To Read More on the Prague Spring

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To Read More on the Prague Spring MILESTONES The Prague Spring A Year of Awakening In 1968, Czechoslovakia was a country revelling in the excitement of change. After some twenty years of authoritarian government, an urgent summons for a new form of communism arose from almost every corner of Czech society. "Socialism with a human face" called for the integration of democratic and socialist ideals and placed itself in direct conflict with Soviet interests. Now, 25 years after this monumental year of upheaval, as the Czech and Slovak republics come to terms with the aftershock of a more recent revolution, it is important to remember the energy and defiance instilled by the Prague Spring. by Alison Pion tion of communism-one that incorporat tims of the 1950 purges and his negative ed a number of Western democratic ele attitude toward the some 4.5 million Sb- This spring a great chance has been ments. yaks living in Czechoslovakia. These given us... It is now up to us to Reformers called for an end to cen policies, as well as his support of censor make our way through unknown sorship and for the establishment of laws ship, particularly alienated numerous conditions, to experiment, to give and party statutes that guaranteed the intellectuals and students and encouraged the Socialist development a new right to dissent. They also demanded them to speak out in favor of change. look, while leaning upon creative recognition of Czechoslovakia’s freedom Intellectuals were well positioned in Marxist thinking... .No one could to determine domestic policies without Czechoslovakian society to be a powerful forgive us were we to waste this outside intervention from powerful coun force for the reform movement. chance, were we to give up our tries such as the Soviet Union. Endowed with a certain respect and status opportunities. due them from their education and role -from a Czechoslovakian govern as cultural leaders, but removed from ment document on reform, entitled political positions that afforded them "Czechoslovakia’s Road to Social influence over the government’s actions, ism," April 19, 1968. intellectual reformers were free to point wenty five years ago, while students out the government’s failures without T in the United States demonstrated for incriminating themselves. civil rights and for an end to the vietnam The intellectual assault on the com War, and while French students and labor munist administration began at the Writ leaders took to the barricades in Paris, ers Congress Conference in Prague in Czechoslovakian youth groups and intel June, 1967. Impassioned speeches and lectuals conducted their own struggle for [Electromap, Inc.] demonstrations called for an investigation reform. The so-called "Prague Spring," into the activities of Novotny’s regime. with its emphasis on rebirth and change, Declarations boomed that, now, the time challenged the ruling Czechoslovakian The Winter Preceding: The Rule of was ripe for change. In response, the Communist party. It pushed Czechoslo discipline Antonin Novotny Novotny government moved to vakia’s leaders to break with the Stalinist these writers through jailings and stricter model of communism and to declare their Despite the tight reign and Stalinist-style censorship regulations. country’s independence from the Soviet governance of Communist Party Chief However, the spirit of reform had bloc. Antonin Novotny, the late 1960s saw the already taken hold of the people and was However, the Prague Spring did not growth of an increasingly restless and not so easily extinguished. Intellectuals denounce communism altogether, the frustrated public who condemned and and student groups continued to press for criticized activities government. basic tenets of which were integral to the the of the the removal of Novotny and for a change movement’s vision of reform. While it Many Czechoslovakians faulted Novotny in government domestic policy. Even did directly confront the ideological and for his retention of the old Stalinist from within his own administration, political monopoly of the Czechoslo bureaucracy and his refusal to give full Novotny was confronted with demands vakian communist government, the backing to Czechoslovakia’s economic for reform as more and more politicians movement strove to create a new defini reform measures. He was also unpopular sensed the changing mood of the for his failure to compensate fully the vic 4 . QpJQJJ3 . JULY1993 Czechoslovakian population. Trouble in Moscow government made no appeal to the people Public reports outlining the abuses While the spirit in Czechoslovakia was to confront the invaders and, instead, and scandals of the Novotny regime one of euphoria and rebirth, Moscow’s preached passive resistance. flourished. The Communist party was mood was a great deal more somber. A From Spring to Winter increasingly discredited, while the reform collective warning by Soviet, Polish, East movement was energized. As tensions In an effort to maintain his power, German, Hungarian, and Bulgarian lead Dubcek struck mounted, the Soviet Union-all the while a compromise with the ers to the