ASSOCIATION NEWS The Political Science of Peter J. Katzenstein

Peter A. Gourevitch, University of California, San Diego Robert O. Keohane, Princeton University Stephen D. Krasner, Stanford University David Laitin, Stanford University T.J. Pempel, University of California, Berkeley Wolfgang Streeck, Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Sidney Tarrow, Cornell University APSA President (2008) eter Katzenstein is a prodigiously tional behavior, but these have Pproductive scholar. As a comparativ- been different books. What ist, a student of international relations, an no one has done better than Peter J. Katzenstein historian, and one who has successfully Katzenstein is to integrate bridged the qualitative and quantitative different levels of analysis in Walter S. Carpenter, Jr., divide in our discipline, he has made sig- the same book, something that Professor of International nal contributions to general international he accomplished in both his Studies relations, political economy, security stud- earlier studies of small states Cornell University ies, European and German studies, Asian and his later ones on Japanese and Japanese studies, and political science security and world regions. Ph.D. in general. In this brief résumé, seven of Katzenstein has been a Harvard University his friends and collaborators highlight his pioneer in two major interna- major contributions. tional relations literatures: in- One of the defining characteristics of ternational political economy Katzenstein’s work has been his ability to and international security. At the same so different from the societies in which move seamlessly between international time, in the comparative politics field, he they were brought up. He therefore sees and comparative politics. All students has been a path breaker in our understand- differences between the United States and of international politics recognize that ing of comparative political economy and other societies that Americans may miss, the state is not just a black box, but few in comparative regional analysis, both in since they take American practices for have been able to open that box with Europe and, more recently, on a global granted. And he sees, acutely, the tensions confidence. Some international relations scale. But more important than his con- and contradictions in American practices scholars have written books about both the tributions to either subdiscipline has been and beliefs—what he and Robert O. Keo- international system and variations in na- his capacity to bridge the two, and the hane, following David Laitin, called the growing reach of his work from Europe “polyvalence” of America in their book to Asia, and more recently to the United on anti-Americanism (2007). Peter A. Gourevitch is a professor of po- States. Before discussing the vast amount litical science at the University of California, Second, there is his enduring interest in San Diego. of substantive work that Katzenstein has the legacies and transformations produced published during a career of almost 40 by history. To understand the variety of Robert O. Keohane is Professor of years, we discuss five major themes that policies pursued by societies toward other Public and International Affairs at Princeton motivate and unify his work. societies, it is essential to understand the University. history of the societies involved, with their residues of attitudes, practices, and Stephen D. Krasner is a professor of Persistent Themes political science at Stanford University. expectations about their relationship to the Katzenstein’s work has reflected four world outside. This theme is evident from David Laitin is the James T. Watkins IV signature themes, from his first article in his Ph.D. dissertation onward. and Elise V. Watkins Professor of Political International Organization in 1971 (“Hare Third, and increasingly, Katzenstein Science at Stanford University. and Tortoise: The Race toward Integra- has sought to link structural with cultural tion”) to his latest books and articles. analysis. His work during the first 15 T.J. Pempel is a professor of political First, Katzenstein has always em- years of his career was largely structural: science at the University of California, phasized the distinctiveness of national to understand patterns of policy, one needs Berkeley. societies, with their historically con- to understand political structure. Yet he ditioned domestic structures and par- was not satisfied with structural expla- Wolfgang Streeck is the director of the Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforsc- ticular cultures. He began his career as nations. Indeed, he came around to the hung in Cologne, Germany. a Europeanist and moved determinedly view that what goes on in people’s heads into Asia in the last decade but he is also is crucially important. Why, he asked, Sidney Tarrow is the Maxwell Upson in the long line of analysts of the United did postwar Germany and Japan, despite Professor of Government and Sociology at States, dating from Tocqueville, who see being so similar structurally, behave so Cornell University. America as so fascinating because it is differently toward terrorism? His answer:

