The Consequences of De-Stalinization in Eastern Europe

CEU eTD Collection Analysis oftheHungarianRevolutionand The ConsequencesofDe-Stalinizationin In partial fulfillment ofthe requirements forthe degree of Eastern Europe:TheComparative Supervisor: Professor Anton Pelinka Nationalism Studies Program Central European University Prague Spring Budapest, Hungary By Emir Gönel Master of Arts Submitted to Submitted 2009 CEU eTD Collection andfinally Eda to Do inwith Revolution the Tour Budapest. and editing my thesis withways patience and helped and, me withKata his Eplenyi commentsme innumerous has assisted Anton who to Pelinka my gratitude deepest Iowe this process. for and showingcritiques, me Kathrynthe historical Heffernan fortraces her comments I am alsoindebted to my classmates for discussing the Hungarian Revolution with me It is apleasureto whomadethank those this thesispossible andsupportedme through ÷ an for being with me all over this process. Acknowledgements i CEU eTD Collection On the Law of Peaceful Coexistence...... 95 CONCLUSION...... 95 6.1: Same End – Different Results: Normalization in Hungary and Czechoslovakia...... 88 SECTION ...... 88 6: NORMALIZATION 5.4: “The Rise of the Warsaw Five” in 1968...... 80 5.3: The Soviet Invasion in ...... 76 1956: Intimidation 5.1: Marxist-Leninist legacy: The Instrumental Approach to Nationalism...... 70 SECTION 5: THE INVASIONS...... 70 4.2: De-centralizing Prague Spring: “The ...... 61 Slovak Question” 4.1: The Prague Spring: Transformation in Czechoslovakia...... 49 SECTION 4: CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1968...... 49 3.2: Conceptualizing “1956”...... 36 3.1: Mutual Interaction: Poland and Hungary in 1956...... 28 SECTION 3: HUNGARY 1956...... 28 2.4: The Reform and its Limits in the Era of Novotny...... 24 2.3: The Impact of Khrushchev’s Secret Speech on Hungary ...... 19 and Czechoslovakia 2.2: Nagy on the New Course...... 17 2.1: A Soviet Experiment in Hungary: Imre Nagy...... 14 2: DE-STALINIZATION INHUNGARYANDSECTION CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1.2: Stalinization in Hungary and Czechoslovakia: Rajk-Slansky Trials...... 10 1.1: The Difference between Czechoslovak and Hungarian Communist Takeovers...... 8 HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA...... 8 TAKEOVERANDSTALINIST CONSOLIDATIONIN SECTION 1:COMMUNIST ...... 1 INTRODUCTION i Acknowledgements...... Table of Contents ii ...... 14 CEU eTD Collection momentum after Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech”. The Prague Spring, on the other hand, other the on Spring, Prague The Speech”. “Secret Khrushchev’s after momentum Ontheone decision-making process. hand,activism in arevolutionary Hungary gained Europe. in Eastern design development and indigenous against had militated interests and Soviet integrity The communist road. socialist the from idea of the deviation to fierceapproach and limited its vision of werethe reification responses Union’s Soviet Spring,because the Prague Sovietthe Union’s policies. Eastern Europe Ichose toanalyze the Hungarian Revolution and of directly and socialism international of milestones were events Both freedom. established protectintervention newly their aliencommunist and of Union to regimes resisted Sovietthe of nature their limiting and change repressive the where to tried Europe,people Eastern people had the chance to experience the slight enjoyment of freedom, they would notlet it go. unions and intellectuals broaden basis However,many in their support. divisions workers’ of political and youth would witness and where reform process accelerate to tried parties in communist factions the reform-minded the reform process Many liberalization. andlimited monitored experience relative, them to “Thaw” allowed had to be stopped. Whenconsumption, constraints and censorship onsocial,cultural and political life.Khrushchev’s spaceand onprivate limits economies, stagnant because of frustrated and dissatisfied leaderships into uncertainty andinstability. Besides, people communist under communist European Eastern regimes brought were system Stalinist the on attack Khrushchev’s Nikita supervision. strict Stalin’s Joseph mechanisms under contractual and repressive different The Hungarian Revolution hadand PragueSpring acausalparallelism with Sovietthe in examples important most the were Spring andPrague Revolution The Hungarian The Eastern European their through countries consolidated regimes communist European The Eastern INTRODUCTION 1 CEU eTD Collection policiesjustifying and its actions,on other. the The suppression Hungarianthe of Revolution its legitimize to formations national allowing while hand, one the on socialism, international “national” in a hypocritical and dual way: denyingnational allegiances and imposing in interests years the of socialism. ininternational shattering withCzechoslovakia, indigenouscoped nationalist allegiances andsurpassednational especially in and Hungary Europe, in idealeaders the Eastern “national” of Soviet treated explain how is to analysis, comparative the besides of research, intention this The secondary idea fostered allegiances and of in“national” were andindigenous challenged both countries. the how and Czechoslovakia and Hungary in circulated had symbols and images historical invasions. military during the experiences of because distinct the process in normalization the differed Even they reaction. Sovietof degree and the leadership the of role the reforms, and liberalization of context and range initiative, and society thecivil of advancement nonconformism, of reasons traditions, authoritarian or democratic formations, national parties, governing the of legitimacy the Union, Soviet the with Hungarian the between SpringRevolution and Prague such historical as thehistories, relations divergences the also but patterns, parallel and similarities of because only not interesting is events both Analyzing relations. in inter-state attitude Soviet’s the affected and processes; union; carried sequential parallelism of followed byinvasion events; and normalization of intellectual workers’ the youth activism, support formationgroups, and the dissident of in the resemblances many bore events Both analysis. of levels different through Spring andof reforms re-centralization. reversal “normalization,” Soviet-imposed with the up ended process relativecases, the liberalization both In in Doctrine.” “Brezhnev the resulted The central argument of the research is that the Soviet Union used the ideaof the Union used the Soviet is that research of the argument The central By examining similarities and differences I will also concentrate on how national and The maincompare aimof is research this to the HungarianRevolution and Prague 2 CEU eTD Collection Stalinization and rehabilitation processes. and rehabilitation Stalinization Hungary becomeandSlansky in Rudolf main would Czechoslovakia in the symbols de- execution ofactions. The leaders Stalinist due topurges, trials,purified the party imprisonment and the dissidentmethods and with Stalinist theirsimilar regimes parties consolidated communisthand, the other the On membersevolution. socialist different to Czechoslovakia and Hungary lead would party, in communist the the of legitimacy the difference, main The leadership. party. Soviet the of role the and The infamous basesparties the of power communist the political inthe atmosphere, understand differences trialsin to andHungarian andCzechoslovak order Stalinist communist consolidation takeover of Laszlo the in section thefirst Icompare Czechoslovakia. and betweenHungary comparative analyses Rajk in analysis. comparative multileveled my in points evaluation central the are Presidium Soviet the and elites party reasons of the andinterests intra-party motivations, causesof the overlappingthe andconflicting rivalries, the actors, diverse The analysis. in historical the important arecrucially realities international and ever-changing effectof the the Europe in Eastern the historical process reciprocal the reformism, on leaderships Soviet the of rationale changing the communism, of evolution the inthe crises, forces Thehistorical blocs. non-interactive historical as two represented not countriesinWestern invasions resulted Union. of Sovietthe recursive the its andtheparanoia satellitelosing countries on influencefrom of control possible the of Theobsession of communism. interpretations national against stance its unacceptable hegemony,communism unity its the and integrity and one-party sphere of and of influence, andhow the interpretationinwas bound reveals PragueSpring Union Soviet its up of The research follows a historical evolutionary path, which is steadily supported by In the thesis, the causes and effects of Hungarian Revolution and Prague Spring are resentiment and resistance and the ill-balance between masses, indigenous masses, between ill-balance the and 3 CEU eTD Collection Eastern European communist regimes. Furthermore, I base Europeancommunistregimes. my Furthermore, onHannahArendt’s Eastern analysis The crisis in Hungary affected internationalist socialism and resulted in the auto-control of the in 1968. crisis Czechoslovak and Revolution Hungarian case, Polish the between connections Revolution provides inbecause of Hungarian isthe events research, the the thecenter 1956 Hungary and on Khrushchev’sthe rationale, precautionsand actions. The conceptualization of in forces social the impact on major had it a because be overlooked, casecannot The Polish in Revolution. reactions leadershipand In the thePolish society.turn, influenced Hungary Poznan andRevolt the processin “Polishthe which October,” sparked partially Hungarian the stability. managed the formation groupsinsociety the intra-party adverse and leadershipof prevented consequences the disastrous reevaluation inPoland Czechoslovak andHungary.due to The “Secret Speech” in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, Czechoslovakia could delay its regime of the masses inHungary, the side-effects proved mobilized frustrated which “New Course,” incognita Nagy’s Consequently, from andwasremoved office. terra was leadingHungary to compensation for the crimes inhis “Newenvisaged Course” a newof party and economic the policy, purification of the past. However, rulersthe Soviet and legalityleadership of theirrealizedStalin’s was andachievements legitimacy personality directly targeting indigenous the the of established that Nagy systems. on attack the system. Thus, establish totalitarian totheir and tried cultStalin’s personality Rakosi’s replacement, Stalin. inMatyas Rakosi Antonin Novotny Hungary reformistinand Czechoslovakia hadcopied Imre Nagy, since of death the Europe intheEastern decentralization relative the impacton tremendous had a its Consequences” Cultand“On Speech Personality the Secret Khrushchev’s In thirdthe section, the in Iexamine developments inPoland of reasons 1956, the the The next section concentrates on the de-Stalinization in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. and Hungary in de-Stalinization the on concentrates section next The 4 CEU eTD Collection new identity new identity and formation foreign independentof an inpolicy would resultthe of crucifixion for a search the initiative, increasing civil Fronts, forces National and social the of resurgence a dogmatic was Nationalism understood. were “nationalism” to approaches stigmaStalinist and Marxist-Leninist and also leadershipbe cannot analyzedunless invasions ofthe Soviet in1956and 1968.Thepsyche an instrument for the Soviet Spring. Prague of the catalyst wasthe dilemma, federalization-democratization Union. The be including inIndeed,the“Slovakoverlooked Question,” “centralized” PragueSpring. the reform movements,Spring.Brown’s followingexplainI try Scott Moreover, beto path, why Slovaksthe cannot and Prague Revolution Hungarian between is of maindistinctions reform the one process decision-making and the representations, elections, andlocal parties, central on the reflection in its and Czechoslovakia ethnic the“Slovak Question,”the composition contains analysis followedpath to organize anindependent andforeign its domesticMy politics relations. because of the growing frustration not only deteriorate to started inCzechoslovakia situation the However, inprocess. reform the of the society leadershipappease anddue togradual forces and thesocial development the controlled Soviet and the Soviet Union, but Party thewhich role of TheCzechoslovakwas leadership. Communist could party the rather the party Revolution and Hungarian Prague Spring, between examine one of main differences the leadsme analysis to in comparative The process to reform Czechoslovakia. gave momentum for fight freedom. which was the in motivation, views common one converged different the but anti-totalitarian, and revolutionary counterrevolutionary, anti-Soviet, national, “1956” allelementssuchas lead carried motivation meintoconclusion.” an“open-ended and interests with diverse actors “1956.” Themultiple to approaches “Counterrevolution” Gyani’s Gabor and revolution” “National Vali’s Ferenc revolution,” “Spontaneous In the fifth section, I try to discover the reasons and motivations of the Soviet AlexanderDubcek in onthePragueSpring, which section, Iconcentrate In thefourth 5 CEU eTD Collection Union on the protection of international socialism were much This were Union international socialism of led protection on the Soviet dominant. the and principles the followed Sovietthe course, of Central apluralist Europe decision-making individual inEastand moreto leadership countries patiently although approached Soviet the that conclusion with the research the finish Finally, Iwill alot. haddiffered Czechoslovakia Kadarin in Janos Hungary andunder normalization the limitations, processes Husak Gustav and recentralization repression, of degrees different hadexperienced societies the leaders, Although had in normalization regulations prescribed Soviets the andchosenappropriate society. the Czechoslovak of resistance passive unexpected the from resulted Doctrine Brezhnev invasionthe in 1968,the inproblems legalizing “law coexistence”of peaceful in the Besides condemnation international of in socialism international Europe. Eastern Soviet-led relatively party stronger leadership. invasions The two revealed the legitimacy problematic of the communist party leaders Czechoslovakia,of Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries and between communication steady of reforms, from gradual pace the emanated Czechoslovakia invasion the of andpassive resistance, of long-lived reform differences, process main country. The the seize over close power to was activism counterrevolutionary initiative lost parties the and Both accusations. of Sovietwere the the targets parties communist Hungarian and Czechoslovak violence Both degrees of andresistance. punished bythe Union.Soviet leading role over the society. Any deviations from the “socialistthe losing been road” have were must stigmatizedparty and communist indigenous the Therefore, agents.” “imperial the of influence the and nationalism” “bourgeois to connected always and reform and democratic communistparty inthe Bloc. The ideaEastern of“national” wasusedtosuppressanyliberal Eventually, Hungary and Czechoslovakia shared the same experience, but in different but experience, same the shared Czechoslovakia and Hungary Eventually, In the final section, I compare the normalization in Hungary inCzechoslovakia. Hungary and normalization Icomparethe In thefinalsection, 6 CEU eTD Collection between between countries communist itsand sole undermined leader-status. legitimate relations of fraternaldeteriorate andmutual the theartificial atmosphere leadership to 7 CEU eTD Collection Basic Contradictions? 1 were in communists’ hands. Because of in hands. gradually conditions,improved communists were the their Becauseof communists’ appointing all the leading flow. Through information later and services security national police, administration, personnel of the police local hadover control they Thereby, ministries. and defense interior in the leading offices and army, soon all the meansnot regardedasapermanent by option So they communists.the arranged andalways occupied of coercion governments andfree the including competition,freeof possibility political were elections, established Communists the confidence, inspire To occupiers. German with collaboration or fascism ‘popular beenhad with tainted most partieswho not pre-war containing representativesall of or fronts’ out of all the as to graduallyanti-fascist cause friction amongst other parties, and finally, toeliminate the opposition. were formed, then,make to alliances with different groups or to quietly change theirstance parties. so governments after or elections the before parties ally other to with first, was, system Stalinist The existencecountries gradually. main The strategy of toachieve Soviets the the consolidation of the of coalition over their Sovietthe took doctrines, to supervisedaccording trainedelites and bySoviet inwhoapprenticeswere Moscow, firstpolitical survivors, exilesand runaways and then Europeancountries. Stalin’s Eastern liberated of newly the governments the takeover Manifesto, they wanted to become the national classes. the from advice Marx’s Fulfilling own. their as it claim to rather but nation, the destroy 1.1: TheDifference Takeovers between Czechoslovak and Hungarian Communist ANDCZECHOSLOVAKIA INHUNGARY CONSOLIDATION TAKEOVERSECTION 1: ANDSTALINIST COMMUNIST Walter A. Kemp, Immediately after liberation, the very first governments were mixed cabinets weremixed governments first very the liberation, after Immediately to not period was post-war immediate parties inthe The goal Communist the of Nationalism andCommunism inEastern Europeandthe Soviet Union: A (London:Macmillan 1999) Press Ltd., pp. 95-96. 8 1 The Communists did not immediately not did Communists The CEU eTD Collection 3 University Press, 1961), p. 6. 2 masses on to the stage as a means of pressure, though the true locus of the locuslaid of asameansto thestage decision-makingthough on masses true pressure, of mobilizing the masses. Ben indicatesFowkes that “window-dressing” hadbring theaim to the wagedabattle parties in communist powerfrom for and Czechoslovakia by Hungary below the end, the In Smallholders. the of strength the counteract to inorder Party Peasant National secured the ministry of the Interiorinfluence and in thenthe trade sought unions further and allied a increased Hungarianstrategy alliancescommunist coalition,followed of takeovers. their communists the Social Democrats with Socialists and Smallholders’ and the Party. They someleadership introduced communist takeover of methodsthe toconsolidate itsregime. among thecountry’s parties. four strongest ranked always Czechoslovakia of Party Communist The needed. not was Army Red the and start the from position in acommanding were communists the in Czechoslovakia, contrary, establish itssupport to regime.On the in Soviet the communist on Hungary relied party completely different ways. Hungary never enjoyed full political support of the masses, and the parties with andforced tounite socialists communists. other of officers the phasedout They parties. the over and pressure activities their intensified subversive work. their for salaries paid actually thus were and legislature Czechoslovak the of members press and ofafree facilities propaganda literally under the protection of they government; the had unlimited useof tremendous the Ibid.,pp. 9-10. EdwardTaborsky, On the other hand, the postwar developments in Hungary followed the general path of path general the followed in Hungary developments postwar the hand, other the On Hungarian communism Communistand Parties consolidated Czechoslovak through 3 Submitting to Soviet guidance, after the Second World War, Czechoslovak Communism1948-1960 inCzechoslovakia 2 Czechoslovak Communists were able to operate to wereable Communists Czechoslovak most of the party weresimultaneously leaders party the of most 9 (Princeton: Princeton (Princeton: CEU eTD Collection History in Documents in (ed) Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, Janos M. Rainer, January U.S.1956 Source: Army Military History Institute Pennsylvania, Carlisle Barracks 6 Studies 4 5 2000),Education Ltd., p.24 Hungarians. conscious politically of antipathy the intensified life political of aspect every of domination communist The suppression widespread andintensepassive resistance. of system multi-party the and to the report of U.S Army Trials 1.2: StalinizationinHungaryandCzechoslovakia:Rajk-Slansky Intelligence “Hungary: Resistanceimprisonment, police terror and surveillance,labor camps, executions, and trials. repression, through classes weredevastated social countries’ The warwith West. the expected Activitiesheavy and industrialization, Potentials,” Both Hungarian introducedincludingyear five and plans, policies Czechoslovak economic collectivization measures. totalitarian and policies Stalinist many in converged parties communist two the of the farms and rearmament sympathy by for USSR,augmented the of mutuality. a feeling Slavonic of the militaryand respect –ledto Nazis the hands of atthe liquidation national from people Czechoslovak for an Worldin they theinWar –the Second part inplayed of Hitler defeat the saving and the beforelong usurped communists the Tobe unlimited power. sure, theSoviets’ liberating role socialism of idea the to over won been had population the of majority The sentiment. Russian made a look coup like a inrevolution February 1948. in Czechoslovakia Front National ofthe Action Committees the Consequently, elsewhere. Study Prepared for U.S. Army Intelligence, “Hungary: Resistance Activities and Potentials,” Ben Fowkes, Vilem Precan, “Dimensions of Czechoslovakthe Crisis 1967–1970,” of , Vol. 10, 60,No. (Routledge, December 2008),p.1663 Heavy industrialization and forced agricultural in,Heavy industrialization agricultural resulted and forced according collectivization anti- harbor not did Czechoslovakia Hungary, and Poland neighboring to contrast In Eastern Europe 1945-1969:From Stalinism toStagnation (Budapest : Central (Budapest European University 2002),p.88 Press, 6 Following the economic and administrative path of Sovietization, the 10 4 The 1956HungarianRevolution: A (London: Pearson 5 Europe-Asia On the other hand, other the On CEU eTD Collection (Massachusetts: Harvard(Massachusetts: University 60 Press, 1961),p. 8 Akadémia 1986)p. Kiado, 34 7 and “satellites.” with Rakosi in uniformity vigor Eastern European participated the exemplary growingWar Coldled tensions, to Sovietthe Union’s imposition of orthodoxy greater even with his Yugoslav comrades. excluded Yugoslavia from its ranks and Rajk was known haveto entertained friendly relations Foreign Affairs onAugust1948. The 3,date is five significant: weeks Cominform the earlier when Rajk wassuddenly his of relieved duties less and given weighty post of Minister of instrumental in achieving Communist domination in Hungary.was It a surprisefor many withguiding of principle work cadres. itassumption followednaturally in thatseeking the enemy the party ranksof the was the this From branches. the to down bodies leading the from party the infiltrated fundamentally Hungarian Working People’s Party on “Cadre Policy work” assumed that the class enemy had Stalin’s purifying and directives campaigns. anti-Yugoslav TheCentral Leadership of the signalwould and de-Stalinization of limits sincerity process, rehabilitation of symbols discussion, of figures of theexecutions, Laszlo Rajk in Hungary and Rudolfleaders Slansky in Czechoslovakia would be the main indisturbance, intellectual dissidenceconducting and political factionalism. Two political trials and which would change naturethe of passive resistance and woulditinto transform public reforms. They were elements,sacrificed along with the deportations of “reactionaries.” Police and, exercised terror thepurges andshow trials party both against non-party and according Security The people”. the of “enemy of the concept Stalin’s adopted Rakosi Matyas Party, to Communist Hungarian the of Secretary General the and systematically grew rule party’s Ferenc A. Vali, Janos Berecz, 1956 The most important cases in Hungary and Czechoslovakia were the political political trials, were the Czechoslovakia cases inand important Hungary The most Laszlo Rajk, the Hungarian Communist leader, as Minister of the Interior, was Interior, of the leader, asMinister Communist Hungarian the Rajk, Laszlo Rift andRevolt in Hungary, Nationalism versus Communism Counter-Revolution in Hungary-Words andWeapons- 8 The estrangement of The of estrangementandTito Stalin in with 1948,together the 7 11 (Budapest: CEU eTD Collection University p.Press, 1976), 388 13 University p.Press, 1984), 120 12 (The American for Association the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1999),p.160 11 Mikes, 9 10 Harmstone (Bloomington: Indiana University 1984),p.91 Press, in the ensuing area-wide campaign against allegedTitoists. against campaign in area-wide ensuing the Czechoslovak policies and road to socialism. So, he condemned and liquidated hisliquidated own and hecondemned socialism.So, to road and policies Czechoslovak executionthe hisof who co-workers, helped himby preparation and implementation the impose modelSoviet on otherthe communist-ruled Gottwald states. allowed anddirected eliminate pluralityFurthermore, Stalin his wished to andto diversity within empire and socialism. to path national Czechoslovak the to discredit instrument wasan trial the process were executed. Eleven economy. socialist the of sabotage and west, the of behalf on espionage government, Prague the against high treason crimes of confessedto codefendants thirteen Slansky, and starting from 1950s. The secretary general of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Rudolf Muscovites against indigenous Communistsfollowed in wake the of Rajkthe case. of andarrests based false trials on purify charges aimed to and hegemony provide of “imperialists.” the thehelpof with inHungary capitalism restore to andattempted his murderRakosi associates, and regime, Hungarian communistthe tooverthrow with Tito May forcedconfess in 1949 and to his he course the of well-arranged trial had that conspired its prestige. willSoviet impulse destroy his and apparent thehis ownhandwork, communist to party and most to strikingly his subservience showed of KlementGottwald PresidentCzechoslovakia, twelve of the victims of Czechoslovak trials were Jewish. were trials Czechoslovak of victims the of twelve Bennett Kovrig, “Hungary,” in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Teresa Igor Lukes, “The Rudolf Slansky Affair: New Evidence,” Vali, H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovak Stalinism was also characterized by political trials and executions and trials by political characterized also was Stalinism Czechoslovak The Hungarian Revolution Rift and Rift Revolt inHungary Nationalismversus Communism 13 The trials were more than imitation of earlier trials in the Soviet Union. in Rather, earlier trials Soviet imitation the of more than Thetrials were 11 The most important difference between Slansky and Rajk trials was that was trials Rajk and Slansky between difference important most The Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution . Communism inEastern Europe, Communism inEastern Europe (London : Andre Deutsch Limited, 