The Politics of Collective Inaction NATO's Response to the Prague

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The Politics of Collective Inaction Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 NATO’s Response to the Prague Spring

✣ John G. McGinn

Introduction

The successful outcome of a high-level meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in December 1967 augured well for the alliance in the coming year. NATO had adopted a new strategic concept, known as “flexible response,” to replace the outdated strategy of massive retaliation. NATO also had approved the Harmel Report, a landmark document on “The Future Tasks of the Alliance,” which proposed to move away from Cold War confrontation and toward peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.1 Auspicious though these developments may have seemed, the Harmel Report’s two-track approach of “defense and détente” was soon overshad- owed by events in Eastern Europe. In early January 1968, a new leader, Alexander Dubãek, ascended to power in Czechoslovakia and promptly embarked on a series of far-reaching reforms that came to be known as the Prague Spring. Although memories of the bloody fate that befell Hungarian reformers in 1956 spurred Dubãek to offer constant reassurances to the So- viet Union and other members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) of

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance,” 14 December 1967. The Harmel Report was attached as a separate document to the December 1967 North Atlantic Coun- cil Communiqué, because the report was not approved by all of the allies. France, which had withdrawn from the integrated military command of the alliance in 1966, would not agree to all of the Harmel findings, but acquiesced in its release as an attachment because the other allies had approved the report in toto. For a detailed discussion of the 1967 Harmel Exercise and the subse- quent report, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance, updated edition (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), especially chapter 6; see also Helga Haftendorn’s recent work, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis in Credibility, 1966–1967 (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1996).

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Czechoslovakia’s loyalty to the Communist bloc, his pledges ultimately were Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 insufficient. Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops moved en masse into Czechoslovakia on the night of 20–21 August, abruptly ending the political and economic reforms of the Prague Spring. Although NATO members closely watched developments in Czechoslo- vakia throughout 1968, the alliance did not pursue a coherent policy. A close examination of NATO actions from January 1968 until the invasion on 20–21 August helps explain why a coordinated approach never materialized. NATO members were extremely cautious in their actions toward Czechoslovakia primarily because they were eager to strengthen the budding process of détente with the Soviet bloc. Substantive arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union appeared to be a real possibility by the summer of 1968, and most of the allied governments feared that any public pronouncements or other actions by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) would jeopardize the chances for meaningful agreements.2 In addition, most Western leaders believed that any supportive rhetoric from NATO would merely undermine the position of the reformist government in Prague vis-a÷-vis its Warsaw Pact allies. As a result, NATO members worked individually rather than collectively to avert military action in Eastern Europe through the use of quiet diplomacy. Western diplomats secretly conveyed messages to the Soviet Union warning that aggressive actions against Czechoslovakia would have adverse effects on East-West relations. This quiet diplomacy signaled that the allies wanted to avoid increasing tensions with the East but, at the same time, were eager to take steps on their own that would help forestall Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. Earlier studies have not fully resolved important questions about West- ern policy during the crisis. This gap in the literature is quite surprising, because the historiography on Czechoslovakia and 1968 is immense. During the Cold War, many journalists, historians, and political scientists attempted to discern the meanings and lessons of the Prague Spring. In the 1970s and 1980s, scholars such as H. Gordon Skilling, Karen Dawisha, Galia Golan, and Jiﬁí Valenta wrote excellent accounts of these momentous events.3 Since the end of the Cold War, scholars have been able to reexamine the Prague Spring in light of the new evidence that emerged from the Soviet and East European

2. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) was the highest decision-making body in the alliance. For- eign ministers, or more often, designated permanent representatives, spoke for member countries in weekly NAC discussions. 3. Karen Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984); H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); and Jiﬁí Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).

112 The Politics of Collective Inaction archives. Mark Kramer and Kieran Williams have done some excellent work Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 exploiting this new information.4 Furthermore, many pertinent documents have been translated into English from the original Czech, Slovak, or Rus- sian.5 The Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the National Security Archive, an independent nongovernmental research institute and library that collects and publishes declassified American documents acquired through the Freedom of Information Act, have been at the forefront of this work.6 Although the new evidence has furthered historical understanding in important ways, the main focus of the latest research has been on materials from the Soviet and East European archives. As a result, recent examinations of the Prague Spring have looked primarily at policy making in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and other Warsaw Pact countries, with much less attention devoted to the role of NATO during this pivotal East-West crisis.7 Kieran Williams, for instance, does not discuss NATO, the United States, or the West to any significant degree in his recent book. Even the literature that does exist about NATO and the events of 1968, written mostly in the 1970s, concentrates primarily on the impact of the Soviet intervention on the alliance.8 Although this issue is extremely important, it is equally vital to examine NATO’s actions prior to the invasion to get a more complete view of the

4. Mark Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine,” in Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker, eds., 1968: The World Transformed (New York: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1998), pp. 111–173; and Mark Kramer, “The Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion: New Interpretations,” parts 1 and 2, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Nos. 2 and 3 (Fall 1992 and Fall 1993), pp. 1, 4–15, and 2–13, 53–55, respectively. Also see Kramer’s lengthy forthcoming book, Crisis in Czechoslovakia, 1968: The Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion. Kieran Williams similarly mines the archives of Eastern Europe and Russia in his book, The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics, 1968–1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Jiﬁí Valenta has also updated his 1979 book (cited in the previous footnote), based on new evidence. A revised edition came out in 1991 from the Johns Hopkins University Press. 5. In particular, see relevant issues of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin; the anthology Prague Spring ’68: A National Security Archive Documents Reader, translation and headnotes by Mark Kramer (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998); and Miklós Kun, Prague Spring—Prague Fall: Blank Spots of 1968 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1999). 6. Detailed information about these resources and selected documents are available from their respective web sites: http://cwihp.si.edu/ and http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/. See also the web site of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies (http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws), which features images of some of the original Soviet and Czech documents. 7. The main exception is Mark Kramer’s forthcoming book (cited in footnote 5 above), which does provide a reassessment of NATO policy, based in part on newly declassified Western documents. Even Kramer, however, focuses more on Soviet and Czechoslovak perceptions of NATO policy than on the policy itself. 8. See, for example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, NATO after Czechoslova- kia, Special Report Series, No. 9 (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1969); Isaac Don Levine, Intervention (New York: Donald McKay Company, Inc., 1969); and I. William Zartman, Czechoslovakia: Intervention and Impact (New York: New York University Press, 1970).

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1968 crisis. This article will evaluate how well NATO functioned during the Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 crisis and what factors precluded a more effective response. The timing of this reexamination of the motivations behind Western action is propitious. American, British, and other allied records have recently become available under the 30-year declassification rule. Furthermore, NATO documents are now available for the first time ever. The NATO archive in Brussels, Belgium formally opened in May 1999. Since NATO records have never before been available to researchers because of security concerns and financial constraints, this development introduces an important new body of evidence for researchers to examine.9 In short, the time is ripe for a thorough analysis of Western policy during the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia. For an analysis of NATO policy, it is important to describe the context of 1968, particularly NATO’s military and political situation as the Prague Spring began. What actions did NATO take in light of developments in Eastern Eu- rope? As the pace of reform accelerated in Czechoslovakia in 1968, tensions within the Warsaw Pact heightened. What contingency planning, if any, did NATO undertake as a hedge against Soviet military action? How did members of the alliance work to prevent an invasion? And finally, what other international and domestic events affected allied policy throughout the first eight months of the year? The answers to these and other questions will shed light on the nature and effectiveness of NATO actions during the Prague Spring.

The Opening Phase: January to March

Within weeks of taking office as first secretary of the Czechoslovak Commu- nist Party (KSâ) on 5 January 1968, Alexander Dubãek embarked on a course of gradual but bold reform. Censorship and other restrictions on freedom of the press were allowed to lapse. Political figures sentenced during the show trials in the 1950s were rehabilitated. These signs of openness and change produced lively public debates about the future of socialism in Czechoslo- vakia. “The sweeping reforms that ensued during the Prague Spring,” Mark Kramer aptly notes, “brought a comprehensive revival of political, economic, and cultural life in Czechoslovakia.”10 As the pace of change accelerated, Dubãek frequently reassured Soviet leaders of his benevolent intentions. He visited Moscow in late January, and

9. A description of the holdings of the NATO archive is available on the web at http://www.nato.int/ archives/index.htm. Although NATO plans to release most documents 30 years and older, to date the archive has declassified records only through the late 1950s. 10. Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis,” p. 122.

