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Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition Memory: A Complementary Learning Systems Approach

Kenneth A. Norman and Randall C. O’Reilly

[email protected], [email protected]

in press, Psychological Review

29th August, 2002

This version may differ in minor ways from the final published version Abstract

We present a computational neural network model of recognition memory based on the biological structures of the and medial cortex (MTLC), which perform complementary learning functions. The hippocampal component of the model contributes to recognition by recalling specific studied details. MTLC can not support , but it is possible to extract a scalar familiarity signal from MTLC that tracks how well the test item matches studied items. We present simulations that establish key qualitative differences in the operating characteris- tics of the hippocampal recall and MTLC familiarity signals, and we identify several manipulations (e.g., target-lure similarity, interference) that differentially the two signals. We also use the model to address the stochastic rela- tionship between recall and familiarity (i.e., are they independent), and the effects of partial vs. complete hippocampal lesions on recognition. Contents Methods ...... 24 Results ...... 24 Introduction 4 Tests of the Model’s Predictions ...... 25 Dual-Process Controversies ...... 4 Simulation 6: Interference and List Strength 26 Cognitive Neuroscience Approaches to General Principles of Interference in our Models 26 Recognition Memory ...... 5 List Strength Simulations ...... 26 Summary: Combining the Approaches . . . . . 6 Methods ...... 27 Precis of Modeling Work ...... 6 Results ...... 27 Complementary Learning Systems . . . . 6 Interference in the Hippocampal Model . . . . 28 A Dual-Process Model of Recognition . . 7 Interference in the Cortical Model ...... 28 Part I: Basic Network Properties . . . . . 7 Differentiation ...... 29 Part II: Applications to Behavioral Phe- Boundary Conditions on the Null LSE . . 29 nomena ...... 8 Tests of the Model’s Predictions ...... 29 A Note on Terminology ...... 10 Self-Report Measures ...... 30 Modeling Framework ...... 10 Lure Relatedness ...... 30 The Cortical Model ...... 10 List Length Effects ...... 31 Familiarity as Sharpening ...... 11 Fast Weights ...... 31 The Hippocampal Model ...... 12 The Hippocampal Recall Measure . . . . 13 Simulation 7: The Combined Model and the In- Simulation Methodology ...... 13 dependence Assumption 32 Basic Methods ...... 14 Combined Model Architecture ...... 32 Simulating YN and FC Testing ...... 14 Effects of Encoding Variability ...... 33 Interference Induced Decorrelation ...... 33 Part I: Basic Network Properties 15 Simulation 8: Lesion Effects in the Combined Simulation 1: Pattern Separation 15 Model 34 Simulation 2: Nature of the Underlying Distribu- Partial Lesion Simulation Methods ...... 34 tions 15 Hippocampal Lesions ...... 34 Limits on Diagnosticity: High Average Overlap 16 MTLC Lesions ...... 35 Simulation 3: YN Related Lure Simulations 17 Relevant Data and Implications ...... 35 Methods ...... 17 General Discussion 36 Results ...... 17 Implications for Theories of How Recall Con- Sources of Variability 18 tributes to Recognition ...... 36 Other Sources of Variability ...... 19 Implications for Theories of How the Hip- Sources of Variability: Summary ...... 19 pocampus (vs. MTLC) Contributes to Recognition ...... 37 Part II: Applications To Behavioral Phenomena 19 Comparison with Abstract Computational Simulation 4: Lure Relatedness and Test Format Models of Recognition ...... 37 Interactions 20 Comparison with Other Neural Network Mod- Forced-Choice Testing and Covariance . . . . . 20 els of Hippocampal and Cortical Contri- FC Simulations Using the Basic Cortical butions to Recognition ...... 38 Model ...... 20 Models of Hippocampus ...... 38 Cortical and Hippocampal Simulations Models of Neocortical Contributions to With Encoding Variability . . . . 21 Recognition Memory ...... 39 Methods ...... 21 Future Directions ...... 40 Cortical FC Results ...... 21 Alternate Dependent Measures ...... 41 Hippocampal FC Results ...... 21 Conclusion ...... 41 YN Results ...... 21 Acknowledgments 41 Tests of the Model’s Predictions ...... 22 Appendix A: Algorithm Details 41 Simulation 5: Associative Recognition and Sensi- Pseudocode ...... 41 tivity to Conjunctions 23 Point Activation Function ...... 42 Methods ...... 23 k-Winners-Take-All Inhibition ...... 42 YN Results ...... 23 Hebbian Learning ...... 43 Effects of Test Format ...... 24 Weight Contrast Enhancement ...... 43 Norman & O'Reilly 3

Appendix B: Hippocampal Model Details 43 Appendix C: Basic Parameters 44 References 45 4 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

Introduction While it is obvious that recall can (in principle) con- tribute to recognition judgments, the notion that recall Memory can be subdivided according to func- routinely contributes to item recognition performance is tional categories (e.g., declarative vs. procedural mem- quite controversial. Practically all extant math models of ory; Squire, 1992b; Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993), and recognition consist of a unitary familiarity process that according to neural structures (e.g., hippocampally- indexes in a holistic fashion the “global match” between dependent vs. non-hippocampally-dependent forms of the test probe and all of the items stored in memory (e.g., memory). Various attempts have been made to align Hintzman, 1988; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Humphreys, these functional and neural levels of analysis; for exam- Bain, & Pike, 1989). These familiarity-only models can ple, Squire (1992b) and others have argued that declar- explain a very wide range of recognition findings (for ative memory depends on the medial temporal lobe, reviews, see Clark & Gronlund, 1996; Raaijmakers & whereas depends on other cortical Shiffrin, 1992; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2000) — even find- and subcortical structures. Recently, we and our col- ings, that at first glance, appear to require a recall pro- leagues have set forth a computationally explicit the- cess (see, e.g., McClelland & Chappell, 1998). Further- ory of how hippocampus and neocortex contribute to more, the relatively small number of findings that can learning and memory (the Complementary Learning Sys- not be explained using standard global matching models tems model; O’Reilly & Rudy, 2001; McClelland, Mc- tend to come from specialized paradigms like Jacoby’s Naughton, & O’Reilly, 1995). In this paper, we advance process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991; see Rat- the Complementary Learning Systems model by using cliff, Van Zandt, & McKoon, 1995 for discussion of it to provide a comprehensive treatment of recognition when global matching models can and can not account memory performance. for process-dissociation data). As such, it is always pos- In the Introduction, we describe two questions that sible to treat these findings as special cases that have little have proved challenging for math modeling and cog- relevance to performance on standard item-recognition nitive neuroscience approaches to recognition, respec- tests. tively: In the math modeling literature, there has been Another issue that has hindered the acceptance of considerable controversy regarding how to characterize dual-process models is the difficulty inherent in measur- the contribution of recall (vs. familiarity) to recogni- ing the separate contributions of recall and familiarity. tion memory; in the cognitive neuroscience literature, re- Several techniques has been devised for quantitatively searchers have debated how the hippocampus (vs. medial estimating how recall and familiarity are contributing to temporal lobe cortex) contributes to recognition. Then, recognition performance (ROC analysis, independence we show how our modeling approach, which is jointly remember-know, and process dissociation; see Yoneli- constrained by behavioral and neuroscientific data, can nas, 2001b, 2002 for review and discussion), but all of help resolve these controversies these techniques rely on a core set of controversial as- sumptions; for example, they all assume that recall and Dual-Process Controversies familiarity are stochastically independent. There are rea- sons to believe that the independence assumption may Recognition memory refers to the process of iden- not always be valid (see, e.g., Curran & Hintzman, 1995). tifying stimuli or situations as having been experienced Furthermore, there is no way to test this assumption us- before, for example when you recognize a person you ing behavioral data alone because of chicken-and-egg know in a crowd of strangers. Recognition can be com- problems (i.e., one needs to measure familiarity to assess pared with various forms of recall memory where spe- its independence from recall, but one needs to assume cific content information is retrieved from memory and independence to measure familiarity). produced as a response; recognition does not require re- These chicken-and-egg problems have led to a rift be- call of specific details (e.g., one can recognize a person tween math modelers and other memory researchers. On as being familiar without being able to recall who ex- the empirical side, there is now a vast body of data on actly they are or where you know them from). Never- recall and familiarity, gathered using measurement tech- theless, recognition can certainly benefit from recall of niques that assume (among other things) independence specific information — if you can recall that the person — these data could potentially be used to constrain dual- you recognized at the supermarket is in fact your veteri- process models. However, on the theoretical side, mod- narian, that reinforces your feeling that you actually do elers are not making use of these data because of reason- know this person. Theories that posit that recognition is able concerns about the validity of the assumptions used supported by specific recall as well as nonspecific feel- to collect these data, and because single-process models ings of familiarity are called dual-process theories (see have been quite successful at explaining recognition data Yonelinas, 2002 for a thorough review of these theories). (so why bother with more complex dual-process mod- Norman & O'Reilly 5

HIPPOCAMPUS ory system, which supports recall and recognition, and that other structures support procedural memory (e.g., perceptual priming, motor skill learning; Squire, 1992b, 1987; Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; Cohen, Pol- ENTORHINAL drack, & Eichenbaum, 1997; Eichenbaum, 2000). Re- MTLC CORTEX searchers have argued that the medial temporal region is important for declarative memory because it is located at the top of the cortical hierarchy and therefore is ide- ally positioned to associate aspects of the current episode PERIRHINAL PARAHIPPOCAMPAL that are being processed in domain-specific cortical mod- CORTEX CORTEX ules (e.g., Mishkin, Suzuki, Gadian, & Vargha-Khadem, 1997; Mishkin, Vargha-Khadem, & Gadian, 1998). See Figure 1 for a schematic diagram of how hippocampus, MTLC, and neocortex are connected. NEOCORTICAL ASSOCIATION AREAS While the basic declarative memory framework is (frontal, temporal, & parietal lobes) widely accepted, attempts to tease apart the contribu- tions of different medial temporal structures have been Figure 1: Schematic box diagram of neocortex, MTLC, and more controversial. There is widespread agreement hippocampus. Medial temporal lobe cortex serves as the inter- that the hippocampus is critical for recall — focal hip- face between neocortex and the hippocampus. Medial tempo- pocampal lesions lead to severely impaired recall perfor- ral lobe cortex is located at the very top of the cortical pro- mance. However, the data are much less clear regard- cessing hierarchy — it receives highly processed outputs of ing effects of focal hippocampal damage on recognition. domain-specific cortical modules, integrates these outputs, and passes them on to the hippocampus; it also receives output from Some studies have found roughly equal impairments the hippocampus, and passes this activation back to domain- in recall and recognition (e.g., Reed & Squire, 1997; specific cortical modules via feedback connections. Manns & Squire, 1999; Rempel-Clower, Zola, & Ama- ral, 1996; Zola-Morgan, Squire, & Amaral, 1986; Reed, Hamann, Stefanacci, & Squire, 1997), whereas other els). To resolve this impasse, we need some other source studies have found relatively spared recognition after fo- of evidence that we can use to specify the properties cal hippocampal lesions (e.g., Vargha-Khadem, Gadian, of recall and familiarity, other than the aforementioned Watkins, Connelly, Van Paesschen, & Mishkin, 1997; measurement techniques. Holdstock, Mayes, Roberts, Cezayirli, Isaac, O’Reilly, & Norman, 2002; Mayes, Holdstock, Isaac, Hunkin, & Cognitive Neuroscience Approaches to Recog- Roberts, 2002). The monkey literature parallels the hu- nition Memory man literature — some studies have found relatively in- tact recognition (indexed using the delayed nonmatch- Just as controversies exist in the math modeling lit- to-sample test) following focal hippocampal damage erature regarding the contribution of recall to recogni- (e.g., Murray & Mishkin, 1998) whereas others have tion memory, parallel controversies exist in the cognitive found impaired recognition (e.g., Zola, Squire, Teng, Se- neuroscience literature regarding the contribution of the fanacci, Buffalo, & Clark, 2000; Beason-Held, Rosene, hippocampus to recognition memory. Killiany, & Moss, 1999). Spared recognition follow- Researchers have long known that the medial tempo- ing hippocampal lesions depends critically on MTLC — ral region of the brain is important for recognition mem- whereas recognition is sometimes spared by focal hip- ory. Patients with medial temporal lobe lesions encom- pocampal lesions, it is never spared after lesions that en- passing both the hippocampus and the medial temporal compass both MTLC and the hippocampus (e.g., Aggle- lobe cortices (perirhinal, entorhinal, and parahippocam- ton & Shaw, 1996). pal cortices, which we refer to jointly as MTLC) typically Aggleton and Brown (1999) have tried to frame the show impaired recall and recognition but intact perfor- difference between hippocampal and cortical contribu- mance on other memory tests (e.g., perceptual priming, tions in terms of dual-process models of recognition. Ac- skill learning; see Squire, 1992a for a review). cording to this view: The finding of impaired recall and recognition in me-

dial temporal amnesics is the basis for several influen- The hippocampus supports recall. tial taxonomies of memory. Most prominently, Squire, Eichenbaum, Cohen, and others have argued that the The MTLC can support some degree of (familiarity- medial temporal lobes implement a declarative mem- based) recognition on its own. 6 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

This framework captures, at a gross level, how hip- these two approaches, by constructing a computational pocampal damage affects memory, but it is too vague model of recognition memory in which there is a trans- to be useful in explaining the considerable variability parent mapping between different parts of the model that exists across patients and tests in how hippocam- and different subregions of hippocampus and MTLC. pal damage affects recognition. Just as some hippocam- This mapping makes it possible to address neuroscien- pal patients show more of a recognition deficit than oth- tific findings using the model. For example, to predict ers, some studies have found (within individual patients) the effects of a particular kind of hippocampal lesion, we greater impairment on some recognition tests than others can “lesion” the corresponding region of the model. By (e.g., Holdstock et al., 2002). In the absence of further bringing a wide range of constraints — both purely be- specification of the hippocampal contribution (and how havioral and neuroscientific — to bear on a common set it differs from the contribution of MTLC), it is not possi- of mechanisms, we hope to achieve a more detailed un- ble to proactively determine whether recognition will be derstanding of how recognition memory works. impaired or spared in a particular patient/test. Our model falls clearly in the dual-process tradition, Aggleton & Brown attempt to flesh out their theory insofar as we posit that the hippocampus and MTLC by arguing that MTLC familiarity can support recog- contribute signals with distinct properties to recognition nition of individual items, but memory for new asso- memory. The key, differentiating property of our model ciations between items depends on hippocampal recall is that — in our model — differences in the two sig- (Sutherland & Rudy, 1989; Eichenbaum, Otto, & Co- nals are grounded in architectural differences between hen, 1994 make similar claims). This view implies that the hippocampus and MTLC; because most of these ar- item recognition should be intact but the ability to form chitectural differences fall along a continuum, it follows new associations should be impaired after focal hip- that differences in the two signals will be more nuanced pocampal damage. However, Andrew Mayes and col- than the dichotomies (“item vs. associative”) discussed leagues have found that hippocampally-lesioned patient above. YR, who shows intact performance on some item recog- nition tests (e.g., Mayes et al., 2002), shows impaired Precis of Modeling Work performance on other item recognition tests (e.g., Hold- stock et al., 2002), and spared performance on some tests In this section, we summarize the major claims of that require participants to associate previously unrelated the paper, highlighted in bold font, with pointers to loca- stimuli (e.g., the words “window” and “reason”; Mayes, tions in the main text where these issues are discussed in Isaac, Downes, Holdstock, Hunkin, Montaldi, MacDon- greater detail. ald, Cezayirli, & Roberts, 2001). Complementary Learning Systems

In summary: It is becoming increasingly evident that The hippocampus is specialized for rapidly the effects of hippocampal damage are complex. There memorizing specific events. appears to be some functional specialization in the me- dial temporal lobe, but the simple dichotomies that have The neocortex is specialized for slowly learning been proposed to explain this specialization are either too about the statistical regularities of the environ- vague (recall vs. familiarity) or they are inconsistent with ment. recently acquired data (item memory vs. memory for new These are the central claims of the Complementary associations). Learning Systems (CLS) framework (O’Reilly & Rudy, 2001; McClelland et al., 1995). According Summary: Combining the Approaches to this framework, the two goals of memorizing specific events and learning about statistical regu- What should be clear at this point is that the larities are in direct conflict when implemented in math modeling and cognitive neuroscience approaches neural networks; thus, to avoid making a tradeoff, to recognition memory would greatly benefit from in- we have evolved specialized neural systems for per- creased crosstalk: Math modeling approaches need a forming these tasks (see Marr, 1971; O’Keefe & new source of constraints before they can fully explore Nadel, 1978; Sherry & Schacter, 1987 for similar how recall contributes to recognition; and cognitive neu- ideas, and Carpenter & Grossberg, 1993 for a con- roscience approaches need a new, more mechanistically trasting perspective). sophisticated vocabulary for talking about the roles of different brain structures in order to adequately charac- The hippocampus assigns distinct (pattern sepa- terize differences in how MTLC vs. hippocampus con- rated) representations to stimuli, thereby allowing tribute to recognition. it to learn rapidly without suffering catastrophic in- The goal of our research is to achieve a synthesis of terference. Norman & O'Reilly 7

In contrast, cortex assigns similar representa- Recall of matching information is evidence tions to similar stimuli; use of overlapping rep- that the cue was studied, and recall of infor- resentations allows cortex to represent the shared mation that mismatches the retrieval cue is ev- structure of events, and therefore makes it possible idence that the cue was not studied. for cortex to generalize to novel stimuli as a func- tion of their similarity to previously encountered Part I: Basic Network Properties stimuli. The hippocampal and neocortical signals have distinct operating characteristics. This difference A Dual-Process Model of Recognition is largely due to differences in the two networks’

We have developed hippocampal and neocortical ability to carry out pattern separation (see Simula- models that incorporate key aspects of the biol- tion 1: Pattern Separation, p. 15, and Simulation 2: ogy of these structures, and instantiate the com- Nature of the Underlying Distributions, p. 15). plementary learning systems principles outlined – MTLC familiarity functions as a standard above (O’Reilly & Rudy, 2001; McClelland et al., signal detection process. The familiarity dis- 1995; O’Reilly & McClelland, 1994; O’Reilly & tributions for studied items and lures are Gaus- Munakata, 2000; O’Reilly, Norman, & McClelland, sian and overlap extensively. The distributions 1998). (see Modeling Framework, p. 10). overlap because the representations of studied

The neocortical model supports familiarity judg- items and lures overlap in MTLC. Some lures, ments based on the sharpness of representations by chance, have representations that overlap in MTLC. Competitive self-organization (arising very strongly with the representations of stud- from Hebbian learning and inhibitory competition) ied items in MTLC and — as a result — these causes stimulus representations to become sharper lures trigger a strong familiarity signal. over repeated exposures (i.e., activity is concen- – In contrast, the hippocampal recall signal is trated in smaller number of units; see The Cortical more diagnostic: Studied items sometimes Model, p. 10). trigger strong matching recall, but most lures do not trigger any hippocampal re- – However, the neocortex can not support re- call because of the hippocampus’ tendency to call of details from specific events, owing to assign distinct representations to stimuli (re- its relatively low learning rate and its inability gardless of similarity). As such, high levels of to sufficiently differentiate the representations matching recall strongly indicate that an item of different events. was studied.

