James Burnham, William Henry Chamberlin, and the Conservative Foreign Policy Dialectic

Home , Modern Age (periodical), William Henry Chamberlin

JAMES BURNHAM, WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN, AND THE CONSERVATIVE FOREIGN POLICY DIALECTIC

Thesis for the Degree of M. A. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY THOMAS BENJAMIN 1976

ABSTRACT

JAMES BURNHAM, WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN, AND THE CONSERVATIVE FOREIGN POLICY DIALECTIC

by Thomas Benjamin

James Burnham and William Henry Chamberlin were the most prominent, articulate, and prolific anti-Soviet writers during the years of the Truman administration. Their most lasting impact was to author a body of work on Soviet-American relations which was widely accepted by American conservatives.

A sustained commentary on the views of Burnham and Chamberlin allows the historian to review the Cold War from their perspective and from the perspective of those who commented on them.

One can trace the shift within conservative ranks from isolation-

ism and Anglophobia to world-wide interventionism, support of the British Empire as a bulwark to Soviet expansionism and a conspiratorial view of international politics.

The conservative foreign policy dialectic of Burnham and

Chamberlin assumed that there could be no peace while the Soviet

Union existed. They had come to this conclusion by accepting at face value the Soviet understanding of the relationship between communism and capitalism. Like Lenin before them, they Thomas Benjamin

foresaw the eventual triumph of one system and the destruction

of the other.

Seeking to preserve America's free society, Burnham and

Chamberlin adopted communist assumptions and methods, would

not have tolerated opposing points of View in their struggle

I with the enemy, would have totally mobilized the nation's

material and intellectual resources which.would have to be

directed by a central authority, and would have required the

subordination of America's allies to American foreign policy

objectives and tactics. Following Burnham's and Chamberlin's

prescription, the United States would have to subvert its own

freedom to save it. This is the dialectic's greatest con-

tradiction. JAMES BURNHAM, WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN, AND THE CONSERVATIVE FOREIGN POLICY DIALECTIC

Thomas Benjamin

A THESIS

Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1976 The thesis of Thomas Benjamin is approved:

72W“

/(17”ZL((LQé/9¢L,

Committee Chairman

Dean

May 1976 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Professors Warren I. Cohen, Madison

Kuhn, and Douglas Miller at Michigan State University, and

Professor Robert Bowers at Hanover College, Indiana for taking the time to read and comment on this thesis. Their numerous suggestions were very helpful. To Professor Cohen, I am very grateful, for his guidance and encouragement.

I would also like to thank Mr. James Burnham for graciously sharing some thoughts with me.

Margaret Gentilcore at the Chicago Tribune was helpful in

looking up and sending me copies of articles on Burnham and

Chamberlin. Devin A. Garrity of Devin Adair sent me some interesting publishing figures. Mildred Benjamin improved countless sentences, often to no avail. Christina Johns lent me her typewriter and provided a sane retreat from the library.

And finally, Royal Benjamin has always helped.

ii CONTENTS

Introduction.

Chapter One: Apostasy and War.

Chapter Two: The Struggle for Recognition. .30

Chapter Three: Ascendancy Within Conservatism. .46

Chapter Four: Conclusion. . .73

Bibliography. .80

iii INTRODUCTION

James Burnham and William Henry Chamberlin were the most prominent, articulate, and prolific anti-Soviet writers during the years of the Truman administration. Only one other anti-

Soviet publicist, David J. Dallin, a professor at Yale University, wrote as well and as much. Burnham and Chamberlin stirred up some controversy in the Truman years, found some liberal (anti- communist) allies, and far more anti-communist conservative admirers. Their most lasting impact was to author a body of work on Soviet-American relations which was widely accepted by

American conservatives.

Formerly sympathetic to the Left, Burnham and Chamberlin in the 1930's and 1940's became staunch conservatives.

Chamberlin's Rightward move was a reaction to Soviet tyranny and secret American diplomacy. Burnham was an elitist before and after his apostasy and was always less libertarian than

Chamberlin. He advocated anti-Soviet policies that could be effected only by a highly centralized state yet simultaneously he paid lip service to the conservative ideal of decentrali- zation. “He also supported Senator Joseph McCarthy's right to attack, investigate, and immobilize the Democratic administration. Burnham's and Chamberlin's intellectual journeys from

Left to Right, from sympathy to great antagonism for the

Soviet Union were similar to those of many intellectuals in the l 1930's and 1940's and comprises an interesting and important corner of recent history.

This study focuses on Burnham and Chamberlin because of their prominence among anti-Soviet intellectuals and because of the undivided attention they gave Soviet-American relations.

Unlike many other anti-Soviet critics, it is possible to review the attitudes of these two writers in detail over the seven and a half years of the Truman administration. These years were crucial for it was then that basic attitudes concerning the nature of the Soviet menace were formed by conservatives and

liberals. Conservatives, in part because of the influence of

Burnham and Chamberlin, attached themselves to a new kind of antiécommunism. This new brand no longer included Anglophobia and isolationism but embraced world wide American intervention-

ism, the British Empire as a bulwark to Soviet expansion, and

a conspiratorial View of international politics. These views can still be found today in the pages of the most influential

conservative publication in America, the National Review.

A sustained commentary on the views of Burnham and

Chamberlin furthermore allows the historian to review the

Cold War from their perspective and from the perspective of

those who commented on them. Other anti-Soviet intellectuals

and opinion makers such as Eugene Lyons, Max Eastman,

William C. Bullitt, and John Foster Dulles contributed to the

postwar Right-wing viewpoint and are given some attention

here. The interpretations of professional historians are

also discussed. However, unlike the present New Left revisionist historians of the Cold War, the diplomatic historians writing immediately after the Second World War did not usually start controversy since by and large they departed little from the internationalist "establishment" interpretation.1 This role was filled by the non-professionals, Burnham and Chamberlin.

The vehement anti-Soviet vision of the Cold War is virtu- ally ignored today (1976) in the popular and academic press.

Historical judgement has moderated with the reduction of tension' and overt hostility between the United States and the USSR. By the late 1960's a number of historians had published many popular articles and books critical of American diplomacy in the postwar era. These new critics believed not that United States foreign policy was appeasing, soft, and defensive during the

Truman Administration but just the opposite. The Dean of the

New Left, William Appleman Williams contends that American policy makers after World War II "...rapidly embarked upon a program to force the Soviet Union to accept America's traditional conception of itself and the world." 2 Students of theirs lost the older vision of the Cold War, written from a perspective of uncertainty and crisis. From that other perspective of America was neither an informal empire nor a defender

1The controversial revisionists of the Second World War; Beard, Tansill, Morgenstern, are primarily concerned with America's entry into the war, not American diplomacy during the war or the consequences of the war. 2William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1972?: p. 206. of the status quo but a war weary nation trying to maintain peace and yet at the same time, stop Soviet aggression.

A study of the writings of the two men who believed they understood communism and the Soviet Union better than most of the writers of their time accentuates the contours of American opinion and images of the Soviet Union and American policy toward it. It takes note of serious, alternative policies, some which were accepted by the American government, some which were politicized by the party out of power, and many which were damned.

This introduction would be incomplete without the inclusion of-a short critique of the history of the Cold War as James

Burnham and William Henry Chamberlin saw it in 1953, the con- cluding point of this paper. Burnham and Chamberlin, of course, did not agree on everything yet if they could sit down together today they would both accept this very general composite outline of the Cold War:

Communism is an ideology that calls for world conquest and is sustained by the power of the Soviet Union through propaganda, military strength and a vast, world-wide web of espionage and infiltration. Prior to 1945, the Soviet Union was not powerful enough to expand overtly through violence and conquest; Instead, the goal of world domination was pursued by the less visible, conspiratorial fifth columns, seeking influence and power in foreign governments. Within Russia, the Soviet government sought to build up the military strength needed for the "inevitable" war with the capitalist nations. Throughout the 1930's the Soviet Union lessened its verbal abuse of the West while continuing to infiltrate governments and public opinion organizations. The liberal Roosevelt administration blindly facilitated the Communists in the United

States by allowing Soviet sympathizers, fellow travelers, and

Soviet agents to infiltrate every important public institution, including government. The State Department, a most important target, was effectively corrupted.

When the European war erupted and Germany attacked the

Soviet Union, the United States, under the influence of the pro-Soviet State Department and a pro-Soviet mass media, un- wisely choose to aid and ally with a state as totalitarian and potentially dangerous as Hitler's Germany. America's political conduct of the war was one of consistent appeasement of the

Soviet Union. At the war time conferences at Teheran and Yalta, the Atlantic Charter was violated and the peOples of Poland and eastern Europe and China were sacrificed by Roosevelt and

Churchill to Stalin's greed. This appeasement policy, the result of ignorance and treason, continued following the conclusion of the war despite further Communist aggression and broken promises. It was only belatedly ended in 1947 when

President Truman called for the firm and vigilant containment of Communist expansion.

The Truman Doctrine was the basis of American policy throughout the rest of the Truman administration. It did save the rest of Europe from conquest but was entirely inadequate over the long stretch (since containment was a defensive policy and remaining on the defensive will not win wars).

Containment also was limited to Europe and, thus faced with resistance there, and Soviet Union redirected it's energies to the East. The United States, the only nation powerful enough to prevent a Red Asia, did nothing.. General George

Marshall, Dean Acheson, Phillip Jessup, and a whole host of other "pink" State Department officers -- through indifference and treason -- permitted the victory of the Soviet directed

Chinese Communists in China. The following year, 1950, Secretary of State Acheson gave the Communist world the green light for the rest of the Far East: Formosa and Korea were announced as outside the American "defense perimeter". In June 1950,

North Korean Communists invaded South Korea.

With American resistance in Korea the long policy of surrender to Soviet force in the Far East was replaced by the

"no-win" strategy of containment and limited war. The Korean war was an inadequate effort, defensive and cautious. Because the Americal military stopped at the Yalu and the American government allowed the armistice line to be drawn at the 38th parallel, it was evident that the initiative in the Cold War had not passed to the Free World. By the end of 1952, the

United States had suffered 141,000 casualties "and not one single Russian has yet been killed, not a single bomb drOpped on Communist China."3

3James Burnham, Containment or Liberation? (New York: John Day, 1953), p. 62. The remainder of this study will attempt to show the routes Burnham and Chamberlin traveled to reach such an understanding, as well as the influences on their thought and the influence of their thought upon others. CHAPTER I

APOSTASY AND WAR

The First World War had a profound radicalizing effect on

William Henry Chamberlin, a Phi Beta Kappa student at Haverford

College. He attached his sympathies to the one apparently hOpeful result of that tragic war, the Communist revolution in

Russia. From graduation in 1917 to his departure to Russia in

1922, Chamberlin was a devout fellow traveler, writing book reviews for radical journals in the later years while living in

Greenwich Village.1 On a whim, he and his Russian born wife,

Sonya, made a pilgrimage to the Soviet Union that was planned to last only months. Instead they stayed for twelve years,

Chamberlin as the Christian Science Monitor's Moscow correspon-

dent. These years effected the permanent cure for his youthful

"disease” of sympathy for Communism. "Enthusiastic hope," he recorded later, "gave way first to detached disillusionment and finally horrified repulsion....I left convinced that the absolu- tist Soviet State...is a power of darkness and of evil with few parallels in history."2

1William Henry Chamberlin, The Confessions of an Individualist (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1940), p. 42-44. 2Dimitri von Mohrenschildt, "William Henry Chamberlin, 1897- 1969," The Russian Review Vol. 29, January, 1970, p. 2—3.

Chamberlin's Russian adventure was not simply a negative experience, for he devoted himself to a close study of Russia.

In particular, he and his wife assembled material on the

Russian Revolution - drawing on sources lost today such as the

Communist Party archives, veterans of the Civil War, and

MOscow's secondhand bookstores - material that he eventually used to write a classic scholarly history, The History of the

Russian Revolution, 1917-1921 (2 vols. 1935).3 Two other books

were written directly from the Soviet experience. Chamberlin's first book, Soviet Russia (1930) described Russia during the

NEP period. Russia's Iron Age (1934), was a more critical

4 account of Russia during the first Five Year Plan.

During Chamberlin's Russian years, James Burnham persued a brilliant academic career. He received his B.A. from

Princeton University in 1927, another B.A. this time from Oxford

University in 1929 and a M.A. from Oxford in 1932. Burnham began teaching philosophy at New York University in 1929. He was sympathetic to the Soviet state during his college days but did not take a serious interest in Communist ideology until the early thirties. As coeditor of a first-class literary magazine Symposium (1930-1934), Burnham was personally intro-

duced to the ideas of a few of America's more brilliant radical thinkers, most notably John Dewey, Max Eastman, and Sidney Hook.

He quickly soured of Communism as practiced in Russia and

3Chamberlin, "With Sonya in Russia," The Russian Review, Vol. 29, January, 1970, p. 57. 4Mohrenschildt, "Chamberlin." p. 3. 10 in 1934 joined a New York centered Trotskyite party and began editing its paper in 1938, The New International.5

Throughout the rest of the 1930's, Burnham was a leading spokesman for American Trotskyism and, according to one recent scholar, one of the most creative socialist intellectuals in

America.6 He clashed with the party and Trotsky himself on the question of the USSR and the World War. Trotsky called on all party members to support the Soviet Union. Burnham considered the USSR a bureaucratic dictatorship rather than a revolutionary workers state and felt such support was unwarranted. This dispute eventually led Burnham to repudiate Marxism in 1940.

While Burnham wrote polemical tracts on the value of dialectics to Marxism, Chamberlin, in Tokyo, appraised the rise of Japanese militarism for the readers of the Christian Science

Monitor and reappraised his Russian experience. In 1937 he wrote A False Utopia which was published only in England and

distributed by the "Right" Book Club. This book described the

"collectivist dictatorships" of Fascist Germany and Communist

Russia, focusing on their similarities while underrating the importance of their differences. His point was that..."everything barbarous that is associated with fascism can be

5James Gilbert, Designing the Industrial State, The Intellectual Pursuit of Collectivism_in America, 1880-1940 Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972, p. 271-272; and "James Burnham: Exemplary Radical of the 1930's," in Ronald Radosh, ed., A New History of Leviathan, Rutton, 1972, p. 214. 6 Richard H. Pells, Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and Social Thought in the Depression YearsITNew York: Harper, 1973), p. 127. 11 duplicated, and often surpassed under communism".7 Burnham came to the same conclusion in his letter of resignation from the Socialist Workers Party in 1940. "Stalinism must be understood," he wrote, "as one manifestation of the same general historical forces of which fascism is another manifestation."8

This analoqy of "Red Fascism" was revised after the Second

World War, with Chamberlin and Burnham playing no small part, and was important in convincing Americans that the 1940's were simply a replay of the 1930's. Substitute Stalin for Hitler and the Cold War made sense.9

Burnham's Marxist writing offered a vision of inevitable catastrophe if present conditions were sustained if the New

Deal continued consolidating bourgeois rule, if the USSR continued repudiating perpetual revolution for bureaucraticization, if all leftists fell for the USSR's People's Front propaganda.

