred to it as “decisive military came under intense attack when the to the uncertain gradualism that char- means.” Clinton Administration took office in acterized the Vietnam War, US forces One of the first to completely cross January 1993. The new Secretary of began Operation Desert Storm with the line in terminology was political- Defense was Jr. Previously, adequate strength to achieve the clear military theorist Edward N. Luttwak, when he had been chairman of the objectives assigned. The Gulf War not writing in the Nov. House Armed Services Committee, only had the support of public opinion 10, 1992. He said, “The Powell Doctrine Aspin drew a distinction between two and Congress but also the backing of is an extreme case of bureaucratic self- schools of military employment, which the international community. protection” and that Powell “insists that he described as “Limited Objectives” Lt. Gen. Colin Powell (r) speaks at a ceremony for outgoing Defense Secretary Weinberger (l) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of the United States should send its forces versus “All or Nothing.” in November 1987 as President Ronald Reagan (c) listens. At the time, Powell was Reagan’s Staff in 1991 was Gen. Colin L. Powell, into danger only if there is a perfectly The All-or-Nothing school “says that nominee for National Security Advisor. who had been Weinberger’s military clear-cut combat goal and overwhelming if you aren’t ready to put the pedal to AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2014 65 the holy month of Ramadan would be profoundly offensive.

The Doctrine in Disrepute After Powell retired, his views and

AP photo by Pablo Monsivais Pablo by photo AP Weinberger’s were challenged more often by factions in the armed forces. In 1995, Thomas Ricks reported in the Wall Street Journal that some senior officers in the Pentagon, especially in the Navy and the Marine Corps, were unhappy with the Powell Doctrine. “Those lesser sorts of military engage- ment to support diplomacy historically have been specialties of the Navy and the Marines,” Ricks noted. Jeffrey Record, a former congressio- nal staffer who had joined the faculty of the Air War College, was a frequent critic. In “Weinberger-Powell Doctrine Doesn’t Cut It” in the Naval Institute’s Proceedings magazine in 2000, Re- cord called the doctrine “simplistic Secretary of State John Kerry (l) and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov go and flawed” and said there was “no separate ways after greeting each other at the US Ambassador’s residence in Par- is, , Jan. 13. Kerry had previously speculated about a small, “very limited” consensus of what constitutes vital war to punish Syria’s Assad regime. national interests. ... A distinguishing feature of great powers is that they are the floor don’t start the engine,” Aspin Doctrine, declaring that he had no prepared to threaten and even go to war said, predicting that “things are going right to put a sign on his door saying, on behalf of nonvital interests for such to tilt future debates somewhat in the “I’m sorry—we only do the big ones.” purposes as demonstrating credibility direction of the Limited Objectives In his first annual report to Con- and maintaining order.” school.” In a news release from the gress, William J. Perry, who replaced Popular author Max Boot said, “So Armed Services Committee, Aspin Aspin as Secretary of Defense in 1994, few missions short of World War II said, “People may not be willing to pay broadened the use of the armed forces satisfy the Powell checklist that, if $250 billion or even $200 billion a year to include instances when “the United strictly applied, it becomes a recipe for a military that is not very useful. States has important but not vital for inaction.” Among those continuing It may be that to maintain a military national interests at stake.” National to support the Weinberger Doctrine for the extreme contingencies, it will security advisor Anthony Lake identi- were the Air Force Association and its be necessary to show that it is useful fied seven “circumstances” in which journal, Air Force Magazine. for the lesser contingencies, too.” military force might be used. One of When airliners hijacked by terrorists Aspin’s looser approach led to disas- them was “to maintain our reliability, crashed into the World Trade Center, ter in Somalia in 1993 (the notorious because when our partnerships are the Pentagon, and a field in rural “Black Hawk Down” incident) where strong and confidence in our leader- Pennsylvania in September 2001, the humanitarian relief turned into armed ship is high, it is easier to get others case for use of force in Afghanistan peacekeeping of a vague and tentative to work with us.” was indisputable. There was less cer- sort and 18 US soldiers were killed American officials quoted by the tainty when the effort was redirected trying to capture a warlord who was New York Times said the reason for air to Iraq in 2003, especially after the riding around in