intensified measures in their rationing of consumers' goods.
2. The operations up to nov will have, the following conseguenees:
a. The destruction of food suplies will play an important role in breaking the enemy's will to resist. s should be especially con- sidered, therefore, in the operations against the chief ports and the .food stocks of the enemy. The transit of food tbroh rance is to be preventedalso.
b. The figit-against tonna in itself, however, cannot have a decisive effe upon te economy o the enemy. In spite of this the at- tacks upon shipping must be continued, not only for their immediate re- sults, but also in order to drive the enemy into convoying and thus to tie up a large amount of shipping space. It will also be important to force the enemy to extend his convoy system over the longest sea-routes possible.
c. Aerial minela in is, in agreement between the Commander in Chief, Navy an the Co er in Chief, Air Force, to be extended also to the French Atlantic ports, as far as-seems necessary.*
d. Interference with public services (gas, water, electricity) at the climax of the warfare against ritsh economy can have a decisive significance. Measures are to be prepared to accomplish this, as well as countermeasures for the protection of our own public services.
e. Coordinated with operations against the economy of the. enemy, acts of sabotage and economic warfare must be employed to a greater ex- tent. mutual coordination of ensive actions by the Navy and Air Force must be assured.
4. Apart from the tasks enumerated according to their urgency in Directive No. 9, paragraph 4,it will be the most important mission of the Air Force during the operation in the West to destroy the British aircraft industr , in order to deprive the British Air Force, the lst potent weapon which could be directly employed against us, of the basis of its existence.
5. The exact time for the beginning of coordinated measures in the war upon the enemy's economy will be given in a separate order.
signed: Keitel
* Pencilled marginal note: "Carried out by communication l/Skl 694&/J& g.Kdos on 29 May 1940."
- 99 - The. uehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 5 June l94O
Nr. 33069/40 Gkdos.Chefs. No. 2 of seven copies
Top secret
1. In order to clear up the situation around Narvik conclusively, all preparations to relieve the Dietl Group from the north also, in addition to those measures already initiated, are to be made.
Therefore arrangements are to be made for landing strong forces of the Arm in Lyngen Fjord, east of Tromsoe, which is unoccupie a present. hese will advance to-the rear of the enemy forces in front of the Windisch Group over the highway leading southwest, and will take and oc- cupy the area around Narvik.
At the same time the Air Force will take possession of an air base in the vicinity of Bard i~oss, and will support the advance of the Army from there.
The mission of the av will be, besides transporting the forces, to take care, of supplyingthem from then on.
2. The necessary reconnaissance and preparations are to be begun at once and must be carried out with the greatest dispatch.
3. The following guiding principles are to be observed in the course of reconnaissance and preparations:
a. Group XXI will initiate and direct uniformly the reconnais- sance for a landing in Lyngen Fjord. The various High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces will give the necessary detailed orders directly. The reconnaissance activities are to cover primarily the following:
(1) Feasibility of landing and unloading in Lyngen Fjord.
(2) Protection of landing activities.
(3) Suitability and state of repair of the Lyngen Fjord- Bardufoss-Narvik highway.
The Minister of Aviation and Commander in Chief, Air Force will carry out reconnaissance for the purpose of occupying and utilizing the Bardufoss airport and will acquaint Group XXI with the results thereof.
b. The Army High Command will get ready. two mixed forces suitable for mountain service of approximately 3,000 men each, including supplies for 4 weeks. Each unit is to be issued 4 to 6 Panzer IV's, Czech tanks of 35 to 38 tons, or assault guns (according to the carrying capacity of the transport vessels).
The Army High Command will convey promptly the data regarding the com- position, equipment, and tonnage requirements of these units to the Naval High Command.
The Navy is to prepare the steamers BREMEN and EUROPA for the job of transportation.
- 100 - Special consideration is to be given to quick unloading.
The necessary preparations of the Air Force will be ordered by the Com- mander in Chief, Air Force. k. The operational plans and the probable period required for prepara- tion are to be reported to me by the respective High Commands through the Armed Forees High Command. Group XXI will report the results of reconnaissance and the intended assignment of the forces after landing.
All measures must be planned so that they can be executed in short order after my decision has been made.
The importance of very eareful concealment of the preparations is es- pecially emphasized.
5. It is intended to regulate command Jurisdiction of this operation in the some manner as during the occupation of Norway.
6. The basis requirement of the entire operation is that the Dietl Group be able to maintain itself until the results of the operation are felt. Until that time the Dietl Group will be left to its own devices, since the reinforcements advancing overland from the south will hardly be able to arrive any earlier either.
Therefore it remains an important task of the Air Force to replenish the Dietl Group by air, with both personnel and materiel, whenever the weather permits.
signed: Adolf Hitler
The Fuebrer and Supreme Commander ,Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 8 June 19+0
W A/Abt.L Nr. 33071/10 Gk.Chefs. No. 2 of five copies
Top secret
Directive No. 114
1. The enemy is offering stubborn resistance to the right wing and the center of the 6th Army,
2. Therefore, following the report of the Commander in Chief, Army, I approve the orders given this morning by Army Group B, namely:
a, Merely to tie down the enemy at the 6th Army front.
b. To transfer the XIV Army Corps to the left wing of the 4th-
- 101 - Army.
*. To inflict a crushing defeat on the strong enemy forces facing the 6th Army by increased pressure of the bulk of the 4th Army toward the southeast and of the left wing of the 6th Army toward the southwest.
3. In addition I issue the following order:
a. The basis aim of the whole operation which was laid down in Directive No. 13 remains in force, i.e., to defeat and destroy the enemy forces in the Chateau-Thierry-Mietz-Belfort triangle, and to bring about the collapse of the aginot line.
However, since the first phase of the operation has not yet been eon- cluded and resistanee north of Paris is very strong, larger forces than originally planned must remain at the Lower Seine and opposite Paris for the time being.
b. Army Group A will begin the offensive on 9 June toward the south-southeast as ordered in Directive No. 13.
e. The 9th Army will advance southward toward the Marne. It is to be augmented as soon as possible by the XVI Army Corps (including the SS formations and the SS Death's Head Division assigned to it). Strong reserves must. back up the point where the two Army Groups join.
d. I reserve to myself the decision as to the later objective of the 9th Army and as to whether the latter is to be left with Army Group B or assigned to Army Group A.
4. The mission of the Air Force, in addition to what has been laid down In I1eeti77sar. asl, ollows:
a. .To support the concentric attack against the flanks of the main enemy. forses facing Army Group B.
b. To keep under observation and strong fighter sover the coastal strip on the right flank of Army Group B and the region southwest of the Bresle sector.
*. To assist in the attack by Army Group A at the focal point.
signed: Adolf Hitler
_
- 102 - The Fuebrer and Supreme Commander Fuebrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 14.June 19k0
WFA/Abt. L Nr. 33083/10 G.Chefs. No. 2 of six copies
Top; secret
Directive No. 15
1. The enemy is evacuating the region of Paris under the impact of our attakis uon his crumbling fronts, and has also begun to evacuate the fortress-triangle Epinal-Metz-Verdun behind the Maginot line. Paris has been declared an open city by means of posters.
A general retreat of the main forces of the Frenh Army to positions across the Loire is not out of the question.
2. The ratio of power and the condition of the French Army permit us to pursue two objectives at the same time from now on.
a.1 To prevent the enemy forees, retreating from the Paris region or standing at the Lower Seine, from establishing a new front.
be To destroy the enemy forces in front of Army Groups A and C, and to bring about the collapse of the Maginot line.
3. Therefore, with regard to further operations of the Army, I order the following:
a. The enemy forces at the Lower Seine and in the Paris region are to be vigorously pursued by pushing the right wing of the Army along the coast in the direction of the Loire estuary, and then by turn- ing from the region of Chateau-Thierry towards the Loire above Orleans. Paris is to be occupied with strong forces as soon as possible. The naval bases of Cherbourg and Brest, also Lorient and St. Nazaire are to be captured.
b. The forces at the center, up to about the region of Chalons, are to continue in the general direction of Troyes, for the time being; their tank and motorized divisions are to be pushed in the general di- rection of the Langres plateau.
The infantry divisions will reach the region northeast of Romilly- Troyes next. Preparations are to be made for using them later at the Middle Loire.
c. The balance of the Army forces will continue their present missions: To destroy the enemy in the fortified regions of northern France, to cause the collapse of the Maginot line, and to prevent the retreat toward the southwest of the forces deployed there.
d. The Saarbrueeken assault group will begin the offensive through the Maginot line on 14 June, in the general direction of Lune- ville. The offensive at the Upper Rhine is to be undertaken as early as possible.
f. The Air Force will have the following missions:
a, To keep the speedy army advance upon the Loire moving with air 'attacks. At the same time the advancing troops are to be escorted
- 103 - by antiaircraft artillery and protected against air attacks.
To prevent the escape of the enemy by sea by smashing harbors ard ship- ping at the northern French ports.
b. The enemy's retreat in front of Army Groups A and C is to be retarded, the focal point being in front of the tanks on the right wing of Army Group A.
Any enemy rail transports running southwest toward and beyond the Neufehateau-Belfort line are to be prevented.
Simultaneously the breakthrough of Army Group C through the Maginot lie is to be supported.
Antiaircraft artillery is to facilitate the attack by the right wing of Army Group A, especially the penetration of the French fortifications.
signed: Adolf Hitler
Th*eArmed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters
WFA/Abt. L . 33099/If0 A.Kdos.Chefs. 19 June 194'f0
No..2 of six copies
1. The Fuehrer wishes to have only. arts of the'Von Kleist Group, along with the mountain divisions, take part in the advance toward Lyon and Bourg.
The other fast troops of the Von Kleist Group are to be used in front of the right wing of Army Group B in order to capture quickly the coast as far as the Spanish border.
2. In about 2 or 3 days the Italians intend to attack the Alp front across the small St. Bernhard, -the Col Maddalena, and north and vest of Ventimiglia.
This Italian operation is to be assisted by having the force mentioned in section 1 turn on Grenoble and Chambery.
3. Except for this relief attack in the rear of .the French Alp front, the green line shown in the annex (TrJN.: not ineluded), defining the French area to be occupied, is not to be crossed for the time being.
4. The Fuehrer intends to stage a big parade in Paris. The time has not yet been set. Troop concentrations for this parade in the environs of Paris must not, however, hamper fast occupation of the areas intended
- 104 - for this purpose.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces Righ Command
signed: Keitel
Aimed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters
WFA/Abt. L Nr. 3312if/4O g.Kdos.Chefs. 2 Jul. 1940
No. 2 of five copies
Top secret
Re: Warfare against England
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided:
1. A landing in England ispossible, provided that air superiority can be attained and certainther eessary conditions fulfilled. The .date of commencement is therefore still undecided. All, preparations are to be begun so that the operation can be carried out as soon as possible.
2. The High Commands of the branches of the-Armed Forces are to supply the following information promptly:*
Army: a. Estimate of the strength of the British army in view of the planned objectives. Probable losses, especially of ,equipment, and the expected condition of the army after partial rearmament during the next few months.
b. Possibilities of using artillery from the Continent for additional protection of ship concentrations and transports against British naval forces (in cooperation with the Navy).
avy: a. Analysis of the landing possibilities for large numbers of Armyrtroops (25 to 4O divisions) and antiaircraft units, with a de- scription of the coastal topography of southern England and of the British naval and land defenses.
b. Statement as to which routes and what equipment could be used for troops and supply transports on such a scale with adequate safety.
It should be kept in mind that a landing on a broad front will probably facilitate the further penetration of the Army
*, 'Information as to the type and amount of shipping space available and the time required to make it ready.
- 105 - Air Force:, a. 'Opinion on whether and when we -can reckon with achieving desisive air superiority. In this connection information of the comparative strength of the British and the German Air"orses.
b. Which airborne forces can be used to support the operation and in what way. Transport planes should be assembled for this purpose, regardless of all .other tasks.
3. The High Commands should jointly examine all organizational ques- tions pertaining to the landing troops arising from the necessity to limit and utilize the naval and air transport space in the best manner possible.
The forces to be landed should be greatly superior in numbers to the British troops, especially as regards tanks; they should'also be largely motorized and protected by strong antiaircraft forces.
4. All preparations must bear in mind that the plan to invade England has not taken any sort of definite shape as yet, and that these are only prerations for a possible operation. As few' people as possible shoul e informed of these plans.
The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command
signed: Keitel
Armed Forces High Command Berlin, 10 July 19140
WFA/Abt. L Nir. 33137/40 gQ..Chefs. No. 4 of nine copies
Top secret
Re: Artillery protection. for transports to Britain.
In pursuance of the requested analysis of artillery protection for transports to Britain (OKW/WFA/ Abt. L Nr. 33 124/40 g. KChefs. Para- graph 2b), the Fuehrer has ordered:
All preparations are to be made to provide strong frontal and flank ar- tillery protection for the transportation and landing of troops in case of a possible crossing from the coastal strip Calais-Cape Gris Nez - Boulogne. All suitable available heavy batteries are to be employed for this purpose by the Army High Command and the Naval High Command under the direction of the Naval High Command and are to be installed in fixed positions in conjunction with the Todt Organization.
The Commander in Chief, Ai' will assume responsibility for protection against air attacks upon batteries under construction or already built. He will see to it that the antiaircraft batteries assigned to this area,
- 106 - insofar as their, position will permit, can also be employed for defense against targets at sea.
Arrangements for coordinated fire control will be in the hands of the Commander in Chief, Navy, who is to report at an early date concerning the state and probable duration of preparations.
The duties assigned to the Army High Comamad in Paragraph 2b of the above order are cancelled.
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signed.:. Keitel
The Fuebrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 16 July 19+0
0KW/WA/L Nr. 33 i60/ko g.Kdos. No. 4 of seven copies
Top secret
Directive No. 16
Re: Prepaations for a landing operation a ainst Britain.
Since Britain, despite her hopeless military situation, still shows no indications of a desire to come to terms with us, I have decided to pre- pare an invasion, and, if necessary, to carry it out.
The aim of this operation is to eliminate the British homeland as a ,base for continuing the war against Germany, and, in case of need, to occupy it completely.
Therefore I order the following:
1. The landing is to be carried out as a surprise crossing on a broad front, pupsifrom Ramagate to the region west of the Isle of Wight. Units ofi the Air Force will act as artillery and units of the Navy as engineers.
The question as to whether it will be useful to carry out limited ac- tions before the general crossing, as for instance, the occupation of EiTesle of Wight or of Cornwall, is to be considered from the point of view of each branch of the Armed Forces, and opinions on this question are to be reported to me, I reserve the decision for myself.
Preparations for the whole operation are to be concluded by mid-August.
107 - 2. Part of these preparations will be to create such conditions as will make a landing in. Britain possib a:
a. The British air force must be subdued morally and physi- cally to such an extent that it will be unable to offer any worthwhile resistance to the German crossing.
b. Mine-free passages are to be created.
s. The Strait of Dover, as well as the western entrance of the Channel, is to be tightly sealed off with mine 'fields on both flanks, at about the line from Alderney to Portland.
d. The forward area of the coast is to be dominated and sealed off by strong forces of coastal artillery.
e. It is desirable to tie down the British naval forces uast before the crossing in the North Sea as well as in the Mediterranean the latter by the Italians)'. Even now we must try to damage as much as possible the vessels of the British naval forces now in home waters by means of air and torpedo attacks.
3. Command organization and preparations:
Of the forces which are to be employed, each Commander in Chief will lead those belonging to his particular branch, under my or- ders and according to my general directives.
Commncing 1 Aug. the operations staffs of the Commander in Chief, Army, the Commander in Chief, Navy, and the Commander in Chief,. Air are to be' located within a radius not greater than 50 km. from my headquarters (Ziegenberg)
It seems to me advisable that the nucleus operations staffs of the Commander in Chief, Army and the Commander in Chief, Navy should be lo- cated together in Giessen.
The Commander in Chief, Army will therefore have to employ the staff of an Army Group for the command of the landing armies.