– Familiarity is measured by the activity of ¡ There are boundary conditions on the

the top most active units, though other diagnosticity of the hippocampal recall measures are possible and we have explored signal. When the average amount of some of them, with similar results (see also of overlap between stimuli is high, hip- Alternate Dependent Measures, p. 41). pocampal pattern separation mechanisms

break down, resulting in strong recall of The hippocampus supports recall of previously shared, prototypical features (even in re- encountered stimuli. When stimuli are presented sponse to lures) and poor recall of fea- at study, the hippocampus assigns relatively non- tures that are unique to particular studied overlapping (pattern-separated) representations to items. these items in region CA3. Active units in CA3 are

linked to one another, and to a copy of the input The difference in operating characteristics is pattern (via region CA1). At test, presentation of a most evident on yes-no related lure recognition partial version of a studied pattern leads to recon- tests, where lures are similar to studied items, but struction (pattern completion) of the original CA3 studied items are dissimilar to one another. The representation and, through this, reconstruction of hippocampus strongly outperforms cortex on these the entire studied pattern on the output layer (see tests (see Simulation 3: YN Related Lure Simula- The Hippocampal Model, p. 12). tions, p. 17). – The hippocampal model is applied to recog- – As target-lure similarity increases, lure nition by computing the degree of match familiarity increases steadily, but (up to between retrieved information and the re- a point) hippocampal pattern separation call cue, minus the amount of mismatch. works to keep lure recall at floor. 8 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

– Very similar lures trigger recall, but when by studied items and corresponding lures will this happens the lure can often be rejected be highly correlated — if A does not trigger due to mismatch between retrieved infor- recall, A’ will not trigger recall-to-reject (see mation and the recall cue. For example, if Hippocampal FC Results, p. 21). a participant studies “rats” and is tested with “rat”, they might recall having studied “rats” The predicted interaction between target-lure (and reject “rat” on this basis). similarity and test format was obtained in exper-

¡ iments comparing a focal hippocampal amnesic On related lure recognition tests, the with control participants. The model predicts that presence of any mismatching recall is hippocampally-lesioned patients, who are relying highly diagnostic of the item being a exclusively on MTLC familiarity, should perform lure. As such, we posit that participants poorly relative to controls on standard yes-no recog- pursue a recall-to-reject strategy on such nition tests with related lures, but they should per- tests, whereby items are given a confident form relatively well on forced-choice tests with cor- “new” response if they trigger any mis- responding related lures, and they should perform matching recall. well relative to controls on both yes-no and forced-

In the Sources of Variability section (p. 18) we dis- choice tests that use unrelated lures (insofar as both cuss different kinds of variability (e.g., variability networks discriminate well between studied items due to random initial weight settings, encoding vari- and unrelated lures). Holdstock et al. (2002; Mayes ability) and their implications for recognition per- et al., 2002) found exactly this pattern of results in formance. hippocampally-lesioned patient YR (see Tests of the Model’s Predictions, p. 22). Part II: Applications to Behavioral Phenomena Associative recognition tests (i.e., study A-B, C-D; The effects of target-lure similarity on the two test with studied pairs and recombined pairs like A- models interact with test format (yes-no versus D), can be viewed as a special case of the related lure forced-choice) (see Simulation 4: Lure Relatedness and paradigm discussed above (see Simulation 5: Associa- Test Format Interactions, p. 20). tive Recognition and Sensitivity to Conjunctions, p. 23).

The hippocampal advantage for related lures The hippocampal model outperforms the corti- (observed with “yes-no” tests, as discussed cal model on yes-no associative recognition tests. above) is mitigated by giving participants a As in the related lure simulations, the hippocampal forced choice between studied items and corre- advantage is due to hippocampal pattern separation, sponding related lures at test (i.e., test A vs. A’, and the hippocampus’ ability to carry out recall-to- B vs. B’, where A’ and B’ are lures related to A reject. and B, respectively; see Forced-Choice Testing and Covariance, p. 20). – Even though the cortical model is worse at – Cortical performance benefits from the associative recognition than the hippocam- high degree of covariance in the familiarity pus, the cortical model still performs well scores triggered by studied items and corre- above chance. This finding shows that our sponding related lures, which makes small cortical model has some (albeit reduced) sen- familiarity differences highly reliable. sitivity to whether items occurred together at study. This contrasts with other models (e.g., – In contrast, use of this test format may ac- Rudy & Sutherland, 1989) that posit that cor- tually harm hippocampal performance, rel- tex supports memory for individual features ative to other test formats. On forced-choice but not novel feature conjunctions. tests with non-corresponding lures (test A vs.

B’, B vs. A’), participants have two inde- Giving participants a forced choice between pendent chances to respond correctly: On tri- studied pairs and overlapping re-paired lures als where participants fail to recall the stud- (test A-B vs. A-D) mitigates the hippocampal ad- ied item (A) , they can still respond correctly vantage for associative recognition. This mirrors if the lure (B’) triggers mismatching recall the finding that “forced choice corresponding” test- (and is rejected on this basis). Use of cor- ing mitigates the hippocampal advantage for related responding lures deprives participants of this lures. “second chance”, insofar as recall triggered Norman & O'Reilly 9

We present data from previously published studies high input overlap, the neocortical model’s that support the model’s predictions regarding how sensitivity to discriminative features of stud- focal hippocampal damage should affect associative ied items and lures approaches floor, and the recognition performance, as a function of test for- studied and lure familiarity distributions start mat (see Tests of the Model’s Predictions, p. 25). to converge (resulting in decreased discrim- inability). Hippocampally- and cortically-driven recognition can be differentially affected by interference manipu- Data from two recent list strength experiments lations: Increasing list strength impairs discrimina- provide support for the model’s prediction that tion of studied items and lures in the hippocampal list strength should affect recall-based discrimina- model, but does not impair discrimination based on tion but not familiarity-based discrimination (Nor- MTLC familiarity. The list strength paradigm mea- man, in press) (see Testing the Model’s Predictions, sures how repeated study of a set of interference items p. 29).

affects participants’ ability to discriminate between non- We also discuss ways of modifying the learning strengthened (but studied) target items and lures (see rule to accommodate the finding that increasing list Simulation 6: Interference and List Strength, p. 26). length (i.e., adding new items to the study list)

In both models, the overall effect of interfer- hurts recognition sensitivity more than increasing ence is to decrease weights to discriminative fea- list strength (Murnane & Shiffrin, 1991a; see List tures of studied items and lures, and to increase Length Effects, p. 31). weights to prototypical features (which are shared The extent to which the neocortical and hip- by a high proportion of items in the item set). pocampal recognition signals are correlated varies in The hippocampal model predicts a list strength different conditions. These issues are explored using effect because increasing list strength reduces re- a more realistic “combined model” where the cortical call of discriminative features of studied items, network responsible for computing familiarity serves as and lure recall is already at floor. Increasing list the input to the hippocampal network (see Simulation 7: strength therefore has the effect of pushing the stud- The Combined Model and the Independence Assumption, ied and lure recall distributions together (reducing p. 32). discriminability). Variability in how well items are learned at study The neocortical model predicts a null list (encoding variability) bolsters the correlation be- strength effect because the familiarity signal tween recall and familiarity signals, as was pos- triggered by lures has room to decrease as a func- tulated by Curran and Hintzman (1995) and others. tion of interference. Increasing list strength re- duces responding to (the discriminative features Increasing interference reduces the recall- of) both studied items and lures, but the average familiarity correlation for studied items. This difference in studied and lure familiarity does not occurs because interference pushes raw recall and decrease. As such, discriminability does not suffer. familiarity scores in different directions (increasing interference reduces recall, but asymptotically – In the neocortical model, lure familiarity it boosts familiarity by boosting the model’s initially decreases more than studied-item responding to shared, prototypical item features). familiarity as a function of list strength, so the studied-lure gap in familiarity actually In summary, recall and familiarity can be in- widens slightly with increasing interference. dependent when there is enough interference to counteract the effects of encoding variability. – The widening of the studied-lure gap can be explained in terms of differentiation — Partial hippocampal lesions can lead to worse studying an item makes its representation overall recognition performance than complete le- overlap less with the representations of sions (see Simulation 8: Lesion Effects in the Combined other, interfering items (Shiffrin, Ratcliff, & Model, p. 34). Clark, 1990). As such, studied items suffer

less interference than lures. In the hippocampal model, partial lesions cause – There are limits on the null list strength ef- pattern separation failure, which sharply re- fect for MTLC familiarity. With high lev- duces the diagnosticity of the recall signal. els of interference item strengthening and/or Recognition performance suffers because the 10 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

noisy recall signal drowns out useful information Modeling Framework that is present in the familiarity signal. Moving Both the hippocampal and neocortical networks uti- from a partial hippocampal lesion to a complete le- lize the Hebbian component of O’Reilly’s Leabra al- sion improves performance by removing this source gorithm (O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000; O’Reilly, 1998, of noise. 1996; the full version of Leabra also incorporates error-

In contrast, increasing MTLC lesion size in the driven learning, but error-driven learning was turned off model leads to a monotonic decrease in perfor- in the simulations reported here). The algorithm we used mance. This occurs because MTLC lesions directly incorporates several widely-accepted characteristics of impair familiarity-based discrimination, and indi- neural computation, including Hebbian LTP/LTD (long- rectly impair recall-based discrimination (because term potentiation/depression) and inhibitory competition MTLC serves as the input to the hippocampus). between , that were first brought together by Grossberg (1976) (for more information on these mech- These results are consistent with a recent meta- anisms see also Kohonen, 1977; Oja, 1982; Rumelhart & analysis of the lesion data, showing a negative cor- Zipser, 1986; Kanerva, 1988; Minai & Levy, 1994). In relation between recognition impairment and hip- our model, LTP is implemented by strengthening the pocampal lesion size, and a positive correlation be- connection (weight) between two units when both the tween recognition impairment and MTLC lesion sending and receiving units are active together; LTD is size (Baxter & Murray, 2001b). implemented by weakening the connection between two units when the receiving unit is active, but the sending A Note on Terminology unit is not (heterosynaptic LTD). Inhibitory competition is implemented using a k-winners-take-all (kWTA) algo- We use the terms “recall” and “familiarity” to de- rithm, which sets the amount of inhibition for a given scribe the respective contributions of the hippocampus layer such that at most k units are strongly active. Al- and MTLC to recognition memory because these terms though the kWTA rule sets a firm limit on the number of are heuristically useful. The hippocampal contribution to units that show strong (> .25) activity, there is still con- recognition is “recall” insofar as it involves retrieval of siderable flexibility in the overall distribution of activity specific studied details. We use “familiarity” to describe across units in a layer. This is important for our discus- the MTLC signal because it adheres to the definition sion of “sharpening” in the cortical model, below. Key of familiarity set forth by Hintzman (1988; Gillund & aspects of the algorithm are summarized in Appendix A. Shiffrin, 1984) and others, i.e., it is a scalar that tracks the global match or similarity of the test probe to studied items. The Cortical Model However, we realize that the terms “recall” and “fa- The cortical network is composed of two layers, in- miliarity” come with a substantial amount of theoretical put (which corresponds to cortical areas that feed into baggage. Over the years, researchers have made a very MTLC), and hidden (corresponding to MTLC) (Fig- large number of claims regarding properties of recall and ure 2). The basic function of the model is for the hidden familiarity; for example, Yonelinas has argued that re- layer to encode regularities that are present in the input call is a high-threshold process (e.g., Yonelinas, 2001a), layer; this is achieved through the Hebbian learning rule. and Mandler (1980) and others (e.g., Aggleton & Brown, To capture the idea that the input layer represents many 1999) have argued that familiarity reflects memory for different cortical areas, it consists of 24 10-unit slots, individual items, apart from their associations with other with 1 unit out of 10 active in each slot. A useful way to items and contexts. By linking the hippocampal contri- think of slots is that different slots correspond to differ- bution with recall and the MTLC contribution with fa- ent feature dimensions (e.g., color or shape), and differ- miliarity, we do not mean to say that all of the various ent units within a slot correspond to different, mutually (and sometimes contradictory) properties that have been exclusive features along that dimension (e.g., shapes: cir- ascribed to recall and familiarity over the years apply to cle, square, triangle). The hidden (MTLC) layer consists the hippocampal and MTLC contributions, respectively. of 1920 units, with 10% activity (i.e., 192 of these units Just the opposite: We hope to “re-define” the properties are active on average for a given input). The input layer of recall and familiarity using neurobiological data on the is connected to the MTLC layer via a partial feedforward properties of the hippocampus and MTLC. In the paper, projection where each MTLC unit receives connections we systematically delineate how the CLS model’s claims from 25% of the input units. When items are presented at about hippocampal recall and MTLC familiarity deviate study, these connections are modified via Hebbian learn- from claims made by existing dual-process theories. ing. Input patterns were constructed from prototypes by Norman & O'Reilly 11

a) b)

Hidden (MTLC)

Figure 3: Illustration of the sharpening of hidden (MTLC)

layer activation patterns in a miniature version of our cortical ¡¦¥§¡¦¨ © Input ( ¢¡¤£ er-level ne ex) model. (a) shows the network prior to sharpening; MTLC ac- Figure 2: Diagram of the cortical network. The cortical tivations (more active = lighter color) are relatively undifferen- network consists of two layers, an input layer (corresponding tiated. (b) shows the network after Hebbian learning and in- to “lower” cortical regions that feed into MTLC) and a hid- hibitory competition produce sharpening; a subset of the units den layer (corresponding to MTLC). Units in the hidden layer are strongly active, while the remainder are inhibited. In this compete to encode (via Hebbian learning) regularities that are example, we would read out familiarity by measuring the aver- present in the input layer. age activity of the k = 5 most active units.

randomly selecting a feature value (possibly identical to ber of units. Sharpening occurs because Hebbian learn- the prototype feature value) for a random subset of slots. ing specifically tunes some MTLC units to represent The number of slots that were flipped (i.e., given a ran- the stimulus. When a stimulus is first presented, some dom value) when generating items from the prototype MTLC units, by chance, respond more strongly to the is a model parameter — increasing the number of slots stimulus than other units; these units get tuned by Heb- that are flipped decreases the average overlap between bian learning to respond even more strongly to the item items. When all 24 slots are flipped, the resulting item the next time it is presented, and these strongly active patterns have 10% overlap with one another on aver- units start to inhibit units that are less strongly active age (i.e., exactly as expected by chance in a layer with (for additional discussion of the idea that familiarization a 10% activation level). Thus, with input patterns one causes some units to drop out of the stimulus represen- can make a distinction between prototypical features of tation, see Li, Miller, & Desimone, 1993). We should those patterns, which have a relatively high likelihood of note that sharpening is not a novel property of our model being shared across input patterns, and non-prototypical, — rather, it is a general property of competitive learn- item-specific features of those patterns (generated by ran- ing networks with graded unit activation values in which domly flipping slots) which are relatively less likely to be there is some kind of “contrast enhancement” within a shared across input patterns. Prototype features can be layer (see, e.g., Grossberg, 1986, Section 23, and Gross- thought of as representing both high-frequency item fea- berg & Stone, 1986, Section 16). tures (e.g., if you study pictures of people from Norway, The sharpening dynamic in our model is consistent most people have blond hair) as well as contextual fea- with neural data on the effects of repeated presentation tures that are shared across multiple items in an experi- of stimuli in cortex. Electrophysiological studies show ment (e.g., the fact that all of the pictures were viewed on that some neurons that initially respond to a stimulus ex- a particular monitor in a particular room on a particular hibit a lasting decrease in firing, while other neurons that day). Some simulations involve more complex stimulus initially respond to the stimulus do not exhibit decreased construction, as described where applicable. firing (e.g., Brown & Xiang, 1998; Li et al., 1993; Xi- ang & Brown, 1998; Miller, Li, & Desimone, 1991; Familiarity as Sharpening Rolls, Baylis, Hasselmo, & Nalwa, 1989; Riches, Wil- To apply the cortical model to recognition, we exploit son, & Brown, 1991). According to our model, this lat- the fact that — as items are presented repeatedly — their ter population consists of neurons that were selected (by representations in the MTLC layer become sharper (Fig- Hebbian learning) to represent the stimulus, and the for- ure 3). That is, novel stimuli weakly activate a large num- mer population consists of neurons that are being forced ber of MTLC units, whereas familiar (previously pre- out of the representation via inhibitory competition. sented) stimuli strongly activate a relatively small num- 12 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

To index representational sharpness in our model — and through this, stimulus familiarity — we measure the average activity of the MTLC units that win the compe- tition to represent the stimulus. That is, we take the av- CA3

CA1 erage activation of the top (192 or 10% of the MTLC) units computed according to the kWTA inhibitory com- petition function. This “activation of winners” (act win) measure increases monotonically as a function of how many times a stimulus was presented at study. In con- trast, the simpler alternative measure of using the aver- DG age activity of all units in the layer is not guaranteed to increase as a function of stimulus repetition — as a stim- ulus becomes more familiar, the winning units become more active, but losing units become less active (due to EC_in EC_out inhibition from the winning units); the net effect is there- fore a function of the exact balance between these in- creases and decreases (for an example of another model that bases recognition decisions on an activity readout from a neural network doing competitive learning, see Input

Grossberg & Stone, 1986).

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Although we use ¢¡ in the simulations re- Figure 4: Diagram of the hippocampal network. The hip-

ported below, we do not want to make a strong claim pocampal network links input patterns in

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that ©¡ is the way that familiarity is read out (EC) to relatively non-overlapping (pattern-separated) sets of from MTLC. It is the most convenient and analytically units in region CA3; recurrent connections in CA3 bind to- tractable way to do this in our model, but it is far from the gether all of the units involved in representing a particular EC

only way of operationalizing familiarity, and it is unclear pattern; the CA3 representation is linked back to EC via region ¤¦¥¨§ £ CA1. Learning in the CA3 recurrent connections, and in pro-

how other brain structures might “read out” ¢¡ jections linking EC to CA3 and CA3 to CA1, makes it possible from MTLC. We briefly describe another, more neurally to recall entire stored EC patterns based on partial cues. The plausible familiarity measure (the time it takes for ac- dentate gyrus (DG) serves to facilitate pattern separation in re- tivation to spread through the network) in the General gion CA3. Discussion section. Finally, we should point out that the idea (espoused above) that the same network is involved in feature ex- tail to motivate the model’s predictions about recognition traction and familiarity discrimination is controversial; in memory. Additional details regarding the architecture of particular, Malcolm Brown, Rafal Bogacz, and their col- the hippocampal model (e.g., the percentage activity in leagues (e.g., Brown & Xiang, 1998; Bogacz & Brown, each layer of the model) are provided in Appendix B. in press) have argued that specialized populations of neu- In the brain, entorhinal cortex (EC) is the interface rons in MTLC are involved in feature extraction versus between hippocampus and neocortex; superficial lay- familiarity discrimination. At this point, it suffices to say ers of entorhinal cortex send input to the hippocampus, that our focus in this paper is on the familiarity discrimi- and deep layers of entorhinal cortex receive output from nation capabilities of the cortical network, rather that its the hippocampus (see Figure 1). Correspondingly, our ability to extract features. We address Brown and Bo- model subdivides EC into an EC in layer that sends in- gacz’s claims in more detail in the General Discussion. put to the hippocampus and an EC out layer that receives output from the hippocampus. Like the input layer of The Hippocampal Model the cortical model, both EC in and EC out have a slotted structure (24 10-unit slots, with 1 unit per slot active). We have developed a “standard model” of the hip- Figure 4 shows the structure of the model. The job of pocampus (O’Reilly et al., 1998; O’Reilly & Munakata, the hippocampal model, stated succinctly, is to store pat- 2000; O’Reilly & Rudy, 2001; Rudy & O’Reilly, 2001) terns of EC in activity, in a manner that supports subse- that implements widely-accepted ideas of hippocampal quent recall of these patterns on EC out. The hippocam- function (Hebb, 1949; Marr, 1971; McNaughton & Mor- pal model achieves this goal in the following stages: ris, 1987; Rolls, 1989; O’Reilly & McClelland, 1994; McClelland et al., 1995; Hasselmo, 1995). Our goal in Input patterns are presented to the model by clamp- this section is to describe the model in just enough de- ing those patterns onto the input layer, which serves to Norman & O'Reilly 13

impose the pattern on EC in via fixed, 1-to-1 connec- tion and the test probe tends to indicate that an item was tions. From EC in, activation spreads both directly and not studied. indirectly (via the dentate gyrus, DG) to region CA3. For each test item, we generate a recall score using

