William Henry Chamberlin

october 1934 The Evolution of Soviet Terrorism William Henry Chamberlin Volume 13 • Number 1 The contents of Foreign Affairs are copyrighted.©1934 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution of this material is permitted only with the express written consent of Foreign Affairs. Visit www.foreignaffairs.com/permissions for more information. THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET TERRORISM By William Henry Chamberlin THE reorganization of the Soviet political police, the OGPU, and its virtual transformation into a Commissariat not for Internal Affairs which does possess the right to pro nounce death marks a second summary sentences, important a stage in the evolution of the terrorism which has been consistent was feature of Soviet administrative practice. The first stage in or 1922, when the Cheka, Extraordinary Commission for Com was as A bating Counter-revolution, reorganized the OGPU. strong element of continuity is noticeable in both these changes. Felix Dzerzhinsky, the original head of the Cheka, remained head was of the OGPU until his death in 1926, when he succeeded by another Pole, Menzhinsky, who died in the spring of 1934. Both the head of the new Commissariat for Internal Affairs, Heinrich two are vet Yagoda, and his assistants, Agranov and Prokofiev, a eran Chekists; and the Soviet newspaper Komsomolskay Pravda a sees in this fact desirable proof that the spirit of the Cheka will no continue to prevail and that there will be relaxation of the "class enemies." struggle against The functions of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs are also to strikingly similar those of the OGPU. It retains control of numerous border defense, of the ordinary police and of the forced labor camps which have grown up in Russia in recent years. It also possesses the less formidable functions of supervising fire and the of and divorces. At prevention registration marriages a tached to the Commissariat is special commission (osoboe to soveschanie) which has the right exile persons from the country to or to sentence them to terms of confinement, up five years, in or in labor i.e. without prisons camps "administratively," any court trial. This indicates that there will be no lack of con scripted "class enemies" for the digging of canals and for other are rough tasks where large supplies of cheap labor appreciated. All these similarities between the functions of the OGPU and successor some to a of its lend point the cynical remark of foreign rumors an resident of Moscow when of impending reorganization and of the OGPU to circulate in Moscow last renaming" began name a a spring: It's like changing the of dog with bad reputation Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve, and extend access to Foreign Affairs ® www.jstor.org ii4 FOREIGN AFFAIRS same for biting people in the hope that people will forget it's the animal." At the same time the withdrawal from the Commissariat for to sen Internal Affairs of the right pronounce summary death no tences and the fact that apparent provision ismade for trans to were ferring the Commissariat the special regiments which are under the control of the OGPU developments of genuine im new portance. The wings of the OGPU have been clipped. The Commissariat will still be an agency of terrorism, endowed with a summary punitive powers which would be unthinkable in not democratic country. But it will be quite the old OGPU, just as even at that organ, the height of its virtually uncontrolled power, never equalled the Cheka in the number of its executions. seem to to Several circumstances have contributed the curbing of the OGPU. First of all, the Soviet authorities are convinced that the satisfactory harvest of 1933 and the subsequent im towns provement in the supply of the with food and manufac a turn tured goods marked definite for the better in the pro crisis which the Soviet Union has been since longed experiencing the inauguration of the first Five Year Plan. With the resistance to of the peasant collective farming broken (not least through the more huge state-organized famine of 1932-1933), and with food on stuffs and goods the long depleted shelves of the cooperative stores, it seemed that the need for extraordinary methods of re pression, which smacked strongly of martial law, had passed. the the fact that the Pravda assures Then, too, " OGPU, despite us that it was surrounded with the warm love of tens of millions an of workers and peasants," had acquired extremely bad reputa tion in the outside world. Thanks to the secrecy with which its were and in of Russia's abun operations cloaked, consequence dance of inaccessible and almost unknown places of banishment severe and the Soviet censorship, the full truth about the decima a tion of the Russian intelligentsia and of considerable part of