The operation will bear the code name "Seeloewe".
The various branches of the Armed Forces will have the following duties. in connection with preparing and carrying out the operation:
a. Amy will draw up, first of all, the operational and crossing plans Iforall formations of the first wave to be transported. The antiaircraft artillery sailing with the first wave will remain su- bordinate to the Army (to the various crossing units) until the task of protecting and supporting the ground troops san be differentiated from that of protecting the debarkation points and air bases to be oc- cupied.
Further, the Army will apportion the transports among the various cross- ing units and will select the points of embarkation and debarkation in agreement with the Navy.
b.* Na : will procure the transports and transfer them in accordance withie wishes of the Army, with due regard for navigational considerations, into the various embarkation areas. As far as possible, vessels of the vanquished enemy countries are to be utilized.
A naval staff to supply needed expert advise will be assigned to each
- 108 - point of embarkation along with escort vessels and protecting forces.
Together with the air forces assigned for protection, the Navy will de- fend the entire Channel crossing on both flanks. Command authority dur'- ing the crossing will be defined in a later order.
Further, it will be the duty of the Navy to direct the setting up of coastal artillery in a uniform manner, i.e., all batteries, both of the Army and the Navy, suitable for fighting against targets at sea; and to organize over-all fire control.
The greatest possible number of extra-heavy artillery pieces is to be assigned as soon as possible to protest the crossing and to screen the flanks against enemy action from the sea. For this railway guns are to be utilized also (including all available captured ordnance),, and are to be installed with railroad turntables. Those batteries specifisally designated for firing on targets on the British mainland (K 5 and K 12) are not to be included.
Apart from this, the available extra-heavy platform-gun batteries are to be built into concrete fortifications facing the Strait of Dover in such a manner that they will be able to withstand the heaviest air at- tacks and hence can dominate. the Strait continually under all conditions, within the limits of their range. The technical work will be the obli- gation of the Todt Organization.
c. The duties of the Air Force will be:
(1) To prevent interference by the enemy air force.
(2) To destroy coastal fortifications which could affect debarkation points, to break up the initial resistance of enemy ground troops, and to disperse oncoming reserves during our advance. Toward this end the closest collaboration between individual formations of the Air-Force and invasion units of the Army will be necessary.
(3) Also to destroy important highway arteries suitable for bringing up enemy reserves, and to attack approaching naval forces, of the enemy at a long distance from the crossing sites.
I request suggestions for the use of parachute and airborne troops. In this connection, the Air Force, in conjunction with the Army, is to test-whether it would not be practical at the beginning to keep para- chute and airborne troops as a reserve, to be committed at once in case of need.
i. The preparations required for establishing communications be- tween France and the British mainland are to be handled by the Chief, Armed Forces Signal Communications0
The completion of the remaining 80 km. of the East Prussia cable is to be arranged in cooperation with the Navy.
5. 'I request the several Commanders in Chief to submit to me as quickly as possible the following:
a. Plans of the Navy and Air Force for the completion of preparations for crossing the Channel (see paragraph 2).
b. Details of the installation of coastal batteries (Navy).
*, A general estimate of the tonnage to be assigned and the
- 109 - manner of its preparation and outfitting. What participation of civilian authorities will be required. (Navy).
d. Organization of air protection at the points of assembly for invasion troops and transports (Air Force),
e. Crossing and operational plans of the Army; the composi- tion and equipment of the first invasion wave.
f. Organization and plans of the Navy and Air Force for the actual crossing, for its protection, and for the support of the landing.
g.: Proposals concerning eommitment of parachute and airborne troops, as well as those concerning assignment and command of the anti- aircraft artillery, after a sufficient amount of British soil has been won (A.r Force).
h. Proposal for locating the operations staffs of the Com- mander in Chief, Army and the Commander in Chief, Navy.
i. Attitude of Army, Navy, and Air Force as to whether small- scale actions are considered advisable before the main landing, and if so,' of what sort.
3. Proposal of Army and Navy regarding command authority, durig the crossing.
signed: Adolf Hitler
The Fuebrer and Supreme Commander " Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 1 Aug. 1940
0KW/WFA/L Nr. 33 210/40 AKdos.Chefs. No. 2 of ten copies
Top secret
Directive No. 1
For the Conduct of Air and Naval Warfare against Britain
In order to establish conditions favorable to the final conquest of Britain, I intend to continue the air and naval war against the British homeland more intensively than heretofore.
With this end in mind I issue the following orders:
1. The German Air Force is to overcome the British Air Force with all means at its disposal and in the shortest possible time. The attacks are to be directed primarily against the planes themselves, their ground
- 110 - installations, and their supply organizations, also against the aircraft industry, including plants producing antiaircraft materiel.
2. After we have achieved temporary or local air superiority, the air war is to be carried on against harbors, especially against estab- lishments connected with food supply, and also against similar establish- ments in the interior of the country.
Attacks on the harbors of the south coast are to be undertaken on the smallest scale possible, in view of our own intended operations.
3. On the other hand, air attacks on warships and merchantmen of the enemy may be diminished, unless particularly advantageous targets offer themselves, unless additional effects would be achieved in connection with actions described in paragraph 2, and unless such attacks are neces- sary to train crews for future operations.
4. The intensified air war is to be carried out in such a manner that the Air Force can be called upon at any time to support naval operations against advantageous targets in sufficient strength. Also, it is to stand by in force for operation "Seeloewe".
5. I reserve for myself the decision on retaliatory terror attacks.
6., The intensified air war may comence on or after 5 Aug. The exact time is to be selected by the Air Force itself according to the weather, after preparations have been completed.
The Navy is authorized to begin the projected intensified naval warfare at the same time.
signed: Adolf Hitler
__ ~ _
- 111 - The Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters 1 Aug. 1940 WFA,/Abt. L I. Nr. 33189/40 g.K.Chefs'. No. 2 of eight copies
Top secret
Re: Operation "Seeloewe"
Following the report of the Commander in Chief, Navy of 31 Jul. to the effect that preparations for operation "Seeloewe" cannot be completed prior to 15 Sep. 190, the Fuehrer decided as follows:
1. Preparations for "Seeloewe" are to be-continued, and also the Army and the Air Force should try to be ready by 15 Sep.
2. 1 or at the most 2 weeks after the beginning of the large- scale air offensive against England, which can start approximately on 5 Aug., the Fuehrer will decide, depending on the results of this battle, whether operation "Seeloewe" is still to take place this year or not.
3. If a decision is made against execution of "Seeloewe" in September, nevertheless all preparaions should continue, but in a form which will not damage seriously the German economy through paralyzing inland shipping.
4. The operational preparations should for the time being continue on the previously planned wide scope, in spite of the objection of the Navy that it can safeguard only a narrow strip (westward about as far as Eastbourne).
5. The orders in Directive 16, No. 3, second paragraph remain in effect, but transfer to the vicinity of Fuehrer Headquarters should take place only shortly before the operations, and parts of. the Army High Command can remain in the previous Army headquarters.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signed: Keitel
The Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters
WFSt/L Nr.33229/1O g.K.Chefs. 16 Aug. 1910
No. 2 of eight copies
Top secret
Re: Operation "Seeloewe"
- 112 - 1. The Fuehrer decided on 15 Aug. as follows:
a. Preparations for operation "Seeloewe" are to be continued for 15 Sep., including assembly of all necessary naval personnel.
The decision concerning execution of the operation will be reserved un- til the over-all situation becomes clearer.
b. Preparations for a landing in Lyme Bay are to be discontinued because of the lack of sufficient defense possibilities.
The ships are to be assembled along the coast between Ostend and Le Havre, so as to avoid concentration in a few harbors close to the enemy coast, and confuse the enemy's picture of our landing plans.
c. Preparations must be made in such a way that they do not pre-' elude a crossing. on a narrow front, if this should be ordered on a week's notice; on the other hand it should remain possible to cross once in the direction.of Brighton, without further reinforcement of heavy equipment.
2. On the basis of this Fuehrer decision, the Commanders in Chief, Army and Air are asked to make suggestions for the use of paratroopers and airborne troops, and especially to express an opinion as to whether these should be used together with the first landing wave, or whether they should be kept back as a reserve, depending on the situation in the Channel.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signed: Keitel
The Armed Forces High Command Fuebrer Headquarters 3 Sep l1940 wFS~t/L Nr3? 33235/4Q g.xdos.Chefe . .No. 2 of eight copies
Top secret
Re: Operation "Seeloeve"
For the time being the following dates have been decided upon for the preparations for operation "Seeloewe 1 :
1. The earliest date for departure of the transport fleets is.20 Sep., and for S day (day of the landing) 21 Sep.
2. The order for the start of the operation will be issued on S minus 10 day, in other words probably on 11 Sep. 1940. 3. The final decision on S day and S time (the beginning of the first landing) will be made at the latest at noon on S minus 3 day.
- 113 - 4. All preparations must be made in such a manner that the operation may be stopped as late as 2 hours before S time.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signed: Keitel
The Armed Forces High Command Berlin, 14 Sep. 1940
WFSt/Abt. L Hr. 33287/40 g.K.Chefs. No. 2 of eight copies
Top secret
At the :conference with the Commanders in Chief of the branches of the Armed Forces. on 14 Sep. the Fuebrer made the following decisions;
1. Operation "Seeloewe"
a. The beginning of the operation is being postponed further. A new order (referring to OKW/WFSt/Abt.L r. 33255i0 g .Kdos.Chefs. of 3 Sep. 1940, number 2) will be issued on 17 Sep. All preparations are to be continued.
b. The.Air Force is to carry out the attack on British long-range batteries firing on the French coast, as soon as preparations to that effect are concluded.
co Under these circumatances it is not necessary at this time fully to carry out the special measures provided for the coastal areas (OKW Hr. 2332/10 g.K.Chefs. Abw.III(C) of 29 Aug. 19 1 0,Translator's note: hot included.) However, measures for defense against spies and for de- ception purposes are to be intensified according to agreement to be reached between the Armed Forces Intelligence Division and the Army High Command or the corresponding Armed Forces commanders for the various coastal sectors.
2. Air attacks on London
Air attacks on London should be expanded, continuing primarily against important military targets and those vital to the city (including rail- road stations), as long as there are worthwhile targets.
Terror attacks against purely residential sections are to be kept as a last resort, and are not to be used for the time being.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signed: Keitel
- 114 - The Armed Forces High Command Berlin, 19 Sep. 1940
IFSt/Abt. L Nr. 33294/40 g.Kdos.Chefs . No, 2 of eight copies
Top secret
Re: Operation "Seeloewe"
The Fuebrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has made the fol- lowing decisions:
1. Concentration of the transport fleet is to be stopped, insofar as it hasnotlready been completed.
2. The shins assembled in the ports of departure are to be dispersed in such a way that losses from enemy air attacks will be reduced to a minimum. However, it should remain possible to reassemble the ships at the ports of departure on 10 days notice under favorable weather con- ditions.
3. The 10 steamers from the Norway traffic earmarked for operation "Herbstreise"* should be returned to their normal tasks. Six other steamers earmarked for operation "Seeloewe" should be withdrawn over a period of time unnoticeably, and should be used until further notice to speed up supplies for Group XXI.
4. The Commander in Chief, Air is to increase the air defenses in the invasion ports to the greatest possible extent.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signed: Keitel
Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters 20 Sep. 1940
WFSttAbt. L. Nr. 33 298 ag.K.hefs.(I) No. 3 of six copies
Top secret
Following the request of the Rumanian government for German training personnel and demonstration troops, the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has made the following decisions:
1. The Army and the Air Force are to send military missions to Rumania. On the outside it will be made to appear that it is the task of these
* Landing on the coast of Scotland planned as a diversionary operation in connection with "Seeloewe".
- 115 - missions to aid Rumania, our friend, in organizing and training her armed forces.
2.. The real tasks, which must not be apparent either to the Rumanians or to our own troops, are as follows:
a. To proteet the oilfields from attacks of a third power and from destruction.
b. To enable the Rumanian armed forces to carry out certain tasks according to a definite plan drawn up in the interest of Germany.
c* To make preparations for operations by German and Rumanian forces from Rumania in ease we are forced into a war with Soviet Russia.
3. Thus the following obtains for the work and the composition of the Army mission and the strength of the demonstration troops:
a. For the direst protection of the oilfields (sabotage, uprisings) German troops should be use only in special cases. This is rather the task of the Rumanians. The cooperation with the special forces which are already in the oil fields should not be apparent on the outside.
b. The German "demonstration troops" should consist at first of one motorized division reinfkr ced y s. To what extent they will be reinforced later, ostensibly "for training purposes", remains to be seen.
e. Training is to be carried out in such a way that some of the Rumanian forces wil be trained as "model divisions" for later use on our side. The Rumanian command is to be influenced to give these forces preference as to personnel and equipment. This is for the present more important than influencing the entire army, for example by training the officer corps, giving courses ai ols, etc.
d. The tasks of members of the military mission in preparation for larme-scale troop concentrations should be camouflaged.
4. The task of the Air Force mission consists primarily in protecting the oil fields against air Tauks by means of demonstration troops, and in training the Rumanian air force for this urpose and, insofar as pos- sible, for later combined operations with the umanian army. Thereafter it is important to make preparations for using strong German forees in possible later operations based in Rumania. The Commander in Chief, Air will decide in accordance with the over-all situation what forces will be available for the military mission.
5. In order to regulate questions concerning the military missions of both branches of the Armed Forces which have to be decided on the spot, a common commander will be appointed by special order. In other re- spects the military missions 'will be directly subordinate to their high commands. In order to establish close liaison with the German Legation, the Army and the Air Force are requested to make their attaches mimnmers of the military missions,
6. The Armed Forces High Command (Intelligence Division) in cooperation with the Foreign Office will instigate discussions with Hugarian auth- orities for the purpose of transporting German forces through Tunga:ian territory..
7. The Commanders in Chief of the Army and the Air Force are requested to report when the military missions for Rumania will be available, and
- 116 - in what strength.
8. Officers who are to be sent for purposes of investigation or as advanced cowmnd are to be reported to the Armed Forces High Command, which will obtain the approval of the Fuehrer and will ask the Foreign Office to announce these officers,
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signed: Keitel
____
Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters 12 Oct. 194O WFt/Abt. L (I r 33 3180 s..Chefs.- No. 6 of fourteen copies
Top secret
1. The Fuehrer has decided that preparations for the landing in Britain are to be kept up from now until spring, merely as a means of exerting political and military pressure.
Should a landing in Britain be decided on again in the spring or early summer of 1941, the required degree of readiness will be ordered. at the proper time. Until then the military dispositions for a later landing are to be further improved,
2. All measures connected with relaxing readiness for combat are to be ordered by the High Commands according to the following principles:
a. The British are to be left under the impression that we are still preparing a landing on a wide front.
b. At the same time the strain on the German economy is to be eased.
3. This, in detail, means that:
Army:
The units earmarked for operation "Seeloewe" will be available for proposed new formations or other assignment. However, we must avoid allowing it to become noticeable that the coastal areas are less heavily garrisoned. Navy:
The preparations in personnel and materiel are to be eased in such a manner that both personnel and tonnage, especially tugboats and
- 117 - fishing steamers, will be returned, insofar as is necessary, to the tasks of naval warfare and the public economy. All movenents of shipping con- nected with the relaxation of combat readiness are to be carried out ir- conspicuously, and extended over a considerable period of time. They are to be utilized as far as possible for the transportation of goods or captured material.
4. The High Commands are requested to report by 20 Oct. to the Armed Forces High Command all measures taken in connection with relaxing the preparations for operation "Seeloewe", as well as the length of time which will be required to restore ten-day readiness.
The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command
signed: Keitel
The Fuebrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 12 Nov. 19I40
WFSt/Abt.L(I) Nr. 33 356/itO g.K.Chefs. No. 2 of ten copies
Top secret.