The resulting pattern of activity in CA3 is stored by Heb- the formula:

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bian weight changes in the feedforward pathway, and by ¢¡

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¡¤£¦¥ ¡©£ strengthening recurrent connections in CA3 between ac- (1) tive units; these weight changes serve to bind the dis- where match is the number of recalled features (on parate elements of the input pattern by linking them to a EC out) that match the cue (on EC in), and mismatch is shared episodic representation in CA3. likewise the number that mismatch (a feature is counted An important property of DG and CA3 is that repre- as “recalled” if the unit corresponding to that feature in sentations in these structures are very sparse — relatively EC out shows activity > .9); numslots is a constant that few units are active for a given stimulus. The hippocam- reflects the total number of feature slots in EC (24, in pus’ use of sparse representations gives rise to pattern these simulations). separation. If only a few units are active per input pat- One should appreciate that equation 1 is not the only tern, then overlap between the hippocampal representa- way to apply the hippocampal model to recognition. For tions of different items tends to be minimal (Marr, 1971; example, instead of looking at recall of the test cue it- see O’Reilly & McClelland, 1994 for mathematical anal- self, we could attach contextual tags to items at study, ysis of how sparseness results in pattern separation, and leave these tags out at test, and measure the extent to the role of the DG in facilitating pattern separation). which items elicit recall of contextual tags. Also this Next, to complete the loop, the CA3 representation equation does not incorporate the fact that recall of item- needs to be linked back to the original input pattern. This specific features (i.e., features unique to particular items is accomplished by linking the CA3 representation to ac- in the item set) is more diagnostic of study status than tive units in region CA1. Like CA3, region CA1 contains recall of prototypical features — if all items in the exper- a re-representation of the input pattern. However, unlike iment are fish, recall of prototypical fish features (e.g., the CA3 representation, the CA1 representation is invert- “I studied fish”) in conjunction with a test item does not

ible — if an item’s representation is activated in CA1, mean that you studied this particular item. We selected

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well-established connections between CA1 and EC out £

¡©£¥ ¡©£ the rule because it is a simple way allow activity to spread back to the item’s representa- to reduce the vector output of the hippocampal model tion in EC out. Thus, CA1 serves to “translate” between to a scalar that correlates with the study status of test sparse representations in CA3 and more overlapping rep- items. Assessing the optimality of this rule, relative to resentations in EC (for more discussion of this issue, see other rules, and exploring ways in which different rules McClelland & Goddard, 1996; O’Reilly et al., 1998). might be implemented neurally, are topics for future re- At test, when a previously studied EC in pattern (or search.

a subset thereof) is presented to the hippocampal model, The only place where we deviate from using

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the model is capable of reactivating the entire CA3 pat- £

¡¤£¥ ¡©£ in this paper is in our related lure tern corresponding to that item via strengthened weights simulations, where distractors are related to particular in the EC-to-CA3 pathway, and strengthened CA3 recur- studied items, but studied items are reasonably distinct rents. Activation then spreads from the item’s CA3 rep- from one another. In this situation, we use a recall-to- resentation to the item’s CA1 representation via strength- reject rule that places a stronger weight on mismatching ened weights, and (from there) to the item’s EC out rep- recall. The YN Related Lure Simulations section of the resentation. In this manner, the hippocampus manages to paper contains a detailed account of our reasons for us-

retrieve a complete version of the studied EC pattern in ing recall-to-reject, and the implications of using this rule

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response to a partial cue. £

¡©£¦¥ ¡©£ in place of . The Hippocampal Recall Measure To apply the hippocampal model to recognition, we Simulation Methodology exploit the fact that studied items tend to trigger recall Our initial simulations involve a side-by-side com- (of the item itself), more so than lure items. Thus, a high parison of the cortical and hippocampal networks re- level of match between the test probe (presented on the ceiving the exact same input patterns. This method al- EC input layer) and recalled information (activated over lows us to analytically characterize differences in how the EC output layer) constitutes evidence that an item these networks respond to stimuli. A shortcoming of was studied. Also, we exploit the fact that lures some- this “side-by-side” approach is that we can not explore times trigger recall of information that mismatches the direct interactions between the two systems. To rem- recall cue. Thus, mismatch between recalled informa- edy this shortcoming, we also present simulations using 14 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

a combined model where the cortical and hippocampal Simulating YN and FC Testing networks are connected in serial (such that the cortical To simulate YN recognition performance, items were regions involved in computing stimulus familiarity serve presented one at a time at test, and we recorded the fa- as the input to the hippocampal network) — this arrange- miliarity score (in the cortical model) and recall score ment more accurately reflects how cortex and hippocam- (in the hippocampal model) triggered by each item. For pus are arranged in the brain (see Figure 1). the cortical model, we set an unbiased criterion for each Basic Methods simulated participant by computing the average familiar- ity scores associated with studied and lure items (respec- In our recognition simulations, for each simulated tively) and then placing the familiarity criterion exactly “participant” we re-randomized the connectivity patterns between the studied and lure means. All items triggering for partial projections (e.g., if the specified amount of familiarity scores above this criterion were called “old”. connectivity between layer X and layer Y was 25%, then each unit in layer Y was linked at random to 25% of the For the hippocampal model, we took a different ap- units in layer X) and we initialized the network weights proach to criterion setting; as discussed in Simulation 2 to random values (weight values in the cortical model below, it is possible to set a high recall criterion that is were sampled from a uniform distribution with mean = sometimes crossed by studied items, but never crossed by .5 and range = .25; see Appendix B for weight initial- lures. We assume that participants are aware of this fact ization parameters for different parts of the hippocam- (i.e., that high amounts of recall are especially diagnostic pal model). The purpose of this randomization was to of having studied an item) and set a recall criterion that ensure that units in MTLC and the hippocampus would is high enough to avoid false recognition. Accordingly, develop specialized receptive fields (i.e., they would be in our basic-parameter simulations, we used a fixed, rel- > more strongly activated by some input features than oth- atively high criterion for calling items “old” (recall = ers) — this kind of specialization is necessary for com- .40). This value was chosen because — assuming other petitive learning. parameters are set to their “basic” values — it is some- times exceeded by studied items, but never by lures (un- After randomization was complete, the cortical and less lures are constructed to be similar to specific studied hippocampal models were (separately) given a list of items; see Simulation 3 for more details). items to learn, followed by a recognition test in which the models had to discriminate between 10 studied tar- For both models, we used ¢¡ (computed on individ- ual participants’ hit and false alarm rates) to index YN get items and 10 nonstudied lure items. No learning 1 occurred at test. Unless otherwise specified, all of our recognition sensitivity. recognition simulations used the same set of parameters Our method for simulating FC testing was straight-

(hereafter referred to as the basic parameters; these pa- forward: We presented the two test alternatives, one at a

£ ¤¦¥¨§ rameters are described in detail in Appendix C). In our time. For the cortical model, we recorded the ¢¡ basic-parameter simulations, we used a 20-item study list score associated with each test alternative, and selected

the item with the higher score. For the hippocampal

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(10 target items, plus 10 interference items that were not ¡

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¡©£ ¥ ¡¤£ tested), and the average amount of overlap between items model, we recorded the score as- was 20% — 20% overlap between items was achieved by sociated with each test alternative, and selected the item starting with a 24-slot prototype pattern, and then gener- with the higher score. For both models, if there was a tie, ating items by randomly selecting a feature value for 16 one of the two test alternatives was selected at random. randomly selected slots (note that each item overlaps at All of the simulation results reported in the text of

least 33% with the prototype, but on average items over- the paper are significant at £¥¤ .001. In graphs of simu- lap 20% with each other). lation results (starting with Figure 9), error bars indicate To facilitate comparison between the models, we the standard error of the mean, computed across simu- used hippocampal and cortical parameters that yielded lated participants. When error bars are not visible, this is roughly matched performance across the two models because they are too small relative to the size of the sym-

for both single-probe (yes-no, or YN) and forced-choice bols on the graph (and thus are covered by the symbols).

(FC) recognition tests. We matched performance in this 1 ¦¨§ ©     , where is the inverse of the normal distri- 

way to alleviate concerns that differential effects of ma- bution function,  is the hit rate, and is the false alarm rate. To ¦ nipulations on hippocampal recall and MTLC familiarity avoid problems with § being undefined when hit or false alarm rates

are attributable simply to different overall levels of per- equal 0 or 1, we adjusted hit and false alarm rates using the correc- ¦

tion suggested by Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) prior to computing § :



!"$#% '&( )*  & formance in the two networks. However, this matching ©  , where = the number of “old” responses, does not constitute a strong claim that hippocampal and = the total number of items, and  = the corrected percent “old” value. cortical performance are — in reality — matched when overlap equals 20% and study list length equals 20. Norman & O'Reilly 15

Pattern Separation in MTLC and the Hippocampus of overlap in region CA3 of the hippocampal model, and in the hidden (MTLC) layer of the cortical model. Pat- 1.0 tern separation is evident when overlap between the in- MTLC ternal representations of paired items (in CA3 or MTLC) Hippo is less than the amount of input overlap. 0.8 p a

l The results of these simulations (Figure 5) confirm er

v that, while both networks show some pattern separation,

O 0.6 the amount of pattern separation is larger in the hip- n

io pocampal model. They also show that the hippocampus’ ability to assign distinct representations to stimuli is lim-

entat 0.4

s ited — as overlap between input patterns increases, hip-

re pocampal overlap eventually increases above floor levels p e (although it always lags behind input pattern overlap). R 0.2

Simulation 2: Nature of the Underlying 0.0 Distributions 0.00.20.4 0.6 0.81.0 Input Overlap One way to characterize how cortical and hippocam- pal contributions to recognition differ is to plot the dis- Figure 5: Results of simulations exploring pattern separa- tributions of these signals for studied items and lures. tion in the hippocampal and cortical models. In these simu- Given 20% average overlap between input patterns, the lations, we created pairs of items and manipulated the amount MTLC familiarity distributions for studied items and of overlap between paired items. The graph plots the amount of input-layer overlap for paired items versus: 1) CA3 overlap lures are Gaussian and overlap strongly (Figure 6a) — in the hippocampal model, and 2) MTLC overlap in the corti- this is consistent with the idea, expressed by Yonelinas, cal model. In this graph, all points below the diagonal (dashed Dobbins, Szymanski, and Dhaliwal (1996) and many line) indicate pattern separation (i.e., representational overlap others (e.g., Hintzman, 1988), that familiarity is well- < input overlap). The hippocampal model showed a strong described by standard (Gaussian) signal-detection the- tendency towards pattern separation (CA3 overlap < < input ory. In contrast, the hippocampal recall distributions overlap); the cortical model showed a smaller tendency towards (Figure 6b) do not adhere to a simple Gaussian model. pattern separation (MTLC overlap was slightly less than input The bulk of the lure recall distribution is located at the overlap). zero recall point, although some lures trigger above-zero recall. The studied recall distribution is bimodal and, Part I: Basic Network Properties crucially, it extends further to the right than the lure re- call distribution, so there are some (high) recall scores Simulations in this section address basic properties that are sometimes triggered by studied items, but never of the cortical and hippocampal networks, including by lures. Thus, high levels of recall are highly diagnostic differences in their ability to assign distinct (“pattern- — for these parameters, if an item triggers a recall score separated”) representations to input patterns, and differ- of .2 or greater, you can be completely sure that it was ences in their operating characteristics. We also discuss studied. sources of variability in the two networks. The low overall level of lure recall in this simulation can be attributed to hippocampal pattern separation. Be- cause of pattern separation, the CA3 representations of Simulation 1: Pattern Separation lures do not overlap strongly with the CA3 representa- tions of studied items. Because the CA3 units activated Many of the differences between hippocampally- and by lures (for the most part) were not activated at study, cortically-driven recognition in our model arise from the these units do not possess strong links to CA1; as such, fact that the hippocampal network exhibits more pattern activity does not spread from CA3 to CA1, and recall separation than the cortical network. To document the does not occur. two networks’ pattern separation abilities, we ran simu- The studied recall distribution is bimodal because lations where we manipulated the amount of overlap be- of nonlinear attractor dynamics in the hippocampus. If tween paired input patterns. The first item in each pair a studied test cue accesses a sufficiently large number was presented at study and the second item was presented of strengthened weights, it triggers pattern completion: at test. For each pair, we measured the resulting amount Positive feedback effects (e.g., in the CA3 recurrents) re- 16 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

a) b) MTLC Familiarity Histogram, .2 Overlap Hippocampal Recall Histogram, .2 Overlap

0.12 0.8 Studied Studied 0.10 0.7 Lure 0.6 Lure y 0.08 y 0.5 nc nc e 0.06 e 0.4 qu qu e e r r 0.3 F 0.04 F 0.2 0.02 0.1 0.00 0.0 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 -0.2 0.00.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 Familiarity Recall

Figure 6: (a) histogram of the studied and lure MTLC familiarity distributions for 20% average overlap; (b) histogram of the studied and lure hippocampal recall distributions for 20% average overlap sult in strong re-activation of the CA3 and CA1 units that Hippocampal Recall Histogram,.405Overlap were activated at study, thereby boosting recall. Most studied items benefit from these positive feedback ef- 0.25 fects but, because of variability in initial weight values, Studied some studied items do not have weights strong enough 0.20 Lure

to yield positive feedback. These items only weakly ac- y c tivate CA3 and are poorly recalled, thereby accounting n 0.15 e u

for the extra “peak” at recall = 0. q e

r 0.10 Limits on Diagnosticity: High Average Overlap F 0.05 Increasing the average amount of overlap between items reduces the diagnosticity of the hippocampal re- 0.00 call signal. When the amount of overlap between input -0.2 0.00.20.40.60.81.0 patterns is high (e.g., 40.5%, instead of 20%), both stud- Recall ied items and lures trigger large amounts of recall, such that the studied and lure recall distributions are roughly Figure 7: Histogram of the studied and lure hippocampal re- Gaussian and overlap extensively (Figure 7). call distributions for 40.5% average overlap High levels of lure recall occur in the high-overlap condition because of pattern separation failure in the hippocampus. As documented in Simulation 1 (Fig- both studied items and lures. Figure 8 shows that in- ure 5), the hippocampus loses its ability to assign dis- creasing overlap increases the probability that prototyp- tinct representations to input patterns when overlap be- ical features of studied items and lures will be recalled, tween inputs is very high. In this situation, the same CA3 and reduces the probability that item-specific features of units — the units that are most sensitive to frequently- studied items will be recalled (in part, because the hip- occurring prototype features — are activated again and pocampus intrudes prototypical features in place of these again by studied patterns, and these units acquire very item-specific features). strong weights to the representations of prototype fea- In summary, The results presented here show that tures in CA1. When items are presented at test, they hippocampal recall has two modes of operation: When activate these “core” CA3 units to some extent (regard- input patterns have low-to-moderate average overlap, less of whether or not the test item was studied), and ac- high levels of matching recall are highly diagnostic — tivation spreads very quickly to CA1, leading to possi- studied items sometimes trigger strong recall (of item- bly erroneous recall of prototype features in response to specific and prototype features) but lures trigger virtu- Norman & O'Reilly 17

Recall of Prototypical and Item-Specific Features as a Function of Overlap

1.0

0.8

) Studied Prototypical ll 0.6 Studied Item-Specific Lure Prototypical Reca

( 0.4

P Lure Item-Specific 0.2

0.0

0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 Average Input Overlap

Figure 8: Plot of the probability that item-specific and prototypical features of studied items and lures will be recalled, as a function of overlap. As overlap increases, the amount of prototype recall triggered by studied items and lures increases, the amount of item-specific recall triggered by studied items decreases. ally no recall. In contrast, when input patterns have high reasons: First, there is extensive empirical evidence that, average overlap, recall functions as a standard signal- when lures are similar to studied items, but studied items detection process — both studied items and lures trigger are unrelated to one another, participants use recall-to- varying degrees of prototype recall. reject (see, e.g., Rotello, Macmillan, & Van Tassel, 2000; Rotello & Heit, 2000; Yonelinas, 1997; but see Rotello & Heit, 1999 for a contrasting view). Second, Simulation 3: YN Related Lure Simulations it is computationally sensible to use recall-to-reject — we show that the presence of mismatching recall in this The strengths of the hippocampal model are most ev- paradigm is highly diagnostic of an item being nonstud- ident on yes-no related lure recognition tests, where lures ied. are similar to studied items, but studied items are dissim- ilar to one another. In this section, we show how the Results hippocampal model outperforms the cortical model on Figure 9 shows the results of our related lure simu- these tests, because of its superior pattern separation and lations: Recognition performance based on MTLC fa- pattern completion abilities. miliarity gets steadily worse as lures become increas- ingly similar to studied items; in contrast, recognition Methods based on hippocampal recall is relatively robust to the To simulate the related lure paradigm, we first cre- lure similarity manipulation. Figure 9 also shows that ated studied item patterns with 20% average overlap be- hippocampal performance is somewhat better for related

tween items. Then, for each studied (target) item, we lures when the recall-to-reject rule is used (as opposed to

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created a related lure item by taking the studied item and £

¡¤£ ¥ ¡©£ ). flipping a pre-specified number of slots; to vary target- The cortical model results can be explained in terms lure similarity, we varied the number of slots that we of the fact that the cortical model assigns similar repre- flipped to generate lures (less flipping results in more sentations to similar stimuli — because the representa- overlap). For comparison, we also ran simulations with tions of similar lures (vs. dissimilar lures) overlap more “unrelated” lures that were sampled from the same item with the representations of studied items, similar lures pool as studied items. benefit more from learning that occurs at study. Thus, In the related lure simulations presented here (and lure familiarity smoothly tracks target-lure similarity;

later in the paper), we used a recall-to-reject hippocam- ¡

£ increasing similarity monotonically lowers the target-

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pal decision rule instead of our standard

¡ ¡

§ £

¥ lure familiarity difference, leading to decreased discrim-

¡©£ rule. According to this rule, items that trig- inability. ger any mismatch are given a “new” response, otherwise In contrast, the hippocampal recall signal triggered the decision is based on match. We used this rule for two by lures is stuck at floor until target-lure similarity > 18 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

Effect of Target-Lure Similarity onYNd© MismatchingRecall as a Function of Lure Similarity 2.5 0.30 0.25 Studied items 2.0 Lures

) 0.20 © 1.5 atch 0.15 d sm N 0.10 Mi Y 1.0 Hippo with recall-to-reject P( 0.05 0.5 Hippo (match - mismatch) 0.00 MTLC 0.0 unrelated 0.5 0.7 0.9 unrelated 0.5 0.7 0.9 Target-Lure Similarity Target-Lure Similarity Figure 10: Plot of the probability that lures and studied items