To him nothing was as it seemed. Historical forces, most notably the Soviet Union and the New Deal, conspired. Movements were disguised, their true meanings hidden.lo At this early - 7Chamberlin, A False Utopia, Collectivism in Theory and Practice (Andover, England: The Chapel River Press, 1937), p. 230. 8 Leon Trotsky, In Defense of Marxism Against the Petty Bourgeois Opposition (New York: Merit Publishers, 1965), P. 208. 9 For elaboration of this theme see Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson, "Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930's - 1950's," The Journal of American History Vol. LXXV (April, 1970), p. 1046-1064: Ernest R. May, Thg 'Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1973) and Marshall D. Shulman, Beyond the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). 10Gilbert, Designing the Industrial State, p. 274-6; and James Burnham, The_Peop1e's Front: The New Betrayal (New York:

12 date the crusading and apocalyptic nature that was to mark

Burnham's controversial postwar books was quite evident.

Both Burnham and Chamberlin opposed the coming war and

America's entrance into it, but, as expected, for very different reasons. The German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1939

fortified Burnham's anti-Stalinist feelings. He concluded,

in a party document, that since "Soviet intervention in a war will be wholly subordinated to the general imperialist character of the conflict as a whole..." then the world's working class

should not unconditionally support the "degenerated" Stalinist

regime or support any capitalist government but turn the coming war from an imperialist one to a class war.11 Burnham's

analysis, written for a limited audience, likewise had limited

relevance to what was going on in Europe. Chamberlin, on the other hand, (writing for the Monitor in France in 1939 and 1940) was producing realistic evaluations of the European crisis,

evaluations that, in America, were becoming less and less

popular.

Chamberlin's viewpoint, very briefly, was that by the

Munich conference of September, 1938, Britain and France

could not stop Hitler. Recognizing this, those two powers

choose temporarily to repudiate interference in Eastern Europe.

Left alone in this region, Chamberlin believed, Hitler would

have eventually clashed with the USSR. Such a war would have

been the least undesirable and possibly could have rid the

West of its two most dangerous enemies. However, after 11 Trotsky, In Defense of Marxism, p. ix.

Czechoslovakia the democracies chose the disasterous policy of guaranteeing the new status quo in Eastern Europe—-a policy that seemed impossible to Chamberlin unless both Germany and Russia were defeated in war. "I could see no convincing reason, moral, political, or strategic," he wrote, a striking contrast to his postwar attitude, "why they should become involved in a war on some East European issue."12

Chamberlin opposed American intervention in the war, giving the same reasons as traditional isolationists and America First.

He had not lost his profound disillusionment with America's first crusade in EurOpe and foresaw even greater and more disasterous consequences developing from a second crusade. Hitlerism was not an isolated evil that when destroyed would bring permanent peace, he reasoned, but was only one aspect of a general disease that had overtaken European civilization. America pos- essed neither the power nor wisdom to put every nation in

Europe in its proper place. Furthermore argued Chamberlin,

American interests would best be served by staying out of this

"European quarrel" and preserving American strength and freedom. "The costs of entering the war," argued Chamberlin, "would have to be measured...in greatly increased liability to reac- tionary modifications of our democratic and individualistic system."13

In 1940 James Burnham.repudiated Trotsky and Marx and began work on a book that gave him national rec0gnition and

12Chamberlin, Confessions, p. 253, and The Evolution of a 13 Conservative (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959), P. 2§2-53. Chamberlin, Confessions, p. 29M-93,

following year. William Henry Chamberlin returned to the united States following the German occupation of France and settled down as a free-lance writer, contributing regularly to The New Leader, The Wall Street Journal, Readers Digest,

and American Mercury. He also began work on a new book, this

time evaluating the state of the world. .In 1941 he accepted the editorship of the newly published, Russian Review, a

position he retained for six years.

On June 22, 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union, an act that revolutionized American opinion concerning Russia.

Prior to the attack, Russia's standing in American eyes was extremely low because of the notorious purge trials, the

Molotov-RibbentrOp non-aggression pact and its shameful Polish

sequel, and finally the war on Finland. 14 After June 22,

Russia became an unofficial but welcome ally and following

the American entry into the war, a comrade in arms. Many

journalists, who prior to the summer of 1941 had seen only the

similarities of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, now stressed

their differences and some even alleged the similarities between the United States and Russia.15

l4Publicopinion polls showed in 1939 that a majority of Americans believed Communism, not fascism, the worst evil. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University

Press, 1972), P. 32-33. 15 Thomas Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969, eighth edition), p. 726-27; and Adler and Paterson, "Red Fascism," p. 1051. 15

William Henry Chamberlin was one journalist who did not share the new pro-Soviet mood. At first he did not concern himself with this trend because of what were to him obvious reasons. "From June 22, 1941," he wrote in the Atlantic Monthly,

”Stalinite Communism has been pretty definitely eliminated as 16 Europe's 'wave of the future.'" But the Soviet Union success- fully resisted the Germans and Chamberlin, along with only a few others such as Eugene Lyons, Louis Fischer, Max Eastman, and William Bullitt,-complained of the "purification of Stalin" for the next three years.17

Chamberlin completed The World's Iron Age18 that summer.

This book described that "disease" of the modern age - "an infernal cycle of wars and revolutions and counter-revolutions".

He believed that the key to the entire mess was the Soviet

Union. "It was Russia," wrote Chamberlin, "that supplied the impetus to the revolt against European civilization. Had there been no Lenin there might well have been no Hitler and no

Mussolini." His advice to America was no surprise. Stay away from it all, for "it is in the building of a new and even better democracy at home, not in adventures abroad, that

America's g true m1331on o o 11es...." O 19

16Chamberlin, "The Struggle for Continents," The Atlantic Monthly Vol. 168 (September, 1941), p. 280. 17 Gaddis, p. 43-44. 18 Chamberlin, The World's Iron Age (New York: Macmillan, 1941). l9 Ibid., p. 107; Paul Birdsall, review of World's Iron Age in The Political Science Quarterly Vol. 57 (March, 1942), p. 130-32. 16

While Chamberlin fought a lost cause, James Burnham

published his widely acclaimed Managerial Revolution. In this book, Burnham argued that Marxism and Capitalism had little

relevance to the advanced industrial state. It was the managers -- technicians, engineers, administrators -- who were

running society and who were to be the ruling class of the

future. They would organize society so that all power and economic privilege would remain in their hands. This thesis was not original with Burnham. Nearly ten years before A.A.

Berle and Gardner Means in The Modern Corporation and Private

Property had given attention to this trend. Burnham's

innovation was the way he related it to the world crisis. He predicted that three "managerial" superstates would emerge from

the world war, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and the United

States. Germany would conquer the USSR and become the European

superstate, Japan would dominate most of Asia, and the United

States would come to control the Western Hemisphere and much

of the British Empire.20

Burnham's new world closely resembled George Orwell's world of 1984 which was made up of Oceania, Eurasia, and

20Burnham, The Managerial Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962, third edition, originally 1941. This book sold 10,000 copies by early 1942 which was "extremely good for a work of that kind" and was reviewed seriously and sympathetically almost everywhere. Dwight Macdonald, "The Burnhamian Revolution," Partisan Review Vol. Ix (January-February, 1942), p. 76: George Orwell, "Second Thoughts on James Burnham," The Orwell Reader (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co.,II956), p. 336; and John P. Diggins, "Buckley's Comrades," Dissent Vol. 22 (Fall, 1975), p. 17

Eastasia. This resemblance was no accident. Orwell drew heavily on The Managerial Revolution in writing his famous book. Orwell's new aristocracy correlated with Burnham's managers and both forsaw monopoly industry and centralized government.21

Although Burnham by this time was opposed to the collectiv— ist "managerial societies" and America's drift toward them

(as a result of the New Deal), be believed such ominous change was, if not inevitable, then extremely probable. For the

United States, this transformation would either entail a bid for maximum world power or isolationist suicide. American expansionism would continue for decades, he predicted, with the United States emerging as one of the three superstates in the world. Suchaagrandiose way of looking at the world,a

Burnham speciality, was inherited from his Marxist past and was later utilized for deciphering the Cold War.

The "era of good feelings" for the Soviet Union in the

American media continued from 1942 through 1944. Important periodicals such as Life, the Saturday Evening_Post, Colliers,

the Readers Digest, The Nation, the New Republic, and even

22 National Geographic contributed to the pro-Soviet mood.

ZlMichael Maddison, "1984: A Burnhamite Fantasy?" The Political Quarterly Vol. 32 (January-March, 1961), p. 75-77. 22 Paul Willen, "Who 'Collaborated' With Russia?", The Antioch Review Vol. XIV (September, 1954), p. 259—283; and Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 339. 18

The image of the USSR was being rehabilitated also in such popular books as Joseph Davies' Mission toMoscow,23 James

Reston's Prelude to Victopy, Foster Rhea Dulles" The Road to

Teheran, and Wendell Willkie's One World. Walter Lippmann

said at the time that One World and Mission to Moscow were the

two finest analyses of the Soviet Union that had reached the public.24

The impact of this flood of sympathetic and often times inaccurate information was substantial. John Lewis Gaddis has found that there was a favorable attitude among well educated

Americans -- the so-called foreign affairs concerned public -- toward the Soviet Union throughout the war.25 A poll taken in

September 1944 indicated that thirty percent of Americans believed that the Soviet Union had changed for the better since 1939, forty-six percent thought that the government of the USSR was as good as the Russian people could expect, and only seven percent foresaw an aggressive Russia following the war.26

For William Henry Chamberlin and the few other critics of Russia, this period was one of intense frustration.

Chamberlin's publications during the war, though still very antieSoviet, gave excellent and valuable analyses of Soviet foreign policy. His tone was subdued and his predictions

23Warner Brothers made Mission to Moscow into a motion picture in 1943. 24 Willen, p. 272. 25 Gaddis, p. 46. 26 Willen, p. 259-260. l9

fairly accurate as to the immediate postwar period. In Feb- ruary 1942, in an article for the Atlantic Monthly, he warned

that Soviet-American cooperation could be taken for granted only until the achievement of the common goal, the defeat of Hitler.

He noted that following the war "Russia will be a wrecked, desolate country" and could emerge with "conservative rather than revolutionary objectives in foreign policy." Soviet policy would probably not be directed along anti-American lines,

Chamberlin suggested, as long as there was any prospect for postwar reconstruction aid from the United States. This analysis was repeated later by some New Left historians in their attempts to explain the origins of the Cold War.27

Chamberlin noted that the current popular tendency was to

give Russia the breaks in the headlines and softpedal any criticism of Stalin. To this he advised, "...leave the glori-

fication of Stalin and the Soviet regime in the zealous hands of the Communists and the Dean of Canterbury."28

In May, 1943, the Soviet Union announced the dissolution of the supposedly independent Comintern. This move was hailed

in the United States as final proof that the USSR had abandoned world revolution and taken up nationalism and would continue

collaboration with the West after the war. This event was

27William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Dell publishing Co., 1972), p. 2471248; Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1971 (New York: John WIIey and Sons, 1972Y, p. 14, 22; and Thomas G. Paterson, "The Abortive Loan to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War, 1943-1946," The Journal of American History Vol. LVI (June, 1969), p. 70-92. 28 Chamberlin, "Russia: An American Problem," The Atlantic Monthly Vol. CLXIX (February, 1942), p. 148, 152, 155-156. 20 probably most important in the thinking of the New York Times editorialist one year later, when he said, "It is not misrepre- senting the situation to say that Marxian thinking in Soviet 29 Russia is out."

Max Eastman, in an article published in Readers Digest,

July, 1943, commented that such wishful thinking was both mistaken and injurious to Soviet-American relations. Eastman, like Chamberlin, had been an early Soviet sympathizer and had lived in Russia. After leaving Russia in 1924, he became one of the most authoritative American students of Communist theory and practice, remaining a socialist but with a great distaste for the Stalinist dictatorship. He warned that "the much advertised 'dissolution' of the Comintern -- the self-styled

'General Staff of the World Revolution' was not a move toward closer collaboration"...and in fact "...does not mean anything."

Eastman believed that the best hope for postwar collaboration was not wishful thinking, but hard headed realism -- a policy concerned with real issues, backed up by force, and completely understood by Stalin.3o

The Catholic Church, traditionally anti-Soviet, was another focus of dissent. Catholic World, not taken in by the

dissolution of the Comintern, called it a move to obscure

Stalin's desire for world revolution. Fulton J. Sheen took the view that, "Communism is the Asiatic form of fascism and

29The New York Times, April 4, 1944. 30 Max Eastman, "We Must Face the Facts About Russia," Readers Digest Vol. 43 (July, 1943). P. 3, ll. 21 fascism the European form of communism." In the fall of 1944 the editor of Catholic World warned, "the greatest potential

menace to permanent peace is Soviet Russia. Fascism is not and never was as dangerous as Communism." The Catholic Digest

expressed its anti-Soviet nature through the frequent articles of David Dallin, Cardinal Francis Spellman, Lyons, Sheen, and

Chamberlin. Also in 1944, William C. Bullitt, the former

American ambassador to the Soviet Union, purported to give the view of the Catholic Church in Rome, in an article published in Elle. Bullitt criticized American blunders in dealing with

Russia and commented on the "Roman's" fear of a barbarian invasion of Europe by Russia. This theme was later sounded frequently by Burnham and Chamberlin.31

In 1943 Burnham published The Machiavellians. In this

book he argued that freedom and democracy were myths, they were fictions that have never existed and would never exist. It is in this book that Burnham defined his conception of politics and power. He argued that politics consisted of the struggle for power. All historical changes were simply changes of one ruling class by another. As in the Managerial Revolution,

Burnham seemed fascinated by power and by the most powerful nation in the world (at the time he was writing the two books,

31Catholic World Vol. CLVII (May, 1943). p. 149-154; Gaddis, Cold’War, p. 53: William C. Bullitt, "The World from Rome," Life Vol. XVII (September 4, 1944), p. 94-109: and Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreigp Policy, 1941-1949 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970). P. 44. 22 late 1940 and late 1942) , Germany, where his sympathy probably laid.32

As the war continued through 1944, President Roosevelt's personal diplomacy received more conservative criticism.