114 The Politics of Collective Inaction the Soviet press reported “full accord” between Czechoslovakia and the So- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 viet Union on a wide range of issues.11 Czechoslovak leaders attempted to draw appropriate lessons from the Hungarian crisis of 1956. Dubãek believed that the Hungarian leader, Imre Nagy, had gone too far when he declared Hungary’s neutrality and withdrew from the Warsaw Pact in early November 1956. Dubãek therefore eschewed any mention of an independent foreign policy and made frequent references to the “unbreakable” friendship between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.12 He often reiter- ated the traditional slogan, “With the Soviet Union for all time!” and he re- newed bilateral alliances with the Soviet Union and neighboring states to confirm Prague’s fidelity to the WTO.13 Dubãek later wrote that he and his colleagues were aware that foreign policy was “an untouchable area.”14 Above all, Dubãek believed that the Soviet Union would tolerate internal reform so long as Czechoslovakia never questioned its membership in the Warsaw Pact and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). New evidence from Russian archives reveals that Nagy’s decision to renounce Hun- garian membership in the Warsaw Pact (though not his actual announcement of it, which came after the Soviet decision to invade) may well have played a part in Moscow’s decision to intervene militarily, though it was not the only factor. Concerns about the Suez crisis and the repercussions from the post- Stalin succession struggle also played a key role in Soviet decision making at the time.15 Thus, although Dubãek was attempting to learn from the 1956 case, it was not clear whether that experience would provide useful guidance about Soviet policy in 1968. Despite Czechoslovak reassurances, Soviet and other East-bloc leaders were increasingly concerned about developments in Prague. From an early stage, Leonid Brezhnev and other members of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) were suspicious about the direction in which the new Czechoslovak government appeared to be heading. Most of the East European states were also worried about the trends in Czechoslovakia. The East German leader, Walter Ulbricht, and the Polish leader, W∏adys∏aw Gomu∏ka, were especially vehement in their opposition to the “anti-socialist

11. Department of State (State), Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Intelligence Note, 31 January 1968, the National Security Archive (NSA), Soviet Flashpoints Collection (SFC), Box I. 12. Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis,” p. 136. 13. Skilling, Interrupted Revolution, p. 617. 14. Dubãek, Hope Dies Last: The Autobiography of Alexander Dubãek (New York: Kodansha In- ternational, 1993), p. 114. 15. Mark Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 188–192.

115 McGinn influences” emanating from Prague.16 The principal reason for their concern Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 was a fear that Czechoslovak liberalization might spread to their own countries.17 Within the Soviet Union as well, great concern arose about a possible spillover from Czechoslovakia. Soviet leaders were alarmed by reports of growing nationalist sentiment in Ukraine, and they perceived clear linkages between developments in Czechoslovakia and the situation in Ukraine.18 The Ukrainian party leader, Petro Shelest, who was also a full member of the CPSU Politburo, was strongly supportive of Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia.19 At a hastily called summit in Dresden on 23 March, the East-bloc leaders voiced their concerns and criticisms of the Czechoslovak government. Because Dubãek and his aides had expected the discussion to be concerned only with economic issues, they were very surprised when Ulbricht opened the meeting by demanding that Dubãek inform the other leaders of his party’s plans for the coming months. When the Czechoslovak delegates inquired about the presence of Soviet and East German generals at the gathering, Brezhnev responded that the officers were present “[s]o that if we need help in solving Czechoslo- vak matters it can be rendered immediately.”20 Dubãek later recalled that this “none too subtle intimidation” was not lost on him or the others.21 As these events unfolded in the East, NATO was busy trying to follow up on the decisions taken at its December 1967 meeting. Although the individual states were keeping track of developments in Czechoslovakia, their main concern was how to implement the recommendations of the Harmel Report, especially the recommendations pertaining to “détente” and a “further relaxation of tensions.” Numerous issues had to be resolved before the principles could be put into practice, but the general direction seemed to be positive. Despite this air of optimism, the Western allies were not counting on any sudden breakthroughs. NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio acknowl- edged that follow-up studies to the Harmel Report did not require dramatic and immediate accomplishments. In a conversation with the U.S. ambassador to NATO, Harlan Cleveland, in February 1968, Brosio said that even the first steps toward implementation of the conclusions of the Harmel Report

16. Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis,” p. 127. 17. See, for example, “Italian Report on Soviet Reactions to Events in Czechoslovakia and the Dresden Meeting,” in Prague Spring ‘68, p. 79. 18. Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis,” p. 144. 19. Mark Kramer, “Ukraine and the Soviet-Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968 (Part 1),” Cold War Inter- national History Project Bulletin, No. 10 (March 1998), pp. 212–227. 20. Williams, Prague Spring, pp. 70–71. 21. Dubãek, Hope Dies Last, p. 141.

116 The Politics of Collective Inaction were important. The alliance had recently emerged from a two-year “crisis of Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 credibility” in 1966–1967, sparked by French President Charles de Gaulle’s decision to pull his country out of NATO’s integrated military command.22 The debate over the flexible response strategy and the role of nuclear weapons in allied defense policy had laid bare some major fissures within NATO that were just beginning to be repaired.23 Slow but steady progress, therefore, was a desirable outcome for Western leaders in 1968. Although détente was a relatively new concern for NATO, some limited movement along those lines had been under way for some time. President Johnson’s “bridge-building” speech in October 1967 had proposed a series of steps to reach out to the states of Eastern Europe. Since the mid-1960s, several West European countries had been increasing scientific, cultural, and financial contacts with the Eastern bloc. Nevertheless, the Harmel Report was the first document that explicitly codified détente as a task of the alliance. It was a difficult task for a military alliance to pursue because the whole notion was predi- cated on influencing perceptions and did not necessarily deal with concrete military capabilities.24 Even so, NATO leaders wanted a relaxation of tensions with the Soviet bloc, and the Harmel formula gave the alliance a way to achieve those goals. Western deliberations about détente focused on the prospects for mutual force-reduction talks with the Warsaw Pact. A study of the practicality of these sorts of arms-control talks was launched in early 1968.25 The main purpose of the talks was to reduce force levels and, therefore, tensions in Europe, but other issues were also at stake. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk believed that reducing frictions in Europe, the area covered by NATO, might induce U.S. allies to provide military support elsewhere in the world, notably East Asia.26 Certain obstacles, however, had to be surmounted before East-West coopera- tion would be feasible. The thorniest immediate issue during discussions held by the alliance’s Political Committee was the question of German reunification. In the past, Western governments had insisted that the German question

22. Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution. 23. Telegram 119536, SECSTATE to the United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- zation (USNATO), 22 February 1968, in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Vol. XIII, Western Europe Region, 1964–1968 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 670. For an in-depth treatment of the 1966–1967 NATO crisis, see Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution. 24. Edwin H. Fedder, NATO: The Dynamics of Alliance in the Postwar World (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1973), p. 48. 25. Telegram 148389, SECSTATE to USNATO, 17 April 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIII, pp. 687–689. 26. Transcript, Dean Rusk Oral History Interview IV, 8 March 1970, by Paige E. Mulhollan, Internet Copy, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library (LBJL), p. 14.