§ will trigger mismatching recall, as a function of target-lure sim- Figure 9: YN recognition sensitivity ( ) in the two models, as a function of target-lure similarity. Target-lure similarity ilarity. This probability is close to floor for studied items; the was operationalized as the proportion of input features shared probability that lures will trigger mismatching recall increases by targets and corresponding lures; note that the average level with increasing target-lure similarity. of overlap between studied (target) items was held constant at 20%. These simulations show that the hippocampal model is more robust to increasing target-lure similarity than the cortical both networks can support good performance on YN model. The figure also shows that hippocampal performance recognition tests with lures that are unrelated to studied for related lures is better when a recall-to-reject rule is used items. When the networks are challenged by boosting instead of match - mismatch target-lure similarity, performance in both networks suf- . fers; however, the hippocampus is more robust to this manipulation than cortex. As such, the model predicts that recognition discrimination based on hippocampal re- 60%, and lures do not start to trigger above-criterion (i.e., call should be better than discrimination based on MTLC > > .40) recall until target-lure similarity 80%. This oc- familiarity on YN tests with related lures. This prediction curs because of hippocampal pattern separation – lures is consistent with the view, expressed in several empirical have to be very similar to studied items before they ac- papers, that recall is especially important for discrimi- cess enough strengthened weights to trigger recall. nating between studied items and very similar distractors The hippocampus also benefits from the fact that (e.g., Hintzman, Curran, & Oppy, 1992; Rotello et al., lures sometimes trigger pattern completion of the corre- 2000). sponding studied item, and can subsequently be rejected based on mismatch between recalled information and the test cue. Figure 10 illustrates the point (mentioned ear- Sources of Variability lier) that when lures resemble studied items, but studied items are not related to one another, mismatching recall The final issue that we need to address in the Basic is highly diagnostic — studied items virtually never trig- Network Properties section is variability. Recognition ger mismatching recall, but lures sometimes do. As such, performance involves detecting the presence of a vari- it makes to use a rule (like recall-to-reject) that as- able memory signal against a background of noise. Many signs a very high weight to mismatching recall. distinct forms of variability can affect recognition per- Figure 10 also shows that mismatching recall trig- formance; we need to carefully delineate which of these gered by lures increases substantially with increasing sources of variability are present in our models, because target-lure similarity. This increase in mismatching re- — as we show later — different forms of variability have call helps offset, to some degree, increased matching re- different implications for recognition performance. call triggered by related lures. With recall-to-reject, the The primary source of variability in our models is only way that lures can trigger an old response is if they sampling variability: variation in how well, on average, trigger a large amount of matching recall but no mis- neural units are connected to (sampled by) other neu- matching recall. The odds of this happening are very ral units in the network. Note that our use of the term low. “sampling variability” differs from how other modelers In summary: These simulations demonstrate that have used this term. In our model, sampling variability Norman & O'Reilly 19

is a function of variability in the initial values assigned Another source of variability in recall and famil- to weights in the network. Other models use sampling iarity scores is variability in pre-experimental exposure variability to refer to variability in which item features to stimuli: Some stimuli have been encountered exten- are presented to the model at study and test (Atkinson & sively prior to the experiment, in many different contexts; Estes, 1963), or variability in which memory trace is re- other stimuli are relatively novel; for evidence that pre- trieved at test (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984). experimental presentation frequency affects recognition Sampling variability arises because, at the beginning memory, see Dennis and Humphreys (2001). Variability of each simulation, weight strengths and connectivity in pre-experimental exposure (like encoding variability, patterns are set randomly. As discussed earlier, this ran- but unlike sampling variability) affects studied items and domness helps units in MTLC and the hippocampus form related lures in tandem. specialized representations of the input space. It also Finally, in addition to variability in how much test has the consequence that, by chance, some input features items overlap with pre-experimental memory traces, are sampled better (by units further “downstream”) than there is also variability in how much items overlap with other input features. other items presented in the experiment; this kind of An important property of sampling variability is that variability also affects studied items and related lures in it decreases as network size increases. Intuitively, as the tandem. Overlap-related variability is already present number of units and connections increases, the odds that in the model, but its effect on performance is typically any one input pattern will be “undersampled” relative dwarfed by sampling variability. Consequently, variabil- to another decreases. We conducted simulations to ex- ity in overlap should play a much larger role, proportion- plore this issue, and the results were very clear: As we ally, in larger networks with minimal sampling variabil-

increased network size, variability in MTLC familiarity ity. ¡ and hippocampal recall scores steadily decreased, and scores steadily increased. Sources of Variability: Summary In a network scaled to the approximate size of the In summary, the basic model (as described above) human brain, sampling variability would likely be negli- is strongly influenced by sampling variability, and lacks gible. Therefore, we conclude that other forms of vari- other, plausible sources of variability such as encoding ability must be at play in the human brain; we briefly variability. Given that sampling variability is not likely to describe some other sources of variability below. be a factor in human recognition memory performance, one might conclude that we should eliminate this source Other Sources of Variability of variability and incorporate other sources. Unfortu- A potentially important source of variability in recall nately, this is not practical at present — models that are and familiarity scores is variability in how well stimuli large enough to eliminate sampling variability cannot be are encoded at study. This kind of encoding variability feasibly run on available computational hardware. Fur- can arise, for example, if participants’ attention fluctu- thermore, adding more variability on top of sampling ates over the course of an experiment — some items will variability in our small networks leads to poor perfor- be encoded more strongly than others, leading to higher mance, unless other steps are taken to compensate for recall and familiarity scores at test. increased variability (e.g., increasing the learning rate). An important property of encoding variability, which Because of these limitations, we refrain from making is not true of sampling variability, is that it affects stud- strong predictions about how manipulations affect vari- ied items and related lures in tandem. That is, encoding ance in this paper. Nevertheless, we can still use the basic fluctuations that boost the memory signal triggered by a model to explain many phenomena that do not depend studied item also boost the memory signal triggered by on the exact source of variability. Also, it is relatively lures that are similar to that studied item (e.g., if “cat” is straightforward to supplement the basic model with other encoded so as to be especially familiar, the related lure forms of variability on an “as needed” basis, and we do “cats” will also be highly familiar). In contrast, sam- this to make some important points in Simulation 4. pling variability operates independently on each input feature; in small networks where sampling variability is Part II: Applications To Behavioral the dominant source of variance, noise associated with Phenomena sampling of non-shared (discriminative) features of over- lapping stimuli counteracts much of the shared variabil- The simulations in this part of the paper build on the ity in memory scores triggered by these items. We revisit basic results described earlier, by applying the models this issue later, when we explore how lure relatedness in- to a wide range of empirical recognition memory phe- teracts with test format (Simulation 4). 20 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

nomena (e.g., how does interference affect recognition FC Accuracy in MTLC performance in the two models). Whenever possible, we 1.0 present data that speak to the model’s predictions. t

c 0.9 e rr

Simulation 4: Lure Relatedness and Test o

C 0.8

Format Interactions n o i t r 0.7 As we saw in Figure 9, the model predicts that the o op hippocampus should outperform cortex on standard YN r

P 0.6 Corresponding lures tests where participants have to discriminate between Non-corresponding lures studied items and related lures. In this section, we show 0.5 how giving participants a forced choice between stud- unrelated0.5 0.7 0.9 ied items and corresponding related lures benefits per- formance in the cortical model but not the hippocampal Target-Lure Similarity model, thereby mitigating the hippocampal advantage. Figure 11: FC accuracy in the MTLC model as a func- Forced-Choice Testing and Covariance tion of target-lure similarity, using corresponding and non- corresponding FC testing. For high levels of target-lure sim- In an forced-choice (FC) test, participants are simul- ilarity, FC performance is slightly better with corresponding taneously presented with a studied item and a lure, and lures vs. with non-corresponding lures. are asked to select the studied item. The specific ver- sion of this test that boosts cortical performance involves £

where represents familiarity of studied items and ¥



pairing studied items with corresponding related lures  ¢¡ that of lures, is variance and is covariance be- (i.e., lures related to the paired studied item; for exam- £

tween and ¥ . Equation 2 shows that increasing co-

ple, study “RAT”, test “RAT” vs. “RATS”). £ ¥ variance reduces the variance of the ¥ familiarity The central insight as to why this format improves difference, which in turn boosts FC performance. cortical performance with related lures is that, even though related lures trigger strong feelings of familiar- FC Simulations Using the Basic Cortical Model ity (because they overlap with the studied items), corre- Our first concern was to assess how much FC testing sponding studied items are reliably more familiar. Be- with corresponding related lures benefits performance cause performance in an FC test is based on the differ- in our basic cortical model. Towards this end, we ran ence in familiarity between paired items, even small dif- simulations using a paradigm introduced by Hintzman ferences can drive good performance, as long as they are (1988); in these simulations, we compared FC perfor- reliable. mance with corresponding related lures (i.e., study A, B; The reliability of the familiarity difference depends test A vs. A’, B vs. B’, where A’ and B’ are lures re- on where variability comes from in the model. As lated to A and B, respectively) to FC performance with discussed in the previous section, some kinds of vari- non-corresponding lures (e.g., study A, B; test A vs. B’; ability (e.g., differences in encoding strength and pre- B vs. A’). To the extent that there is covariance between experimental exposure) necessarily affect studied and re- studied items and corresponding lures, this will benefit lated lure familiarity in tandem, whereas other kinds of performance in the corresponding lure condition relative variability (e.g., sampling variability) do not. When the to the non-corresponding lures. former kind of variability predominates, the familiarity As shown in Figure 11, FC performance is values of studied items and corresponding lures will be higher with corresponding related lures than with non- highly correlated, and therefore their difference will be corresponding lures — this replicates the empirical re- reliable. When sampling variability predominates, the sults obtained by Hintzman (1988) and shows that there studied-lure familiarity difference will be somewhat less is some covariance present in the basic cortical model. reliable. To quantify the level of covariance underlying these re-

More formally, the beneficial effect of using an FC sults, we can compute the following ratio:

£

 

test depends on covariance in the familiarity scores trig- ¡



¥

£

gered by studied items and corresponding related lures § (3)

©¡  ©¡ ¥ (Hintzman, 1988, 2001). The variance of the studied-lure

familiarity difference is given by the following equation: When  = 1, covariance will completely offset studied

¤£ £ ¤£



¡

¢¡ ¥¦¥ ¨§ ©¡ © ©¡ ¥ ¥ ¥ (2) and lure variance, and the studied-lure familiarity differ- Norman & O'Reilly 21

ence will be completely reliable (i.e., variance = 0);  = 0 sion rule. We applied this rule to FC testing in the follow- means that there is no covariance. For target-lure similar- ing manner: If one item triggered mismatching recall, but

ity = .92, the covariance ratio  = .27 in the correspond- the other item did not, the second item was selected; oth-

¡ ¡ ¡



£ ¥¨§ £

¡©£ ¥ ¡©£ ing condition and = -.01 in the non-corresponding con- erwise, the item triggering a higher dition. Thus, the model exhibits roughly one third the recall score was selected. maximal level of covariance possible. Cortical FC Results In summary: Although the basic model qualitatively As expected, the corresponding vs. non- exhibits an FC advantage with corresponding related corresponding difference for the cortical model lures, this advantage is not quantitatively very large. This was much larger in our simulations with encoding is because the dominant source of variability in the basic variability (Figure 12a) than in our simulations without cortical model is sampling variability, which — as dis- encoding variability (Figure 11). Computing the average cussed above — does not reliably affect studied items covariance/variance ratio for the .92 target-lure overlap and corresponding lures in tandem.  condition shows that = .62 for corresponding lures Cortical and Hippocampal Simulations With Encoding vs.  = -.05 for non-corresponding lures. This is more Variability than double the covariance in the basic model (.62 vs. Next, we wanted to explore a more realistic scenario .27), and confirms our intuition that decreasing the in which the contribution of sampling variability to over- contribution of sampling variability relative to encod- all variability is small, relative to other forms of variabil- ing variability should increase covariance and boost ity (like encoding variability) that affect studied items performance in the FC-corresponding condition. and corresponding lures in tandem. Increasing the rela- Hippocampal FC Results tive contribution of encoding variability should increase In contrast to the cortical model results, FC- covariance, and thereby increase the extent to which the corresponding and FC-non-corresponding performance cortical model benefits from use of an FC-corresponding were almost identical in the hippocampal model (Fig- test. We were also interested in how test format affects ure 12a). It seems clear that the same arguments the hippocampal model’s ability to discriminate between about covariance benefiting FC-corresponding perfor- studied items and related lures (when encoding variabil- mance should hold for hippocampus as well as for cortex. ity is high). To address these issues, we ran simula- Why then does the hippocampus behave differently than tions with added encoding variability in both the corti- the cortex in this situation? This can be explained by cal and hippocampal models, where we manipulated test looking at what happens on trials where the studied item format (FC-corresponding vs. FC-non-corresponding vs. is not recalled — on these trials, participants can still YN) and lure relatedness. respond correctly if the lure triggers mismatching recall Methods (and is rejected on this basis). The key insight is that We added encoding variability using the following studied recall and lure misrecall are independent when simple manipulation: For each item at study, the learn- non-corresponding lures are used (in effect, participants ing rate was scaled by a random number from the 0-to-1 get two independent chances to make a correct response), uniform distribution. However, this manipulation by it- but they are highly correlated when corresponding lures self does not achieve the desired result; the influence of are used — if the studied item does not trigger any recall, encoding variability is still too small relative to sampling the corresponding lure probably will not trigger any re- variability, and overall performance levels with added call either. Thus, using corresponding lures can actually encoding variability are unacceptably low. To boost the hurt performance in the hippocampal model by depriving relative impact of encoding variability (and overall per- participants of an extra, independent chance to respond formance), we also increased the learning rate in both correctly (via recall-to-reject) on trials where studied re- models to three times its usual value. Under this regime, call fails. This harmful effect of covariance cancels out random scaling of the learning rate at study has a much the beneficial effects of covariance described earlier. larger effect on studied-item (and related-lure) familiar- Because the cortical model benefits from FC- ity than random differences in how well features are sam- corresponding (vs. non-corresponding) testing but the pled. We should note that using a large learning rate has hippocampal model does not, the performance of the cor- some undesirable side-effects (e.g., increased interfer- tical model relative to the hippocampal model is better in ence), but these side-effects are orthogonal to the ques- this condition. tions we are asking here. As with the hippocampal re- YN Results lated lure simulations presented earlier, the hippocampal simulations presented here used a recall-to-reject deci- The results of our YN simulations with encoding variability (Figure 12b) were identical to the results of 22 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

a) FC Testing 1.0 t

c 0.9 e rr o

C 0.8 n o i t r 0.7 Hippo C o Hippo N op r

P 0.6 MTLC C MTLC N 0.5 unrelated0.71 0.92 Target-Lure Similarity Figure 13: Sample stimuli from the Holdstock et al. (2002) related lure experiment. Participants studied pictures of objects b) YN Testing (e.g., the horse shown in the upper left). At test, participants 2.5 had to discriminate studied pictures from three highly related lures (e.g., the horses shown in the upper right, lower left, and 2.0 lower right).

© 1.5 relying exclusively on MTLC familiarity when making d

N recognition judgments (in contrast to controls, who have Y 1.0 access to both hippocampal recall and MTLC familiar- ity). As such, patients should perform poorly relative to 0.5 Hippo controls on tests where hippocampus outperforms cortex, MTLC and they should perform relatively well on tests where 0.0 hippocampus and cortex are evenly matched. Apply- unrelated0.71 0.92 ing this logic to the results shown in Figure 12, patients should be impaired on YN recognition tests with related Target-Lure Similarity lures, but they should perform relatively well on FC- corresponding tests with related lures, and on tests with Figure 12: Cortical and hippocampal related-lure simulations incorporating strong encoding variability. (a) Results of FC unrelated lures (regardless of test format). simulations. When encoding variability is present, the corti- To test this prediction, we collaborated with Andrew cal model benefits very strongly from use of corresponding vs. Mayes and Juliet Holdstock to test patient YR, who suf- non-corresponding lures (more so than in our simulations with- fered focal hippocampal damage, sparing surrounding out encoding variability). In contrast, the hippocampal model MTLC regions (for details of the etiology and extent of (using recall-to-reject) performs equally well with correspond- YR’s lesion, see Holdstock et al., 2002). YR is severely ing vs. non-corresponding lures. (b) Results of YN simulations impaired at recalling specific details — thus, YR has to using the same parameters. As in our previous related-lure sim- rely almost exclusively on MTLC familiarity when mak- ulations (Figure 9), the cortical model is severely impaired rel- ing recognition judgments. Holdstock et al. (2002) de- ative to the hippocampal model on these tests. veloped YN and FC tests with highly related lures that were closely matched for difficulty, and administered our earlier YN-related-lure simulations. As before, we these tests to patient YR and her controls. Figure 13 found that the hippocampal model was much better than shows sample stimuli from this experiment. Results from the cortical model at discriminating between studied this experiment can be compared to results from 15 other items and related lures on YN tests. YN item recognition tests and 25 other FC item recogni- tion tests that used lures that were less strongly related to Tests of the Model's Predictions studied items (Mayes et al., 2002); we refer to these tests as the YN-low-relatedness and FC-low-relatedness tests, One way to test the model’s predictions is to look respectively. at recognition in patients with focal, relatively complete Figure 14 shows that, exactly as we predicted, YR hippocampal damage. Presumably, these patients are Norman & O'Reilly 23

PerformanceofPatientYR Relative to Controls on FC tests with non-corresponding (vs. corresponding) n 2 related lures. ea M l 1

ro Simulation 5: Associative Recognition and t

on 0 Sensitivity to Conjunctions C w

o -1

l In this section, we explore the two networks’ perfor- e mance on associative recognition tests. On these tests, /B -2 e participants have to discriminate between studied pairs v

o of stimuli (A-B, C-D) and associative lures generated by b -3 A recombining studied pairs (A-D, B-C). To show above- s -4 chance associative recognition performance, a network SD YN Hi FC Hi YN Low FC Low must be sensitive to whether features occurred together at study; sensitivity to individual features does not help dis- Figure 14: Performance of YR relative to controls on matched criminate between studied pairs and recombined lures. YN and FC-corresponding tests with highly related (Hi) lures; The hippocampus’ ability to rapidly encode and store the graph also plots YR’s average performance on 15 YN tests feature conjunctions is not in dispute — this is a central and 25 FC tests with less strongly related (Low) lures. YR’s feature of practically all theories of hippocampal func- scores are plotted in terms of number of standard deviations tioning, including ours (e.g., Rudy & Sutherland, 1995; above or below the control mean. For the YN and FC low- Squire, 1992b; Rolls, 1989; Teyler & Discenna, 1986). relatedness tests, error bars indicate the maximum and mini- In contrast, many theorists have argued that neocortex is mum z-scores achieved by YR (across the 15 YN tests and the not capable of rapidly forming new conjunctive represen- 25 FC tests, respectively). YR was significantly impaired rel- tations (i.e., representations that support differential re- ative to controls on the YN test with highly related lures (i.e.,

sponding to conjunctions vs. their constituent elements) ¥¤¦ her score was ¢¡¤£ SDs below the control mean) but YR per- formed slightly better than controls on the FC test with highly on its own; see O’Reilly and Rudy (2001) for a review. related lures. YR was not significantly impaired, on average, Associative recognition can be viewed as a special on the tests that used less strongly related lures. case of the related lure paradigm described earlier. As such, we would expect the hippocampus to outperform cortex on YN associative recognition tests, because of was significantly impaired on a YN recognition test that its superior pattern separation abilities, and its ability to used highly related lures, but showed relatively spared reject similar lures based on mismatching recall. performance on an FC version of the same test (YR ac- tually performed slightly better than the control mean on Methods this test). This pattern can not be explained in terms of difficulty confounds (i.e., YR performing worse, relative In our associative recognition simulations, 20 item to controls, on the more difficult test) — controls found pairs were presented at study — each “pair” consisted the YN test with highly related lures to be slightly eas- of a 12-slot pattern concatenated with another 12-slot ier than the FC test. Figure 14 also shows that YR was, pattern; at test, studied pairs were presented, along with on average, unimpaired on YN-low-relatedness and FC- three types of lures: associative (re-paired) lures, feature low-relatedness tests. YR performed worse on the YN lures (generated by pairing a studied item with a non- test with highly related lures than on any of the 15 YN- studied item), and novel lures (generated by pairing two low-relatedness tests; this difference can not be attributed nonstudied items). Our initial simulations used a YN test to the YN-low-relatedness tests being easier than the YN format. test with highly related lures: YR showed unimpaired performance on the 8 YN low-relatedness tests that con- YN Results trols found to be more difficult than the YN test with

highly related lures; for these eight tests her mean z-score As expected, the hippocampal model outperformed ¨§ was 0.04 ( £ = 0.49; minimum = -0.54; maximum = the cortical model in our YN associative recognition sim- 0.65; J. Holdstock, personal communication). We have ulations (Figure 15). The other important result from the yet to test the model’s prediction regarding use of FC- YN associative recognition simulations was that corti- corresponding vs. FC-non-corresponding tests with re- cal performance was well above chance. This indicates lated lures; based on the results shown in Figure 12, the that cortex is sensitive (to some degree) to feature co- model predicts that YR will be more strongly impaired occurrence in addition to individual feature occurrence. 24 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

