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Bull Hedley. (1977). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. (1995). The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Chinkin, C.M. (1989). The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38:850-66.

Franck, Thomas M. (1990). Power of Legitimacy Among Nations. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gamble, John King, Jr. (1985). The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as Soft Law. Houston Journal of International Law 8:37-47.

Gruchalla-Wesierski, Tadeusz. (1984). A Framework for Understanding Soft Law. McGill Law Journal 30:37-88.

Kaplan, Morton A. (1957). System and Process in International Politics. New York: Wiley. References: Chapter 6 19

Kennedy, Duncan. (1976). Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication. Harvard Law Review 89:1685-1778.

Krasner, Stephen D. ed. (1983). International Regimes. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Palmer, Geoffrey. (1992). New Ways to Make International Environmental Law. American Journal of International Law 86:259-83.

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Sunstein, Cass R. (1986). Legal Interference with Private Preferences. University of Chicago Law Review 53:11129-74.

Zarring, David. (1998). International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations. Texas International Law Journal 33:218-330.

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Abbott et al. The Concept of Legalization. International Organization 54(3):118.

Abbott, Kenneth, and Duncan Snidal. (2000). Hard and Soft Law in International Governance. International Organization 54(3):421-456.

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(1998b). Who Are the Masters of the Treaty? European Governments and the European Court of Justice. International Organization 52(1): 121-47. 20 References: Chapter 7

(2000). The European Union’s Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash? International Organization 54(3):489

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Chayes, Abram. (1965). A Common Lawyer Looks at International Law. Harvard Law Review 78(7):1396-1413.

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Slaughter, Anne-Marie. (1995a). International Law in a World of Liberal States. European Journal of International Law 6:503-38.

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Bailey, Micahel, Judith Godlstein, and Barry Weingst. (1997). The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade. World Politics 49 (3)309-38.

Baldwin, Robert. (1998).Imposing Multilateral Discipline on Administered Protection. The WTO as an International Organization. Anne Krueger, ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 297-327.

Destler, I. M. (1995). American Trade Politics, 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.

Franck, Thomas M. (1995). Fairness in International Law and Institutions. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gilligan, Michael J. (1997). Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation, and Collective Action in American Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Goldstein, Judith. (1993). Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. References: Chapter 8 23

Hudec, Robert E. (1993). Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System. Salem, N.H.: Butterworth Legal Publishers. 297.

Ibid. 296.

(1999). The New WTO dispute Settlement Procedure. Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 8 (1):1-53.

Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, and Jeffrey J. Schott. NAFTA: An Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.

Jackson, John H. (1998). The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence. London: Royal Institute for International Affairs.

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Keesing, Donald B. (1998). Improving Trade Policy Reviews in the World Trade Organization. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.

Keohane, Robert O. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Krasner, Stephen D., ed. (1983). International Regimes. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Krueger, Anne. (1998). The WTO as an International Organization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lohmann, Susanne, and Sharyn O’Halloran. (1994). Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence. International Organization 48 (4):595-632.

Magee, Stephen P., William A Brock, and Leslie Young. (1989). Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mayer, Wolfgang. (1984). Endogenous Tariff Formation. American Economic Review 74:970-85.

Milner, Helen V. (1988). Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

New York Times. 9 June 1995. at D3. 24 References: Chapter 8

New York Times. 4 December 1999. at A6.

Reinhardt, Eric. (1995). Efficiency and Distribution in GATT Dispute Outcomes: A Statistical Study. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago. 31 August-3 September.

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Schattschneider, E. E. (1935). Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff. New York: Prentice Hall.

Sevilla, Christina R. (1998). The Politics of Enforcing GATT and WTO Rules. Ph.D. diss. Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

Shonfield, Andrew. (1976). Politics and trade. London: Oxford University Press.

Sykes, Alan O. (1991). Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations. University of Chicago Law Review 58:259.

Verdier, Daniel. (1994). Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France, and the United States, 1860-1990. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Chapter 9

Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. (2000). Hard and Soft Law in International Governance. International Organization 54 (3):421–56.

Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal. (2000). The Concept of Legalization. International Organization 54 (3):401–19.

Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. (1999). The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. International Organization 53 (4):699–732.

