Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy
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S. Doc. 105-2 REPORT of the COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY PURSUANT TO PUBLIC LAW 236 103RD CONGRESS This report can be found on the Internet at the Government Printing Office’s (GPO) World Wide Web address: http://www.access.gpo.gov/int For further information about GPO’s Internet service, call (202) 512-1530. For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 ISBN 0-16-054119-0 The Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy Daniel Patrick Moynihan, New York, Chairman Larry Combest, Texas, Vice Chairman John M. Deutch, Massachusetts Jesse Helms, North Carolina Martin C. Faga, Virginia Ellen Hume, District of Columbia Alison B. Fortier, Maryland Samuel P. Huntington, Massachusetts Richard K. Fox, District of Columbia John D. Podesta, District of Columbia Lee H. Hamilton, Indiana Maurice Sonnenberg, New York Staff Eric R. Biel, Staff Director Jacques A. Rondeau, Deputy Staff Director Sheryl L. Walter, General Counsel Michael D. Smith, Senior Professional Staff Joan Vail Grimson, Counsel for Security Policy Sally H. Wallace, Senior Professional Staff Thomas L. Becherer, Research and Policy Director Michael J. White, Senior Professional Staff Carole J. Faulk, Administrative Officer Paul A. Stratton, Administrative Officer (1995) Cathy A. Bowers, Senior Professional Staff Maureen Lenihan, Research Associate Gary H. Gower, Senior Professional Staff Terence P. Szuplat, Research Associate John R. Hancock, Senior Professional Staff Pauline M. Treviso, Research Associate Appointments to the Commission By the President of the United States The Honorable John M. Deutch, Belmont, MA Mr. John D. Podesta, Washington, DC Ambassador Richard K. Fox, Jr., Washington, DC Ms. Ellen Hume, Washington, DC By the Majority Leader of the Senate Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pindars Corners, NY Professor Samuel P. Huntington, Boston, MA By the Minority Leader of the Senate Senator Jesse Helms, Raleigh, NC Mrs. Alison B. Fortier, Chevy Chase, MD By the Speaker of the House of Representatives Representative Lee H. Hamilton, Nashville, IN Mr. Maurice Sonnenberg, New York, NY By the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives Representative Larry Combest, Lubbock, TX Mr. Martin C. Faga, Falls Church, VA Table of Contents Figures and Tables XIX Summary of Findings and Recommendations XXI Chairman’s Foreword XXXI Vice Chairman’s Foreword XLVII I. Overview: Protecting Secrets and Reducing Secrecy 1 Commission Purposes and Objectives Secrecy Issues Not Addressed by the Commission Defining Government Secrecy The Means for Protecting Government Secrets The Importance of Protecting Secrets The Intangible Costs of Secrecy Efforts to Quantify the Costs of Secrecy Evolving Concepts of National Security A Statutory Basis for the Secrecy System The Case for a Statutory Approach A Proposed Statute Conclusion II. Rethinking Classification: Better Protection and Greater Openness 19 Toward a Life Cycle Approach to Classification Management The Secrecy System Bases for Classification A Half Century of Executive Orders Protection of Sources and Methods Protection Under the Atomic Energy Act Living With Ambiguity: The Levels of Classification Controlling Access to Secrets: The “Need-to-Know” Principle Clarifying Security in Special Access Programs Protecting Other Government Information The Classifiers Original Classification Authorities: The Linchpin of Classification Derivative Classifiers: Enhancing Accountability Where it Matters Developing Better Classification Guides Improving the Training and Education of Classifiers The Key to Better Classification: The Initial Decision to Classify The Importance of the Initial Decision XV Improving the Initial Decision Enhancing Implementation and Oversight A Greater Role for the Congress The Focal Point: Executive Branch Policy Development and Oversight Policy Development: Who’s in Charge? Oversight: The Critical Missing Link A New Approach to Policy Development and Oversight Strengthening Implementation and Oversight Within Agencies Conclusion III. Common Sense Declassification and Public Access 49 Why Public Access Matters Promising Developments: Declassification Success Stories Unnecessary Secrecy Persists Sensible Risk Management Continuing Barriers to Declassification and Public Access Declassification Under Past Executive Orders Executive Order 12958: A Renewed Focus on Declassification Declassification and the Freedom of Information Act How Much Is Still Classified? How Long Does It Take Before Information Is Declassified? How Much Does Declassification Cost? The Impact of Agency Equities: Multiple Agency Reviews Mean Multiple Delays The Current State of Agency