Senator Robert Taft, a leading Republican spokesman, charged that the President's policies toward Russia were based on "the delightful theory that Mr. Stalin in the end will turn out to have an angelic nature and will do of his own accord the things which we should have insisted upon at the beginning." 33 This was precisely Bullitt's charge in the several articles and one book published after the war.

Burnham, in his first article devoted entirely to Soviet-

American affairs, argued that Stalin was working to end the

European war on a favorable basis, "i.e., do £3939 Stalinist domination of the Continent." He saw the mutiny of the

Communist directed ELAN in the Greek army and navy, and the swarm of articles in the American press on corruption, tyranny, collusion, and anti-Western agitation in China (he asked,

32Burnham, The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom (New York: the John Day Co., 1943): Benedetto Croce, “Political Truth and Popular Myths," in M Philoso h , translated by E.F. Garritt (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1949), P. 88-92; and Orwell, "Second Thoughts," 336-337. Few reviewers, as opposed to the Managerial Revolution, took this book seriously. Time, May 17, 1943, p. 90-92: Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nation, May 1, 1943, p. 636-638: Francis G. Wilson, The American Political Science Review, August, 1943, p. 725-726; Gwynne Nettler, American Sociological Review, October 19, 1943, p. 606-607; Joseph Roucek, The Annals of the American Academ , July, 1943, p. 123-124. 33 Vernon Van Dyke and Edward Lane Davis, "Senator Taft and American Security," The Journal of Politics Vol. 14 July, 1952), p. 178. 23 hinting darkly, "Why all at once, so many?") as just two signs of

Communist preparation for renewed revolutionary activity through- 34 out the world. Also in the spring of 1944 Burnham prepared a secret study of Soviet intentions for the Office of Strategic Ser- vices which was distributed at that time to the "relevant Washington desks . " This study, later revised , became . Part I of Burnham's early Cold War analysis, The Strgggle for the World (1947).35

Chamberlin in the fall of 1944 still assumed that the

Soviet Union was pursuing a policy in Eastern Europe that would not be very different if a nationalist, non-communist government was in charge. He predicted that postwar problems between the Soviet Union and its Western allies would be centered around Stalin's nationalist Russian ambitions" During the next few months, Chamberlin developed a very different analysis of Soviet policy, one closer to Burnham's. In 1945 the image of a Soviet colossus perched at the edge of a pulverized Europe seemed to dominate the thinking of both

Burnham and Chamberlin. So long as Russia was fighting hard

and at great cost inside Russia, Chamberlin could view postwar prospects with some dispassion and concentrate on dis— pelling certain illusions about the Soviet Union. Previously he had assumed that devastation would make Russia a malleable

ally after the war. But as Russian armies penetrated Eastern

34Burnham, "The Sixth Turn of the Communist Screw," Partisan 35 Review V01. XI (Summer, 1944), p. 365-366. Burnham, The War We are-In: The Last Decade and the Next (New York: Arlington House,—1967), p. 10. Burnham also confirmed his consultative status with the 058 in a telephone conversation with the author, January 2, 1976. 24

Europe, it became increasingly clear to him that Soviet power would control at least half of Europe.36

As the Soviet Union began a new offensive in Poland and

the allies recovered from the Battle of the Bulge, the Yalta

Conference took place. The Yalta agreements —- many of which were not published at the time -- were evidence to most

Americans and American commentators that wartime unity of

Great Britain, Russia, and the United States would continue 37 after the war. Public criticism was limited. Polish-

American groups and congressmen of Polish descent called the

agreement on Poland a "stab in the back" and a "second Munich."38

Chamberlin, without knowledge of the accords on the Far East,

the dismemberment of Germany, the reparations agreement, and

Soviet voting in the United Nations was very severe in his

judgment. He wrote:

Stalin's domination of the European scene, the sacrifice of Poland's independence, the subjection of a shattered and desolated Europe to the will of extra-European power, the confirmation of Tito's totalitarian regime in Yugoslavia, the scrapping of the Atlantic Charter, the emasculation of the world security scheme by giving all the "peace-loving nations" strong enough to wage war a status outside of and above the law: these are the principle fruits of Yalta.39 36Chamberlin, "Russia and Europe, 1918-1944," The Russian Review, Vol. 4 (Autumn, 1944), p. 9. 37 A Gallup poll found that the reaction to the published results (March 10, 1945) to be, 61% favorable, 9% unfavorable, and 30% undecided. Bailey, A Dlplomatic History, p. 764. 38 Ibid., p. 764. 39 Chamberlin, America: Partner in World Rule (New York: Vanguard Press, 1945), p. 302. 25

In the late 1940's and in the 1950's on no single subject did

Chamberlin write more than on Yalta.4o

Chamberlin went on in his new book, America: Partner

in World Rule that Russia was the big winner in the war against

Hitler and would emerge with a wide sphere of influence beyond

its 1941 borders. He dismissed Russian security needs, a

frequent argument of liberals, saying that Russia had twice

been invaded when it held Polish and Baltic territories. As

for American policy, Chamberlin viewed it as having been con-

stant onesided appeasement. He advised American policy makers

to support regional federations for defense, liquidate

imperialism, and reconstruct Europe with the material and moral

aid that only the United States could provide.41

Chamberlin's call for a partnership with Russia along with American acceptance of "the risks and sacrifices of a

philosophy of global interventionism" was a reluctant one.

He preferred a world of several powerful states in which the

United States did not have to use its ‘power to restrain

the others but rather had only to maintain its military

strength in a balanced state system. Unlike Burnham,

Chamberlin detested power, power politics, and America's

unnecessary use of its power in 1917 and again in 1941.

. For example: Chamberlin, "The Munich Called Yalta,” in in Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The Yalta Conference: Problems American Civilization (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1955), p. 48-55; "Yalta,” in Harry Elmer Barnes, Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Caldwell, Idaho: .The Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1953): "Appeasement at Yalta," ln Sidney Fine, ed. Recent America: Conflicting Interpretations of the Great I§sues INew yofi: The Macmillian Co., 1961), p. 368-375. 41ChaﬁSEEIIn, America, p. 144-145, 165—166, 180-183.

He asserted, in one chapter title, that "Power is Hell". hBurnham would have argued that "power is all there is".

Five years earlier Chamberlin had been indifferent to the

fate of Eastern Europe and had maintained that the appeasement

policy followed at Munich was the sensible thing to do. In

the spring of 1945 his views on Eastern Europe led him to break

off a fifteen year association with The Atlantic Monthly, when

that journal published several accounts praising conditions in

Soviet controlled Poland.42

Burnham, in an article written for the Partisan Review in

the spring of 1945, argued that Stalin was the true and legiti-

mate guardian of the Russian Revolution. He argued that Stalin

was a "great man", even a genius, and that his Russia would

conquer EurOpe and Asia. Burnham obviously admired Stalin's

use of power: "Out of this war," he wrote, "out of the very

defeat in the first years of the war, Stalin had translated

into a realistic political perspective the dream of theoretical

geopolitics: domination of Eurasia....Starting from the

magnetic core of the Eurasian heartland, the Soviet power flows

outward, west into Europe, South into the Near East, East

into China...."43

42 Chamberlin, Evolution, p. 259-261. 43 Burnham, "Lenin's Heir," Partisan Review Vol. XII (Spring, 1945), p. 72, 66-67. Both Burnham and Chamberlin followed, with certain reservations, Halford MacKindor's dubious formula of geopolitics: Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island: Who rules the World-Island commands the World. 27

In June 1945, Max Lerner, editor of the liberal newspaper

PM, noted that the "frayed utopians" and "embittered Galahads

of the Left" -- specifically mentioning Chamberlin -- were

furnishing anti-Russian ammunition to the great mass audiences which Hearst and McCormick supplied. This Left opposition said

Lerner, had two themes: (1) that Soviet Russia was both

tyrannical and imperialist: and (2) that American policy under

Roosevelt had been a long course of appeasement.44 Chamberlin

and Burnham, along with others who paid less attention to

Soviet-American affairs such as Eastman, Lyons, Bullitt, Norman Thomas, Sidney Hook, Freda Utley, and John T. Flynn, had been

sympathetic to the Soviet Union in the 1920's and 1930's.

Prior to the Cold War of the latter 1940's, these "frayed

utopians" had become hardened Cold Warriors of various political

persuasions. Although Burnham and Chamberlin were usually

refered to as "liberals" at this time, their strong anti-

communism made them congenial bedfellows of the growing Con-

servative movement in America.

Neither Burnham nor Chamberlin expected Russia's success-

ful emergence from the war as a great power. Burnham's hatred

of the Soviet state ambivalently mixed with admiration of

of Stalin had grown by the end of the war into tremendous fear,

even mightmare, of Russia as a military power and (managerial)

communism as an unstoppable creed. He went farther than most

intellectuals in his reaction against communism and was a

44D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins 1917-1960, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1961), p. 281-282. 28

McCarthyite before Joseph McCarthy was even a Senator. Burnham gave his anti-communism a fatalistic, even apocalyptic quality that was a carry over from his knowledge of Marxist theory.

And, like other former radicals, his experience with communism gave him, so be believed, that unique understanding of its danger. Chamberlin was the more prolific writers amdhe had one of the best understandings of international politics of these anti-Soviet partisans. Certainly he possessed better understanding than Burnham. Chamberlin could distinguish Soviet power realities from the domestic tyranny and ideology that he hated. Unlike Burnham, he viewed the Soviet Union, in 1945, as a threat to Eastern Europe, not the entire world. His crusade during the war against pro-Soviet distortions in American journalism -- like his crusade against American intervention in the European war -- gave him a reputation among liberal journalists as one whose Opinions were worthless, prejudiced by his virulent anti-communism. This was not always true.

Subsequent historians have concluded that the pro-Soviet mood exhibited by American liberals and journalists during the war was often incorrect and it "generated a false sense of euphoria which led to disillusionment and recrimination later on."45

After the war, Chamberlin no longer had the stature he once enjoyed among journalists and observers of foreign affairs.

He had supported and promoted too many causes that were unpop- ular in the eyes of most "liberals". Burnham too, had alienated many of his leftist colleagues as comments in the ngtisan Review

45 Gaddis, Cold War, p. 42. 29 by George Orwell, Dwight Macdonald, and Sidney Hook attested.

But, both Burnham and Chamberlin, while keeping their left-

1ibera1 contacts with the New Leader and the Partisan Review,

became leading anti-communist commentators for both the anti- communist Left as well as the small but growing anti-communist

Right. CHAPTER II

THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION

The European war ended on May 7, 1945, with the German surrender at Reims, France. The Grand Alliance was now faced with the task that had been postponed throughout the war, the political reordering of Europe. The vague declarations made at Yalta for public consumption papered over profound differences and fostered an illusion of greater cooperation and trust than existed among the Big Three.

Most Americans were optimistic at war's end. Public

Opinion polls taken in the summer of 1945 found that many more than not expected continued great power cooperation.1 The chorus of American public Opinion makers, for the most part, was decidedly hopeful, liberal, and pro-Soviet. America's entrance into the war led to greater interest in American foreign relations and, as has been noted, the Soviet Union.

As never before, publishing houses and periodicals were inter- ested in material concerned with nearly all aspects of American foreign relations.2

1Warren B. Walsh, "American Attitudes Toward Russia," The Antioch Review Vol. VII (Summer, 1947), p. 185. —_— In an August, 1945 Gallup Poll, 54% of those polled expected continued Russian COOperation, 30% did not. Donnie Dennis, A History of American Diplomatic History (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Caiifornia, 1971), p. 208. 30 31

Books published in 1945 on Russia and Soviet-American relations in the United States fell into the pro- or anti-

Soviet pattern. These Are-the Russians by Richard E. Lauterbach

described a progressive, friendly, and COOperative Russia.

Lauterbach, Moscow correspondent for Elmo and llﬁo, foresaw

”many billions of dollars" of trade between the Soviet Union and the United States which was to him an excellent reason for getting along with Russia. The Russia I Believe In: The

Memoirs of Samuel N. Harper edited by his brother Paul Harper

was a very sympathetic look at Soviet and pre-Soviet Russia.

In the 1920's and 1930's when other observers became disillu- siOned with the Soviet experiment -- he accused Chamberlin of being "sour" -- Harper praised the regime's positive achieve- ments. Edgar Snow's The Pattern of Soviet Power was a bOok

which urged collaboration in Moscow during the war, argued that the Soviet Union was creating spheres of influence in

Europe and Asia for reasons of national security and defense only. Edmund Stevens in Russia Is No Riddle also expressed

friendly understanding of Russia's foreign policy.3 3 Richard E. Lauterbach, These Are the Russians (New Yorkn Harper, 1945); Paul Harper, ed. The Russia I Believe In: The Memoirs_gf Samuel N. Harper (CHiCago: The University of Chicago Press, 1945); Edgar Snow, The Pattern of Soviet Power (New York: Random House, 1945); Edmund Stevens, Russia Is No Riddle (New York: Greenburg, 1945); Hans Heymann, We Can DO Business With Russia (Chicago: ziff- Davis, 1945). D.S. von Mohrenséhildi, Review of These Are The Russians, The Pattern of Soviet Power, Russia Is No Riddle in The Russian Review Vol. 5 (Autumn, 1945), p. 114- 117. Michael Karpovich, Review of The Ru§sia I Believe In in The Russian Review Vol. 5 (Autumn, 1945), p. 118-122. Francis Hackett, 9n Judging Books (New York: The John Day Company, p. 164-170,—for reviews of Lauterbach and Harper, 1945). 32

There were fewer notable books critical of Russia. Besides

Chamberlin's America: Partner in World Rule, which received

many reviews although few were favorable, there were William

L. White's Report on the Russians and David J. Dallin's The

Big Three. White's report was an account of his six weeks

visit to the Soviet Union in 1944. The book was critical of living conditions in Russia and of the economic system there.

Yet at the same time White was approving of several aspects of the Soviet government, including foreign policy. Chamberlin, in a review for American Mercupy, commented that he did not

think there was any favorable aspect of life under the Soviet regime that White failed to mention. Still, this book received many unfavorable reviews and sixteen foreign correspondents -- including John Hersey, Richard Lauterbach, Edgar Snow, John

Fisher, and Edmund Stevens -- signed a manifesto condemning the book because it could "sharpen distrust and suSpicion among the Allies." Dallin, a member of the political opposition in the Moscow Soviet from 1918 to 1921 and a professor at Yale University since that time, viewed Russian imperialist expansion with alarm. He predicted the Big Three would fall apart and that the United States and Great Britain would have to stop Soviet expansion. Although Dallin's book was more pessimistic than Chamberlin's, Dallin received nearly unanimous praise from the reviewers. The consensus on Chamberlin's work was similar to this statement in the Weekly Book Review:

”Mr. Chamberlin's anti-Soviet prejudices are so strong that he 33 cannot be regarded as a sound interpreter of world affairs."4

In the fall of 1945 Chamberlin attacked the unjust peace that was being forced upon Eastern Europe and America's negligent response. In two articles written for the conservative news letter, Human Events, he alleged that Poland's government of national unity was nothing more than the wartime

Soviet puppet government. Chamberlin also deplored Russia's arbitrary annexation of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, part of

Finland, and northern Bukovina. The United States, he said, was not making concessions to the Soviets on a reciprocal basis but was following a policy of "spineless yielding."S

From late 1945 through 1946, Americans watched Soviet-

American relations worsen. Most Americans were not prepared

for the behavior of the Soviets after the war and many reacted with mixed senses of betrayal, anger, hatred and guilt. The notion that the United States was the aggrieved party, turned upon by the country it had aided tremendously during the war, was reinforced in the minds of Americans several times.