Biersteker, Thomas J., and Cynthia Weber, eds. (1996). State Sovereignty as Social Construct. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bowett, Derek W. (1958). Self Defence in International Law. Manchester: Manchester University Press. References: Chapter 9 25

Brunnée, Jutta. (1993). Toward Effective International Environmental Law: Trends and Developments. In Law and Process in Environmental Management, edited by Steven A. Kennett, 217–36. Calgary, Alberta: Canadian Institute of Resources Law.

Brunnée, Jutta, and Stephen J. Toope. (1997). Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building. American Journal of International Law 91:26–59.

(2000). International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 39:19–74.

Byers, Michael. (1999). Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chinkin, Christine M. (1989). The Challenge of Soft-Law: Development and Change in International Law. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38:850–66.

Finnemore, Martha. (2000). Are Legal Norms Distinctive? NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 32 (3):699–705.

Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization 52 (4):887–917.

Franck, Thomas M. (1990). The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations. New York: Oxford University Press.

Fuller, Lon L. (1969). The Morality of Law. Rev. ed. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Glenn, H. Patrick. (2000). Legal Traditions of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goldsmith, J. L., and E. A. Posner. (1999). A Theory of Customary International Law. University of Chicago Law Review 66:1113–77.

Goldstein, Judith, and Lisa L. Martin. (2000). Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note. International Organization 54 (3):603–32.

Hillgenberg, H. (1999). A Fresh Look at Soft Law. European Journal of International Law 10:499–515. 26 References: Chapter 9

Hurrell, Andrew. (2000). Conclusion: International Law and the Changing Constitution of International Society. In The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law, edited by Michael Byers, 327–46. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kahler, Miles. 2000a. Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case. International Organization 54 (3):549–71.

(2000b). Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization. International Organization 54 (3):661–83.

Kennedy, David. (1997). New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance. Utah Law Review 2:545–637.

Keohane, Robert O., Andrew Moravcsik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. (2000). Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational. International Organization 54 (3):457–88.

Kingsbury, Benedict. (1998). The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law. Michigan Journal of International Law 19:345.

Koh, Harold. (1997). Why Do Nations Obey International Law? Yale Law Journal 106:2599–2659.

Lasswell, Harold D., and Myres S. McDougal. (1971). Criteria for a Theory About Law. Southern California Law Review 44:362.

Lauterpacht, Hersch. (1947). Recognition in International Law. London: Cambridge University Press.

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Chapter 10

Alexandrowicz, C. H. (1969). New and Original States: The Issue of Reversion to Sovereignty. International Affairs 45:465-80.

(1977). The New States and International Law. Millenium 3:226-33.

Andreski, Stanislav. (1968). The African Predicament: A Study in the Pathology of Modernization. New York: Atherton Press. Chap. 7.

Beer, G. L. (1923). African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference. New York: Scribner’s. 65. 28 References: Chapter 10

Bedjaoui, M. (1981). A Third World View of International Organization. The Concept of International Organization. G. Abi-Saab, ed. Paris: UNESCO. 207.

Beitz, Charles R. (1979). Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Brownlie, Ian. (1979). Principles of Public International Law, 3rd Ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 74.

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(1984). The Expansion of International Society: The Consequences for the Law of Nations. The Expansion of International Society. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 359.

Bull, Hedley. (1967). The Anarchical Society. London: MacMillan. Chap. 1 and 3.

(1969). International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach. Contending Approaches to International Politics. K. Knorr and J. N. Rosenau, eds. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 20.

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Ibid. 515.

(1976). Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations. British Journal of International Studies 2:104-5.

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(1979). The State’s Role in World Affairs. Daedalus, The State 108:121.

(1984). European States and African Political Communities. The Expansion of International Society. Bull Hedley and Adam Watson, eds. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 106.

Bull, Hedley and Adam Watson, eds. (1984). The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Part 1 and 2.

Ibid. 430.

Burke, Edmund. (1928). Letter to a Noble Lord. The Works of Edmund Burke. F. W. Rafferty, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 46-7. References: Chapter 10 29

Callaghy, Thomas S. (1984). The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective. New York: Columbia University Press.

Connor, Walker. (1972). Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying. World Politics 24 (3):319-355.