PSOnline www.apsanet.org 893 they were “informed by different norms” politics worldwide will become increas- his colleagues argued that much impor- (1993. 266). Yet in embracing cultural ingly homogeneous. This global political tant behavior in world politics cannot be explanations, he did not reject structural economy view, with many variations, has understood without understanding norms, ones, but rather sought to understand how deeply affected work on European politi- culture, and identity. They sought both to domestic structures are rooted in cultural cal integration, economic interdependence define these terms clearly and to show that practices. and foreign policy, the comparative poli- neither realism nor liberalism could be Fourth, truth, for Katzenstein, comes tics of wealthy countries, and the politics persuasive without being embedded in a from attention to minute political details of globalization. In the realm of security broader sociological perspective. That is, and not from the abstraction of central politics, structural views have also pre- they called for a “sociological turn” in the tendencies found in statistical models or vailed, notably in the structural realism of study of world politics, a call that has con- the core strategic interactions highlighted Kenneth W. Waltz. tributed to a large and growing literature in formal models. He is determined never In his work on international relations, seeking to show how social norms affect to short circuit the complexity of the inter- Katzenstein has consistently criticized the conduct of international relations. national system or that of domestic poli- this structural conception of a homo- Katzenstein’s most recent single- tics. As an analyst of societies’ interac- geneous world. In Disjoined Partners authored work is A World of Regions: Asia tions with their external environments, he (1976a) he showed that political integra- and Europe in the American Imperium. In has adopted a dual vision—understanding tion in culturally similar societies—in this major study, Katzenstein emphasizes interdependence without forgetting that this case, Germany and Austria—is far not only regional distinctiveness but that, convergence is precluded by difference. from assured. Indeed, he wrote, “multiple in his view, “globalization and internation- These themes have produced an mutually reinforcing counter pressures . alization make today’s regions porous” intersecting and portentous realization . . make for the persistence of political (2005, 19). That is, transnational flows of that one cannot understand societies autonomy” (220). Similarly in his edited money, people, and goods, coupled with without understanding the regional and book, Between Power and Plenty (1978a), interstate institutional orders, promote global contexts within which they exist; Katzenstein and his co-authors emphasize connections among these regions without and one cannot understand regional and the divergence, not convergence, of the destroying their diversity. But to under- global politics without understanding foreign economic strategies of advanced stand a “world of regions,” one has to the distinctiveness of the societies that countries, which he explained as “due understand the power dimension as well, compose them. In his work on foreign principally to differences in domestic since it is “embedded in the American economic policies and on the policies of structure” (297). imperium” (209). Economic and political small states, Katzenstein insisted on the If global structural explanations are structures; history, norms, and culture; in- importance of understanding the variety false or at least incomplete, what accounts terests and power: all of these components of capitalist states. A World of Regions for the persistence of difference—for the are part of Katzenstein’s rich conception (2005) restates the theme that regions and absence of homogeneity? For Katzenstein, of world politics. societies are porous to the global system, the answers are history and culture: which also depends on the actions of its In the 1980s, Katzenstein emphasized component parts. history. In what is surely one of his most International Political We now turn to the major areas of important works, Small States in World Economy political science in which Katzenstein has Markets, he employed an historically Katzenstein is one of the creators of made an impact: international relations, informed comparative method to show the modern field of international and including international political economy that “the distinctive strategy by which the comparative political economy. His edited and security; the comparative politics small European states adjust to change book, Between Power and Plenty (1978a), of Europe, with a special emphasis on derives from corporatist domestic struc- swiftly became a classic, and a defining Germany; and the study of regionalism, tures that have their historical origin in the milepost of a field. Foreign economic focused on comparisons among Asia, Eu- 1930s and 1940s” (1985, 210). Originally, policy now became the object of explana- rope, and the United States. We conclude Small States was part of an unwieldy man- tion, a sharp break from the primacy of by re-emphasizing some overarching uscript along with what became Corpo- security policy, of national interest defined themes that Katzenstein has brought to ratism and Change (1984), which argued in military terms, as the major preoccupa- political science and international studies that Austria and Switzerland, despite their tion of the international relations scholarly with his professional and institutional political differences, both constituted vari- community. Countries need wealth to contributions. eties of democratic corporatism—a social sustain whatever they do, including the variant in Austria and a liberal one in promotion of their security concerns. To Switzerland. As in Small States, Katzen- Qualifying Globalization: get wealth, they make choices about how stein traced democratic corporatism back to relate to the world economy: how open Katzenstein on International to the politics of the 1930s and 1940s. or closed their economies should be to Relations After these impressive works embed- trade, how to manage economic competi- ded in history, Katzenstein turned his Structural explanations of politics, tion, and how to strengthen their econo- attention to culture. He spent much of rooted in industrialization and modern- mies