117 McGinn must be resolved before other steps on peace and reconciliation would be Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 desirable. The wisdom of that policy was now being challenged.27 The initial debates in the alliance were further complicated by questions about the future of Europe. The European Economic Community (EEC) had become an engine of European unity and integration, but there were three competing visions for the future of the continent.28 The Atlantic conception, favored by Great Britain, Germany, and the United States, saw European unity and Atlantic connections as complementary and fundamental to the development of European cohesion and strength. By contrast, the Gaullist vision of a “European Europe” sought to create a West European core cen- tered on the Continent and to decrease the presence of the two external “he- gemonic” powers: the United States and the Soviet Union.29 The third conception of the future of Europe, the Soviet idea, would have established a European security conference for the improvement of East-West relations. Although the first two visions were often sources of contention within the alliance, the Soviet idea was not yet seriously considered. Some contemporary observers expressed concern that the European focus on the EEC and détente, combined with American commitments elsewhere in the world, could possibly undermine the strength of the alliance.30 Collective defense was another important subject of discussion in Brus- sels. NATO had to decide how to work out the operational details of flexible response and the arrangements for nuclear decision making within the alliance’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The United States attempted to reassure West Germany about reductions of American troops in Europe that were planned for 1968. The projected cuts were intended mainly to allay the U.S. Senate’s growing irritation at the “dollar drain” from U.S. forces in Eu- rope at a time of escalating conflict in Vietnam. The Johnson administration assured the West Germans that the reductions would not undermine the alliance’s defense posture.31 In a letter to the German government in January

27. Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution, p. 372. 28. On this subject, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Framework of East-West Reconciliation,” For- eign Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 2 (January 1968), pp. 256–272. 29. Ibid., p. 259. De Gaulle’s vision of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals excluded the United States and the United Kingdom, although it assumed the continued viability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. 30. Miriam Camps, “Is ‘Europe’ Obsolete?” International Affairs: A Quarterly Review, Vol. 44, No. 3 (July 1968), p. 440. 31. These reductions were agreed upon after trilateral talks between the United States, Great Brit- ain, and West Germany in 1966 and 1967. These talks focused on the so-called offset issue. Increas- ingly high foreign-exchange costs for the basing of American and British troops in West Germany had created domestic pressure to have the West Germans offset those costs. The three countries reached an agreement in April 1967 (ratified by the full alliance in December 1967) that settled the financial issues and led to the withdrawal of some British and American forces in early 1968. For a thorough discussion of the offset crisis, see Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution.

118 The Politics of Collective Inaction

1968, the United States pledged that it would buttress its presence in Europe Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 “whenever the situation requires,” and that rising political tensions would spur redeployment.32 These assurances, however, were not enough to con- vince West German officials (and other European allies) that it would be feasible to rely on political warning. Nor did the assurances allay West German concerns about the scale of the projected reductions in American force levels. Some in West Germany saw the cuts purely as a rationalization for the redeployment of troops from Europe to Southeast Asia.33 U.S. officials, on the other hand, argued that the reductions were justified because the United States would have sufficient political warning and sufficient strategic airlift capability to bring forces back into the region in the event of a crisis.34 Ten- sion about this matter buffeted NATO to varying degrees throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, and it was one of the most salient intra-alliance issues during the Czechoslovak crisis. One final factor that influenced NATO action was the nature of the alliance itself. NATO was not a supranational organization that made policy for member states; sovereignty remained with the national governments.35 Thus, as one scholar has observed, “the point at which national decisions coincide is NATO policy. NATO cannot command, order, or impose constraints upon members or upon their nationals.”36 This situation gave rise to vexing problems in NATO’s command system. Although the alliance had a significant or- ganizational superstructure, the NAC could not compel members to act or behave in a certain way. The NATO governments were content to put up with this situation. As former U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles remarked in 1956: “All NATO members would, I think, agree that NATO should not at- tempt to represent the totality of their policies. . . . Every NATO country . . . has certain national interests that may sometimes require independent judgment.”37 The alliance was but one aspect—albeit an important aspect—of each state’s foreign policy. This loose arrangement made it inherently difficult to devise a coherent NATO policy toward the situation in Czechoslovakia. In addition, various events both inside and outside Europe hindered the alliance’s ability to respond to events in Czechoslovakia. The biggest diver-

32. Telegram 100911, SECSTATE to USNATO, 18 January 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIII, p. 661. See also, John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Pos- ture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 185–188. 33. Duffield, Power Rules, p. 182. 34. Ibid., p. 185. 35. Paul B. Stares, Command Performance: The Neglected Dimension of European Security (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991), p. 8. I am grateful to Mark Kramer for alert- ing me to Stares’s book. 36. Fedder, Dynamics of Alliance, p. 77. 37. Quoted in ibid., p. 24.

119 McGinn sion for the United States, and indeed for the whole alliance, was the war in Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 Vietnam. More than 500,000 American troops were in Southeast Asia at the beginning of 1968, a commitment that placed significant limits on the Ameri- can political, diplomatic, economic, and military presence in Europe. These limits were particularly noticeable in congressional debates. Although support for NATO generally remained strong in Congress,38 some representatives and senators called for reductions of troop levels in Europe either to support the war in Vietnam or to begin a general retrenchment from U.S. overseas commitments. In particular, the perennial Mansfield Resolution (named after its sponsor, Senator Mike Mansfield) circumscribed the Johnson administration’s freedom of action with regard to military forces in Europe.39 Every year, Senator Mansfield introduced legislation to eliminate most of the American military presence in Europe. Although his efforts never fully suc- ceeded, his resolution became a yearly headache for administration officials and supporters. Moreover, Czechoslovakia’s continued supplies of military aid to North Vietnam in 1968 caused many in Congress (and in the administration) to be wary of extending support to the government in Prague. In early 1968, congressional leaders would not allow a vote on a bill designed to increase U.S. trade with Eastern Europe. For the time being, all “bridge- building” initiatives were stymied.40 The West European countries, for their part, were preoccupied by intra- European crises in early 1968. A particular concern was the relationship between Britain and the EEC.41 The devaluation of the pound in November 1967 had ignited a balance-of-payments crisis in Europe and the United States and helped lead to the rejection in December of Britain’s application to join the EEC.42 In January 1968, Britain unexpectedly announced the withdrawal of its troops from “east of Suez” and from Southeast Asia. Coupled with the cancellation of a planned purchase of American F-111 fighter jets, these defense cuts shocked Europe. Headlines of “Withdrawal into Europe”

38. Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Walt W. Rostow, to President Lyndon B. Johnson, 22 March 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIII, p. 683. 39. Rusk, Oral History IV, LBJL, p. 15. Also, Memorandum of Conversation (hereafter Memcon) among President Johnson, NATO Secretary General Manlio Broslio, and U.S. ambassador to NATO, Harlan Cleveland, 19 February 1968, in Washington, DC, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIII, p. 667. 40. Telegram 119536, SECSTATE to USNATO, 22 February 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIII, p. 669. Also, Rusk, Oral History IV, LBJL, p. 19. 41. Telegram 2131, USNATO to SECSTATE, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIII, p. 678. 42. The French government’s unwillingness to countenance Britain’s entry into the EEC would have stymied British efforts in any case. De Gaulle had made it very clear that he believed Britain was too closely linked to the United States, and that France would veto any formal vote on Brit- ish entry into the EEC.

120 The Politics of Collective Inaction in the London Economist and “The End of a Superpower” in the Paris daily Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 Le Monde criticized the British moves.43 West European solidarity was further weakened by the Vietnam War. Al- though none of the governments had troops in Southeast Asia, they all dis- played a growing unease about the war. De Gaulle claimed that the conflict demonstrated the illusory nature of the U.S. commitment to the alliance and that Europeans should rely instead on their own solidarity to ensure the continent’s security. In response, the Johnson administration maintained that U.S. assistance to South Vietnam—in support of an alliance similar to NATO— was the clearest possible evidence of a continued U.S. commitment to Europe’s defense. Although many European countries did not agree with the American stance on Vietnam, they were equally reluctant to embrace de Gaulle’s vision. Most of the European allies carefully skirted the subject of Vietnam to avoid ir- ritating France or alienating the United States.44 This was particularly true of West Germany, where the government attempted to strike a balance between its relationships with France and the United States. Because both countries were crucial for German interests, officials in Bonn attempted to steer a middle ground between the two. Even so, in March, former West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard reported in Washington that there was growing doubt in Ger- many (and in Europe generally) about the purpose of NATO. Erhard believed that this sentiment was not so much anti-American as anti-war.45 All of these factors roiled NATO as the Prague Spring began to unfold in early 1968. Not surprisingly, initial Western reactions to the developments in Czechoslovakia were subdued. Memories of the 1956 Hungarian revolution were firmly etched in the minds of Western leaders. Calls for “liberation” in broadcasts by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty had been exposed as empty rhetoric in 1956 when Imre Nagy appealed to the United Nations and the West for support against the Soviet invasion.46 In 1968 the firm consensus among NATO allies was that those earlier mistakes must not be repeated. At the same time, most of the Western governments were caught up in the sheer drama of the Prague Spring. French officials were delighted by the changes in Czechoslovakia and were generally optimistic that Dubãek would succeed in the long run. A successful outcome, they hoped, would create opportuni-

43. Both in Survival, Vol. 10, No. 3 (March 1968). “Withdrawal into Europe,” reprinted from the Economist, 20 January 1968, p. 5; “End of a Superpower,” reprinted from Le Monde, 18 January 1968, p. 3. 44. Memcon, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, West German Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, et. al., 21 March 1968 in Washington, DC, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIII, p. 681. 45. Ibid., p. 682. 46. Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises,” pp. 208–209.