1957), p. 44 12 9 Slavic Review Laszlo Rajk was arrested asain was arrested Laszlo Rajk 12 , (Princeton: Princeton , (Princeton: (Bloomington: Indiana ed. Teresa Rakowska- ed.Teresa According Skilling, to the , p.61. See also George , Vol. 58, No. 1 10 A storm CEU eTD Collection 16 15 1061, asquoted in Skilling,ibid. 389 14 advisers in October 1949, and to the search for “a for Rajk.” Czechoslovak search 1949,andtothe advisers inOctober names had come upin trialthe Laszloof Rajk. Thisin led totheintroduction turn of Soviet ledfrom againstcertain whose directCzechs and for Slovaks pressure factRakosi action to The trials inHungary people’sand other democracies served as a model and awarning, andin emphasized: Commission, Piller for the of research in charge been had placed who Kaplan, Karel hand, other the On creation. centralism. under Prague wassubordinated Slovakia With of trials, influence the Slovak Uprising. danger.” “nationalist of forms the Soviet leaders considered bourgeois nationalism to be the Slovak parallel of Titoism and other movement. Gustav thatthe against Zionism worldHusak commented bycommunist the Slovak nationalists and Jews. The latter was related in some degree to the rise of the campaign ethno-religious dimension of the trials in Czechoslovakia. The party started campaigns against Skilling,388. p. See Kaplan, Ibid. Kaplan connected events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia as ofsuppression. events in waves Kaplan and Czechoslovakia Hungary connected labor camps and forcednon-communists. of of trials establishment the tradesmen, farmers and against measures including severe home, harsher at policies adopted the adoption of more militant policies. The Communist Party unity, and of theCzechoslovakia absolute demandfor vigilance,” “caution and appealfor the led and to world communist inthe tension of anatmosphere created conditions the that indicated worldcamps, into two and the expulsion Yugoslavia from of bloc.the Kaplan As in the Rajk affair, the trial was produced by the “Cold War,” the division of the Nova mysl , no. 6 (1968), pp. , no. 786-90; no. 7(1968), pp.925-33; no. 8 (1968), p. 16 Therefore, it was necessary eliminateto leaders behind the 13 15 He also stresses the stresses Healso 14 CEU eTD Collection Publications, Ltd, 1998),Publications, p. Ltd, 175 Reassessments and New Findings,” 18 17 Imrerelinquish of hisNagy butretain the to to prime responsibilities the ministerial duties Kremlin Rakosi society. The ordered inHungarian ofhisposition taking dominant advantage to countless “mistakes and crimes.” and “mistakes countless to indisposed because of “high-handedRakosi’s and domineering style” in which hadoffice, led felt they that Rakosi told Beria Lavrentii and Malenkov Georgii by led authorities, Soviet sensitive. and cautious “collective leadership” made Soviet the Stalin’s death Czechoslovakia and The tensions due strikesto in and demonstrations Hungary,Berlin Uprising,the Pilsen in riots indicates: Kovrig of Soviet trade toward the bloc. Bennett Hungarian reorientation forced the and economy command new the of application anddogmatic inefficiencies trials and executions, the communist regime had been experiencing difficulties becausestrengthened of the this illusionary unity of the regime. In addition to the frustration of police and parties and of was compulsory non-existence opposition participation the ritualistic terror, 2.1: ASoviet Experiment in ImreNagy Hungary: CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY IN DE-STALINIZATION 2: SECTION Mark Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Kovrig, p. 92 Less than five weeks later after the elections, Rakosi was called to Moscow. The Moscow. to was called after theRakosi elections, later fiveLess than weeks leading declining to productivity. campaign and increasingly heavy levies farmerson only the alienated peasantry, brutal collectivization The country-side. the to “class enemies” of deportation by the wasalleviated shortage housing critical already the tourban areas,where new workers amassive brought influx of industrialization consequences: disastrous Forced created The intensive heavy of development industry the and collectivization of agriculture The homogeneity in was and participation an illusion, political because Hungary Journal ofContemporary History 18 Rakosi was accused of abusing socialist legacy by Rakosi abusing socialist accusedof was 17 14 , Vol. 33, No. 2 (Sage CEU eTD Collection 21 20 19 investments were redirected to light and consumer industries. lightand consumer to wereredirected investments and bynearly 40 percent fell membership farm collective Therefore, farms. of collectivization of standardthe ofliving.deterioration condemned the Five Plansprevious leadership blamedYear and for former the explicitly economic policy, purification and society hisafter prime appointment to ministry. “New His Course” envisagednew a of the party and compensation for the crimes of the past. He specified: Hungarian Communist factionalism in adual leadership, accelerated decision created Soviet The Party Secretary. Party and would ultimately damage the authority of the party. Vali neglect the opportunities to attack Nagy indicated followed acautious approach.Molnar toattack opportunities neglectthe and not hedid However, “NewCourse.” position onNagy’s heldamoderate beginning, Rakosi pluralism inand relaxation had society been annoying Rakosiand hiscolleagues. In the figures in the party. Most communist political prisoners, including Kadar, were released. criticized administrative purges,unlawful methods the andmeasures violent of currentthe and conformists, or dissidents former society, intellectual all for up stood he Secondly, weresetfree was enterprise again allowed scale. asmall on and andprivate deportees internees reappearedanew; market, from the which haddisappeared improved; many goods George Mikes, George Kovrig p.92 Vali p. 159 First of First of all, heslowed downthe heavyexpansion of industry andthe gradually stopped A veteranCommunist Hungarian momentum andMuscovite,Nagy gave politics to Nagy’s attacks on party officers, their actions and bureaucratic excesses, the limited the excesses, bureaucratic and actions their on party officers, attacks Nagy’s praised butand encouraged never given meansof the enforcing his program. consequencesfor Hungary: Rakosi neverwas blamed,the and but dropped Imre Nagywas determined Presidium Soviet the within equilibrium The Presidium. Soviet the in reprimandthe his of Rakosi without liquidation – signified existing the rivalry existing Nagy, of –thesupport Hungarian leaders conflicttwo between The Moscow-tolerated The Hungarian Revolution , (London: Andre Limited,p. 60 Deutsch 1957), 15 20 The standard of Theliving standard of 19 21 CEU eTD Collection 25 24 23 (London:Ford GeorgeAllen & Unwin1971), Ltd, p. 32 22 Furthermore, such asRakosi and Gero. oflong-standing Stalinists was composed Secretariat and Central the Politburo The Nagy’sinitiatives. to hostile remained which committee, central from party’s the its orders received officials, of network party by a duplicated administration, ministers, the prefects, the directors of state enterprises and the police. the and enterprises state of directors the prefects, the ministers, the mechanism administration, have of his the disposal at needto Nagy’s emphasized your enemies. destroy master: the of command remember basic one failed to Nagy outthat Mikespointed infrom party.finally expelledthe George Parliamentseatand was chargeddeviation”“right-wing with opportunist by press andthe his adversaries. be hisimpeachment Nagy of membership and then in Politburo. to deprivation the the came in firstthe resulted andliberalization Front cultural of Popular revitalization the the on efforts Nagy’s leadership, Khrushchev under transformation the to addition In society. in forces “detrimental” realign to inwith seemed theleadershipHungary because uncomfortable, the opposition of the party apparatus, which was completely outside Nagy’s control. encourage to faras as blockgoing them,to theycontinued insecret, innovations. Yet Nagy’s in that his pretended tobe Rakosi and inpublic, supporters favor conciliatory even of or renewed emphasis to the “leading role” of their communist parties. communist their of “leading role” the to emphasis renewed victory by proddinghalt Eastern the European countries to their NewCourses andgive to Union regainto itsin status pre-dominant Soviet politics. Khrushchev sought toreinforce his gradually eclipsed PrimeMalenkov,enablingthe Minister Communist Party of Soviet the Molnar p. 41 Mikes p. 59 Kramer, p.175 Miklos Molnar, Budapest 1956: Soon, Nagy was forced to resign from the Presidency of the Popular Front, gave up his The First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev, had Khrushchev, Union, Soviet the of Party Communist the of Secretary First The A Historyofthe Hungarian Revolution 16 25 , trans. Jennetta 23 However, the state the However, Khrushchev was Khrushchev 22 24 Molnar CEU eTD Collection 27 26 crisis. system. Thesystem could notbelegitimated and this incongruence would eventually provoke mainthat problem incongruencebetweenwas the political culture andthe the political out points Kemp principles. Marxist-Leninist well-established on states communist between his argument was a callStalinists. loyal security forces stayed to state the whole control, for restoration take not could Nagy since and party tothe subordinate always force was police political the of socialist values. He wanted to base relations chauvinist. According to Hugh Seton-Watson, Nagy stressed that he had always favored, and favored, hehad always that Nagy stressed HughSeton-Watson, to According chauvinist. a or he wasanationalist that denied Headamantly NewCourse.” of the Defense “In “thesis” politician justify and to “Newhis by Course” writing hisideas and inconceptualizations his realm. Nagy tried ridto himself of the charges against him,such as being a right-wing deviant massesbecame frustrated symbol the andreform-mindedpeople. of inflexible provided in from stance himsupport sectors different society. Hungarian he Thus, becausehe knewif he weretoresign, his popularity decline. Hiswould and determined self-criticism. and errors his of wanted to force Nagy to enter his resignation, even wishing to press him intoa full recantation and situation problematic the awareof was Vali, Rakosi to According Nagy’s dismissal. 2.2: Nagyon the New Course He had toeliminate oppositionthe and strengthen his tomaneuver cadres freely. Vali, p.163 Kemp,141-143 pp. 26 According to Kemp,According to Nagy was not advocating from adeparture communism.Rather, After his expulsion, he continued his passive resistance in the intellectual and political and intellectual in the resistance passive his continued he expulsion, his After after questionable more became Party Communist Hungarian the of legitimacy The Nagy could not establish his “New Course” permanently in the authoritarian system. authoritarian in the permanently Course” “New his establish not could Nagy 27 However, Nagy preferred to be discharged from from office, be discharged to preferred Nagy However, 17 CEU eTD Collection 30 29 by foreword 28 equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. In “In Defense of the New Course” he Course” New “In Defensethe of coexistence.In benefit, peaceful andmutual and equality sovereignty,mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in each internal other’s affairs, in forChina eachother’s integrity 1954.Nagywasdemandingmutual respect territorial and Panch Sheel conceptof the ideas by hisparaphrasing Hestrengthened identicalfashion.” in acompletely there arrive not will they but socialism at arrive eventually will nations “all statement Lenin’s countries. various the of characteristics and particular the of work disregard andtheoretical pioneering courageous cripplingof Leninism based on cultthe of individual,the inescapably which broughtaboutdogmatism, the tenets and Nagy points out his allegiance to his nation by emphasizing Hungary. MarxistLeninist and to true his indicates patriots devotion socialist Here, popular statement. national political culture. Defininghimself as Hungarian was socialist patriot apolitical and However, socialist patriotism was not local and innate and could not represent the signifying ideathe of socialist patriotism, which not allowwould any national indigenousor deviations. community. national of a particular interests the therefore, to meansdevotion nationalism whereas state, Patriotism, of a particular interests the to means devotion homeland. ancestral one’s motherland, the patria, territory, historical or existing well-defined fairly a to allegiance as patriotism describes Kemp Walter communism. his own country and his Hungarian patriotism. Hungary and her territorialbetween and Union, Soviet the neighbors. and Hungary between friendship for, pleaded actively At the same time he proudly asserted his devotion to Praeger, p.5 Praeger, Kemp p. 7 Frederick A.Praeger, Nagy blamed Stalin’s, and also Rakosi’s, monopolization of explaining Marxism- explaining of monopolization Rakosi’s, also and Stalin’s, blamed Nagy In my patriotismopinion, wasalways a vagueandproblematic, in tamed jargon , or Five Principles, which was declared by India and the People’s Republic of Hugh (NewYork,Inc.Seton-Watson p. 1957), xxii Imre NagyOn Communism: InDefense of the New Course, 30 Nagy aimed to justify his statements by quoting by statements his justify to aimed Nagy 18 28 29 Therefore, communist regimes promoted with a CEU eTD Collection 31 andCultPersonality Consequences:” its inUnion 1956,he condemned Stalin’s “cultpersonality” of inhissecret speech“On the SovietParty of the Communist CongressAt of the Twentieth the theleader. emerged as had Khrushchev 1955, by which, from Khrushchev, N. and Malenkov G. Molotov, V. 2.3: TheImpact of SecretSpeech on Khrushchev’s Hungary and Czechoslovakia society. for the hope and momentum movement the gave it but Revolution, Hungarian of reasons sole the not ideas were “unorthodox” His highrisky. were such arguments country” “satellite of a context in the However, politics. and economy in arrangements and agreements mutual in footing was It independence obvious thathe from leastwas of domination Soviet at thinking equal or sphere of sphere of influence and meaning the Nagy Warsaw of Pact. stated: with inconflictSoviet’s andneutrality, was further coexistence active which demanded sovereignty, national of His description principles. five the to limited not were demands national unity, of basic requirements were andsovereignty independence National sovereignty. national creation by respecting national policies lead independent wouldalso states between noninterference of national loyalty and mutual coexistence that the he indicated Then, cooperation. and close understanding and legitimacymutual camp would socialist dueto fivestrengthen the expressed thatthese principles of the party. Actually, Nagy’s Ibid., p. 33 Stalin’s in death 1953 gave way toapower struggle in Kremlinthe between L. Beria, neighboring Yugoslavia, which stands on the principle of active co-existence. active of principle the on stands which Yugoslavia, neighboring neutral Austria, and building countries socialism,among them Sovietthe Union, and its by made states, neighboring its Hungary easierfor location through geographical policies groups, of power the through neutrality oractive coexistence. is This path a different system,a coordinated foreign through policy andcooperation through the against having countries other those with countries similar or socialist democratic of progressive coexistence is active the seemingly, plan, The most practicable 19 31 CEU eTD Collection Routledge,ix 2008) p. 33 1949-1961 Conferences, 32 Eastern European European leaderships. Eastern indications of what any nor policy directives, promotions byany clear neither accompanied the speechwas because beginning or demotionsamongleaders communist and theirmembers, andfile rank who wereconfused in the the Soviet leadershiparise to started first of speech the Theside-effects in Czechoslovakia. immediately not but might desire among the with the communist states. Stalinization process de- started regime, and oppressive reversetheabsolutist to Hedecided changes. doctrinal and wanted to reform Thus,of uncertainty, suspicion Khrushchev aseries initiated and distrust. of strategic and whole system in SovietStalin’s decisions. His decisions onpurges, deportations and executions resulted in a situation Union and its relations every collective leadership andsingle aggressively attacked person, whohaddisagreed non-communist citizen astheenemy of people.the violated party Stalinnorms of the and communist every identify could which people,” the of “enemy notion the of introduction suppressivehis due policies and infallibleto cult. Anothercharacter faultwas Stalin’s communistindividuals. Therefore, he supposed that he had the right to take all the actions and Stalinstated that forestalled the doctrines of Marxism and Leninism, party and the apparatus Khrushchev states. communist in Union other the and all Soviet inthe people and alienated in whichtraumatized resulted andhis “GreatPurges,” Khrushchev the accused Stalin actions Terry Cox, ed., Thomas P. Whitney, ed., Khrushchev’s Secret Speech in 1956 had an impact on Polish and Hungarian politics, Hungarian Polish impacton and hadan in 1956 Speech Secret Khrushchev’s revolutionary legality. revolutionary democracy,Party of of principles, of exceedingly Party perversions grave serious and of of a whole series thesource stage certain specific ata which became cult the grew, cultgradually howthe Stalin with –[weareconcerned] in andnow future the Party for the importance has which immense we areconcerneda question with present At Challenging Communism in Eastern Europe:1956and its Legacy (New York: The University of Michigan Press, 1963) p. 207 Khrushchev Speeches, Speaks: Selected Articles, andPress 32 33 Rakosi andhad evaluated Novotny speechthe and tasks 20 (London: CEU eTD Collection 35 34 become fully apparent in Czechoslovakia. This coincided with Khrushchev’s second attack on secondattack Khrushchev’s in This with coincided apparentCzechoslovakia. become fully stability. prevented theformation in managedof society adverse groups maintain and theintra-party to Stalinism meantwould have hisownactions. Thus, denouncing theCzechoslovak leadership denouncing any was awarethat introduce AntoninNovotny Moreover, didnot reforms. pressure for reform in Czechoslovakia. So, the Czechoslovak regime kept tight control and social in andenvironment todeteriorate and Hungary Poland continued there wasless public strong ebb flowsand like Hungary with did Nagy.Imre thepolitical Besides, atmosphere and experience not did leadership party the inthan and Hungary werebetter living standards Vali concluded: country. leadingthe wasstill theStalin” “Hungarian because Hungary, forlegality in leadership intra-party strengthening and Socialist were illusionary democracy proletarian Party” –thus quoting Mikoyan. a for affair elementary is an leadership collective of principle “the that and Marxism” to expressedRakosi that nodisplayedinhibition in declaring that the “cult of ispersonality alien onMarch totheHungarianVali submitted his Central andCommittee 13,1956. report 12 moreRakosi had actions and Novotnyin totake than revisions 1956. Heimmediately Czechoslovakia. and in Hungary atmosphere social and political economic, distinct the to due differently Ibid.,p. 217 Vali, p.216 Only in the early 1960s did problems with the centrally economic system planned didproblems the Only in early with 1960s the The insituation Czechoslovakia in1956wasslightly The economydifferent. and had had beenfirmly secured. Security Police “control” the over that ceased, or illegalities that established, firmly been had democracy party internal that anyone supremein party the over and government could Hungary. Rakosi convince Nor was harder tofind peoplebelieve to it –atleast so long as the Hungarian dictator ruled It was easy for Rakosi to say that “collective leadership” existed in Hungary, but it cult, Stalin’s personality to closer stood andactions character Rakosi’s Although 34 The efforts in the implementation of collective of implementation in the efforts The 21 35 CEU eTD Collection Czech and Slovak History,” 36 his owed in who Ostrava secretary party a regional Kolder, of direction Drahomir under the trials, show political associated other and trial Slansky the into inquiry of commission new needed loyalty the reform-mindedof memberswithinhis own HesetCentral Committee. upa responsibility during hiseightyears in power. associate himself verbally with current inand andmaycrises tothose comparable Warsaw have theirBudapest threatened position. Soviet policy easily mightproduced in Prague an of de-Stalinization acceleration factthat of the were aware and to ward off criticismNovotny to acceptof his his own errorsforin made harder hands leader the even one of of power concentration butthe Stalinization, and crimes of the past. implementof de- process him the to Party. Khrushchev ordered Czechoslovak Communist Furthermore, Novotny of the Secretary his asthe First protecting position byfirst of andCzechoslovakia President his officers Vol. 60, No.Vol. 10 60, (Routledge, Dec2008),p. 1720 38 37 1648 was removed andGottwald’s embalmed body would beburied. monumentof way:ThePrague in Stalin inStalinization asuperficial Praguebut continued of the Slansky group had been the personalitythe cultand justified his regime byconfirming Gottwald’s actions: The liquidation first step in the elimination of themainsource as Gottwald targeting by from leadership. Heclearedhimself rupture old of Stalinist methods. The de-culthad continued inhishowever, administration, he hisrepresented policiesand actions as a 1961. October Stalinism at the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Laura Cashman, “Remembering 1948and 1968:Reflections onTwoPivotal in Years Mary Heimann,“The Scheming Apparatchik of the Prague Spring,” Skilling,39 p. be feltleadership approved Soviet needthe In 1963,Novotny bythe and current to to was designed acleverline which de-Stalinization, symbolic of Novotny adopted 36 Contrary to Khrushchev’s expectations, Antonin Novotny became the became Novotny Antonin expectations, Khrushchev’s to Contrary Europe-Asia Studies Europe-Asia 22 37 , Vol. 60, No., Vol.10 60, (Routledge, Dec2008)p. While he was admitting that the personality the that he While wasadmitting 38 Europe-Asia Studies Europe-Asia , CEU eTD Collection 41 40 39 process. rehabilitation trials. commission, known as the Barnabitky Commission,reopen to the files on the Slovak political Gottwald thathe appointments couldnolonger afford tosave,call and to for anew “Slovak bourgeois nationalist” trials.had Novotny nochoice, sacked threeremaining mouthpiece of the Communist Party of Slovakia began to press for a reinvestigation of the in the Czech-speakinggobeyond Slovak Writers, wassuddenlyallowed then to censorship the boundsof permitted regions of the country. In no time, even leaders. Czechoslovak the on pressure for direct Rakosi and officers, security blamed leadership. entirethe methods hispolitical Thereport and Stalin doctrines,Beria’s for responsibility for the trials and the breach of “socialistlegality” was placed on Gottwald and stigmatized the victims as“the enemy peoples” the of and political triggered the lynching. conspiracy,” “thehadfabricated anti-state techniques.