internally. With this shift in focus, the next decade working on Germany ization, have had a powerful hold on the Katzenstein also shifted the key explana- and Japan, as discussed elsewhere in this imagination of analysts for over a century tory variables. To explain how countries essay. When he returned to international and a half. These explanations range from differ in their foreign economic policy, he relations in book form, it was with an Marxist class analysis to the focus on the argued, we need to examine state structure important edited volume, The Culture of material incentives for collective action and policy networks. Strong states lead National Security (1996), which attacked of contemporary political economists. their economies, while weak states allow head-on the prevailing structural ortho- In their most simple form they posit that economic interests to operate on their doxy, especially of realism, in security since politics follows economics and own; dense networks involve high degrees studies. In that book, Katzenstein and economic globalization is occurring, of coordination, while loose networks

894 PS October 2008 cannot avoid unit autonomy. as the explanatory variables. Rather war in Afghanistan but opposing Ameri- These frames of analysis continue to than seeing the state as a unitary actor, can actions in Iraq. Japan, in contrast, the present. The institutional school in domestic variables matter. And if national has been determinedly bilateral. Japanese political science examines the formal interest is not the sole source of utility, political leaders, Katzenstein argues, have properties of political systems that define with economic concerns at play in shaping used the challenges presented by the post- the way preferences are aggregated (e.g., what is being defended or pursued, why 9/11 world as an opportunity for gaiatsu, the range of veto gates, majoritarian not continue the questioning by posing deploying American pressure to break vs. consensus institutions). Conversely, other conceptions of identity? If people domestic logjams that have prevented the civil society school stresses the way have goals associated with their religion, Japan from playing a more active role in interest groups and social structures are ethnicity, value systems, notions of self world affairs. For Japan, 9/11 was an op- organized. These lines converge in the and nation, aren’t these also utilities that portunity to demonstrate that it could be a “varieties of capitalism” school, which can be optimized? And, for that matter, cooperative player. contrasts models of the market along the why not challenge the materialist view of Structure cannot account for these lines of organized vs. liberal economies, what economics is all about by looking different reactions to similar if not identi- weaving together elements of finance, cor- at the cultural foundations of economic cal security threats. To understand why porate governance, labor relations, social behavior? These “new” constructivist is- Japan and Germany reacted so differ- welfare systems, education and training, sues are, for Katzenstein, “old” concerns. ently, Katzenstein has insisted that it is market competition, and producer associa- In helping to found the modern subdisci- necessary to understand norms, identity, tions, all variables that first appeared in pline of international political economy, and institutions and not just international Katzenstein’s work. Katzenstein laid the groundwork for structure. Germans, both leaders and In his work on small states, Katzen- greater attention to domestic politics, to publics, see Germany’s domestic polity as stein led the way along a related line of global comparisons, and to a wider range fragile but at the same time embedded in inquiry: the smaller the democratic state, of issues that shape what countries seek to a Grotian multilateral world anchored in the more extensive the welfare state— optimize in the international arena. Europe. Japan sees its domestic polity as except, of course, in Switzerland—and robust but views the international system the more open its economy to trade. This as a Hobbesian state of nature. contradicted an expectation that state International Security These differences are the result of intervention was unidirectional: the more Katzenstein’s work on security and divergent histories. Just as Katzenstein at- it intervened in one direction, the more it other issues is singular in the depth tributed similarities and variations among intervened in all arenas. But another logic of knowledge that he possesses about small European states to the crisis of the was at work here too: strong state action individual countries as well as about the 1930s and to earlier trajectories of indus- for social insurance provided the safety international system as a whole. When trialization and ethnic disputes, he has net for employees so that they felt secure Katzenstein writes a sentence, the reader emphasized that the security policies of to experience open trade, thereby avoiding always knows that he could have written Germany and Japan, and other countries strikes and conflicts that would be disrup- many additional paragraphs to support as well, reflect the impact of particular tive to trade. Small states thus had much his conclusions. He has always been a historical moments on norms, identities, to offer as a distinctive type of political fearsome empirical researcher and has and institutions that in turn shape foreign economy, with parallels to large states. amassed a depth of knowledge about a policies. Germany’s contemporary stance Later, in his writing on Asia, Katzen- variety of political systems, which has is a reflection of the semi-sovereign status stein moved toward the study of a more allowed him to write authoritatively imposed upon it by the winners