Directive No. 18
The preparatory measures of the High Commands for the conduct of the war in the near future are to be in accord with the following guiding principles:
1. With reference to France:
The aim of my policy toward France is to cooperate with that country in the manner most effective for the future conduot of the war against Britain. For the time being she will play the role of a "non-belligerent power" which is required to allow German war measures to be taken in the territories under her sovereignty - especially in the African colonies - and, if necessary, must even support these measures by the use of her own means of defense. The chief task of the French is the defensive and offensive protection of their African colonies (West and Equatorial Africa) against Britain and the De Gaulle movement. This task might eventually draw France into full participation in the war against Britain.
The negotiations with France subsequent to my meeting with Marshal Petain are, for the present, - apart from the current work of the Armistice Commission - being conducted exclusively by the Foreign Minis- try in conjunction with the Armed Forces High Command. Detailed in- structions will be issued upon the termination of these discussions.
- 118- 2. Spain and Portugal:
Political measures have already been initiated to bring about the early entry of Spain into the war, The aim of German intervention on the Iberian peninsula (code name "Felix"), wuiTf'6T-to drive the British frcn the Western Mediterranean. To achieve this, the following is to be ac- complished:
a. Gibraltar is to be taken and the Strait closed.
b. The British are to be prevented from gaining a foothold at any other spot on the Iberian peninsula or on the islands in the Atlantis.
The preparation and execution of this operation is planned as follows:
First period:
a. Reconnaissance squads (officers in civilian clothes) will com- plete. the preparations required for the action against Gibraltar and for taking over airports.
With regard to secrecy and cooperation with the Spanish, the safety measures laid down by the Chief, Armed Forces Intelligence Division (Ausland Abwehr) are to be followed.
b. Special units of the Armed Forces Intelligence Division, in secret cooperation with the Spaniards, will handle security measures in the Gibraltar region against British attempts to extend defenses farther inland or to detect and interfere with our preparations prematurely.
c. The units assigned to this task will be assembled at a con- siderable distance from the Franco-Spanish border. Their destination is not to be prematurely disclosed to the troops. They will receive advance notice 3 weeks prior to erossing the Franco-Spanish frontier (but only after preparations have been completed regarding the islands in the Atlantic).
In view of the limited capacity of the Spanish railways, the Army will assign primarily motorized units to this operation, so that the rail- roads can be utilized for supplies.
Seond priod:
a. Air.Force units, tipped off by observers in Algeciras, will at a favorable moment stage an air attack from French bases upon the British warships in the harbor of Gibraltar and will land at Spanish airports after the attack.
b. Shortly thereafter the units assigned to Spain will cross the Franco-Spanish border.
Trhird priod:
a. Attack with German troops in order to take Gibraltar.
b. Concentration of troops in order to invade Portugal in case the British should gain a foothold there. The units earmarked for this assignment will march into Spain close on the heels of the forces de- signated for Gibraltar.
Fourth period:
Support of the Spanish in closing the Strait after the Rock has been
- 119 - 'taken; if necessary, also from Spanish Morocco.
Regarding the strength of the forces for operation "Felix" the following will apply:
The units assigned to Gibraltar must be strong enough to take the Rook, even without Spanish assistance.
In addition, a smaller force will have to stand ready to aid the Spaniards, should the British attempt to land at some other spot on the coast. Such an attempt, however, seems unlikely.
Motorized units, mainly, for the contingency of an entry into Poxtugal are to be provided.
Air Force:
For the air attack on the harbor of Gibraltar forces are to be as- signed in sufficient strength to guarantee good results.
Dive bombers,. in particular, are to be transferred to Spain for the en- suing fight against naval targets and for supporting the attack against the Rock.
Anti-aircraft artillery sufficient for use against ground targets, also, is to be attached to the Army formations.
Navy:
Submarines are to be on hand to combat the British Gibraltar for- ces, and especially to hinder an attempt to put to sea which may be ex- pected after the air attaek.
In cooperation with the Army, the transfer of single coastal batteries is to be prepared for, in order to assist the Sian h in closing the Straits. Italian participation is not being planned on.
The islands in the Atlantic (especially the Canary and the Cape Verde Islas) wil assume greaer importance in the British' as well as in our naval strategy on account of the operation against Gibraltar. The Comander in Chief, Navy and the Commander in Chief, Air are to examine the problem of assisting the Spanish in the defense of the Canary Islands and of occupying the Cape Verde group.
I request also that the problem of occupying Madeira and the Azores be examined, and the advantages and disadvantages for naval and air strat- egy which would result. The conclusions drawn from these investigations are to be submitted to me at an early date.
3. Italian offensive against Egypt:
The employment of German forces will be considered, if at all, only when the Italians have reached Marsa Matruh. Even then primarily the assignment of German air forces is to be considered, if the Italians will put the necessary air base at our disposal.
Preparations of the branches of the Armed Forces for assignment in this or any other Worth African theater of operations are to be made as fol- lows:
- 120 - Army:
An armored division (composed as previously provided for) is to be kept in readiness for employment in North Africa.
German ships in Italian harbors which can be used as transports should be equipped to move the largest possible contingents either to Libya or to Northwest Africa.
Air Force:
Preparations for offensive operations against Alexandria and the Suez Canal, in order to close the latter to British warfare. 4. The Balkans:
The Commander in Chief. Army will make preparations to oscupy continental reece nort o e Aegean Sea from Bulgarian bases, if necessary - uisaking it possible to employ German air force units against targets in the eastern Mediterranean, especially those British air bases which threaten the Rumanian oil fields.
To be equal to any eventuality and to keep Turkey in cheek, plans and transportation calculations should be based on the assignment of an Army Group in the strength of approximately ten divisions. The rail- road running through Yugoslavia cannot be counted on for transporting these forces. In order to shorten the period required for the movement, plans for reinforcing the German military mission in Rumania before very long are to be prepared and submitted to me.
he Commander in Chief Air will., in accordane with prospective Army operations, prepare to assign German Air Force units to the southeastern Balkans and an Air Force signal service unit to the southern border of Bulgaria.
The German Air Force mission in Rumania will be augmented to the extent proposed to me.
Bulgarian requests for arms and ammunition for their army are to be handled in an accommodating way.
5. Russia:
Political discussions have been initiated to.sound out Russia's attitude for the near future. Regardless of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have been ordered verbally are to be continued.
Directives will follow as soon as the Army's basic operational plan has been reported to and approved by me,
6. Landing in the British Isles:
Since changes in the general situation might make it possible or neces- sary to return once more to operation "Seeloewe" in the spring of 1941, the three branches of the Armed Forces are to take pains to improve in every way their plans for such an operation
7. I expect reports of the Commanders in Chief regarding, measures re- ferred to in this directive, After they have been received I shall
- 121 - issue orders concerning the method of execution as well as chronological coordination of the individual actions.
Special precautions are to be taken to safeguard secrecy by limiting the number of those working on the preparations., This refers especially to the enterprise in Spain and to plans concerning the islands in the Atlantic.
signed: Adolf Hitler
Armed Forces High Command Fuebrer Headquarters
WFSt/Abt/ : (I L) Nr. 00 1082/40 g.L2 Ana. 8 Dec. 1940
No. 3 of seven copies
Secret
Reference: 0KW/1FSt. Abt. L (I) Nr. 00 1082/10 g.K. of 4 Dec. 1940,
Re: Bulgaria
1. The Commander in Chief, Air will send 4 officers (in civilian dress) to Bulgaria to gather information.
2. The Commander in Chief, Navy will send 2 officers and I official (in civilian dress) to Bulgaria to determine what aid can be given to Bulgaria in coastal defense.
The branches of the Armed Forces are requested to contact the Intelli- gence Division of the Armed Forces High Command directly regarding the time of departure of the investigating groups.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
by direction
signed: Warlimont
--
- 122 - The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Fuehrer Headquarters 10 Dec. 1940 oW fSt./bt. L Np. 33400/40 g.K.Che. No. 2 of twelve copies
Top secret
Directive No. 19
Operation "Attila"
1. The speedy occupation of the still unoccu ied territory of contin- ental France is o be prepare or operation 'At ila" as a countermea- sure) in case a secession movement should manifest itself in those sections of the French colonial empire dominated at present by General Weygand. It will be important to seize, at the same time, the French home fleet and those portions of the French air force based at home or a a o prevent their joining the enemy.
For military as well as political reasons our preparations are to be concealed, in order to avoid alarming the French.
2. If the occasion arises, the entry is to be effected in the follow- ing manner:
a. Strong motorized units, well protected with anti-aircraft artillery, will push through quickly to the Mediterranean along the courses of the Garonne and Rhone Rivers; they will occupy the harbors as soon as possible (particularly the important naval base Toulon) and cut off France from the sea.
b. The forces stationed on the line of demarcation will march in- to the unoccupied area along the entire front.
The time allowed to elapse between the receipt of orders and their ex-. ecution must be as short as possible. Individual units may be moved up for this purpose right now, but they are not to reveal their intended assignment.
It is unlikely that the French armed forces will put up or anized re- sistance against our entry. Any local resistance encountered istobe broken mercilessly. As a precaution against this contingency and for use against possible trouble* spots, bomber formations of the Air Force, especially dive bombers, are to be on hand.
3. In order to be able to prepare measures to prevent the French fleet from uttin to sea and joining the enemy, the anchorage, aondition, ulnera-i i- yy eite, of each unit must be observed constantly. The Commander in Chief, Navy will issue appropriate orders in conjunction with the Intelligence Division, Armed Forces High Command, making use of the possibilities provided by the Armistice Commission.
The Commanders in Chief,' Navy and Air are to examine how best to seize the French fleet with the cooperation of the occupying forces. The following means especially are to be considered:
a. Blocking harbor exits (particularly at Toulon)
b. Airborne landings
o. Acts of sabotage
- 123 - d. Submarine and air attacks against ships putting to sea. The Commander in Chief, Navy is to decide whether the exemptions accorded to sections of the French fleet contrary to the stipulations of the armistice agreement should be withdrawn, and if so, in what measure this is to be done. I reserve to myself the decision regarding the manner of executing the operation. Offensive actions will be permitted only if the French armed forces offer resistance or it portions of the fleet should put to sea, contrary to German orders. 1f. Seizure of French airports and the portions of the air forces based on them is to be arrange "ectly between the Air Force and the Army. Additional means (e.g., airv'rne landings) are to be utilized. 5. The Commanders in Chief are to report to me (in writing, through the Armed Forces High Command) their plans regarding operation "Attila"; this has already been done by the Army., These reports are to specify the period of time which will be required between the receipt of orders and their execution. 6. Preparations for operation "Attila" require the greatest degree of secrecy.
The Italians must not learn anything about our preparations and inten-. tions.
signed: Adolf Hitler
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Berlin, 10 Dec. 19k0 of the Armed Forces No. 3 of ten copies WFSt/Abt.L (IL) Hr. 33392/40 Gk.Chefs. Subject: Assignment of German-air force units to fight from Italian bases. (Special Operation "Mittelmeer")
Top secret
In agreement with our allies, German air units amounting to approximately a wing are to be assigned as quickly as possible (for a limited time only) to tight from Mediterranean bases in southern Italy.
Their most important mission is to attack the British fleet, especially in the harbor of Alexandria, and to combat enemy traffic through the Suez Canal and through the strait between Sicily and the North African coast. However, the critical situation in the Mediterranean may make it neces- sary to use them in the Ionian or the Aegean Seas also. Therefore their
- 121 - assignment is to be arranged in accord with the Italian High Command.
Since Germany is not in a state of war with Greece, no hostile actions may be undertaken directly against the latter for the time being.
signed: Adolf Hitler
LL_ ___
The Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters 11 Dee. 1940 Top secret No. 2 of twelve copies
Re: Operation "Felix"
Operation "Felix" will not be carried, out as the political conditions no longer obtain.
The investigations now proceeding are to be fully completed. All other intended meesures will not tale place; preparations which have been started are to be postponed.
The German batteries which were to be sent for the reinforcement of the Spanish islands and coast are not to be delivered.
signed: Keitel
_
The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Fuebrer Headquarters 13 Dec. 194 0 OBW/WFSt/Abt. L Hr'. 33 106/40 gK.Chefs. No. 9 of twelve copies
Top secret
Directive No. 20
Operation "Marita"
1. The outcome of the battles in Albania is still uncertain. In view of the dangerous situation in Albania it is particularly important to
- 125 keep the British from establishing an air base under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be a threat especially to Italy, as well as to the Rumanian oil fields.
2. My plan is therefore as follows:
a. To set up a gradually increasing force in southern Rumania during the coming months.
b. When favorable weather begins, probably in March, to send this force to occupy the northern Aegean coast by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland (operation "Marita"). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected.
3. The following should be kept in mind in assembling the force:-
a. The 16th Panzer Division, arriving in December will become part of the military mission, the tasks of which are unchanged thereby
b. Subsequently a force of approximately 7 divisions is to be transferred to southern Rumania. Sufficient engineer forces for prepar- ing the Danube crossing can be integrated into the transports of the 16th Panzer Division (as "demonstration troops"). The Commander in Chief, Army will request my decision at the proper time concerning their assignment at the Danube.
c. Preparations should be made to transort additional troops until the entire force intended for operation 'Marita" has been assembled (total of 24 divisions).
d. The Air Force must provide air protection for the force being assembled, and prepare command posts and supply installations on Rumanian soil.
1. Operation "Marita" itself should be prepared on the following basis:
a. The first objective of the operation is to occupy the Aegean coast and Salonika valley. It may become necessary to continue the at- tack via Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth.
b. The Bulgarian army will be in charge of flank protection to- ward Turkey, but in addition German troops should be held in readiness as reinforcements.
c. It is uncertain whether other Bulgarian forces will participate in the attack.
Likewise it is not possible to predict the Yugoslav attitude at the pres- ent time.
d. It will be the task of the Air Force to support the army ad- vance effectively, eliminate the enema3Foice, and insofar as possible occupy British bases on Greek islands by means of airborne landings.
e. It will be decided later to what extent the Italian armed forces are to participate in operation "Marita", and how the operations should be coordinated.
5. The great political consequences on the Balkans of the military preparations require careful planning of all such measures by the High Commands.
- 126 - The Armed Forces High Command will report the transport of troops through Hungary and their arrival in Rumania stb explaining them at first as reinforsements of the military mission n Rumania.
Conferences with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which might give indi- cations of our plans, as well as notification of the Italians, are sub- ject to my approval in each case. The same applies to the dispatch of scouting missions and advance commands.
6. After operation "Marita" it is planned to withdraw the forces used for new assignments.
7. I expect reports from the Commanders in Chief concerning their plans; the Army has already reported. Exact timetables for the planned preparations should be submitted to me, as well as plans for recalling men from the armament industry, insofar as necessary (organization of new furlough divisions).
signed: Adolf Hitler
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuebrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 18 Dee. 1940
1 OW/WFSt/Abt.L(I) Nr. 33 08/J0 g Chefs. No. 4 of nine sopies
Top secret
Directive No. 21
Operation "Barbarossa"
The German Armed Forces must be ready to crush Soviet Russia in a rapid cam i , even before the termination ofethe war with Britain operation arB~ibaroossa"),
,The yArmwill have to assign all available units to this task, with the reservation that the occupied countries must be protected against sur- prise attacks.
The Air Force will have to release forces for the support of the Army in Lheeeast-ern campaign in such numbers that we can expect ground oper- ations to be concluded rapidly, and the East German area will suffer as little as possible through enemy air attacks. This formation of a focal point in the East is limited only by the necessity of keeping the entire combat and arsenal area which we control adequately protected against enemy air raids, and of ensuring that the offensive operations against Britain, particularly against her supply lines, do not come to a stand- still.
The focal point for the Nav's operations will definitely remain
- 127 - Britain, even during a campaign in the East,
If the occasion arises, I shall give the order for delp nmt against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended start fo orations. Prep- arations which require a longer period, unless they have already been started, are to be commenced immediately and brought to a 0/onclusion be- fore 15 May 1941.
However, it is of decisive importance that the intent to attack should not become perceptible.