121 McGinn ties for other European states to move away from the bipolar framework.47 Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 West German leaders were also optimistic, but they recognized that the situation might turn sour very quickly. West German officials thus reserved com- ment on events and waited for a more stable situation to emerge.48 Although U.S. and West European officials sensed all along that the trends in Czechoslovakia were decidedly auspicious for NATO, they were also deeply concerned about Moscow’s reaction.49 Most of the allies therefore took a cautious approach. The American ambassador in Prague wrote that U.S. “visibility should remain low and [our position should] be one of calm concern.”50 Allied officials were anxious to avoid conspicuous declarations of support for the Prague Spring and any other pronouncements that might work against NATO interests. The United States wanted NATO and the individual allied governments to eschew public discussion of the situation in Eastern Europe. U.S. caution on this matter was also attributable to a fear— based on recent intelligence—that any NAC discussions would swiftly be leaked to the Soviet Union. (It is now known that the leaks were coming primarily from the West German government, which had been penetrated at high levels by East German agents.) In sum, NATO wanted to support the efforts of the Dubãek government without compromising Czechoslovakia’s position vis-a÷-vis the Soviet Union or heightening tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.51 In line with this consensus, the Johnson administration expected that the Czechoslovak authorities would neither “lose their heads” when implement- ing their reform plans nor take any steps that might risk Soviet military action.52 U.S. officials anticipated that events in Czechoslovakia would follow a different path from that of the 1956 Hungarian revolution. Nagy had announced Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and had appealed to the West for financial and military assistance. These actions were widely

47. Airgram, U.S. Embassy Paris to SECSTATE, 2 February 1968; Telegram A1775, U.S. Embassy Paris to SECSTATE, 25 March 1968, both in NSA, SFC, Box I. 48. Telegram 10174, U.S. Embassy Bonn to SECSTATE, 28 March 1968, NSA, SFC, Box I. 49. Telegram 1667, U.S. Embassy Prague to SECSTATE, 25 March 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XVII, p. 189. 50. Telegram 1693, U.S. Embassy Prague to SECSTATE, 29 March 1968, NSA, SFC, Box I. Interest- ingly, over two pages of policy suggestions from the ambassador have been excised from the re- leased document. The suggestions concerned possible ways to use the changes of the Prague Spring to American advantage. It seems odd that these suggestions were excised, since the thrust of the ambassador’s cable calls for low visibility. 51. G. Bennett and K.A. Hamilton, eds., Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III, Vol. I, Britain and the Soviet Union, 1968–1972 (London: The Stationary Office, 1997), p. 65. 52. Ibid., pp. 188–189.

122 The Politics of Collective Inaction

(though not accurately) perceived as having brought on the Soviet invasion. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 In addition, the hostile international reaction to the Soviet intervention in Hungary seemed to diminish the likelihood that Soviet leaders would act similarly in 1968. The West did not expect the Soviet Union to jeopardize plans for an upcoming summit with the United States or possibilities for détente in Europe. Thus, although NATO was keenly interested in the Prague Spring, the obstacles to Western action in the East caused the allies to adopt a wait-and- see approach. Western governments were unable to develop a concerted policy that would take full advantage of the situation. On the contrary, most of the NATO states seemed to assume—and even hope—that internal problems within the Warsaw Pact would go away over time. In the meantime, the West focused on further work in pursuit of the Harmel Report’s call for détente, not least to divert Moscow’s attention away from Prague.

The Prague Spring in Full Bloom: April and May

The vigorous exchange of political, economic, and social opinions in the KSâ and throughout Czechoslovakia during the first few months of the Prague Spring culminated in the adoption of an Action Program on 5 April 1968, which mapped out the future policies of the Czechoslovak party.53 While stressing the importance of the leading role of the Communist party as a guarantor of socialist gains, the Action Program strove for “a new model of socialist democracy” in which “the main criterion for evaluating the status of people in society is how the individual contributes toward social progress.”54 The party would also work to eliminate the harmful characteristics of central planning and guarantee freedom of speech. The Action Program did not discuss the possibility of an independent foreign policy, but Soviet leaders were uneasy about the tone, tenor, and implications of the document. Having already expressed strong concern about Czechoslovak policies at the Dresden Conference in March, Soviet officials sensed that the reform process was beginning to challenge the entire Soviet image of socialism.55 Brezhnev, speaking at a CPSU Politburo meeting

53. For the full text of the Action Program, see Robin Alison Remington, ed., Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 88–137. 54. Ibid., p. 97. 55. R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917–1991 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 250.

123 McGinn on 6 May, denounced the KSâ’s initiative as “a bad program, opening up Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 possibilities for the restoration of capitalism in Czechoslovakia.”56 Subsequently, the Soviet Union and its hard-line East-bloc allies stepped up their criticism of the Prague Spring, using all available channels. In addition, the Warsaw Pact armies began conducting military exercises in and around Czechoslovakia in a thinly veiled effort to intimidate the reformers. During a joint Polish-Soviet war game in May, more than 80,000 men and 2,800 tanks maneuvered in close proximity to the Czechoslovak border.57 Furthermore, larger Warsaw Pact exercises, originally planned for Septem- ber, were moved up to June and were shifted to Czechoslovak soil. Dubãek initially resisted this move, but he eventually relented when the Soviet Union proposed a smaller training exercise requiring only military staffs.58 Although the exercises were scheduled to begin on 20 June, advance Soviet units, ominously led by the general who had commanded Soviet troops in Hungary in 1956, crossed the Czechoslovak border on 30 May. Within a short period of time, over 24,000 foreign troops were positioned throughout the country.59 To prepare the political ground for a possible intervention, the Soviet Politburo authorized Ukrainian leader Petro Shelest on 6 May to act as a secret liaison between the Soviet Union and so-called “healthy forces” in Czechoslovakia.60 Soviet leaders singled out Slovak Communist Party leader Vasil Bil’ak and others as potential members of a Soviet-installed regime. Shelest met clandestinely with Bil’ak over two days in late May. As Mark Kramer has observed, this meeting marked a turning point in Soviet thinking about the crisis.61 Afterward, Shelest urged the CPSU Politburo to intervene in Czechoslovakia—politically or, if necessary, militarily—before the Slovak Party Congress in late August and the KSâ’s Extraordinary 14th Congress in September. Bil’ak had convinced Shelest that pro-Soviet Czechoslovak officials were likely to be removed at both of those meetings. In effect, the Shelest-Bil’ak meeting set a deadline for the resolution of the crisis. The NATO countries monitored events in the East and were aware of the troop buildup around Czechoslovakia, but their chief focus was elsewhere. They believed that NATO had an important role to play in détente. An official at the British Foreign Office noted that there was a distinct feeling in the

56. Quoted in Williams, Prague Spring, p. 73. 57. Ibid., p. 116. 58. Dubãek, Hope Dies Last, p. 158. 59. Williams, Prague Spring, p. 117. 60. For a detailed treatment of the Shelest-Bil’ak meeting, see Kramer, “Ukraine and the Soviet- Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968,” pp. 236–238. 61. Ibid., pp. 236–238.

