Two-Process Models of Recognition Memory: Evidence for Recall-To-Reject?
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Journal of Memory and Language 40, 432–453 (1999) Article ID jmla.1998.2623, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on Two-Process Models of Recognition Memory: Evidence for Recall-to-Reject? Caren M. Rotello University of Massachusetts at Amherst and Evan Heit University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom According to two-process accounts of recognition memory, a familiarity-based process is followed by a slower, more accurate, recall-like process. The dominant two-process account is the recall-to- reject account, in which this second process facilitates the rejection of similar foils. To evaluate the recall-to-reject account, we reanalyzed two experiments from Hintzman and Curran (1994) in which subjects made word recognition judgments at different response deadlines, and we conducted two new recognition experiments using pairs of similar pseudowords. The new analyses included modeling at both the group and individual subject levels. The results did not provide any distinctive evidence for recall-to-reject. In addition to discussing this two-process account, we describe a one-process account of recognition, in which the nature of similarity information varies across the course of judgment. © 1999 Academic Press Key Words: recall-to-reject; time course; recall; recognition; response signal. Current research in memory is going through of memory, investigating how people make rec- an exciting period, in which new dimensions are ognition judgments over time (e.g., Dosher & being investigated and new challenges are being Rosedale, 1991; Gronlund & Ratcliff, 1989; created for models of memory. We refer in Hintzman & Curran, 1994). What kinds of pro- particular to recent research on the time course cessing take place during the first few hundred milliseconds of a recognition judgment? Like- Caren Rotello has previously published under the name wise, what kinds of processing have a longer Caren M. Jones. We acknowledge the contribution of Mi- chael Wenger to the implementation of Experiment 1, and time course, possibly constituting optional ele- we also thank Sonya Dougal for assistance with data col- ments of a recognition judgment? Historically, lection. We thank Lewis Bott for contributions to imple- most research on recognition memory has fo- menting and running Experiment 2. We are grateful to cused on the end-product of recognition, that is, Gordon D. A. Brown, Tim Curran, Scott Gronlund, Jason the final outcome of a recognition judgment. Hicks, Douglas Hintzman, Koen Lamberts, Neil Macmillan, Richard Marsh, Elizabeth Maylor, Doug Nelson, Michael However, results showing the time course of Wenger, and anonymous reviewers for comments on this recognition should be highly constraining on work. This research was supported by an Economic and theoretical accounts of memory. Social Research Council grant to Evan Heit and by a Healey Generally speaking, models of recognition Endowment grant from the University of Massachusetts to can be divided into one-process accounts and Caren Rotello. Portions of these data were reported at the 38th Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic Society in Phil- two-process accounts. Single process models, adelphia. such as the global memory models (e.g., SAM, Address correspondence to Caren Rotello, Department of Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; MINERVA 2, Hintz- Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA man, 1988; other multiple-trace models such as 01003-7710 or to Evan Heit, Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United King- Estes, 1994; Heit, 1993; Nosofsky, 1988; com- dom. Electronic mail may be sent to [email protected] posite-vector models such as CHARM, Met- or to [email protected]. calfe, 1982, and TODAM, Murdock, 1982; and 0749-596X/99 $30.00 432 Copyright © 1999 by Academic Press All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. RECALL-TO-REJECT? 433 some connectionist networks: Kortge, 1990; 1974; Mandler, 1980). This second process is Ratcliff, 1990), assume that recognition judg- generally supposed to be slower than the initial, ments, as well as judgments of frequency, are familiarity-based process, but it would be more based on the target item’s familiarity or its total accurate on fine discriminations between items. similarity to the contents of memory (Jones & For example, the second process could lead Heit, 1993). Although the global memory mod- people to state correctly that tuna has been els have been widely and successfully applied to presented zero times when it was another item, many results (see Clark & Gronlund, 1996; salmon, that actually had been presented. Like- Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1992, for reviews), re- wise, the second process could help people to cent findings are discrepant with the core pre- distinguish frogs from frog, though it might be dictions of these models. expected to make some errors on such highly Specifically, the total