Preparations by. the High Commands are to be made on the following basis:
I. General plansri's
The bulk of the Russian Army deployed in western Russia is to be de- stroyed in daring operations with deep penetrations of tank spearheads; no units should be permitted to remain intact and retreat into the wide Russian spaces.
Then, in fast pursuit, a line has to be reached from which the Russian air force is no longer able to attack German Reich territory. The final aim of the operation is to erect a barrier against Asiatic Russia at a general line from the Volga to Archangel. Thus, if necessary,the Air Force can eliminate the last industrial region remaining in Russian hands, in the Urals.
As these operations progress> the Russian Baltic fleet will soon lose its bases and thus cease to be effective.
II. Probable allies and their 'tasks:
A. At the flanks of our op rations we can count upon the active participation of Rumania and Finland in the war on Soviet Russia.
At the proper time the Armed Forces Iigh Command will arrange the manner in which the armed forces of both the Be countries will be placed under German command in this task.
B. It will-be the task of Rumani, to tie down the enemy in co- operation with our forces to be deplo te1here, and also to perform auxiliary services in the rear areas.
C. Finland will have to cover the de loyment of the German Northern Group parts of the XXI Group), comng from Norway, and to op- erate in conjunction with this unit. Finland will also have the task of eliminating Hangoe.
D. The possibility of using the Swedish ilroads and highways for deploying the German Northern Group can be r koned with by the start or operations at the latest.
II. Executipon of the ogperaton:
A. AM (in approval of its plans as reported to me):
In the area of operation, which is divided b the Pripet 'Marshes into a southern and a northern part, the focal int is to be formed in the northern part. Two army groups are to be provided for this purpose.
It will be the task of the Southern Army Group (in the center off the
- 128 - ~L~HiS~ entire front) advancing with especially powerful tank and motorized for- ces from the area around and north of Warsaw, to rout the enemy in White Russia. In this way it must be made possible for strong bodies of the fast units to wheel to the north in order to destroy the enemy forces fighting in the Baltic area, in cooperation. with the army group operat- ing from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad. Only after assuring the performance of this most important task, which must be followed by the capture of Leningrad and Kx'onstadt, are offensive oper- ations to be continued for the occupation of the important center of communications and war production, Moscow.
Only an unexpectedly quick collapse of the Russian power of resistance could justify the simultaneous pursuit of both aims.
The most important task of the XXI Group remains the protection of Norway. even during te operations in thie Eas. The forcies available in excess of those needed for that task are to be assigned at first in the north (mountain corps) in order to protect the Petsamo region and its ore mines, and also the Oulu-Petsamo highway; afterwards they are to advance against the Murmansk railway together with Finnish forces in order to prevent supplies from reaching the Murmansk area by land.
Whether a similar operation can be undertaken with stronger German for- ces (two to three divisions) from the region around ad south of Rovaniemi depends on the willingness of Sweden to put her railroads at our disposal for such deployment.
The bulk of the Finnish Army will have the tasks of taking Hangoe and of tying down as strong Russian forces as possible, corresponding to the progress of the northern German wing, by an attack west of or on both sides of Lake Ladoga.
The army roup assIned south of the Pripet Marshes is to form the f~ocal point in the region of Lublin, in the genera ection of Kiev, in order to penetrate deeply with strong tank formations the flank and rear of the Russian forces and to roll them up along the course of tife Dnieper River.
The German-Rumanian forces on the right flank will have the following tasks:
1. To protect the Rumanian area and therewith the southern flank of the whole operation.
2. To tie down the opposing enemy forces during the offen- sive of the northern flank of the Southern Army group and, as the situ- ation develops, to prevent their orderly retreat across the Dniester River, in concerted attacks with the Air Force.
In the north the aim is to reach Moscow speedily. The capture of this city means a decisive success politically and economically, and, in addition, the elimination of the most important railway junction.
B. Air Force:
Its task will be to paralyze and eliminate, as far as possible, the effectiveness of the lssian air force, and to aid the Army's oper- ations at the focal points, namely at the Central Army group and at the flanks of the Southern y .Group. The Russian railways are, ac- cording to their operational importance, to be out off, or they are to be captured 'at the most important nearby points by daring employment of paratroopers and airborne troops.
- 129 - In order to concentrate the entire striking power upon the enemy air force and on direct support of the Army, the armament industry is not to be attacked during the course of the main operations. Only after the conclusion of the mobile operations may such attacks be considered, par- ticularly against the region of the Urals.
C. Navy:
The Navy, besides defending our coast, will have the task in the operations against Soviet Russia of preventing the enemy naval for- ces from breaking out of the Baltic Sea. When Leningrad has been reached the last base of the Russian Baltic fleet will have been taken, and the fleet will be in a hopeless situation; therefore no major naval operations are to be undertaken previously.
After the elimination of the Russian fleet it will be important to se- cure full freedom of shipping in the Baltic Sea, including the supply lines by sea for the northern flank of the Army (mine sweeping:).
IV. All orders of the Commanders in Chief made on the basis of this di- rective are to be phrased to indicate unequivocally that they concern recautionary measures in case Russia should change her attitude toward us. As few officers as possible are to be informed in the early stages; additional persons are to be initiated as late as possible, and only to the degree required for performance of their individual task. Other- wise we run the risk that the gravest political and military disadvan- tages might ensue if our preparations should become known, the time of which has not even been set.
V. I expect reports from the Coimianders in Chief about their further plans based on this directive
Intended preparations by all branches of the Armed Forces, including the time required for their execution, are to be reported to me through the Armed Forces High Command.
signed: Adolf Hitler
- 130.- The Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters NFSt./Abt.L(I) Nr. 4 011/41 g.K.Chefs. 10 Jan. 1941
No. 3 of 9 copies
Top secret
The Fuehrer decides as follows on 9 Jan. 19+1:
1. Operation "arita"
In accordance with the plans of the Commander in Chief, Army, the Danube can be crossed immediately after it is frozen over by the first wave or parts of it. The pause between the time when the ice melts on the Danube and the time the bridges have been completed will have to be reckoned with.
It is necessary, however, that sufficient forces have arrived in the southern part of Dobrogea (Rumania) and that adequate air.cover is available at the time of the Danube crossing.
2. Operation "Felix"
Preparations are to be discontinued.
3. Preparations for operation "Seeloewe"
Preparations are likewise to be discontinued except for the develop- ment of special equipment and for the purposes of deception.
4. Operation "Attil&b"
It must be possible to carry out this operation on short notice at any time.
During the Air Force operation against Toulon, the harbor should be mined very heavily and the harbor and the heavy coastal batteries cap- tured. For this purpose, naval gunners should be used, if possible on freight-carrying sailing vessels.
Dive bomber units should be held in readiness to prevent operations of the British fleet against Toulon, and long-range fighters should be available for bombing. For the same reason it is important that heavy Army batteries be made available in Toulon soon, since the available' coastal batteries cannot necessarily be counted upon.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signed:, Keitel
_ I__ _I
- 131 - The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters, 11 Jan. 1941 of the Armed Forces No. 2 of thirteen copies OKW/FST/Abt.L Nr. 44oy811l g.K.Chefs.
Top secret
Directive No. 22.
German Participation in the Mediterranean Operations
For strategic, political, and psychological reasons the Mediterranean situation, where Britain is employing superior forces against our ally, requires German assistance.
Tripolitania must be held and the threatened collapse of the Albanian front must be prevented. Not only that, but the Army Group commanded .by Cavallero must be made capable of going over to the offensive from Albania, tying in with later operations of the 12th Army.
Therefore I order as follows:
1. The Commander in Chief, Army is to organize a defense unit capable of rendering valuable service to our allies in the defense of Tripoli- tania* especially against the British armored divisions. Principles to be followed in setting it up will be given in special orders.
Preparations are to be so timed that this unit can be moved directly following the transports now carrying the Ttalian armored division and motorized division to Tripoli (c. 20 Feb.).
2. The X Air Corps will continue to be based in Sicily. Its main mis- sion will be to attack British naval forces and British communications between the weo tern and eastern Mediterranean.
Furthermore, di?ect assistance is to be rendered.to the Graziani Army Group through oprerations against British ports of discharge and supply bases on the coast of western Egypt and Cyrenaica. The necessary pre- liminary conditions for this are to be created by setting up intermediate landing strips in Tripolitania.
The Italian Government has been requested to declare the region between Sicily and the North African coast a blockade zone, in order to facilitate the task of the X Air Corps and to prevent incidents involving neutral shipping.
3. German units in approximately Army Corps strength are to be pro- vided for and made ready for transportation to Albania**, among them the 1st Mountain Division and tank forces. Transportation of the 1st Mountain Division is to begin as soon as the Armed Forces High Command receives Italian assent. In the meantime, we must consider and clarify with the Italian High Command in Albania the question as to whether additional forces for offensive operations in Albania should be used and could be kept supplied along with the Italian divisions.
The. task of the German 'forces will be as follows:
* Pencilled marginal note: "Sonnenblume".
** Pencilled marginal note: "Alpenveilchen".
- 132 - a. First of all, to serve as a support in Albania against the possibility of new crises.
b. To facilitate a later offensive of the Italian Army Group with the aims of smashing the Greek front at a critical point for a far- reaching operation,and of opening the defile west of Salonika from the rear, thus supporting the frontal attack of List's Army.*
4. The Armed Forces High Command will settle with the Operations Staff of the Italian High Command the command jurisdiction of German troops to be employed in North Africa and Albania, and the restrictions which are to be made regarding the use of these troops.
5. All suitable German transports available in the Mediterranean are to be utilized for transferring forces to Albania, if they are not al- ready engaged in convoy duty to Tripoli. The air transport group of Ju 52's based at Foggia is likewise to be utilized for transporting troops.
It is desirable to finish transporting the bulk of German forces to Albania before beginning to transport the defense unit to Libya (see paragraph 1), since this movement will tie up the bulk of German ton- nage.
signed: Adolf Hitler
The Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters, 13 Jan. 1941 WFSt/Abt.L Nr. 00 9/k41 g. . No. 6 of twelve copies
Secret
Re: Decisions of the Fuebrer in organizational matters
The Fuebrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces issued the follow- ing orders on 8 and 9 Jan. in the presence of the Commander in Chief, Army and the Chief of the Air Force General Staff:
1. Organization of a unit for operations in Libya.
This unit should be able to prevent the advance of British tank-supported motorized forces along and in the vicinity of roads. The Fuebrer believes that for this purpose the unit should have some offen- sive weapons, in addition to defensive weapons and mines. The size of the unit is to be approximately as suggested by the Commander in Chief, Army to the Fuehrer. It should be equipped with the following:
* Pencilled marginal note: "from Bulgaria".
- 133 - a. A small panzer unit, which also has a small number of Panzer III's (with 5 cm. cannon).
b. Motorized reconnaissance.
c. Anti-aircraft guns (the Commander in Chief, Army believes that 1 mixed anti-aircraft detachment is necessary). The Fuehrer be- lieves that the 7.5 cm. cannons in production at Iupp which could be mobilized by means of French captured equipment are especially suitable for the Libyan theater.
d. 4.5 cm. anti-tank guns (or 5 cm. anti-tank guns, since they use. the same ammunition as the Panzer III's).
e. Motorized engineer units with large numbers of mines.
2. Preparations for operations by German forces in Albania.
Preparations are to be made for using at least one corps.
Organization should be as follows, although changes may be made if neces- sary, following the current investigation:
a. One mountain division
b. One other division (perhaps a light infantry division?)
c. A tank unit, including a small number of heavy tanks and a number of Assault guns.
The corps should be able to make a deep break through the Greek front at & suitable point, protected by Italian forces in a flanking position.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signed: Keitel
_ _
- 134 -' The Armed Forces High Command Fuebrer Headquarters, 21 Jan. 1941 WFSt/Abt.L(I) Nr. 44046/4l g.K.Chefs.
No. 2 of thirteen copies
Top secret
Reference: Directive 22 of 11 Jan. 1.911 and OW/WFSt/Abt. L(I) Nr.44011/41 gK. Chefs. of 10 Jan. 191, paragraph 2.
The conferences of the Fuehrer and the Duce on 19 and 20 Jan. showed that it is very desirable to send the forces to Tripoli which are in- tended for there as soon as possible (operation "Sonnenblume"), but that the transfer of German forces to Albania (operation "Alpenveilchen") cannot be carried out as previously planned, since this would make rein- forcement and supply of the Italian divisions impossible, and thus the preparations for the Italian offensive would be badly hampered.
Supplementing and correcting previous orders, the Fuehrer decided as follows:
1. Operation "Sonnenblume":
The forces intended for this purpose are to be transferred to Tripoli as soon as possible (starting about 15 Feb.). They are not to be kept back as reserves, but are to be used in combat there, where it is ex- pected that the British armored divisions will be used and the final resistance will be organized.
The Commander in Chief, Navy is asked to postpone the transports to Albania in favor of preparing the transfer of these forces, ,in agree- ment with the Commander in Chief, Army, so that the necessary transport operation, beginning around 12 Feb., can be carried through in the shortest possible time. If the transport situation permits, in order to accelerate the operation supply transport vessels which are sent ahead should be included in the convoys of Italian troops.
2. Operation "Alpenveilchen":
The orders issued are changed to the effect that for the time being only one mountain division without heavy vehicles is to be provided for Ainia. It is to be equipped as indicated by the results of the investigation taking place at the present time.
The Italian High Command intends to prepare 10 divisions in Albania for combat within 8 to lQ weeks. It will be decided at the beginning of March whether one more German mountain division should be transferred to Albania.
3. Operation "Felix":
Possible changes in political conditions make it necessary to alter previous orders to the effect that preparedness for operation "Felix" should be maintained - insofar as this is still possible.
Therefore the let Mountain Division is not to be counted on for operation "Alpenveilchen" :
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command by direction: signed: Warlimont
- 135 - The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters, 5 Feb. 19+1 of the Armed Forces
OKW/WFSt./Abt. L (I Op.) N. No. 2 of eleven copies L44075/41 G. Chefs.
Top secret
Re: Conduct of German troops in Italian theaters of operation.
The German troops fighting shoulder to shoulder with our allies in the Mediterranean must be conscious of their lofty military and political mission.
They have been selected for the purpose of rendering valuable assistance in both a psychological and a military way, to our allies, who in every theater are struggling against an enemy greatly superior in numbers and who, on account of the limited productive capacity of Italy's war econ- omy, are insufficiently equipped with modern weapons.
Despite their just recognition of their own value and of their accomp- lishments, they must be free from any offensive arrogance. They are to earn the respect and appreciation of our allies solely through their actions, their exemplary discipline, their courage, and military prowess.
Their employment will be regulated by the following principles, as agreed on with the Italian General Staff:
1. The German troops in Libya (and, if occasion arises, also in Albania) will be under the direct tactical command of the Italian com- manders in chiefs of these theaters of operation. Otherwise they will be under the Commander in Chief, Army, who is to keep in touch with the local Italian commanders in chief through liaison officers.
2. They may be committed to battle only in all-German formations at least in divisional strength. Exceptions are permissible only if, in the opinion of the German commander, the German unit is directly threatened before it has been completely assembled, or in the case of such a crisis as could result in the loss of the)entire theater of oper- ations if not dealt with at once.
3. When the German unit is committed according to plan, it must be united in the hands of the German commander and not split up among the various sectors of the front.
f. Should the German unit receive an assignment whose execution would, in the opinion of its commander, lead to a grave failure and thus damage the reputation of the German troops, the German commander has the right and duty to request my decision through the Commander in Chief, Army, notifying the German general attached to the Italian High Command in Rome.
5. The X Air Corps will remain subordinate to the Commander in Chief, Air Force, Reichsmarschall Goering. It is to perform its duties, subject to his instructions, in close cooperation with all competent Italian authorities,
signed: Adolf Hitler
__ _
- 136 - The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Berlin, 6 Feb. 1941
OKW/WFSt/Abt.L (IL Op.) Nr. 44 095/4:L g.K.Chefs,
No. 1 of ten copies
Top secret
Directive No. 23
Guiding principles for the conduct of the war against the British war economy.