in the integrated “global” international relations. across the divide that has often separated Second World War, a status that Germans The inclusion of a Japan chapter in Power international relations from foreign policy ultimately embraced. Japan’s security and Plenty (1978a) by T.J. Pempel, at the analysis. policies reflect not only the American time his colleague at Cornell, widened the In several influential articles and books, occupation but also political struggles North Atlantic focus of IR and compara- from The Culture of National Security among contending groups. tive politics. It marked the globalization of (1996) to “Same War: Different Views” The most elegant theories of interna- political economy, integrating issues about (2003), Katzenstein has pointed out tional relations have been associated with “Asian patterns” into European ones, con- that Germany and Japan are in similar rationalist perspectives, realism, or liberal necting both to stages of growth theories, structural positions in the global system. institutionalism, with which Katzenstein as in the work of Walt W. Rostow, and Both have been allied with the United has become increasingly disenchanted. to theories about sequences or changing States for more than 50 years; both have Threats and opportunities do not, he environments as in the work of Alexander played a less prominent role than might be argues, nakedly present themselves to Gerschenkron and Barrington Moore. expected by a realist analysis emphasiz- policymakers. Constitutive and regulative Katzenstein kept moving. In the 1990s ing relative power capabilities: they have norms influence both how policymakers he became a leader in the advent of not, however, reacted in the same way to and publics understand the world and constructivist theories, exploring the role security threats, internal or external. In what they can do about it. 9/11 was an act of identity, of meanings, of the logic of combating terrorism both before and after of war for the United States; for most of appropriate action. This could be read as 9/11, Germany relied on high technology the rest of the world, including Germany a break with his political economy past, surveillance and new laws, while Japan and Japan, it was a crime. and Katzenstein to some degree intended relied on low technology, police visits to Like many foreign scholars who made it to be. But it could also be read as the individual homes, and integration with the intellectual careers in America, Katzen- continuation of his challenge to the tra- community. In Germany it was laws that stein has been fascinated by his adopted ditional IR field where he began. Rather dictated policy behavior; in Japan it was country, seeking to understand both its than security alone, economic policy was social norms. differences from Europe and the role that the dependent variable and economic Germany has been resolutely multilat- it has played as the dominant state in interests mixed with institutions served eral in the post 9/11 world, supporting the world politics during his lifetime. It is not

PSOnline www.apsanet.org 895 surprising, therefore, that he has been in- Advanced Industrial States” (1976b) to hind Katzenstein’s scholarship, one must trigued by how America is viewed abroad: his very micro fugitive paper “Austria and undertake a deep reading of his successive that is, in anti-Americanism. In examin- Kleinwalsertal” (1978b). And although engagements with the German case. Not ing what they call “anti-Americanisms,” he works mainly in a qualitative/historical much imagination is required to suspect Katzenstein and his co-author, Robert vein, he can use quantitative data when that it was his family’s German experi- Keohane, emphasize differences, not simi- appropriate (e.g., “West Germany as ence that made him a post-Westphalian larities (2007). There is anti-Americanism Number Two,” 1982; “Europe as Number theorist of the state avant la lettre. His key in many parts of the world, but the basic Two,” 1981). concept of “semi-sovereignty,” introduced nature of these anti-Americanisms and the What best characterizes Katzenstein’s to characterize the condition of the West reasons for them are not the same. At least empirical methodology is what he calls German successor state to the Reich after in part, this reflects the polyvalence of the “analytical eclecticism.” His impatience 1949, straddles the border between the United States, a country of many different with claims that only one approach is sci- internal and external, between domestic parts, at once the most religious polity in entific has led him increasingly to argue and international politics, and between the industrialized world and the home of that only by using a variety of methods political economy and international rela- a pop culture that is relentlessly hedo- can a political scientist produce a suffi- tions. Germany served as Katzenstein’s nistic and materialistic. Different kinds ciently multidimensional analysis of com- principal demonstration case that the of anti-Americanism reflect reactions to plex phenomena. Second, his eclecticism blurring of that border in the postwar era different parts of America. The rational is accompanied by a persistent method of was a recipe, and perhaps a necessary unitary state of realism and liberal insti- paired comparison in various forms and condition, for both prosperity and peace. tutionalism may be an elegant analytic at various levels. From the “hare and tor- In this sense, and paradoxically enough, assumption, but this assumption cannot, toise” metaphors of his first article (1971), Germany was and perhaps continues to Katzenstein argues, provide us with an to the Germany/Austria comparison in his be for him, although for quite different adequate understanding of an international first book (1976), to the