similarity principle similar pairs. does not hold for all judgments. Subjects often Some recent findings on the time course of reject new test items that are similar to a re- recognition judgments do suggest that familiarity- peated study item (Hintzman, Curran, & Oppy, based information is used early in processing, 1992; Jones & Heit, 1993). Jones and Heit whereas recall-like information would be used (1993) found that prior presentations of words later in processing. Hintzman and Curran (1994) (e.g., salmon) did not influence frequency esti- conducted experiments like those of Hintzman et mates or recognition judgments for unstudied al. (1992), wherein subjects were required to re- similar words (e.g., tuna), even when the pre- spond at various deadlines ranging from 100 to sented word had been shown as many as 18 2000 ms after the appearance of the test item. times. In contrast, when both the old word and Early in processing, response rates on old items a similar word had been studied, the frequency (e.g., frog) and similar, unpresented items (e.g., estimates increased with the presentation fre- frogs) tracked each other. But later in processing, quency of either word. Similarly, Hintzman et responses on the two kinds of items diverged, with al. (1992) had subjects study nouns that were the hit rate for old items increasing and the false- either singular (e.g., frog) or plural, and then alarm rate for similar items decreasing somewhat. give frequency estimates for the words in either In some cases the false-alarm rates to similar items their original plurality (e.g., frog) or with the rose significantly during the early stages of pro- addition or deletion of an “s” (e.g., frogs). cessing and fell significantly later in processing. Hintzman et al.’s subjects produced frequency These results are consistent with the claim that an estimates for the similar distractor items that early, familiarity-based process would not distin- were bimodal: About half of the judgments guish well between frog and frogs, but later, re- were zero and about half of the judgments were call-based information would make this discrimi- roughly the frequency of the studied item. In nation possible. both of these studies, subjects gave a surprising There are several possible variants of two-pro- number of zero judgments for new items that cess models and a number of issues that might be were similar to old items which were presented addressed within a two-process framework. One many times. important issue is how people would use informa- These discrepant results (as well as those of tion from a second, recall-like process. The dom- others, e.g., Ratcliff, Clark, & Shiffrin, 1990; inant, rather well-specified view is the recall-to- Ratcliff, Sheu, & Gronlund, 1992, see Clark & reject account (Clark, 1992, p. 241; Gronlund & Gronlund, 1996, for a review) have recently led Ratcliff, 1989, p. 857; Hintzman & Curran, 1994, researchers (e.g., Hintzman & Curran, 1994; p. 14; see Clark & Gronlund, 1996, pp. 56–57 for Jacoby, 1991) to suggest that one-process mod- a review). Again, assume that the word frog has els of recognition memory, using a single famil- been studied but the word frogs has not. When a iarity measure, may be incomplete. It has been subject is tested on frogs, the second process leads suggested that a second, recall-like process op- to a frog memory trace being recalled, but no frogs erates as well (see also Atkinson & Juola, 1973, memory trace. In the face of this negative evi- 434 ROTELLO AND HEIT dence, frogs is rejected and is given a “new” Consistent with this proposal, there is a judgment regardless of the output of the first, marked trend in Hintzman and Curran’s results familiarity-based process. That is, a recall-to-re- for the false-alarm rate on completely new items ject process would use information about a re- to decrease over the course of judgment, as if called item specifically to reject another, similar the response criterion were stricter at longer foil that cannot be recalled. The rationale is that deadlines. (Similar patterns of decreasing false recalling frog, and failing to recall frogs, leads the alarms across time have been observed in es- subject to attribute the familiarity of frogs to its sentially all response-signal experiments.) similarity to the frog memory trace. Of course, the These completely new items would not be fa- more time that is allowed for the recognition judg- miliar at all and likewise would never be re- ment to be made, the more likely it is that the called, so it is plausible that the decreased re- recall process would have successfully retrieved sponses to these items merely reflect a change in frog, so the more likely it is that frogs would be criterion rather than some operation of a famil- rejected. We note that this recall-to-reject process iarity or recall-like process. We do consider it would not affect judgments on true foils (e.g., unlikely that each subject manages to keep a chair), which are items that have not been seen constant response criterion as the deadline, and and are not similar to any studied item.