4Examples of unfavorable reviews of America: Partner, The New York Times, July 29, 1945, p. 14; The Christian Science Monitor, July 21, 1945, p. 14; The Weekly Book Review, July 22, 1945, p. 6. William L. White, Report on the Russians (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1945).

David Dallin, The Big_Three (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1945). Chamberlin, "W.L. White and His Critics," American Mercupy Vol. LX (May, 1945), p. 625-631. 5 Chamberlin, "Some Consequences of the Second World War," Human Events Vol. II (August 22, 1945), p. 1-4; and ”The Shape of the New Appeasement," Ibid Vol. II (October 17, 1945), p. 1-4. 34

On February 9, Stalin told his Moscow audience that Marxist- Leninism remained valid and that the Russian people could not expect international peace but a new round of war. The Soviet people, he said, must prepare themselves for a replay of the

1930's. Nearly one month later, Winston Churchill, accompanied by President Truman, spoke at Fulton, Missouri. He charged that an Iron Curtain had fallen across Europe and called for an Anglo-American alliance to halt further expansion of Soviet power. The first slogans of the Cold War had been exchanged and America's perception of Russia was rapidly changing.6

In 1946 the anti-Soviet point of view competed strongly for the attention of the foreign affairs attentive public.

In April, William Bullitt published The Great Globo Itself.

Bullitt analyzed the nature of the Soviet threat against the rest of the world. "The communist creed," he said, ”requires that the aim of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, and all other Communist-controlled governments, should be to establish Communist dictatorships throughout the earth. The strategy and tactics...are altered in accordance with its estimate of the world situation. Its aim is never altered.

It is, and will remain, the conquest of the world for Commun- ism." Vera Micheles Dean of the Foreign Policy Association, commented in a review for the New Reppblic that Bullitt,

6Marshall D. Shulman, Beyond the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 4; and Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1971 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972), p. 30-31. 35 while vigorous in his Opposition to Soviet ideas and practices, offered few examples of the concrete measures the United States could or should take.7 This was not an uncommon criticism of anti-Soviet writers.

In June, John Foster Dulles provided Americans with his

"Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What to do About It" in two issues of Elle. The year before, Dulles had served as a delegate to the San Francisco Conference and as an advisor to Secretary of State Byrnes at the London Conference of

Foreign Ministers. He was also a leading Republican spokesman on foreign affiars. He contended in the Elle articles that Russia wanted to spread Soviet governments everywhere and would use any means, fair or foul, to further that goal.

Dulles advised maintenance of a strong military defense, demon- stration of religious faith, and sincere, principled diplomacy in countering the Soviet menace. He explained that a non- appeasing yet vigorous foreign policy "does not require us to become a militaristic people or to make provocative use of far flung bases".8 In the next few years the Luce publications,

Elle and glee, frequently published the views of various critics of the Soviet Union of America's foreign policy. James Burnham,

7William C. Bullitt, The Great Globe Itself: A Preface to World Affairs (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 94; Vera Micheles Dean, "It Might Be Loaded," a review of The Great Globe in the New Republic Vol. 115 (August 12, 1946), p. 181. 8 John Foster Dulles, "ThoughtscnzSoviet Foreign Policy and What to Do About It," Life Vol. XX (June 3, 1946): P. 113- 126: and Ibid., (June 10, 1946). p. 118-130. 36

Sidney Hook, and William Bullitt brought their arguments into millions of American homes, thanks to Henry Luce.

The tone of many of the new anti-Soviet books was more bitter and the imagery more frightening than previous books of the same persuasion. Soviet-American relations was given the magnitude of a Carthage-Rome struggle by these authors. One must emerge victorious and one must be destroyed. Two Worlds

by William Ziff, Must We Fight Russia? by Ely Culbertson,

After Hitler Stalin? by Robert Ingram, Ally Betrayed by David

Martin, and a personal account of a Russian defector, I Choose

Freedom by V.A. Kravchenko were books of varied quality and popularity. Nonetheless they all contributed to the anti-

communist education of Americans.9

Chamberlin was in Europe that summer, his first visit

since 1940. There he gathered material for his next book,

European Cockpit -- a call for European federation.. In the

United States Blueprint for World Conquest was published, con-

taining documents of the Communist International and a lengthy

introduction by Chamberlin. The threat presented by the

Soviet Union, he now asserted, was world wide rather than

just limited to Eastern Europe, ideological as well as

imperialistic. The Cold War, to Chamberlin, had taken on a

9William B. Ziff, Two Worlds (New York: Harper, 1946): Ely Culbertson, Must We Fight Russia? (Philadelphia: Winston, 1946); Robert Ingrim, After Hitler Stalin? (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1946); David Martin, Ally Betreyed: ‘The Uncensored Story of Tito and Mihailovich (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946); V.A. Kravchenko, I Choose Freedom (New York: Harper, 1946). 37 new dimension. He believed Lenin's and Stalin's words on world revolution possessed all the authority of authentic prophecy yet he insisted simultaneously that on every other matter, not a word of theirs could be trusted.10

Chamberlin also that year joined the Board of Directors

Of the newly founded American China Policy Association which was under the leadership of Alfred Kohlberg. The ACPA promoted the policy of giving aid to the Nationalist Government of China and attacked American policy in China. At the end of the year Chamberlin resigned as editor of the Russian

Review because, in part, of criticism of his anti-Soviet bias.11

By the summer of 1946, the Truman administration was pursuing a policy of getting tough with Russia. Soviet influence in Eastern Europe was great but the Soviets had not seized control of any government. Soviet trOOps were, however, still in Iran -- months after the deadline for with- drawal. Soviet diplomats also had rejected the American plan for control of atomic energy and were hindering the peacemaking efforts in Paris. These events helped convince many that Stalin's intentions were expansionist and unfriendly.

10Chamberlin, The European Cockpit (New York: MacMillian, 1947): and Blueprint for World Conquest: The Official Communist Plan, Introduction by William Henry Chamberlin (Chicago: Human Events, 1946).

11Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (New York: Octagon Books, 1974). p. 51-53. "Letters to the Editor," The Russian Review Vol. 6 (Autumn, 1946): P. 118-119. 38

Various public opinion polls taken that summer and fall indicated that, for the first time since 1941, there were more Americans who did not think the Soviet Union was a peace loving nation, than who did.12 The worsening of Soviet-

American relations and the growing anti-Soviet bias in the

United States which was indicated by the polls and the in- creasing amount of anti-Soviet material getting into print disturbed many liberals. Commerce Secretary Henry A. Wallace, one of the more outspoken liberals, directed his attention to this disquieting development. In July he wrote the

President a lengthy letter expressing his misgivings about

foreign policy. He advised conceding Russia reasonable guarantees of security and urged a reconstruction program for the USSR. He also wanted official disapproval of anti-

Soviet publicists, "an effort," said Wallace, "to counteract the irrational fear of Russia which is being systematically built up in the American peOple."13

Wallace had overreacted to the anti-Soviet opinion makers and their impact. Few Americans, by the end of 1946 feared the Soviet Union as Chamberlin and Burnham did. Most, however, believed Russia was untrustworthy, greedy, and

12Walsh, "American Attitudes," p. 187; Hadley Cantril ed., Public Opinion, 1935-1946 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UniVersity Press, 1951), p. 371, 963. 13 Alonzo Hamby, "Henry Wallace, the Liberals, and Soviet- American Relations." The Review of Politics Vol. 30 (April, 1968). P. 158-159. 39 uncooperative, and that American policy toward the Soviet

Union was too soft.14 The events of the next four years, as well as the Truman administration's reaction to those events accentuated the nature of the Soviet threat as perceived by the general public and liberal intellectuals. In time more Americans, liberal internationalists and conservative isolationists would come to the same conclusions that Burnham and Chamberlin reached in 1945 and 1946. However, in 1946 few recognized liberals acclaimed anti-Soviet publications and few anti-Soviet books reached the best seller list. Although the impact was probably very small, the increased number of anti-Soviet books did reflect a definite trend away from the pro-Soviet journalism of World War II.

The decline of radicalismand the demoralization and division among liberals was important to the growth of anti- communism in the United States after World War II and to the new and impressive status given to ex-radicals, like Burnham and Chamberlin, as savants of anti-communism. The Communist

Party and the Socialist Party memberships declined incredibly in the five years after World War II.15 Liberal loyalities were divided between the Wallaceite Progressive Citizens of

America and the anti-communist Americans for Democratic

Action. ‘Because of the onset of the Cold War and the emergence of anti-communism in America the liberal movement 14 Cantril, Public Opinion, p. 271, 962-963. 15 Sidney Lens, The Futile Crusade: Anti-Communism as American Credo (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), p. 72. 40 was left for a few years in a state of crisis. A unified conservative, anti-Soviet movement did not come to prominence as a result, but anti-communism became as respectable after

1946 as anti-Nazism was in the late 1930's.16

On March 12, 1947, President Truman asked Congress to appropriate economic and military aid for Greece and Turkey to strengthen them against "attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures". Without mentioning the

Soviet Union by name, Truman set forth the principle of containment of Soviet expansion which commentators quickly called the Truman Doctrine. The public response was largely favorable while the press had mixed reactions. Several columnists were critical of Truman's militant stand but the editorials of most of the nation's major papers approved and applauded his action. NO important paper chastised Truman for not going far enough to stop Soviet expansion.17

16Lens, The Futile Crusade, p. 64-65, 72-73; Hamby, "The Liberals, Truman, and FDR as Symbol and Myth," The Journal of American Hlstory Vol. LVI (March, 1970), 859, 863; George H. Nash, "The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945," The National Review Vol. XXVII (December 5, 1975), p. A-3, A-4; Lewi§ Feuer, "Russia and the Liberals" The New Republic, (December 8, 1948) p. 14-16: Harold J. Laski, "America - 1947" The Nation Vol. 164 (December 13, 1947) p. 642. ——_ 17 Angus Cambell, "The American Concept of Russia," The Journal of Social Issues Vol. IV (Winter, 1948), p. 16-17. The survey I took included these papers: The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washing- ton Post, The Cleveland Plain Dealer, The Kansas City Star, The Atlanta ConstituEiOn, The Los Angeles Times,

The Philadelphia Inquirer, The Milwaulkee Journal, The Detroit Free Press, The Chicago Tiibune, The San Francisco

Chronicle, The New York Dai y Worker, The Dallas News, The St. Louis Post-Diepatch.

Five days after Turman's address, The Struggle for the

Woglg by Burnham, was published. Burnham's basic argument

in this book was that the advent of atomic weapons demanded

the monopoly of all power by one nation if peace was to be

maintained. World federation was not possible in the forsee-

'ab1e future; thus world empire was the only alternative.

Only a positive attempt to obtain the monopoly of world power

by the United States would prevent the Soviet Union from the

attainment of this goal. The United States, he argued, must

seek world empire by persuasion or force.

Burnham had written an interesting but frightening book.

He stated that the third World War had begun in Greece in

1944, not by Russian imperialism, which was the widely accepted

belief in 1947, but the the world wide conspiratorial movement of Communism. America was losing this war, he continued,

because of the sabotage of fellow travellers within the

American government and of a well meaning but suicidal foreign

policy of appeasement. Burnham argued that the survival of

democracy required the suppression of the extensive communist

apparatus in the United States. Near the end of the book,

Burnham detailed his conception of an American preventative war against Russia; noting where the atomic bombs would fall, how the army would occupy the country, and how the West would

create a democratic, capitalist, and peace loving Russia. He

suggested this alternative might have to be employed.18

18Burnham, The Struggle for the World (New York: The John Day Co., 1947). 42

The Struggle for the World was widely reviewed and it

reached the best seller list.19 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., one of the founders of the Americans for Democratic Action,

commented in a review for the Nation that Burnham's book "is

an able presentation of an allowable viewpoint and on the whole, one must prefer his brand of romantic Machiavellianism, even with its theatrical strokes and operatic colors, to the

confused and messy arguments of the appeasers." The histor-

ian Harry Elmer Barnes described the book as a blueprint for

aggressive war, "more gratuitous and provocative than any-

thing which ever emanated from the Comintern or from the

councils of the Nazis....It is a joke book because it is being

eagerly devoured and recommended by conservative, anti-Soviet devotees of free enterprise."20 19Burnham received unfavorable reviews in The Antioch Review, Vol. 7 (Summer, 1947), P. 315-316. The American Political Science Review Vol. 41 (August, 1947), p. 803; The Annals of the American Academy Vol. 252 (July, 1947), p. 106: AtlantiE Magazine Vol. 179 (May, 1947). P. 152; Commonweal

Vol. 45 (April 4, 1947). P. 615; Ethics Vol. LVII (July, 1947), P. 297-302; Christian Century Vol. LXIV (May 21, May 28, and June 4, 1947), p. 646-648, 678-679, 702-703; Letters to the Editor of Life ran two to one against Burnham, Life Vol. 22 (March 31, 1947), p. 38, Life ran four pages of letters concerning The Struggle for the World, two examples were: "Struggle for the World" is the greatest single contribution you have ever made within the pages of Life", Rev. Rowland Nye, and: "'Struggle for the World" is a vicious and evil document....", Gene Carpenter; The New York Times, March 16, 1947, p. l; lpe Yale Review Vol. 36 (Summer, 1947), p. 755. Favorable reViews were in The Nation Vol. 164 (April 5, 1947), p. 32; The New York Herald Tribune Weekly Book Review, April 20, 1947, p. 2; The Saturday Review of Literature Vol. 30 (April 12, 1947), p. 28; ZiEE.V°l' 49 TMarch 24, 1947), p. 106-107. 20 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "World War III," a review of Struggle for the World, in the Nation Vol. 164 (April 5, 1947), p. 32; Harry Elmer Barnes, The Annals of the Ameri- can Academy of Political and Social Science Vol. 252 (JUly, 1947)! P. 106. 43