“confession” The state use of Stalin’s Presidium that the Slansky trial and the other show trials of the 1950s were constructed by the Novotny’s patronage. position to bourgeois nationalists.” bourgeois “Slovak of of so-called showtrials inthe matter which moreSlovak the cautious was forum bitter denunciation of the Stalinist past and the slowness of changes in policy. andwriters journalists inApril dominated by and May 1963 were and theme this provided a of congresses The victims. of the rehabilitation and of reforms implementation systematic and for acomplete pressuring which was public, general the to wasrevealed nonethis of Mary Heimann,1724 p. Skilling,48 p. Ibid.,p. 1722 41 Dubcek’s attachment to the Slovak Party had safeguarded the continuity of the Skilling indicated that apart from Slansky and some of his fellow victims, the victims, fellow his of some and Slansky from apart that indicated Skilling A Slovak,prominent Alexander Dubcekwas a member of Kolderthe Commission, Kulturny zivot 39 In February 1963, the Kolder Commission reported tothe Kolder the reported Commission 1963, InFebruary , the weekly journal journal weekly , the of Union Party-approved the of 23 Pravda , the official the , 40 Meanwhile CEU eTD Collection 32, No.3(Springer Page,Oct., 1986),p. 197 43 42 of criticism muffled a youth, the of apathy political the intellectuals, the of dissent open Czechoslovakia lacked legitimacy. Czechoslovakia Due toalackParty between and of Communist promise of compatibility reality, the tendencies. centralist model and Soviet the of failure the of because was crippled economy 2.4: TheReform and its Limits in theof Novotny Era anything. whoinvestigators were involved andresponsible for the trials of fiftiesthe were chargedby Neither politicians top norlower administrative such workers as judges, security forces and beenhad not publicly absolved of charges of inserious crimes compensated or any way. hundred of leadingthe victims by party had been exonerated name, andthousands of other treated as guilty of serious failings and were not readmitted to the party. Moreover, only a few still were others and Slansky cases. all in rehabilitation political with coupled exoneration concerning illegal methods or the analysis of responsibility was revealed. Nor was the judicial leadership continued to cover up the truth about the trials. None of the report’s conclusions because the limited, was commission the success of the of inMay 1963. However, Slovakia elevating personality and his promotion becometo the First Secretary of the Communist Party centralist and historical discrimination. Thesecond consequence Alexander Dubcek’swas was mobilized and had displayed their will to administer justice and fight against Prague’s Manfred Spieker, “Crisesin sinceEastern Europe 1956,” Skilling,49 p. The situation got worse for Novotny worse forThe Novotny situation the “cosmeticafter got in changes” the regime. The importantThe rehabilitationconsequences: hadtwo process Slovak First,the public 43 Slow paced rehabilitation, growing Slovak discontent, Slovak growing rehabilitation, paced Slow 24 Studies in Soviet Thought, Vol. 42 CEU eTD Collection 47 CEU PressPrague, 1998) Navratil, PragueSpring The 1968:A National ArchiveSecurity Reader Documents (Prague: Follow-up Resolution by CPCz CC the Plenum, September 1967”, asquotedin (ed) Jaromir of bottom the by at police brutally dispersed were andthey nature, political increasingly close to Prague Castle, where the Central Committee was in session, their chants acquired an 46 Reader 45 44 in students took streets to the proteston 31 Octobera spontaneous 1967. hundred Afterwards, several police.harshly by Czechoslovak dormitory, was the suppressed and had situation the birth measuresgave to mass deteriorated actions. oppressive the de-Stalinization, with starting Europe, in Eastern As in cases views. all stripped of journal,its strippedweekly of Union Writers’ was the Furthermore, disciplinary action. to andsubjected reprimanded people.” of interests our national even and socialism, state, the to contrary directly run that views of presentation “for the Hendrych, Jiri Party, Communist Czechoslovak the of Secretary by the condemned “enemy of the peoples” by reporting the rise of the “anti-socialist” activities. The writers were of concept reinstall the and to tried hiscontrol moved tighten for theway to reformers, opened foundations of the system. the of sapping the to contributed students among tendencies resistive and policy foreign Precan, p. 1664 Precan, See “Proceedings of of 4 the See“Proceedings Jaromir Navratil, ed., Skilling,46 p. (Prague: CEU Press, 1998), p. 5 The student demonstration, which was about the ill conditions in the Strahov the in conditions ill the about was which demonstration, student The Novotny, instead of reconciliation, that wouldinstead of Novotny, have that reconciliation, tensions and the cooleddown very nation.” of for the their “responsibility existence their called Kundera Milan writer the what in convictions their regain to determination their as well as – allowamending speech of freedom to lawof to press the the role inthe Middle East issues – from attitudes rangingon independentexpressed Prague’s theirsovereign and 1967, they 27-29, Prague from Congressin Fourth June Atthe Czechoslovak people. the of history and traditions the to corresponding sphere, culture civilized the to a return – context” “European a for been calling had writers Czechoslovak The Prague Spring1968 A NationalSecurity ArchiveDocuments 46 44 Several writers were expelled from the Party, while others were th Czechoslovak Writers’ Congress, June 27-29, 1967, and a Literarni noviny Literarni 25 , the tribune of social criticism and revisionist and criticism social of tribune the , 47 After marching After 45 CEU eTD Collection 49 Press, 1997)p.56 48 every aspect almost over leadership exercised Committee Central centralized the that control Czechoslovak Communist Party deepento intra-party democracy, and readdress the top-down on the called Dubcekalso management. and leadership in especially central separated, must becarefully Novotny government andby statingtasks the thethat during party Plenum his legitimacy. question to started in party the officers the of discontent triggered process rehabilitation the in initiative half-hearted His cohesion. intra-party secure to inorder party in the reformists the toappease Slovak political society. andeconomicHeonly demandsof Czechand the wanted cultural,social, thegrowing with continue inaccordance not reforms Hecouldprocess. army. independentthe organizations wereandintodisbanded weredrafted the student expellees Novotny moreeven paranoid, and so he expelled many leaders,university student while many another march The if inquiry proved growing unsatisfactory. malaisein the society made the stage to andtheythreatened policefor the terror was responsible who into investigation and evenirritated leaders Student outraged students. conformist the demanded an outside their hostels, prompting another police assault. resumed protest their students retreating Several and injured badly were Neruda Street. Navratil, p. 6 Williams, Kieran Alexander Dubcek, the first secretary of the Slovak Communist Party, angered Party, Communist Slovak ofthe secretary first the Dubcek, Alexander Militia. People’s the supreme commander of a kind of private army commanderof forces of armed and republic,supreme the secretary,the of president the Czechoslovak Communist Party, was directed above all against Novotny, and against his concentration of power as first Committee Plenum held from October 30-31, 1967. The criticism raised at the Plenum itself aCentral at manifested party cohesion of the of treasured the The fragmentation rehabilitation of and reform the start since the deteriorating hadbeen image Novotny’s The Prague Spring anditsAftermath, 49 26 48 The intense reaction of hadof police reaction Theintense the (Cambridge: Cambridge University CEU eTD Collection 1967 File for A. Novotny; & Vondrova Navratil,vol. 1” 51 Archive DocumentsReader 1967” in 30-31, October Jaromir(ed) Navratil, 50 Czechoslovak crisis Czechoslovak 52 Spring 1968:ANational SecurityArchiveDocuments Reader highest party ranks. Sovietsupport Novotny unwillingness to gave momentum forcesto thereformist inside the Maud According Bracke,theprocess. to part inthat not take hedomestically that would and behave solved to in would problem the that Czechoslovakia andindicated December 9,1967 life. of Czechoslovak that Novotny that unpopular. was widely straighthours, he almostspoke to all of members the Presidiumthe individually learnedand ofeighteen a period Over diplomatically. acted Brezhnev case. bethe proved to not But that hoped thatBrezhnev’s visit, and presumed wouldendorsement, help him power. reconsolidate Novotny Clearly, December. in early Prague to visit unofficial a brief, for Brezhnev invited informing hisparty Withoutundermine hiscolleagues, Novotny any chance opponents. to of unrestin society had also spread into the ranks of the party. the that showed Plenum October The interests. local his by motivated falsely was Dubcek in According hard-liners to the “bourgeois nationalism.”Prague, Dubcek of advocating “Remarks by Leonid Brezhnev at aMeeting of Top CPCzOfficials,in Prague, December 9, Plenum, Committee Central the at Novotny Antonin and Dubcek, Alexander by “Speeches MaudBracke, Like Matyas Rakosi, Novotny sought the support of the Soviet leadership as his last leadership as support Soviet the of sought the Novotny Like Rakosi, Matyas Which Socialism,Whose Détente? West European Communism andthe 52 1968 50 Again, the Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party accused Party Communist Czechoslovak the of Secretary the Again, (Budapest: Central (Budapest: European University p. 136 2007) Press, , 1998p.13 51 In the end, he attended a Presidium meeting on 27 The Prague Spring 1968:ANationalSecurity in (ed) Jaromir Navratil, Jaromir in (ed) , 1998 ,p.18, The Prague CEU eTD Collection Evidence,” 53 mass seizedweapons so, prisoners,freedjail, the the worker city and the attacked arrested haddelegation been arrested. this that andwerealsoincrease, spreading from rumors wage about the answer authorities the including a 20 percentwage increase. By 28 June the haddelegation received not still an economicmeet demands, to persuade authorities Warsaw central the to to send adelegation met to decided locomotiveplant and of Works Stalin Poznan the June workers Saturday 23 conditions of the workers of inthe Communist Party. Poland’s fourthMoscow and another Stalinist Edward Ochab took over Bierut’s position of the First Secretary largest during in attack had Congress theTwentieth died of a heart BoleslawBierut leadership. the city, Poznan,experiencing, on the one hand, the impact of de-Stalinization;were on the other hand, the change of deteriorating.division Polishexisted between Muscovites indigenous communists.and Poland was On of of Hungariansthe theninfluenced thePolish leadership andpopulation. reactions and those inHungary reactions sparked and“Polish October” as thePoznan Revolt mutuallya self-perpetuating, cycle in reinforcing actionsof reactions. and Events Poland such reaction, off a chain eventsinset the in1956 Poland means unidirectional. Instead, was byno Revolution. The in process 1956, especially by triggered Twentieth the Party Congress, Soviet 3.1: MutualInteraction:PolandandHungaryin1956 SECTION 3:HUNGARY1956 54 Johanna“Hungarian Granville, and Reactions Polish tothe Events of 1956: New Archival Ibid.,1053 The Poznan riots arose from national and international political disorder. The The political atmosphere in Poland has a special place in evaluating Hungarian evaluating in place special a has in Poland atmosphere political The Europe-Asia Studies Europe-Asia 54 Eventually, the workers assumed that the delegation had been had delegation the that assumed workers the Eventually, , Vol. 53, No. 7 (Taylor & Francis, Ltd., Nov., 2001), p.1051 28 53 As in Hungary, a CEU eTD Collection 58 57 56 55 their own. handle on theevents leaders to Soviet convinced Poles. delegation,including Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Molotov, andKaganovich, coulddeter not the Soviet the visitof and unscheduled the military intervention even Soviet of threat that the capital. the around defensive positions up taking by responded Gomulka to loyal troops Polish leadership. Polish the intimidate to undoubtedly was purpose their Poland, western and northern in Stationed Warsaw. toward advanceits troops to leadership ordered on 19 October leaders. Soviet The by Soviet the 19. on October Secretary First as Gomulka brought backed Army Corps bythe Security leadershipand theInternal majority the Polishthe of Consequently, events. Poznan the after power to restoration Gomulka’s toward sympathetic society in Theof changes. economic grew leadership policy was need Polish gradually Polish because Revolt, Poznan the after increased leadershipposition a top to admittance officials andexposedeconomic failures.Demandsfor reformistWladyslaw Gomulka's re- government riots. largeinto anti- escalated Polish citiesand had other spread over fire. open The demonstration manyOffice of building District to because haddiedof the Security, where people order the and the station radio attacked the workers when the accelerated The anarchy guards. from the Kemp,145 p. Vali, p.263 Granville,1053 p. Vali,262-263 pp. 57 for three years.arrest for three house under been had who Poland, of Primate the Wyszynski, Stefan Cardinal figures with the communistmarginalized regime, made peace reconciled He with the Catholic masses. the Church to and released concessions several made immediately he he Ochab, When replaced of his official policy. national the part culture make to attempt pressurewith a genuine public Gomulkathe The Polish cooled leader The Ochab regime dealt with the riots, but had to dismiss several senior Stalinist After intense debates, the responsible and collective action of Polish leadership Polish of action collective and responsible the debates, intense After 58 56 The decision by done Thedecision wassodetermined authorities 29 55 Gomulka’s takeover was not approved wasnot takeover Gomulka’s CEU eTD Collection Communism in anditsEastern Europe/1956 Legacy Routledge 2008),p. (London: 82 Selection of Documents (New York, 1956)” as quoted in ed. Terry Cox Challenging 60 59 was not only non-Stalinist, but even non-Leninist, and much like Tito’s. like much and non-Leninist, even but non-Stalinist, only not was as defined in terms of building Communism, in which ledturn him adopta to position which led“New Course” orviolatedhis himtorejecting thatrestricted anything country’s interests was in eased society. Polish terror Security, Public Spychalski. With the andGeneral Polish-born Konstantin Rokossowski himby replaced Polethe Marian withdrawal of Soviet Soviet the feelings, soheremoved anti-Soviet soothe Gomulka needed to Furthermore, troops and the dissolution of the Committee for stratifications. social intellectualsfrom diverse andattract Writers’ the Union surpass which would intellectuals. Paul Zinner emphasizes its potential as significance an organ of opposition, Communist younger like-minded of group informal small a than more no first was which studentsworkers, andintellectuals were fiercely supporting the in developments Poland. new successes. to Democracy the basis of Marxism-Leninism and in the spirit of the forceshelp on which, development of those attrouble-making unfettered to attempts and the Twentieth Congress, lead the People’s everywarning to andHungarian calledworker honest forevery firmly patriot oppose to the Hungarian hand, one the On a paradox: experiencing were in Hungary people in Poland, developments Communist Party resolution declared that the Poznan provocation to be a “Central Committee Statement, 30 June 1956. National Communism and Popular Revolt: A Ibid.,p. 146 Gomulka did not want to deviate from the Soviet principles. On Nagy’s contrary, the On principles. want from Soviet the todeviate not Gomulka did war period, the people's colleges and veteran fighters movement veteran fighters workers people'swhoof the war period, colleges the and together formermembers of university students' from organization immediatethe post- acrowd of brought debate on June people.the reunions The 6,000 27attracted instance, For June 27. March17and between thirteen and reunions sponsored debates Circle Petofi The for reforms. pressure the accelerated force and It became an active Circle, Petofi the was force intellectual and dissident Hungarian of embodiment The 60 On the other hand, many reformist, non-communist politician, 30 59 Simultaneous to the CEU eTD Collection 64 63 Poland,” in Intervention Military 62 pp.22-23 System,” 61 reformer had Gomulka,Erno Gero, Rakosi promoted alike-mindedhard-liner. In July 1956, Rakosi was forced to retire. In contrast to Ochab in Poland, who assisted the Hungarian society: beginning. the The formationin Soviet Presidium Circle asadangerous considered Petofi the in had their diverged the which approach However, urgentattention. factor, deserved Party. Communist Hungarian the of Committee Central the center, political sole the challenging was which leading center, as asecond circle intellectual described the hand,Gero On other the reformer to lead Hungary and the Party, although the Hungarian people wanted to see Nagy to wanted as people Hungarian the Party, although lead the and Hungary to reformer frustrated masses andmaintain order. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership did notallow a they delegitimized theregimeby figure,removing thecould omnipotent who suppress the policies. hiswould predecessor’s persecute authorities withoutwas chosen bythe Soviet Gero that knew people way.follow However, amoderate aimed to attending the society’s needs. It was obvious, as a hard-liner, that Gero Kovrig, p. 93 Granville, p.1058 Krzysztof Persak, “The Polish-Soviet Confrontation in 1956 and the Attempted Soviet Paul E. Zinner, “Revolution in Hungary: Reflections on the Vicissitudes of a Totalitarian 64 communist party membership and even functionaries in various institutions. layers ofthe important reached intellectuals had reform. Moreover, will the to and consider to in were forced Muscovites Party the circle, popularity intellectual of the representation broad the of Because intellectuals. young with rally joint a held communists. counter- of slogans inthe reassuretheHungarian revolutionary not shouldPetofi Circle absence the Thus, in Poznan. attacks counter-revolutionary direct no were were they there he that of supporters students, andNagy,warned mostly intellectualsImre and Although gunshots.” without Poznan ideological “an was Circle Petofi The For Gero and Soviet leadership, the Petofi Circle was a crucial social and political and social a crucial was Circle Petofi the leadership, and Soviet Gero For From the start, the Soviet Presidium’s choices were contradictory: on the one hand, His awareness signified that Gero, as the newly elected First Secretary of Party,the Secretary of First asthenewly Gero, elected that signified His awareness The Journal ofPolitics 63 , Vol. 21, No. 1 (Cambridge University Press, Feb 1959), Europe-Asia Studies, 31 Vol. 58, no. 8(Dec2006), 62 p. 120 61 CEU eTD Collection 66 : Central(Budapest European University p.Press, 2002), 157 inDocuments A History Revolution: Hungarian 1956 The Rainer M. Janos Byrne, Malcolm 65 most important factors which had inflamed people’s resentment in Hungary. Another in Hungary. resentment people’s inflamed had which factors important most of legitimacy. retainhe intoaccountpopular that and to took inorder he alsoshow concerns a sense would wrong. been had it Kemp byreburying that Laszlo emphasizes Rajk publiclythe wasacknowledgingregime that were not eligible for people to follow a logical understanding of Gero’s policy outcomes. people200,000 frustrated Rajk’s would attend socialreburial. andfrustration The disorder political circle, which sourceof was the all he Besides,predictwrong-doing. didnotthat damagenot his hisauthority,belong strengthen he rather leadership. Hethought didnotthe to would reburial the that mind his in had Gero 6. October on terror of victims Communist other onOctober23. out which broke by revolution, immediately the overtaken but 15and22in place was their took between eventually October significance Belgrade, significantly,startingbutheSeptember The talks 11,noobjections raised negotiations. to Apparently preoccupied with unfoldingthe official Suezcrisis, Tito’s response cameonlyon campaignpropaganda in which against Yugoslavia, Rakosi had played aleading part. fierce the and Rajk trial by Laszlo the caused problems for the Gero apologizes letter, the toTito. In letter bysending the the process completed Gero, Yugoslavia. with reconciliation strategy, follow orforced to Khrushevian implemented inappropriatepolicies. Gerowanted mistake. in resulted disastrous the currents of social political and theirleader.Incomprehension future,the of indecision on leadershipthe andmisapprehension Kemp,147 p. See the “Letter from Erno Gero to Josip Broz Tito, July 19, 1956” in ed. Csaba Békés , Obstinate insistence on conservative personalities in Hungary was maybe one of in maybeone the was of Hungary insistence personalities conservative on Obstinate Gero kept his promise by allowing the ceremonial reburial of Laszlo Rajk and three and alone country the left Gero mistake, leaders’ Soviet the to addition In 66 Gero believed he could exclude himself from former crimes of the Party 32 65 CEU eTD Collection 69 68 67 character of the PolishSovietleadership and the leading role of theevent party. According toVali, the revolutionary deviated onthe parties communist the of dependency the Members, Warsaw Pact the The unity of from expectations: accepted same the always had leadership the but different, been have could forces norms Soviet of Soviet supremacy.had evolved in its experimental approaches in Eastern and Central Europe. The reaction of the It was a Revolution, Spring Prague and responses the of Presidium. Soviet the Sovietleadership The Hungarianto the in and tounderstand Polish events connection the order between Hungarian Poland. in cult personality the absenceof the Granville, Johanna to was,according difference Revolution of 1848-49 –chanting slogans: the of Hungarian the hero statue of Jozef Bem–the Polish to the General the gesture a symbolic 23 Octoberwashighlyin significant marched The revolutionary the process. demonstrators as Hungarian psyche. impact hadon the premiership” Imre “unsuccessful completely what of unaware Nagy’s leaders SovietUnion, werealso Soviet the leadership fightswithin and the political party the and bureaucratic the all of Between society was. in Hungarian the transformation fierce the students andintellectuals took form the manifestos. of Rakosi couldand Gero not realize how by agitation accommodation Tito, with establish belated Belgrade looking to to and traveling clique” and Rakosi’s hegemonic personality. While Gero wasbusy of completing hisagenda Vali, p.166. Granville, p.1056. Granville,1051. p. It is very important to compare the different attitudes of the Soviet leadership in regard leadership Soviet of attitudes the compare different the to is important It very freedom! Stalinism!death to inWestop halfway, Independence,trust Imre won't Nagy! Polish-Hungarian friendship! To hell with traitor leaders! We want new leadership; we in hand! Long live the hand nation! Polish Long live thePolish Workers'walk LongliveParty! the let's Kossuth, and Bem Father of nation the We're way! Hungarian the onfreedom Independence based and equality! showsustheway,let'sPoland follow 67 In Hungary, there was a groundswell of hatred toward the so-called “Rakosi-Gero so-called the toward ofhatred wasagroundswell there InHungary, 69 68 Motivated by the change in Polish society, the student demonstration on demonstration student the society, in Polish change the by Motivated 33 CEU eTD Collection 71 70 East European Review East European by set Moscow. conduct Communist of rules by violating of Committee carried thereby Polish Central the Party, the out revolutionary act calling in Soviet troops. Thecallingin troops. Polish Soviet was andcontainment military prompt Onthe efficient. rally. student the their The absence. demonstration violentwhenwould turn leadershipthe arrived onthe day of innormalize had in andthe weredelegates their escalated Yugoslavia atmosphere to relations in action.physicallyand Poland presentthus on28Juneand Gero could his take However, meet. to regime conservative for the harder and more political were demands students' in Hungarian the Poznan, workers resented the its to limitedcontain Incontrast in goals. the dueto rebellion authorities Poznan wereableto Polish the and distress caused byeconomic revolt a workers' mainly was Poznan crisis of Firstall, the and international personalities. politics relations, inter-state actions, political dynamics, social multiple from rather but phenomenon, mass-elite from only not emanated found they that hadalready leadership lost Hungarian and masses. the hadleadership Soviet On the contrary, the Presidium. the Soviet leadership Party reassured Communist Polish in intervention political Soviet’s Therefore, hegemony. Soviet against and Party Communist their Hungarian against both revolted people because differed Hungary Johanna“1956 Why Granville, Reconsidered: and NotPoland?”Hungary Vali, p.263 Thirdly, the Polish leaders could manage the Poznan crisis on their own, without ontheir crisis own, Poznan the manage could leaders Polish Thirdly,the The reasons for the Soviet’s different approaches to Hungary and Poland had Hungarian Revolution was. Hungarian Revolution by notalbeitmasses, inthesensethatsupported revolution apeople’s wasthe the itselfrose against that bondage the imposedauthority. by Soviet The change, Polish rather upon but the local governmentby the communistaction,revolutionary party imposed theirwill people that was notthe it vassalage. In Poland customs of accepted by leadershiplike party local the avassal acting communist state organ, against the It was a revolt within the Communist orbit carried out against the paramount Soviet , Vol. 80, No. 4(Maney, Vol. 80, 2002), Oct pp.660-666 Publishing, 70 34 71 Secondly, Ochab and his colleagues were his and colleagues Ochab Secondly, The Slavonicand CEU eTD Collection freedom, the idea of national sovereignty, multi-party system and neutrality. Gomulka acted Gomulka neutrality. and system multi-party ideanational sovereignty, the of freedom, in seeds the wasNagy’she of “New factor which planted reform, Course,” important society were taking initiatives without Nagy’s leadership. Inmy maybe opinion, themost himself with inHungarian orient of masses.Manynewly organs the demands the established to than other choice no had He position: a different in himself found Nagy However, masses. ways. differentleadership Soviet Gomulkaandfrustrated reconcile could the hard-liners, socialism. against revolution with a counter- elements, hadanti-Soviet which demonstration, associated immediately they 74 73 72 his audience. enragingfurther as counterrevolutionaries, demonstrators Hungarian denouncingthe October speech on23 Ochab's conciliatory to demonstrators,the attitude ErnoGerodelivered ascathing radio demonstration. and flamed the protesters Hungarian units the andindeterminacy of The disorganization emphasizes: Granville revolutionary atmosphere. of the provided containment quick disciplinethe authority and Polishover soldiers Fourthly, forces. military and police Hungarian of inefficiency the and inability the of because by invitation. contrary, first the intervention Soviet in23-24 October Hungaryon was invasionactually an Ibid.,pp. 667 Ibid.,pp. 666 Ibid.,pp. 661-668 Finally, the new reformist leaders of frustrated masses shaped the events in totally events shapedthe masses frustrated leaders of newreformist Finally, the Another difference emanated from the approaches of the leaders: In contrast to contrast In leaders: the of approaches the from emanated difference Another Hungarian demonstrators. unhesitatingly the at couldshoot Security Authority units State Hungarian the soldiersfighters. The wereforbidden open fireunlessto fired they were Only upon. freedom sideof so-called the the to some deserted and wavered units army Hungarian The overwhelmingmajority yet obeyed soldiers Polish of orders, regularthe 72 Gero requested Soviet forces and the ministries supported foreign Soviet Gerorequested interferenceforces andthe ministries supported 74 The main mistake committed by leaders wasthat committed TheHungarian mainmistake 73 35 CEU eTD Collection in M. J. Lasky (ed.), 75 affairs had exacerbated the legitimacy problem of legitimacyparty. 