Czechoslovakian government Soviets. legitimized anxiously awaiting the outcome- He the presence of went unheeded. Though the Soviet bloc foreign troops pledged a policy of non-interference in in Czechoslovakia, agreed suggested that Czechoslovakia ought to to increase restrictive measures the Czechoslovakian power struggle. against proceed cautiously with its reform poli dissidents and to restore censorship, and Alexander Dubcek and the Blossom cies or face potentially harsh reprisals promised to purge the 1968 reformers ing of SprIng like those Hungary received in 1956, from the political arena. In return, the In January of 1968, Novotny was the Dubcek regime still declared its right Soviet Union offered Czechoslovakia to determine domestic policies without replaced by Alexander Dubcek as head of economic assistance and continued peace outside interference. the Czechoslovakian communist party. between the two countries-an agreement Dubcek had been a leading figure in the that effectively reinforced the political mounting Slovak opposition to Czech ties between the two countries. dominance in the country’s post-war However, most Czechoslovakians years. He now came to symbolize the remained angry and frustrated by the spirit of reform and the hopeful mood of Soviet Union’s invasion and repressive the Prague Spring. measures. Large and militant demonstra Almost immediately after his ascen tions against the U.S.S.R’s actions sion to power, Dubcek eased regulations occurred in late October and early regarding censorship and began to move November, but the spirit of rebirth was his country towards a model of commu already largely stifled. The verbal nism that encouraged political discussion protests by communist parties in and dissidence. It is unclear whether Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Italy did noth Dubcek himself shared the desire for ing to affect the Soviet Union’s hard-line reform or whether he simply reacted to position on Czechoslovakian reform. the insistent demands of the people. In Throughout the next three years, either case, in a reform platform pub individuals active in the Prague Spring lished April 9, 1968, Dubcek’s party out Prague’s Old Town Square with Tyn Church movement were either jailed or expelled in background [Nicholas Breyfogle] lined its plan for monumental change. from Czechoslovakia for their activities. Included in the package were regula Vladimir Skutina, former TV commenta tions that guaranteed freedom of speech, tor and a well known advocate of change, press, assembly, and religious obser Czechoslovakia’s reform movement was sentenced to two years in prison on vance. It established electoral laws raised fears in Moscow about the possible charges of having written unpublished adverse effects on Soviet Union’s designed to broaden the choice of possi the pamphlets slandering Czechoslovakia and ble candidates and provide greater oppor power position in Europe. It provoked the U.S.S.R. A group of fifteen Czech tunities for non-communist parties. concern that Czechoslovakia’s example intellectuals charged with "subverting the might lead to other anti-Soviet outbreaks Dubcek’s plan for reform also included republic" were sentenced to prison terms economic policies that afforded public in other parts of Eastern Europe. The ranging from 12 months to 2.5 years. reforms had already received support and private businesses more indepen These, and hundreds of other trials, com from Yugoslavia Rumania. Con dence and allowed them to trade openly and bined with police searches and random with Western nations. In addition, there fronted with a mounting sense of vulnera mass round-ups, frightened the popula was a plan to establish an independent bility, Soviet leaders became increasingly tion and silenced public demands for judiciary system and draft a new constitu convinced that a policy of non-interfer reform. tion for implementation in 1969. ence towards Czechoslovakia would be What had once been in Czechoslo To keep Dubcek in line and remind counter-productive. vakia a time of spring, hope, and rebirth him of his promises to the Czechoslo Thus, on August 20, 1968, quickly transformed into a cold winter of vakian people, the country’s leading intel Czechoslovakia was invaded by the silence and resignation. Yet, the energy lectuals issued a manifesto on June 26, armed forces of the five Warsaw Pact and optimism of this movement that gal powers. Despite level 1968. The piece, entitled "2,000 Words the high of hostili vanized the country into action continues to Workers, Farmers, Scientists, Artists, ty felt by the Czechoslovakian public, to be commemorated each year in life’s. and Everyone," warned against a return to resistance to the predominantly Soviet enduring cycles. As the revolution of authoritarianism. The manifesto also force of 400,000 was largely non-violent 1989 has shown, while spring leads sea called for all Czechoslovakians to push and grassroots based. Reluctant to posi sonally to winter, winter leads just as nat for further reform of old Stalinist prac tion itself in direct opposition to the Sovi urally and inevitably to spring.
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