1. The effect of our conduct of the war against Britain up to the present:
a. Contrary to our original belief, the best effects in the war against Britain's war economy have been achieved in the losses- due to attacks on her shipping tonnage by our naval and air forces. This ef- fect was further increased by demolishing harbor installations, destroy- ing great stores of supplies and forcing ships to sail in convoy, re- sulting in less effective utilization of shipping space.
We can expect these results to be increased to a considerable extent, since more submarines will be used this year. This can lead to the col- lapse of British resistance before very long.
b. It is more difficult to appraise the effect of air attacks aimed directly against the British armament industry. However, a con- siderable decrease in production can certainly by expected as a conse- quence of the destruction of numerous plants and the resulting disorgan- ization of the armament industry.
c. The least perceptible effect, so far, has been that made upon the morale and the resistance of the British people.
2. Conclusions for our strategy:
The effect Qf naval operations against enemy merchantmen will presumably be increased in te course of the next few months, since we will be us- ing additional submarines and surace orces. On the other hand, the volume of our air attacks cannot be sustained, since commitments in other theaters compel us to withdraw increasingly larger portions of the Air Force from assignment against the British Isles.
Therefore in the future it will be necessary to concentrate the air at- tacks still more and to aim primarily at targets whose destruction will ave results similar to those achieved by our naval warfare. Only thus can a final decision be expected within a reasonable time.
3. Therefore the aim of further operations against the British home- land must be to concentrate all means of naval and air warfare against the enemy's' supplies, to slow down the British aircraft industry and, if possible, to cause further damage to it.
For this purpose the following will be necessary:
a, To destroy the most vital British import harbors, especially harbor installations and ships* at anchor or under construction.
* Handwritten marginal note: "Warships and merchantmen".
- 137 - b. To fight shipping with all means at our disposal, especially inbound traffic.
c. To destroy systematically the nerve centers of plane produc- tion; also the anti-aircraft industry and industries producing powder and explosives.
These missions must be carried out by the forces remaining in this area even ifs strong units of the Air Force are withdrawn to other theaters of operation during the course of the year. k. In carrying-out this task the following will be observed:
a. Sinking merchantmen is more important than combatting enemy warships.
This applies also to the use of aerial torpedoes.
Decrease of enemy tonnage not only intensifies the effects of the all- important blockade, but at the same time it renders any operation.in Europe or Africa more difficult for the enemy.
b. Theattacks on harbor cities and plants of the aircraft in- dustry are to be continually repeated even if good effects have been observed.
c. The enemy's losses and his sense of insecurity are to be in- creased by continuous mining operations.
d. When the British move their shipping to. the smaller ports because of our attacks against the principal import harbors, our attacks must follow, so far as the range of our planes permits.
e. Only if objectives named in paragraph 3. cannot be attacked on account of the weather or other operational conditions, are attacks justified against other armament factories or cities of primary impor- tance to the war economy, as well as against supply depots in the in- terior and communication facilities.
No decisive results can be expected, on the other hand, from systematic terror attacks on residential districts, or operations against coastal. fortifications.
5. Up until regrouping begins for operation "Barbarossa", air and sea attacks are to be steadily increased, if possible, not only in order to cause as much damage as possible to Britain, but also to create the im- pression that we still plan to invade the British Isles this year.
6. Separate orders will be issued for reconnaissance at sea, to pro- vide the necessary cooperation between sea and air warfare.
7. Directive No. 9 of 29 Nov. 1939, tile supplement to Directive No. 9 of 26 May 1940, and Directive No. 17 of 1 Aug. 1940 are cancelled. signed:' Adolf Hitler
- 138 - The Arme'd Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters Nr. 2f'1O87/'l g.Chefs.WFSt/Abt.L(I Op.) 6 Feb. 19'1
No. 2 of thirteen copies
Top secret
Re: Operation "Sonnenbiume."o
The Fuebrer has decided as follows:
1, In order to support the defense operations of the Italians in Libya prior to the arrival of German Army troops, the Air Force has been ordered by the Commander in Chief, Air to carry out the following opera- tions in addition to elimianating the British air forces on Malta:
a. Attack British supply shipments along the North African coast,
b. Combat enemy forces advancing west in Cyrenaica.
c. Smash concentrations of enemy tank and motorized units advanc- ing in western Cyrenaica by using all available forces and the heaviest bombs.
For this purpose, Air Force units with their own fighter and anti-aircraft defenses can be transferred to North Africa, if necessary withdrawing them from warfare against the British Isles. Necessary.shipments should be combined with transport of the defense unit now being transferred, depending on the development of the situation.
2. Furthermore it is the' task of the Air Force, together with the Italian Air Force and the Italian naval commander Catania, to protect German sea transports against attacks by enemy air and naval forces (including loading and unloading operations). The anti-aircraft units .of the German defense unit may be used for this purpose temporarily.
The Commanders in Chief, Navy and Air themselves Nill arrange for pro- viding the transport vessels with anti-aircraft equipment.
In order to avoid mistaking Italian for British' submarines, the German General at the Italian High Command will. ask the Italians to keep the Italian submarines out of this area during these transport operations. Furthermore, he will urge the Italian High Command to give the naval commander Catania greater freedom in using his forces (request of the X Air Corps, in order to facilitate cooperation between the Italian naval forces 'and the German Air Force),
3. The transport of the Army unit designated for Libya is to get under way and be carried out as quickly as possible. For the purpose of combining it later with the fast Italian forces, the unit is to be put under a German commanding general, and, contrary to previous plans, should be reinforced with tanks (I regiment at first). Plans should be made to bring the force up to strength by means of a panzer division reinforced with defensive forces.
The Commander in Chief, Air will prepare to support the operations di- rectly with air forces later.
4. The Commander in Chief, Air is requested to make preparations to
- 139 - supplement sea transports 'to Tripoli by available air transports if neces- sary. Transfer of the 1st Squadron of the III Bomber Group (special duty) from Albania will be arranged with the Italian command. 5. The German General at the Italian High Command is authorized to make the necessary local decisions concerning the order in which the German forces are to be transferred from southern Italy to North Africa, as the situation may require. If necessary the high commands of the branches of the Armed Forces will make liaison officers available, The progress of preparations should be reported. The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command signed: Keitel
Armed Forces. High Command 'Fuehrer Headquarters 'f'1l'I./1 gK. Chefs. WFSt/At. I(I Op. ) 15 Feb. l94fl
No. 3 of 10 copies
Top secret
1. The use of strong Army and Air forces in the Eastern Theater in the spring and summer can induce the British to launch operations against the coasts of the occupied west area or against Norway, in addition to the operations in the Mediterranean and possibly also against Portugal. Daring British action can be expected (Zeebruegge 1917).
In order to prevent British successes, even prestige successes, the Fuebrer has issued the following orders: a. In case of an enemy landing in the occupied west area, the Commander in Chief, West, appointed by the Commander in Chief, Army, is responsible for the defense. The Commander in Chief, Army is asked for an opinion as to whether the Commander in Chief, West will need a special order for this purpose regarding command authority (e.g., defense of the coast). b. The defenses of the German-occupied British' Channel islands are to be reinforced in the dourse of the next two months by means of coastal batteries and similar. units of the Army to such an extent that any landing attempts can be warded off without the aid of bomber units of the Air Force. These measures are to be utilized as deception in connection with operation "Seeloewe".
- 140 - Particulars of the defense measures to be prepared are to be regulated by agreement between the Army and the Navy, with the Army responsible.
c. Reinforcement of the coastal defenses in Norway is to be car- ried out wit great emphasis, asilready discussed with the Commanders in Chief, Army and Navy4 Narvik the arctic coast, and all spots at which the coastal roads could be out by naval forces or small landing operations are especially important. The defenses must be prepared to cope with battleships which the British might use in such operations.
If the Commander in Chief, Navy does not-have the necessary batteries available, the Commander in Chief, Army is requested to furnish captured batteries. Details will be worked out by the Commanders in Chief, Army and Navy, with the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway par- ticpating.
d, In Norway dive bombers, fighters, and long distance fighters are to be stationed permanently to repulse enemy attacms from the air or sea. In order to manage with as few forces as possible and yet have air forces available at all'endangered spots, the ejuestion of establish- ing mixed squadrons or schools and training units might be-investigated.
e. In stationing our naval forces, it should likewise be kept in mind that, beginning in the spring, not the German Bight, but Norway and the coasts of the occupied west area will be the target of enemy naval operations,
2. Mediterranean Theater
If Tripolitania in North Africa should also be lost to the British, the occupation of the French Mediterranean coast, including Corsica, and of Malta will be of increasing importance.
a. Operation "Attila"
In spite of other tasks, it must be possible to carry out this operation at any time, even if later with makeshift means and :on longer notice.
The High Commands are requested to report changes in the preparations for operation "Attila" (especially the airborne command),
b. Corsica
In case of operation "Attila", a surprise occupation of Corsica is also considered: Directives will follow.
-c. Malta
The XI Air Corps (Airborne) is indispensible for such an op- eration.
In order to get a basis for a Fuehrer decision, the Commander in Chief, Air is requested to state whether, from the point of view of the time involved, the Airborne Corps can be used against Malta still prior to operation "Barbarossa".
3. Operation "Alpenveilchen"
Since the Italian front in Albania has been consolidated in the mean- time, and since reports indicate that no decisive successes can be ex- pected in Albania even with German troops during this season, forces
- 141 - need not be held in readiness for this operation.
4. Operation "Barbarossa"
The Armed Forces High Command will set the time - which should be as late as possible - for making connection ,with.Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Rumania.
The High Commands are requested to report their wishes in this respect to the Armed Forces High Command.. (The Army High Command has already done so.)
Before this time only General Antonescu may be told that it is best to reinforce the forces in Moldavia. Rumania will be informed of our plans later in time by the Chief of the Armned Forces Mission via a special notice from the Armed Forces High Command.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signed: Keitel
--- L ---
The Armed Forces :High Command Fuehrer Headquarters WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) 19 Feb. 19+1 Nr. 44f 3189/41 g.K. -Chefs. No. 2 of nine copies
Top secret
caI Re: Sonnenblume
The Fuerer made the following decisions on 18 Feb.:
1. The German forces in Africa under General Rommel will be nown as the "German Africa Corps", effective at once.
2. In order to reinforce the German Africa Corps, the Army High Com- mand should transfer a full panzer division to Tripolitania, in addi- tion to the 5th Light Infantry Division with its panzer regiment.
The Armed Forces High Command
by direction
signed: Warlimont
------
- 142 - Armed Forces-High Command Fuehrer Headquarters Nr, 44 18711, g.Kdos. WFSt/ L(i O 19 Feb. . "19k3.
No, 2 of ten copies
Top secret
On 18 February the Fuehrer made the following decision regarding execu tion of operation "larita":
i. The following dates are envisaged:
Commencement of building pontoon: 28 February Crossing of Danube. 2 March
The final order for carrying out the operation will- be given on 26 February at the latest.
It will be decided on 26 February at the latest whether the XIV Army Corps will march into Bulgaria when bridge-building operations are be- gun or whether only antiaircraft forces will be moved in.
2. It-is for the Bulgarians alone to decide if and when to lay mines off Varna and Burgas.
3. If air attacks are carried out against Bulgaria and Rumania from Greek territory, the X Air Corps has freedom of action in opera- tions against Greek territory.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
by direction
signed: Warlimont
Copy
The Fuehr'er and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 28 Feb.19#I
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L Nr. 0035k/kl S.K.
A. -'I am acquainted with the differences in opinion prevailing in the *Navy and the Air Force concerning organization of coastal reconnaissance in the coastal areas and at sea from the written and oral reports of the Commanders in Chief of these branches.
Both branches agree on the tasks to be performed by this reconnaissance
- 143 - and on the forces needed. However, the Navy demands, on the basis of the agreement reached in 1939 between the Commander in Chief, Air and the Commander in'Chief, Navy, that all coastal air forces set up for the purposes of naval warfare should beeIpaced under its command.
The Commander in Chief, Air is of the opinion, however, that only those air forces should be under the tactical command of the Navy which oper- ate excluvsively for naval warfare, but that for the best possible use of t i orcedinvolved the Air Force should have unified command over air forces engaged in operations concerning both aerial and naval war- fare, At times such operations are of greater importance to naval warm fare, at times to aerial warfare,changing frequently. Often reconnais- sance forces, become available for new tasks, and then again more planes must be supplied by the Air Force,
B. I make the following statement concerning these differences of opinion:
1. The agreement reached in 1939 between the two Commanders in Chief was based on the, supposition that the operations areas of the Navy and of the Air Force would generally be separate. At that time it was not possible to foresee to what extent the Air Force would be in- volved in operations at sea which would require previous reconnaissance. Briefly only the course of this war has brought out the close interrela- tion, of naval and aerial warfare, For this reason the agreements reached in 1939 cannot be considered binding and excluding any other course which may appear advisable during this war.
2. If all forces needed for carrying out certain tasks were per-. manently placed under each branch of the Armed Forces, also when these forces by their nature belong to another branch, this would be-sniplest and most convenient for each branch, but it-would be extravagant and wasteful from an over-all point of view, particularly at ctimes when all available forces are needed.
3. Since only a few air forces can be used against the British Isles in the spring, they must-be utilized as economically as possible.. Reconnaissance and bombing missions of the coastal air forces and of the Air Force are largely carried out in the same areas, and -therefore must be under the unified command of the Air Force.
C. I therefore issue the following orders:
1. The Navy will remain in charge of reconnaissance north of 520 N in the Skagerrak and the Baltic Sea entrances. In addition to sub 4arine protection in this area, it takes over this function in the English Channel as far as Cherbourg. For this purpose, the Commander, Naval Air remains under the tactical command of the Navy.
2. The Air Force takes over reconnaissance off the Norwegian coast, and in the northern North Sea inclusive of the Orkney, Shetland, Tarffaroe Islands by means -of a special "Commander, Reconnaissance, Norway". Air escort in this area is also his task.
The demarcation line between the areas defined under 1 and 2 can be determined only after their forces have been allocated for these tasks to the Commander, Naval Air and-the Commander, Reconnaissance, Norway.
The Navy has the right to request assistance in reconnaissance and es- cort from the Commander, Reconnaissance, Norway in the area along the borderline of the two reconnaissance areas.
3. The Air Force will'continue to carry out reconnaissance in
- 144 - the Channel area and fighter rotection south of 520 N as far as the et~ftude o C er , excep for rine escort (paragraph B, 1) and subohase already previously assigned to the forces of the Commander, Naval Air.
14. The Commander in. Chief, Air will be in charge of air recon- naissance and air .cover for convoys in the Atlantic. For this purpose he wil set up an Air Commnan er, Atlantic, ased at Lorient. This' po- sition should be filled by an iAi Force officer familiar with the prob- lems of naval warfare, who will guarantee that the needs of aerial and naval warfare will be met equally,' Naval officers are to be appointed to his staff.
The tasks of the Air Commander, Atlantic are as follo6ws: a. Reconaissancea for submarine warfare,
b. Escort and reconnaissance during operations of naval. surface forces in the Atlantic and convoy escort in the coastal area.
co Weather reconnaissance,
d. Bombing missions against ships at sea in areas to be agreed upon between the Air Force and the Navy.
The reconnaissance and escort missions have priority over all purely combat missions.
Forces of the Air Commander, Atlantic may-be used for operations against the British-Isles only if this does not curtail the requirements or re- connaissance and escort for naval warfare.
5. Furthermore, the Commander in -Chief, Air is making preparations for setting up an Air Commander, Baltic Sea, to whose staff naval of- ficers should like-wisebe appointed. I will issue orders as to when this command is to be 'set up, what forces are to be allocated, and what tasks are to be carried out.
6. The setup outlined under paragraphs 1-4 will become effective on 15 Mar., insofar as the present organization is affected.
