https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19950016842 2020-06-16T08:11:52+00:00Z 't/z NASA Technical Memorandum 104803 STS-61 Mission Director's Post-Mission Report Ronald L. Newman IN m e_ ul m IN f_ m O" e- O Z _ O i n ,O Z tm 0 _-_ ,-_ Q. L. •rw _ I OU _=-_ _ Otto t- o00 0 I • 0 _0 Z _-'. Z January 1995 ! STS-61 Mission Director's Post-Mission Report January 1995 PREPARED BY: Ronald L. Newman Special Assistant APPROVED BY: Randy._Brinkley STS-61 Mission Director tQ O Ill NASA Technical Memorandum 104803 STS-61 Mission Director's Post-Mission Report Ronald L. Newman Space Station Program Office Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center Houston, Texas January 1995 ii STS-61 Mission Director's Post-Mission Report Abstract This report details events that occurred before and during the STS-61 Space Shuttle mission and makes recommendations for future mission execution. The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) First Servicing Mission (SM-1) was a highly successful space flight. The HST hardware installation tasks designated as success criteria by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) were all accomplished. All planned optional tasks were completed as well. The new optical instruments were later demonstrated to have corrected the spherical aberration present when the telescope was placed into orbit in April 1990. Key to the success of the HST SM-1 was the fact that the HST had been designed and built to be maintained by astronauts during extravehicular activity (EVA). The success of this mission came also as a result of total commitment to the mission by NASA and its contractor team. This mission was probably the most complex Shuttle mission flown to date. NASA was willing to devote the necessary resources to ensure its proper completion. Because of the complexity and importance of this mission, NASA management established a number of independent review groups to assess the management, design, planning, and preparation for the mission. The review groups made key and timely recommendations which caused or contributed to a number of mission enhancements. This report recommends the following. • A mission management plan for each complex mission • Appointment and empowerment of a mission director for each future highly complex mission • Continued use of coordinated independent peer review for critical missions • Extended template for complex missions for earlier completion of mission preparation milestones • Uniform NASA-wide EVA hardware certification requirements • Single point of control for mission safety and assurance activities • Single EVA safety process • Central coordinated strategic plan for NASA public affairs activities for high profile missions Contents 1. Executive Summary ..................................................................................... 1 2. Introduction .................................................................................................. 9 3. Pre-Mission Events .................................................................................... 11 4. Mission Events ........................................................................................... 75 Appendix A: Mission Director Recommendations ....................... 83 Appendix B: Payload Officers Recommendations ........................ 97 Appendix C: EVA Section Recommendations ............................. 107 Appendix D: STS-61 Crew Comments and Recommendations .............................................................................. 115 Appendix E: EVA Management Office Recommendations ............................................................................... 119 Appendix F: Crew and Thermal Systems Division Recommendations ............................................................................... 125 Appendix G: John Young Comments and Recommendations ............................................................................... 127 Appendix H: PDRS Post-Mission Summary ................................ 131 Appendix I: Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................... 143 V Executive Summary The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) First Servidng Mission (SM-1) was a highly successful space flight (STS-61). The success criteria established by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) before the mission, consisted of the successful replacement of the HST's solar arrays (SAs), rate sensor unit no. 2 (RSU 2) and wide field/planetary camera (WF/PC); installation of the corrective optics space telescope axial replacement (COSTAR) and the magnetic sensing system no. 1 (MSS 1); and replacement of HST's RSU 3, electronic control unit no. 3 (ECU 3), and solar array drive electronics no. 1 (SADE 1). Not only were all these tasks performed, making the mission a success, but also all the planned secondary tasks were accom- plished, namely installation of the Goddard high resolution spectrograph (GHRS) redundancy kit, the coprocessor for the HST main computer and MSS 2 and replace- ment of both types of RSU fuse plugs and ECU 2. The many tasks of the mission occurred remarkably close to the way that the tasks were planned. Launch of the Orbiter Endeavour occurred on December 2, 1993, at approximately 3:27 AM CST. On the first and second flight days Orbiter systems were made ready for rendezvous with and capture of the HST and for the EVAs. On the third flight day the crew performed rendezvous maneuvers, established communications with the HST, grappled the HST, and berthed it in the Orbiter payload bay, all according to plan. On the fourth flight day the first extravehicular activity (EVA) occurred, during which replacements were performed of RSU 2, RSU 3, ECU 1, ECU 2, and the RSU fuse plugs. Preparations for the next day's SA replacements also were made. Unexpected difficulty in dosing the RSU compartment doors was eventually overcome with the use of a payload retention device strap and the efforts of both EVA crewmembers. Physical distortion in one the SAs prevented its complete retraction. On the fifth flight day the distorted SA was manually jettisoned. The jettison procedure had been practiced during one of the joint integrated simulations 0ISs) before the mission, and it did not negatively affect the EVA schedule. Both SAs were successfully replaced during this second EVA. The third EVA, performed on the mission's sixth day, included the WF/PC replacement and the installation of both MSS modifications. Deterioration of one of the old MSS covers was discovered during was discovered during the EVA. l_'_tlv" s.,m,_ I During the fourth EVA on the next day, installations of the COSTAR and of the coprocessor occurred with no significant problems. Also during this EVA the crew- members removed the insulated covers of several pieces of flight support equipment. Two of these covers were modified after the EVA for use as covers to be installed on both MSSs during the fifth EVA. Early on the eighth flight day, the Orbiter was boosted to an orbit of approxi- mately 321 by 320 nautical miles. Also on the eighth day, commands to the HST were unable to move the SA primary deployment mechanisms, resulting in a decision to have the EVA crewmembers manually deploy the SA booms during that day's EVA. During this fifth and final EVA, the crewmembers performed the replacement of the SADE 1, manually deployed the SA booms, installed the GHRS redundancy kit, and installed the new covers on both MSSs. Commands sent to the HST successfully unfurled both SAs. Data problems encountered following the EVA were eventually attributed to a malfunctioning channel in one of the HST's data interface units (DIUs). When the DIU was switched to an alternate channel, it functioned properly. The HST was redeployed on flight day 9. The crew was given a day off on flight day 10. On flight day 11, the Commander and Pilot practiced Orbiter approaches and landings using the portable in-flight landing operations trainer (PILOT). During the twelfth flight day the Endeavour landed at Kennedy Space Center at approximately 11:25 PM CST on December 12, 1994. During the mission the replacement hardware was shown to be electrically functional. The new optical instruments were later demonstrated to have corrected the spherical aberration present when the telescope was placed into orbit in April 1990. These new instruments improved the telescope's optical performance to levels expected from the original design. Key to the success of the HST SM-1 was the fact that the HST had been designed and built to be maintained by astronauts during EVA. Astronauts and other EVA experts were very heavily involved in the HST design process. While budget limita- tions during the building of the HST prevented the incorporation of EVA-friendly features into every component, nearly all the components were made at least EVA- compatible, meaning that even though special tools or procedures would still have to be developed to work on the component, it is accessible and replaceable by an astronaut wearing a pressurized extravehicular mobility unit (EMU). The success of this mission came also as a result of total commitment to the mission by NASA and its contractor team. The fact that the HST was launched containing a flawed mirror, the fact that a large number of components were in need 7' 2 [ Executive Summau_lv of servicing or replacement, and the fact that not all of these components were EVA- friendly, combined to make this mission probably the most complex Shuttle mission flown to date. Multiple NASA centers and numerous contractors were involved in the design,