Records Management Agency Attitudes Affect Public Access Public Access in the Information Age Adequate Oversight Is Crucial to Sensible Declassification Policies Recommendations for Improving Declassification and Public Access Establishing A National Declassification Center to Coordinate Public Access Policy Clarifying Protection of Sources and Methods Information Improving Records Management and Other Agency Practices to Promote Public Access Conclusion IV. Personnel Security: Protection Through Detection 75 Overview of the Personnel Security Process The Background Investigation Types of Investigations Investigative Costs The Adjudication Improving the Current System Modernizing the System’s Cold War Foundations XVI Increasing Clearance Reciprocity and Standardization Enhancing Investigative Quality Reducing Inefficiencies in the Processing of Cases Addressing Transparency and Due Process Concerns Allocating Resources More Effectively Strengthening Employee Assistance Programs Assessing the Value of Financial Disclosure Advancing Polygraph Research Making the Clearance Process More Efficient Through Automation Conclusion V. Information Age Insecurity 95 Federal Government Information Security and the National Information Infrastructure The Growing Threat to Information Systems Security The Improving Federal Response Improving Oversight Mechanisms Enhancing Executive Branch Oversight and Policy Formulation Enhancing Congressional Oversight and Policy Formulation Addressing Current Problems Preventing Redundancies in Technology Development Promoting Government-Industry Cooperation Discouraging the Use of Classification as an Alternative to Effective Information Systems Security Encouraging Greater Accountability and Leadership Planning for the Future Disseminating Threat Information Increasing Awareness of Computer Attacks Developing Auditing and Intrusion Detection Capabilities Including Security in Automation Projects Professionalizing Information Systems Security Strengthening Information Technology Training and Awareness Conclusion VI. APPENDICES A. Secrecy: A Brief Account of the American Experience B. Commission’s Authorizing Statute C. Summary of Recommendations D. Biographical Information E. Acknowledgments F. List of Commission Meetings and Programs G. Major Reviews of the U.S. Secrecy System H. Acronyms and Abbreviations XVII XVIII Figures and Tables Figures 1. Where It Happens: Classification Activity By Agency 31 2. Agency Declassification at a Glance 58 3. Number of Federal and Contractor Employees with Clearances 76 4. Total Investigation Costs 77 5. Federal EAP Statistics 88 6. Trends in Hacker Tools 99 7. Percentage of Companies with Employees Educated on Computer Abuse Laws 112 Tables 1. Provisions in Past Executive Orders Promoting Public Access to Information 55 2. Major Personnel Security Authorities Since EO 10450 79 3. Potential Legislative Jurisdiction for Information Systems Security 103 XIX Summary of Findings and Recommendations It is time for a new way of thinking about secrecy. Secrecy is a form of government regulation. Americans are familiar with the tendency to over- regulate in other areas. What is different with secrecy is that the public cannot know the extent or the content of the regulation. Excessive secrecy has significant consequences for the national interest when, as a result, policymakers are not fully informed, government is not held accountable for its actions, and the public cannot engage in informed debate. This remains a dangerous world; some secrecy is vital to save lives, bring miscreants to justice, protect national security, and engage in effective diplo- macy. Yet as Justice Potter Stewart noted in his opinion in the Pentagon Papers case, when everything is secret, nothing is secret. Even as billions of dollars are spent each year on govern- ment secrecy, the classification and personnel security systems have not always succeeded at their core task of protecting those secrets most critical to the national security. The classification system, for example, is used too often to deny the public an understanding of the policymaking process, rather than for the necessary protection of intelligence activities and other highly sensitive matters. The classification and personnel security systems are no longer trusted by many inside and outside the Government. It is now almost routine for American officials of unquestioned loyalty to reveal classified information as part of ongoing policy disputes—with one camp “leaking” information in support of a particular view, or to the detriment of another—or in support of settled administration policy. In the process, this degrades public service by giving a huge advantage to the least scrupulous players. The best way to ensure that secrecy is respected, and that the