Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics RUTH W
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American Political Science Review Vol. 99, No. 1 February 2005 Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics RUTH W. GRANT Duke University ROBERT O. KEOHANE Princeton University ebates about globalization have centered on calls to improve accountability to limit abuses of power in world politics. How should we think about global accountability in the absence of global D democracy? Who should hold whom to account and according to what standards? Thinking clearly about these questions requires recognizing a distinction, evident in theories of accountability at the nation-state level, between “participation” and “delegation” models of accountability. The distinction helps to explain why accountability is so problematic at the global level and to clarify alternative pos- sibilities for pragmatic improvements in accountability mechanisms globally. We identify seven types of accountability mechanisms and consider their applicability to states, NGOs, multilateral organizations, multinational corporations, and transgovernmental networks. By disaggregating the problem in this way, we hope to identify opportunities for improving protections against abuses of power at the global level. he interdependence of states, globalization of global powers in a manner compatible with democratic business, expansion of the scope and authority principles (see Held 1995 and Young 2000, chap 7). Tof multilateral organizations, and rapid increases Our analysis helps to resolve a puzzle that is posed in the number of nongovernmental organizations by conventional views of accountability. The prevailing (NGOs) have heightened concerns about the way view in the international relations literature of mul- power is used and abused on the world stage. Contro- tilateral organizations, such as the World Bank and versy about globalization pivots around the twin issues World TradeOrganization (WTO), is that these entities of accountability and democracy. A crucial feature of are weak relative to states. But critics of global- representative democracy is that those who govern are ization view such organizations as relatively uncon- held accountable to the governed. If governance above trolled, criticizing them as “unaccountable” while cel- the level of the nation-state is to be legitimate in a ebrating the democratic accountability of states (Dahl democratic era, mechanisms for appropriate account- 1999). Thus, multinational organizations are character- ability need to be institutionalized. Yet these mecha- ized as both weak and unchecked at the same time. nisms cannot simply replicate, on a larger scale, the We argue that multilateral organizations are in fact familiar procedures and practices of democratic states. accountable—–indeed, more accountable in many re- We seek in this article both to explain why account- spects than powerful states—–but in ways quite differ- ability is so problematic at the global level and to ent from those envisaged by observers who equate ac- suggest pragmatic improvements in accountability countability with participation. Similarly, our analysis mechanisms. Our analysis considers accountability as helps to explain why the parties to the debate over only one of several ways in which power can be con- global accountability so often seem to be “talking past strained, examines nondemocratic accountability me- each other.” To officials of the World Bank, it is the chanisms as well as democratic ones, and scrutinizes NGOs who seem accountable to nobody, whereas the the analogy between global and domestic power struc- officers of the Bank must answer to their supervisors tures in order to specify the nature of the problem of and ultimately to the states that empowered them. To accountability in global politics more clearly. We distin- the representatives of the NGOs, it is the World Bank guish two basic concepts of accountability: delegation that lacks accountability because it does not answer and participation. We explore accountability mecha- to those affected by its policies, the very people for nisms of both types that could be utilized to regulate whom the NGOs claim to speak. An agreement on the need for greater accountability will not resolve this dis- agreement without a consensus on what accountability entails. Accountability, as we use the term, implies that some Ruth W.Grant is Professor of Political Science and Philosophy, Duke University, Box 90204, Durham, NC 27708 ([email protected]). actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of Robert O. Keohane is Professor of International Affairs, Woodrow standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their re- Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton sponsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose University, Princeton, NJ 08540 ([email protected]). sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities The authors are grateful to Karen Alter, Craig Borowiak, William have not been met. Accountability presupposes a re- Curtis, Peter Feaver, Hein Goemans, Stephen Grant, Nan Keohane, Lenore Jones-Perretto, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Joseph Weiler, and Ngaire lationship between power-wielders and those holding Woods for criticisms of an early version of this paper and con- them accountable where there is a general recognition versations about the concept of accountability. We also appreciate of the legitimacy of (1) the operative standards for ac- critiques by three anonymous referees and the Editor of APSR. countability and (2) the authority of the parties to the Comments by colleagues at Duke University at a seminar that we held on September 24, 2003, and by participants in a seminar at New relationship (one to exercise particular powers and the York University Law School on March 1, 2004, were particularly other to hold them to account). The concept of account- helpful. ability implies that the actors being held accountable 29 Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics February 2005 have obligations to act in ways that are consistent with in generally applicable rules. Accountability mecha- accepted standards of behavior and that they will be nisms of various kinds—–whether strictly democratic or sanctioned for failures to do so. not—–are therefore also required if abuses of power are Thus, not all constraints on abuses of power in world to be limited in nonarbitrary ways that can be defended politics constitute mechanisms of accountability. Uni- on ethical as well as practical grounds. lateral uses of force, though they are often described Thus, our focus in this article is on the role of ac- as “holding someone accountable,” do not qualify as countability mechanisms in world politics. What kinds accountability mechanisms in our sense. In the clas- of accountability mechanisms are likely to be effec- sical, European balance of power system,1 the prin- tive in constraining international organizations such cipal mechanism of constraint was, ultimately, coer- as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund cion or the threat of coercion. States were the exclu- (IMF)? Should we think about accountability in the sive sources of legitimate authority, and though they same way when considering powerful entities that are could legally bind themselves through international structured quite differently from multilateral organi- treaties, if treaties were broken, states had to resort zations—–multinational corporations, NGOs, transna- to self-help to assert their rights. States in a balance of tional organizations, and states? How should we think power system are not “held accountable” in any mean- about global accountability when there is no global ingful sense, although they may be constrained by co- democracy? Accountability mechanisms in world pol- ercion or the threat thereof. Similarly, the economic itics are not limited to those that are emphasized in interdependence of states creates constraints, but states participatory models of democracy, and even these that are bargaining for advantage on economic issues mechanisms should be viewed, not in isolation, but in are not necessarily held accountable to one another. the context of other constraints on the abuse of power. States in the nineteenth century engaged in bilateral How can understanding accountability at the level of tariff negotiations, confronting limits on their ability the nation-state clarify the problem of accountability to achieve their objectives. But since they had under- at the global level? taken no prior obligations by joining multilateral insti- tutions, there was no accountability process involved. There is another important mode of constraining the TWO GENERAL MODELS OF powerful that must be distinguished from accountabil- ACCOUNTABILITY FOR NATION-STATES ity. “Checks and balances” are mechanisms designed to prevent action that oversteps legitimate boundaries by Accountability functions to expose and sanction two requiring the cooperation of actors with different insti- sorts of abuses: the unauthorized or illegitimate ex- tutional interests to produce an authoritative decision. ercise of power and decisions that are judged by ac- Accountability mechanisms, on the other hand, always countability holders to be unwise or unjust. In politics, operate after the fact: exposing actions to view, judging ensuring accountability requires establishing institu- and sanctioning them. The executive veto power in tions that provide information to those people trying the U.S. Constitution is part of a system of checks and to hold power-wielders accountable and that enable