pairing of Austria reasons, what it was in the 1980s for so security environment that reflects both and Switzerland in his political economy many others also: a “model.” In his case the way in which norms and identity have work (1984), to Europe and Asia in rela- of a state that had learned a lesson all affected the deployment of American tion to the American hegemon (2005), other states should learn as well: to accept power and the way in which other states, Katzenstein is one of the premier pairing internal constraints and external interde- guided by their own unique histories, have comparativists of our generation. pendence as fundamental conditions of responded. Despite his empirical penchant and his their operation, and to flourish with and recurrent use of comparison, Katzenstein’s regardless of them. contributions have been deeply theoreti- The message of Katzenstein the Europa Europa cal. Europe has provided a foundation— political economist was, in a nutshell, Though mainly trained in interna- not a cage—for his theoretical contribu- that not having command of full state tional relations, Katzenstein’s substantive tions. Take his insistent interest in power: capacities—being constrained by effective interests—like those of his mentor, Karl it was his original interest in Austria—a federalism, strong interest associations, W. Deutsch—have centered mainly on weak state in uneasy symbiosis with a powerful courts, and dense international Europe. Of the 34 (count them!) books stronger one—and his books on Germany obligations—afforded West Germany and occasional papers listed on his CV, 16 (1987; 1997b)—a strengthening state that more effective economic governance focus entirely on Europe and another six chose to limit its own power—that fed his than other comparable countries. Semi- are at least partly European in substance. preoccupation with the taming of power. sovereignty protected the West German His newest book (co-edited with Jef- This interest broadened into globalized state from counterproductive illusions frey Checkel) will deal with the politics form in A World of Regions in 2005. of omnipotence other states at the time of European identity (2009), as did his Undergirding his musings on the nature still held, and forced it to cultivate other first article, “Hare and the Tortoise” of Europe and Asia as world regions is means of public policy than direct state (1971). But like Deutsch, Katzenstein is his interest in the relation of each to the control—means that turned out to be not fundamentally an area specialist— American hegemon: an untamed power much better matched than traditional state understanding that term in its traditional that is at least partially restrained by its intervention to the evolving problems in sense—but an empirically based compara- relations to these two areas of the world. a changing, increasingly interdependent tive theorist whose early theoretical ex- Even as he developed into a scholar world. A fragmented, decentralized, weak plorations and his embedding in domestic of world politics, Katzenstein remained state, West Germany had to learn to make structures were grounded in the European concerned with the taming of power in deals with a multiplicity of actors in civil experience and have returned him there Europe. His writings on the European society who commanded their own sort repeatedly. Union reflect the fundamental ambiva- of sovereignty that could not be ignored. Katzenstein’s empirical grounding is a lence that is embedded in the history and Distributed intelligence and responsibil- good place to start. Some IR specialists the dynamics of the European project. ity, and an evolving culture of coopera- may think they have dipped deeply into His basic question is: “can the same set of tion in the production of collective goods domestic politics when they refer airily to institutions that effectively tamed German between social actors forced to substitute “domestic structures”: not Katzenstein the power avoid the accumulation of power for a strong state, turned out to be ideal Europeanist! Work your way through Pol- that appears to be necessary to move from prerequisites for national economic suc- icy and Politics in West Germany (1987) economic to social and political power?” cess. or Corporatism and Change (1984) and This takes us to his vision of Germany. Unlike the main branch of the “variet- you will find the deep immersion of a ies of capitalism” literature, however, well-trained European area specialist. His Katzenstein never suggests that German empirical range runs from the very macro Germany and the Taming of semi-sovereignty had been invented to “International Relations and Domestic Power promote the prosperity of the Germans Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of To understand the driving concerns be- or the “competitiveness” of Germany as

896 PS October 2008 a country. That semi-sovereignty contrib- was a question that needed a comparativ- domestic threats under the auspices of the uted to prosperity was certainly welcome, ist and Europeanist to ask. For nearly 30 police. Weaving these threads together, as it made it more unlikely that Germans years, Katzenstein has been making con- Katzenstein asked why Japan had not would rediscover their past preferences sistently powerful and paradigm-shifting expanded its military forces in parallel for effective state control; indeed, Katzen- contributions to the study of both Japan with its rapidly rising GNP and why both stein’s work on Germany can be read as a and Asia. Beginning without the tradition- of its security forces chose instead to rely continued attempt to reassure his German al linguistic and area studies training, he on largely non-violent mechanisms in pur- readers that more advantages were to be approached Asia with the eager student’s