124 The Politics of Collective Inaction

West that NATO “should be more concerned with a policy of active détente; Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 they needed to be convinced that the alliance’s defensive role was not an anachronism.”62 Specifically, the British official contended that

NATO had a role to play as a clearing house for the exchange of information and plans in this field, and in obtaining a consensus on the way in which individual approaches should be handled and on what were the best subjects for discussion. . . . Moreover within NATO itself, we ought to continue studies on force reductions, on East/West relations and so forth, all of which could be of relevance to the future role of NATO.63

Arms control remained one of the highest priorities within the alliance. The Political Committee began deliberations on the subject of mutual force reductions on 22 April, hoping to reach a consensus for the June Ministerial meeting in Reykjavik. As Undersecretary of State Eugene Rostow wrote to Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, the “objective at Reykjavik should be to promote a meaningful dialogue with the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe.”64 The desire for a positive outcome was counterbalanced, however, by several key obstacles. Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia prompted many NATO leaders to view the likelihood of arms-control talks pessimistically.65 These officials doubted that the Soviet Union would agree to substantive talks while there was turmoil within the Eastern bloc. Some were also concerned that the Soviet Union would cite American actions in Vietnam as grounds for not proceeding further with an easing of tensions. At the national level, the concept of “bridge-building” continued to be debated in the United States and other Western countries. The Johnson administration made the case for increased trade with the Soviet bloc by invok- ing three main arguments: (1) trade would advance U.S. interests in Vietnam and the world; (2) trade in nonstrategic goods would not affect the flow of Soviet arms to Vietnam; and (3) trade would moderate the conflict with the Soviet Union.66 Other observers, however, cautioned against hasty overtures

62. “Record of the Ninth Meeting of the Conference of Her Majesty’s Representatives in Eastern Europe,” 10 May 1968, London, in Bennett and Hamilton, eds., British Policy Overseas, pp. 43–44. 63. Ibid., p. 44. 64. Letter from Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Eugene V. Rostow, to Belgian For- eign Minister Pierre Harmel, 25 May 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIII, p. 698. 65. Memcon, Rusk, Mitchell Sharp, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, et al., Wash- ington, 30 April 1968, in ibid., p. 693. 66. Theodore C. Sorenson, “Why We Should Trade with the Soviets,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 3 (April 1968), pp. 579–582.

125 McGinn to the Warsaw Pact and cited the tense standoff between the Soviet Union Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 and Czechoslovakia as a clear warning of the dangers of dealing with Mos- cow. In their view, “the Soviet Union remains in principle in a position of permanent hostility to the noncommunist world, [and] détente must inevita- bly remain limited.”67 Further complications arose in West Germany, where the government more clearly defined its policy toward Eastern Europe. While reaffirming strong ties to the United States and NATO, Chancellor Willy Brandt argued that the Federal Republic would not let the German issue stand in the way of détente any longer. This stance was articulated in Brandt’s policy of Ostpolitik. Now both détente and reunification were seen as related issues on a long and arduous road ahead.68 NATO also had to contend with the domestic political turmoil that many of its member states were experiencing. Protest movements buffeted virtu- ally all NATO countries in 1968. Along with countless peaceful rallies came a surge of violent confrontations between students and police in France, Brit- ain, Italy, Belgium, West Germany, and the United States. These incidents, and the distractions they posed, were a further barrier against concerted action vis-a÷-vis Czechoslovakia.69 Imminent elections in France, Italy, Canada, and the United States also worked against decisive action by the West. In Belgium, a functioning government had not been in place for several months because political parties could form no workable coalition.70 Outside Europe, the Vietnam War continued to influence the actions of NATO governments. The United States had to cope with the aftermath of the Tet Offensive, the burgeoning antiwar movement, and the rise of the so- called counterculture among American youth. Frustration over the American public’s reaction to the war had induced President Johnson to make a stun- ning announcement on 31 March that he would not be a candidate for president in the November election. Although Johnson pushed hard for a summit with the Soviet Union before he left office, he continued to focus on Vietnam throughout the spring. Europeans hoped that the United States could soon bring a satisfactory end to the war.71 The combined impact of these domestic and international factors rein- forced NATO’s predilection for a hands-off policy toward events in Czecho-

67. Robert Conquest, “The Limits of Détente,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 4 (July 1968), p. 742. 68. Willy Brandt, “German Policy toward the East,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 3 (April 1968), p. 480. 69. For in-depth treatments of the 1968 movements in various NATO countries, see the relevant chapters in Fink, Gassert, and Junker, eds., 1968: The World Transformed. 70. Brandt, “German Policy,” p. 480. 71. Memcon, Rusk, Raymond Barre, Vice President of the Commission of the European Commu- nities, et al., Washington, DC, 5 June 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIII, p. 701.

126 The Politics of Collective Inaction slovakia. At a U.S. National Security Council (NSC) meeting in late April, Sec- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 retary of State Dean Rusk argued that the United States was well advised to maintain a low-key stance. Charles Bohlen, the deputy undersecretary of state for political affairs, seconded Rusk’s “advocacy for quiet diplomacy.”72 Reflecting these sentiments, the State Department counseled its mission in Brussels to urge caution. The department also recommended against hold- ing a special NAC session on Czechoslovakia, adding that “public comments of any kind are risky.”73 A similar approach was recommended in May by the British ambassa- dors to the various Warsaw Pact countries, who had been convened in Lon- don to advise the British Foreign Office. The British ambassador to the Soviet Union noted that developments in Czechoslovakia “were touching very sensitive nerves in the Kremlin” and therefore had important implications for Soviet foreign policy and leadership in the Communist world.74 A senior For- eign Office official summed up the consensus at the meeting when he stated that “Czechoslovakia [had] reached a crucial moment in her history, and might be said to have gone too far in its new policies to be able to turn back.” The Soviet Union could crack down on the Dubãek regime, or it could give higher priority to détente. The actions of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries, the official continued, “would be mostly out of our control; it would not be possible for us to exert much control over them, though we would do what we could.”75 Although a few of the NATO countries had begun to develop contingency plans for a response to Soviet economic sanctions or military intervention, the alliance as a whole never prepared for such eventualities.76 This lack of coordination resulted mainly from a widespread perception that Soviet military maneuvers were little more than a show of force designed to intimidate the Czechoslovak government. Western officials were convinced that the NATO treaty area was not threatened.77 Although information filtering out about Soviet intentions was increasingly ominous, many U.S. and West Eu- ropean leaders persisted in the belief that an armed invasion of Czechoslo- vakia was unlikely. A U.S. Central Intelligence Agency memorandum in May

72. Memorandum for the Record (MFR), NSC meeting, 24 April 1968, NSA, SFC, Box I. The same document can also be found in FRUS, Vol. XVII, pp. 69–70. 73. Telegram 162669, SECSTATE to USNATO, 11 May 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XVII, pp. 196–7. 74. Record of Conference, 10 May 1968, in Bennett and Hamilton, Documents on British Policy, p. 46. 75. Ibid., pp. 43, 45. 76. Memorandum from the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Charles Bohlen, to the Undersecretary of State, Nicholas Katzenbach, 28 April 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XVII, pp. 72–74. 77. Telegram 162651, SECSTATE to all European Diplomatic Posts (Europe), 11 May 1968, NSA, SFC, Box I.

127 McGinn argued that “the best judgment that can be made at this stage is that the Sovi- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 ets will probably stop short of military intervention.”78 Although most analysts did not rule out the possibility of intervention, NATO leaders generally believed that the consequences of an intervention would be so detrimental to East-West détente that Moscow would be deterred from resorting to force.