AssociativeRecognition in the Two Models that emphasizes the shared item: Participants are asked, 2.1 “which of these items was paired with A: B or D?”. This encourages participants use a strategy where they cue 2.0 with the shared item (A), and select the choice (B or D) that best matches retrieved information. The prob- 1.9 lem with this algorithm is that success or failure depends ©

d entirely on whether the shared cue (A) triggers recall; if

N 1.8 A fails to trigger recall of B, participants are forced to Y 1.7 guess. In contrast, on FC associative recognition tests with non-overlapping choices (FC-NOLAP tests: study 1.6 A-B, C-D, E-F; test A-B vs. C-F), participants have mul- tiple, independent chances to respond correctly; even if 1.5 A does not trigger recall of B, participant can still re- Novel Feature Re-paired spond correctly if they recall that C was paired with D Lure Type (not F). Hippo To demonstrate how recall-to-reject differentially MTLC benefits FC-NOLAP performance (relative to FC-OLAP performance), we ran FC-NOLAP and FC-OLAP simu- Figure 15: Results of YN associative recognition simulations lations in the hippocampal model using a recall-to-reject in the cortical and hippocampal models. Using parameters that rule. For comparison purposes, we ran another set of yield matched performance for unrelated (novel) lures, cortex simulations where decisions were based purely on the is impaired relative to the hippocampus at associative recog- amount of matching recall. nition; nonetheless, cortex performs well above chance on the associative recognition tests. Methods These simulations used a cued recall algorithm The ability of the cortical model to encode stimulus where, for each test pair (e.g., A-B), we cued with the conjunctions can be explained in terms of the fact that first pair item and measured how well recalled informa- cortex, like the hippocampus, uses sparse representations tion matched the second pair item. On FC-OLAP tests, (as enforced by the k-winners-take-all algorithm). The we cued with the shared pair item (A) for both test al- kWTA algorithm forces units to compete to represent in- ternatives (A-B vs. A-D). On FC-NOLAP tests we cued put patterns, and units that are sensitive to multiple fea- with the first item of each test alternative (A from A-B, tures of a given input pattern (i.e., feature conjunctions) and C from C-D). We had to adjust some model param- are more likely to win the competition than units that are eters to get the model to work well using partial cues; only sensitive to single input features. Representations specifically, we used a higher-than usual learning rate are more conjunctive in the hippocampus than in cor- (.03 vs. .01) to help foster pattern completion of informa- tex because representations are more sparse (i.e., there tion not in the cue, and we increased the activation crite- is stronger inhibitory competition) in the hippocampus rion for counting a feature as recalled (from .90 to .95) than in the cortex. For additional computational support to compensate for the fact that the output of the model is for the notion that cortex should encode low-order con- less clean with partial cues. junctive representations, see O’Reilly and Busby (2002). Results Effects of Test Format As expected, FC-NOLAP performance was higher in In Simulation 4 we showed how giving participants the recall-to-reject condition (vs. the “match-only” con- a forced choice between studied items and correspond- dition) but FC-OLAP performance did not benefit at all ing related lures mitigates the hippocampal advantage for (Figure 16). Because of this differential benefit, FC- related lures. Analogously, giving participants a forced NOLAP performance was better overall than FC-OLAP choice between overlapping studied pairs and lures (FC- performance in the recall-to-reject condition. Consis- OLAP testing: study A-B, C-D test A-B vs. A-D) miti- tent with this prediction, Clark, Hori, and Callan (1993) gates the hippocampal advantage for associative recogni- found better performance on an FC-NOLAP associative tion. In both cases, performance suffers because partic- recognition test than on an FC-OLAP associative recog- ipants do not get an “extra chance” to respond correctly nition test. They explained this finding in a manner that (via recall-to-reject) when studied recall fails. is consistent with our account — they argued that partic- Typically, FC-OLAP tests are structured in a way ipants were using recall of studied pairs to reject lures, Norman & O'Reilly 25

HippocampalAssociativeRecognitionPerformance Effect of HippocampalDamage (Kroll et al.,1996) 1.0 3.0 Controls t

c 0.9 Patient

e 2.5 rr o

C 0.8

© 2.0 d n o i N t

r 1.5

0.7 Y o p o

r 1.0

P 0.6 0.5 0.5 FC-OLAP FC-NOLAP 0.0 Novel Feature Re-paired Match only Test Format Recall-to-reject Lure Type

Figure 17: Associative recognition in a patient with bilateral Figure 16: Associative recognition performance in the hip- hippocampal damage (taken from Kroll et al. (1996), Experi-

pocampal model, as a function of recall decision rule (match §

ment 1); scores for the patient and controls were computed only vs. recall-to-reject) and test format (FC-OLAP vs. FC- based on average hit and false alarm rates published in Table 3 NOLAP). FC-NOLAP performance benefits from use of recall- of that paper. The patient performed better than adult controls to-reject, but FC-OLAP performance does not benefit at all. at discriminating studied items from novel lures but was worse When recall-to-reject is used, FC-NOLAP performance is bet- than controls at discriminating studied items from feature lures ter than FC-OLAP performance. (where one part of the stimulus was old and one part was new) and was much worse that controls when lures were generated by re-combining studied stimuli. The pattern reported here is and that participants have more unique (independent) qualitatively consistent with the model’s predictions as shown chances to recall useful information in the FC-NOLAP in Figure 15. condition.

Tests of the Model's Predictions sociative recognition, the patient’s performance in this experiment was above chance. This is consistent with The implications of the above simulation results for the idea that cortex is sensitive (to some degree) to fea- patient performance are clear: Patients with focal hip- ture conjunctions. However, this study does not speak pocampal lesions should be impaired, relative to con- to whether cortex can form novel associations between trols, on YN associative recognition tests, but they should previously unrelated stimuli — because stimuli (includ- be relatively less impaired on FC-OLAP associative ing lures) were familiar words, participants do not nec- recognition tests. essarily have to form a new conjunctive representation to No one has yet conducted a direct comparison of how solve this task. well patients with hippocampal damage perform relative Two studies (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997; Mayes to controls, as a function of test format. However, there et al., 2001) have examined how well patients with focal are several relevant data points in the literature. Kroll hippocampal damage perform on FC-OLAP tests where et al. (1996) studied associative recognition performance participants are cued with one pair item and have to say in a patient with bilateral hippocampal damage (caused which of two items was paired with that item at study. by anoxia), as well as other patients with less focal le- The Vargha-Khadem et al. (1997) study used unrelated sions. In Experiment 1 of the Kroll et al. (1996) pa- word pairs, nonword pairs, familiar face pairs, and unfa- per, participants studied 2-syllable words (e.g., “barter”, miliar face pairs as stimuli, and the Mayes et al. (2001) “valley”) and had to discriminate between studied words study used unrelated word pairs as stimuli. In all of and words created by re-combining studied words (e.g., these studies, the hippocampally-lesioned patients were “barley”). Results from the patient with bilateral hip- unimpaired. This is consistent with the model’s predic- pocampal damage, as well as control data, are plotted in tion that patients should perform relatively well, com- Figure 17. In keeping with the model’s predictions, the pared to controls, on FC-OLAP tests. Furthermore, the patient showed impaired YN associative recognition per- patients’ excellent performance on these tests despite formance, but YN discrimination with novel lures (where having hippocampal lesions, coupled with the fact that neither part of the stimulus was studied) was intact. Fur- the tests used novel pairings, provides clear evidence thermore, even though the patient was impaired at as- that cortex is capable of forming new conjunctive rep-

26 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition ¢¡¤£¥£¥¦¨§ © resentations (that are strong enough to support recogni- ¢¡¤£¥£¥¦¨§ © B tion, if not recall) after a single study exposure. One BEFORE caveat is that, while MTLC appears capable of support- studying ing good associative recognition performance when the ¢¡¤£¥£¥¦¨§ © s to-be-associated stimuli are the same kind (e.g., words), A and B it performs less well when the to-be-associated stimuli

are of different kinds (e.g., objects and locations; Hold-  stock et al., 2002; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997). Hold- LTD stock et al. (2002) argue that MTLC familiarity can not AFTER studying

support object-location associative recognition because ¢¡¤£¥£¥¦¨§ © object and location information do not converge fully in MTLC. As a final note: While the studies discussed above Figure 18: Illustration of how Hebbian learning causes inter- found patterns of spared and impaired recognition per- ference in our models. Initially (top two squares) the hidden formance after focal hippocampal damage that are con- unit responds equally to patterns A and B. The effects of study- sistent with the model’s predictions, it is important to ing pattern A are shown in the bottom two squares. Studying keep in mind that many studies have found an “across- pattern A boosts weights to features that are part of pattern A the-board” impairment in declarative memory tasks fol- (including features that are shared with pattern B), and reduces lowing hippocampal damage. For example, Stark and weights to features that are not part of pattern A. These changes Squire (2002) found that patients with hippocampal dam- result in a net increase in responding to pattern A, and a net de- age were impaired to a roughly equal extent on tests with crease in responding to pattern B. novel vs. re-paired lures. We address the question of why some hippocampal patients show “across-the-board” vs. which pattern A activates the hidden unit. The effects of selective deficits in Simulation 8, below. learning on responding to pattern B are more complex: LTP boosts weights to features that are shared by pat- Simulation 6: Interference and List Strength terns A and B, but LTD reduces weights to features that are unique to pattern B. We now turn to the fundamental issue of interference: If you train a network of this type on a large number How does studying an item affect recognition of other, of overlapping patterns (e.g., several pictures of fish), the previously studied items? In this section, we first re- network will become more and more sensitive to features view general principles of interference in networks like that are shared across the entire item set (e.g., the fact ours that incorporate Hebbian LTP and LTD. We then that all studied stimuli have fins), and it will become less show how a list strength interference manipulation (de- and less responsive to discriminative features of individ- scribed in detail below) differentially affects discrimina- ual stimuli (e.g., the fact that one fish has a large green tion based on hippocampal recall vs. MTLC familiarity. striped dorsal fin). In the long run, this latter effect is harmful to recognition performance — if the network’s General Principles of Interference in our Mod- sensitivity to the unique, discriminative features of stud- els ied items and lures hits floor, then the network will not be able to respond differentially to studied items and lures At the most general level, interference occurs in our at test. However, in the absence of floor effects, the ex- models whenever different input patterns have overlap- tent to which recognition is harmed depends on the extent ping internal representations. In this situation, studying to which interference differentially affects responding to a new pattern tunes the overlapping units so they are studied items and lures. In the next section, we explore more sensitive to the new pattern, and less sensitive to this issue in the context of our two models. the unique (discriminative) features of other patterns. Figure 18 is a simple illustration of this tuning pro- List Strength Simulations cess. It shows a network with a single hidden unit that We begin our exploration of interference by simulat- receives input from five input units. Initially, the hidden ing how list strength affects recognition in the two mod- unit is activated to a roughly equal extent by two differ- els; specifically, how does strengthening some list items ent input patterns, A and B. Studying pattern A has two affect recognition of other (non-strengthened) list items? effects: Hebbian LTP increases weights to active input (Ratcliff, Clark, & Shiffrin, 1990) features, and Hebbian LTD decrements weights to inac- tive input features. These changes bolster the extent to Norman & O'Reilly 27

a) Effect of List Strength on b) Effect of List Strength on c) Size of the LSE in MTLC Recognition in MTLC Recognition in the Hippocampus and the Hippocampus 2.5 2.5 1.2

- 1.0 2.0 2.0 d©

d© .

t . 0.8 t : n d© d© I 1.5 1.5 n

E I 0.6

S k ng YN L 1.0 YN 0.4 1.0 a o e r

t 0.2 W 0.5 0.5 S 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 .10 .20 .26 .33 .41 .50 .10 .20 .26 .33 .41 .50 .10 .20 .26 .33 .41 .50 Average Input Overlap Average Input Overlap Average Input Overlap

Weak interf. Weak interf. MTLC Strong interf. Strong interf. Hippo

Figure 19: Results of list strength simulations in the two models. (a) shows MTLC results; (b) shows hippocampal results; (c) re-

§ §

plots data from (a) and (b) as list strength difference scores (weak interference - strong interference ) to facilitate comparison across models. For low-to-moderate levels of overlap (up to .26), there was a significant list strength effect in the hippocampal model but not in the cortical model; for higher levels of overlap there was a list strength effect in both models.

List Type Target Items Interference Items (e.g., doubling the number of presentations leads to more weak interf.: bike robot apple cat tree towel weight change than doubling the learning rate), because strong interf.: bike robot apple cat tree towel the initial study presentation alters how active units will cat tree towel be on the next presentation, and greater activity leads cat tree towel to greater learning (according to the Hebb rule). We also manipulated average between-item overlap (ranging Table 1: List strength compares weak interference lists with from 10% to 50%) to see how this factor interacts with strong interference lists. In both conditions, participants are list strength — intuitively, increasing overlap should in- asked to discriminate between targets (e.g., bike) and nonstud- crease interference. ied lures (e.g., coin) at test. Results Methods In our cortical network simulations (Figure 19a), there was no effect of list strength on recognition when In our list strength simulations, we compared two input pattern overlap was relatively low (up to .26), but conditions: a weak interference condition and a strong the list strength effect (LSE) was significant for higher interference condition. In the weak interference condi- levels of input overlap. In contrast, the hippocampal net- tion, participants study target items once and interfer- work showed a significant LSE for all levels of input ence items once. The strong interference condition is the overlap (Figure 19b); the size of the hippocampal LSE same except interference items are strengthened at study increased with increasing overlap (except in the .5 over- (e.g., by presenting them multiple times, or presenting lap condition, where the LSE was compressed by floor them for a longer duration). In both conditions, par- effects). Figure 19c directly compares the size of the ticipants have to discriminate between target items and LSE in the two models. nonstudied lures at test. If strengthening of interference items (in the strong interference condition) impairs target We also measured the direct effect of strengthen- vs. lure discrimination, relative to the weak interference ing interference items on memory for those items; both condition, this is a list strength effect. A simple diagram models exhibited a robust item strength effect whereby of the procedure is provided in Table 1. memory for interference items was better in the strong interference condition (e.g., for 20% input overlap,

The study list was comprised of 10 target items, ¡ interference-item increased from 2.13 to 3.22 in the

followed by 10 interference items. Interference item ¡ hippocampal model; in the cortical model, increased strength was manipulated by increasing the learning rate from 2.08 to 3.12), thereby confirming that our strength- for these items (from .01 to .02). In our models, strength- ening manipulation was effective. ening by repetition and strengthening by increasing the learning rate have qualitatively similar effects; however, The data are puzzling: For moderate amounts of quantitatively, repetition has a larger effect on weights overlap, the hippocampus shows an interference effect despite its ability to carry out pattern separation, and cor- 28 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

Effect of List Strength on Studied Recall a) Effect of List Strength on Raw Familiarity, 20% Overlap 0.20 0.76 Studied items 0.16 0.75 Lures y y t i c r 0.74 n 0.12 a i l e i u m q

a 0.73 e F

r 0.08 F 0.72 0.04 0.71 0.00 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 0.00.20.4 0.6 0.81.0 List Strength (Interference Lrate /Target Lrate) Recall b) Effect of List Strength on the Studied - Lure Familiarity Gap Weak interference Strong interference 0.04 e c

n 0.03 Figure 20: Studied recall histograms for the strong and weak e r

interference conditions, 20% overlap condition. Increasing list ffe i strength pushes the studied recall distribution to the left (to- D 0.02 y t i wards zero). r a i l i

m 0.01 a tex — which has higher baseline levels of pattern overlap F — does not show an interference effect. We address the 0.00 hippocampal results first. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 List Strength (Interference Lrate /Target Lrate) Interference in the Hippocampal Model Figure 21: (a) Plot of how target and lure familiarity are af- Understanding the hippocampal list strength effect is fected by list strength (with 20% input overlap). Initially, target quite straightforward. Even though there is less overlap and lure familiarity decrease; however, with enough interfer- between representations in the hippocampus than in cor- ence, target and lure familiarity start to increase. (b) Plot of tex, there is still some overlap (primarily in CA1, but the difference in target and lure familiarity, as a function of list also in CA3). These overlapping units cause interfer- strength; initially, the difference increases slightly, but then it ence — specifically, recall of discriminative features of decreases. studied items is impaired through Hebbian LTD occur- ring in the CA3-CA1 projection and (to a lesser extent) might decrease as a function of interference. Discrim- in projections coming in to CA3. Importantly, for low- inability is a function of the difference in studied and to-moderate levels of input pattern overlap, the amount lure familiarity (as well as the variance of these distribu- of recall triggered by lures is at floor, and therefore it tions); therefore, if lure familiarity decreases as much as can not decrease as a function of interference. Putting (or more) than studied familiarity as a function of inter- these two points together, the net effect of interference is ference, overall discriminability may be unaffected. This to move the studied distribution downwards towards the is in fact what occurs in the cortical model. at-floor lure distribution, which increases the overlap be- Figure 21a shows how raw familiarity scores trig- tween distributions and therefore impairs discriminabil- gered by targets and lures change as a function of in- ity (Figure 20). terference. Initially, both studied and lure familiarity de- crease; this occurs because interference reduces weights Interference in the Cortical Model to discriminative features of studied items and lures. Next, we need to explain why a LSE was not obtained There is also an interaction whereby lure representa- in the cortical model (for low-to-moderate levels of input tions degrade more quickly than studied representations, overlap). The critical difference between the cortical and so the studied-lure gap in familiarity increases slightly hippocampal models is that lure familiarity is not at floor (Figure 21b; note that while the increase is numerically in the cortical network, thereby opening up the possibil- small, it is highly significant). ity that lure familiarity (as well as studied familiarity) However, with more interference, the studied-lure Norman & O'Reilly 29

gap in familiarity starts to decrease. This occurs because Effect of List Strength on RawFamiliarity,40.5% Overlap weights to discriminative features of lures begin to ap- 0.77 proach floor (and — as such — can not show any ad- 0.76 ditional decrease as a function of interference). Also,

y 0.75

raw familiarity scores start to increase; this occurs be- t i r a

cause, in addition to reducing weights to discriminative i l i 0.74

features, interference also boosts weights to shared item m a

features. At first, the former effect outweighs the latter, F 0.73 and there is a net decrease in familiarity. However, when 0.72 Studied Items weights to discriminative features approach floor, these Lures weights no longer decrease enough to offset the increase 0.71 in weights to shared features, and there is a net increase 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 in familiarity. List Strength (Interference Lrate /Target Lrate) In this simulation, list strength did not substantially affect the variance of the familiarity signal; variance in- Figure 22: Plot of how target and lure familiarity are affected creased numerically with increasing list strength but the by list strength with 40.5% input overlap. When overlap is increase was extremely small (e.g., 10x strengthening of high, target and lure familiarity increase right from the start, the 10 interference items led to a 3% increase in vari- and the target-lure familiarity gap monotonically decreases. ance). However, we can not rule out the possibility that adding other forms of variability to the model (and elimi- MTLC familiarity. With enough interference, the corti- nating sampling variability; see the Sources of Variability cal model’s overall sensitivity to discriminative features section) might alter the model’s predictions about how always approaches floor and the studied and lure famil- list strength affects variance. iarity distributions converge. The amount of overlap be- Differentiation tween items determines how quickly the network arrives at this degenerate state — more overlap yields faster de- The finding that lure representations initially degrade generation. When overlap is high, raw familiarity scores faster than studied representations can be explained in increase (and the familiarity gap decreases) right from terms of the principle of differentiation, which was first the start; this is illustrated in Figure 22, which plots tar- articulated by Shiffrin et al. (1990); see also McClelland get and lure familiarity as a function of list strength, for and Chappell (1998). Shiffrin et al. argued that studying 40.5% input overlap. an item makes its memory representation more selective, such that the representation is less likely to be activated by other items. Tests of the Model's Predictions In our model, differentiation is a simple consequence The main novel prediction from our models is that of Hebbian learning (as it is in McClelland & Chap- (modulo the boundary conditions outlined above) recog- pell, 1998). As discussed above, Hebbian learning tunes nition based on hippocampal recall should exhibit a LSE, MTLC units so that they are more sensitive to the stud- whereas recognition based on MTLC familiarity should ied input pattern (because of LTP), and less sensitive to not. other, dissimilar input patterns (because of LTD). Be- Consistent with the hippocampal model’s prediction, cause of this LTD effect, studied-item representations are some studies have found a LSE for cued recall (e.g., less likely to be activated by interference items than lure- Kahana & Rizzuto, submitted; Ratcliff et al., 1990) al- item representations; as such, studied items suffer less though not all studies that have looked for a cued re- interference than lures. As an example of how studying call LSE have found one (e.g., Bauml, 1997). How- an item pulls its representation away from other items, ever, practically all published studies that have looked in the 20% input overlap simulations the average amount for a LSE for recognition have failed to find one (Ratcliff of MTLC overlap between studied target items and inter- et al., 1990; Murnane & Shiffrin, 1991a, 1991b; Ratcliff, ference items (expressed in terms of vector dot product) Sheu, & Gronlund, 1992; Yonelinas, Hockley, & Mur- was .150, whereas the average overlap between lures and dock, 1992; Shiffrin, Huber, & Marinelli, 1995). Al- interference items was .154; this difference was highly though this null LSE for recognition is consistent with significant. our cortical model’s predictions (viewed in isolation), it Boundary Conditions on the Null LSE is nevertheless somewhat surprising that overall recogni- tion scores do not reflect the hippocampal model’s ten- It should be clear from the above explanation that dency to produce a recognition LSE. we do not always expect a null list strength effect for One way to reconcile the null LSE for recognition 30 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