Clapham, Christopher. (1985). Third World Politics. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Crawford, J. (1978). The Criteria for Statehood in International Law. British Yearbook of International Law 1976-1977. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 95.

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Ibid. 98.

Ibid. 116-17.

Ibid. 144.

Ibid. 162.

Curtin, P. D. (1964). The Images of Africa, Vol. 1. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 279-80.

Ekeh, P. (1975). Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa. Comparative Studies in Society and History 17:108.

Everyman’s United Nations. (1968). New York: United Nations. 370-71.

Finley, John H., ed. (1951). Complete Writing of Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War. New York: Modern Library. 331.

G.A. Res. 2621. U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess. (1970).

G.A. Res. 2627. U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess. (1970).

G.A. Res. 2708. U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess. (1970).

G.A. Res. 3103. U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess. (1973).

Gong, G. W. (1984). The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chap. 2.

Grotius Hugo. (1925). De Jure Belli Pacis Libri. trans. F. Kelsey. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vol. 1. Chap. (1): section xiv. 30 References: Chapter 10

Hart, Keith. (1982). The Political Economy of West African Agriculture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 104-5.

Hoffman, Stanley. (1981). Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Hayek, F. A. (1967). Kinds of Rationalism. Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chap. 5.

Jackson, H. and Rosberg, Carl G. (1982). Personal Rule in Black Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Jackson, Robert H. (October 1986). Negative Sovereignty in Sub-Saharan Africa. Review of International Studies 12:247-64.

(1987). Civil Science: A Rule-Based Paradigm for Comparative Government. Delivered at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 3-6 September.

James, Alan. (1986). Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society. London: Allen & Unwin.

Ibid. 25.

Ibid. 153-60.

Kant, Emmanuel. (1957). Perpetual Peace. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill/Library of Liberal Arts. Addendum. 59.

(1977). On the Relationship of Theory to Practice in International Right. reprinted in Kant’s Political Writings. Hans Reiss, ed. New York: Cambridge University Press. 92.

Ibid. Second Article. 16-20.

Keohane, Robert O., ed. (1986). Neorealism and Its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kirk-Greene, A. (1980). The Thin White Line: The Size of the British Colonial Service in Africa. African Affairs 79:25-44.

Knox, T. M. (1979). Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. London: Oxford University Press. 13.

Krasner, Stephen D. (1983). International Regimes. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. References: Chapter 10 31

Lauterpacht, Hersch. (1985). International Law: A Contemporary Perspective. Richard Falk, Friedrich Kratochwil, Saul H. Mendlovitz. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. 19.

LeVine, Victor T. (1980). African Patrimonial Regimes in Comparative Perspective. The Journal of Modern African Studies 18:657-73.

Mair, Lucy. (1967.) African Kingdoms. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chap. 1.

Mazrui, Ali. (1984). Africa Entrapped: Between the Protestant Ethic and the Legacy of Westphalia. The Expansion of International Society. Bull Hedley and Adam Watson, eds. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chap. 19.

McEwen, A. (1971). International Boundaries of East Africa. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 22.

McIlwain, C. H. (1932). The Growth of Political Thought in the West. New York: MacMillan. 268.

Ibid. 268.

Miller, Lynn H. (1985). Global Order: Values and Power in International Politics. Boulder and London: Westview Press. 49.

Morgenthau, Hans. (1966). Politics among Nations. New York: Knopf. 25.

Mortimer, Robert A. (1984). The Third World Coalition in International Politics, 2nd ed. Boulder and London: Westview Press.

Oakeshott, Michael. (1962). The Study of ‘Politics’ in a University. Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays. London: Methuen. 313.

Ibid. 69.

Oakeshott, Michael. (1975). Hobbes on Civil Association. Oxford: Blackwell. Chap. 1.

Pennock, J. Roland. (1966). Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods. World Politics 18:415-34.

Pettman, Ralph. (1979). State and Class: A Sociology of International Affairs. London: Croom Helm.

(1981). Competing Paradigms in International Politics. Review of International Studies 7:39-49. 32 References: Chapter 10

Plischke, E. (1977). Microstates in World Affairs. Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute. i.

Popper, Karl R. (1968). Conjectures and Refutations. New York: Harper & Row Torchbooks.