Spring Turns to Summer

Even after Soviet troops declined to leave Czechoslovakia at the end of their May-June exercises, the Czechoslovak government remained committed to its reform program. Dubãek still did not believe that the Soviet Union would invade. As he recounted in his memoirs, a valid alliance treaty bound Czechoslovakia to the Warsaw Pact, and he was avoiding anything that might cast doubt on his country’s loyalty to that treaty.79 Despite Dubãek’s efforts, the publication of the “2,000 Words” manifesto in late June shattered the uneasy calm in Soviet-Czechoslovak relations.80 Written by a prominent dissident intellectual, Ludvík Vaculík, and signed by several dozen intellectuals and other prominent figures, the statement called for the pace of reform to be accelerated. It also called for the formation of grass-roots movements to lead the reform program.81 To this end, the statement rejected the assertion that the Communist Party should maintain a leading role in society—“no gratitude is due the Communist party”—and contended that spontaneous initiatives at a lower level were needed to get the country moving in the right direction.82 Soviet leaders were outraged by the publication of the “2,000 Words.” An editorial in the CPSU daily Pravda on 11 July called the manifesto “an overt attack against the Czechoslovak Communist Party and the socialist state and against the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people.”83 At an emergency conference in Warsaw in mid-July, the leaders of the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Bul- garia condemned the Czechoslovak leadership. The Warsaw Letter, issued at the conclusion of the meeting, thundered against the forces of “counterrevo-

78. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Intelligence Memorandum, “The Crisis in Soviet-Czecho- slovak Relations,” May 1968, NSA, SFC, Box III. 79. Dubãek, Hope Dies Last, p. 165. 80. Remington, Winter in Prague, p. 195. For the complete text, see “2,000 Words to Workers, Farmers, Scientists, Artists, and Everyone,” in ibid., pp. 196–202. 81. Ibid., p. 199. 82. Ibid., p. 198. 83. I. Alexandrov, “Attack on the Socialist Foundations of Czechoslovakia,” in ibid., p. 207.

128 The Politics of Collective Inaction lution”: “Never will we consent to allow imperialism, by peaceful or Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 nonpeaceful means from within or without, to make a breach in the socialist system and change the balance of power in Europe in its favor.”84 Ulbricht and Gomu∏ka were incensed by Czechoslovak actions and were even more aggressive than Brezhnev. Gomu∏ka insisted that a military solution had become unavoidable. Anything less, he warned, would be an “empty ges- ture.”85 In a fateful decision, Dubãek chose not to attend the conference, real- izing that it would consist exclusively of complaints about the Prague Spring. The Soviet Union continued to pressure the Czechoslovak government throughout the summer.86 Soviet troops stayed firmly in place after the conclusion of further exercises in Czechoslovakia in early July.87 Although the withdrawal of these forces was eventually negotiated, the troop buildup around Czechoslovakia was proceeding rapidly. Moreover, a second clan- destine meeting between Petro Shelest and Vasil Bil’ak took place on 20–21 July. During this discussion, Shelest conveyed Brezhnev’s desire for a “letter of invitation” from the Czechoslovak hard-liners requesting Moscow’s urgent support for the “defense of socialist gains” in Czechoslovakia.88 As tensions between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia increased in July, the NATO countries maintained their low profile toward events in East- ern Europe. Although Western governments wanted to support Czechoslo- vak reform efforts, they decided against the use of public diplomacy to aid the Prague Spring. In earlier discussions with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, West German State Secretary Rolf Lahr had repeated the NATO view that “rash words could only be counterproductive.”89 The American ambassador in Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson, echoed those sentiments on 22 July. “I am convinced,” he wrote, “that our present posture on the Czechoslovak affair is the correct one.”90 In essence, the NATO states were anxious to avoid any inadvertent heightening of tensions with the Soviet Union. For much the same reason, Western leaders refrained from approaching the Czechoslovak authorities directly at any time during the spring or summer. The British ambassador in Prague believed that it was essential for NATO to keep its distance, and he insisted that a discussion with the reformers

84. Skilling, Interrupted Revolution, p. 669. 85. Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis,” p. 147. 86. Telegram 4614, U.S. Embassy Moscow to SECSTATE, 11 July 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XVII, pp. 201–203. 87. Telegram 202635, SECSTATE to Europe, 16 July 1968, NSA, SFC, Box I. 88. Kramer, “Ukraine and the Soviet-Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968,” pp. 239–243. 89. Memcon, Secretary of State Rusk and West German State Secretary Rolf Lahr, Washington, DC, 10 May 1968, NSA, SFC, Box I. 90. Telegram 4751, U.S. Embassy Moscow to SECSTATE, 22 July 1968, NSA, SFC, Box I.

129 McGinn would be a mistake. “Indeed,” he remarked in late July, “I find it hard to con- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 ceive of any useful result [from such an approach].”91 Most of the Western leaders justified their hands-off policy by claiming that officials in Prague themselves wanted NATO to keep quiet.92 In a typical expression of this view, the U.S. ambassador in Prague declared that Czechoslovak officials “seem to prefer handling their troubles within the communist orbit.”93 Despite the cautious stance that NATO adopted, the Soviet Union raised allegations of capitalist subversion twice in late July. In one case, Soviet officials reported the unearthing of a top secret U.S.–European Command (EUCOM) plan for subversive activities in socialist countries in the wake of developments in Czechoslovakia. (There is no evidence that such a plan ever existed, though not all of the relevant documents are yet available.) In the other case, the Soviet press trumpeted the supposed discovery of a cache of U.S.–manufactured weapons in western Czechoslovakia. Although it is now known that the Soviet KGB (Committee on State Security) itself planted those arms, Soviet officials claimed that the weapons had been smuggled in by West German Sudeten “revanchists.”94 Similar reports in the Soviet press in early August harped on other supposed “evidence” of neo-Nazi and West German designs against Eastern Europe.95 For many in the West, these accusations, though obviously spurious, validated the wisdom of NATO’s low-key policy. As the prospect of Soviet military intervention loomed larger, the West- ern allies took certain steps to try to avoid a repetition of the Hungarian experience. They knew they would face moral quandaries if Czechoslovakia appealed to NATO or the United Nations for assistance. Undersecretary of State Eugene Rostow articulated this conundrum in a memorandum to Sec- retary Rusk. He noted that “Czechoslovakia is surely in the Soviet sphere of influence. But that fact hardly justifies murder in broad daylight.”96 NATO tried to avoid any moves that could be seized on as a pretext for Soviet military action. The West German Bundeswehr shifted its “Black Lion” exercises

91. Telegram 2005, British Foreign Office to U.K. Embassy Moscow, 24 July 1968, in Bennett and Hamilton, Documents on British Policy, p. 67. 92. Rusk Oral History IV, p. 21. 93. Telegram 2682, U.S. Embassy Prague to SECSTATE, 22 July 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XVII, p. 211. In one case, however, a private Czechoslovak citizen approached the United States to discuss the possibilities for a “personal loan” to help the Prague economy. The official had lunch with an American diplomat in late April and explored this idea. It appears that this notion was not pursued. See Telegram 1882, U.S. Embassy Prague to SECSTATE, 22 April 1968, NSA, SFC, Box I. 94. Telegram 4720, U.S. Embassy Moscow to SECSTATE, 19 July 1968, NSA, SFC, Box I. 95. Skilling, Interrupted Revolution, p. 733. 96. Memorandum from Eugene Rostow to Rusk, 20 July 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XVII, p. 206.

130 The Politics of Collective Inaction to another part of the country, because the original training area was located Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 too near the Czechoslovak border.97 The risk of an East-West confrontation did not wholly subside, however. A potentially explosive situation occurred in the summer when a few local NATO commanders inadvertently exceeded their authority. In response to the Soviet maneuvers, a British air commander ordered the dispersal of aircraft to defend against a possible attack, and four U.S. cavalry units prepared for combat operations. An even more perilous situation arose later on when a West German division commander based in Bavaria ordered his forces to load up with ammunition, leave their barracks, and move to their wartime defensive positions.98 Although the mobilization was defused in short order, these incidents caused great concern in NATO circles.99 Although Western leaders sought to avoid any further incidents, they also tried in various ways to head off a Soviet invasion. Walt Rostow, President Johnson’s national security adviser, recommended against issuing a public statement (a÷ la 1956) that would foreclose military options for the West. Un- certainty, he argued, could have a useful deterrent effect. In the spirit of the Harmel Report, Rostow recommended forming ad hoc political groups within NATO to discuss possible measures to deal with the crisis in Czechoslova- kia.100 No concerted NATO policy developed, but several alliance members did contact Soviet representatives to discuss their misgivings. British officials met with the Soviet ambassador in late July to relay the message that “encour- aging signs of improvement in East/West relations would all be drastically set back if the Russians walked into Czechoslovakia.”101 Similar messages were conveyed by the U.S. and West German governments. These consultations were intended to highlight the importance of détente and to emphasize that Soviet military action would incur heavy political costs. Even at this late date, however, as tensions mounted in the East, most of the NATO governments did not expect that the Soviet Union would invade Czechoslovakia. They believed that the Soviet leadership had too much at stake in its relations with the West and “would draw back in the last resort from the use of force to bring the Czechoslovaks into line.”102 In July, the U.S.