suit of their missions. Deeply entrenched gained from less than from more power. voracious appetite to learn from others norms arising in response to defeat in war Still, the real reason for semi-sovereignty through collaboration, auditing courses, and a strongly pacifist public were his key was not German desires for prosperity but joint teaching, editing volumes, and joint answers. Building from this insight, he the desires of Germany’s neighbors for authorship. In the process he began by then confronted a third body of litera- security. Ultimately, politics is about more raising previously unexplored questions, ture, namely that of international rela- important things than prosperity, and even then doing voluminous empirical research tions theory. Japan’s complex but largely where Katzenstein the theorist of the state to resolve them. (More than one of us anti-violent approach to the two faces of dresses up as a political economist, he is has experienced the excitement of his security, like that of Germany, challenged primarily concerned with the potential for “Eureka!” moments as he found answers the prevailing security studies paradigms violence vested in the modern state and to the problems he posed). The questions of realism and institutionalism, along hidden behind the facade of a peaceful emerged from his extensive comparative with their various subtypes and variations. pursuit of economic happiness. background and his intolerance for ad hoc Japan’s modest security aspirations defied Every worthwhile theory in the social country-based “explanations” that made neo-realist predictions, while formal rules sciences entails an element of utopian little analytic or comparative sense. Like of institutionalism did little to explain Jap- thinking in that it presents its conceptual all great students his insights have often anese behavior. His norms-based explana- constructions of a good society, or system, stunned his alleged teachers, and his work tion was also to prove a fertile seed for his as real possibilities. The inherent pos- has changed the terms of intellectual de- subsequent contributions to the alternative sibilism of social theory may be seen as bate on both Japan and the Asian region. paradigm of constructivism. rhetoric aimed at bringing about a desired Katzenstein’s Asian adventure began Insights from these early works on state of affairs by presenting it as ratio- with his inclusion of Japan as a main- Japan led logically to increased attention nally conceivable and therefore realistic. stream case in Between Power and Plenty to Asia. Together with Takashi Shiraishi, Katzenstein’s work on Germany—on the (1978a), and continued with his co-editor- Katzenstein organized a group of special- country’s historical success in spite of, ship of the seven-volume series Policy and ists to examine what they called “Network and perhaps because of, the domestic and Politics. Both projects focused on how Power,” viz. the economic linkages woven international semi-sovereignty of its post- power is organized in different industrial across Asia by huge Japanese conglomer- war state—conjures up the possibility of democracies, prioritizing the relationships ates along with smaller ethnic Chinese a peaceful world order in which interests between state and society. This broadly businesses (1997a). The result com- in prosperity displace once and for all comparative framework generated more bined insight into the political as well as the passion for power. It is this underly- intellectual rewards than either essential- economic forces undergirding the “Asian ing theme—the hoped-for taming of the ist Japan-centric explanations or the then miracle” with still another challenge to Leviathan by both an organized domestic prevailing but constricting comparisons presuppositions in international rela- society and institutionalized international of Japan and the United States. Simul- tions. Rather than rehearsing balance of obligations—that explains why Katzen- taneously his nuanced examination of power and multipolar instability theories, stein’s work on Germany later extended to the country’s dynamic inside-outside Katzenstein portrayed an Asian region both the German response to terrorism in relationships offered insights far beyond whose member states were driven far the 1970s and 1980s and to European inte- any generated by prior explorations of more by a variegated mixture of domestic gration. It cannot be surprising, then, that Japanese foreign policy or domestic politics, incipient Asian regional institu- that same theme remained strongly alive responses to external pressures. The result tions, and a preponderant elite attention to even when, in the 1990s, the limits of was a powerful repositioning of Japan national and regional economic develop- domestic semi-sovereignty for the defense and its political economy away from the ment. He and Shiraishi pushed their analy- of German prosperity became increasingly esoteric periphery of comparative politics sis of Asia further with Beyond Japan visible. Unlike neo-liberal economists and and into its mainstream. (2006), which prioritized the region as a political scientists, Katzenstein regarded Katzenstein’s subsequent contribution whole and its intersecting influences from the demise of German corporatism with was to Japanese security studies and here Japan, China, and the United States. To be suspicion, and the same holds for the again he began from a distinctive starting understood, they argued, the Asian region increasing unilateralism of the Schröder point. Taking a different slant from the had to be seen as socially constructed reforms—not necessarily because he was predominant academic and journalistic and porous rather than geographic and a good Social Democrat, but because he debates over the causes of Japan’s rising