The necessary details are to be determined between the Navy and the Air Force, and are then to be submitted for approval or if necessary for decision. They are to concern themselves with the following':
a.. Distribution of forces in the various reconnaissance areas.
b. Measures which must be taken so that air' reconnaissance and escort will not break off when ships pass from one area into the other.
c. The air reconnaissance and escort requirements of the Naval Group Commands must be met to the fullest extent, and any decrease in the reconnaissance forces made on 15 Mar. or their transfer to an- other command area must be submitted tQ the Navy for approval or to me for a decision.
d. Safe and direct communications between the naval group commanders and the commanders of reconnaissance and escort must be as- sured.
e. Agreement must be reached on codes, reconnaissance wave
- 145 - lengths, Sand maps.
Dl. This decision covers only an emergency situation such as will pre- vail in t1je spring, without being a final settlement of the problem of naval air frces.
However, 'e commanders wbo carry out reconnaissance for naval as well as for ae'al. warfare must be aware of their great responsibility with regard to over-all warfare at sea, and especially with regard to those air forces which were established and trained for the purposes of naval warfare.
The persons responsible for combined reconnaissance and escort operations must strive to, think beyond the limits of only one branch of the Armed Forces, and to regard warfare within their sea areas as one unified op- eration, for the benefit of which reconnaissance and escort forces op- erate with changing emphasis.
signed:, Adolf Hitler
Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters I Mar, 1941 WFSt/Abt. LI Op) Nr. 44 166/41 g.K.Chefs. No. 5 of twelve copies
Top secret
Re: Unified command of' defensive operations in the western coastal area.
1. The fact thatGerman forces in the occuped western territorieb are being reduced. in the spring of 191 maJes itnecessary to direct the entire strength of the remaining forces toward repulsing attempted enemy landings and to concentrate them under unified command, in order to carry out these defensive operations.
The Commander in Chief, Army (and under him the Commander in Chief, West) is responsible for the preparation and execution of defense against'such attacks in Belgium and France; while the Commanding Gen- eral, Armed Forces, Netherlands is responsible in the Netherlands.
2. In the event of an enemy landing operation against the Belgian or French coast the coastal defense troops and installations of the Navy are to come under the command of the Commander in Chief, West or the responsible Commanding General. Likewise the anti-aircraft artillery which is locally available and is suitable for such defense can be util- ized temporarily by the local Army commands, insofar as the situation in the air permits.
- 146 - The Commander in Chief, West will decide the extent to which Army com- mand posts are to take over unified command, wherever this is not regu- lated by the Commander in Chief, Army.
3. The troops and installations of the Navy thus subordinated to the Army are still to remain under the command of the Commander in Chief, Navy asAfar as their tasks in naval warfare are concerned.
4. The air forces are required to comply with the wishes of the Com- mander in Chief, West in reconnaissance matters. With regard to the assignment of combat and defense forces they are directed to cooperate with the armies concerned,
5. Other forces in the coastal area (customs guards, police, labor service, Todt Organization, etc.) will come under the command of the Commander in Chief, West, or the responsible Commanding General, when he takes over the unified command.
6. The unified command'in the coastal area by the Commander in Chief, West or a Commanding General is to take effect either automatically or upon orders when an enemy landing is imminent or is being executed.
A landing is to be recognized as imminent if it can be observed by re- connaissance at sea or from the air, or can be ascertained from land.
7, The results of reconnaissance by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be constantly compiled in such a way that enemy landing opera- ,tions can be recognized in time, and can be effectively shadowed and re- pulsed.
The Commander in Chief, West will issue the required instructions, in conjunction with the other branches of the Armed Forces.
8. The Commander in Chief, West will undertake the preparatory work for the assumption of unified command. For this task he has authority to give orders to the naval and air commands in the West.
9. In the Netherlands the command jurisdiction which has prevailed hitherto will remain in effect.
The Commander in Chief, West and the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Netherlands are required to maintain a constant exchange of information regarding the enemy.
In case of immediate danger, the Commander in Chief, West is authorized to issue directives to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Nether- lands.
The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command
signed: Keitel
~_ II __
- 147 - Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters 5 Maar. l94f WFSt/Abt.L(I Op.) Nr. 44 282/kl g.K.Chefs. 5 No. 2 of fourteen copies
Top secret
Directive No, 24+
Concerning Cooperation with Japan
The Fuehrer has issued the following orders for cooperation with Japan:
i, The aim of this cooperation, based on the Tripartite Pact, must be to induce Japan to take action in the Far East as soon as possible. This wi ie own strong Britis -orcesand shift the emphasis of American interests to the Pacific.
In view of the still undeveloped war potential of the enemy, the sooner Japan decides to intervene the better will be her prospects for success. Operation "BarbarossaI will create especially favorable conditions for this both from a political and from a military viewpoint.
2. To prepare for this cooperation it will be necessary to strengthen the Japanese war potential with all means at our disposal.
To achieve this, the various High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces will have to satisfy, in afar-reaching and generous manner, the wishes of the Japanese to share German know-how in the spheres of strat- egy, combat experience, war economy, and technical knowledge.. Reciproc- ity is desirable, but must not impede the negotiations. In this respect, naturally, those Japanese desires which can influence the conduct of the war at an early date will have priority.
Special cases will be subject to the Fuebrer's decision.
3. The coordination of the operational plans of the two countries will be the task of the High Command, Navy.
In this respect, the following principles are to be observed:
a. The common aim of strategy is to conquer Great Britain quickly and thus keep diTt .S out of the war. Beyond this, Germany has neither political, military nor economic interests in the Far East which could interfere with Japanese designs.
b. The great success achieved by Germany in the war on merchant shipping seems to make it especially advisable to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. Besides that, every opportunity of further- ing the German war on merchant shipping should be taken advantage of.
c. The raw material situation of the Triartite Powers makes it imperative that Japan should seize those regions which she needs for continuing the war, especially if the United States should. intervene. .Rubber deliveries must continue even after Japan's entry into the war, as they are vital for Germany.
d. The capture of Singapore, key position of Great Britain in the Far East, would be a decisive success for the common strategy of the three powers.
Attacks against other British naval bases are also capable of shattering
- 148 the enemy's sphere of power, and similar to attacks on sea communica- tions, of tying up important enemy forces of all kinds (Australia). American naval bases should be attacked only if the U.S.A. cannot be pre" vented from entering the war. The exact time for beginning conferences on operations cannot be given yet, 4. In the militar commissions which are to be set up in accordance with the Tripartte Pact on y such matters will be handled as are the common concern o a ee participating powers, Problems of economic warfare, primarily, will fall into this category. The settling of, detailed. questions will be the function of the chief commission with the assistance of the Armed Forces High Command. 5. Regarding operation "Barbarossa" no indication whatsoever must be given to the Japanese.
The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High. Command (signed in draft form:) Keitel countersigned: (signature illegible)
Naval High Command Berlin, 6 Mar. 1941 Chief, Naval Staff l.Skl. I op 262/41 Gkdos. Chefs.
Top secret
Re: Directive No. 1 for operation "Barbarossa"
Reference: None Note.: Special attention is called to the security regulations in araa tap C 1 with regard to the handling of this communica- ion.
A. Basic operational directives: I. The general political situation may force us into a war with Russia. For this eventuality the following directives have been issued:
1. The German Armed Forces must be prepared to defeat Soviet Russia in a fast campaign (operation "Barbarossa") even prior to the end of the war against Britain.
- 149 - The Army will have to use all available forces, with the provision that the occup-ied territories must be protected against attacks.
The important thing for the Air Force will be to release such strong forces for the support of the Army in the eastern campaign that the ground operations can. be brought to a quick conclusion, and damage to the German east area through enemy air attacks will be kept to a minimum. The numbe' of air forces to be concentrated in the East will be deter- mined by the necessity to keep the entire area under our control ade- quately protected against enemy air attacks, and to continue the raids on Britain, particularly its imports.
The main target for the Navy, also during the eastern campaign, remains Britain.
2. The general operational plans are as follows:
By means of quick Army oPerations the Russian Baltic Sea fleet is to be deprived of its bases and thus put out of commission. From the very start powerful blows are to prevent the Russian air force from interfering effectively.
On the flanks of the German operations we can count on active participa- tion of Rumania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia. The Armed Forces High Command will come to an agreement at the proper time with these two countries as to the manner in which their armed forces will be placed under German command in this event.
It is possible that Swedish railroads and highways will be made avail- able for bringing up a German force to northern Finland at the latest at the beginning of the operations.
3. The Navy will be responsible in the war against Soviet Russia for preventing the enemy naval forces from breaking out into the Baltic Sea, at the same time protecting the German coast. Since the Russian Baltic Sea fleet will be deprived of its last base when Leningrad is reached, and its situation will therefore be hopeless, large naval operations should be avoided earlier.
After the Russian fleet has been eliminated, the important thing will be to safeguard traffic in the Baltic Sea, including supplies by sea for the northern Army wing (minesweeping).
II. In accordance with these orders I issue the following direc- tives for naval warfare in the event of an eastern campaign:
1. The aim of German naval warfare in the war against Britain is to maintain and if possible to intensify the pressure against this main enemy, especially in the Atlantic.
2. By means of continuous German offense measures, Britain must be prevented from launching large-scale strong offensives, in case Germany is involved in a war on two fronts. German defense measures are to minimize British attacks as much as possible.
3. We must manage with a small number of forces in the oper- ations against Russia. The plans of the Army to occupy the Baltic Sea coast first of all by means of quick action will permit limiting our forces in this manner.
4. By means of declared mined areas and minefields we must attempt to confine Russian operations, if possible, to submarine opera- tions.
- 150 - 5. Attempts of the Russian fleet to establish connection with the British Fleet through the Baltic Sea entrances cannot succeed because of the German positions in the Baltic Sea entrances. Likewise it will be easy to prevent Russian forces from breaking out,
6. Offense operations on a small scale should be launched particularly from the Finnish area,
7. The western Baltic Sea west of Gjedser and the Baltic Sea entrances as far as the Skagerrak must be kept open for supply traffic to Norway and Sweden. 'Ship traffic east of Gjedser should be stopped for the time being, but an attempt should be made to reestablish it as soon as possible, if only at certain places, in order to support Army operations and forl economic reasons.
8. The arctic coast and the sea routes in that area are to be protected likewise.
In addition to protecting the German-occupied coasts in the Black Sea, an attempt must be made there to damage the. superior Russian naval forces with our few available forces by offense operations. Mines are to be held in readiness to prevent Russian forces from breaking through the Bosporus. It will depend on developments in the southeast, as well as the attitude of Turkey, whether Britain will undertake relief mea- sures on behalf of Russia from the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. Preparations to ward off such measures should be considered and prepared,
B. Directives for carrying out the operations:
In accordance with the above directives, the "Situation Analysis for Operation 'Barbarossal" annexed hereto (TrN.: not included will be the basis for operational planning.
Consequently I issue the following directives:
I. Directives for operations:
1. War against Britain:
a. Warfare in the Atlantic is to be continued with all available fleet forces. The available escort forces are to be concen- trated in support of this task.
b. Submarine warfare is to continue, In order to have submarines available in the Norwegian area in case of an emergency, single submarines are to be sent against Britain from the Norwegian bases. Single submarines are also to continue to-operate in the central Atlantic in order to disperse enemy defense forces and to tie up light combat forces.
c. All preparations are to be made. for protecting our coasts against attacks of British fleet forces and against submarine operations for the purpose of disrupting German shipping. The transfer of the TIRPITZ and possibly also of cruisers of the training group to Trondheim is being considered as a measure which would probably serve as a threat to the flank of British attacks on northern Norway. A de- cision in this matter will be reached later.
d. Warfare in foreign waters will be continued by the Naval Staff with all suitable forces.
- 151 - 2, Warfare against Russia:
a. In the Baltic Sea the PT boats are to be employed offensively against the routes along the coast of the Baltic countries and the Russian bases there; after transfer of PT boats to Finland also in the Gulf of Finland.
Submarines assigned to the Baltic Sea are to operate against the enemy shipping routes and outside bases,
Plans are to be made for fast minelayers to lay offensive barrages-in a declared area in the western part of the Gulf of Finland (steps are being taken to procure the VERSAILLES, 24 knots, the COTE D'ARGENT, 22 knots, and the ROIJEN, 24 'knots).
b. As defensive measures, the Naval Staff will announce declared areas in the Oeland-Memel area and north and south of Bornholm as far as Kolberg. Single barrages are to be provided for these de- clared areas. The number of mines available depend on the time when the operation starts. For the time being only a total of about 3,000 statdard mines, type C' (EMCO) and a corresponding number of barrage pro- tective devices can be provided for all "Barbarossa" projects.
a, In order to prevent Russian naval forces, especially submarines, from breaking out, a net barrage is to be laid at Gjedser as one of the first steps, The minefields in the declarod areas in the southern entrance of the Sound and the Great Belt will not be reinforced for the time being. The Naval Staff will announce new and extended de- clared areas in the southern entrance of the Sound. Loaded minelayers are to be kept ready-at the proper points in order to be able to lay barrages in the straits. of the western Baltic Sea (especially the Sound and the Gjedser Strait) on short notice, The SCIIIESIEN and the SCHELSI G- HOLSTEIN will be used as floating batteries.
d. Because of the threat to our shipping in the Baltic Sea by submarines and rimines, merchant shipping east of Gjedser is to be stopped at first. An attempt is to be made to resume shipping soon, depending on the situation. Troop transports to Sweden and later supply transports are particularly important in this connection
e. For the tasks of air reconnaissance and air escort in the Baltic Sea the Fuebrer has ordered the Commander in-Chief, Air to appoint an'"Air Commander, Baltic Sea" for operation "Barbarossa", whose staff is to include naval officers. The Armed Forces High Command will order the time when this command is to be set up, the distribution of forces, and its tasks,
For the purposes of naval warfare, the Air Commander, Baltic Sea is to be asked to provide far-reaching and cottinuous air reconnaissance, wherever it may be most useful for preventing surprise attacks by en- emy surface forces, and for submarine patrol and defense, as well as for close surveillance of our sea lanes and protection of our operations.
f. In the Arctic Ocean the available forces are to be used to protect our ships. As soon as Finland enters the war, Petsamo and the ships there must be protected. The Army is to be asked to pro- vide artillery protection, and if necessary the ships in Liinahamari are to be transferred to protected harbors in northern Norway.
g. In the Black Sea the Rumanian and Bulgarian forces are to be used to protect the coastal area and the Danube. In the course of the Army operations, the question of bringing up the German Danube
- 152 - flotilla for use on the Dnieper may be considered. Preparations are to be made to mine the entrance to the Bosporus in order to prevent the Russian naval forces from breaking out of the Black Sea.
3. Su t of naval operations by the Air Force and foreign navies:
a. The following requests have been submitted to the Armed Forces High Command for air support of naval operations: Sudden bomber raids' at the outbreak of war against Russian bases and ships in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Arctic Ocean,and the locks of the White Sea Canal; bomber forces should be provided to protect the German coasts and sea communications against British attacks.
It is to be expected that in the war against Britain the 3rd Air Force, consisting in the main of the IX Air Corps, and in Norway the 5th Air Force will continue to be used in their present setup.
b. For cooperation with the Finnish, Swedish, and Rumanian navies the following is planned and has been reported to the Armed Forces High Command:
Finnish naval forces will be used in the combined naval operations in the northern Baltic Sea, especially in the Gulf of Finland; Finnish bases will be prepared to receive German naval forces (mine ships, sub- marines, and perhaps PT boats); deliveries of mines to Finland for planned barrages in the Gulf of Finland; support of German radio intel-, ligence against Russia through the Finnish intelligence organization At least weeks prior to the start of the operation are required to make the necessary-contacts and preparations.
The Swedes will be asked to supply protection of Swedish territorial waters so that German supply shipments can continue in these waters pro- tected by Swedish naval forces, and to lay mine barrages in Swedish territorial waters as an extension of German minefields and as protec- tion for the Gulf of Bothnia. Two weeks will be needed to establish the necessary connections.
In Rumania it is necessary to prepare the Rumanian naval forces and aux- iliary mine ships for offensive operations in mine warfare. Since 'prep- arations are already in progress for operation "N4arita'", only 1 week's notice is necessary.