97. Bennett and Hamilton, Documents on British Policy, p. 67. See also, Stares, Command Per- formance, p. 75. 98. See Stares, Command Performance, pp. 75–76, for a description of this incident. 99. Ibid., p. 76. 100. Memorandum from E. Rostow to Rusk, 20 July 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XVII, p. 207. 101. Bennett and Hamilton, Documents on British Policy, p. 65. 102. Ibid.

131 McGinn embassy in Moscow reported that “we have no, repeat no, indications [of] Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 imminent Soviet military intervention.”103 Even if NATO had wanted to undertake bolder preparations, several factors made it difficult for the alliance to devise any contingency planning or to increase its military readiness. NATO had not yet formulated an operational concept (i.e., a force posture) for the new flexible-response strategy.104 Allied planners were therefore reluctant to change the status of their conventional forces in response to the crisis. In addition, NATO was reluctant to increase its readiness even modestly, because it did not want to give the Soviet Union a pretext for invading Czechoslovakia.105 Although the events in Eastern Europe had important military implications for the alliance, Western leaders were de- termined to avoid anything that might be construed as a provocation. Finally, with over 500,000 soldiers in Vietnam, American forces were stretched thin in the European theater. Secretary of State Rusk called it a “miracle” that the United States was able to maintain reasonable force levels in Europe.106 Throughout the spring and summer, NATO continued working on follow- up studies to the Harmel Report. These efforts culminated in what came to be known as the Reykjavik Signal, which was introduced at the NAC ministerial conference in June. The proclamation affirmed NATO’s willingness to enter into mutual force reduction talks with the Warsaw Pact in the near future. In addition to being part of a détente policy, the Reykjavik Signal was seen as a way to alleviate the growing pressure for troop withdrawals in both the United States and Great Britain.107 NATO’s willingness to continue with these initiatives, despite the situation in Czechoslovakia and the harsh rhetoric from Moscow, underscores the continued salience of détente in the minds of Western leaders. For many NATO countries, including the United States, other foreign policy issues still took precedence over the events in Czechoslovakia. As Jiﬁí Valenta has pointed out, President Johnson paid little heed to Czechoslova- kia, because he was intent on getting the Soviet Union to agree to hold strategic arms limitations talks that would culminate in a summit before he left office in January 1969.108 Moreover, the United States continued to be mired

103. Telegram 4616, U.S. Embassy Moscow to SECSTATE, 11 July 1968. The National Archives and Records Administration Archival Information Locator. Available on the web at http:// www.nara.gov/nara/searchnail.html. 104. Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution, p. 293. In fact, it would be two years before NATO formulated an operational concept for flexible response. 105. Duffield, Power Rules, p. 188. 106. Memcon, Rusk, Barre, et al., in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIII, p. 703. 107. Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution, p. 292. 108. Jiﬁí Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision, rev. ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 191.

132 The Politics of Collective Inaction in Vietnam. Although Secretary of State Rusk later claimed that he had “spent Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 a great deal of time on European questions during the Johnson administration,”109 Vietnam was clearly the administration’s highest priority. A commitment on the scale of Vietnam was bound to divert American manpower, resources, and attention away from European issues. The West European countries were similarly distracted. Britain, although generally supportive of the NATO agenda and decisions, remained beset with balance-of-payments problems. The British also were still coming to terms with the defense cuts and troop withdrawals announced earlier in the year. France, for its part, continued to be a “rather reluctant ally.”110 Wide- spread student unrest in the summer of 1968 preoccupied the French government.111 (The unrest helped bring about the fall of President de Gaulle in early 1969.) As a result, French diplomacy was often unsteady. Although French leaders were unhappy with the Reykjavik Signal, they did not prevent the agreement from being approved. Instead, the French representatives dis- sociated themselves from the document, permitting the other NATO countries to adopt it as an addendum to the ministerial communiqué.112 The NATO countries recognized that the Soviet Union’s posture vis-a÷-vis the West remained hostile in many ways, but most were hoping to reach some sort of broad agreement with the Soviet Union. The Reykjavik Signal was a good example of the Western vision of détente at that time. Although Western leaders pursued as broad a strategy as they could, they did not expect an immediate Soviet response to the offer of mutual force-reduction talks.113 Pressing Soviet concerns in Eastern Europe and lingering issues with the Vietnam war made that unlikely. Even so, continued calls for arms control had significant ancillary benefits for NATO. These actions increased intra-alliance unity and decreased domestic pressure for troop cuts in many countries.114 In fact, at Reykjavik “there was less disarray and more determi- nation” than at any NATO ministerial meeting in recent years.115 Throughout the summer of 1968, NATO’s de facto policy was, like the Harmel Report, couched as a two-track approach. On the one hand, NATO members worked individually, through quiet diplomacy, to try to deter a Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Although the NATO countries were supportive of

109. Rusk Oral History IV, LBJL, p. 25. 110. Intelligence Note No. 512, 28 June 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIII, p. 724. 111. Memcon, Rusk, Barre, et al., 5 June 1968, in ibid., p. 703. 112. Telegram 3403, USNATO to SECSTATE, 8 June 1968, in ibid., pp.707–709. 113. MFR, NSC meeting, 19 June 1968, in ibid., p. 717. 114. Intelligence Note No. 512, 28 June 1968, in ibid., p. 722. 115. Ibid., p. 725.

133 McGinn the Prague Spring, they were anxious to avoid exacerbating East-West tensions. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 They screened all high-level pronouncements on the crisis very closely.116 The main way NATO hoped to avert Soviet military action was by signaling the detrimental effects that an invasion would have on the détente process—a “gentle warning” approach.117 Even as they did this, however, they continued to explore areas for accommodation and détente with the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. The Reykjavik Signal was the clearest example of this effort.

The End of “Spring”: August

The prospects for the Czechoslovak reform movement waned in late July and early August. Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders met at the border town of âierna nad Tisou, from 29 July to 1 August, for four days of talks to address Soviet concerns. Although some press reports hailed the discussions as a “breakthrough,” in reality they produced nothing of the sort.118 The parties had reached the point where candid communication was no longer possible. One remark by Brezhnev was particularly telling in this regard. When Dubãek commented on the breadth of public support for his government, Brezhnev responded (as Dubãek recalls): “If I gave instructions, I too could have a ton of letters here [expressing support] in no time.”119 As the delegations parted ways on 1 August, no resolution had been achieved, and tensions quickly heightened again. The leaders of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and the other WTO states (except for Romania) met two days later, on 3 August, in the Slovak capital Bratislava for a one-day conference. This multilateral meeting was equally unsatisfying. At the core of the resultant joint declaration were two contradictory principles. The declaration recognized the right of each socialist state to chose its own path to socialism, but it also recognized the right of other socialist states to intervene if they feared counterrevolution.120 In the end, Dubãek agreed to a joint declaration that stated, among other things, the “common international duty of all socialist countries [is] to support, strengthen, and defend the gains of socialism.”121 This declaration was later

116. Bennett and Hamilton, Documents on British Policy, p. 65. 117. Telegram 2005, the Foreign Office to U.K. Embassy Moscow, 24 July 1968, in ibid., p. 67. 118. Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis,” p. 149. 119. Dubãek, Hope Dies Last, p. 168. 120. See the text of the Bratislava Declaration in Prague Spring ‘68, esp. p. 327. See also Williams, Prague Spring, p. 103. 121. Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis,” p. 149.