23October of problem The communist the hadthe affairs exacerbated in Rakosi-Geroagainst clique, and in Soviet increase the internal intervention Hungarian the Gero founddefense: ataposition himself activity.of counterrevolutionary Therefore, constant people worried the authorities.leadership Theincreased itsSoviet warnings about fervent numberattitudeAn of Rajk’s of hadattended andreburial the people the unexpected disorder. in intotal was Hungary The atmosphere party. communist ofthe instead wreckage his heHungary,he found withWhen trip Yugoslavia.reconciliatory to backfrom came path busykeep orderin Khrushchev’s was Instead oftryingfollowing new Gero too Hungary, to society. and government the forces seized counterrevolutionary the that them telling officers from leadership reports its receiving Soviet andkept the intellectual Simultaneously, activism. leadership, control andits liquidated lost social over Party’s power AtGero’s reformer. the and change analyze dynamics not the could leadership Soviet the However, inGero. with replacing Rakosi the Hungarian situationexacerbated inthe hadKhrushchev Hungary. find tried to middle the wayby society. People 3.2: Conceptualizing“1956” were aware that Gero was anything Party.the of leading role but a cautiously by following Soviet line, declared his devotion to Warsaw Pact and emphasized the Gero's speech wasaired Radio on Budapest, October 1956, 18:30hrs. 23, See transcriptthe Nagy’s defense on his “New Course,” Gero’s poor initiative, the continuing frustration continuing the initiative, poor Gero’s his“NewCourse,” on Nagy’s defense Gero’s appointment to the General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party internationalists. proletarian also at weare same but the time arepatriots nationalists…We not we are that state categorically wealso patriots, we are that proclaim while we Hungarian patriots…Yet are Communists andpatriotism…We, Hungarian internationalism proletarian aconflict between create whointend to those There are The Hungarian Revolution 75 36 (New Praeger, York: 1957), pp. 51-52. CEU eTD Collection elimination of police terror, political sovereignty and state neutrality. In the end, Nagy found Nagy end, the In neutrality. state and sovereignty political terror, police of elimination in economy, self-management motivating cooperatives, agricultural of formation in the choice cultural and religious freedom, ademocratic multi-party system,farming,independent free far-reaching reforms. for Nagy and pressed Theynationwide spread councils workers’ and revolutionary the initiative, demanded freedom of assembly, free unions, the right to strike, 77 Heath and151 Company, p. 1992), 1945-1991: documentsand analysis,Revolution, 76 was announced. elections parliamentary free of holding secret andthe and was restored system multi-party were withdrawntroops from internalBudapest and the security A service wasdisbanded. forces. of listen new demands the the social rising to needed York 2008),York p.88 Communism inEasternEurope: 1956andits Legacy were fruitless, andhisinitial popularity declined rapidly. restore order and disarm His first, like primary leader. upon especially at taking arevolutionary wasto office endeavor the insurgents. act, not Nagy however, did inpower, Installed His Secretary. KadarasFirst andJanos Premier appeals to the fighters Nagy appointas to wasforced Committee masses. Central The frustrated the and forces, to lay down their by by Soviet the limited intervention Security supported officers between State Hungarian arms finally, andof literature, evacuation Soviet troops. the agreements including Sovietexploitation of Hungarian uranium, freedom the in expression of foreign trade of thepublication in outrages, implicated Stalinist the andothers for Farkas from trial party, the expulsion the public of of Nagy Rakosi government, reinstatementthe to the demanded People inHungary. events of course the for landmark the were demonstrations Tony Tony Kemp-Welch, “Dethroning Stalin: Poland 1956and its Legacy,” in Paul Kecskemeti, “Anatomy of a Revolt,” in After a few days’ hesitation, he started to fulfill the demonstrators’ demands. Soviet Eventually, peaceful the demonstrations infight turned into Budapest aviolent 77 However, the changes in the society were too rapid, and the new civil 37 Eastern Europe Transformation and ed. Lyman H. Legters (Lexington, D. C. , ed. Terry Cox (Routledge London-New 76 Therefore, he understood that he that understood he Therefore, Challenging CEU eTD Collection 79 78 of the masses’ revolutionary élan. revolutionary of masses’ the spontaneously,butrather heit wasforcedby the into uncontrollable, overwhelming upsurge Hungary’s neutrality. According to Paul Kecskemeti, Nagy did not choose this radical course himself in a situation, in which he was declaring the withdrawal from the Soviet Bloc and example, Walter Kemp indicated: example, For symbolsStalinism. and of attacked frustrated people were how which presented actions, politiciansnational gave declarations through course the of Still,events. weresymbolic there nationaland some expression true search for to started some intellectuals national discourses, by motivated people were in Obviously, nationalism role the of Hungary. overemphasize underestimate or not “1956” would in of fore. analysis the My approach camein“1956” to actions and events symbolic national the studies, many In action. mass national or revolution heroes: historical and of national thecelebration the changeinto showed which examples, symbolic Many repressions andterror. statutes of Stalin destroyed. were Nyyssonen Heino other gives Stalin’s been representing had image,which every attacked inPeople the demonstrations Kemp,147 p. Paul Kecskemeti, p.152 The feverish, fast and complex course in Hungary was generally reduced to a national to reduced was generally in Hungary course complex and fast The feverish, 1848 Revolution) asa national holiday. Apostolic Crown) to the Hungarian flag and reinstate 15 March (the anniversary of the the coatof arms (without Kossuth the restore to hepromised wherein October Nagy was that 1848 revolution. Interestingreceived28 too popularly theof decision Bem, heroof the Jozef General of tomb the (Polish) around mustered was crackdown, the 1848 revolution.is It also telling that the rally of 23 October, which led a to severe Hungary innamed apoetof 1956(the Petofi Circle) was national after resistance from It is nocoincidence was that thegroup that theforce drivingin behind change internal and external freedom. The new military commander of Budapest, General Budapest, of commander military new The freedom. external and internal 1848, and in both cases strugglethe freedom for originated from desirethe for both Népszava were renamedThey Square. became Gyorgy Dozsa Square Arpad Stalin and renamed Bridge, the Stalin after Streetthe old was national renamed heroesthe Street of Hungary. of Hungarian On the Youth,30th of theOctober Stalin Bridge was demanded eternal glory for the dead heroes. Events wereagaincompared to for deadheroes. the glory eternal demanded 78 38 79 CEU eTD Collection KronoScope 80 not signify that I am adhering to one interpretation. itbutmy does in Revolution” research, “Hungarian using Ipreferred Therefore, undeniable. uprising movement oranti-totalitarian – revolutionary the in elements society the are amongforeign In scholars. any conceptualization – counterrevolution, revolution, national is“1956”. argument tobe “revolution” The considered the common especially approach, and and political structure participants from social every stratum symbolize the complexity of social changeinthe in the society, the developments becausethe interpretations, have several be in Arendt’s will Ibelieveargumentation “1956”can deeply examined this chapter. that, many andFerencVali’s comparisonintellectuals. between Furthermore, andHannah authors and rolefrom many Gyani’s social of actors Iwillbenefit deepanalysis and his Gabor possession presentam take 1956events.Igoingthe social the of to transformation and the Hungary,“1956”is fiercely Factions in debated. contemporary Hungarian attemptpolitics to deepen conclusion or debatethe in in in currentpolitics Even details. and historiography reach a definitive to not is My aim Course.” “New the on approach Union’s Sovietthe leaders and Communist of Hungarian the power the party, in rivalry the the intensity of the society, Hungarian the andaims of dynamics an lead of the itunderstanding to becausewill Hungarianthe on Revolution. debates with deeper analysisandconceptualization the does notprovide a complete picture of the situation at hand. Therefore, I continue this chapter fervor national the of selection” “elective the on focusing just However, sentiments. Soviet anti- with mixed fever national the how demonstrate which examples, other many were There Heino Nyyssönen,“Time, Political Analogies and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution," The debate on the conceptualization of the crisis in Hungary is vital for my forresearch, is vital in Hungary crisis the of conceptualization on the The debate with “who troops the in springthe of 1849 squashedthe aggressiveforces.” struggle for freedom in 1848.” Moreover, Király also connected National the Guard Guard was“the heirof of heroicthe national gloriousthe guards revolution and members of Bélathe army, Király, police and National began Guard. to Accordingorganize to Király a Revolutionarythe National Defense Committee comprised of 6:1 2006 pp. 51-52 6:12006 39 80 CEU eTD Collection 84 Company, p.482 1958), 83 < (News & AprilLetters, pp. 344-77,378-4201980), 82 ed. Berlin,pp. 82-83. 1919, Luxemburg Rosa 81 the Continental multi-party system, argued Arendt. She idealized the evolution in Sheidealized Arendt. the evolution Hungarian Continental system,the multi-party argued by presented one tothe representation electoral of democratic alternative only the represented solidarity. masses’ class of the energy and potential the situation revolutionary the revolutionary mass strikes – from inwhich, local further turn, up actions sprouted thanks to partial, “spontaneously” grewinto general local and continuously,conflicts and political ortheory.in some book set out carry itsa plan struggle not modernLuxemburg, the according out does to class proletarian According to separateactivities. separable or are not leitmotif.and organization Spontaneity Luxemburg. Inher political ofspontaneity dialectic thinking,the herand organization was byRosa revolution,” whichwasconceptualized Hungarian asa“spontaneous Revolution,” but without rigid party control or apparatus terror.” apparatus rigidof or withoutbut control party basis, asocialist on economy Hungarian reorganize the and to order restore to step practical system in Hungary. totheArendtpointed spontaneouscouncils formation worker of council the revolutionary and they create their own developmental process. Parallel to what Luxemburg stressed over again, Luxemburg also describes in herphilosophy as “the workers the leaders of their own” and andin centrally willfor freedom the was notwas the force moving action. every directed leaders, not organized,had was 1956. She no It of Revolution: the emphasized uniqueness the http://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1910/theory-practice/ Ibid.,p. 498 Hannah Arendt, Hannah Junius, Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie (The crisis in the German social-democracy), new Rosa Luxemburg, Hannah Arendt defined “1956” “Reflections epilogue in her of the book, on the The establishment of the Revolutionary and Workers’ Councils represented “the Workers’ first of The and Revolutionary the establishment Councils represented Hannah Arendt indicated that the theory of Luxemburg became a fact in Hungary in in Hungary fact a became Luxemburg of theory the that indicated Arendt Hannah The Origins of Totalitarianism Gesammelte Werke Gesammelte 81 Not “organized” and hence “planless,” these economic, “planless,” these andhence Not“organized” (Collected Works) Vol. 2, trans. David Wolff, 40 , (New York: The, (New York: World Publishing 84 This spontaneous reorganization > last accessed 27.04.2009 82 83 CEU eTD Collection 88 European Review History of 87 86 85 revolutionary and self-regulatory aspect of the Hungarian society. Hungarian the aspectof self-regulatory revolutionary and councils anddenounced“1956” revolution. aworkers’ consciousness of a given social group. arevolutionaryrequirements, ismanifestationevent theviolent of awakeningthe of class- usage the to according because calla revolution, itto in be order established haveto Gyani is right in his critique massesrevolutionary worker inadisorganized unplanned way. and class-conscious Gabor indicating that the class characteristics tyranny.of the Hungarian event freedom clear againstdictatorship,the against upsurge of of of sign democracy a true was of parties, restoration the not councils, evolution the uniquethe of that concludedArendt Assembly. National of replacement asthe Committee, Revolutionary National exceptional form Council, counterpartofnormalas the and Supremetheir National unique government to “the council-men” enable would representation direct and self-coordination Free elections, She wrote: society andrepeatedly and thein revolution. uniqueness the political of the realm emphasized Ibid.,p. 520 Gabor Gyani, “Revolution, uprising, civil war: the conceptual dilemmas of 1956,” Ibid.,pp.500-501 Ibid.,p. 499 According to Gyani, the British historian Bill Lomax put the same emphasis on the on emphasis same the put Lomax Bill historian British the Gyani, to According Rosa Luxemburg’s“spontaneous in could revolution” theoretically emerge the neither above nor below.” by by andnot workers, the a governmentthe or party, is, that by his peersandfrom bound not is by inhis trust anything except qualities, andhis personal istohave pride been elected therefore, elected, The representation. his with him entrust to confidence havehein integrity, andjudgmentto issupposed whosepersonal courage enough by a program a or platform an ideology,or butexclusively by his estimation of a man, prompted is not voter of moreover, the choice, The of candidates. asaslate or choices either tothe electorate with alternate asindividuals machinery andproposed party the by selected not and bottom, at the for arechosen the councils men elected “Thus, the 86 , Vol. 15, No. 5 (Routledge, Oct 2008), p. 519 85 87 Arendt laid stress on the evolution of workers’ 41 88 Lomax thought that the that thought Lomax CEU eTD Collection 89 to equality,to and politicalinstitutions by would bereplaced social power. a way hierarchyin to society would which give road the reopened CommunistParty,the and by over ruled power state former the smashed both blow one in thus had councils, workers’ the through factories their over control direct in establishing workers the of self-mastery became a successively a pseudo “national” government, an inner cabinet of aninnermixed of apseudo“national”became a cabinet government, successively it Party, the to subservient administration, a Communist 4.From November 23to October from successive transformations underwent that out pointed Hungarian government the Vali control. foreign from freedom for strived Hungarians forces. Rather, anti-communist explaining sources of motivation and frustration. role in adominant played conceptualization of the if national component understandthe is to interest main My point. a very different to theresearcher bring will nationalism freedom fightor with the ideaof forces. revolt However,convergenceuprising, the corrupt policies of the party or government, and theleader, of mismanagement the the against dissidence of direction the emphasize alien to variably ideology or the presence of foreign They implynot action.do changed a suddenand conceptualizations These spontaneous in common. havesomething biasdefinitions butthese of researcher, the wordingthe reveals masses. Gyani warns about the choice of uprising, revolt orfreedom fight, because exact conscious bypolitically action acollective itwas class. Rather one to be dedicated not could in Hungary transformation and change the supporters, its to According component. “national” Revolution”bring diversitythe out socialthe of inactors Hungary 1956. 1956. The“National defenders Uprising,” “Counterrevolution”of the “Anti-Totalitarian and in class worker the of role over-emphasized the to object historians and scientist political Bill Lomax, Bill According to Ferenc Vali, the conflict was not essentially between communist and communist between not essentially was Ferenc conflict Vali, the to According tothe “1956” importance Uprising attaches asaNational of The conceptualization Hungary 1956 . (London:Allison & Busby, p.203 1976), 42 89 Many intellectuals, CEU eTD Collection 91 90 revolutionary revolutionary andgroups institutions. acknowledgehad of existence the to defacto the and democratization, de-Sovietization its own inviewof and pressures underrevolutionary government, Thecentral Armed Forces. of Committee Revolutionary the of the creation as such measures, revolutionary constitutional extra- to resort hadit to rule, Communist ofmonopolistic aftereffects the counteract and difficulties allay To government. coalition representative balanced, finally and allegiances, social class or sole national impulse. Therefore, the conceptualizations as revolution and asrevolution conceptualizations the impulse. Therefore, sole national or social class one the of unity because and consciousness not occur of “1956”didliberalization. Moreover, social groups, even reform-minded people in the party, were signaling the need for reform and hardship. Insuch an frustrationenvironment, andwere aggregated resentment and many been suffering from cultural and political limitation, terror and police experiencing economic doctrines institutional and the the support idea dismissal spontaneity. of people had However, a Actually,from atmosphere andsudden violent the reaction detachmentsocialistproduced event. the of form the to related is also emphasis national The internationalism. proletarian powerfulmost the was factornationalism that mean not does it However, thatneutrality. and sovereignty national led to a rift within theinexistent “1956”had and motivated partially society the and triggered ideaoffreedom, the communist party and united people against the Ibid.,p. 321 Vali, p.320 People cannot deny the fact that national elements, symbols and declarations were and declarations symbols elements, national that deny thefact cannot People incorporated into the administrative system into country. system administrative incorporated the of the inorganization Budapestandin the had provinces been and declared legal 30.The on October revolutionary by in Primeclimax with adeclaration Minister the a andreached 28, October on of Fighters Freedom the with negotiations governmental opening the with continued formation, their of encouragement the and councils worker’s of Party’srecognition the onOctober 26with started which legitimization, of acts the with were completed institutions national new under centralization sovereignty andAll institutions together country of toexpressnationalworked freedom,the its its break-up from the supranational entity, the Soviet Union. The re- 90 Vali indicated: Vali 43 91 CEU eTD Collection 92 triggered political mobilization According toGyani: and theirtriggered declared mobilization political radical demands. had students university the revolution the of outbreak the Before youth. the and students whoalso tookpartin formationthe of councils. forums, discussions and meetings. Obviously, theywere the mental workers of the revolution, organized intellectuals non-communist and Reform-minded movement. civil the of formation Eventually, both facilitated disappointed groups the masses and played an active role in the non-conformist. became and policies strict the of because marginalized were them of reformers. into them of most transformed and them idealestranged and reality communist the between The contradictions due inmeasures,to corruption evaporated andviolenteven theirpolitics comrades. against were ideals tenets and Marxist-Leninist how witnessed they takeover, Since communist masses. and party the between mediators the were They revolution. the in role important alsoleadingwealthier occupied inlocal positions affairs. peasants Intellectualstook an of the big Older of representatives cities. outside action revolutionary carried kulaks Younger ininterests “1956”. withmany are morebecause there limited, actors diverse areinasense national uprising Gyani,“Revolution, uprising, civil conceptual the war: dilemmas of 522 1956,” p. Other important groups, whohadimportant groups, played anactiveOther university in“1956”,werethe role Somealways of The metamorphosis wasnot balancedandmoderate. intellectuals the The hadimportantpeasantry played role initial in phase the laterstages. and in the Communist system. more andamongof “dictatorship reliablethe supporters of the the proletariat” the whocame students werecounted from lower socialthe students university classes, favored policies admission the Since activism. revolutionary for ground breeding ideal thenot in were training, university incorporated intensethe ideological propaganda more little a requires students explanation, university because of the universities’ strict admission policiesmobilization before 1956, along with revolutionary The 92 44 CEU eTD Collection 94 93 of revolutionary potential. Hecalled phenomenonthis “the mobility trap”: Gyani expresses that this general feeling of uncertainty was the crucial factor in the formation many people becoming confused about their identities: theirmany becomingpeople about confused by whichwereprerogatives, as Gyani provided Party.the However, emphasizes: communistthe regimes. In hadbenefittedexchange, from they social and political for basis economic and social the were workers industrial especially and society Hungarian diversesupport interests and reasonsto or Workersto resist.were a not homogenous in group system. education politicized society, which caused question theirthem identity to and their inindoctrination the in importantly, lacked hardships. Most the freedom over-andthe they economic experienced by affected brutal the policies of regimethe andmany of them in badgrew up living standards directly were families and relatives Their government. pro-Soviet the against irritation them caused total and already affected Thebrutal troops. policies Soviet the police and Additionally, surprisingly youth the played crucial in role authorityfighting against state the Ibid.,p. 523 Ibid. mobility from one day to the next. In the Hungary of the mid-1950s, there was not one not was compact social whose identity group there coincided with image.their mid-1950s, the of Hungary the In next. the to day one from mobility intelligentsia,just asmuch as those who replaced them, and facedwho the task of becoming the new feeling growinguncertainty of experienced this The 1945changes the declassee’s of the new elite or in, a widespreadwith set and uncertainty transience out that points feelingof Gyani the new working class in this cartwheel of social had which workers, the was revolution the during force dynamic critical most The The reason why this “social politics” eventually proved to be a trap was that the was that be atrap to proved eventually politics” this“social The reasonwhy keep societydetermined efforts to in mobility, aperpetual of itsstate owngrave. dug political by with the forced coupled Stalinist elite, the The rapidindustrialization counterparts incounterparts 1920sandthe 1930s. both mental.structural Industrial and inthe likeworkers nothing1950s their were furtherinflated broughtabout theirnumbers inturn changes, tremendously, which industrialization forced The social of politicsany of circumstances group. other than the reallynot better were ingeneral workers of the circumstances The actual 93 45 94 CEU eTD Collection opinion, Hungary did not experience true democratic consolidation. Two World ethnic Wars, experience Two democraticconsolidation. not true opinion, Hungary did permanence of revolutions. of permanence was a return, rather thansense, and only in this sense, 1956 was more a of a counter-revolutionstep than a revolution, since it conceptual instrict this In the revolutions. modern of extension progressive further a than arestoration of more direction, according “1956” “1956” carriedmorethan that aspects traits. was counterrevolutionary revolutionary to the notion of the 98 97 96 95 because “1956”had a declared goal and hadaforeseeable conclusion: an stage, earlier to a return of as anact restoration, in Hungary changes the sees Gyani attributable to the definition of homogenous national definition national revolution. tothe homogenous attributable of not in were Hungary developments the that shows society in factions the of different mobilization the and interests of diversity the uncertainty, of feeling the on emphasis Gyani’s Ibid.,p. 527 Ibid.,p. 526 Ibid.,p. 519 Ibid. It isIt stillhard define to “1956” a my formeras act torestore conscious In order. Gyani has remarks true on motivationsthe of forces social the in Hungary and hefinds doubtful. applying “revolution,” theword meantinleast when themodern sense, isat 1944–1945 and factory the and of national later councils then times), propriety the of of freedoms of councilscouncils of revolutionary possible workers’ includedthe antecedents the established the of restoration (the anew democracy of directforms some of creation and the democracies bourgeois institutional the system, multi-party a with replacement its and party Communist the of monopoly the of elimination the as such hadevents inmindmerely of instead changes, “restoration” progressive concerned Finally 1956: comeifwe to round most of demandsthe that instigators the of the liberties. by point of formerly lost departure someregaining political social of the and Englishreturn American eighteenth-century definitively a “revolutions,” the and to to the the seventeenth-century that inwas similar to the situation 1956 mainHungarian of thrust been has reason The disturbance. anti-Communist and anti-Soviet Hungarian seizure backfired.duplicitous arbitrary of power, and exercise the and legitimize system the stabilize meantto was strategy, which mobilization The notion of 96 97 revolutio 98 works better to describe the analytical meaning of the 46 95 CEU eTD Collection and the rise of the national declarations, overlapped with the anti-Soviet feeling, resentment with anti-Soviet the overlapped national anddeclarations, of the rise the uprising. The circulation national andof historical symbols, searchfor identity the national it Moreover, waspartially feeling of the masses. mobilized uncertainty a national and administration, culture, Hungarian with the intertwined leadershipwere communism and because theSoviet society, politics and regime what ordevelopments if interrupt Soviets Hungarian didnot the freedom security.fight, The anti-Sovietactors feeling with also diverse facilitated interestshadit“1956” nodefinite mean not was multiple direction, which does that a revolution. The fought that, believe I in Hungary. communism abolishing of aim the forhave not did members party and their freedom. We could not theorize and guessanythingrestoration butof old order. the supervision since startof the SecondWorldthe War. These werepointingdemands out foreign Hungary was under patronage. Soviet insteadof independence national for out and crying foreign neutral policy a were demanding People directly. their representatives formedtime andinin councils and manner, analmostdemocratic theyvoted elected which about uniqueness the right in workers’ the andcouncils. ashort of revolutionary Peopleacted point some at was Arendt revisionism. or reformism socialist driven elite more no was there neutrality and the Polish Revolthad played animportant part in defining future. Hungarian Austrian communism”, “national Yugoslav countries. neighboring their from them affected be atmosphere Obviously, in forces overlooked. and not thePoland should social party “neutral”“Titoist” Austria, Yugoslavia and pro-Soviet countries. Theimportance of turbulent social and rights. political People werelivingin abipolar world asthey were neighboring system. During the crisis, wanted independence, people freedom,their civil, democratic, tensions, border disputes andforeign interventions preventedtruepluralism and parliamentary On the other hand,On because other is manyintellectuals Gyani the right, workers, reform-minded headits wasforced Afterhad lost thegovernment, control theand to Party Nagy total 47 CEU eTD Collection fervent desirefor freedom.fervent the was motivation,had onecommon which clique. complex“1956” The against Rakosi-Gero 48 CEU eTD Collection National Security Archive DocumentsReader National SecurityArchive Revolution,” February 22, 1968””in (ed) Jaromir Navratil, 99 failures toward the leadership,policies attitude domestic of Novotny’s anddiscriminative Revolution. Pact members’ surveillance would help lead “Prague Spring”longerto last Hungarian than ontheWarsaw leadership. Theawareness members newCzechoslovak with the Pact Warsaw behaviorPrecautious andhis of Dubcek indicated anddistrust existentthe team doubtof the countries. Warsaw from Pact officials state of and party attendance the of because however, from speech, the wereremoved projects Dubcek’s However, affairs. foreign Czechoslovak inthe innovativeformulations toexpress wanted of Dubcek earlier speech, draftthe wouldmade of intheCommunist people haveParty Sovietthe uncomfortable. Union In the need to“uphold democratic centralism” and “enforce the leading role of the party.” the in people hestrongly emphasized and society, because The speech party disappointed the Revolution.” “February in