II. Directive for 'nmand and organization:
1. The areas OA 'roup West and Group North, as well as the tasks of the Commanding Admiral,. Norway under the operational command of Group North and of tb^:; joutheasts~1Lri. (Balkans) under the Naval Staff remain as heretofore. Consequently thQ entire operations against Russia will take place in the area of Group North, except for those in the Black Sea area.
2. Under the operational responsibility and command of Group North, direction of the operations in the Baltic Sea for the duration of operation "Barbarossa" will be in the hands of the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers, who will transfer with his operational staff to the Swinemuerde command post.
3. The Commander,' Mine Ships will be placed under the com- mand of the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers. The staff of the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers will be enlarged by the Commander, Torpedo Boats and his staff,
- 153 - A submarine staff officer will be assigned to handle submarine operations.
For air operations close connection is to be maintained with the Air Commander, Baltic Sea, to be appointed by the Air Force.
The Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic Sea will be charged with defense of the Baltic Sea entrances, the Skagerrak, and the Kattegat.
The defense operations of Naval Station,' Baltic Sea will be confined to the sea area west of the Gjedser Strait.
4. For the purpose of protecting coastal areas which will be occupied during operation 'Barbarossa", a Coastal Shore Commander, Baltic and a Coastal Shore Commander, Finland and their staffs will be prepared.
Operations on the arctic coast will be under the Admiral, Arctic Coast.
5. The present tasks of the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers, involving fleet forces, will be taken over by the Fleet Command, and those involving the training group by the 2nd Admiral of the Fleet.
6. * Liaison with the Finnish and the Swedish navies will be carried on by the Naval Staff through the Naval Attaches for the time being. In the case of Finland a Naval Liaison Staff may be set up.
III. Allocation of forces:
1. Group West for operations in the Atlantic:
The Fleet with the BISMARCK, the GNEISENAU, the SCHARN- HORST, the PRINZ EUGEN, and the HIPPER.
The bulk of the destroyers and torpedo boats will be assigned to Group West (decision on details later).
2. Group North:
The TIRPITZ and cruisers of the training group (those not ready for combat or only ready to a limited extent). The LUETZOW until she is ready to depart for warfare in the Atlantic.
A small number of destroyers and torpedo boats (decision on details later).
3. Commanders, Baltic Sea:
All mine ships. All PT boat flotillas. The mine ships will have to be assigned by Group North.
2 mine detonating vessels, 1 subchaser flotilla, 2 minesweeping flotillas (fishing steamers).
2 patrol boat flotillas, each of the two Groups to allocate one of them. The Groups will regulate the details between themselves.
4. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines:
Those training submarines which cannot be used for train- ing purposes are to be used for operations. The majority should be as- signed for operations against Britain, 10 to 22 submarines should-be assigned to the Commander, Baltic Sea for operations in the Baltic Sea,
- 154 - 5. Commuander, Naval Air:
Orders allocating forces for tas.ks in the Baltic Sea will follow.
6. Admiral, Southeast:
A river minesweeping flotilla will be transferred from the area of Group West.
IV. Pre oatins to be made:
1. Transfer of forces:
The transfer of the fleet forces in accordance with the operational plans will be ordered by the Naval Staff at the proper time. The annexed schedule will serve as a guide (TrN.: not included).
Preparations are to be made for anchorages, shipment of supplies and reinforcements, shipyard repairs, etc.
All measures should be taken as quietly as possible, calling attention to the increased danger in the eastern Baltic Sea from British aerial mines.
The forces to be transferred to the Baltic Sea should be distributed among the various harbors as much as possible.
2. Transfer of training and testing establishments:
The greater part of submarine training should be trans- ferred to Trondheim.
The Anti-Submarine School should be transferred to Horten, if it has already returned to the Baltic Sea,
The Submarine Acceptance Command, the Warship Construction Testing Com- mand, the Torpedo Experimental Sttation, etc., are to be transferred from the eastern Baltic Sea to the area west of Gjedser. The cruisers of the training group not being transferred to Trondheim are to remain in the western Baltic Sea.
The SCBIIESTEN and the SCKLESWIG-HOLSTEIN are to be prepared for use as floating batteries (heavy guns, anti-aircraft guns., submarine de- fense).
3. Protection of the coasts and harbors:
Decisions concerning coastal and anti-aircraft artillery, plans for harbor barrages, barrages for the Bay of Danzig, as well as concerning establishment of anchorages safe from torpedoes are contained in l.Skl. I op 75/41 Gkdos, Chefs, of 30 Jan. 1941.
Minelaying measures are to be prepared in such a manner that mines can be laid on short notice also prior to the outbreak of war.on orders of the Naval Staff,
The anti-submarine net barrage for the Gjedser Strait is to be given priority so that it can be laid at any time also prior to the outbreak of war, if this has not already been done.
The layi'ng of the barrage will probably not be announced for the time
155 - being, since shipping in this area is already instructed to rollow cer- tain routes.
Special orders will be 'isued for preparing barrage material for the planned minefields and declared areas. The Naval Staff will probably announce the declared areas at the outbreak or war.
4. Preparation of offensive measures:
Preparations are to be made ror the transrer to Finland of 3 rast mine ships prior to the outbreak or war disguised as leave ships.
Mines and supplies ror these ships should also be shipped to Finland prior to the outbreak or war. The 3 ships are to be provided with 3 months' supplies.
Enough torpedoes, ammunition, ruel, and roodfor'one replenishment or 8 small submarines are to be made ready ror transport to Finland prior to the outbreak or war.
Preparations are to be made ror supplying PT boats in Finland.. It is not possible to tell at the present time whether and when a PT boat tender can be transferred to Finland.
C. -Directives ror security and deception or the enemy:
1. a. The above directives were issued by the Armed Forces High Command and the Naval Staff as a precautionary measure in case Russia should change her present attitude toward us.
b. Consequently the number or officers to be involved in the advance preparations is to be kept as small as possible. Addi- tional personnel is to be included as late as possible, and then is only to be informed about the particular part or the operation it is engaged in. Otherwise there is the danger that ir our preparations, no date ror which has been set as yet at all, become known, they might have political and military consequences of the most serious nature.
c. The group or officers fully acquainted with the preparations is to be limited as long as possible to the Group Commanders, the Commanding Admirals, the Commanders, their chiers or staff, and 1st admiralty staff officers. Further ofricers are not to be drawn in until their tasks relating to the preparatory measures absolutely re- quire it.
2. For the purpose of deceiving the enemy, the following orders have been released by the Armed Forces High Command:
a., The aim of the deception is to keep preparations for operation "Barbarossa" secret. This aim will underlie all camou-. flage measures.
b. For this purpose it is important to maintain the prevailing uncertainty concerning our plans during the first part of the preparations, that is during the first part of April. During the following period the preparations for "Barbarossa" which cannot be camouflaged must be made to appear as diversionary operations for the invasion of England. Preparations for operation 'Barbarossa must be made to appear as the greatest deception in military history, designed to divert from the final preparations for the invasion of England.
- 156 - c. In spite of the fact that preparations for "Seeloewe" are being relaxed to a great extent, for the above reason everything should be done to keep up the impression with our own forces that an invasion of England is still being planned, even though in an entirely new form and with relatively small forces.
d. The stronger the forces are which we assemble in. the East, the greater must be the effort to support the uncertainty concerning our plans. For this purpose the Army High Command, in coop- eration with the Armed Forces Intelligence Division, is to prepare the sudden "closing" of certain areas in the English Channel and in Norway.. (Code word for this measure: "Albion".) It is not so much a question of carrying out such measures in great detail with a large number of forces, as of arousing as. much attention as possible thereby.
e, The Naval Staff will issue separate orders for any deceptive measures to be carried out by the Navy on the basis of the above directives.
D. Repts of plans:
By 1 Apr. 1941 the Naval Groups and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, and insofar as necessary also the Commanding Admiral, Norway and the Admiral, Southeast, will report plans and details concerning distribu- tion of their forces in connection with the above directives of the Naval Staff for operation "Barbarossa",
The various divisions of the iaval High Command are requested to carry out the necessary measures.
15 May 1941 should be kept in mind for the time being as X day and the date when all preparations should be completed.
signed: Raeder
1_
- 157 - Copy
Armed Forces Hi h Command Fuehrer Headquarters WJFSt-Abt. L, (T ) 13 Mar, 1941 U25/41 g.k.Chas.
Reference: WFSt/Abt, L(I) Nr. 33408/4tO g.K. Chefs. of 18 Dec. 1940.
Supplement to Directive 21
Directives for Special: Areas Operation "Barbarossa)
I. Operations area and authority in ,:command:
1. In East Prussia and the Generalgo uvernement (German-occupied Poland) the Armed Forces High Commandwi putinto effect the command authorities and regulations concerning supplies applying to the Armed. Forces' within a given command area at least 4 'weeks prior to the gin- niig of .operations. The Army High Command will submit proposals at the proper time in agreement with the Commander in Chief, Air. It is not planned to declare East Prussia and the Generalgouvernement an Army operations area. However the Commander in Chief, Army, on the basis of the unpubslshed Fuehrer orders of 19 and 21 'Oct. 1939, has the right to order all preparations which are necessary for carrying out his military assignment and for protecting the troops. He can delegate this power to the commanding generals of the army groups and of the armies. Such orders take priority over all other tasks and orders of civil authorities. 2. The Russian area to be occupied in the course of these opera- tions shou3l be divided into states with separate governments according to special directives, as soon as the progress of the war permits. The following therefore obtains: a. The oprations area formed when the Army advances acros. the frontiers of the eic an t e neighboring states is to be as nar / 1'Ovas possible. The Commander in Chief, Army has command authority 'in this area, and has the right to delegate it to the commanding generals of the army groups and the armies. b. In the operations area of the Army the Reichsfuehrer SS will have special assignents by order of the Fuebrer in preparation for the political administration. These tasks will be determined by the necessity to settle the conflict between two opposite. political systems. In carrying out these tasks the Reichsfuehrer SS acts independently and on his own responsibility. Otherwise the authority of the- Commander in Chief, Army and his subordinate commands are not affected thereby. The Reichsfuehrer S3 will take care that his tasks do not interfere with op- erations. Details will be settled by the Army High Command directly with the Reichsfuehrer SS. c. As soon as the operations area has reached a sufficient depth it will be limited 'in the rear. The newly occupied area in the rear of the operations zone will be given a separate olitical adminis- tration. At first it will be divided into North (Baltic , Ce nter White Russia), and South (Ukraine), on the basisofethnic differences and the borders between the army groups. In these areas the poladitic adminis- tration will be in the hands of Reich commissioners wo will receive their orders from the Fuehrer.
- 158 - 3. For all military tasks in the political administrative areas in the rear of the operations areas armed forces commanders will be ap- pointed who are subordinate to the Ci of Sta7 Armed Forces High Command.
The armed forces commander is the highest representative of the Armed Forces. in the area in question ard exercizes authority in military mat- ters. ie has the tasks of a territorial commander and the command au- thority of the commander of an army or a commanding general.
In this capacity he has above all the following tasks:
a. Close cooperation with the Reich commissioner, in order to support h:m in his political task.
b. Exploitation of the country and protection of its economic resources for the benefit of the German economy (see- paragraph 4).
c. Exploitation of the country for supplying the troops in accordance with the requests of the Army High Command.
d. Military protection for the entire area, especially for airfields, supply routes, and supply installations, against uprisings, sabotage, and enemy paratroops.
e. Regulation of highway traffic,
fe Provision of billets for troops, police, and other or- ganizations, and for prisoners of war remaining in the particular area,
As regards the civil authorities, the armed forces commrander has the right to order Theasures which are necessary for carrying out mili- tary tasks. In this regard his orders have precedence over all others, including those of the Reich.commissioner,
Separate regulations and orders concerning assembly and allocation of the necessary forces will follow.
The time when command should be transferred to these armed forces com- manders will be announced as soon as the military situation permits a change in command without disrupting operations. Until that time the command posts appointed by the Commander in Chief, Army will function on the same basis as these armed forces commanders,
k. The Fuehrer placed Reichsmarschall Goering in charge of uni- fied direction of the economic administration in the operations area and in the political admiistra ion areas; e in turn delegated this task to the Chief, War Economy and Armaments Division, Armed Forces Hig Command. Special directives will be issued y this office.
5. The bulk of the police forces will be subordinate to the Reich commissioners. Requests for police orces in the operations area will be submitted by the Army High Command at an early date to the Operations Planning Section, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command.
6. Special orders and regulations will be issued for the behavior of the troops toward the population and the tasks of the military courts.
II. Traffic of persons, goods, and communications:
7. The Operations Staff, Armed 'Forces High Command will issue special orders for measures necessary prior to the start of the opera-
- 159 - tions, in order to limit traffic of persons, goods, and communications to Russia,
8. At the be innin of the operations the German-Russian border and later the -rearborr;de r oerations area are to be closed by the Commander in Chief, Army to all non-military persons, goods, and communi- cations, except to the Reichsfuehrer SS, by means of police troops used in accordance with Fuehrer directives, These police troops will be quartered and supplied by the Army Quartermaster General, who can ask the Reichsfuehrer SS for liaison officers for this purpose.
The border will be closed also to leading personalities and deputies of the highest government authorities and of the Party, The Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command will notify the highest government authorities and the Party offices to that effect. The Commander in Chief, Army and his deputies will decide on any exceptions.
Aside from the special regulations necessary for the police troops of the Reichsfuehrer SS, all requests for permission to enter the area are to be sent exclusively to the Commander in Chief, Army,
III. Directives for Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary, and Finland:
9. The necessary agreements with these countries will be reached by the Armed Forces High Command in connection with the Foreign Office in accordance with the requests of the High Commands. If further oper- ations should necessitate special privileges, such requests are to be submitted to the Armed Forces High Command.
10, Police measures for the direct protection of the troops are permissible, regardless of special privileges granted other authorities.
Further directives will be issued concerning this matter.
11. Special regulations for these countries will be issued later concerningthTTTwing:
Food and fodder Quarters and equipment Purchase and shipment of goods Regulations concerning money and payment Soldiers' pay Indemnities Mail and telegraph services Traffic Jurisdiction
Requests of the branches of the Armed Forces and offices of the Armed Forces Hi Command in these matters to te governments of thede coun- tries are o e reported to the Operations Planning Section, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command by 27 Mar. 1941.
IV. Directives for Sweden:
12. Since Sweden comes into question only as a possible transit area, no special authority is being planned for the comimaner of the German troops. However, he has the right and the responsibility to safeguard directly railroad transports against sabotage and attack.
The Chief of Staff, Armed. Forces High Command
signed: Keitel
- 160 - T(lk~P~PB~I~EII~
Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters WFSt/Abt. L(I op) Nr, 00504/41g..K 24 Mar. 1941
No. 3 of eight copies
Top secret
Re: Reconnaissance and attacks in the Greek territorial waters of Crete
The Fuehrer and Supreme. Conmmander of the Armed Forces has ordered recon- naissance and attacks on all naval forces (including Greek ones) in the Greek territorial waters of Crete, effective at once.
The, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
By direction
signed: Jodl
_~ I~ _
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 27 Mar. 1941
6KW/WFSt/Abt.L(I Op') Nr, 44379/41 g.K.Chefs. No. 2 of twelve copies
Top secret
Directive No. 25
1. The military coup in Yugoslavia has changed the political situa- tion in the Balkans, Yugoslavia is to be regarded as an enemy. Even if she were to affirm her loyalty to us she would still have to be de- stroyed as quickly as possible.
2. It is my intention to break into Yugoslavia with a concentric op- eration moving in the general direction of Belgrade and the south, one arm coming from the Fiume-Graz area and the other from the area around Sofia; to administer a crushing defeat to the Yugoslav armed forces; and, in addition, to detach the southernmost portion of Yugoslavia from the rest of the country and to use it as a base for continuing the German-Italian offensive against Greece.
The early reopening of Danube traffic and the seizure of the copper mines at Bor are important for the war economy.