List Strength Effect for Recall, should emphasize that the technique we used to estimate Familiarity, andOld/New Recognition familiarity-based discrimination assumes that recall and ) ©

d 0.6 familiarity are independent — the independence assump- . t tion is discussed in more detail in Simulation 7. Also, n I

g 0.4 as discussed by Norman (in press), we can not conclu- n

o sively rule out (in this case) the possibility that the ob- r t served LSE for recall-based discrimination was caused S

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. ity. Nonetheless, the overall pattern of results is highly t

n 0.0 I consistent with the predictions of our model. k a

e -0.2 Lure Relatedness W

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E affects discrimination in the plurals paradigm (Hintz-

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L man et al., 1992), where participants have to discrimi- d©(R) d©(F) d©(Old) nate between studied words, related switched-plurality (SP) lures (e.g., study “scorpion”, test “scorpions”), and

Figure 23: Plot of the size of the list strength effect for ¡ £¢¥¤ § unrelated lures. The model predicts that the ability to

three dependent measures: , recall-based discrimination;

£¦§¤ £¨¥© ¤ §

§ discriminate between studied words and related SP lures

, familiarity-based discrimination; and , discrim- ination computed based on “old/new” responses. Error bars should depend on recall (see Simulation 3. Thus, we

indicate 95% confidence intervals. The LSE was significant for should find a significant list strength effect for studied

£¢¥¤ £¦§¤ £¨¥© ¤

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, but not for or . vs. SP discrimination, but not necessarily for studied vs. unrelated discrimination, which can also be supported by familiarity. with the model’s predictions is to argue that hippocampal Furthermore, we can also look at SP vs. unrelated recall was not making enough of a contribution, relative pseudodiscrimination, i.e., how much more likely are to MTLC familiarity, on existing tests. This explanation participants to say old to related vs. unrelated lures. leads to a clear prediction: List strength effects should Familiarity boosts pseudodiscrimination (insofar as SP be obtained for recognition tests and measures that load lures will be more familiar than unrelated lures), but re- more heavily on the recall process. Norman (in press) call of plurality information lowers pseudodiscrimina- tested this prediction in two distinct ways. tion (by allowing participants to confidently reject SP Self-Report Measures lures). Hence, if increasing list strength reduces recall of In one experiment, Norman (in press) collected self- plurality information (but has no effect familiarity-based report measures of recall and familiarity — whenever discrimination) the net effect should be an increase in a participant called an item “old”, there were asked pseudodiscrimination (a negative LSE). whether they specifically “remembered” details from As predicted, the LSE for studied vs. SP lure discrim- when the item was studied, whether the item just seemed ination was significant; the LSE for studied vs. unrelated “familiar”. To estimate recall-based discrimination, we lure discrimination was nonsignificant; and there was a

plugged the probability of saying “remember” to studied significant negative LSE for SP lure vs. unrelated lure ¡ items and lures into the formula for . We computed pseudodiscrimination (Figure 24). familiarity-based discrimination using the Independence In summary: We obtained data consistent with the Remember-Know technique described in Jacoby, Yoneli- model’s prediction of a LSE for recall-based discrimi- nas, and Jennings (1997). nation, and a null LSE for familiarity-based discrimina- Norman (in press) found that the effect of list strength tion, using two very different methods of isolating the on old/new recognition sensitivity was nonsignificant in contributions of these processes (collecting self-report this experiment, replicating the null LSE obtained by data, and using related lures). The model’s predictions Ratcliff et al. (1990). However, if you break recogni- regarding the boundary conditions of the null LSE for tion into its component processes, it is clear that list familiarity-based discrimination remain to be tested. For strength does affect performance (Figure 23). As pre- example, our claim that discrimination asymptotically dicted, there was a significant LSE for discrimination goes to zero with increasing list strength implies that it based on recall; in contrast, list strength had no effect should be possible to obtain a LSE (in paradigms that whatsoever on familiarity-based discrimination. 2 We familiarity-based discrimination — these results are being presented 2Norman (in press) did not report how list strength affects for the first time here. Norman & O'Reilly 31

Effect of List Strength on Discrimination of the model’s prediction of parallel effects of list length Studied Items (S), Related Lures (SP), and and list strength. In particular, Murnane and Shiffrin

) Unrelated Lures (U) (1991a) and others have obtained a dissociation whereby z

A 0.08 list length impairs recognition sensitivity but a closely . t

n matched list strength manipulation does not. This finding I

g 0.04 implies that adding new items to the list is more disrup- n o

r tive to existing weight patterns than repeating already- t

S studied items. We are currently exploring different ways

- 0.00 of implementing this dynamic in our model. Az .

t -0.04

n Fast Weights I

k One particularly promising approach is to add a large, a

e -0.08 transient fast weight component to the model that reaches W ( its maximum value in one study trial and then decays ex-

E -0.12

S ponentially; subsequent presentations of the same item L S vs. SP S vs. U SP vs. U simply reset fast weights to their maximum value, and decay begins again (see Hinton & Plaut, 1987 for an Figure 24: Results from the plurals LSE experiment. In this early implementation of a similar mechanism). This dy- experiment, recognition sensitivity was measured using ¢¡ (an namic is consistent with neurobiological evidence show- index of the area under the ROC curve; Macmillan & Creel- ing a large, transient component to long-term poten- man, 1991). The graph plots the size of the list strength effect for three different kinds of discrimination: Studied vs. related tiation (LTP) (e.g., Malenka & Nicoll, 1993; Bliss & switched-plurality lures (S vs. SP); studied vs. unrelated lures Collingridge, 1993). (S vs. U); and related vs. unrelated lure pseudodiscrimination The assumptions outlined above imply that the mag- (SP vs. U). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. There nitude of fast weights at test (for a particular item) will was a significant LSE for studied vs. related lure discrimina- be a function of the time elapsed from the most recent tion, and there was a significant negative LSE for related vs. presentation of the item; the number of times that the unrelated lure pseudodiscrimination. item was repeated before this final presentation does not matter. As such, presenting interference items for the have previously yielded a null LSE) by increasing the first time (increasing list length) should have a large ef- number of training trials for interference items. fect on fast weights, but repeating already-studied in- terference items (increasing list strength) should have List Length Effects less of an effect on the configuration of fast weights at test. Preliminary cortical-model simulations incorporat- Thus far, our interference simulations have focused ing fast weights (in addition to standard, non-decaying on list strength. Here, we briefly discuss how list length weights) have shown a list length/strength dissociation, affects performance in the two models. In contrast to but more work is needed to explore the relative merits the list strength paradigm, which measures how strength- of different implementations of fast weights (e.g., should ening items already on the list interferes with memory the fast weight component incorporate LTD as well as for other items, the list length paradigm measures how LTP), and how the presence of fast weights interacts with adding new (previously nonstudied) items to the list in- the other predictions outlined in this paper. terferes with memory for other items. The idea that list length effects are attributable to The basic finding is that our model, as currently con- quickly decaying weights implies that interposing a de- figured, makes the same predictions regarding list length lay between study and test (thereby allowing the fast and strength effects — adding new items and strengthen- weights to decay) should greatly diminish the list length ing already-presented items induce a comparable amount effect. In keeping with this prediction, a recent study of weight change and therefore result in comparable lev- with a 5 minute delay between study and test did not els of interference. As with list strength, the model pre- show a list length effect (Dennis & Humphreys, 2001). dicts a dissociation whereby (so long as overlap between The next step in testing this hypothesis will be to run ex- items is not too high) list length affects discrimination periments that parametrically manipulate study-test lag based on hippocampal recall but not MTLC familiar- while measuring list length effects. ity. Yonelinas (1994) obtained evidence consistent with this prediction using the process dissociation procedure (which assumes independence). However, some extant evidence appears to contradict 32 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

Simulation 7: The Combined Model and the Recall-Familiarity Correlation for Studied Items Independence Assumption 0.5

Up to this point, we have explored the properties of 0.4 hippocampal recall and MTLC familiarity by presenting n o input patterns to separate hippocampal and neocortical i t 0.3 networks — this approach is useful for analytically map- a el ping out how the two networks respond to different in- rr 0.2

puts, but it does not allow us to explore interactions be- Co tween the two networks. One important question that 0.1 cannot be addressed using separate networks is the sta- tistical relationship between recall and familiarity. As 0.0 mentioned several times throughout this paper, all ex- 0.00.10.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 tant techniques for measuring the distinct contributions of recall and familiarity to recognition performance as- P(Encoding Failure) sume that they are stochastically independent (e.g., Ja- coby et al., 1997). This assumption can not be directly Figure 25: Simulations exploring the effect of encoding vari- tested using behavioral data because of the chicken-and- ability on the recall-familiarity correlation for studied items. egg problems described in the Introduction. As encoding variability (operationalized as the probability that participants will “blink” and fail to encode half of an item’s To assess the validity of the independence assump- features at study) increases, the recall-familiarity correlation tion, we implemented a combined model in which the increases. cortical system serves as the input to the hippocampus — this arrangement more accurately reflects how the two systems are connected in the brain. Using the combined tive; limiting the range of possible EC representations model, we show that there is no simple answer regarding makes it easier for the hippocampus to learn a stable whether or not hippocampal recall and MTLC familiar- mapping between CA1 representations and EC represen- ity are independent. Rather, the extent to which these tations. Second, the EC in layer for the combined model processes are correlated is a function of different (situa- only has 240 units, compared to 1920 units in the MTLC tionally varying) factors, some of which boost the corre- layer of the separate cortical network. This reduced size lation and some of which reduce the correlation. In this derives from computational necessity — use of a larger section, we briefly describe the architecture of the com- EC in would require a larger CA1, which together would bined model, and then we use the model to explore two make the simulations run too slowly on current hard- manipulations that push the recall-familiarity correlation ware. This smaller hidden layer in the combined model in opposite directions: encoding variability and interfer- makes the familiarity signal more subject to sampling

ence (list length). variability, and thus recognition ¢¡ is somewhat worse, but otherwise it functions just as before. We used the Combined Model Architecture same basic cortical and hippocampal parameters as in our separate-network simulations, except we used input pat- The combined model is structurally identical to the terns with 32.5% overlap — this level of input overlap hippocampal model except the projection from Input to yields approximately 24% overlap between EC in pat- EC in has modifiable connections (and 25% random con- terns at study. nectivity) instead of fixed 1-to-1 connectivity. Thus, the In the combined model, the absolute size of the Input-to-EC in part of the combined model has the same recall-familiarity correlation is likely to be inflated, rela-

basic architecture and connectivity as the separate corti- ¤¦¥¨§ £ tive to the brain, because of the high level of sampling cal model. This makes it possible to read out our ¢¡ variability present in our model. Sampling variability familiarity measure from the EC in layer of the com- leads to random fluctuations in the sharpness of cortical bined model (i.e., the EC in layer of the combined model representations, which induce a correlation (insofar as serves the same functional role as the MTLC layer of the sharper representations trigger larger familiarity scores, separate cortical network). and they also propagate better into the hippocampus, bol- There are, however, a few small differences between stering recall). Because of this issue, our simulations the cortical part of the combined model, and the separate below focus on identifying manipulations that affect the cortical network. First, the EC in layer of the combined size of the correlation, rather than characterizing the ab- model is constrained to learn “slotted” representations, solute size of the correlation. where only one unit in each 10-unit slot is strongly ac- Norman & O'Reilly 33

a) Recall-Familiarity Correlation for Studied Items b) Raw Familiarity and Recall Scores for Studied Items

1.0 0.72 0.3 0.8 n y o t i i 0.70 t r 0.6 ll a a l i l ca i

e 0.2 rr m Re a 0.68 0.4 F Co 0.1 0.2 0.66 0.0 10 40 70 100 130 160 10 40 70 100 130 160

List Length List Length

Studied familiarity Studied recall

Figure 26: Simulations exploring how interference affects the recall-familiarity correlation. (a) Increasing list length reduces the recall-familiarity correlation for studied items. (b) Increasing list length leads to a decrease in studied-item recall scores, but studied-item familiarity scores stay relatively constant.

Effects of Encoding Variability to discriminative item-specific features. Insofar as items vary in how much interference they are subject to (due Curran and Hintzman (1995) pointed out that encod- to random differences in between-item overlap), and in- ing variability can boost the recall-familiarity correla- terference pushes recall and familiarity in different di- tion; if items vary substantially in how well they are rections, it should be possible to use interference as a encoded, poorly-encoded items will be unfamiliar and “wedge” to decorrelate recall and familiarity. will not be recalled; well-encoded items will be more familiar, and more likely to trigger recall. We ran sim- We ran simulations measuring how the recall- ulations in the combined model where we manipulated familiarity correlation changed as a function of interfer- encoding variability by varying the probability of par- ence (operationalized using a list length manipulation). tial encoding failure (i.e., encoding only half of an item’s There were 10 target items followed by 0 to 150 (non-

features) from 0 to .50. For each simulated participant, tested) interference items. As expected, increasing list £ ¤¦¥¨§ length lowers the recall-familiarity correlation for stud- we read out the MTLC familiarity signal ( ¢¡ , read

out from the EC in layer) and the hippocampal recall sig- ied items (Figure 26a) in the model.

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¡©£ ¥ ¡©£ nal ( between EC out and EC in) on each trial, and measured the correlation between these ing at how interference affects raw familiarity and re- signals (across trials). The results of these simulations call scores for studied items in these simulations (Fig- are presented in Figure 25; as expected, increasing en- ure 26b). With increasing interference, recall decreases coding variability increased the recall-familiarity corre- sharply but familiarity stays relatively constant; this dif- lation in the model. ferential effect of interference works to de-correlate the two signals. Once recall approaches floor, recall and fa- Interference Induced Decorrelation miliarity are affected in a basically similar manner (i.e., not much); this lack of a differential effect explains why In the next set of simulations, we show how the pres- the recall-familiarity correlation does not continue to de- ence of interference between memory traces can reduce crease all the way to zero. the recall-familiarity correlation. In the Interference and In summary: The combined model gives us a princi- List Strength section of the paper, we discussed how the pled means of predicting how different factors will affect two systems are differentially affected by interference: the statistical relationship between recall and familiarity. Hippocampal recall scores for studied items tend to de- Given the tight coupling of the cortical and hippocampal crease with interference; familiarity scores decrease less, networks in the combined model, one might think that and sometimes increase, because increased sensitivity to a positive correlation is inevitable. However, the results shared prototype features compensates for lost sensitivity presented here show that — to a first approximation — 34 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

independence can be achieved, so long as factors that re- Effect of HippocampalDamage onFCRecognition duce the correlation (e.g., interference) exert more of an influence than factors that bolster the correlation (e.g., 1.0 encoding variability). Future research will focus on iden- t ec 0.9 tifying additional factors that affect the size of the corre- rr o lation. C 0.8 n o i t

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Model Pr Hippocampal recall 0.5 MTLC familiarity In this section, we show how the combined model can provide a more sophisticated understanding of the 020406080100 effects of different kinds of medial temporal lesions. Lesion Size (Percent) Specifically, we show that (in the combined model) partial hippocampal lesions can sometimes result in Figure 27: Effect of hippocampal damage on forced-choice worse overall recognition performance than complete (FC) recognition performance. This graph plots FC accuracy hippocampal lesions. In contrast, increasing MTLC le- based on MTLC familiarity, hippocampal recall, and a combi- sion size monotonically reduces overall recognition per- nation of the two signals, as a function of hippocampal lesion formance. size. FC accuracy based on MTLC familiarity is unaffected by hippocampal lesion size. FC accuracy based on hippocampal recall declines steadily as lesion size increases. FC accuracy Partial Lesion Simulation Methods based on a combination of recall and familiarity is affected in We ran one set of simulations exploring the effects of a nonmonotonic fashion by lesion size: initially, combined FC focal hippocampal lesions, and another set of simulations accuracy declines; however, going from a 75% to 100% hip- pocampal lesion leads to an increase in combined FC perfor- exploring the effects of focal MTLC lesions. In all of the mance. lesion simulations, the size of the lesion (in terms of % of units removed) was varied from 0% to 95% in 5% increments. In the hippocampal lesion simulations, we familiarity (e.g., Yonelinas, 2001b). lesioned all of the hippocampal subregions (DG, CA1, CA3) equally by percentage; in the MTLC lesion sim- Hippocampal Lesions ulations, we lesioned EC in. To establish comparable Figure 27 shows how hippocampal FC performance, baseline (pre-lesion) recognition performance between cortical FC performance, and combined FC performance the hippocampal and cortical networks, we boosted the (using the decision rule just described) vary as a function cortical learning rate to .012 instead of .004; this increase compensates for the high amount of sampling variability of hippocampal lesion size. As one might expect, hip- pocampal FC performance decreases steadily as a func- present in the (240 unit) EC in layer of the combined tion of hippocampal lesion size, while cortical perfor- model. In these simulations, we used forced-choice test- ing to maximize comparability with animal lesion studies mance is unaffected by hippocampal damage (insofar as familiarity is computed before activity feeds into the hip- that used this format (e.g., Baxter & Murray, 2001b). pocampus). The most interesting result is that hippocam- To simulate overall recognition performance when pal lesion size has a nonmonotonic effect on combined both processes are contributing, we used a decision rule recognition performance. At first, combined FC accu-

whereby if one item triggered a larger positive recall

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¡©£ ¥ ¡©£ ¤ §¡ was selected; otherwise, if , actually improves combined FC performance. the decision falls back on familiarity. This rule incorpo- Why is recognition performance worse for partial rates the assumption (shared by other dual-process mod- (75%) vs. complete lesions? The key to understanding els, e.g., Jacoby et al., 1997) that recall takes precedence this finding is that partial hippocampal damage impairs over familiarity. This differential weighting of recall the hippocampus’ ability to carry out pattern separation. can be justified in terms of our finding that, in normal circumstances, hippocampal recall in the CLS model is We assume that lesioning a layer lowers the total number of units, but does not decrease the number of active units; more diagnostic than MTLC familiarity. Furthermore, accordingly, representations become less sparse and the it is supported by data showing that recall is associated with higher average recognition confidence ratings than average amount of overlap between patterns increases. There is neurobiological support for this assumption: In Norman & O'Reilly 35