Czechoslovakia, takeover Anniversary communist of Twentieth the follow acautious pathin toappease theSovietorder leadership. Dubcek deliveredaspeech at had to Dubcek However, andSlovaks. Czechs the between inequalities and endthe process reform the accelerate would which initiative, will and astrong wereexpecting Czechoslovakia 4.1: ThePragueSpring: Transformation in Czechoslovakia 1968 SECTION 4:CZECHOSLOVAKIA “Alexander Speech Marking 20 the Dubcek’s Dubcek decided toimplement domestic reforms but in a gradual way. He was aware of which reforms, implement to will the had Dubcek that indicates Navratil Jaromir Dubcek’s premiership gave hope to all forces in society, and many people in , 1998 p. 51 49 th Anniversary “February Anniversary of Czechoslovakia’s The Prague Spring1968:A 99 CEU eTD Collection Security ArchiveDocuments Reader Committee, March 25, 1968” ” in (ed) Jaromir Navratil, 101 1968, crisis, Czechoslovak 100 “permanent democracy.” move toward nation the to and measures,” internal of our and objectives nature the about by motivated international “standdoubts pressure Czechoslovak upto Communist Party to 1948. An letter signedopen by and 134 writers cultural figures onMarch 25 called onthe citizens whohad been imprisoned,unlawfully persecuted professionallyhurtor February after maneuver.example, For Czechoslovak the Writer’s Union demanded full rehabilitation of all space foundto great intellectuals andwriters inprocess, reform the relative emancipation hand,itwas a movement of intellectual and cultural revival in sense. broadest the With the initiated and by economicparty leadership. carried On other out reform, the communist the but rather it was a double development. On the one hand, it was a movement of political and role of the non-communist parties in it. the of and Front National the of enhancement the foresaw instead but system, multiparty true a advocate alongside not Hedid party. the communist groups political independentand social head of Commissionthe on Political Reform, proposed participationthe in makingdecision of party mechanism, which had been stigmatized by formerthe leadership. Zdenek Mlynar, the disconnect party and state institutions. Moreover, Dubcek wanted to include forces outside the party and the of functioning internal the democratize methods, administrative the improve Slovakto develop people. Dubcekstarted political institutional and reforms, which would leadership and Warsaw Pact members. Dubcek wanted to show that the “Action Program” “Action the that show wanted to Dubcek members. Pact Warsaw and leadership from social groups resulted in the emergence of the “Action Program.” “Open Letter from 134 Czechoslovak Writers and Cultural Figures to the CPCz Central Bracke, Which Socialism, According to Bracke, the Prague Spring was not only an elite-led top-down process, top-down an elite-led only not was PragueSpring Bracke, the According to Immediately after preparing the “Action Program” Dubcek had to reassure Dubcek Sovietthe preparing hadto Immediately after “Action Program” the 101 p. 136 The mutual Themembers betweenthe mutual dialogue party and support the Whose Détente?West EuropeanCommunism and the , 1998p.76 100 50 The Prague Spring1968:ANational CEU eTD Collection Fascism and Communism,” and Fascism 102 1968: A NationalSecurity 1968: Archive DocumentsReader 103 tenets. Marxist-Leninist to according system strengthen the to aimed Program Action The andpolicies. actions by corrupt the contaminated and leadership by former damaged the Czechoslovakia was in currentsocialistthe system that Dubcek emphasized reform programs. indigenous of implementation the after especially countries, in their demands popular of chain-reaction feareda member they that parties was Themainfearamong the in WarsawPact. parties dangerous foremergednot of legitimacy the and out was popular demand of communistthe adopted. The Program called for a wide-ranging societal initiative, for an open exchange of exchange foropen an initiative, societal for awide-ranging called Program The adopted. forces. other political parties of the National Front and rapprochement of all social and cultural role through consolidation of the true socialist system, which would require the support from leading its The party secure power. would of concentration monopolistic totally against the was Dubcek it. dictate than rather initiative” socialist inspire “to mission a with party political a intoParty true be reorganized would Communist Czechoslovak because the socialism, between the sole position connection indivisible the over overand constantly emphasize to needed his team Dubcek and of the party and its mutual and coherent role in the international solidarity of Czechoslovak foreign policy with the Soviet bloc: the Action stressed of Plan authors the for socialism,” the appropriate social relations and “reform of the whole political system so that it will permit the dynamic development of Peter Sugar, “Continuity and Change in Eastern Authoritarianism:European Autocracy, “The CPCz CC Action Program, April 1968 ” in (ed) Jaromir Navratil, At the Central Committee’s April session, Dubcek’s Action Program was formally was Program Action Dubcek’s session, April Committee’s Central the At alliance and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist states. imperialism…Thebasic orientationforeign ofCzechoslovak around policy…revolves of world aggressiveattempts the against forces anddemocratic by socialist the in struggle democracy,socialism the progress, and of theWe side resolutely on stand 102 While the plan envisioned small steps toward “political pluralism” “political toward steps small envisioned plan the While East EuropeanQuarterly, 51 , 1998p.92 18(1984)p. 20 The Prague Spring 103 CEU eTD Collection 105 Press 1979),p.27 Essays, 104 Czechoslovak crisis, 1968 crisis, Czechoslovak political other the and Front, National in the role a privileged party communist the granted Program Action the liberalization, international Inaddition to interests. strategic national and Eastern Bloc and could have definitely Eastirritated Germany and the Soviet Union. for the a taboo was of Germany, which Federal Republic the with of normalization relations “theprovide for legal of equal coexistence two in nations state.” a common socialist and problem Slovak plan,the redress the according would federal to arrangement,” “socialist A modifications.” carry necessary constitutional the to and Slovaks, out between Czech and of relations the arrangement in forconstitutional “a called change crucial the Program also Action The elections. semi-free introduced market and a one, with economy socialist mixing of in works artand censorship publications, gradual scientific themassmedia; predicted Furthermore, theProgram political shut down surveillance bythe police;secret abolished andtravel. assembly freedom speech, of rights, secure thecivil and to aimed were taken opinions, anda democratization entirethe of social inand system, political legal which steps and its bodies. and its more in activesought Nations United especially international participation the organizations, in East and Central Europe. To prevent Czechoslovakia’s isolation, Dubcek andhis followers especially internationalism, Soviet-led vision the of dogmatic the against controversial totally mutual members, theWarsawnew the with foreignrelationship independent Pact policy was European Although policy. interdependent leadershipemphasized its Czechoslovak and the Bracke, Milan Hübl, “The Legacy of 1968,” in Czechoslovakia’s desire to connect with the rest of the world emanated from itsfrom own emanated world the of rest connectthe with to desire Czechoslovakia’s Another important aspect of the Action Program was the formulation of active new of a formulation was the Action aspect of Program the important Another ed. Frantisek Silnitsky, Larisa Silnitsky,Karl Reyman, (Brighton: The Harvester Which Socialism, Whose Détente? West European Communism andthe 105 The independent initiative in international affairs started with the with started affairs international in initiative independent The , p.137 Communism andEasternEurope: A Collection of 52 104 CEU eTD Collection Russian languageRussian in instructions gaveliterature school “criticaland in rise to as thethinking,” York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 277 109 108 Europe-Asia Studies,No. Vol. 10(Routledge, 60, Dec2008),p.1827 107 106 styles.” literary of variety scintillating up expressed formulated in themes, in into then are journals terms, only scholarly a the beauty; and richness its in all shines years, Stalinist the during by Russisms mutilated been has described of speeches the “The asfascinating:had this Czechlanguage,which congress Vaculik, in was amajor turningthe Czechoslovakintellectual point Josef Korbel awakening. inJune by Milan particularly 1967, andfellow Kunderahis speeches the novelist and Ludvik joinedParty. had Communist the never from family,and Prague a wealthy generation younger slightly a of was who Havel, while fiction, innovative his for prominence withgained a lyric later communist gaining recognition poet as only themes, orthodox revival. international and national Czechoslovak in the symbols intellectual crucial were Havel Vaclav playwright the and Kundera domestic liberalization from emanated intellectual debates during 1960s. Thenovelist Milan identities. Charles Sabatos brilliantly compares Havel’s and Kundera’s approaches: Havel’sandKundera’s brilliantly compares Sabatos Charles identities. international and domestic Czechoslovak on emphasis varying the signaled liberalization aspects of different interpretation of Their PragueSpring. the roles through important in itgroups were considered partners but not as as equals tothe party. JozefKorbel, Ibid. Charles Sabatos, Criticism and Destiny: Kundera and Havel on the Legacy of 1968, Ibid. According to Sabatos, the Fourth Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers’ Union in Union Writers’ of the Czechoslovak Congress theFourth Sabatos, to According Their had considerably:Kundera differed also personal backgrounds firstand artistic possibility reform,of includingtrue Havel. of the skeptical more non-communists those and Kundera, such as communists, present.“destiny,” he whatnational Czech called the “critical idealized of Kundera’s concept thinking” whileAt theHavel calledtime, for the “courage”this to lookpolemic at the difficult was issues ofseen the as representing two camps: reform Twentieth-Century TheMeanings ofits Czechoslovakia: History 109 The resentment against Soviet impositions such as 53 108 106 International and International 107 They played They (New CEU eTD Collection 1991), pp.1991), 30-31 in Hamsik, D. (ed.) 110 leadership had The been liberalization Soviet of Czechoslovakia. domestic international and debate within would culminate mobilized factions social and in intellectuals tosupport order policies. its and regime the of self-critic asa function would Front National controlled a opinion, my In “self-criticism.” of need the defending was Havel system. whole the Havel opposition, wasaskingmechanism, fortrue acontrol could checkandbalance which “could party beademocraticdrawingof this tradition on and party humanism.”democracy new that the opposition suggested and tradition” humanistic and Czechoslovak democratic party all-powerfulto the communist party. “the Havelevoked and strong specific published essay“Onthe Themethe of an Opposition,” which called for agenuine opposition in entity its international relations. nottobeenslavedby determined leadership a supranational TheCzechoslovak was interests. international politics. The foreign policy was formed according to Czechoslovak national its in of newidentification role active in party’s the was reflected approach Kundera’s 111 layCzech culture in: Kundera, greatness the of According to society.of traitCzech asaunique inbetweenness their identity Kunderain true presented thishistorical Central Europe. andcultural for search and historical richness and cultural rediscover their to started Czech intellectuals M.Kundera, ‘Speechat Fourth Congress the Czechoslovakof Writers’ the Union (1967)’ Václav Havel and Paul Wilson Paul and Havel Václav The “true consolidation of the regime or true reconciliation with the outer world” outer the with reconciliation true or regime the of consolidation “true The Vaclav freedoms. Havel and domestic liberalization Havel demandingtrue was others. havein thiscentury if its hasitbeenand, genius alert, now know will more thanthe more it Idaresay,is...Our hasmany than experienced, others century nation then what madetwentieth issuehas our everyimportant that features nationality problem, unique its by complicated further and socialism, and Stalinism enslavement, fascist democracy, between torn history, nation’s our of course whole The 110 Writers Against Rulers Against Writers , Open Letters: selected prose1965-1990 (New York, Random House, 1971) p. 169 54 , (New York, Vintage, 111 CEU eTD Collection 113 112 hardliners in the Party, emerged with different interests: in with different emerged Party, the hardliners membersby and Pact society inWarsaw the Czechoslovak elements counterrevolutionary formally without being Some neworganizations, legalized. which be would defined being, into came Party a Social Democratic reactivated, were Party, People’s and Party Socialist the parties, political existing While initiative. party of the scope beyond way the now became anorganicwas mechanism, which thereform its authority,process because reassert ithad to aware that was also party The country. the over party control andrenew society, and Czechoslovak leadership haltto the reform process, purge “the harmful” elements in the party shape. began take to renewal society civil the of for prerequisites and the pluralism social and a newpolitical of foundations Party,” the and freefrom organizations “leading the and institutions emerged, roleof the wresting themselves independent public being andopinion was formed expressed.Aninfrastructure of Precan, Vilem to According relations. fraternal socialist the from deviations Czechoslovakia’s pressing for the protection “leadingthe of role communistthe of party” andagainst demanding atrue legal All system. were social callinggroups full the for rehabilitation of all a civil mechanism,incontrol and whichindependent semi-independentsocial were actors Bracke,pp.140-141 Precan, “Dimensions of Czechoslovakthe Crisis 1665 of 1967–1970,” p. The problem layThe inproblem themembers the Warsaw factthat Pact werepressuring the The relative rise of the civil society and civil initiatives resulted in the development of development in the resulted initiatives civil and society civil the of rise relative The illegal status.” illegal however,groups, or parties of these None rights. human on broadenedit debate the from there, was allowed strive starting victims; rehabilitation forwas the all Republicof Its point to (n.213).” intocharged fortakeover, by victims 1948“LawtheDefense of communist the of the the NationalThe K213 wasamore controversial matter:itwas organized as a group formerof It Front, rights. human was founded members, by 144 anumber which rose to3,000just and invasion. before the civil of defense the and pluralism party advocated and It socialism.” they continued buildingthe of“anew political system,hithertonever realized inhistory: democratic andK213. first The wasaclub for political toparticipate which in discussion, wanted to have Club new wereKAN,the “Influential organizations Members, Non-Party of Engaged a semi- 113 55 112 CEU eTD Collection 114 transparency the of provide also would rehabilitation the on process andsupervision pressure civil the Eventually, past. the of ashes the over see newregime raking tothe they wanted and opposition of intra-party forcesthe outside now Therewere consciousness. democratic growing evidenced initiative civil the of pressure The personalities. and administrations Novotny’s mistakes by andindependenceand repeat not from therupture pastthe declaring, crimes its prior itface could that regime so for the important was process The rehabilitation with newsystem, givemoral, hadthevictims. aid personal, economic which social to to and unified and be recovered to had practices illegal of victims the Moreover, obligation. political forces. of security shiftfor into reform placeaimed alsoadvantage leadership the cadres the andtheto Dubcek involved indirectly or prevented processes. rehabilitation the personal Important change took which weredirectly network, security andinternal police military,the secret the targeted also compromising figurein favor of reformmoderate led by party.the wasa Svoboda Dubcek, Like of the Republic. asthenewPresident in Svoboda voted April of CCPlenum the headstate, of as Novotny of for replacement the demand Following public 115 responsible for the crimes had be to punished dueto indirecttheiror direct involvement. in authorities which fair the process, legal a demanded initiative civil past years.The the 20 over practices unlawful of victims been had who non-communists, and communist citizens, H.Gordon Skilling, Bracke,p.137 Both civil and political authorities saw completion the of asamoral rehabilitation and were soon removed from from removedwere soon office.” themselves butwith varying publicly,and degreesof self-criticism,admission of guilt General, Chairman J.Litera, Supremethe of Court, andothers defendtried to the Ministerblocked the implementation of rehabilitation. Certain incumbents, such as A. Neuman, and lawyers.itprocurators, stillwas Many, held charged, public andhadoffice and figures but investigators,judges,lesser of high Novotny, also – security officials, of Justice,Cepicka, Bacilek, including, Gottwald, be ultimately responsible, deemedto leaders “The press,J. Kudrna, radio, Ministerand television of Interior, were filled J.with Bartuska, condemnations Procurator of the political Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution Interrupted Czechoslovakia’s 114 56 , p. 375 115 The reformist movement reformist The CEU eTD Collection 116 the of resolution for need the out pointed Manifesto the Furthermore, speech. free of defense the for committees of establishment the demanded and Front National the of representatives for official views. It called for the formation of editorial councils to be composed of mouthpiece a into which had press, degenerated and local the change district the of requested Manifesto the Moreover, problems. the solve to commissions and committees citizens’ and demanded the needof Front, meetingnational special apublic emphasized of committees National the of revival the advised It forces. foreign the of intervention and threat present civil intervention reform Party’sthe vanishingagainstwill to was concerned with and the was a June 1968.Thewas Manifesto Words” Manifesto on 27 published “TwoThousandthe Precan, the “independentPrecan,public” the wasmobilized fears by in two particular: Party was following a middle road, in which it tried to appease everyone. According to Vilem increase of the party initiative.Czechoslovak authorities. The social forces witnessed the gradual slowdown of reform and an The Dubcek leadershipthe against and critiques leadership, reaction the which stifling Soviet the for responsible was taking too much risk, while the of lawjustice. the and and rehabilitation the administrative measures incorrect of inthe revision the wouldresult directly That courts. the Precan, p. 1667 Precan, Written Written by writerthe Vaculik and signedby intellectuals70 artists, and public figures, The reform The movementhands reform be forces, which the strengthened social the of could not Moscow. of “socialism”interests the to preference give would and country, own intheir matters internal be unableand wouldto and Party state Czechoslovak leaders the of thecurrent respect, words, other outside. In “international and from pressure into would give leaders reform the that fear was second The Party.” defend, the the of role “leading the with asincompatible others of rightdemands see the and entities of the CzechoslovakTheobligations,” first was people that to thedecide new onregime that would onlyis considerto say, the demandsthey of wouldsome social give in to 116 57 CEU eTD Collection 118 Heath and215 Company, p. 1992), Europe: Transformation and ed.Lyman Revolution, 1945-1991, H. Legters (Lexington, D.C. 117 and democratic. non-Stalinist socialism, because the aim movement,” “the reform or “political change” suchas concepts, moderate scholars preferred of the party wasthe process in Czechoslovakianot as “a revolution.” Accordingthe to Gordon Skilling, many destruction avoided describing many commentators Therefore, from andmajor society. party the swings without regime its of consolidate could party The socialism, initiative. civil the facilitate immediately not did movement but reform the of nature calm relatively and rather gradual The Spring.” “Prague the to a reformed in communistthe party. Theintra-party struggles andlimited pluralism in party the gave birth pressures. external and internal these mainly dueto resolution, Committee in a Central text the condemned leadership Czechoslovak the Unfortunately, movement. a counterrevolutionary into mutated had andprocess reform the role, its Party losthad leading the Warsaw that leaders Pact the of for it obvious evidence because was leaders and the Dubcekleadership, Warsaw Pact shocked theirinternal affairs. Consequently, exasperatedThousand “Two the Words” Manifesto the in intervene were to countries iftheforeign back government, the to action armed necessary take people the that itproposed Furthermore, process. the reform of continuation a provide to inorder strikes and demonstrations debate, level, local through atthe action” “direct take should they thepeople of insecurity.general argued that Czechoslovakia However, but through butexisting through institutions. The pace of legislative change was slow, astheSlovak step problem well democratization. toward as as animportant nationality as the of means solving one federation it considered and question Czech-Slovak Skilling pp.827-828 “2000 Words: A StatementDemocratization”on (EastEurope,1968) August in Eastern The reform process in Czechoslovakia was first activated by the Czechoslovak elites by Czechoslovak the activated first was inCzechoslovakia process The reform of and chaos astate tocreate want not they didthat indicated The cosignatories 118 The elite-driven reforms affected legal The reforms affected elite-driven procedures, 58 117 CEU eTD Collection “Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution:” Interrupted “Czechoslovakia’s for real the revitalization of parties. opposition the in Skilling book hiswrote Words”freepluralist Manifesto,for they “TwoThousand Inthe and calledelections regime. shown that civil and socialpolicy. my In itopinion, was true especiallythat post-invasion the especiallyperiod had forces had the potentialforeignindependent political butthattheywere and pluralism true alsodemanding status quo, to change the system intoprotect thenew to themselves tosacrifice people were willing andthat revolutionary character a democratic Springhave transformed would a revolution. into itself Hearguedthat the had process from beenif Prague interrupted outside, that the hadnot Skilling process indicated the aim nor toseize governmentnotthe struggle, overthrow power. political asthey did to of forms non-constitutional in themselves involve not did they but reform, of continuation strengthening itself Civil initiatives. of civil society the could express for and apply pressure a and communities intellectual and civil non-communist, of formation a victims, communist only thewithin party initiative. Therewasa publicopinion, arehabilitation growing non-of Prague Spring. Question was not resolved and federalization of the regime was not reified until the end of liberalization not adual hand, process, had experienced On other the Czechoslovakia reorder Czech-Slovak relations on a federal basis, was without parallel in without basis, was a federal on Czech-Slovakrelations reorder to inbe designed legalprocedures.Federalization, byradicalchanges accompanied andthorough systematicin mannerunequaled communistother countries, was and to correctgrossinjusticesindoctrination.was intended in The rehabilitation to process a freedom of expression was a complete break withmajor the reforms Sovietwere extremely radical pattern in the context of theof Sovietmodel.censorship The extent of andthree leastAtexception. oflifewithout all aspects and affected many andsubstantial, of quickeningthe political the currents changes action. Moreover, envisaged were leaders and by intellectual certain all elite, groupswereeventuallysocial into drawn society Although impetusforas a whole. reform initially the was by party given in number –and shift aportentous in balanceof the forces within the party inand apparatchik –the bureaucratic by rulingclass, some 100,000 power group or a strong the old way, and the ruled were unwilling to be so ruled. It involved the gradual loss of classic recipe for a revolutionary situation: the rulers were unable continueto to rule in Lenin’s conforming to order old abreakdown the of of theproduct “January was 59 CEU eTD Collection 119 organic and healthy process inorganic andhealthy process PragueSpring.the system started to change gradually. Thus, the Warsaw Pact troops interrupted an evolutionary, liners in pre-invasion. With motivation the and pressure, legal, the and social administrative in advantage andsecurity cadres, which werestill hard- with political,the bureaucratic packed take to leadership newCzechoslovak the for was hardprocess It formerof regime. the system legal lawless personalities, criminal misdeeds, legacies, carrying was Czechoslovakia newlyloseleadershipenrage total andnorto theSovietto forces. social emerged control to not gradually implemented were reforms The forums. intellectual and political civil, of center became the lands Slovak and Czech process.” were partof this “evolutionary Front National the of activation controlled the and groups, and movements non-communist the of formation the of permission gradual The initiative. civil-intellectual the of growth the with by boosted was which atmosphere, relative pluralist the created Party andSlovak The Czechoslovak of regime. the destabilization the facilitated had independent path to organizing itsfactors, foreign eliterelations. Both and initiatives,civil not only because of the growing civil dissidence and frustration. Rather, the party followed an Theequilibrium internal between civil-social wasdestabilized requests. and external pressures The Czechoslovak Communist Party did posses the power to balance Soviet demands and leadership.Hungarian Revolution party the PragueSpringwasintherole1956 and of of intodeclarations, demonstrations and general strikes. One of the main differences between the transformed which resistance, in apassive themselves mobilized forces social The revolution. Ibid.,834 In my opinion, the progress in Czechoslovakia was evolutionary, not revolutionary. not evolutionary, was in Czechoslovakia progress the opinion, my In The in especially pre-anddevelopments, a signaled post-invasion, thepossibility of pretenses of Soviet federalism.” ofSoviet pretenses Czechoslovakia either before or under communist rule, and was the antithesis of the 119 60 CEU