Ti_me magazine devoted an article to Burnham's arguments in the issue it covered the Truman Doctrine. "Everyone will want to disbelieve it," wrote glee, "but only one defense of Burnham's book can be made: it is -- appallingly -- true." The editors of the The Christian Century asserted Burnham had provided the

intellectual rationale for Truman's new get-tough with Russia policy. His book, they said, "may influence America's destiny even more profoundly than the President's historic message to

Congress....It fits the 'stop Russia' policy of the Truman

Doctrine so exactly that one can hardly read it without thinking,

'Here, whether they realized it or not, is what the senators and representatives were really approving as the foreign policy of the United States!" Time, Life, Commonweal, American Mercury,

and a text book called Basic Issues of American Democracy carried condensations of the book. The Struggle for the WOrld, wrote Burnham and a revisionist historian later, was the first systematic analysis of the Cold War.21

21Time, "The War Without A Name," Vol. 49 (March 24,1947), p. 26- -27; Life, "Struggle for the WOrld," Vol. 22 (March 31, 1947), 59-p. 64; The Christian Century, "Blueprint for Destruction," Vol. LXIV (May 28,1947) p. 678 and "The Truman-Burnham Parallel," Vol. LSIV (June 4, 1947), p. 702-703; Commonweal, "Is It Really One World," Vol. 45 (March 14, 1947), p. 534-540: American Mercury, "The Goal of Soviet Policy," Vol. 64 (April, 1947), p. 389-406, several chapters of Struggle were condensed in American Mercu over the next few months; Hillman M. Bishop and Samuel Hendel, ed. Basic Issues ofAmerican Democreey (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1948), Ch. 7, p. 272-287. Burnham, Suicide of the West (New York: The John Day Co., 1964), 260; Ronald Lora, "Conservative Intellectuals, the Cold War, and McCarthy,” in Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis, eds., The Spector: Original Essayepon the Cold War and the _Origins of McCarthyism (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), p. 702-703. 44

In April the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow broke

down. General Marshall, then Secretary of State, left con-

vinced of Soviet intent to aggravate the worsening economic

malaise of Europe. At Harvard's commencement, June 5, Marshall

stated that the United States would "aid in the drafting of

a European program and of later support for such a program

of recovery ." The Marshall Plan, along with the Truman

Doctrine were, in Truman's words, two halves of the same walnut. The Plan was important in convincing many liberals

that Truman's foreign policy managed just the right balance

between generosity and bellicosity. Burnham, at first a

supporter of the Truman Doctrine, disagreed. He believed

communism did not expand by way of a hungry man's stomach but with tanks and fifth columns. The Marshall Plan might help Europe, he contended, but it would not stop the steady

advance of world communism. C 22

Throughout 1947 the Russians, either in response to the

hardening American policy or following their own timetable,

consolidated their hold on Eastern Europe. In Poland,

Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania all but Communists

subservient to Moscow were purged from government. Americans

at this time felt only vaguely threatened. There was general

public approval of Truman's tough response to the Russians.

22Hamby, "The Liberals," p. 867; Burnham, with Andre Malraux, "The Double Crisis: A Dialogue," The Partisan Review Vol. XV (April, 1948). p. 417. 45

There was also a sense of frustration among Americans that the peace was not working out as they had been led to believe, but little fear of imminent war.

The history written on recent Soviet-American relations,lnr

1947 was based more on political sympathies than documentary evidence. Historians and journalists did not yet have the documents. The Foreign Relations of-the‘ United States series did not

23 reach the Cold War years for more than two decades. Inlthe absence of solid historical research came the sensational and controversial books like The Struggle for the World . Almost by

default Burnham and Chamberlin became two of the first revisionists of the Cold War. Their attacks on the "official" interpretation of America's role during the war and after served the same function as revisionist writings on World War I that appeared in the 1930's. They supplied the ideological support and ration- alization for political conservatives-n-most of whom were

Republicans -- and their attacks on the Democratic administrators of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman on the State Department and the Foreign Service under these Presidents.24

23For example: The FRUS volumes on the Yalta conference were published in 1955, volumes on Potsdam.appeared in 1960. The regular series did not reach 1945 until 1969. 24 Lora, "Conservative Intellectuals," p. 42-45; The first important memoirs of the Grand Alliance and the origins of the Cold War were published in 1947: John R. Deane's The Strange Alliance and James Byrnes"§peakingFrankly. Vera Micheles Dean's Russia: Menace or Promise, Walter Lippmann's The Cold War, John Fischerr§ Why They Behave Like Russians, and Hamilton Fish Armstrong's The Calcu- lated Risk were books of moderation and control that many professional historians recommended. The authors assumed the Soviet union's peaceful, but not non-expansionist intentions. CHAPTER III

ASCENDANCY WITHIN CONSERVATISM

The spring of 1948 witnessed a war scare in the United

States. In late February, Czechoslovakia became communist in a bloodless coup. Immediately American's recalled Hitler's takeover of Prague just nine years before, as well as the terrible sequel of events that followed. Stewart and Joseph

Alsop wrote in their column on March 17, "the atmosphere in Washington today is no longer a postwar atmosphere. It is a prewar atmosphere." A Chicago reporter noted that for some time confidence in peace had slowly eroded, but "with the

Czech coup, it practically vanished." 1 William Henry

Chamberlin blamed the "debacle in Czechoslovakia" on the

Yalta conference and foresaw a war producing chain of events developing in 1948.2

Less than two months after the Czech crisis, the

Russians blockaded Berlin. By mid-July the Berlin crisis had become the second war scare of the year. TRB of the Neg.

Republic on July 19 commented that "this is the showdown."

Chamberlin wrote that unless the Soviet Union did not lift

1Time Vol. LI (March 8, 1948), P. 10: The New York Herald

Tribune, March 17, 1948; Eric Goldman, The Crucial Decade-And After, America, 1945-1960 (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. J 79. 2 William Henry Chamberlin, "Debacle in Czechoslovakia,” The New Leader Vol. 31 (March 6, 1948). P. 16.

46 47

the blockade soon, the United States would have to break it

by armed convoy. He admitted that this strong action might

provoke World War III but said, "the risk must be taken."3

Public Opinion polls reflected the significance of these

events as understood by Americans. A poll taken in early

‘February found that the most important problem facing the

United States was inflation. In April, it was the danger of

war that worried Americans most.4 The Cold War was coming

home to Americans as never before. Truman had asked Congress

in March to enact a permanent program of Universal Military

Training and to reestablish selective service. The most

respectable news magazines printed such headlines as "How

Close Is War?" and reported a growing sentiment for a pre-

ventative atomic strike against the Soviet Union. David

Dallin in the New Leader called his front page article,

"Stalin Wants War!" In June and July President Truman sent

several groups of B-29 bombers -- planes capableof carrying

atomic bombs -- to Germany and England.5 Events such as these

made James Burnham's analysis of world affairs more palatable 3 "TRB," The New Republic Vol. 119 (July 19, 1948), p. 3; Chamberlin, "Showdown in Berlin," The New Leader Vol. 31 (July 17, 1948), p. 16. 4public opinion Quarterly_Vol. 12 (Fall, 1948), p. 557; and Ibid., (Winter, 1948), p. 764. 5Robert A. Divine, "The Cold War and the Election of 1948," The Journal of American History Vol. 59 (June, 1972), p. 90-110; Time, ﬁHow Close Is War?" October 4, 1948, p. 28-29; Newsweek Vol. 31 (March 22, 1948), p. 26-27; David Dallin, "Stalin Wants War!" The New Leader Vol. 31 (July 24, 1948), p. l. 48 to many, including conservatives who had long been anti-

Soviet but not necessarily interventionist. According to one scholar, Burnham became the intellectual leader of these

"new imperialists."6

A week before the Czech coup, James Burnham testified in his capacity as an expert on communism before a sub-committee of the House Un-American Activities Committee. This invi- tation indicated the growing stature of Burnham as an anti-

Soviet expert in the opinion of conservative politicians. One of the members of this sub-committee, which was chaired by

Richard Nixon, praised Burnham's writings and wished he were a member of the committee.

Burnham explained the nature of the communist conspiracy and then proceeded to discuss America's alleged communist subversion problem. "The communist movement will have to be outlawed," said Burnham, "democracy must defend itself." His logic was this, "if we permit a murderer the free run of our

6For further discussion of this transition see: Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., "The anatomy of American 'isolationsim' and expansionsim. Part 1," The Journal of Conflict-

Resolution II (June, 1958). p. 111; Norman A. Graebner, The New Isolationism: A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy since 1950 TNew York: Ronald Press, 1956). P. 18-23; Richard Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The General and the President and the Future of American

Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Young, 1951). p. 228-235; and Samuel Lubell, The Future of

American Politics (New York: Harper, 1951), p. 153-155. Lubell's impressionistic study confirmed the end of ideological and ethnic isolationism. He like myself, saw this development as the result of emergence of Russia and the United States as the major military powers in the world after World War II. Lubell also found a sense of unilateralism, a belief that the US should and could correct international problems on its own. Burnham, more than Chamberlin, would agree with this sentiment. 49

house, we can expect that in the end someone is going to get

killed." Burnham did note that in spite of the acute inter-

national situation, he would not advise Opposing communism

at any cost. "Unless we can preserve at least a reasonable

amount of decency and democracy," he said, "it is not worth

'fighting against communism."7

Chamberlin disagreed with Burnham's conception of just

exactly what a reasonable amount of decency and democracy was. He flatly opposed blanket repressive legislation because

it was, to him, neither decent nor a good idea. Chamberlin

proposed instead red baiting in meeting the communist chal-

lenge inside America. "Intelligent, discriminating, 'red

baiting' should be regarded in the light of the obligations of good citizenship." That anti-Soviet Opinion was beginning

to have some beneficial effect was also noted by Chamberlin.

He remarked in Human Events that the passage of the Mundt-

Nixon bill by the House of Representatives, the investigations

of the Un-American Activities Committee, the 1948 Republican

platform pledging new legislation that would help expose

the treasonable activities of communists, were steps in the

right direction.8 7 Eric Bentley, Thirty Years of Treason: Excerpts from Hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1938-1968 (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), p. 272-288.

8Chamberlin, Human Events Vol. 5 (August 11, 1948), p. 1. "Unrelenting Exposure," The New Leader Vol. 31 (November 20, 1948), p. 16; "Outlaw the Communists?" The Neg Leader Vol. 32 (October 29, 1949), p. 16. 50

More than ever before, America's complex foreign diffi- culties were being attributed by many Americans and nearly all conservative Americans to past and present communist

infiltration into government, the press, the universities,

and even into the motion picture industry. Many Republican politicians used the revelations that had come out of the

twenty-two congressional investigations into communist

activities of the Eightieth Congress to attack the record of

the New Deal, the Truman administration, and Democrats generally.9 Anti-Soviet writers used the allegations of wide-

spread internal subversion found in the Congressional Record

to "prove" the existence of a communist network in the United

States. In turn, politicians and committees drew upon the writings of anti-Soviet intellectuals to give their charges and activities some degree of respectability. In this crusade

Burnham and Chamberlin were certainly well known names but

the best informed man an; regarded by conservatives, on the

subject of communism in the United States was undoubtedly

J.B. Matthews. Matthews, like Chamberlin, had once been a

fellow traveler. He had much to do with the creation of HUAC

in 1938 and was Martin Dies' most fertile source of information during the Committee's first years.

9Congressional investigations are a good indication of the intensity of public issues. During the 79th Congress only four investigations into communist activities were conducted. Griffith and Theoharis, ed. The Spector, "American Politics and the Origins of McCarthyism," p. 4. 51

1948 witnessed a turning point in public attitudes toward Russia. This was no drastic turn around. There had been a progressive deterioration of feelings since the end of the war. Truman's reaction to Russian actions in Iran and supposed actions in Greece, his tough talk and over- dramatization, helped bring home the Soviet "danger" to

Americans. Executive Order 9835 of March 1947, which in- stituted a broad loyalty review program, was important in spreading fear of communist subversion. The subtle and not so subtle reporting of Time, Life, Newsweek, and The US

News and World Report also contributed to the remaking of

American anti-communism. The events and crises of 1948 were crucial in tipping the balance of public opinion. Not before

1948 is it meaningful to classify the mood of the United

States as anti-communist.lo 10 Public Opinion Quarterly, (Spring, 1950), p. 192. A June 1946 poll found 58% of those contacted believed that the Soviet Union was "trying to build herself up to be the ruling power of the world." A March 1948 poll found 77%, a May 1949 poll, 66%, and a January 1950 poll found 70% to the affirmative. Also see Angus Cambell, "The American Concept of Russia," The Journal of Social Issues Vol. IV (Winter, 1948), p. 17-18, 21. For an extensive analysis of the Truman administration's influence on American opinion see Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policyy Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946-1948 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971). A less extreme position is taken by Athan G. Theoharis, Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of

McCarthyism (Chicago: Quadrangie, 1971). 52

Burnham's and Chamberlin's impact on American attitudes is harder to chart. Their audience, the readers of American

Mercury, The Freeman, Human Events, The Chicago Tribune, The

New Leader, and their books,was a small minority of the popu-

lation but the large majority of publicly concerned conservatives. Strong endoresments by and frequent articles in the three leading conservative periodicals of the nation (American

Mercury, The Freeman, and Human Events) made Burnham and

Chamberlin the leading conservative analysts of the Cold War.

The ascendancy of Burnham and Chamberlin within conservative ranks occured at a time when American conservatism was growing in respectability and influence. According to Chadwick

Hall, writing in 1955, nothing less than a conservative revolution took place in the late 1940's. This change in mood he and others reported, was the result of weariness of international tension and awareness of supposed communist infiltration into liberalism. As conservatism became popular in the 1950's the ideas and assumptions of Burnham and Chamberlin likewise found a larger audience. Conservative thought by

1953 had integrated nearly all the ideas of these two intellectuals.11 11 Chadwick Hall, "America's Conservative Revolution," Antioch Review Vol. XV (June, 1955), p. 216; Cushing Stout, "Liberalism, Conservatism, and the Babel of Tongues," The Partisan Review Vol. XXV (January-February, 1958), p. 109; Peter Viereck, Conservatism Revisited (New York: Collier). p. 20; Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 163-179. 53

By late 1948 Burnham was again on the offensive. In his first book Since The Struggle for the World he maintained that

American intervention in the domestic concerns of all nations was a necessity so long as the problem of communism existed.12

Chamberlin was also spouting interventionism. In September, writing for the social democratic New Leader, he argued that

it was time for the United States along with the non-communist

West to go over to the counter-Offensive by sponsoring, en- couraging, and unifying Eastern European emigrees and their efforts to overthrow communist regimes.l3

Three events in 1949 seemed to verify Burnham's and

Chamberlin's pessimism. The Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb, Alger Hiss's perjury trial, and Chain Kai-shek's defeat at the hands of the Chinese communists, lead many Americans to conclude that they were losing the Cold War. In April

Chamberlin praised the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in the Russian Review. He said the Soviet-American deadlock

was formidable but that war was not imminent. The Soviet

Union was distinctly inferior militarily and would not start a shooting war, while the preventative war by the United States was constitutionally impossible.l4

”James Burnham and Andre Malraux, The Case for DeGaulle: A Dialogue between Andrew Malraux and James Burnham (New York: Random House, 1948), p. 46-47.