Ruggie, John Gerard. (1986). Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity. Neorealism and Its Critics. Robert O. Keohane, ed. New York: Columbia University Press. 130-57.

Ryle, G. (1964). Ordinary Language. Ordinary Language. V. C. Chappell, ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 32.

(1968). The Concept of Mind. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Chap. 2.

Shaw, Malcolm N. (1986). Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 16-24.

Ibid. 30.

Shue, Henry. (1980). Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U. S. Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sieghart, Paul. (1986). The Lawful Rights of Mankind. New York: Oxford University Press. 68.

Suganami, Hidemi. (1984). Japan’s Entry into International Society. The Expansion of International Society. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chap. 12.

Touval, S. (1972). The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 4.

Vansina, J. (1966). Kingdoms of the Savanna. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 155-56.

Vincent, R. J. (1984). Racial Equality. The Expansion of International Society. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chap. 16.

(1986). Human Rights and International Relations. New York: The Royal Institute of International Affairs and Cambridge University Press. 118.

Wallace-Bruce, N. L. (1985). Africa and International Law: The Emergence to Statehood. Journal of Modern African Studies 23:575-602.

Wight, Martin. (1952). British Colonial Constitutions. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 80-81. References: Chapter 10 33

(1966). Why is There No International Theory? Diplomatic Investigations. H. Butterfield and M. Wight, eds. London: Allen & Unwin. 17.

(1977). The Origins of Our States-System: Geographical Limits. Systems of States. Leicester: University of Leicester Press. 128.

(1986). Power Politics, 2nd ed. Baltimore: Penguin Books and Royal Institute of nternational Affairs. 25-26.

Ibid. 307.

Williams, Robert. (1987). Political Corruption in Africa. Aldershot, England: Gower Publishing. Cap. 1.

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Betts, Richard. (1977). Soldiers, statesmen, and cold war crises. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Bialer, Uri. (1980). The shadow of the bomber. London: Royal Historical Society.

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Bull, Hedley. (1972). The theory of international politics, 1919–1969. In International Politics, 1919–1969, edited by Brian Porter. New York: Oxford University Press. 34 References: Chapter 11

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Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport & Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1

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Case 57/65, Alfons Lütticke GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Saarlouis [1986] ECR 205 References: Chapter 18 67

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Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale[1974] ECR 1405

Case 149/77, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aerienne Sabena [1978] ECR 1365

Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Commission of the European Economic Community [1963] ECR 95

Case 9/70, Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein [1970] ECR 825

Case 411/74, Yvonne Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1337

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Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southhampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teaching) [1986] Common Market Law Review (1) 688; [1986] ECR 737

Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz Gesellschaft and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1989] ECR 1998

Case 45/76, Comet BV v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2052-53

Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Sirnmenthal S.p A. [1978] ECR 629

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Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities [1971] ECR 363

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Ibid. 102.

Ibid. 297.

Ibid. 366.

Ibid. 372.

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Ibid. 128.

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Ibid. 710.

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_____. (1975). The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory. Berkeley: University of California Press.

_____. (Spring 1976). Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration. International Organization 30:173-212.

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_____. (Summer 1966). Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe. Daedalus 95:862-915.

Keohane, Robert and Stanley Hoffman. (1990). Conclusions: Community Politics and Institutional Change. The Dynamics of European Integration. William Wallace, ed. London: Pinter. 280-81.

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Lindberg, Leon. (1963). The Political Dynamics of the European Integration. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 10.

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Ibid. 612-14.

Mann, Clarence. (1972). The Function of Judicial Decision in European Economic Integration. The Hague: Martinus Nihjoff. 508-15.

Mitrany, David. (1966). A Working Peace. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 99.

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Ibid. 147-48.

Ibid. 152-54.

Ibid. 238-40.

Ibid. 247.

Ibid. 275-81.

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Ibid. 263-85.

Schermers, Henry. (1982). The Role of the European Curt of Justice in the Free Movement of Goods. Courts and Free Markets, vol. 1. Eric Stein and Terrence Sandalow, eds. 222-71.

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Ibid. 540-42.

_____. (1991). The European Court of Justice. Europolitics: Institutions and Policymaking in the New European Community. Alberta M. Sbragia, ed. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 127. 72 References: Chapter 18

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Ibid. 2425.

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