Effect of HippocampalDamage onStudiedandLureRecall Effect of MTLC Damage on FC Recognition

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Figure 28: Plot of the probability that studied items and lures MTLC Lesion Size (Percent)

£¥¤§¦©¨ £¤¦ § ¡ will trigger a positive ¢¡ score, as a as a func- tion of hippocampal lesion size. For studied items, the proba- Figure 29: Effect of MTLC (specifically, EC in) damage on bility declines monotonically as a function of lesion size. For forced-choice (FC) recognition performance. This graph plots lures, the probability first increases, then decreases, as a func- FC accuracy based on MTLC familiarity, hippocampal recall, tion of lesion size. and a combination of the two signals, as a function of EC in lesion size. All three accuracy scores (recall-alone, familiarity- alone, and combined) decline steadily with increasing lesion the brain, the activity of excitatory pyramidal neurons size. is regulated primarily by inhibitory interneurons (Dou- glas & Martin, 1990); assuming that both excitatory and pocampus. inhibitory neurons are damaged by lesions, this loss of inhibition is likely to result in a proportional increase in activity for the remaining excitatory neurons. MTLC Lesions Pattern separation failure (induced by partial dam- Turning to the effects of MTLC lesions, we find age) results in a sharp increase in the amount of recall that lesioning EC in hurts both cortical and hippocampal triggered by lures. Combined recognition performance recognition performance (Figure 29). Therefore, com- in these participants suffers because the noisy recall sig- bined recognition performance decreases steadily as a nal drowns out useful information that is present in the function of MTLC lesion size. The observed deficits re- familiarity signal. Moving from a partial hippocampal sult from the fact that overlap between EC in patterns in- lesion to a complete lesion improves performance by re- creases with lesion size — this has a direct adverse effect moving this source of noise. on cortically-based discrimination; furthermore, because Figure 28 provides direct support for the “noisy hip- EC in serves as the input layer for the hippocampus, in-

pocampus” theory; it shows how the probability that creased EC in overlap leads to increased hippocampal

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¡¤£ ¥ ¡©£ lures will trigger a positive score in- overlap, which hurts recall. creases steadily with increasing hippocampal lesion size until it reaches a peak of .41 (for 55% hippocampal dam- Relevant Data and Implications age). However, as lesion size approaches 60%, the prob- The simulation results reported above are consistent

ability that lures and studied items will trigger a positive

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¡¤£ ¥ ¡©£ score starts to decrease. This oc- Baxter and Murray (2001b). This meta-analysis incor- curs for two reasons: First, because of pattern separation porated results from several studies that have looked at failure in CA3, all items start to trigger recall of the same hippocampal and perirhinal (MTLC) lesion effects on prototypical features (which mismatch item-specific fea- recognition in monkeys using a delayed-nonmatching-to- tures of the test probe); second, CA1 damage reduces sample (DNMS) paradigm. Baxter and Murray (2001b) the hippocampus’ ability to translate CA3 activity into found, in keeping with our results, that partial hippocam-

the target EC pattern. As the number of items triggering

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¡¤£ ¥ positive scores decreases, control of more complete lesions — in the meta-analysis, hip- the recognition decision reverts to familiarity. This ben- pocampal lesion size and recognition impairment were efits recognition performance insofar as familiarity does negatively correlated. The Baxter and Murray meta- a better job of discriminating between studied items and analysis also found that perirhinal lesion size and recog- lures than the recall signal generated by the lesioned hip- 36 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

nition impairment were positively correlated, just as we Implications for Theories of How Recall Con- found that MTLC lesion size and impairment were cor- tributes to Recognition related in our simulations. As discussed in the Introduction, the dual-process ap- Baxter and Murray’s results are highly controversial; proach to recognition has become increasingly prevalent Zola and Squire (2001) re-analyzed the data in the Bax- in recent years, but this enterprise is based on a weak ter and Murray meta-analysis, using a different set of foundation. Yonelinas, Jacoby, and their colleagues have statistical techniques that control, e.g., for differences in developed several techniques for measuring the contribu- mean lesion size across studies, and found that the nega- tions of recall and familiarity based on behavioral data, tive correlation between hippocampal lesion size and im- but these techniques rely on a core set of assumptions pairment reported by Baxter and Murray (2001b) was no that have not been tested; furthermore, some of these as- longer significant (although there was still a nonsignifi- sumptions (e.g., independence) can not be tested based cant trend in this direction; see Baxter & Murray, 2001a on behavioral data alone, because of chicken-and-egg for further discussion of this issue). Our results con- problems. tribute to this debate by providing a novel and principled account of how a negative correlation might come into More specifically, measurement techniques such as being, in terms of pattern separation failure resulting in process dissociation and ROC analysis are built around a noisy recall signal that participants nevertheless rely dual-process signal detection theory (Jacoby et al., 1997; upon when making recognition judgments. Of course, Yonelinas, 2001b). In addition to the independence as- our account is not the only way of explaining why par- sumption, this theory assumes that familiarity is a Gaus- tial hippocampal lesions might impair recognition more sian signal-detection process, but recall is a dual high- than complete lesions. Another possibility, suggested by threshold process (i.e., recall is all-or-none; studied items Mumby, Wood, Duva, Kornecook, Pinel, and Phillips are sometimes recalled as being “old”, but lures never (1996), is that a damaged hippocampus might disrupt are; lures are sometimes recalled as being “new”, but neocortical processing via epileptiform activity. studied items never are). The CLS model does not as- sume any of the above claims to be true — rather, its The results reported here speak to the debate over core assumptions are based on the functional proper- why hippocampally lesioned patients sometimes show ties of hippocampus vs. MTLC. As such, we can use relatively spared recognition performance on standard the CLS model to evaluate the validity of dual-process recognition tests with unrelated lures, and sometimes do signal-detection theory. not. The model predicts that patients with relatively complete hippocampal lesions (that nonetheless spare Results from our cortical model are generally consis- MTLC) should show relatively spared performance, and tent with the idea that familiarity is a Gaussian signal- patients with smaller hippocampal lesions (that reduce detection process. In contrast, results from our hip- the diagnosticity of recall without eliminating the signal pocampal model are not consistent with the idea that re- outright) should show an “across-the-board” declarative call is a high-threshold process — recall in our model memory deficit without any particular sparing of recog- is not all-or-none, and lures sometimes trigger above- nition. This view implies that the range of etiologies that zero recall. Our claim that lures can trigger some match- produce selective sparing should be quite narrow: If the ing recall, and that the number of recalled details varies lesion is too small, you end with a partially-lesioned hip- from item to item, is consistent with the Source Moni- pocampus that injects noise into the recognition process; toring Framework set forth by Marcia Johnson and her if the lesion is too large, then you hit (in colleagues (e.g., Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). addition to the hippocampus) and this leads to deficits in Although the recall process in our model is not familiarity-based recognition. strictly high-threshold, it is not Gaussian either. If over- lap between stimuli is not too high, our recall process is approximately consistent with dual-high-threshold the- General Discussion ory, in the sense that (for a given experiment) there is a level of matching recall that is sometimes exceeded by In this section of the paper, we review how our mod- studied items, but not by lures, and there is a level of mis- eling work speaks to extant debates over how to charac- matching recall that is sometimes exceeded by lures, but terize the respective contributions of recall (vs. familiar- not by studied items. Furthermore, we assume that par- ity) and hippocampus (vs. MTLC) to recognition. Next, ticipants routinely set their recall criterion high enough to we compare our model to other neurally-inspired and ab- avoid false recognition of unrelated lures, and that partic- stract computational models of recognition. We conclude ipants set their criterion for recall-to-reject high enough by discussing limitations of the models and future direc- to avoid incorrect rejection of studied items. As such, the tions for research. model provides some support (conditional on overlap not Norman & O'Reilly 37

being too high) for Yonelinas’ claim that lures will not be of recall and familiarity in terms of very specific ideas called “old” based on recall, and that studied items will about the neurocomputational properties of hippocam- not be called “new” based on recall. pus and MTLC. Moreover, we have implemented these Regarding the independence assumption: As men- ideas in a working computational model that can be used tioned earlier, Curran and Hintzman (1995) and others to test their sufficiency and generate novel predictions. have criticized this assumption on the grounds that some According to the CLS model, practically all dif- degree of encoding variability is likely to be present in ferences between cortical and hippocampal contribu- any experiment, and encoding variability results in a pos- tions to recognition can be traced back to graded differ- itive recall-familiarity correlation. Our results confirm ences in how information is represented in these struc- this latter conclusion, but they also show that interfer- tures. For example, the fact that hippocampal repre- ence reduces the recall-familiarity correlation. As such, sentations are more sparse than cortical representations it is possible to achieve independence (assuming there is in our model implies that hippocampal recall will be enough interference) even when encoding variability is more sensitive to conjunctions than MTLC familiarity, present. but crucially both signals should show some sensitivity Overall, although the details of the CLS model’s pre- to conjunctions (see Simulation 5 for more discussion dictions are not strictly consistent with the assumptions of this point). This graded approach makes it possible behind dual-process signal detection theory, it is safe to for the CLS model to explain dissociations within sim- say that the CLS model’s predictions are broadly con- ple categories like “memory for new associations” — sistent with these assumptions; accordingly, we would for example, the finding from Mayes et al. (2001) that expect measurement techniques that rely on these as- hippocampally-lesioned patient YR sometimes shows in- sumptions to yield meaningful results most of the time. tact FC word-word associative recognition (presumably, The main contribution of the CLS model is to establish based on MTLC familiarity) despite being impaired at boundary conditions on the validity of these assumptions cued recall of newly learned paired associates (Mayes — e.g., the assumption that lures will not be called “old” et al., 2002; see Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997 for a similar based on recall does not hold true when there is exten- pattern of results). As discussed earlier, these dissocia- sive overlap between stimuli, and the independence as- tions are problematic for A&B’s “item” vs. “associative” sumption is more likely to hold true in situations where dichotomy. interference is high and encoding variability is low than Lastly, we should mention an important commonal- when the opposite is true. ity between the CLS model and the A&B theory: Both theories predict sparing of item recognition (with unre- Implications for Theories of How the Hip- lated lures) relative to recall in patients with complete pocampus (vs. MTLC) Contributes to Recog- hippocampal lesions. While some studies have found nition this pattern of results in patients with focal hippocam- pal damage (e.g., Mayes et al., 2002), it is potentially To a first approximation, the CLS model resembles quite problematic for both models that other studies have the neuropsychological theory of episodic memory set found roughly equivalent deficits in recognition (with forth by Aggleton and Brown (1999) (A&B) — both unrelated lures) and recall following focal hippocampal theories posit that the hippocampus is essential for re- damage (e.g., Manns & Squire, 1999). We do not claim call and that MTLC can support judgments of stimulus to fully understand why some hippocampally-lesioned familiarity on its own. However, this resemblance is patients show relatively spared item recognition but oth- only superficial. As discussed in the Introduction, simply ers do not. However, it may be possible to account for linking “recall” and “familiarity” to hippocampus and some of this variability in terms of the idea, set forth by MTLC, without further specifying how these processes Baxter and Murray (2001b) and explored in Simulation work, does not allow us to predict when recognition will 8, that partial hippocampal lesions are especially harmful be impaired or spared after hippocampal damage. Ev- to recognition. This idea is still highly controversial and erything depends on how you unpack the terms “recall” needs to be tested directly, using experiments that carry and “familiarity”, and the CLS and A&B theories unpack out careful, parametric manipulations of lesion size (con- these terms in completely different ways. trolling for other factors like lesion technique and task). The A&B theory unpacks recall and familiarity in terms of a simple, verbally stated dichotomy whereby Comparison with Abstract Computational recall is necessary for forming new associations but fa- Models of Recognition miliarity is sufficient for item recognition. In contrast to the A&B theory, the CLS model grounds its conception Whereas our model incorporates explicit claims about how different brain structures (hippocampus and 38 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

MTLC) support recognition memory, most computa- at-study models may be incapable of explaining the null tional models of recognition memory are abstract in recognition LSE obtained by Ratcliff et al. (1990). An the sense that they do not make specific claims about important implication of the work presented here is that how recognition is implemented in the brain. The REM interference-at-study models do not always show exces- model presented by Shiffrin and Steyvers (1997) repre- sive effects of interference on recognition sensitivity; our sents the state of the art in abstract modeling of recog- cortical model predicts a null recognition LSE because nition memory (see McClelland & Chappell, 1998 for a increasing list strength reduces lure familiarity slightly very similar model). REM carries out a Bayesian com- more than studied-item familiarity, so the studied-lure putation of the likelihood that an ideal observer should gap in familiarity is preserved. say “old” to an item, based on the extent to which that In this paper, we have focused on describing qual- item matches (and mismatches) stored memory traces. itative model predictions, and the boundary conditions Our cortical familiarity model resembles REM and other of these predictions. Working at this level, it is clear that abstract models in several respects: Like the abstract there are some fundamental differences in the predictions models, our cortical model computes a scalar that tracks of the CLS model vs. models like REM. Because study- the “global match” between the test probe and stored ing one item degrades the memory traces of other items, memory traces; furthermore, both our cortical model and our model predicts — regardless of parameter settings models like REM posit that differentiation (Shiffrin et al., — that the curve relating interference (e.g., list length 1990) contributes to the null LSE. Thus, our modeling or list strength) to recognition sensitivity will always work relies critically on insights that were developed in asymptotically go to zero with increasing interference. the context of abstract models like REM. In contrast, in REM it is possible to completely eliminate We can also draw a number of contrasts between the deleterious effects of interference items on perfor- the CLS model and abstract Bayesian models. One mance through differentiation; if interference items are major difference is that our model posits that two pro- presented often enough, they could become so strongly cesses (with distinct operating characteristics) contribute differentiated that the odds of them spuriously matching to recognition whereas abstract models attempt to ex- a test item are effectively zero; whether or not this actu- plain recognition data in terms of a single familiarity pro- ally happens depends on model parameters. cess. Another difference is that — in our model — inter- ference occurs at study, when one item re-uses weights Comparison with Other Neural Network Mod- that are also used by another item, whereas REM posits els of Hippocampal and Cortical Contributions that memory traces are stored in a non-interfering fash- to Recognition ion, and that interference arises at test, whenever the test item spuriously matches memory traces corresponding to Models of Hippocampus other items. The hippocampal component of the CLS model is The question of whether interference occurs at study part of a long tradition of hippocampal modeling (e.g., (or only at test) has a long history in memory research. Marr, 1971; McNaughton & Morris, 1987; Rolls, 1989; Other models that posit structural interference at study Levy, 1989; Touretzky & Redish, 1996; Burgess & have found large and sometimes excessive effects of in- O’Keefe, 1996; Wu, Baxter, & Levy, 1996; Treves & terference on recognition sensitivity. For example, Rat- Rolls, 1994; Moll & Miikkulainen, 1997; Hasselmo & cliff (1990) presented a model consisting of a 3-layer Wyble, 1997). Although different hippocampal models feedforward network that learns to reproduce input pat- may differ slightly in the functions they ascribe to par- terns in the output layer; the dependent measure at test is ticular hippocampal subcomponents, a remarkable con- how well the recalled (output) pattern matches the input. sensus has emerged regarding how the hippocampus Like our hippocampal model, the Ratcliff model shows supports episodic memory (i.e., by assigning minimally interference effects on recognition sensitivity because re- overlapping CA3 representations to different episodes, call of discriminative features of lures is at floor; as such, with recurrent connectivity serving to bind together the any decrease in studied recall necessarily pushes the constituent features of those episodes). In the present studied and lure recall distributions closer together. The modeling work, we build on this shared foundation by Ratcliff model generally shows more interference than applying these biologically-based computational model- our hippocampal model because there is more overlap ing ideas to a rich domain of human memory data (for an between “hidden” representations in the Ratcliff model application of the same basic model to animal learning vs. in our hippocampal model. data, see O’Reilly & Rudy, 2001). Based on these results (and others like them), Mur- The Hasselmo and Wyble (1997) model (hereafter, nane and Shiffrin (1991a) concluded that interference- H&W) deserves special consideration because it is the Norman & O'Reilly 39

only one of the aforementioned hippocampal models that unit is active but the receiving unit is not — and heterosy- has been used to simulate patterns of behavioral list- naptic Hebbian LTD — decrease weights if the receiving learning data. The architecture of this model is gener- unit is active but the sending unit is not — are impor- ally similar to the architecture of the CLS hippocampal tant for familiarity discrimination, whereas our model model, except H&W make a distinction between item only incorporates heterosynaptic Hebbian LTD). Other and (shared) context information, and posit that item models incorporate radically different mechanisms, e.g., and context information are kept separate throughout the anti-Hebbian learning that reduces connection strengths entire hippocampal processing pathway, except in CA3 between active neurons (Bogacz & Brown, in press). where recurrent connections allow for item-context asso- One difference between the models proposed by Bo- ciations; furthermore, in the H&W model recognition is gacz & Brown vs. our model is that — in the Bogacz based on the extent to which item representations trigger & Brown models — familiarity is computed by a spe- recall of shared contextual information associated with cialized population of novelty detector units that are not the study list. The H&W model predicts that recogni- directly involved in extracting and representing stimulus tion of studied items should be robust to factors that de- features (see Bogacz & Brown, in press for a review of grade hippocampal processing because — insofar as all empirical evidence that supports this claim). In contrast, studied items have the same “context vector” — the CA3 our combined model does not posit the existence of spe-

representation of shared context information will be very cialized novelty detector units; rather, the layer (EC in)

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strong and thus easy to activate. However, the fact that where we read out the ¢¡ familiarity signal con- the CA3 context representation is easy to activate implies tains the highest (most refined) cortical representation of that related lures will very frequently trigger false alarms the stimulus, which in turn serves as the input to the hip- in the H&W model (in contrast to the CLS model, which pocampus. predicts low hippocampal false alarms to related lures). We should note, however, that our model could easily The H&W model also predicts a null list strength effect be transformed into a model with specialized novelty de- for hippocampally-driven recognition, and a null main tectors, without altering any of the predictions outlined in effect of item strength on hippocampally-driven recogni- the main body of the paper. To do this, we could connect tion (in contrast to our model, which predicts that both the input layer of the combined model directly to CA3, item strength and list strength effects should be obtained CA1, and DG, and we could have this input layer feed in

in the hippocampus). Thus, because H&W use a differ- parallel to a second cortical layer (with no connections ¤¦¥¨§ ent hippocampal recognition measure, and separate item £ to the hippocampus) where we compute ¢¡ . The and context representations, their model generates recog- units in this second cortical layer could be labeled “spe- nition predictions that are very different from the CLS cialized novelty detectors” insofar as they are not serving hippocampal model’s predictions. However, we should any other important function in the model. This change emphasize that, if H&W used the same recognition mea- would not affect the functioning of the cortical part of the sure as our model (match - mismatch) and factored item model in any way. recall as well as context recall into recognition decisions, Having the same layer serve as the input to the “nov- their model and the CLS model would likely make very elty detection” layer and the hippocampus could, in prin- similar predictions because the two model architectures ciple, affect the predictions of the combined model, but are so similar. as a practical matter none of the combined model predic- Models of Neocortical Contributions to Recognition tions outlined in Simulations 7 and 8 would be affected Memory by this change. For example, if cortical units involved In recent years, several models (besides ours) have in computing novelty/familiarity were not involved in been developed that address the role of MTLC in famil- passing features to the hippocampus, then it would be iarity discrimination; see Bogacz and Brown (in press) possible in principle to disrupt familiarity for a partic- for a detailed comparison of the properties of different ular stimulus without disrupting hippocampal recall of familiarity-discrimination models. Some of these mod- that stimulus (by lesioning the “novelty detector” units). els, like ours, posit that familiarity discrimination in cor- However, this is probably not possible in practice — ac- tex arises from Hebbian learning that tunes a popula- cording to Brown and Xiang (1998), perirhinal neurons tion of units to respond strongly to the stimulus (e.g., involved in familiarity discrimination and stimulus rep- Bogacz, Brown, & Giraud-Carrier, 2001; Sohal & Has- resentation are topographically interspersed, so lesions selmo, 2000), although the details of these models differ large enough to affect one population of neurons should from ours (for example, the Bogacz et al., 2001 and So- also affect the other. hal & Hasselmo, 2000 models posit that both homosy- A major issue raised by Bogacz and Brown (in press) naptic Hebbian LTD — decrease weights if the sending is whether networks like ours that extract features via 40 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