unchanging. In the process he was also prefers to see the state—and above all the GNP, he asked instead about the seeming able to shed light on the question of “Why German state—in shackles rather than insouciance of Japanese officials toward is there no NATO in Asia?” roaming about; not to mention the fact traditional security. And in a second Insights gained from his work on the that to him, it is not prosperity that is the important break, he examined “security” Asian region combined with work he had ultimate object of politics but security not merely as protection from foreign done on into a far more comprehensive from aggression. enemies through military capabilities argument addressing American hegemony, but also as comprehensively including global politics, and the role of regions economic, food, energy, and other security in A World of Regions (2005). There he From Europe to Asia challenges. In addition, he recognized argued that Japan in Asia plus Germany “Why is there no NATO in Asia?” This that security required protection from in Europe provided regional military and

PSOnline www.apsanet.org 897 economic outposts that were pivotal in Less impressed by the responsibility of his contributions to APSA. Well known sustaining America’s global power. He power highlighted by his teacher, Joseph for his successful editorship of Interna- thus integrated Asia into a fresh global Nye, and being morally troubled by tional Organization during the 1980s, he schema showing once again that he could hegemony, Katzenstein has sought ways has steered the highly successful series, approach Japan and Asia with exciting to promote Tamed Power (1997b). As we Cornell Studies in International Political questions and provocative answers. argued above, in his extensive work on the Economy, for over two decades. He has Federal Republic of Germany, he has been served on advisory boards at Hong Kong comfortable in finding that it is merely a University, Peking University, Princeton The Themes of Katzenstein’s semi-sovereign state, unable to act autono- University, the Max Planck Institute, and Work: A Concluding Reprise mously from the many social and institu- the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin and on Three interrelated intuitions lie behind tional networks that crowd the corridors the nominations committee for political Peter Katzenstein’s empirical masterpiec- of power. In his long collaboration with science of the American Academy of es—an insistence on the distinctiveness T.J. Pempel comparing the international Arts and Sciences. He has also served on of political experiences and institutions, a roles of Germany and Japan, Katzenstein numerous editorial boards, including ISQ, preference for smallness, and a passion to is glad to report that many realists (about IO, and the Handbook of International tame power. These intuitions provide his whom he learned as an undergraduate, Relations. work with normative coherence. serving as a research assistant to Kenneth His contributions to his own university Provoked by grand theories associ- Waltz) were wrong: neither country has are equally stellar. Winner of several of ated with Robert Keohane and Joseph demanded the international power that Cornell’s most distinguished teaching Nye highlighting transnationalism in the would be commensurate with their (dis- awards, to top off this list of accom- 1970s, and guided by a moral vision that tinct) economic miracles. Their power had plishments he recently won the Stephen values diversity, Katzenstein has long been tamed by their parallel histories. Weiss Award “for effective, inspiring and insisted on the wide varieties of institu- The source of Katzenstein’s intuitions, distinguished teaching of undergradu- tional responses to these forces that were not unlike that of his three inspirational ates and for outstanding contributions to forecast as promoting a common world mentors at Harvard—Karl Deutsch, Stan- undergraduate education.” His energy and culture. In his political economy work in ley Hoffmann, and Judith Shklar—is the dedication to our profession are nothing the 1980s, he analyzed a double distinc- fact that Bismarck’s Germany had grown short of phenomenal. He has chaired over tion—not only between small and large too big for Europe, and this meant danger. 50 Ph.D. committees at Cornell, training capitalist states, but between two distinct Taming German power was the key to some of the today’s most distinguished types of small corporatist states—with peace in Europe. Therefore, the distinc- specialists in both IR and comparative liberal and social variants. Years later, in tive institutions and networks of Austria politics, and has served on the Ph.D. com- collaboration with a young generation of and East Germany implied that one nation mittees of 47 others. His Ph.D.s teach at security scholars that led to The Culture could be peacefully and permanently some of the finest departments of political of National Security (1996), Katzenstein divided into separate states, and their science both here and abroad. pushed them to emphasize how distinct smallness would play to the advantage of Katzenstein is also well known for his national cultures can trump realist and all. To be sure, several of Katzenstein’s contributions to diversity and equality. He liberal interests to sustain distinct foreign forecasts went awry—two of the Germa- has been a strong supporter of women and policies. In his most recent book, A World nys did unite; America did not become a minorities, and a consistent and persua- of Regions (2005), Katzenstein counters small state in the wake of the 1980s eco- sive voice for equality of opportunity in the vision of globalization by addressing nomic crises; Austria’s corporatism has the profession. He is especially noted for the distinct developments in Asian