134 The Politics of Collective Inaction cited in support of the intervention and, in retrospect, was a clear precursor Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 to the Brezhnev Doctrine, which authorized the use of force to protect socialist governments anywhere in the Soviet bloc. Equally important, though not known at the time, the Bratislava meeting gave Bil’ak an opportunity to pass on to Shelest the “letter of invitation” requesting Soviet military support in Czechoslovakia.122 This letter was instru- mental in solidifying CPSU Politburo support for military intervention. Prepa- rations for possible military action against Czechoslovakia had accelerated even before the âierna and Bratislava conferences. Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops began to mass around the Czechoslovak border in late July and early August.123 The introduction of five Soviet field armies and a 70-percent increase in tactical aircraft deployed in the vicinity of Czechoslovakia brought the preparations to their climax.124 These troop movements were detected by Western intelligence services, but none of the officials who saw the information regarded it as a cause for alarm. On 17 August, the Soviet Politburo unanimously approved a final decision to “lend urgent military assistance” to the “healthy forces” in Czechoslovakia.125 In addition to downplaying the growing signs of an imminent Soviet invasion, Western governments continued to look for some basis for hope in Eastern Europe. The United States initially reacted to the âierna meeting as if it had given a reprieve to Dubãek.126 U.S. State Department analysts reported that a modus vivendi, albeit a precarious one, had been worked out between Prague and Moscow.127 Unlike in July, State Department cables that assessed the crisis in August no longer discussed the likelihood of Soviet military intervention.128 Even if these cables had been gloomier, it was clear that U.S. officials were not going to change their posture. Western leaders hoped for the best, but they were unwilling to undertake forceful public action, for fear of the attendant dangers to détente, peace, and security. The State Department instructed its posts in Europe that “we and everybody else in NATO have not wanted to make things more difficult for Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks understand [that], so do the Russians.” When presidential candidate Richard

122. Ibid., p. 150. 123. Telegram 3998, U.S. Embassy Belgrade to SECSTATE, 14 August 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XVII, pp. 505–506. 124. CIA Intelligence memorandum, “Military Developments in the Soviet-Czechoslovak Confron- tation,” 2 August 1968, NSA, SFC, Box III. 125. Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis,” pp. 163–164. 126. Telegram 2825, U.S. Embassy Prague to SECSTATE, 4 August 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XVII, p. 233. 127. Telegram 213732, SECSTATE to Europe, 2 August 1968, NSA, SFC, Box II. 128. Telegram 215343, SECSTATE to Europe, 6 August 1968, and telegram 218860/1, SECSTATE to Europe, 10 August 1968, both in NSA, SFC, Box II.

135 McGinn

Nixon visited President Johnson at his ranch on 10 August, Nixon restated the Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 familiar policy that “the best line publicly is that this is a sensitive situation. We have sympathy but to say anything would not be helpful.”129 Soviet leaders privately understood the hands-off approach adopted by U.S. officials.130 At a CPSU Politburo meeting, Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko noted:

There’s no danger of a large-scale war [with NATO] now. The situation is favorable in this respect. However, if we let Czechoslovakia go, others might be tempted, too. But keeping it [Czechoslovakia] will strengthen us. The international situation has no surprises in store for us right now.131

Not only were Soviet leaders aware that NATO would not go to war over Czechoslovakia; they also knew that Czechoslovakia itself had made no preparations for organized armed resistance.132 Dubãek had forbidden any such preparations, not least because he suspected that Soviet leaders would quickly learn about them (from their agents in the Czechoslovak army) and would seize on them as a pretext for military action. Dubãek still hoped to avert an invasion through political means, but all his efforts proved futile.133 The invasion, dubbed Operation Danube, commenced just before midnight on the night of 20–21 August.

Conclusions

Throughout the 1968 crisis, the NATO countries sought to avoid antagoniz- ing the Soviet Union or taking other steps vis-a÷-vis Czechoslovakia that would exacerbate East-West tensions. This approach, they believed, would be the only possible way for the Czechoslovak reforms to take root and flour- ish. In retrospect, it is clear that NATO’s policy not only failed to prevent the Soviet invasion, but may even have encouraged it—inadvertently—by giving Soviet leaders a high degree of confidence that they could move into Czecho- slovakia with a free hand.

129. Notes of meeting at LBJ Ranch, 10 August 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XVII, p. 234. 130. Telegram 214831, SECSTATE to Europe, 4 August 1968, NSA, SFC, Box II. 131. “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS to 19 iyulya 1968 goda,” 19 July 1968 (Top Secret), in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Fond (F.) 3, Opis’ (Op.) 45, Delo (D.) 99, Listy (L1.) 418–419. Special thanks to Mark Kramer for this citation and translation. 132. Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis,” p. 159. 133. Miklós Kun, remarks at seminar, “Prague Spring—Prague Fall: Blank Spots of 1968,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, 23 February 1999.

136 The Politics of Collective Inaction

Did NATO miss opportunities for public diplomacy or other steps that Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 could have forestalled the Soviet military intervention? Jiﬁí Valenta has argued that a firmer posture by Dubãek and a “credible demonstration of Czechoslovakia’s will to resist” could have deterred the intervention.134 Dubãek, Valenta contends, took every possible political and moral step to prevent Soviet action, but his failure to consider military measures ensured his eventual defeat.135 Dubãek, however, vigorously disputes Valenta’s contention, and argues that military resistance would have resulted in a “sense- less bloodbath,” that reformers had not yet solidified their hold on the government, and that the Czechoslovak armed forces were under the control of antireformist officers.136 In the final analysis, Dubãek’s reasoning seems more persuasive. Although a brinkmanship course may have been successful, the dangers of escalation and misunderstanding through such a policy could have been disastrous. The Berlin crises and Cuban Missile Cri- sis had demonstrated in stark terms the potential dangers of superpower confrontation. Western leaders were therefore reluctant to go down a similar path in 1968. Instead, the NATO countries opted to remain focused on détente throughout the Prague Spring. On the very day that the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia, President Johnson and Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin were scheduled to announce imminent strategic arms limitation talks between the two countries. Forced to cancel the announcement, Johnson lamented: “The ‘Cold War’ is not over.”137 NATO had tried to maintain the long-term vision inherent in the Harmel Report, and indeed over the long run, this position turned out to be successful. The setback for nuclear arms control proved to be only temporary. Discussions on strategic arms limitations began in 1969 and led to two bilateral treaties in the 1970s. The quiet diplomacy of NATO member states did have an impact, particularly in the longer term. During the crisis, this diplomacy conveyed West- ern displeasure with Soviet aggression. Although these efforts did not prevent the Soviet intervention, they did help expose the dubious nature of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. By eschewing direct contacts with the Prague government, NATO avoided giving the Warsaw Pact an alibi for its military action. When the Pact’s armed forces crushed the Prague Spring,

134. Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, p. 187. 135. Ibid., p. 190. 136. Ibid., pp. 188–189. 137. Quoted in Frank Costigliola, “Lyndon B. Johnson, Germany, and ‘the End of the Cold War,’” in Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, eds., Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1936–1968 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 208.

137 McGinn the bankruptcy of Communist “solidarity” was starkly evident. Events in Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/1/3/111/695152/152039799316976823.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 Czechoslovakia in 1968 revealed that the Soviet Union would not tolerate any deviation within the bloc and would intervene to reverse the course of any “counterrevolutionary” movement. Over time, this policy—termed the Brezhnev Doctrine—would prove to be disastrous to the Soviet cause. Finally, although the alliance never articulated a unified and coherent policy toward events in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring, NATO did abet individual Western efforts and facilitate discussions that supported the goals articulated in the Harmel Report. Such an outcome was probably the most that could have been expected, given the nature of the Atlantic alliance. Disparate national interests, domestic unrest, distractions elsewhere in the world, and the dynamics of consensus decision making precluded a stronger NATO stance during the events in Czechoslovakia. This result underscores the problematic nature of NATO crisis management during the Prague Spring.

Note

This article builds on a paper presented at the June 1998 annual meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations in College Park, Maryland. This effort represents the first step in a larger project that will explore NATO policy throughout the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia. The article is based on English-language sources as well as translated Czech and Russian documents. Later stages of the project will entail detailed research in various allied archives. The author would like to thank Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, David Painter, Lawrence Kaplan, Mark Kramer, Monica Belmonte, Lisa Davenport, Simon Limage, Vanessa Garcia, and four anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments, suggestions, and insights on earlier drafts of this article.

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