13Chamberlin, "Showdown in Berlin," The New Leader, vol. 31 (July 17, 1948), p. 16; and "Blueprint for Counter- Offensive," Ibid. (September 16, 1948), p. 16.

14Chamberlin, "American-Soviet Relations Since the War," The Russian Review V01. 8 (April, 1949), p. 101; Ibid.

The recently concluded Atlantic alliance, Chamberlin argued in the New Leader, was simply an act of self defense, one that made war less probable. But by November his Old pessimism.was back. News of the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb was the "worst news in a bad year." He compared this development to that of a notorious killer with a dangerous new weapon.15

Burnham in 1949 wrote a new book on Soviet-American relations which was published the following year and he taught at New York University. He published very little but his reputation continued to grow. On March 18, communist leader

Palmiro Togliatti speaking before the Italian Chamber of

Deputies attacked American foreign policy. Togliatti said that the United States had claimed the role of a superior destined to lead the world and noted that this was the same role claimed by the Nazi's. To illustrate his point he cited

Burham's thesis in The Struggle for the World.16

The writing on Soviet-American relations in 1948 and

1949 was, like always, a hodge-podge that included the

"The Cold War: A Balance Sheet," Vol. 9 (April, 1950). p. 85-84; and "The Lost Peace: An AutOpsy," Human Events

15Chamberlin, "The Meaning of the Atlantic Pact," The New Leader Vol. 32 (April 30, 1949), p. 16; Ibid.’ "A Killer Gets a Gun," V01. 32 (November 5, 1949), p. 16.

16The Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol. 1 (Pravda, Marcﬁ‘lB, 1g49, p. 2?, 1:11-43). 55 virulent anti-Soviet view,17 the liberal argument against

Truman's "get tough" policy, 18 and the memoirs and histories l9 that reflected the "official" interpretation.

Probably the most notable book of the last category was

Arthur Schlesinger's The Vital Center, published in 1949.

Schlesinger, the "budding young dean of mainstream historians" called for a purposeful liberalism for America and a rejection of the ideologies of the Right and Left. His brand of liberal-

ism was embodied in the New and Fair Deals.

Schlesinger's chapter, "The Communist Challenge to

America," was a succinct version of the liberal-establishment

17John M. Murry, The Free Sociepy, London, 1948; Edgar A. Mowrer, The Nightmare of American Foreign Polioy, New York, 1948; S. Milkolajezyk, The Rape of Poland: Pattern of Soviet Aggression, New York, 1948; John Thomas Flynn, The Roosevelt Myth, Chicago, 1948; Arthur B. Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed, Indianapolis, 1948; G.F. Elliot, l: Russia Strikes, New York, 1949; John Thomas Flynn, 322 Road Ahead, Chicago, 1949; Robert E. Stripling, The Red Plot Against America, Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania, 1949; Oksana Kasenkina, Leap to Freedom, Philadelphia, 1949.

18Henry A. Wallace, Toward World Peace, New York,1948; Fritz Sternberg, How to Stop the Russians - Without War, New York, 1948; P.M.S. Blackétt, Fear War, and the Bomb, New York, 1949; James P. Warburg, Put Yourself in Marshall's Place, New York, 1948; and Warburg, Last Call for Common Sense, New York, 1949. l9 Henry L. Roberts, Home from the Cold Wars, New York, 1948; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, New York, 1948 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, New York, 1948; Pauline Tompkins, American-Russian Relations in the Far East, New York, 1949; E.R. Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference, New York, 1949; Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember, New York, 1949; and Arthur M. Schlesinger, IDS Vital Center, Boston, 1949.

56 view of the Cold War. To him, the meaning of Yalta was not appeasement but reasonable compromise and Soviet chicanery.

Soviet expansion and conspiratorial subversion, more dangerous than Fascism and demanding nothing less than world conquest, evoked a tough and justified American response. Schlesinger devoted a number of pages to the matter of internal subversion and espionage, which he considered, "of course, obvious and 20 acute." Schlesinger, one of the founders of the Americans for Democratic Action, revealed with The Vital Center the

ideological confusion among America's intellectual class in the postwar era. One could no longer assume that liberals lent a sympathetic ear to the Soviet Union or even to socialism nor could one assume conservatives favored isolationism or feared a strong centralized state.

James Burnham's outlook at mid-century was still (in his own words) "the catastrophic point of view." His new book, The Coming Defeat of Communism was not as optimistic

as its title. Containment had failed, he said, because it had no objective, was defensive, and was too narrow. American aid to Greece and Turkey had not solved the Balkan communist problem, but had postponed it. The Marshall Plan was in- effective because half of Europe did not trade with the other half and the massive communist movements in the West were blocking reconstruction. The Berlin airlift proved nothing.

20Schlesinger, Chapter VI, "The Communist Challenge to America," pp. 92-130, 129. 57

Armed convoys should have smashed through communist Germany and proved to the world that communists could be set back.

Burnham was convinced that it was treason and subversion within the United States, more than anything else, that pro- duced the Soviet atomic bomb and Nationalist China's defeat.

He proposed to outlaw the communist party, publicize the organizations that acted as fronts, and liberate territories now under communist rule. His plan for liberation called for a huge propaganda campaign, a stop in all negotiations with communist leaders, and the creation of refugee-liberation movements which would provide leadership to the peOples under communism in their eventual revolts. Finally Burnham said the defeat of communism was probable because there were 21 enough men in the world "who have so determined."

The Coming Defeat was condensed in Time, American Mercury,

Commonweal, and was highly acclaimed in the conservative press.

American Mercury called it "a brilliant and lucidly written appraisal of our prospects in the Cold War....' J.M. Lalley in Human Events lamented that the civilian and military leaders of the nation did not understand, as Burnham so clearly did, that war and politics in the modern age are merely different tactical operations and essentially identical terms. Alfred C. Ames reviewed the book for the Chicago Tribune.

21James Burnham, The Coming_Defeat of Communism (New York: John Day, 1950). p. 12, 21—27, 124, 175, 278. 58

"No page is wasted in this explosive volume," said Ames. "The

author writes with the knowledge and insight Of a disillusioned

revolutionary. He writes with the passion of a full heart and

the incisiveness of a superb mind." Writing two years later

in Newsweek, former New Dealer Raymond Moley said that IRE

Coming Defeat was very important in shaping the thinking of

Republican critics of the Truman-Acheson diplomacy. Burnham's book did not sell as well as The Struggle for the WOrld but it

22 did make the best seller list.

Liberal magazines and the Eastern press were not impressed with Burnham's second "book on how to tame the Russians."23

David Spitz in the New Republic wrote in a very perceptive

review that "Burnham thinks in extremes, in black and white

categories that leave no room for compromise or the accommo-

dation of inconvenient details. There is doubtless a terrible

fascination in simplicity, in having to confront only a single

pair of absolutes unfettered by qualifications." Charles

Poore, in an article on Burnham in the New York Times, said

22Time Vol. LIII (February 20, 1950), p. ; "Our Spineless Foreign Policy," American Mercury Vol. LXX (January, 1950), p. 3-13 and (February, 1950). P. 131-142; "The Nature of Modern War," Commonweal Vol. 51 (February 10, 1950), p. 480-483; American Mercury Vol. LXX (March, 1950), p. 372-373; J. M. Lalley, Human_§yents Vol. VII (February 15, 1950). P. 4; Alfred C. Ames, "Stop Reds Without Warfare? Explosive Book Suggests A Way," The Chicago Sundey Tribune February 19, 1950; Raymond Moley, "The End of a Blind Trail," Newsweek Vol. 42 (March 8, 1953), p. 92. 23 James Reston, The New York Times, February 19, 1950.

the author was the leading exponent of the "don't-just-stand-

there -- do-something school," a sort of "academic Cotton

Mather of the reconstructed left."24

The Coming Defeat of Communism gave focus and intellectual

respectability to what had previously been anxieties and doubts

concerning the future of containment. John Foster Dulles had put forth vague suggestions for an anticommunist counter-

offensive which Chamberlin had attacked as sounding "like a muted version of Henry Wallace."25 Dulles advocated a moral

counteroffensive, not an active one. Burnham was more explicit.

According to Townsend Hoopes, Burnham's book struck profoundly

sympathetic cords in "important" segments of the State Depart- ment, the CIA, and among military planners at the Pentagon.

When the North Korean invasion occured a few weeks after the book was published, Burnham's arguments concerning the in-

adequacy of containment were reinforced and, according to

Hoopes, upper reaches of the national security bureaucracy

decided to put the liberation-roll back doctrine to a 26 practical test. Burnham has denied having an influence on

the decision to liberate North Korea directly, and probably 24David Spitz, The New Republic Vol. 122 (March 20, 1950), p. 18; Charles Poore, The New York Times, February 16, 1950. 25 Chamberlin, "Opposing Ideas -- Mistaken Psychology," The New Leader Vol. 32 (April 2, 1949), p. 16. 26 Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles: The Diplomacy of the Eisenhower Era’TBoston: Little, Brown, and Co.,—I973), p. 83, 118-119. 60 this is so, despite the fact that he was a CIA consultant at the time. But, Burnham had been advocating a policy of liberation for nearly four years and this position was sub- sequently adopted by most conservatives, in and out of government. Accordingly, Burnham's potential for influence was considerable.27 The Korean War and Joseph McCarthy hit America at nearly the same time. McCarthy's charge that there were 205 communists in the State Department went a long way in explaining to former isolationists, conservative Republicans, and small-town Mid- westerners how America had dropped from its unassailable position of 1945.

27Mr. Burnham denied having any influence in the upper reaches of the government and declined to give any names of those he worked with or for in government in a telephone conversation with the author on January 2, 1976. One way to chart the diffusion of Burnham's and Chamberlin's ideas is to list the publications in which their books are cited as important sources. Anthony T. Bouscaren, America Faces World Communism (New York, Vantage Press, 1953); , Imperial Communism (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1953): , A Guide to Anti-Communist Action (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1958); Louis F. Budenz, The Techniques of Communism (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1954); David J. Dallin, The New Soviet Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951); Brantley Burcham, Red Challenge to America: A Guide for Intelligent Action (New York: ExpoSiEion Press, 1955); Coral Bell, Negotiation From Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963); Dorothy Fosdick, Common Sense and World Affairs (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 19557. 61

America‘s participation in the war at first had general public approval and many Americans believed the Third World

War had begun in earnest. One poll taken in the summer of

1950 indicated that many Americans were willing to take more drastic steps to suppress domestic communism than Burnham had ever publicly considered. Four percent of those polled wanted registration of American communists. Thirteen percent wanted execution of communists while forty percent wanted internment in special camps or imprisonment for those who held that belief. In Boston, Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews declared in August, "I would be willing to pay any price to achieve a world at peace, even the price of instituting a war...it would win for us a proud title -- we would be the first aggressors for peace." General Orville Anderson, commandant of the Air War College, announced that the Air

Force was poised and waiting for the order to drop an atomic bomb on Moscow. Truman fired both men within days.28 The ideological atmosphere in the United States, fueled by a war against communism at home and abroad, was congenial to Burnham and Chamberlin. After all, this was the kind of mobilization against communism toward which these two intellectuals had worked for years.

28Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade -- And After: America, 1945-1960 (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 159; Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 14 (Winter, 1950). P. 811, an August poll indicated that 57% of those polled believed the United States and the Soviet Union were fighting World War III; Ibid., p. 802; The New York Times (Matthew's speech) August 25, 1950; Carl Solberg, Riding High: America in the Cold War (New York: Mason and Lipscomb, 1973), 161. 62

Beginning in 1950 Burnham regularly lectured at the National

War College, the Air War College, the Naval War College, and

the School for Advanced International Studies. He also worked

as a consultant for the CIA, as noted above. In July, Burnham

attended the first Congress for Cultural Freedom, held in West

Berlin. The meeting brought together eminent liberals and

anti-Soviet excommunists in order to (according to the United

Press), "challenge the alleged freedoms of Soviet-dominated

Eastern Europe and attempt to unmask the Soviet Union's and

Soviet-sponsored 'peace' demonstrations as purely political

maneuvers."29 Besides Burnham, some of those in attendance included SchleSinger, Arthur Koestler, the British novelist and author

of two favorites of anticommunists, Darkness at Noon and The

Yogi and the Commissar, the American novelist James T. Farrell,

and Burnham's colleague at New York University, Sidney Hook.

The tone of the meeting, according to Christopher Lasch, was

"high-level McCarthyism." Burnham's contribution to the

proceedings was his contention that the West's agitation for

peace, taking the forms of pacifism, disarmament, and neutral-

ism, was a form of bourgeois-liberal weakness. Furthermore, such agitation for peace was meaningless, "so long as the Communist power threatens the world." World peace, he said, was possible only thrOugh the elimination of all Communist power.30

29Christopher Lasch, The Agony of'the American Left (New York: Vintage Books, 1969). P. 63. 30 Ibid., p. 64, 68; Burnham, "Rhetoric and Peace," The Partisan Review Vol. (Fall, 1950). p. 861-871. 63

The following year, Burnham, Schlesinger, and Hook founded the American Committee for Cultural Freedom. Until 1957, the

ACCF (receiving financial help from the CIA) served as a forum for both conservatives and liberals as long as the topic discussed related to communism.

In the Fall of 1950 Chamberlin published America's Second

Crusade, which dealt with the American entry into World War II and with -Boosevelt's wartime diplomacy. The book brought together for the first time the totality of his revisionist interpretation. Anyone familiar with Chamberlin's writings read nothing new. The book, although well written and interesting, did not sell well.31

America's Second Crusade was widely reviewed and was highly

controversial. Harry Elmer Barnes, a true believer of the revisionist interpretation, contended that Chamberlin's book was the most important revisionist history of World War II.