and begun to look terrifyingly unsocial. But his encouragement of young scholars. The European regional institutions. As should his intuitions about distinctiveness, small- Cornell series that he edits has offered a be clear, a keyword sweep of Katzen- ness, and the importance of taming power venue for an array of such scholars, many stein’s works would surely find distinct have remained his normative ballast. of whom express heartfelt thanks for his among his favorite non-capitalized words. professional advice in the prefaces of their books. His generosity is legion: reading Standing against his grand predecessors Public Goods and Private in the study of nationalism, most especial- the acknowledgements of virtually every ly his teacher and friend Karl W. Deutsch, Connections major book in IR and many in compara- and guided by a moral vision that small We could not conclude this essay on tive politics turns up his name and grateful is beautiful, Katzenstein never had even Katzenstein’s contributions without point- thanks for his advice. a vicarious nostalgia for the gargantuan ing out that he is one of the profession’s Finally, all of us who have co-authored Austro-Hungarian Empire. As we learn finest producers of public goods. His this appreciation have profited from his re- from his dissertation-turned-first-book contributions to the American Political lentless friendship, which has sometimes Disjoined Partners (1976), Katzenstein Science Association have been exten- come across as “tough love.” We have found favor (and stability) in an Austria sive, including co-chairing the program occasionally struggled to meet his stan- and East Germany as separate small committee for the 1995 annual meeting. dards of excellence—both in himself and states. In Small States and World Markets He was also secretary of the association in his colleagues—but we have always (1985), Katzenstein reveals his admira- in 2003, APSA lecturer at the Japanese recognized the depth of his friendship, tion for the openness and adaptability of Political Science Association meetings in which has never been lacking, despite Europe’s small states and their national 1997, and a member of the committee on disagreements, even on fundamentals. To economies. And in that book, he forecasts International Political Science of the As- readers of his work, his colleagues, and that with the changing world economy, the sociation from 1989–92. His first of many his students, Peter J. Katzenstein has been U.S., becoming relatively smaller, would prizes was the Helen Dwight Reid Award a beacon of insight and a pillar of support. have a lot to learn from these small states, of the APSA in 1974 and he is a past win- As members of the American Political and he implies that this would make his ner of the Woodrow Wilson Prize. Science Association, we are honored that adopted country a better one. Katzenstein’s service does not end with he is our president.

898 PS October 2008 Note * The authors wish to express their thanks to Sarah Tarrow, who turned her editorial skills and her friendship for Peter to helping to produce a reasonably coherent and better-organized essay than we would otherwise have written.

References Cong, December 5 and 9. New York: Columbia University Press. Katzenstein, Peter J. 1971. “Hare and Tortoise: The Race Towards Integration.” International ———. 1982. “West Germany and Number Two: ———, ed. 1997b. Tamed Power: Germany in Organization 25:290–95. Reflections on the German Model.” In The Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Political Economy of West Germany: Modell ———. 1976a. Disjoined Partners: Austria and Deutschland, ed. Andrei Markovits. New ———. 2003. “Same War-Different Views: Germany since 1815. Berkeley: University of York: Praeger, 199–215. Germany, Japan and Counter-Terrorism.” California Press. International Organization 57:731–60. ———. 1984. Corporatism and Change: Austria, ———. 1976b. “International Relations and Do- Switzerland, and the Politics of Industry. ———. 2005. A World of Regions: Asia and mestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Europe in the American Imperium. Ithaca: of Advanced Industrial States.” International Cornell University Press. Organization 30:1–45. ———. 1985. Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca: Cornell Katzenstein, Peter J., and Takashi Shiraishi, eds. ———. 1978a, ed. Between Power and Plenty: University Press. 1997a. Network Power: Japan and Asia. Foreign Economic Policies in Advanced Indus- Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. trial States. Madison: University of Wisconsin ———. 1987. Policy and Politics in West Ger- Press. many: The Growth of a Semi-sovereign State. ———, eds. 2006. Beyond Japan: The Dynamics Philadelphia: Temple University Press. of East Asian Regionalism. Ithaca: Cornell ———. 1978b. “Center-Periphery Relations in University Press. a Consociational Democracy: Austria and ———. 1993: “Coping with Terrorism: Norms Kleinwalsertal.” In Territorial Politics in and Internal Security in Germany and Japan.” Katzenstein, Peter J., and Robert O. Keohane, eds. Industrial Nations, ed. Luigi Graziano, Peter In Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, 2007. Anti-Americanisms in World Politics. Katzenstein and Sidney Tarrow. New York: eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Praeger. Institutions and Political Change. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 265. Katzenstein, Peter J., and Jeffrey T. Checkel. ———. 1981. “Europe as Number Two.” U.S. 2009. European Identity. Cambridge: Cam- Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance, ———, ed. 1996. The Culture of National Se- bridge University Press. Subcommittee on International Trade. 96th curity: Norms and Identity in World Politics.

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