a US airplane two strikes near Sarajevo in 1995—Opera- main justification, the assumption that months later. tion Deliberate Force—was to “drop Iraq was preparing weapons of mass Another believer in Limited Ob- a few bombs and see what happens.” destruction, was found to be mistaken. jectives was Madeleine K. Albright, That was four years before Operation Over the next several years, the Global Clinton’s ambassador to the UN, Allied Force ousted the Serbian regime War on Terrorism evolved to include who asked Powell, “What’s the point of Slobodan Milosevic in 1999. an emphasis on nation building in Iraq of having this superb military that In February 1998, discussing air and Afghanistan. you’re always talking about if we strikes against Iraq, Albright—by A major assumption of the new can’t use it?” then Secretary of State—said, “We National Defense Strategy in 2005 Clinton did not reappoint Powell for are talking about using military force, was that irregular warfare—terrorism, a third term as Chairman, for which but we are not talking about war. insurgency, and other nonconventional he was eligible. Instead, in October That is an important distinction.” In conflict—had become the dominant 1993, he chose Army Gen. John M. December 1998, Operation Desert Fox form of likely engagement for US Shalikashvili, who was more ame- sent 650 air sorties and 400 cruise forces. nable to views of the Administration. missile strikes against Iraq, but it In 2010, Adm. Michael G. Mullen, Shalikashvili went to some length was called off after 70 hours, in part the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of in disagreeing with the Weinberger because some felt bombing during Staff, said, “We must not look upon 66 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2014 the use of military forces only as a officials said the objectives included sounded like the modern equivalent of last resort, but as potentially the best, punishing Assad and sending him “a the Vietnam syndrome. first option when combined with other very clear signal.” The operation would The whole thing fizzled out in early instruments of national and interna- take the form of a cruise missile attack, September when Assad agreed to a tional power. We must not try to use launched by Navy destroyers in the casual comment by Kerry in a news force only in an overwhelming capac- eastern Mediterranean. There would conference that Syria could avert an ity, but in the proper capacity, and in be no air strikes or US ground forces. attack by placing its weapons under a precise and principled manner.” It Secretary of State John F. Kerry international control. The Administra- was interpreted as a repudiation of said it would be “a very limited, very tion doubted Assad’s sincerity but had Weinberger and Powell. targeted, very short-term effort that de- no choice except to fold its initiative grades his capacity to deliver chemical for a strike. Through the Lens of Syria weapons” and “an unbelievably small, Comparisons with Weinberger were How far US policy had drifted from limited kind of effort.” inevitable. Despite all the criticism, the Weinberger Doctrine was starkly Obama said, “Any action that we no one has yet come forward with a demonstrated during the Syria crisis contemplate and partners like France comprehensive alternative to his six of 2013. A chemical weapons attack might contemplate would be limited, tests. Often disparaged and sometimes Aug. 21 by Syrian President Bashar al- proportionate, and appropriate and fo- declared dead, the tests keep bobbing Assad’s forces killed more than 1,400 cused on deterring the use of chemical back up. Events have a way of making civilians outside Damascus. weapons in the future and degrading them look reasonable, even wise. President Obama had warned Assad the Assad regime’s capacity to use Thirty years later, in the absence in 2012 that “a red line for us is [when] chemical weapons.” of anything that credibly supersedes we start seeing a whole bunch of chemi- The Washington Post reported that it, Weinberger’s Doctrine is still the cal weapons moving around or being some military leaders had “serious res- yardstick against which the use of utilized.” Following the Damascus ervations” about the impending strike. force is measured. n attacks, the Administration shifted into According to the New York Times, the high gear and floated a plan for strikes “drum major for intervention” in Syria against Syria, disclosing details—and was Kerry. John T. Correll was editor in chief of limits—of the envisioned operation. Opinion polls found that only 30 Air Force Magazine for 18 years and “The options we are considering are percent of the public supported a strike is now a contributor. His most recent not about regime change,” said White on Syria. Kerry attributed the reluctance article, “The Feeder Force,” appeared House spokesman Jay Carney. Other to “an enormous Iraq hangover,” which in the January issue.

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