eTD Collection The Press,Harvester 1979),p. 33 Collection ofEssays 120 The court. own their and government their formed they in which status, autonomous subject to the Magyar threat. constantly remain than rather Czechoslovakia, new,democratic the enter to Slovaks preferred includewas to the Czechsand new the state since the Accordingthis to Slovaks, agreement, state. this of foundation for the stage the set representative, Czech the G. Masaryk, and T. intheUS active organizations by Slovak of Agreement, signed May 30, 1918representatives First World War, the Czechs and Slovaks joined forces to form a common state. The Pittsburg subduednot strong Magyarinfluence,nation. were Slovaks the the survivedasa and During and dependence national thousand-year the Despite century. tenth in the State Moravian system. state a federal on based Czechs, with the equal relations establish alsowanted to questionedreforms. theThey andstructural administrative, political society: leading They took positions in Czechoslovakthe Communist Party, they and always in Czechoslovak factor a than moreregulating were Slovaks Moreover, many instances. aggressivelynational the whichhadacted against of demands Czech authorities, in Slovaks wasalways wavedasidebythe The“Slovak Czechs. Question” the centralistof tendencies reform a Slovaksinbalance process. check provided system Czechoslovakia and against the and decision-making representations, elections, parties, local and central the on reflection its Hungarian Revolution wasthe ethnicand in PragueSpring composition Czechoslovakia and the between main differences Oneof the centralism. legacy of Prague discriminative 4.2: De-centralizingPragueSpring:“TheSlovak Question” Frantisek Silnitsky, “The Nationality Problem,” in The Slovaks experienced the fear of total assimilation since the fall of Great the thefall of since assimilation fear of total the experienced The Slovaks the carries as“Prague Spring”, known in 1968,popularly The crisis Czechoslovak , ed. Frantisek Silnitsky, Larisa Silnitsky and Karl Reyman, (Brighton: 120 The Pittsburg Agreement provided Slovaks a kind of Agreement The a provided Slovaks Pittsburgsemi- of kind 61 Communism andEastern Europe:A CEU eTD Collection 121 automatically identified with the Czech people because of the absence of Czech national of Czech of because absence the Czech people the with identified automatically government Czechoslovak the that indicated Silnitsky side. Czech the on equivalent no with Czechoslovakia of Party Communist the of subdivision a special as existed Slovakia of Party Communist The Czechs. the for available are none while government, of organs autonomous maintain special Slovaks to wereallowed this,the Despite Republic. Czechoslovakian the National Council inMay disbanded intowas 1945 andincorporated the central of government Czech the abandon nationalism. in However, Czechoslovak to Front aimed National 1945, expansionism. Nazi against minorities nationalism was reified until the end of the SecondCzechoslovak influence, Magyar WorldStarting with project. a political into was transformed War and the expulsion of German authorities promoted the development of Slovak culture. In my Czech opinion, the Czechoslovakianism consciousness, national strengthen and Magyarization prevent to order In be national one indicated: Slovaks to wereconsidered Silnitsky Frantisek group. idea, and Czechs this According to state. newCzechoslovak inthe “Czechoslovakianism” ideaof national the was country, the of federalization and normalization Husak’s Gustav after even persist would which legacy, Another Czechoslovakia. multinational the of establishment passing day. “Slovak The arise Question” to started from verythe beginning of the Czechs and Slovaks would for mutual work independence toform one country. languagebecameSlovakian theofficiallanguage, tobe used in schoolsthe anduniversities. Ibid., p. 34 The new system politicalof pluralism,multi-partied the with governmentof the with each more centralized became of Czechoslovakia government the However, Czechs and Slovaks becoming unified in one state. the of concept the to rule, Hungarian livedunder who people theCzech of branch Slovakia, and it embodied an entire set of attitudes –from the view of the Slovaks as a of Magyarization the against this Slovaks by theCzechsand jointactions of resultwas the contrary, the To invention. a political not time, that at was, Czechoslovakianism 62 121 CEU eTD Collection 124 123 122 political organs. political population livedpopulation in area. that Slovakia, or slightly over 10 percent, although more than one-quarter of Czechoslovakia’s and of candidates Communistthe Party in1949 from Czechoslovakia of only 236,432 were choice of only a little over30percent of votersthe in Slovakia. Of 2,311,066membersthe Czechs cast their ballots of in 40percent the While over in than provinces Slovakia. Czech the stronger considerably for the Communist were Communists The “SlovakQuestion.” the of persistence the centralism and Prague Party in the 1946 elections, the Party was in centralism. andrepresentation Prague and decision-making resulted the Party Party inof Slovakia, inscribed the in constitution was 1948.In theseinstitutionspractice were setting upof institutionsSlovak suchasthe Slovak Counciland National the Communist pluralism starting from 1948. An asymmetric form of limited federalism,which included the key institutions,political ministries and security forces resulted in liquidationthe of political communist donors. Czech provinces inMuch less property for inwas Slovakiaworkers. distribution than available confiscated the and thus industrial of asmaller ratio had therefore and Czech than areas the agrarian more remained there was Slovakia muchindustrialization, in its upsurge arecent Despite variety. Czech the than conservative less reason Redthe Army than Czechdid Catholicism Slovak provinces. deeper andgoes is more to be thankful of hands atthe heavily more suffered Slovakia that was provinces Czech in the than Slovakia for gifts from the Ibid., p. 42 Taborsky, Ibid., p. 36 The lack of communist traditions in Slovakia was one of the important reasons for reasons important oneof the was inSlovakia traditions communist The lackof Edward Taborsky suggests that the reasons for the weaker standing of the party in party the of standing for weaker the reasons thatthe suggests Taborsky Edward The rise of the communists in the Czechoslovak government and the takeover of of the and takeover the government Czechoslovak inthe communists of the The rise Communism inCzechoslovakia 1948-1960 122 This asymmetrical political arrangement, in turn, created inequalities in inequalities created in turn, arrangement, political asymmetrical This 124 123 63 , p. 41 CEU eTD Collection were in were and positions, to bureaucratic from subordinate subject rule Prague. Slovaks associations, cultural andthe league, youth the Sciences, Academy of the unions, instance, trade the forall institutions, almost In was legalized inthe1960Constitution. which Czech superiority and discrimination, wereawareof TheSlovakthe awakening. people 127 126 125 state. Czechoslovakian the within relations national of analysis an for demands increased and consciousness national Slovak of strengthening a was growth economic the Paralleling development. economic intense undergoing was Slovakia However, rights. essential most their practicallyof all of were deprived organs political Slovakia.national The Slovak granted to centralism hadfunctioned well voices dissident the and suppressed from Slovakia. Twenty-Second Congressof of Communistinthe Party Sovietthe Union 1961,Prague within its own figures andranks sentenced manyimportant of Until Slovakthe Uprising. the enemies its expose began to party the Therefore, Slovakia. and Czechoslovakia of Parties Communist the purify to needed was consolidation Stalinist nationalist.” “bourgeois being of insisting bringing on the Slovak problem to the surface, were called provocateurs and accused would once solve economically. itself Slovakia hadcaughtup automatically nationalities thatthe problem viewof and thought Marxist-Leninist hadmaintained classic the regime communist The society. the of denationalization predicts which Marxism-Leninism, to imply socialist unified nation. The Slovak Question was ignored due to the doctrines of of the idea Czechoslovakianism revitalized in realmsCzechoslovakia, andpolitical economic dominate cultural, which to methodswere aimed of The communists, deprived of powers. real Skilling,53 p. Silnitsky, “The Nationality Problem,” p. 39 Bracke,p.135 The 1960 Constitution of Czechoslovakia limited the autonomy that had already been had autonomy already the limited that Czechoslovakia of Constitution The 1960 The failed reforms did nothing but increase public discontent. Those who were 126 The economic betterment was not the sole reason for the Slovak 64 125 127 For Slovaks, CEU eTD Collection Prague Spring,” 128 129 April 467–495 p.2008) pp. 473 attended by not only Novotny, butalso Nikita Khrushchev. holdingfanfare, ceremonies great Uprising with National Slovak the anniversary of twentieth itthe celebrated year Thefollowing Slovakorganization. and educational important cultural Slovak history. it In 1963 commemorated the centennial Maticathe of slovenska, an in milestones national important celebrated Slovakia of Party Communist the end, this To been the justifying inequalities under name the of converginginto one nation. had his which Hestarted struggleagainstCzechoslovakianism, interests. Slovakthe national andin defend in hewould promote which politics, Dubcek anewcurrent Slovak symbolized FirstParty. Secretary andbecame CommunistBacilek andof Pavol Slovak the David the inAlexander lead Dubcektook the 1963. afterhisstruggle hardliners, againstthe while Karol operative. nationalism” remained heresy “Slovakof whilethe emergeduncompromised leaders Communist Slovak other of trials the for responsible individuals the that indicates Brown constitutionthe of theand weakening thus with institutions. Scott 1960 national of Slovak Novotny hadwith legitimacy,because identified Slovaks had no any reform cosmetic real or Czechoslovakia. According to Skilling, the Communist Party of Slovakia occupied a peculiar followingDubcek policy was arelative federalization the cautious idea,on of because Question,” “Slovak the of treatment for the was critical comeback political Husak’s exculpated theimprisoned and personalities then Husak. likepartially rehabilitated Gustav officially it condemned policiesnational figures. erroneous the on Moreover, Slovak it because nation, Slovak the for important critically were recognition, necessary Novotny’s Scott Brown, “Socialism with a Slovak Face: Federalization, Democratization, and the Ibid.,p. 474 The de-Stalinization process in Czechoslovakia directly affected the Slovak leadership Slovak the affected directly in Czechoslovakia process The de-Stalinization These events, especially the celebration of the Slovak National Uprising and 128 East European PoliticsEast European and Societies 65 , Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sage Publications, 129 CEU eTD Collection 133 132 Spring,”475 p. 131 130 insense. adouble PragueSpring anational the revival, was leadership.Brackeemphasizedthat fall Novotny of Slovakmobilized Question, thus, both Slovaks Czech and andinit the end, contributed to the respect for national rights, which would follow anoverall democratization of the country. The issue ofmorality and conscience in politics. raise the to led the Czechs –all bourgeois nationalists Slovak so-called persecution the the of – consequences tragic its and anti-Semitism terror, political Silnitsky, Frantisek to According theSlovakin supported leadership. cause Czechs reform-minded Many de-centralization. Question.” “Slovak the of resolution the for demand constitutional basis for Czech-Slovak relations. Husak’srevealed appointment the popular made This, inturn, anew Bratislava. Husakadeputy fordeveloping responsible chairman, constitutional in arrangement.impact had His appearances public Pragueand both an anew toward debate pushfederalization needthe the in to heindicated which conferences, on federation. he unity, needmakingreference the didsoin mention state to his for noconstant of opinion out that although Dubcek was promoting Slovak national consciousness as the First Secretary, According to Czechoslovak intellectuals, the Czechoslovak identity inescapably was identity Czechoslovak the intellectuals, Czechoslovak According to only not placeSlovaks of the in andCzechsquestioned Czechoslovakia world. socialist the national identity. The revival Slovakthe of national wasconsciousness Both overlooked. Czechoslovak only of revival the on concentrated Spring”, “Prague as Czechoslovakia and nationalism. centralism Slovak betweenPrague in struggle position this Bracke,p.138 Silnitsky, p.40 Brown, “Socialism with a Slovak Face: Federalization, Democratization, and the Prague Skilling,54 p. The Czech public, not ignoringespecially intellectuals, theagendaof Slovak the were 131 Husak’s in inclusion started withhis politics participation in Smolenice 133 Inmy opinion, general approach, named which the reform spring in 132 66 Reform-minded Czechs weredefendingthe 130 Brown points CEU eTD Collection 135 134 different interests of the Slovak politician and intellectuals. Some Slovaks would press for press would Slovaks Some intellectuals. and politician Slovak the of interests different served federalization” “first argument The process. liberalization the converge within motivations would Slovak Czech and arguedthat debate “federalization-democratization” the on stance neutral a had who intellectuals other many hand, other the On form “aof only.” was by while matter federalization definition contents, and form matter of “a as reform of juxtaposition misleading the had recreated intellectuals even that Slovak indicated Brown in form content. and anoblecause Czechs, was by the wasaimed which “liberalization”, that represented they and Slovakia therefore and Czechoslovakia, of administration the of form the with beingobsessed of Slovaks accused thinkers SomeCzechoslovak Question.” Slovak then democratization, the “first argument the favor to started intellectuals Czech the removal, Novotny’s after contrary, the On indicated: Brown AsScott democratization.” then federalization, “first Slovaks was slogan the of popular butthe among themselves, vary could of Slovaks forum. language The a multilateral into cultural space political and Czechoslovak the issue,transformed which federalization unified the about werenot Slovaks Even Czechs and Slovaks. amongdebates Dubcek,headed Federalization government. the and democracy were thekey in words the Alexander Party, Communist Slovak of Secretary former First the where Czechoslovakia, revival shouldbe not ignored in evaluating “1968”. national Slovak hand, other the On history. and culture identity, European the with connected Ibid.,p. 469 Brown, p.467 The question of federalization was critically important in 1968 reform process of democratization. for Slovak safeguards as successful national for aprerequisite rights institutional champion to them led which democracy, of units basic the of one as nation the regarded they for democracy; necessary precondition as a federalization inthelate1960ssawintellectuals Federalization Slovak The dependent. weremutually democratization federalization many and Slovaks, According to 134 67 135 CEU eTD Collection Westview Press, pp.65-66 1996), 138 137 136 the federalization of Czechoslovakia. From 1 January wassub-divided state into From the 1969 the federalization 1 January the Czechoslovakia. of of entirethe development subsequent “Praguethe towards Spring.” catalyst the became thus Question” “Slovak the in words, put as Jaromir Navratil Therefore, simultaneously. federalization and democratization both needed which Czechoslovakia, had internalized “Slovak Question” and they itrecognized eventually was that questionthe of Czech Many process. reform the during beneficiaries were societies both However, invasion of Warsaw Pact members. lasteduntil the debate The federalization-democratization be would protected. national rights federalization,Therefore, firstinstitutions, they theirwanted in political which and organs a reformed Communist state as it justnation asweakin thatleavetheSlovak would largerby population Czech numerically the had been in the democratic order majoritarianism,outvoting an lead federalization to would democratization without thought of the First Republic. They question. Slovak of the settlement a satisfactory without anduntenable incomplete be would democracy feared argument federalization” “first the of supporters Other surface. the Slovak the brought to problems they people.repeatedly Therefore, which blamed Czechsthey forignorant their and discriminative positioning Slovak against in even in thatexisted reform process, the inequalities balance the hereditary to federalization Slovaks. and Czechs the between normalize relations the to federalization of potential the recognized leadership Soviet The survive PragueSpring. the demise of the to “Action Program” from the major was only reform the Federalization Five.” of “Warsaw the intervention Carol Carol Skalnik Leff, Navratil, Ibid.,p. 487 The federalization-democratization dilemma was resolved after the military the after wasresolved dilemma The federalization-democratization 138 The Constitutional FederationLaw of passed on28Octoberwas 1968andled to The Prague Spring1968,ANational Security Archive Documents Reader The Czech andSlovakRepublics: Nation versus State 68 137 (Boulder, CO: p.7 136 CEU eTD Collection 140 139 normalized andsuppressed thehopes for liberalization and democracy. andin federation terms new unitary a The inway. different of Czechoslovakianism discourse the Husakrenewed asafiction. stayed regime imagined the democratic-federal therefore, democratization was empty and without The content institutionalization. “formal”of federal survivor of resumed trials,underSovietthe the supervision recentralization disguise under the hero- Husak, national Gustav interests. cry fornational to just itout was meaningless that and civil rights wereenacted. rights and civil new securing criminal republics,nor laws for two constitutions separate federal constitution, October 27,1968,was onlythe judicial of enactmentone of 1968reforms:the neither a after the on occupation adopted enactment federation, of the theconstitutional Hübl indicates parliament was renamed the Federal Assembly and new national parliaments were created. Czech Socialist Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic. The previous Czechoslovak Milan “TheHübl, Legacy 1968,”26 of Cashmann,1652 p. This should not be seen as “victory in defeat” for Slovaks. On the contrary, as Milan 140 Federalization under the authoritarian rule showedSlovaks rule authoritarian the under Federalization 69 139 CEU eTD Collection support of support of certain national whichmovements, interpreted as they beingin the vanguard of the in their forthright very became Engels and Marx criteria these of As aresult units. economic modernizecouldnot quickly enough behavethey would dissolved to orassimilated by larger modernize in order to pass through havetobeencouraged to therefore leastwould They developed. werethe nationalistic the phase of capitalismmost were the that states them, those to According Engels. and and byMarx large underestimated then on to socialism. and by was nationalism Indeed, socialism. than appeal If stronger much have they to itself showed follow revolutionsdidthe not in of the predicted1848 Europe Marxist Nationalism path. not got. from have they them take man Wecannot what workinghas nocountry. the proletariat: the indicated of identity.strategy Manifesto national The of the Communist as source prime the nationality, not consciousness, class embracedand phasehistory of post-capitalist reached the society once thestate away with along would wither modernity that of apart capitalism, bourgeois of invention an as nationalism considered followers his and Marx formation. modern and asa fact serious national realize notproblematic the did Marx andEngels Ltd, 1986),p.24 142 141 condition that stemmed from stemmedfrom setof a rational circumstances. that condition 5.1: Marxist-Leninistlegacy:TheInstrumentalApproachtoNationalism SECTION 5: THE INVASIONS RonaldoMunck, Kemp, p. 23 Despite Marx and Engel’s outlook that nationalism would lose its significance in time, significance its lose would nationalism that outlook Engel’s and Marx Despite For Marx and Engels the nation-state was primarily an economic unit, an objective sentiment. be national impetus for would no and internationalists) there byenlightened controlled As capitalism wouldnationalism. – evolve intosocialism, by-product nation-states its was wouldtoo witherso away (or at leastsocialism, be to path evolutionary the on phase a transitional was capitalism as Therefore capitalism. of product the Nation was 142 141 The Difficult Dialogue:The Difficult MarxismNationalism and 70 (London: ZedBooks CEU eTD Collection 146 145 144 143 Association ofPoliticalStudies not. did it when it denounced or them, suited it when nationalism of clothes had movements the stolen Socialist current. an ideological not tactic asapolitical nationalism revolution. international capability to either stabilize or destabilize communist polities. communist destabilize or either stabilize to capability had the clearly Nationalism ofnationalism. character of Lenin controversial was aware the socialism.But nationalismspromote and supersede atacticitself to was self-determination national to right slogan Lenin’s a sense, In policy. aregressive internationalism proletarian leadlater breakdown tothe barriers andnational butthemostof make resolute anything nationalism on the other. advocatingaccount, nations the equality of on hand one the andthestruggle bourgeois against into tendencies both take must Marxism that indicated way serious much a in nationalism to Thus, Lenin’s approach states. between different antagonisms national diminish to can work proletariat the in power Once formation. national sense of in bourgeois the not but ‘national’, become they therefore, nation, of the class leading the rise to to have they supremacy, must political acquire proletariat the Since nations. abolish to wish initially not nationalism to oppose and undermine the nationalism during the Revolution. firstarose Russian wasusing Theaim revolutionary power of bourgeoisie elites. As a result, revolutionary appealingto of The practice its ownexistence. to enjoys the right therefore Lenin did every that nationality exhibits its own particular virtues (language, culture and history) and notion insofarviews the asit feelings thenational importance of recognized and encouraged RobertZuzowski, “Nationalism and Marxismin Europe.” Eastern Ibid., p. 73 Munck, Kemp, p. 26 Lenin was a fierce supporter of the idea of national self-determination, which would which national self-determination, idea of of the supporter a fierce Lenin was “Revolutionary by nationalism,”differed Lenin, from advocated Marxist original the The Difficult Dialogue 143 145 For this very reason their line of argument necessitated to co-opt , Vol.No. 1, 33, (April pp. 71-72 2006), , p. 1 71 146 Therefore, Lenin set socialist Therefore, Politikon: South African 144 CEU eTD Collection authorities and delegates would visit the countries in order to make indigenousthe in to countries surethat the wouldorder visit anddelegates authorities Soviet the necessary, seen was itif points, some In approvals. policy in domestic determinant were Moscow to pilgrimages The consultants. and police political officers, military werecontrolled agents, Europe by Soviet inEastern and Central politics domestic affairs, of the Communistnature indivisible Bloc the importantly, Most preventedUnion. Soviet the of Party Communist the by check them from contacting thein always were agreements Westernintra-state The Union. Soviet the needsof the to were directed world. Besides foreign on Sovietthe Their demands. economies, especiallyheavyindustrialization and production, therefore, had to consult the Soviet Presidium, when they wanted to implement policies. Communist the of role leading the signified had theparty” of role “leading Party the Basically, leaderships. of theindependentpeculiar had their neverestablished Europe andin Central parties Eastern Soviet Union. the inparty Sovietdouble-speak: of communist regimes wastheproduct The communist Therefore,interests had beto suppressed by the party leadership. The emphasis on the leading role of the the policy National states. communist fraternal between andequality the cohesion would damage makers which “national,” of idea the stigmatized communists The socialism. international and party of Eastern expected to followEurope, two basic principles: The protection of the leading role of the communist were leaders of nation Europe Eastern understanding Thecommunist and nationalism. Dogmatic Simplicity5.2: orTactical Complexity doctrine. upon social pressureof the reflected realities self-determination andnational nation-state the nationalism, towards attitude instrumental patriotism revolutionary or nationalism apart from bourgeois nationalism.Lenin’s Soviet-led international socialism made the indigenous communist parties dependent parties communist indigenous the made socialism international Soviet-led Marxist-Leninist nationalismhad view on functioned asasimple guidance of 72 CEU eTD Collection and p.184 Company, 1992), and Transformation Revolution, 1945-1991 147 reality,” “parallel created de-Stalinization However, parties. in thecommunist of control bases the allowed Muscovites conservative toretain was theira strategical It offices. protectmove to hand,they Ontheother communists. reform-minded Presidium promoted hand, Soviet the On one the Europe. Eastern of in parties communist wereechoed the conflicts The intra-party andmethods leaveStalinist theleaders system. reform their Khrushchev to societies. ordered European in anomalies Eastern produced de-Stalinization However, regimes. communist “consolidation.” step towards first make could regimes the Thus, regimes. in communist andthe reforms elections replacements, party would not pose any problems. Moreover, the Kremlin had to give consent to the Kemp indicates the legitimacy dilemma of the communists: the of dilemma legitimacy the indicates Kemp seizeintra-party ledchaotic to thepublic and rivalry reformers process support. reform the between repression liberalization.and against The distrust Sovietexperimentalism, the apparatus. party and state masses;reforms andappeasethe hand, other on the majority in conservativethey resisted the situation and created achaotic atmosphere. On the one hand, the reformers triedimplement to the in exacerbated society the liberalization Simultaneously, relative structure. bureaucratic and administrative leadership causedaparallel dual parties. The European communist Eastern Antonin Liehm, “The Czechoslovak Reform Movement,” in Stalinist oppressive methods enabled the indigenous leaders to establish their establish to leaders indigenous the enabled methods oppressive Stalinist Due to internal and external demands for reform and control, the society oscillated society the control, and reform for demands external and internal to