Hebbian learning have adequate capacity to explain our variability (by presenting test items in other contexts a ability to discriminate between very large numbers of fa- variable number of times prior to the start of the experi- miliar and unfamiliar stimuli (e.g., Standing, 1973 found ment) will allow us to address a range of interesting phe- that people can discriminate between studied and non- nomena, including the so-called frequency mirror effect, studied pictures after studying a list of thousands of pic- whereby hits tend to be higher for low-frequency (LF) tures). Bogacz and Brown (in press) argue that — even in stimuli than for high-frequency (HF) stimuli, but false a “brain-sized” version of our cortical model — the net- alarms tend to be higher for HF stimuli than LF stim- work’s tendency to represent shared (prototypical) fea- uli (see, e.g., Glanzer, Adams, Iverson, & Kim, 1993); tures at the expense of features that discriminate between recently, several studies have obtained evidence suggest- items will result in unacceptably poor performance after ing that recall is responsible for the LF hit-rate advan- studying large numbers of stimuli. Bogacz and Brown tage and familiarity is responsible for the HF false-alarm- (in press) point out that the anti-Hebbian model that they rate advantage (Reder, Nhouyvanisvong, Schunn, Ayers, propose does not have this problem; this model ignores Angstadt, & Hiraki, 2000; Joordens & Hockley, 2000; features that are shared across patterns and, as such, has Reder et al. also present an abstract dual-process model a much higher capacity. A possible problem with the of this finding). anti-Hebbian model is that it may show too little inter- Furthermore, we plan to directly address the question ference. More research is needed to assess whether our of how participants make decisions based on recall and network architecture, suitably scaled, can explain find- familiarity. Clearly, people are capable of employing a ings like Standing (1973), and — if not — how it can be variety of different decision strategies that can differen- modified to accommodate this result (without eliminat- tially weight the different signals that emerge from the ing its ability to explain interference effects on recogni- cortex and hippocampus. One way to address this issue is tion discrimination). to conduct empirical Bayesian analyses to delineate how At this point in time, it is difficult to directly com- the optimal way of making recognition decisions in our pare our model’s predictions to the predictions of other model varies as a function of situational factors, and then cortical familiarity models because the models have been compare the results of these analyses with participants’ applied to different data domains — we have focused on actual performance. A specific idea that we plan to ex- explaining detailed patterns of behavioral data, whereas plore in detail is that participants discount recall of pro- the other models have focused on explaining single-cell totype information, because prototype recall is much less recording data in monkeys. Bringing the different mod- diagnostic than item-specific recall. The frontal lobes els to bear on the same data points is an important topic may play an important part in this discounting process for future research. While the CLS model can not make — for example, Curran, Schacter, Norman, and Galluc- detailed predictions about spiking patterns of single neu- cio (1997) studied a frontal-lesioned patient (BG) who rons, it does make predictions regarding how firing rates false alarmed excessively to nonstudied items that were will change as a function of familiarity. For example, of the same general type as studied items; one way of the model predicts that, for a particular stimulus, neurons explaining this finding is that BG has a selective deficit that show decreased (vs. asymptotically strong) firing in in discounting prototype recall. Thus, the literature on response to repeated presentation of that stimulus should frontal lesion effects may provide important constraints be neurons that initially had a less strong response to the on how recognition decision-making works, by showing stimulus (and therefore lost the competition to represent how it breaks down. the stimulus). Supplementing the model with a more principled theory of how participants make recognition decisions Future Directions will make it possible for us to apply the model to a wider range of recognition phenomena, for example sit- Future research will address limitations of the model uations where recall and familiarity are placed in oppo- that were mentioned earlier. In the Sources of Variabil- sition (e.g., Jacoby, 1991). We could also begin to ad- ity section, we discussed how the model incorporates dress the rich literature on how different manipulations some sources of variability that we plan to remove (sam- affect recognition ROC curves (e.g., Ratcliff et al., 1992; pling variability) and lacks some sources of variability Yonelinas, 1994). that we plan to add. Increases in computer processing speed will make it possible to grow our networks to the Another topic for future research involves improving point where sampling variability is negligible, and we crosstalk between the model and data. In will replace lost sampling variability by adding encoding principle, we should be able to predict fMRI activations variability and variability in pre-experimental presenta- during episodic recognition tasks by reading out activa- tion frequency to the model. Including pre-experimental tion from different subregions of the model; to achieve Norman & O'Reilly 41

this goal, we will need to build a “back end” onto the range of other human and animal memory phenomena. model that relates changes in (simulated) neuronal activ- ity to changes in the hemodynamic response that is mea- sured by fMRI. Finally, Curran (2000) has isolated what Acknowledgments appear to be distinct ERP correlates of recall and famil- iarity; as such, we should be able to use the model to This work was supported by ONR grant N00014- predict how these recall and familiarity waveforms will 00-1-0246, NSF grant IBN-9873492, and NIH program be affected by different manipulations. Our first attempt project MH47566. KAN was supported by NIH NRSA along these lines was successful; we found that — as pre- Fellowship MH12582. We thank Rafal Bogacz, Neil dicted by the model — increasing list strength did not af- Burgess, Tim Curran, David Huber, Michael Hasselmo, fect how well the ERP familiarity correlate discriminates Caren Rotello, and Craig Stark for their very insightful between targets and lures, but list strength adversely af- comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript. KAN fected how well the ERP recall correlate discriminates is now at Princeton University, Department of Psychol- between targets and lures (Norman, Curran, & Tepe, in ogy, Green Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544, email: knor- preparation). [email protected]. Alternate Dependent Measures We also plan to explore other, more biologically Appendix A: Algorithm Details

plausible ways of reading out familiarity from the cor- ¤¦¥¨§ £ This appendix describes the computational details of tical network. While ¢¡ has the virtue of being easy to compute, it is not immediately clear how some the algorithm that was used in the simulations. The al- other structure in the brain could isolate the activity of gorithm is identical to the Leabra algorithm described in only the winning units (because “losing” units are still O’Reilly and Munakata (2000; O’Reilly, 1998), except active to some small extent, and there are many more the error-driven-learning component of the Leabra algo- losing units than winning units). One promising alter- rithm was not used here; see Grossberg (1976) for a sim- native measure is settle time: the time it takes for activ- ilar model. Interested readers should refer to O’Reilly ity to spread through the network (more concretely, we and Munakata (2000) for more details regarding the al- measured the number of processing cycles needed for gorithm and its historical precedents. average activity in MTLC to reach a criterion value = .03). This measure exploits the fact that activity spreads Pseudocode more quickly for familiar vs. unfamiliar patterns. The

¡ The pseudocode for the algorithm that we used is

§¡ £ £¨¢ £ ¥

measure is more biologically plausible than given here, showing exactly how the pieces of the algo-

£ ¤¦¥¨§

¢¡ , insofar as it only requires some sensitivity to rithm described in more detail in the subsequent sections the average activity of a layer, and some ability to assess fit together. how much time elapses between stimulus onset and ac- Outer loop: Iterate over events (trials) within an

tivity reaching a pre-determined criterion. Preliminary

¡

¡ £ £¨¢ £ ¥

§ epoch. For each event, settle over cycles of updating: ¡

simulation results show that yields good

£ ¤ ¥ §

scores, and – like ¢¡ – does not show a list strength 1. At start of settling, for all units: ¡ effect on for our basic parameters (20% overlap). Fur-

ther research is necessary to determine if the qualitative (a) Initialize all state variables (activation, v_m,

¡

£ ¤¦¥¨§ §¡ £ £¨¢ £ ¥

properties of ¢¡ and are completely etc). identical or if there are manipulations that affect them (b) Apply external patterns. differently. 2. During each cycle of settling, for all non-clamped

Conclusion units:

We have provided a comprehensive initial treat- £

¦¨§ (a) Compute excitatory netinput ( £¥¤ or , ment of the domain of recognition memory using our eq 6). biologically-based neural network model of the hip- (b) Compute kWTA inhibition for each layer,

pocampus and neocortex. This work extends a similarly ©

based on £ (eq 9):

comprehensive application of the same basic model to a ©

range of animal learning phenomena (O’Reilly & Rudy, i. Sort units into two groups based on £ :

§

2001). Thus, we are encouraged by the breadth and depth top and remaining to .

©

£

of data that can be accounted for within our framework. ii. Set inhib conductance £ between and

© 

Future work can build upon this foundation to address a £ (eq 8). 42 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

(c) Compute point-neuron activation combining The inhibitory conductance is computed via the kWTA excitatory input and inhibition (eq 4). function described in the next section, and leak is a con- stant.

3. Update the weights (based on linear current weight § Activation communicated to other cells (  ) is a values), for all connections: thresholded (  ) sigmoidal function of the membrane po-

tential with gain parameter  :

(a) Compute Hebbian weight changes (eq 10).

£

(b) Increment the weights and apply contrast- 

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enhancement (eq 12). 



,+ (¤

Point Neuron Activation Function where * is a threshold function that returns 0 if

-/. and  if . This sharply-thresholded function is

Leabra uses a point neuron activation function that

§21 43 convolved with a Gaussian noise kernel ( 0 ), models the electrophysiological properties of real neu- which reflects the intrinsic processing noise of biological rons, while simplifying their geometry to a single point. neurons. This produces a less discontinuous determinis- This function is nearly as simple computationally as tic function with a softer threshold that is better suited the standard sigmoidal activation function, but the more for graded learning mechanisms (e.g., gradient descent). biologically-based implementation makes it consider- ably easier to model inhibitory competition, as described k-Winners-Take-All Inhibition below. Further, using this function enables cognitive models to be more easily related to more physiologically Leabra uses a kWTA function to achieve sparse detailed simulations, thereby facilitating bridge-building distributed representations (c.f., Minai & Levy, 1994).

between biology and . Although two different versions are possible (see ¡ The membrane potential is updated as a function O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000 for details), only the sim- pler form was used in the present simulations. A uni- of ionic conductances £ with reversal (driving) potentials

¢ as follows: form level of inhibitory current for all units in the layer

is computed as follows:

£

£

¦

¢ £

£ £

© © ©

§ § §

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£



(4) 

¥ £ 65 £ § £

£ (8)

§

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where is a parameter for setting the inhibition ©

with 3 channels ( ¡ ) corresponding to: excitatory input;

 ¥ between the upper bound of £ and the lower bound of

leak current; and inhibitory input. Following elec- ©  £ . These boundary inhibition values are computed as

trophysiological convention, the overall conductance is

£ a function of the level of inhibition necessary to keep a

§ decomposed into a time-varying component £ com- unit right at threshold:

puted as a function of the dynamic state of the network,

¢ ¨ ¨ ¢<¨

§

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£

£98 £ ¤ ¤ ¥; £ £ ¥;

©: :

and a constant that controls the relative influence of ¤

¢ § £ (9)

the different conductances. The equilibrium potential

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can be written in a simplified form by setting the exci-

¢

£98

where ¤ is the excitatory net input without the bias

tatory driving potential ( ¤ ) to 1 and the leak and in-

¢©¨ ¢ hibitory driving potentials ( and ) of 0: weight contribution — this allows the bias weights to

override the kWTA constraint.

£ £

¤ ¤

In the basic version of the kWTA function used here,

© ©

¨ ¨

§ (5)



£ ¤ £ ¤ £ £ £ £ £

£ and are set to the threshold inhibition value for

£ £

£ the £ and most excited units, respectively. which shows that the neuron is computing a balance be- Thus, the inhibition is placed exactly to allow units tween excitation and the opposing forces of leak and to be above threshold, and the remainder below thresh- inhibition. This equilibrium form of the equation can

old. For this version, the 5 parameter is almost always be understood in terms of a Bayesian decision making £

.25, allowing the £ unit to be sufficiently above the framework (O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000).

inhibitory threshold. We should emphasize that, when

£

¤ ¦¨§ The excitatory net input/conductance £ or is membrane potential is at threshold, unit activation in the computed as the proportion of open excitatory channels model = .25; as such, the kWTA algorithm places a firm as a function of sending activations times the weight val- upper bound on the number of units showing activation ues: >

¦ .25, but it does not set an upper bound on the num-

£ ¤ ¤

¦ § £ ¨§  § 

§ ¤ § § § (6) ber of weakly active units (i.e., units showing activation between 0 and .25). Norman & O'Reilly 43

Activation dynamics similar to those produced by the Area Units Activity (pct) kWTA function have been shown to result from simu- EC 240 10.0 lated inhibitory interneurons that project both feedfor- DG 1600 1.0 ward and feedback inhibition (O’Reilly & Munakata, CA3 480 4.0 CA1 640 10.0 2000). Thus, although the kWTA function is somewhat biologically implausible in its implementation (e.g., re- Table 2: Sizes of different subregions and their activity levels quiring global information about activation states and in the model. using sorting mechanisms), it provides a computation- ally effective approximation to biologically plausible in- Projection Mean Var Scale % Con hibitory dynamics. EC to DG, CA3 .5 .25 1 25 (perforant path) Hebbian Learning DG to CA3 .9 .01 25 4 (mossy fiber) The simplest form of Hebbian learning adjusts the CA3 recurrent .5 .25 1 100

CA3 to CA1 .5 .25 1 100

weights in proportion to the product of the sending (  )

¤

(schaffer)

¨§ § §   § and receiving (  ) unit activations: . The weight vector is dominated by the principal eigenvector Table 3: Properties of modifiable projections in the hippocam- of the pairwise correlation matrix of the input, but it also pal model: Mean initial weight strength, variance of the initial grows without bound. Leabra uses essentially the same weight distribution, scaling of this projection relative to other learning rule used in competitive learning or mixtures- projections, and percent connectivity. of-Gaussians (Rumelhart & Zipser, 1986; Nowlan, 1990; Grossberg, 1976), which can be seen as a variant of the Oja normalization (Oja, 1982): in a parametric, continuous fashion. This contrast en-

hancement is achieved by passing the linear weight val-

¤ ¤ ¤

¤¤£¥£ § §   § ¥  § § §  §  ¥ § ¢¡ (10) ues computed by the learning rule through a sigmoidal nonlinearity of the following form:

Rumelhart and Zipser (1986) and O’Reilly and Mu-

¤

§ nakata (2000) showed that, when activations are inter- §

"£ 

 (12)

 (

preted as probabilities, this equation converges on the 

"

conditional probability that the sender is active given that

¤

§ the receiver is active. where is the contrast-enhanced weight value, and the To renormalize Hebbian learning for sparse input ac- sigmoidal function is parameterized by an offset and

tivations, equation 10 can be re-written as follows: a gain  (standard defaults of 1.25 and 6, respectively,

used here).

¡

¤ ¤ ¤

§ §§¦*  §  ¥ § ¨§ ¥  ¥ § #+ (11)

where an ¡ value of 1 gives equation 10, while a larger Appendix B: Hippocampal Model Details value can ensure that the weight value between uncorre-

lated but sparsely active units is around .5. Specifically, This section provides a brief summary of key archi-

¡

§ ¨ © § 1 3 ¥75 1 3 ¥ 

we set and , where tectural parameters of the hippocampal model. Activity

is the sending layer’s expected activation level, and 5 levels, layer size, and projection parameters were set to (called savg cor in the simulator) is the extent to which mirror the “consensus view” of the functional architec-

this sending layer’s average activation is fully corrected ture of the hippocampus described, e.g., by Squire, Shi-

§ 5 § for ( 5 gives full correction, and yields no mamura, and Amaral (1989). correction). Table 2 shows the sizes of different hippocampal sub- regions and their activity levels in the model. These ac- Weight Contrast Enhancement tivity levels are enforced by setting appropriate param- eters in the Leabra kWTA inhibition function. As dis- One limitation of the Hebbian learning algorithm is cussed in the main text, activity is much more sparse in that the weights linearly reflect the strength of the condi- DG and CA3 than in EC. tional probability. This linearity can limit the network’s ability to focus on only the strongest correlations, while Table 3 shows the properties of the four modifiable ignoring weaker ones. To remedy this limitation, we projections in the hippocampal model. For each simu- introduce a contrast enhancement function that magni- lated participant, connection weights in these projections fies the stronger weights and shrinks the smaller ones are set to values randomly sampled from a uniform dis- tribution with mean and variance (range) as specified in 44 Modeling Hippocampal and Neocortical Contributions to Recognition

the table. The “scale” factor listed in the table shows how Leabra algorithm: influential this projection is, relative to other projections coming into the layer, and “percent connectivity” speci-

Parameter Value Parameter Value

¢ ¨ fies the percentage of units in the sending layer that are ¨

0.15 £ 0.235

connected to each unit in the receiving layer. Relative ¢

0.15 £ 1.0

to the perforant path, the mossy fiber pathway is sparse ¢

£ ¤

¤ 1.00 1.0 ¡

(i.e., each CA3 neuron receives a much smaller number



£¢ 

of mossy fiber synapses than perforant path synapses) ¤ 0.15 0.25 

and strong (i.e., a given mossy fiber synapse has a much ¤ .02 600 ¦ larger impact on CA3 unit activation than a given per- MTLC ¦ .004 Hippo .01 forant path synapse). The CA3 recurrents and the Schaf- MTLC savg cor .4 Hippo savg cor 1 fer collaterals projecting from CA3 to CA1 are relatively For those interested in exploring the model in more diffuse, so that each CA3 neuron and each CA1 neuron detail, it can be obtained by sending email to the first receive a large number of inputs sampled from the entire author. CA3 population. The connections linking EC in to CA1, and from CA1 to EC out, are not modified in the course of the sim- ulated memory experiment. Rather, we pre-train these connections so they form an invertible mapping, whereby the CA1 representation resulting from a given EC in pattern is capable of re-creating that same pattern on EC out. CA1 is arranged into eight columns (consist- ing of 80 units apiece); each column receives input from three slots in EC in and projects back to the correspond- ing three slots in EC out. See O’Reilly and Rudy (2001) for discussion of why CA1 is structured in columns. Lastly, our model incorporates the claim, set forth by Michael Hasselmo and his colleagues, that the hip- pocampus has two functional “modes”: an encoding mode, where CA1 activity is primarily driven by EC in, and a retrieval mode, where CA1 activity is primar- ily driven by stored memory traces in CA3 (e.g., Has- selmo & Wyble, 1997); recently, Hasselmo, Bodelon, and Wyble (2002) presented evidence that these two modes are linked to different phases of the hippocampal theta rhythm. While we find the “theta rhythm” hypoth- esis to be compelling, we decided to implement the two modes in a much simpler way — specifically, we set the scaling factor for the EC in to CA1 projection to a large value (6) at study, and we set the scaling factor to zero at test. This manipulation captures the essential differ- ence between the two modes without adding unnecessary complexity to the model.

Appendix C: Basic Parameters

20 items at study: 10 target items (which are tested) followed by 10 interference items (which are not tested) 20% overlap between input patterns (flip 16/24 slots) Fixed high recall criterion, recall = .40 The following are other basic parameters, most of which are standard default parameter values for the Norman & O'Reilly 45

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