the all never known. through these years may be But enough out to f>easantsacts did leak convince the public opinion of the world that was a an the OGPU sheer terrorist organization, rather than ordinary political police. The charges of "sabotage" which it as gave excuse for its frequent wholesale arrests inspired little credence, especially after the curious piece of bad luck which most attended the elaborately staged of all the sabotage trials, that of the so-called "Industrial Party." For Professor Leonid THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET TERRORISM 115 Ramzin, who obediently turned state's evidence and incriminated in all sorts of himself and his colleagues treasonable and sabotage as one activities, inadvertently mentioned of the leading figures a in the "conspiracy" and candidate for the post of Premier in one a the event of its success, P. P. Ryabushinsky, well-known pre-war industrialist. And P. P. Ryabushinsky, very inconven of in iently for the stage-managers the trial, had died Paris long before the trial had begun and before the Industrial Party had begun its self-confessed but rather questionable existence. The firm stand of the British Government at the time of the arrest and trial of six British engineers in the service of the Metro was a Vickers Company in the spring of 1933 pointed indication were to of the external complications which likely arise when the OGPU to its unlimited and its gave scope powers lively imagina tion at the expense of citizens of foreign countries. President a Roosevelt's insistence that fair and open trial would be expected was for American citizens who might be arrested in Russia prob to ably another factor in bringing the Soviet leaders the conclu sion that a modification and limitation of the OGPU would be an aid to the international relations. country's an Finally, the existence of organization with unlimited power over own of life and death every Soviet citizen, and possessing its and an immense of was not army apparatus espionage, consistent with the r?gime of Caesarian dictatorship which Stalin has created no in the Soviet Union. Although there is evidence that the ever to a a or OGPU tried play the r?le of "state within state" to course endeavored directly shape the of political and economic was policy, there always the possibility that efforts in this direction might be made. So the OGPU has gone the way of the Cheka, and the Commis a new sariat for Internal Affairs will write chapter in the history of Soviet administrative repression. in December the Cheka the first few Organized 1917, during was months of its existence quite mild in its operations. Its rela were or tively few victims during this period mostly bandits "an a to archists" with strong impulse "expropriate" private prop who could erty, scarcely be distinguished from bandits. Beginning to to with July 1918, however, the Cheka began put death politi cal opponents of the r?gime in large batches. The fiercest aspects were as a of the Terror of the French Revolution repeated, and result the same causes: domestic of much uprisings, foreign inter ii6 FOREIGN AFFAIRS vention, a critical food situation. Bolshevik terrorism reached was what perhaps its climax in September and October 1918, after Lenin a had been wounded and prominent Petrograd Communist, Uritsky, had been killed by Socialist Revolutionaries. was The largest single shooting in Petrograd, where it was more officially announced that than 500 persons had been put to death in revenge for the murder of Uritsky and the attack on were Lenin. Among these several former Tsarist Ministers, A. N. A. D. Khvostov, Protopopov, I. D. Stcheglovitov and N. A. Maklakov. The town of Yaroslavl seems to have come second, more an with than 400 victims, executed after the suppression of uprising there in July. A description of what must have been a massacre a grim in sleepy provincial town is contained in the to following laconic message the Soviet press from Penza, dated September 25: "The White Guard plot and the attempt to break into the prison and free the hostages have been liquidated. For murder from ambush one a the of comrade, Egorov, Petrograd worker, the Whites paid with 152 lives. In the future firmer measures will be taken to in regard the Whites. Signed: The President of The Provincial Soviet, Turlo." On a 200 were single day, October 3, almost killings reported from various parts of the country. The Cheka of the Front in Kotelnich led the list with 61 executions; the Chembar county Cheka to death as for killed put 48 "hostages Egorov;" Rybinsk the town thirty hostages; little of Klin executed eight for "coun the Astrakhan Cheka to ter-revolutionary agitation;" put death were an twelve who accused of participating in uprising in that on no town August 15.

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