Referring to Walter Millis's influential history of America's decision to intervene in the First World War, Barnes commented that Chamberlin's book was the "Road to War" of the second

World War. "It is unlikely," he said, "that any later books or documentary revelations will suffice to alter fundamentally the panOrama of folly, deception, blunders, and vindictiveness which Chamberlin has placed before our eyes with such courage and skill." John Chamberlain in the Freeman and Freda Utley

31Chamberlin, America's Second Crusade (Chicago: Henry Regency, 1950). This book sold 9,500 copies as compared to John T. Flynn's The Roosevelt Myth which sold 120,000. 64

in the Chicago Sunday Tribune vigerously praised both the book

and its author. General Robert E. Wood, chairman of Sears,

Roebuck and CO. and Everett M. Dirksen, then the Republican

candidate for the Senate from Illinois also praised Chamberlin's

book at a talk by the author at the University of Chicago.

On the other side of the debate was James Minifie, who wrote

in The Saturdoy Review, "to anyone who had to endure over a

number of years the daily dose of Virgilio Gayda or Dr. Goebbles,

it comes as a shock to find Mr. Chamberlin ladling out the

same dish."32 The debate on the American entry into World War II, and

to a lesser extent the consequences of the war, was starting

to get heated by 1950. The breakdown of bipartisanship,

popular discontent with the Korean war and Truman's foreign

'policy, and the highly partisan Republican campaign of 1952,

helped to give the revisionist interpretation a large, but not 33 overwhelming, popular acceptance. George Morgenstern in

1947, Charles A. Beard and John T. Flynn in 1948, and Charles

C. Tansill in 1952 also published revisionist histories, 32 Harry Elmer Barnes, Current History Vol. 19 (December, 1950), p. 352-4; John Chamberlin, Freeman Vol. 1 (December 12, 1950); Freda Utley, The Chicago Tribune, October 15, 1950, p. 6; Chamberlin talk, Chicago Tribune, July 15, 1950; James Minifie, The Saturdapreview Vol. 33 (November 18, 1950). P. 20. 33 Edward Suchman, Rose Goldsen, and Robin Williams, Jr., "Attitudes Toward the Korean War," Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 17 (Summer, 1953). p. 171-172; Wayne S. Cole, "American Entry into World War II: A Historio- graphical Appraisal," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review Vol. XLIII (March: 1957), p. 610-611. 65

although none was as comprehensive -- concerning the onset,

course, and results of the war -- as Chamberlin's study.

These revisionist histories were well received by conservatives

and former and present isolationists, of which a large number

were Republican politicians. Professional historians by and

large had accepted the internationalist interpretation of the

American entry into the war and of Roosevelt's wartime

diplomacy and many viewed the revisionist publications as

biased and unsound.34

The last two years of the Truman administration witnessed

a very newsworthy, and for Burnham and Chamberlin a disappoint-

ing and hopeful, period. In October 1950, General MacArthur

began the liberation of North Korea. This was not good enough

-34George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret Wer (New York: Devin-Adair, 1947» Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War: A Study in eppearances and Realities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948); John Thomas Flynn, The Roosevelt Myth (New York: Devin-Adair, 1948h Charles C. TansilI, Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Polioy, 1933-1941 (ChiEago: Henry Regnery, 1952). Robert A. Divine, ed., "Diplomatic Historians and World War II," in The Causes and Consequences of World War II (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1969), p. 3-44, contains a lengthy historiographical review. Divine believes Chamberlin's Second Crusade to be the fullest statement of the revisionist critique. For the reactions of historians to the revisionist writers see: Cole, "American Entry," p. 610-611; Donnie Dennis, History of Diplomatic History, p. 184-5; Ronald Radosh, Prophets on the nght: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), p. 60; Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1971 (New York: John Wiiey, 1972), p. 92;

66 for Chamberlin. "The United States refrained from the most obvious effective measures of self-defense: bombing of

Chinese military, industrial and communication centers, acceptance of Chinese Nationalist troops as full allies, prompt rearming of the Japanese." The Eighty-Second Congress conducted thirty-four investigations into communist activities which was ten more investigations than the Eighty-First conducted and seventeen less than the Eighty-Third conducted.35

In May of 1952, Dulles wrote in Elle that liberation from Moscow's rule would not occur "unless the United States makes it publicly known that it wants and expects liberation to occur." General Eisenhower, the Republican presidential nominee, accepted the Dulles thesis of liberation (hazy as it was) in August. In an address before the American Legion he proclaimed, "never shall we desist in our aid to every man and

\ woman of those shackled lands.'"36 Dulles also had written the foreign policy plank of the Republican Party platform, which fully embraced the revisionist interpretation of the

Cold War that had been laid down years previously by Chamberlin and Burnham. It stipulated: "The leaders of our Administration

in power acted without the knowledge or consent of Congress 35Chamberlin, The Freeman Vol. 1 (April 23, 1951) "Can We Escape From Victory," p. 465; Griffith and Theoharis, eds. The Spector, Introduction, p. 13. 36 Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," Life Vol. XXXII (May 19, 1952), p. 146-160; Eisenhower speech, New York Times, August 26, 1952, p. 12.

‘ 67 or the American people. They traded our overwhelming victory

for a new enemy and for oppressions and new wars which were quick to come." A Republican administration, continued the document, "will mark the end of the negative, futile and

immoral policy of 'containment' which abandons countless human beings to a despotism and godless terrorism."37

Both Chamberlin and Burnham applauded this stand of the

future President and Secretary of State. But within a year both men were disillusioned with the Republican administration.

They did not read more into Dulles' short-of-war brand of

liberation than there actually was. However they did expect

American support for and organization of Eastern European anti-communist groups, steps which the Eisenhower administra-

tion was not willing to take, at least not publicly.38

It was probably no coincidence that both Burnham and

Chamberlin published devastating arguments against the policy of containment at the beginning of the administration that had repudiated containment. .Yet despite the unpOpularity of

the no-win strategy in Korea, the apparent invincibility of

Senator McCarthy, and electoral triumph of liberation, few

37Athan Theoharis, The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.Sl Politics, 1945-1955 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1970). P. 142-143. 38 Chamberlin, The New Leader, "Containment AND Liberation," Vol. 35 (October 13, 1952), p. 19; Burnham, Containment or Liberation? An Inquiry into the Aims of United States Foreign Policy (New York: John Day, 1953), see Chapter 11, p. 143-254. 68 outside conservative ranks heeded Chamberlin's and Burnham's cries. Still, all had not been in vain. One reviewer, John

Lukacs writing in Commonweal noted a_kind of triumph of the

ideas of Chamberlin and Burnham. Lukacs compared the editorials, columns, and articles written in 1953 with those written in 1948 and found "universal condemnation" of the once virile unconditional surrender doctrine and tremendous criticism of containment as "out-of-date, maudlin, cowardly. "39

Chamberlin's book, Beyond Containment, was a lengthy

and well written history of the Cold War, from the Second World

War to Eisenhower's pledge to "go beyond containment." His suggestion on liberation was psychological warfare, aimed at the nationalities of the Soviet Union, an attack on the greatest "weakness" of the communist state. Although Chamberlin

‘was greatly influenced by McCarthyite thinking on internal security, he did retain more balance and moderation concerning the limits of American power. He believed the United States alone could not save Europe and Asia from communism, which contrasted sharply with Burnham's unilateralism. Still, like

Burnham, Chamberlin eventually wanted the eradication of

Communist power completely.40

As usual the conservative press found much to praise in a book by Chamberlin. Frank Chodorov writing in Human

Events considered Beyond Containment "the most lucid, most

39John Lukacs, Commonweal Vol. 59 (October 17, 1953). p. 43. 40 Chamberlin, Beyond Containment (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953), chapter 15. 69 concise, and most satisfying" of all the many books on the contemporary international situation. The Freeman condensed one chapter and considered it an important new book. Anatole

Shub in the pages of the Russian Review commented that Beyond

Containment was "a sound, clear review for the layman of the

41 issues of the global struggle."

Containment or Liberation? by Burnham analyzed the faults

and weaknesses of containment and the strengths of his policy of liberation. His section on the history, nature, and faults of containment was the most sober and historical analysis he had given thus far in any of his Cold War works, but it was based on the same assumptions -- the indivisibility of war and peace, the ideological impetus of communist imperialism, and

the impossibility of peace while communists possessed power --

as his earlier books. A final section argued for the immediate

application of a policy aimed at the liberation of the Chinese,

East European,and Russian peoples, one that would, "apply in

all major spheres: military, economic, psychological, diplomatic, political." He even suggested the possibility

of "a large-scale interior action in order to achieve the

Opponents overthrow - the liquidation of the Soviet regime -

in a manner that is most efficient, least wasteful of life

and of physical resources, and most promising for a civilized

41Frank Chodorov, Human Events Vol. 10 (October 14, 1953); The Freeman Vol. 3 TEebruary 23, 1953), p. 379-382; Robert Don Levin, The Freeman Vol. 4 (February 22, 1954), p. 389-390; Anatole Shub, The Russian Review Vol. 13 (April, 1954). P. 154. 70 future," presumably a massive armed uprising in communist

East Europe aided materially and militarily by the west.

Like the Marxists he wrote about, Burnham believed in the higher law ethic, that, the end justified the means. He had not discarded much of his Marxist past.42

Several reviews brought up the similarity between Burnham's ideas and the Eisenhower-Dulles "policy" of liberation. "The publication at this time," wrote Issac Don Levine in ﬁepep'

Events, "of James Burnham's "Containment or Liberation?" should prove a Godsend to President Eisenhower's crew of advisors on psychological warfare in their quest of a blueprint for a positive American foreign policy." Of Burnham, he wrote: "one of the very few prime political thinkers on the almost barren landscape Of American statesmanship today."

(Gordon Craig in the Herald Tribune stated that Burnham's book

was important at that time when the Eisenhower administration was placing greater emphasis on political warfare against the

Soviet Union. He also noted that, "it is impossible to deny that Mr. Burnham expresses very forcefully the fears and

frustrations of many Americans who feel that the initiative has been left too exclusively in Soviet hands."

Conservatives were of course extremely impressed with

Burnham's latest analysis while liberals no longer took the

"Middle Aged Man with a Horn" seriously. American Mercury

regarded this book "as the most important examination of

4ZBurnham, Containment or Liberation? p. 130.

American foreign policy published since the end of the Second

World War." Robert Strauze-pre, later associated with the so-called protracted conflict school of international relations, considered Burnham's work on the Cold War as "seminal."

Eugene Lyons wrote in the Freeman, "Burnham has written a powerful, and in this reviewer's Opinion irrefutable indict- ment of containment in theory and in practice, and a brilliant exposition of its alternative." Chamberlin also joined the chorus. "This is a brilliant, angry, stimulating and intensely controversial discussion of America's No. 1 issue in foreign affairs." Chamberlin, however, did not think Burnham had solved the problem of liberation but he did not offer any solutions himself. Chamberlin's criticism was most interesting since his own policy of liberation as stated in Beyond Contain-

ment was a little less bold but nearly identical to Burnham's.

Schlesinger, on the other side of the debate, described the book in the New Republic as a careless job, "filled with

confusion, contradiction, ignorance, and misrepresentation."

He was very perceptive in noting, "Mr. James Burnham's vigorous new pamphlet is...a series of recommendations for

President Eisenhower."43

43Gordon Craig, The New York Herald Tribune, March 1, 1953, p. 111; Robert Strausz-Hupe, The Annals of the American Academy Vol. 293 (July, 1953), p. 154; Issac Don Levin, Human Events Vol. 10 (March 25, 1953); American Mercury, VOl. LXXVI (January, 1953). P. 3; Eugene Lyons, gpe Freeman Vol. 3 (April 6, 1953), p. 497-499; Chamberlin, The Chicago Tribune, March 1, 1953; Schlesinger, The Eeg Republic Vol. 128 (March 16, 1953). P. 16. 72

Chamberlin and Burnham had spoken for the conservative movement in the United States. Arriving from the Left, they had in only a few years become the most important policy analyists of the Right and the creators of a conservative alternative to an already conservative foreign policy. For a time, they thought their version would become Official policy, but foreign policy is not so easily changed. CHAPTER FOUR

Conclusion

By the late 1950's and 1960's, Chamberlin and Burnham devoted themselves less the the Cold War, although by then their ideas had become the standard conservative position on international affairs. In fact, in the late 1950's, a conservative school of thought on foreign affairs, known by the term "Protracted Conflict," was formed around Robert Strausz-

Hupe and William Kintner. This school was based primarily on one of Burnham's precepts, that the communist war against the West will be a lengthy one employing various tactics but with the same goal: world conquest.

In the decade of the "New Conservatism" and the growth

(some say mistakenly, beginning) of the conservative intellectual movement, Burnham figured prominently. In the early

1950's he strongly advocated the creation of a magazine that would be as important to the Right as the New Republic and

The Nation were to the Left. When William F. Buckley, Jr.,

established the National Review Burnham was there as an editor

and author of the Review's Cold War column, called "The Third

World War." In 1954, Burnham charged in Web of Subversion

that communist penetration in the American bureaucracy during World War II was massive. This book was based primarily upon the congressional investigations into communist activities of the previous eight years. 73 74

In 1956 he considered Eisenhower's and Dulles' handling of the Suez Crisis suicidal and representative of the decline of the West. Burnham did not address himself at the time to the Hungarian crisis and the Eisenhower administration's failure to test its liberation policy. Only later, at a safe distance, did he care to explain what the government should have done. Perhaps because of the Hungarian fiasco Burnham dropped his aggressive pressure stand and advocated the with- drawal of American and Soviet trOOps from Central Europe. This scheme sounded suspiciously like Lippmann's 1947 neutralization plan and failed to excite any conservatives. It was soon forgotten.

In 1959 in Congress and the American Tradition he lamented

the shift in power from the Congress to the Presidency. Ten years later he criticized Congressional interference with the

President's prerogative to wage war.

In the 1960's Burnham supported Goldwater for President, advocated unlimited war in Vietnam, and presumed for a time that the Sino-Soviet split was simply a communist deception designed to lure the West into dropping its defense. Burnham's most important publication since The Struggle for the World

was published in 1964. In Suicide of the West, he concluded

that liberalism was the ideology of Western suicide. He warned that unless the West abandoned this set of ideas, the ideals and influence of Western Civilization would be doomed and communism would triumph. This book did not elect Barry

Goldwater but was a favorite of conservatives and was reprinted 75 in 1975 by the Conservative Book Club, which called it, "the most searching analysis of the pathology of liberalism ever put to paper." Burnham today is writing a column called "The

Protracted Conflict" for the National Review.

Chamberlin continued writing his column for the New Leader

until 1968. He continually stressed the need to rearm Germany and Japan, and to repudiate the Yalta agreement. In 1959 he published his autobiographical Evolution of a Conservative

which dealt more with his philosophy of libertarian individual- ism than foreign affairs. Throughout the 1950's and 1960's

Chamberlin wrote critical reviews on American and Russian literature for publication in several magazines. The German

Phoenix published in 1961 was Chamberlin's last book. In it he appraised Germany's swift rise from defeat and destruction.