Due reverse. Once they controlled the state they tried to gain control of the nation by championingnation the of its control historygain to and tried they distinctivestate the cultural controlled traditions.they Once Asreverse. they would discover, one the and one organism national and mechanism state the make same to order in will national the or, The ingoal of othermost nationalists works, is to gain control to of thebuild state as a means a of nation-state.structuring The Communists worked in 147 in leadership Soviet which deployed both the reformists andconservatives in , ed. Lyman H. Legters, Lexington, D. C. Heath 73 Eastern Europe CEU eTD Collection 151 10 European Nationalism, Politicsand Religion 150 Sugar and IvoJ.Lederer (Seattle: University Washington of Press, 1971),pp.301-302 149 148 ofHungarian history. factors progressive important emphasized all the Resolution the and history geography, literature, Hungarian improve tongue, mother the the teaching of to Inorder feelings Hungarians. of reverse and the and patriotic process the strengthen decided to state of education tasks public Resolution of the a 1954, Inearly communist consciousness. create to identities and eliminate national Central Committee to in order nationalist of prejudices of were purged Hungary consolidation, textbooks of the Hungarian of Europeannations wererevised. example,duringvarious Eastern For Stalinist Communist histories official Moreover, holidays. national celebrate to started parties The period. Stalin’s Party dealing with Russian languagefrom teaching and national schools heroes rehabilitated duringvilified the Stalinization, but also reforms based on indigenization. Some Eastern Bloc countries excluded sum up, they wanted a legal and more democratic state. wanted to live in better economic they conditionsMoreover, rights. and theypolitical and wantedsocial civil, the partytheir to demanding stop were they state that was terror.problem To population. to conquer government; it was the government that used nationalism winto the backing of the tried who nationalists the not was It below. from change policy for action and demands mass no were There above. from policies national implemented Europe Eastern of leading parties Ibid., p. 9 Peter Sugar, “The Problems of Nationalism in Eastern Europe: Past and Present,” in in in GeorgeBarany,“Nationalism Hungary,” Kemp, p. 6 The process was part of “state-sponsored nationalisms.” “state-sponsored of was part process The not only Atparty leadersde- the communistfacilitated basedon point, reforms this nation to have legitimacy have legitimacy nation authority. to and can hold by power controlling state;but the needs one tosecure support the of the 151 People were not against these national reforms and liberalization, but the liberalization, and reforms national against these People werenot 149 (Hampshire:Ashgate 1999) Publishing Ltd., p. 74 148 Nationalism inEasternEurope Nationalism 150 The Soviet Union and the , ed. Peter F. East CEU eTD Collection reality reality was “defined” by a dreamworld, where daily the life delusion,of shortage, and people.” Social of the by “enemies attacks with permanent was confronted One,” which communists subjugated citizens to the collective illusion of an identity of the “People-as- 152 explained, butwerebig,frightening, impersonal, andnationally strange, deracinating. that wasnot comprehensively clearly framework neverclearly or supranational defined, a forced into people with stages were of declarations solidarity schools, and repeated policies, limited cultural space,including compulsory teaching of Russianthe language in all foreign Becauseof dependent nationalist.” “bourgeois or class international proletarian the andfeeling. triggered anti-Soviet IntheSoviet-imposed and bipolar system, belong people to counterrevolutionaries. and nationalist bourgeois agents, Imperial simpleterms: to countries inboth processes Hungarian Union Revolution Sovietand PragueSpring. reduced the The complex reform not shoulddeceivetheresearcher while analyzingthe in“national” simpleits which equation, idea of the Union used Soviet the Thus, societies. of the differentiation the was against Union Soviet the start, From the societies. the of needs specific the was answering process didnotchange theattitude of Sovietthe leadership, which not questioneven if did reform for Nagy popular The leadershipand Dubcek support of hypocritical. approach Sovietthe was leadershipby asnational Soviet counterrevolutionarythe deviation or the activism. Therefore stigmatized and simplified were process liberalization in the reforms All regime. communist the against dangers direct the were initiative civil in the increase the and pluralism Political in reaction partiespresence of animmediate caused indigenous Union.the Sovietthe which was concentrated only on two conditions.Anything that would threaten the omnipotent Sugar, “The Problems of Nationalism in Eastern Europe: Past and Present,” p. 15 Naturally, this attitude fostered national reactions or search for the national identity national the searchfor or national reactions fostered attitude this Naturally, The diversity of meaning demands hadnothe leadership,and context for theSoviet 75 152 The CEU eTD Collection 155 European Politics and Societies 7:1(Winter 1993),p.153 154 HaraldWydra, York: Routledge (New 2008),p. 66 contradictory position: anti-Stalinism within Sovietthe Union, and inmost neo-Stalinism of Soviet Union, which actsfor been blamed, mighthaveStalin eventuallya ledKhrushchev to Hungarian society. in Party echoed was also Communist Hungarian uncertainty the and the of leadership Democracy,” in Democracy,” 153 Presidium. Soviet the of balance internal in the oscillations to attributable primarily were position Ferenc Vali argued Europe. Central and East in the thatleaderships their and bothregimes communist the theaffected had rise of Imre Nagy to the premiershipparty. The powerstruggle between Lavrenty Georgy Beria, Malenkov and Nikita Khrushchev and his inthe fallfactionalism and jealousy fromgreed, rivalries, was Stalin of thatlegacy The administration. andhad Party the neverexperienced leadershipduring healthy Stalin’s collective 5.3: TheSovietin Invasion 1956: Intimidation Czechoslovakia. in and both Hungary repression theSoviet of thesymbols infervor and attacked motivated wereeasily why bepeople not surprising should itself. It Union Soviet the other, collective “other.” itAs Europeansdomination. acollectiveprovided existed, Soviet Eastern as the long Union from stemmedSoviet Europe in Eastern tension of growing main cause the Maria Todorova, world. better vision a of eschatological the dueto tolerated was victimization Vali, p. 165 Maria Todorova, “Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Communistlegacy in EE,” East Harald Wydra, “The Power of Second Reality:Communist Myths and Representations of According to Vali, the concept of irresponsibility for acts committed outside the outside committed for acts irresponsibility of Vali, concept the to According After Stalin’s death, the Soviet leadership swept into the Presidium obscurity,leadership because swept Soviet the After Stalin’s death, 154 In other words, Soviet indoctrination and coercion resulted in the creation of of a in creation the resulted coercion and indoctrination Soviet words, In other 155 Thefluctuations in Malenkov-Khrushchev Democracy andMythinRussia andEastern Europe 76 duumvirate , ed. Alexander Wöll and damaged theHungarian 153 According to CEU eTD Collection 157 156 as “bourgeois nationalists.” as “bourgeois reformists the party stigmatized communist indigenous in the groups andleaders conservative Soviet the and imperialists” of the activities “subversive the of Union ascendancy as the activities in dissidentthe of groups any communist country would by be interpreted Sovietthe in The the rise Nagy’s “NewCourse.” liberalization for hope during hadsociety, which frustrated had error and of trial method the However, society. the with Party the reconcile to tried and the society even more.Secretary. First Gero was incompetent new asthe was endorsed “advice” andGero accept theSoviet to but little had choice Rakosi ifit as over First Secretary. would someone else HWP bebest took informed Rakosi that to understand “restore wasnecessary unity whatever in bluntly leadership”; Mikoyan to Hungarian the the needsimprove onlyif Rakosi stepped down. Havingbeen authorized by do Presidiumthe to of the situation the would that convincedMikoyan These preliminary talks includingGero. Erno senior and Hungarian officials, other three met Rakosi with July,Mikoyan Budapeston 13 Hungarian Anastas Mikoyan society, was byKhrushchev.charged Upon his in arrival factions. reformist dual fosterleadership polarity to in1953andhelped in conservativebetween and the party created indecisiveness and their conflicts intra-party of resolution in the biasedreferees the always leaders were Soviet the So, Secretary. General as Rakosi Stalinist hard-liner replacing by Minister Prime the as first Nagy recruited had Malenkov Ironically, Party. Communist Hungarian the and Ministry from Prime the removal causedNagy’s in rehabilitation, progress countries. satellite the Kramer, p.179 Ibid.,p. 213 The Communist Party of the Soviet Union delayed the option to interfere physically in stop leadershipferment the disarray To and thewithin Hungarian the growing 157 156 Khrushchev, who spoke for reforms, change, de-Stalinization and de-Stalinization change, reforms, for spoke who Khrushchev, 77 CEU eTD Collection 159 158 Budapest. On 30 October, the Soviet Union announced “Declaration on the Principles of Principles the “Declaration on announced Union Soviet the October, On 30 Budapest. supportleadership had to government currentthe and withdraw from preparedto troops Hungarian in resulted This, inthechange ofthe turn, Sovietcivilians. views,and Sovietthe ofhundredssoldiers causedthedeaths Soviet and of counterrevolution. fighting The a than rather uprising national-democratic been hada event recent the that 28 October on against theforces authority of state Union,and Soviet Hungarian the announcedgovernment of restoration public order. SovietBudapest units into toassist Hungarian troopsand security state forces in the redeploy Khrushchevauthorizedthat change Minister thetruth Zhukov SovietDefense to not did it but evaluations, for open and homogenous not was making Soviet-decision the that Contrary to common judgment andits unanimity, decision without inunprecedented an step matter.such animportant expectation, the discussion participants,other Mikoyan heldfirm in hisopposition. The adopthad Presidium therefore to in the Soviet session showed Despiteall the consensus among thepro-intervention sendinmeasures, only troops. and then political leadership ontheirthethat Sovietshould try willorder Hethought own. restore decision,Hungariansthemselvesthe Anastasmember, that the arguing Mikoyan, opposed participantsother strongly supported introductionthe of Sovietforces, but a key Presidium inHungary. situation focusthe on to agenda the changed had alreadybeen scheduledfor 23Octobertodiscuss matters andother Khrushchev abruptly upon Sovietsthe torequesthelp andinvited A the Soviet troops. Presidium meeting Ibid.,p. 184 Ibid.,p. 183 After the first wave of fighting, in which “the freedom weresuccessful fighters” freedom “thein which offighting, firstwave After the called Gero paranoia, hysterical with mixed mechanism self-defense the of Because 78 158 Khrushchev and all but one of the of one but all and Khrushchev 159 CEU eTD Collection our internationalour duty.” of Hungarianthe giving fulfilled counterrevolution, inroutingthe forces the aidto people we protect the workerclassKhrushchev inHungary. said“in visits hisdelegation during in 1958: negotiation. of decision the reversed immediately So,who Khrushchev, for theacceptable not absolutely Presidium unanimously decisions were neutrality. Both of and declaration then, the Pact Warsaw the from withdrawal approved the full-scale use of military force to < Vol.10/14,No.14, (Minneapolis,pp. 15-16, USA,1958), Government Delegation Visits in Hungary Source Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 162 161 160 the Moreover, military action. would take as alast option they that aware was leadership policy. in Soviet wavering Moscow. of alarmin disarmed authority, Hungarian troops the against state causedeven greater councils. workers’ and revolutionary by system establishing communist the to alternative an were creating peaceful path. Yet, it was hadKhrushchev reconcile relations to aimed Union’s byfollowing the with Hungary the too late to slow down the demanding masses of Hungary, which and Other Socialist Countries:” Socialist and Other Development StrengtheningandFriendship Further between Cooperation of and USSR the http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/issue?issue=724124 “Triumph indestructibleof of Soviet-Hungarian friendship”- The Soviet Party and Ibid.,p. 189 Ibid.,p. 187 According toMark Kramer, the grisly reprisals, thatsome of the insurgents carried out The Soviet Union could not take the risk of losing a Warsaw Pact member Unionlosing Pact risk take the couldnot the and The Soviet of aWarsaw leaving open possibilitythe of total a partial or withdrawal. countries, Warsaw presence inits Pact the forcontinuedand basis troop the reexamine Soviet Union would scrupulously “observe the full sovereignty in Itpledged the socialist future countries.” thatof in equality the between relations each socialist state” of principle of “violations the had rampant committed Moscow and that past, the The European relationsSoviet-Eastern plagued had been mistakes” by“egregious in 161 The last impact on the Soviet leadership was the Hungarian decisions: First, decisions: wastheHungarian leadership Soviet the impacton Thelast 162 The final acts brought an end to the long period of indecision and indecision of period long the to end an brought acts final The 79 >, last accessed 22.03.2009 160 CEU eTD Collection 165 164 War History Vol. 6,No. 4, (Routledge, Nov 2006), p. 493 163 inflamedeconomic and peasantandconverged had the especially end workers discontent for Khrushchev: The lesson an obvious was there However, Europe. Central and inEastern urgent policy more cautious need to improve stirred anti-Soviet existent feelings.Khrushchev understood pursue hehadthat amuch to economic situation experimentationsinterventions inand frequent in domestic of policies socialistother countries socialist countries. His could social and cultural in Europe behazardous. countries “satellite” and Central Eastern The 5.4: “TheRise of Warsaw the Five” in 1968 communist parties andworldwide states vis-à-vis Soviet dominance. itmarkedbut thelimitsit inof thesensethatwashighly for theautonomydisadvantageous of national roads strategy.According toMaud Bracke, it did notcause a break with this strategy, invasion of the limitations revealed ideologicalthe wassuggested by permissiveness that the international wasunshakeable. international relations of the Soviet action in Hungary risk of constituteda thirdWorldWar. Aleksandr Stykalin emphasizes effectiveness the that impunity and a clear proof that intervention. the postwar bipolar system of communistcountries system. quoleft European stabilizethe status thepost-1945 to bipolar system designed world Any ofWestern the the involvement of the Western PowersSoviet by declaring neutrality. Csabaeffort Bekes indicates that the Hungarian leadership was inin adelusion, which empirethey to helpsought the of United and Nations detach withthese no countries realistic would chance be seen ofas riddingan themselves of the Bracke,p.54 Ibid.,p. 493 Csaba Bekes, “The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality,” Cold Khrushchev realized that the impact of his policies, like de-Stalinization, on the on de-Stalinization, like policies, his of impact the that realized Khrushchev 163 No superpower would even dare to create a directly armed conflict and the 164 Besides the international outcomes, the military the Besides theinternational outcomes, 80 165 CEU eTD Collection 166 democratization process, the social forces found more in space forces social themselves the and found mobilized democratization process, reformsthe in Through and Czechoslovakia. impatient more andpeople more demanded were Union. However, of bein harmony Soviet basic principles the the neededto andwith actions measures. repressive violations andconsequently, silenced communist the governments themasses by taking had be demonstrated against to delayedagain, peopleinmany neighboringthe Soviet states as communism after the Czechoslovak invasion. However, the consciousness in the Eastern Bloc leadershipslostinaction.movement in theirfaith world and communist party People had the states, communist andmovements, parties which socialist were awakened by Sovietthe Thereweremore states. communist European EastandCentral for the certainty and stability continuity, of element an always been had socialism International Five.” “Warsaw the needsof tothe time, according this emerged waveof the suppression forces. However, armed 1968. Yugoslavia andRomania hadopposed ideathe ofintervention, and then usethe of indicates: MaudBracke However, communist in countries East and Central shouldEurope beameliorated and improved. status unequal Unionthat quo betweentheSoviet anddiscriminative relations and other was leaders Soviet the for conclusion crucial Another malaise. political and social the with Ibid., p. 56 Alexander Dubcek was aware from DubcekAlexander wasaware of beginninghisthe his leadership that decisions in Czechoslovakia in invasion the to sharply reacted movement communist world The continuity at a time when continuity was much needed. leadershipsinimmediately because the 1956, werenot affected parties of these orientations parties the openlysupported invasion Soviet of Hungary. The internationalist factthe contrary that, whatto happenedin 1968,all WestEuropean the communist of thesewhich regardingquestions major Hence, changes Indicativewere tabooed. of is this insidemovement world the communist insidethese and parties mechanisms by existed parties as later stage, a at felt only were of 1956 effects the here: a role played consciousness” “delayed of phenomenon the because term, short the in parties of Communist internationalism the of orientations basic the consciouslyaffect not did 1956 of events The used internationalism as an element of 81 166 CEU eTD Collection 167 as “strikingly in and Czechoslovakia situation the mean criticized a course followed under developments revolutionary” Dubcek. Czechoslovakia in pressure on Bloc appliedto halt“counter- so-called an the attempt outright significant history in watershed of PragueSpring,the markingthe thefirsttime theSoviet-led Czechoslovakia. Accordingprovide amultilateral forum demandto asuppression of movement reform the in to Navratil,inspillover effect theircountries resulted in Dresden meetings on March 23. Dresdenwould the have conferencewould process reform the and policy foreign its change might Czechoslovakia that of the six communist policies. Romania’s autonomous and byYugoslavia countries, already threatened parties was a essential strengthen ideologicalto unity and unify defenseof the European the socialist itwas Therefore, Germany. of Republic Federal the of of policy the a result tense, extremely developmentstowards in Czechoslovakia. Theybelieved situation in the waspresent Europe regimes.for and the Eastern communist important Central European 169 168 expected. Moscow measures the out never carried but course, reform control the of reassert to repeatedly promised andthey leadership faction Czechoslovak the within pro-Moscow the themselves to they whether allied indicate clearly not they did counterparts, avoid with meetings Soviet to Dubcek that and his from team deviated operational in Soviet the code ways:three they tried the Dubcek leadership gradually lost the control of the reform process. Kieran Williams stated WarsawPact, membersthe of to According leadership. Czechoslovak the topressure order Kieran Williams, Kieran Ibid., p. 32 Navratil, p. 28 Contrary to Ulbricht and Gomulka’s direct accusations on Dubcek leadership, Kadar leadership, Dubcek accusations on direct Ulbrichtand Gomulka’s Contrary to attitude most the critical adopted Poland Republicand Democratic The German The Prague Springandits aftermath 167 The security and unity of the communist bloc were critically bloc were communist the of unity and The security 169 82 , p. 37 168 Thefear CEU eTD Collection 171 Press Prague,1998) p.64 The Prague Spring 1968:A National ArchiveSecurity Reader Documents (Prague:CEU 170 reminiscent of the prologue to the Hungarian tothe counterrevolution.”reminiscentof prologue the the situation by irritating reformist forces, who saw the forum as an interrogation and system and interrogation an as forum the saw who forces, reformist irritating by situation the coercion. attempts torely facilitated Soviet aswell Kadar’s “comradely on approach persuasion” as of Gomulkahelped andUlbrichtpressure put on Czechoslovakthe authorities, whereas views harsh the in which meeting, Dresden in balance the described Navratil themselves. by problems solve its could leadership Czechoslovak the that Hethought be their concerns. not should in Czechoslovakia thedevelopments that indicated and leadership Dubcek’s respected Kadar Janos leader, Only Hungarian the inCzechoslovakia. recentdevelopments the delegates, for example Kosygin, made no attempt to hide their growing dissatisfaction with Soviet Theother Pact. Warsaw ofthe members the between conciliator a being his role follow andwasenjoying a middleto doubtful road was not Gomulka.also tried Brezhnev as Dresden leadership andhe butthe him repercussions, meeting Dubcekpartly reassured and in events Czechoslovakia. home, encounteringinspired, atleast werebeingheby which at indirectly, suspected the been had he difficulties the from part in stemmed clearly Spring Prague the toward Dubcek fiercelyfrom beginning.the indicated Navratil Gomulka’s that pronounced hostility criticized Poland, of leader neo-Stalinist and reformist old the Gomulka, crisis. the of stages in early the approached Union differently each Soviet Republic, Hungary and the Poland, Democratic German the Bulgaria, countries, Pact Five Warsaw The process. decision-making between the Hungarian Revolution and the Prague Spring was the pluralism present in the Navratil, of StenographicAccount Dresden the Meeting, March23,1968in Jaromir(ed) Navratil, Ulbricht was also afraid of the waves of reforms in Czechoslovakia and its domestic its and in Czechoslovakia reforms of waves the of afraid also was Ulbricht The Dresden session worked on the contrary to the desired expectation: itexacerbated expectation: desired the to contrary the on worked session The Dresden 171 The Prague Spring1968:A National Security Archive Documents Reader 83 170 The main differentiation , p.64 CEU eTD Collection 172 signed the “Two ThousandWords:” distinguished scientists, andwas joined by nearly seventy individuals,prominent includingOlympic writers, cultural figures, athletes, as well as manifesto’smore Prague Spring Ludvik writer document. than Theany author, other Vaculik, a number of ordinary citizens who line. reformist from departure leadership potential prevent Dubcek’s attemptto forces to social other nonconformist the of suppression the to approach hesitant Dubcek’s fore. elementsthe to came intervention and the slownessinvitations, needfor the military outside of rejection and Brezhnev’s the Dubcek’s after of the reform process triggered intellectuals and raging in raging full force. were forces counterrevolutionary the that and pro-Western openly become soon policy would foreign Czechoslovak that regime, Czechoslovak the werecovertly undermining United States West its Germany and that the loyal most beingcadres, of Czechoslovakia deprived was of Party theCommunist subverted, and being weakened forces were security army and Czechoslovakia. with their relations to jeopardize not hard worked they hand, other the On Czechoslovakia. tempt would enemies external that personal meetings and calls. leaders the onehand, the On were anxious thepossibility about delegations, ministries, diplomats, foreign atraffic of in Therewas than Hungary. pluralistic continued toexpress their concern about the course of the events. The process was much more leaders and thecommunist was increased bilateral feeling. talks frequency The Sovietof intimidation.of groups in Evenmoderate party the and society by were affected anti-this Ibid.,p. 114 According to Navratil, the “Two Thousand Words” Manifesto came to symbolize the symbolize came to Manifesto Words” Thousand “Two Navratil, the to According The situation got worse, when the Soviet negotiators expressed that the Czechoslovak the that expressed negotiators Soviet the when worse, got situation The at the district and regional levels – through levelspublic criticism,at the districtand regional demonstrations, –through strikes, directactionundertake called to ordinary on andSlovaks The statement upon Czechs 172 These reports raised the alarm among the members of Warsaw Pact 84 CEU eTD Collection 177 1968: A National ArchiveSecurity DocumentsReader (Prague: CEU Press Prague, 1998)p. 173 Czechoslovak case, however, the absence of permanently stationed Soviet troops made the troops Soviet stationed permanently of absence the however, case, Czechoslovak delivery vehiclesagreements providing deploymentof forthe tactical Soviet warheads andnuclear-capable with its soil.on Union had Soviet Inthemid-1960s, drawn up anumberof top-secret Hungary, refused, let throughout 1950sand1960s,the beSoviet to ground troops stationed permanently East Germany, link”“weakest communist had system world. European inthe the of Czechoslovakia defense Poland was thatCzechoslovakia the MaudBrackehighlightes WestUnion Germany.Sovietand and also the both with borders sharing country only the and Czechoslovakia. Pact Warsaw in the those of westernmost In the Five” andwantedRomania andinclusion Yugoslavia’s sessions.the to by anti-Sovietfeeling. didnot wanttobeinterrogated “Warsaw Dubcek and histeam the the “Two Thousand Words Manifesto.” On the contrary, domestic forces were propagating an and targeted pressurecampaigns started Five,” in the“Warsaw especially press, The foreign counterrevolution.”as leaders“anti-socialistof evidencethe denounced theManifesto call to by Czechoslovakleadership Sovietthe manifesto adopting the condemned aresolution, Although So, caughtoff-guard. Dubcekleadership of the was authorization government. the interfere.who might ifnecessary, anyone with backCzechs government, against weapons will our and Slovaks other and they that pledge signatories The affairs. internal Czechoslovakia’s in intervene bemight to preparing “foreign forces” that to a reference with concludes The document “The Two Thousand Words” Manifestoas in (ed) Jaromir Navratil, The Prague Spring Czechoslovakia was geopolitically crucial to the Soviet Union. The country was the was country The Union. Soviet the to crucial geopolitically was Czechoslovakia the June 27without Manifesto on newspapersthe published The Czechoslovak appropriate to out once good [national]reputation.” good out once to appropriate and to “take into our own hands our common cause and give it aform more“improve domestic “carry mounted