'Like Burnham Chamberlin supported Goldwater in 1964 (but unlike Burnham he thought he would win) and unlimited war in

Vietnam. He died atrmmmein Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1969.

From 1945 to 1953 and beyond, James Burnham and William

Henry Chamberlin saw nothing less than the gravest crisis that Western civilization had ever faced. To them, lple was the Cold War. It had not begun in 1945 or even 1947 but in 1917 with the Bolshevik's seizure of power. It was truly a struggle for the world, a struggle which would not end until one side had eliminated the other.

Burnham had come to this conclusion by retaining the deterministic outlook of his Marxist past and applying it to a world of rapidly changing power relationships. Chamberlin, 76

always less dogmatic than Burnham, combined his extremely

negative personal opinion of the Soviet state with the fact

of Russia's attainment of superpower status in World War II

and came up with, in his mind, an international nightmare.

For both there could be no compromise with communism. A

communist victory, assured Chamberlin, would hail, "a dark

night of the soul....The world would become spiritually a dead

planet." The defeat of communism, on the other hand, "might

realize the age old dream of a truly free and humane society,

rising to new heights of spiritual and cultural achievement

and material well being...."44 To Burnham and Chamberlin, Soviet-American relations

prevailed over everything, a View to which most Americans

subscribed at one time or another during the Truman years.

-But to these two experts the conflict could not be understood

as a great power conflict over territory, influence, or

prestige. To these self-proclaimed "realists" the Cold War

was above all ideological. The solution was simple. Eliminate

communism and world peace would be assured. There was no

doubt in Burnham's mind of the ability of the United States

to accomplish such a feat. Chamberlin also had an exaggerated

concept of America's role and power in the world, but he was

never as confident or as assured of America's omnipotence.

His emphatic advice to American policy makers stressed the

need to enlist the aid of America's new allies, Germany and

44Chamberlin, Beyond Containment, p. 357-358.

Japan, and rearm them. Even during the war he considered the unconditional surrender policy both costly and idiotic, when instead the United States and Great Britain should have been creating a new power balance favoring the West. Chamberlin's policy of containment preceeded Truman's by at least four years.

Both Burnham and Chamberlin considered conspiracy to be the essence of communism. The Soviet Union, they often argued, was not a nation, a state, or a government, but actually the base of an enterprise, "which fuses the characteristics of a secular religion, a new kind of army, and a world conspiracy."45

The conspiratorial View -- rooted in American History and thought with the "conspiracy" of such groups as Catholics,

Mormons, masons, and Jews -- holds that history is purposeful and directed by God or some other high force. The plan of history is good and identical with the interests of the United

States. If something goes wrong then blame is placed on some conspiracy, and indeed, according to Burnham and

Chamberlin, something did go wrong after the Second World War.

The United States lost its preeminent position in the world and within a short time its very existence was placed in jeopardy.

Burnham and Chamberlin had learned the lessons of the 1930's along with everyone else. Appeasement is suicidal. Totali- tarian dictatorships are dangerous, expansionist, and war breeding. Obviously then, such international outlaws should

45Burnham, Containment or Liberation?, p. 48.

eliminated, or at least made clearly aware that certain

activities would not be tolerated. Few dismissed the Red

Fascist analogy. This was best explained by John Diggins'

corollary to Santayana's aphorism those who remember the

past too well are determined to universalize it.46

Burnham and Chamberlin, however, went one step further.

Instead of pushing Marxism aside and treating Russia as

merely another nation state or empire, they accepted at

face value the Soviet understanding of the relationship

between communism and capitalism. They viewed Russian power

politics through Leninist assumptions. For instance, Lenin

foresaw the eventual triumph of one system and destruction

of the other. He assumed that peace was only war prosecuted

by other means. Burnham and Chamberlin called themselves

'power realists but they were actually ideologues who based

their policy propositions on expediency, not principle, and

on inevitability, not possibility. Is it not ironic that

Burnham's and Chamberlin's legacy to conservative foreign

policy thought is an outlook on the world based on the

assumptions of their sworn enemies?

The conservative foreign policy dialectic of Burnham and

46John P. Diggins, Up From Communism: Conservative Odysseys in American Intellectual History (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. xiii. Diggins fine study, of which nearly one quarter is devoted to James Burnham, was published too late to be of any use for this paper. Our separate theses are quite different although there are some common interpretations concerning the importance of Burnham in American conservatism which were reached independently. 79

Chamberlin above all sought to preserve America‘s free society.

In doing so it adopted communist assumptions and methods.

It would not tolerate opposing points of view and foreign policy debates in its struggle with the enemy. It would require total mobilization of the nation's material and intellectual resources, directed by, it would seem, a central authority. It would require the subordination of America's allies to American foreign policy objectives and tactics. In short, the United States would have to subvert its own freedom to save it. This is the dialectic's greatest contradiction. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY

Because of the nature of this thesis the usual division of the bibliography into primary and secondary works is not use- ful. The chief sources for this study are the published books and articles of James Burnham, William Henry Chamberlin, and the other important participants. The result is that what would normally be considered secondary sources become primary ones for the purposes of this paper.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Bentley, Eric. Ed. Thirty Years of Treason: Excerps From Hearings Before The House COmmittee On Un-American Activities, 1938-1968. New York: Viking, 1971.

Bullitt, William C. The Great Globe Itself: A Preface to World Affairs. New York: Charles Scribner‘s Sons, 1946.

. "The World From Rome," Life XVII (September 4, 1944), P. 94-109.

Burnham, James. Containment or Liberation? An Inquiry into the Aims of United States Foreign Policy. New York: John Day, 1953.

. "Lenin's Heir." Partisan Review XII (Spring,

. "Rhetoric and Peace." Partisan Review XVII (Fall, 1950), 861-871.

. Suicide of the West: An Essay on the Meaning and Destiny_of Liberalism. New York: Arlington House, 1964, 1975.

. The Coming Defeat of Communism. New York: John Day, 1950. 80 81

. The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom. New York: John Day, 1943.

. The PeOple's Front: The New Betrayal. New York: Pioneer, 1937.

. The Managerial Revolution: What is Happening In the World. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1941, 1962.

. "The Sixth Turn of the Communist Screw." Partisan Review XI (Summer, 1944), 365-366.

. The Struggle for the World. New York: John Day, 1947

. The War We are In: The Last Decade and the Next. New York: Arlington House, 1967.

Burnham James and Malraux, Andre. The Case for DeGaulle: A Dialogue between Andre Malraux and James Burnham.

New York: Random House, 1948.

. "The Double Crisis: A Dialogue." Partisan Review XV (April, 1948), 415-417.

Chamberlin, William Henry. A False Utopia: Collectivism in Theory and Practice. Andover, England: The Chapel River Press, 1937.

. "A Killer Gets A Gun!" New Leader 32 (November 5, 1949), 16.

. America: Partner in World Rule. New York: Vanguard Press, 1945.

. America's Second Crusade. Chicago: Henry Regency, 1950.

. "American-Soviet Relations Since the War." Russian Review 8 (April, 1949), 100-103.

. Beyond Containment. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1963,

. "Blueprint for counter-Offensive." New Leader 31 (September 16, 1948), 16.

. Ed. Blueprint for World Conquest: The Official Communist Plan. Chicago: Human Events, 1946.

. "Can We Escape From Victory?" Freeman 1 (April 23, 1951), 465. 82

. "Containment AND Liberation." New Leader

3§(October 13, 1952), 19.

. "Debacle in Czechoslovakia." New Leader

31 (March 6, 1948), 16.

" Opposing Ideas -- Mistaken Psychology," New Leader 35 (April 2,1949), 16.

. "Outlaw the Communist?" New Leader 32

(October 29, 1949), 16.

"Russia: An American Problem." Atlantic Monthly CLXIX (February, 1942), 148- 156.

. "Russia and Europe: 1918-1944." Russian Review 11(Autumn, 1944), 5-12.

. "Showdown in Berlin." New Leader 31 (July 17, 1948), 16.

. "Some Consequences of the Second World War." Human Events II (August 22, 1945), 1-4.

. "The Cold War: A Balance Sheet." Russian Review—9 (April, 1950), 84-85.

. The Confessions of an Individualist. New York: MacMillan, 1940.

. The European Cockpit. New York: MacMillan, 1937.

. The Evolution of a Conservative. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959.

"The Lost Peace: An Autopsy." Human Events VII (May 10, 1950), 1-4.

. "The Meaning of the Atlantic Pact." New Leader 32 (April 30, 1949), 16.

. "The Shape of the New Appeasement." Human Events II (October 17, 1945), 1-4.

. "The Struggle for Continents.” Atlantic Monthly 168 (September, 1941), 278-280.

. The World's Iron Age. New York: MacMillan, 1941.

. "Unrelenting Exposure." New Leader 31 TNovember 20, 1948), 16. 83

. "With Sonya in Russia." Russian Review 29 (January, 1970), 56-62.

. "W.L. White and His Critics." American Mercury LX (May, 1945), p. 625-631.

Croce Benedetto. My Philosophy. translated by E.F. Carritt. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1949, 88-92.

Dallin, David. "Stalin Wants War!" New Leader 31 (July 24, 1948), l. '

Dulles, John Foster, "A Policy of Boldness." Life. XXXII (May 19, 1952), 146-160.

Dulles, John Foster. "Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What do do About it." Life XX (June 3 and June 10, 1946), 113-126, 118-130.

Eastman, Max. "We Must Face the Facts About Russia." Readers Digest 43 (July, 1943), 3-11.

Feuer, Lewis. "Russia and the Liberals." New Republic 119 (December 8, 1948), 14-16.

Laski, Harold J. "America -- 1947." Nation 164 (December 13, 1947), 642.

Macdonald, Dwight. "The Burnhamian Revolution," Partisan Review VIX (January-February, 1942), p. 76-84.

Moley, Raymond. "The End of a Blind Trail." Newsweek 42 (March 8, 1953), 92.

Orwell, George. "Second Thoughts on James Burnham." The Orwell Reader. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956.

Schlesinger, Arthur M.,Jr., The Vital Center. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949.

Trotsky, Leon. In Defense of Marxism Against the Petty Bourgeois Opposition. New York: Merit, 1965.

BOOK REVIEWS

Ames, Alfred C. review of The Coming Defeat of Communism, by James Burnham, in Chicago Sunday Tribune, 19 February 1950.

Barnes, Harry Elmer. review of The Struggle for the World, by James Burnham, in Annals of the American Academy, July 1947, p. 106. 84

. review of America's Second Crusade, by

William Henry Chamberlin, in Current History, December 1950, p. 352-354.

Birdsall, Paul. review of TthWorld's Iron Age, by William Henry Chamberlin, in Political Science Quarterly, March 1942, p. 130-132.

Chamberlin, John. review of America's Second Crusade, by William Henry Chamberlin, in Freeman,12 December 1950, p. 4

Chodorov, Frank. review of Beyond Containment, by William Henry Chamberlin, in Human Events, 14 October 1953.

Craig, Gordon. review of Containment or Liberation?, by James Burnham, in New York Herald Tribune, 1 March 1953, p. 111.

Dean, Vera Micheles. review of The Great Globe Itself, by William C. Bullitt, in New Republic, 12 August I946, p. 181.

Don Levin, Robert. review of Beyond Containment, by William Henry Chamberlin, in Freeman, 22 February 1954, p. 389-390.

. review of Containment or Liberation? by James Burnham, in Human Events, 25 March 1953.

Hackett, Francis. review of These are the Russians, by Richard E. Lauterbach; and The Russia I Believe In, by Paul Harper, ed., in On Judging Books (New York: John Day, 1945), 164-170.

Karpovich, Michael. review of The Russia I Believe In, by Paul Harper, ed., in Russian Review, Autumn, 1945, p. 118-122.

Lalley, J.M. review of The Coming Defeat of Communism, by James Burnham, in Human Events, 15 February 1950.

Lukacs, John. review of Beyond Containment, by William Henry Chamberlin, in Commonweal, 17 October 1953, p. 43.

Lyons, Eugene. review of Containment or Liberation?, by James Burnham, in Freeman, 6 April 1953, p. 497-499.

Minifie, James. review of America's Second Crusade, by William Henry Chamberlin, in Saturdanyeview, 18 November 1950, p. 20. 85

Nettler, Gwynne. review of The Machiavellians, by James Burnham, in American SociOlOgical Review, 19 October 1943, p. 606-607.

Poore, Charles. review of The Coming Defeat of Communigm, by James Burnham, in New York Times, 16 February I950.

Reston, James. review of The Coming Defeat of Communism, by James Burnham, in New York Times, 19 February 1950.

Roucek, Joseph. review of The Machiavellians, by James Burnham, in Annals of the American Academy, July 1943, p. 123-124.

Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. review of The Struggle fpr the World, by James Burnham, in Nation, 5 April 1947, p. 32.

. review of Containment or Liberation?, by James Burnham, in New Republic, 16 March 1953, p. 16.

Shub, Anatole. review of Containment or Liberation?, by James Burnham, in Russian Review, April 1954, p. 154.

Spitz, David. review of The Coming Defeat of Communism, by James Burnham, in New Repubiic, 20 March 1950, p. 18.

Strausz-Hupe, Robert. review of Containment or Liberation?, by James Burnham, in Annals of the American Academy, July 1953, p. 154.

Utley, Freda. review of America's Second Crusade, by William Henry Chamberlin, in Chicago Tribune, 15 October 1950.

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UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

Dennis, Donnie. "A History of American Diplomatic History." Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1971.

NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

American Mercury, 1941-53.

Antioch Review, 1941-55.

Annals of the American Academy, 1941-59.

Atlantic Monthly, 1941-53. Catholic World, 1941-53.

Chicago Tribune, 1941-53.

Christian Science Monitor, 1941-45.

Commonweal, 1941-53.

Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1949.

Freeman, 1950-53.

Human Events, 1944-53.

Life, 1941-53. Nation, 1941-1953. National Review, 1955-76.

New Leader, 1946-52.

Newsweek, 1945-53. New York Herald Tribune, 1947-53.

New York Times, 1941-75.

Partisan Review, 1941-1954.

Public Opinion Quarterly, 1941-53.

Readers Digest, 1941-53.

Russian Review, 1941-1969.

Saturday Review of Literature, 1941-53.

Time, 1941-53.

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Hamby, Alonzo. "Henry Wallace, the Liberals, and Soviet- American Relations." The Review of Politics 30 (April, 1968). 153-169.

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Willen, Paul. "Who 'Collaborated' with Russia?" Antioch Review XIV (September, 1954), 259-283. ll!IIIHHIHHIIMI"Hull“lllllllWHIIUHJIIHIIIHIIHI 93006965762