our to renewal situation,”forward,” the to process grass-roots effortcouldmorebevigorous were outof adds, a office, the statement officials these Once down. step to officials anti-reformist compel to – picketing and 85 173 CEU eTD Collection CEU PressPrague, 1998), p. 239 Navratil, PragueSpring The 1968:A National ArchiveSecurity Reader Documents (Prague: 176 175 174 actual deployment of these arms problematic. arms of these deployment actual revision of Czechoslovak military policies. military Czechoslovak of revision afar-reaching andproposed Organization the Warsaw Treaty criticized inMay 1968,strongly called Memorandum,issued Gottwald Klement by the Gottwald Military Political Academy conventional spending, military and alively developedissue. debate on public Theso- this Czechoslovak society, the construction of facilitiesthe hadbe to postponed until 1969. Consultative Committee. Consultative Political- the of role Command the and in and Joint Pact the Warsaw inthe its army new Czechoslovak military doctrine, which could change the position of Czechoslovakia and chief political officer, General Prchlik emphasizedin a press conference the need todraw up a post-January the border, Czechoslovak the at place taking exercises military Organization’s leadership expressed wishes to engage in commercial, diplomatic and cultural contacts with contacts cultural and diplomatic in commercial, engage to wishes expressed leadership were notwelcomed by the Soviet Union, East Germany and Poland. Furthermore, the Dubcek constructive vis-à-vis policy Romanian leaders,and Yugoslav whoseautonomous policies independentinitiative in international affairs. The Czechoslovak a leadership favored an policyalsoenvisaged in foreign Thenewdirection in role active Europe. more politically newappease a it emphasis leaders due the not couldbut assuming to of Treaty Organization, andWarsaw instrengthen mutual solidarity the mainrespect to the that repeated was aim Union Warsaw intheend.The PactmembershadinvadedCzechoslovakia and officials Czechoslovakia in the Action Program was one of the most important reasons why the Soviet Press Conference with Lt. General Vaclav Prchlik, July 15, 1968 as quoted in (ed) Jaromir Ibid.,p. 139 Bracke,p.143 The Czechoslovak military leadership resisted against Soviet pressures to increase its to pressures Soviet against resisted leadership military The Czechoslovak Besides disturbinginmilitary, changes Czechoslovak foreign the policy of 176 175 86 In July, in response to the Warsaw Treaty Warsaw tothe in response InJuly, 174 Due to the negative the in developments Dueto CEU eTD Collection Warsawcountries Pact Romania without invade to theCzechoslovak in territory August 20. normalizing relations with Federalthe Republic of Germany. These all deviations led the France, Italy and Austria. More dangerously, Czechoslovakia took steps in the direction of 87 CEU eTD Collection Central Europe,” 179 Comparative Politics, 178 177 Soviet Presidium recommissioned them, although they were active even during the invasion. the However, leadership. collective-reformist their of evaporation the witnessed end,they in the and, in politics roles important took and forces reformist the joined they rehabilitation, andpeople’sagainstleadership.After politicians their andthe terror reformist the resentment had and imprisoned experienced hardship,which political of showed them errors the anti-the measures, their Stalinist dueto leadersvictimized were both contrary, the On of leaders. the from emanated experiences the werenot differences The control? and surveillance Soviet the party,” pro-Soviet by adisciplined, society the over control centralized rigid of re-establishment “the predicted normalization Soviet-led limitations. and recentralization of degrees repression, different had experienced societies the leaders, appropriate chosen and in normalization the had Although regulations prescribed Soviets haveand contrasts. similarities Czechoslovakia about restoring extreme predictability. If democratization is about introducing organized uncertainty, then normalization is primarily Czechoslovakia 6.1: Same End – Different Results: Normalization in Hungary and SECTION 6: NORMALIZATION marginal elements” marginal Jiri Valenta, “Revolutionary Change, Soviet Intervention, and Normalization in East- Zvi Gitelman,“The Politics of Socialist Restoration in Hungary and Czechoslovakia,” Edward Taborsky, “The Return to ‘Normalcy’,” 177 How could both societies experience so differently the normalization process under process normalization the differently so experience societies both could How The normalization processes Janos Kadarinunder Hungary in and Gustav Husak “the reconciliation of populations with the regimes and the neutralization of of the neutralization andthe regimes the with populations of reconciliation “the Comparative Politics, 178 13(January p. 187. 1981), and “the reversal of the revolutionary change.” 16(1984), p.128 88 Problems ofCommunism 179 19(1970), p. 31 Kieran Williams Kieran CEU eTD Collection masses had the means even after mass arrests, imprisonments and expulsions and they and expulsions and imprisonments arrests, mass after even means the had masses part of reform the which process, was led only by party the in beginningthe of 1968. The hadreformist emerged. groups willing toresist They were force anyinvading andtheywere and non-communist and mobilized, many massesforces. weretotally The Warsaw Pact escalation of the crisis. Thus, they authorized Kadar, with relative broad powers. was also awarewith arms,of thewhich dashedfrustration theresistUnion not Soviet they that could understood hand,Hungarians people.other the On spirit ofin the the resentment more even cause and revolutionary Hungary in situation and the worsened forces occupation hatred development. of Thethe feeling. Thepresenceof anti-Soviet the the officers many including exacerbated Soviettop Nagy and people leadership and imprisonments,violent suppression arrests, crisis, runaways Hungarian the andexecutions of they did not wrong-doings.The Kadarwitnessed all inHungary,tragedies and insurgents caused great expect the and forces of occupation between fight hand,the other On the and policies. character Husak’s with play anda passive importantrole which longan resistance, would in changeof the met was in Czechoslovakia invasion The forrecentralization. Union’s callings Soviet the nor their regime. consolidated had in they partially which process, reform leading agradual hadbeen thesituation. HusakandDubcek contrary, On the exacerbate masses. They were forced to follow people’s demands, which were too marginal and would lead frustrated to initiative lost the had leadership factionalism the and weak becauseof Nagy wereand Kadar However, not countries. both in revisions in and reforms of a continuation the for position support to control popular Therewas countries. of inboth from nature emanated resistance the the personalities the process, in which the communist party became Czechoslovakia’s almost bloodless resistance was not broken by the presence of the of presence the by broken not was resistance bloodless almost Czechoslovakia’s party neitherexpectations people’s the In theend answer could PragueSpring, the of converging these between normalization of course the in differentiation The 89 CEU eTD Collection 181 180 countries” and cause “the morale of the communists inbe reducedtozero.” of “themorale Hungary communists andcause countries” the to lead tobloodshed' and addedtheintervention would 'erode authority the of socialistthe and destructive be will force military of use “the that warned and intervention military Soviet large-scale favor not he did November, 2 on Moscow to visit his In authority. his legitimize path to followed adifferent Kadar However, "counter-revolution." the of perpetrators inpower leadershipHungary. The Soviet demanding was severereprisals againstthe regain to refuge and Union wereplanning in Soviet the party took ofthecommunist leaders Kadar’s. Husak could many end, In the against andmeasure torepressiveprocess social divisions. started take not consolidate in reform the areversal becausetheysignaled deeplydisappointed, leaders,their were people his regimeHowever,after of theSovietization underground. andworked strikes demonstrated, organized and his normalization process took longer than revolutionary aspects and that hour by hour the situation in Hungary moving situationinrightward, was byhourthe Hungary hour and that aspects revolutionary Hungary in negative auniformly he light.Although claimed thatNagy's hadpolicy counter- According Union. Soviet of the mandate must beunderthe not newthe government that to authorities the Kramer, warned Therefore,herepeatedly even leadership. and his activities base for have apopular was to onit hard how knew He troops. 3 Soviet the of November withdrawal the until freely act and legitimate be Kadar did not portraya socialist country to counter-revolution.” the recentcommunists,” and said that he “agreed with Soviet officials that it was impossible surrenderto events “killing of preventthe failure to the existing government's He highlighted revolution. in in the wereactive elements counterrevolutionary the awarethat hand,hewas other the Ibid. Kramer, p.200 Hungary was under Soviet military administration for several months. The fallen The months. several for administration military Soviet under was Hungary In these meetings, Kadar declared that his new “revolutionary government” could not could government” “revolutionary newhis that Kadar declared meetings, In these 181 90 180 On CEU eTD Collection 185 Revolution,” Hungarian 184 183 182 Revolution,” Ginsburgs, “Demise and Revival of a Communist Party: An Autopsy of the Hungarian ofNagyandPal in executions the deportations culminating andexecutions, purges, arrests, wholesale including yearsintensive “normalization,” Two of process. in normalization the Communism." Gomulka's to or Titoism group, whichRakosi-Gero is Hungarian and asort “thirdof line,” with no connection to the of Communism the with in common anything have to want not does which Revolution, Party. Hedefinedin as“thenew Hungary communism from which type emerged the Hungarian heir totheHungarian Workers’ notthe Socialist Workers’ Party successor and was November 1 the clearly itscreationof Kadar's resolute. predecessor underlay of the policies discredited the from party thenewborn of program the in total divorcing of necessity new communist the of awareness mistakes and past with thatthis preoccupation Ginsburgsindicates George party and emphasizedmisdeeds. than Nagy’s Gero of Rakosi and errors criminal more the emphasized Kadar explicitlymismanagement. Even though hemade less effort todownplay the Soviet’s rolein the events,that the of the responsibility and mistakes his Heconfessed masses. to the be honest had to acounterrevolution. more than no as he whole the uprising described leadership. 1956 In December Soviet imposed by the movement, togetrid clique. of Rakosi-Gerothe popular discontent. leadership torecognizehefrom had Soviet that uprisinggenuine urgedthe stemmed the “Broadcastby RadioKossuth,Free November 1,195621:00hrs., asquoted George Ginsburgs, “Demise and Revival of a Communist Party: An Autopsy of the Ibid., p.201 Ibid. In the course of In Kadar courseof the foundtime, himself adopting which rigidthe formulas, were Unfortunately, Kadar’s approach could not purify Kadar’s supervision hisUnfortunately,not underSoviet approach could terror The Western Political Quarterly 182 In other words, he was arguing that the entire nation took part in the The Western Political Quarterly 183 However, when Kadar analyzed the crisis and knew that he that knew and crisis the analyzed Kadar when However, 185 , Vol. 13, No. 3 (Sep 1960), p. 793 91 184 , Vol. 13, No. 3 , Vol. 13, (Sep 1960),p. 789 Kadar announced in his speech on in George CEU eTD Collection The protocol The protocol was apolitical program for systematically includingundoing the PragueSpring, leaders. an imposed Czechoslovak other the onDubcekand but aDiktat agreement, was not freed, they were tied upby Protocol Moscow the on 26 August.Maud Bracke indicates it that actually werenot leaders Czechoslovak The normalize country. to the his to reverse policies Dubcek andcharged they leaders Czechoslovak the So, released inCzechoslovakia. situation between socialist states. socialist between soldiers as an act of violation international of law and the principles governing relations Politburoof formulated CPC,the on nightof August 21and condemning the entry of adopted Vysocancy the supportingpresent, a quorum the resolution and,of decision the with 188 187 186 begun. had already that system social of the restructuring the of continuation as the as well office, byforce toreturn to of whohadbeen away bepermitted andarms representatives taken party invading andrefused units collaboration political of any state kind.the demanded that They occupation and demandedthe foreign refusedwithdrawal of troops, with tocollaborate the being andmanaged. controlled Thecivil unconditionally resistance condemned the without spontaneously acted and intellectuals workers young people, and of nonviolence the by alienintervention Five.” The by existence triggered population, “Warsaw the whole the prison, and asmany as 600 had been executed. 35,000 had been tried for “counter-revolutionary acts,” nearly 26,000 hadbeen sentenced to hadbeen more than people arrested, 100,000 was complete, process timethe regime. By the Kadar's eliminate mostactiveto opposition the were required to inJune 1958, Maleter Ibid. p. 1669 Precan, Kramer, pp.210-211 187 Following civil initiative, the Czechoslovak delegates assembled at a Prague factory in factory assembled ataPrague delegates initiative, Czechoslovak the Following civil In Czechoslovakia, people had reacted totally differently against the military the against differently totally had people reacted In Czechoslovakia, 188 The leaders of the “Warsaw Five” did not want to exacerbate the exacerbate want to not Five”did the“Warsaw of Theleaders 92 186 CEU eTD Collection McDermott and Matthew Stibbe Berg,McDermott 2006),p.104 (NewYork: Revolution andResistance inEasternEurope:Challenges toCommunist Rule 190 189 attacking only the progressive reformers and his former supporters. As hebecame aresult, hisformer and supporters. reformers theprogressive only attacking course, adogmatic Ulc, steered Otto Husak According to Moscow’shegemony. confines of within the efforts andbymodernization bytolerance characterized national reconciliation, Hungary 1956:a after relatively brief of course repression befollowedto by a program of emulate in Kadar’s to policies expected was 1969. Husak inApril Party Czechoslovakia of FirstDubcek Secretary Husaksucceeded Within of of support as Communistthe the Moscow, demonstrations were violently suppressed by state. the strike to demand newthe launched protested University of policies sit-in students government. anationwide the respectwantlosenot to theirnewly rightsandfreedoms. gained summoned Crowds inbigcities for civil which social did groups, different intheof resulted in mobilization turn, organizations. This, and politicalcensorandleadership began reforms. suspend ban Theand to new political periodicals then rights, of evaporation towitness started the they Czechoslovaksociety, because andfrustrated but all of prevent Consequently,felt systemicthe crisis. change unexpected shocked needto the this these anti-authoritarian leadership TheCzechoslovak memberstates. Pact Warsaw the of impositions and regulations troop presence, but it was affirmed that they would not interfere in the political situation. furthersanctioned the Congress. The document Vysocony of the press, and cancellation the its the party control over full and role”of “leading of the communist the re-establishment the “auto-normalization.” Kieran Williams, “The Prague Spring: From Elite Liberalization to Mass Movement,” in Bracke,p.200 Since theinvasion, Gustav Husak had Communist been running the Party of Slovakia. Kieran Williams has explained the change of the Czechoslovak leaders as of leaders a result of change Czechoslovak the the has Williams explained Kieran 190 The transformation was not only necessary because of the of because necessary only not was transformation The 93 , ed. Kevin 189 CEU eTD Collection (Bloomington: Indiana(Bloomington: University pp.Press, 1984), 346-347 Normalization,” in Normalization,” 192 191 course opposing both the left and the right wings of the party. the of wings right the and left the both opposing course a centrist followed Kadar whereas conservatives, party the of policies the with identified different processes in Hungary in processes Czechoslovakia: and different Hungary purges, arrests,through imprisonment andpolice Jiri terror. brilliantly Valenta compared the opposition political all eliminating by regime his “consolidated” Husak end. in the resistance their help promises to university students and party the the backbonebroke of passivethe keep not leadercould workers’ union the strong pressure, Underin this academies. military from of berecruited cadets a new,union would docile whileunion bebanned, core the would students’ university the that decided Presidium Czechoslovak the Eventually, strike. general calla to union metalworkers’ pact with the establisheda national union students’ because the Jiri Valenta, “The Soviet Union and East Central Europe: Crisis, Intervention, and Ibid. Husak declared war against mobilized workers, trade unions and university students, university and trade unions mobilized workers, war againstHusak declared repression and continuous repression.” repression and continuous endorsement of the continuation of Dubcek’s democratization to a policy slowly from proceeded foran compromisesearch unsuccessful and afictious of open Husak under in Czechoslovakia Normalization us.” with is against us isnot “Whoever in the 1970s: in normalization Czechoslovakia of theprocess describes slogan Kadar’s andin ushered relaxation political and pluralism…The evencautious reverse of achieving and domestic allegiances liberalization.national building for Normalization strategy his reflects – in us” isHungary with us broughtagainst not an end to terror Sovietsthe but bymost famous Hungarians. also Kadar’s is“Whoslogan of 1961 – “In Hungary the pattern of normalization led to a flexible regime tolerated not only by Communism inEasternEurope 94 192 , ed. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone Teresa , ed. 191 CEU eTD Collection Characterization in the Soviet National National in Interest,” Soviet the Characterization 193 Ramundoexplaines:September 1968. in coexistence law peaceful of legalized the and wasestablished “Brezhnev Doctrine” the Therefore, Czechoslovakia. of invasion the justify and rationalize to need the felt had Brezhnev memberbetween mutual andrespect states. relations violated Czechoslovakia and invaded members Pact Warsaw the meetings, bilateral and forums multilateral many After Organization. Treaty had Warsaw the Westparalyzed with the normalization 1970), p.963 legal objective-sounding standard of "peaceful coexistence.” preferring mask instead to biasedanda similarly subjective behind legality morethe obvious, so been not had Soviets the endorsed, they legality international the of statement building of communism," a euphemism for continued serveParty "the saidto lawwas domestic that Soviet indicated Ramundo Bernard leadership. rule of the Soviet Union. In their internationaldomestic law, or thespecial legality and bias purpose reflected of Soviet the In be arranged. had to socialism ofinternational tenets andthe relations which intra-state in establishlegal authorities a needtoorder, hadthe Hungary Soviet the and shown Poland Hungary, but it was formulated law the Khrushchev in tohalt of radicalization peaceful order coexistence a last moment attempt,all, and theyunsuccessful were First of Union. policywhich needsof would international Soviet the servetheand domestic one.defined However, the byevents Stalin in On theLawofPeacefulCoexistence domestically to CONCLUSION advance the cause of socialism. Then, Bernard A. Ramundo, “Czechoslovakia and the Law of Peaceful Coexistence: Legal In the Post-January period of Czechoslovakia, its active foreign policy and the Socialist law and legal actions were considered in communism to be an instrument, be an to communism in considered were actions legal and law Socialist 95 Stanford Law Review 193 , Vol. 22, No. 5 (May CEU eTD Collection 195 194 sensitive to change within the parameters of the basicbe of designedto of coexistence principles the change theambiguity andof peaceful was and policy. constancy the accommodate needto of imperativethe to the subject was coexistence peaceful of law the that out pointes Ramundo socialism. international the of structure flexible” and “organic werethe coexistence of inthe policy strength the and weakness Union. The orderingSoviet socialist-camp of andreliedontheperspective relationships Soviet the of the licenses coexistence peaceful of principle the words, other In authority. the of top the The ofinternational quoprinciple socialism status arranged the Soviet andthe put Union on action in order to protect the interests of of socialism. interests the protect to in action order building Communism. TheHungarian Revolution only latter, proved the needthe to take in interest collective their as well as states socialist individual of interests national the to according function would socialism international of principle The Union. Soviet the by later all andformulated principles other the whichwould encapsulate coexistence, and peaceful benefit, mutual and equality affairs, internal in noninterference nonaggression, sovereignty, for integrity mutual andterritorial respect based onthe“FivePrinciples”: conceptualization his dueto and policies’ authorities domestic foreign by was disgraced Soviet the socialism. international from of couldstigmatized tenets the asadeviation becondemned andmember state Ibid. Ibid.,p. 965 Imre Nagy was removed from his office in the government and party, because Nagy because andparty, from his inthe government removed Imreoffice Nagy was otherwise permits revolutionary struggle revolutionary andcompetition otherwise permits two camps.between the but coexistence, of motivating policy the concern Soviet nuclear aprincipal warfare, needs applies only relationships with intoto non-socialist andtakes states account Sovietthe of waging coexistence peaceful of Theprinciple socialism." and"international coexistence" of "peaceful fundamental principles two into isdivided The lawcoexistence of the international class struggle with capitalist states. It outlaws 96 195 Therefore, the actions of any 194 CEU eTD Collection 197 196 individual party was responsible for the cohesion of the international socialist system. The system. socialist international the of cohesion the for responsible was party individual each that reemphasized Doctrine Brezhnev The regimes. communist European Central also to the other socialistcountries and the entire communistmovement. individualwords, regimes parties or socialist countries. responsibilities had not its only people to but bloc of affairs internal the strictly were relationships bloc that claiming by sovereignty of principle the violated had Doctrine Brezhnev the Ramundo, to According action. necessary totake and interfere to asareason used and “counterrevolutionary” Anything initiative Soviet belabeledcounterrevolution.”could underthe statement “the resolutelyoppose exportandimportof the socialist countries meaning All“FivePrinciples”initiative. hadno inthe legalized the end, whenthe doctrine Soviet the “justified” always had anti-socialist and revisionist nationalist, bourgeois agent, socialistfactions in the country. The concept “enemy of the peoples” such as imperialist of camp the andits own interestpeople. had leadershipbeen thecollective against both Czechoslovak Dubcek’s working people. justificationAnother forces. and leadcounterrevolutionary facilitate would which present provocation, aggression. for the wage a "justto war"suchasself-defense, liberation national and resistance against Soviet internationalrationale relations, it does not outlaw the use of nonnuclear force. Such force may be used in force useof the decries coexistence thelawof Although peaceful internationalism. was socialist and the inpeaceful coexistence thedouble standards hadrepresented assistance” need to protect the true interest of the Ibid.,p. 974 Ibid.,p. 970 The Czechoslovak crisis put an end to de-centralization processes in the Eastern and Eastern in the processes de-centralization to end an put crisis The Czechoslovak anti- andactedagainst targeted forcesthe of occupation The doctrine arguedthat “fraternal justifying legal rationale inthe and The Czechoslovakia occupation 196 Therefore, in both crises the Soviet Union accused imperial influence and influence imperial Union accused in theSoviet crises both Therefore, 97 197 In other In CEU eTD Collection only come through people’s organizing themselves outside the structures of the party of only people’s structures through organizing themselves outsideparty the and come the could change emerge: The to started objectives far-reaching more with movements dissident countries. However, after 1968 all hope for reform within the communist framework died and ruleof temporary Sovietinthe Eastandrestoration the communist Central European consolidation, provided ashort-term invasion The legality,and self-determination. equality interpretation on Soviet one-sidedness of the biasor the indicated and Brezhnev Doctrine the socialismUnion. condemnedthat andRomania role Soviet the and of Yugoslavia the illegalmanyparties intervention by question started international to communist and the disgraced especially was movement communist European The countries. communist between society. in andin party factions the the save and them from imperial-counterrevolutionary to the people of assistthe Czechoslovakia in to they order that acted indicated Doctrine Brezhnev massin Ironically,more period. andnon-violent post-invasion civil the active resistance a experienced and Czechoslovakia justadelusion Five” was of “Warsaw forcesthe theory thatcounterrevolutionary the didfacenotshowed andit anymassresistance occupied troops The Westerninfluence powers. wasno of that there existent had exposed Czechoslovakia leaderin in hierarchy as the passive undisputed resistance Bloc. However, Eastern the campbetween the members. violationmutual independent and ofthe path socialistwas obvious doctrines responsibility afterrelations independentwith Czechoslovakia sought Following West. the anational and policies, After autonomous and powers. Yugoslavia Western Romania’s against the Pact of the coherence and uniformity the Five” proved by “Warsaw the action collective The communism of world because wasdamaged fraternal violation the of the relations SovietUnion’s placeinthe restored and Brezhnev’s The invasion authority reinforced 98 CEU eTD Collection 198 communist regimes. communist state. Their activities would eventually lead to the complete abolition of the Eastern European Fowkes, Eastern Europe 1945-1969 198 , p. 81 99 CEU eTD Collection Korbel, Jozef. Gyani, Gabor. “Revolution, uprising, civil war: the conceptual dilemmas of 1956.” Ben. 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