We must attempt to induce Hungary and Bulgaria to participate in the operations by extending to them the hope of regaining Banat and Macedonia.
- 161 - Political promises made to the Croats will render.the internal tension in Yugoslavia more acute,
3. My detailed orders are as follows:
a. As soon as sufficient forces are available and the weather, situation permits, the Air Force is to destroy the city of Belgrade and the ground organization of the Yugoslav air force by means of continuous day and night attacks.
b. If possible at about the same time - certainly not earlier - operation "Marita" is to begin, with the limited objective, for the time being; of occupying the Salonika basin and getting a foothold on' the heights of Edessa (Vodena). The XVIII Army Corps can move into position for this attack by way of Yugoslav territory.
In order to prevent the enemy from establishing an organized front be- tween Mount Olympus and the heights of Edessa. (Vodena) we must make use of any favorable opportunities which offer themselves.
c, All forces still available in Bulgaria and Rumania may be utilized for the attacks which are to be launched toward the northwest from the region around Sofia, and toward the west from the region of ,Kynstendil-Gorna Dzhumaya, except that a force of the approximate size of a division (in addition to anti-aircraft troops) must remain for the protection of the Rumanian oil fields,
For the time being, the protection of the Turkish boundary is to be left to the Bulgarians. A German formation, a panzer division if pos- sible, is to be kept in readiness behind them as a reserve.
d. The attack coming from the general direction of Graz and moving southeastward is to be launched as soon as the necessary forces have been assembled. 'The decision as to whether Hungarian soil will be used for the push against the Yugoslav border will be left up to the Army.
Security measures at the Yugoslav frontier are to be strengthened at once.
Important points may be seized at. the Yugoslav border just as on the Bulgarian borders even before the .general attack begins. These actions should be timed to coincide with the air attack on Belgrade.
e, Two attack groups of the Air Force are to support the opera- tions of the 12th Army and those of the assault group to be formed in the Graz area, concentrating the forces according to the progress of the Army operations. The Hungarian ground organization can be utilized for assembly and the actual operation.
It is to be investigated whether the X Air Corps should be employed, based on Italian territory. However, escort of the transports to Africa must be assured.
Preparations for the occupation of Lemnos island should be continued; however, it should not be executed until I issue the order,
Adequate anti-aircraft protection should be provided for Graz, Klagen- furt, Villach, Leoben, and Vienna,
4. Basic agreements with Italy will be reached by the Armed Forces High Command to begin with.
- 162 - The Army is to provide for liaison staffs for the Italian 2nd Army and for Hungary,
The Air Force is empowered to reach agreements at the present time with the Italian and Hungarian Air Forces concerning borders of the air op- erations areas. Preparations can be made at once to set aside the sup- plies for the Hungarian ground organization.
5. The Commanders in Chief will report to me through the Armed Forces High Command concerning the planned operations and the related command questions.
signed: Adolf Hitler
PI__ I __
- 163 - Fuebrer and Supreme C der Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces33 Apr. 1941
JW stLAtLr ;x 395L1 .gKCh. No, 3 of fifteen copies
Top secret
Directive HNo. 26.
Cooperation with our allies in the Balkans,
1, The mnilltar tasks intended for each of the southeast Euro ean nations in the caZPC .2 against Yugo8lavia arise ou o 8e po Cal a s, w. oh can be defined as follows,, re preferably, will occupy Ba t, since it is to. be awarded to er. owever, Hunay has expressed her readiness to participate in the destruction of the enemy over and above is,
Bk l is is to get Macedonia back; consequently she will be interested ma y the attack in that direction,. although no specific _pressure will be exerted by G y. n adition the Bulgarians will have the duty of defending the rear against Turkey, with the assistance of a German armored fora tion. For this purpose Bulgaria will also call upon the three divisions stationed at the Greek border,
Rumania is to confine her tasks, in her own as well as in Germany's irest, to securing her borders against Yugoslavia and Russia. The Chief of the German Armed Forces Mission is to work toward strengthening R ia's preparedness for defense -against Russia, and is to attempt to bring about the transfer of th R ian forces aron :Te evar farther to the east (if possible) in order to avoid disrupting communications be- tween the Hungaian 2nd Army and the German 11 Army Corps*. At least two-way commncations across te Hunaian-H mnian border between the Hungarian and GerIman liaison staffs mut continue without interference.
2, The following guiding principles will apply with regard to mlian coo ration and the organization of co nd. authority in the impe g
I reserve to myself the coordinated planning and direction of this campaign, insofar as it has to do with layig down operational objectives for the Italian and ian forces within the framework of over-all strategy. This must be car-ived out in such a manner as will ensure that due allowance is made for the sensibilities of our allies and that the Chi of State of Italy and Hungary are enabled to appear as sovereign 1}J', >i leaders in the eyes of their people and their armed forces.
Th sor I shall convey all military demands having to do with the co- ord kated execution of operations (to be submitted to by the Commander in Chief, Army and the Co mander in Chief, Air) to the Duce and to Regent Hrthy in the form of rsonal letters, as proposals and requests.
The Commanding General, 12th Amy is to use the same procedure in his
* Tr.I: The a ssag from "and is to attempt to bring about" to "the German 2 Corps , referring to the desired transfer of Ruanian units, is crossed out in the text, A marginal note indicates that it was corrected in the Armed Fores High Co udn order 0 44 7/#l andm6 Naval Staff order I op *i4/41 of 6 Apr,
- 164 - relations with Bulgarian state and military authorities,
3. A headquarters of the "German General attached to the High Comand of the H ian Armed Forces" is to be set up in Hgary, and an Air Force liaison staff is to be attached to its staff.
This headquarters will maintain my no unications with the Regent, and will also maintain liaison between the branches of the Armed Forces and the Hungarian High Co nd .
All details of cooperation with the Italian and Hungarian forces are to be regulated by the branches of the Armed Forces and by the liaison personnel to be exchanged between the adjoining armies or air forces.
The. air defense forces of Rumania and Bulgaria will continue as in- tegral s o e r -nair defense of these countries, unless they should receive assignment under the co mand of their own armed forces. Hungary is to protect her territory independently, with the proviso that the German forces operating there and the installations important to them will be protected by the German Armed Forces.
5. Aside from the new regulation regarding unified command, the agree- ments with Hungary remain in force. The Italian 2nd Army will be at liberty to move only when the attack of the German 2nd Army and the fl~I Amy Corps' mobile forces begins to have an effect. It may be neces sary that this attack move more southward than southeastward for this purpose at first, The Armed Forces High Command is to arrange that the Italian air force will restrict itself, first, to protecting the flank and rear of the Albanian front, second, to attacking airfields at Mostar and on the coast, and third, to cooperative missions ahead of the front of the Italian 2nd Army, as soon as the latter's offensive begins.
6. 1 shall define later the occuation duties which will devolve upon the various nations after the c gn sen ed. Meanwhile, we must emphasize in every way, in our manner of cooperating with our allies during the operations, the feeling of brotherhood in arms for the pur- pose of attaining a common political goal. signed: Adolf Hitler
Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters 3 Apr. 1941$ Nr.& 4f41/4l g.K. Chefs. WFSt/Abt. L(I 3p.) No. 2 of thirteen copies
Top secret
Re: C Sonnenblume ')
Ref .: COK enStdX, Op.Abt. (II b)Nr. 5 16/41 g.KChefs of 25 Mar. 1941
The Fuhrer decided the. following on 2 Apr,:
- 165 - 1. The-- ier task of the German. Africa Cor s remains to safe rd the posit one rear e an uo as any s forces in orus Arica as possible.
The resulting attacks with limited objectives must not be extended fur- ther than the fev available forces allow before the 15th Panzer Division arrives Under no circumstances should 'the open right flank be en- dangreda which would necessarily be the case in an advance to the north on Benghazi.
2. Even after the arrival of the 15th Panzer Division, a large-scale offensive aimed perhaps at Tobruk should not be launched.
The set tasks in other theaters of the bulk of the X Air Corps as well as of the Italian forces, which for the time being cannot be motorized any further, will probably prevent us, from expanding our objectives prior to fall 1941.
These plans could be chag d only if the bulk of the British armored forces were withdrawn from C reica, in which case new orders will be issued.
3, As regards command authority over Italian forces, for the time being only one additional motorized diviion (102nd) will be placed under the Germ iiAfrica Corps if this is necessary.
New orders will be issued in case of a later large-scale offensive.
,. The German General at the Italian Armed Forces Headquarters is ordered to procure the approval of the Italian High Command concerning. these directives.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command signed: Keitel
The Puebrer and Supreme Co nder Fuebrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 14 Apr. 1941
OKW/FSGt . L (I Op. Hrj 4 0®l Chefs. No. 12 of seventeen copies
Top secret
Dietive N.2
1. The Yugoslav armed forces are being dissolved. This, together with the elimination of the Greek army in Thrace and the capture of the valley of Salonika and of the Florina area, makes it possible to begin the attack on Greece after sufficient forces have been brought up, with the aia oW Anni la ing the Greek-British forces there, occupying Greece, and thus finally ejecting the British from the Balkans.
- 166 - 2. I therefore Issue the following orders for the continuation of the operations in the Balkans:
a. Yugoslavia:
The aim of the operations remains to annihilate the remaining Yugoslav forces and to mop up and occupy the country.
The German troop are to be used to occupy old Serbia and Banat. The protctor een the M4orava and the Danube is to be seized as quickly as possible. As few forces as possible should be sent into Yugoslavia in addition to those there already.
The Air Force is to destroy the remainder of the Yugoslav air forces and to uport Army operations in such a way that possible serious re- sistance may be broken quickly. If necessary bombers and antiaircraft units not needed in operations against Greece may be withdrawn already in agreement with the Armed Forces High Command for use elsewhere.
It is up to the Commander in Chief, Air to reach the necessary agree- ments with the Italian Air Force on the basis of the demarcation line between the 2nd German and the 2nd Italian Armies.
The Itaian 2nd Arm has the task of mopping up and occupying the area southweiiUoiliiig-hway Karlovac-Bos Novi-Banya Luka-Sarajevo. It may be necessary for fast German forces to make occasional sorties across this line in support of the Italian advance.
The Hunggarian 3rd Army will mop up and occupy the Yujroslav area vest of the i8a as ifar as Danube and the Drava. Participation of the two Hungarian motorized brigades in further operations of the German 2nd Army has been'requested and approved.
b. Greece:
As soon as sufficient forces are in the area of Plorina and the Salonika valley, the decisive attack on the British-Greek force in northern Greece is to egin. is e obecve o this' operation to encircle and annihilate the enemy forces there by an early breakthrough toward Larissa, and to prevent erection of a new defense front.
Simultaneously the Italian break through the Greek front in Albania is to be supported by an vance of German forces toward the southwest.
Subsequently fast troos pushing toward Athens should occupy the remain- ing Greek maino n uding the a eTonesos. At the same time the Italian Army Group Albania will advance west of the line from Lake Prespanako along the ridge of the Pindus mountains in the direction of the Gulf of Patras. If time and road conditions permit, every effort must be made to cut off a retreat of the main Greek force west of the Pindus mountains.
The Air-Force should support the new Army operations with strong forces and Sep the advance of the German forces moving, in addition to fight- ing the Greek and British air forces. The later occupation of the Cyclades Island is to be supported.
The Commander in Chief, Air is to arrange with the Italian Air Force the division between the operations areas.
All suitable forces of the Army and the Air Force are to be assembled in order to prevent possible evacuation of British troops. Especially
- 167 - everything possible should be done by means of constant air attacks on Greek harbors and partiularlT on ship concentrations, as well as by miing of the approach routef , to prevent the British from escaping across the Mediterranean.
3. i myself shall issue the order for the atroo operation against Lemnos and for the occuPation of Thasos and emo ra * ans- ator s note: The last S words were crossed out by an n is copy.) The order will be issued at least 48 hours prior to the beginning of the op- eration.
For this purpose the Arm is to leave one division in Thrace, while the Bg ias are to take over the occupation of the remainder of Thrace a a ti' &to be determined by me,
k. After these operations have been carried out, the bulk of the Army forces used wl be wi awn r new as s. one or two divisions. hou bFe left in Greece, one iadditonal division in Salonika, and two or three divisions in Serbia.
Following the operations against Greece, the most important tasks of the Air Force (I Air Corps) will be support of the Africa Corps. In the e7ar eure renewed mining of the Suez Canal is of great importance, in order to prevent the enemy from bringing up reinforcements from East Africa, or at least make this more difficult.
The air defenses of the conquered territories are to be prepared.
The coastal defenses are to be prepared for the time being on the basis that the northern Aegean coast, including Salonika, will be in the hands of the Bulgarians, the adjoining eastern Aegean coast up to and includ- ing the Gulf of Saros in German hands,, and the remaining Greek coastal areas in Italian hands.
Final decisions cannot be made until the end of the operations in the Balkans.
5. I expect the Commanders in Chief to submit detailed reports of their plans.
The princtples laid down in Directive No. 26 of 3 Apr. 1941 obtain with regard to possible requests made by the branches of the Armed Forces to allies.
signed: Adolf Hitler
_ _ _~ ______
- 168 - he armede Forces High Commnd Fuehrer Headquarters WSt/Abt.L Wr, 44545/4-2 g. do.Chefe. 18 Apr. 1941 Cr op- /p~u)
Top secret
The fueb r made the following basic decisions on 16 Apr, 1941 concern- ing the B,E n problem: 1 W The aim should be to withdraw the German Armed Forces from the Pa11 ans, s soon as possible with the following limitations:
So .asps and communications therewith must be assured in Yugo- slavi a, on the Greek mainland, and in the Aegean Sea for the protection and supply of the Air Force, in order to be able to carry on air warfare against Britain in the oastern Mediterranean with the best possible ef- fect~
In particul thB area of Salonika must remain occupied by German troops (Gem an occupational area between the river Struma and the line Edessa- Veria- aterin±)' The other necessary bases will be determined by the Co der in Chief, Air, Insofar as necessary defense will be provided by Itaian troops.
b. The copper area in northeast Serbia between the Danube,, the Morava, and a line still to be determined ' will be made a German. protec- torate,
c, Shipping on the.Danube will be safeguarded under primarily erman control, Details will follow. d. The Yugoslav area.between the Tisa, the Danube, and the Rumanian border will be occupied te oraril by German troops.
2. The. following German occuption-troops are to remain in the south- eastern area for thsproe
a. Approximately one division in the copper area and for occupation of the temporary protectorate (according to lb and 14)
b, Approx. teely two divisions in old Serbia in the area not occupied by Bulgaria or Italy.
-c.0 Approx tely one division around Salonikca, in the area mentioned under la.
Accordmtg to Directive 27, a aph J, 1 or 2 additional divisions were to be left in Greece, This order is revoked; this task will be taken ovrer by the Italians,
B. Air Force:
The Air Force can also use the Greek mainland and the Aegean Islands as bases in carrying on aerial warfare in the eastern Mediter- ranean and for attacking the Suez Canal, The forces needed for this purpose are to be left in Greece or to be transferred there
The German air forces can make full use of airfields, airfield installa- tions, comaunications, and supply installations in the area occupied by
- 169 - the Italian forces If necessary new airfields can be constructed also in this area,
The Armed Forces 'High Co and has wade requests to tlis effect to the Italian High Comand. The details will be arranged directly between the German and the 'Italian Air Forces ; the necessary consideration should be given to possible Italian wishes in this respect.
In addition to defenses for German bases, only antiaircraft guns need to be left for the protection of the German Army forces. If necessary the Gorman occupied area and the Aegean Islands can be fortified as a southern protective area for air defense of the Rumanian oil fields, The Co nder in Chief, Air will reach the necessary agreements for the remaining Greek area directly with the Italian Armed Forces.
It 'is to be examined further whether a.ir bases, at least for light planes, can be established on the islands in the Aegean Sea, in. order to safeguard also from the air the sea supplies that must be pushed for- ward as far as the Dodecanese. Results are to be reported
C®
Italian forces are to be provided for coastal defense in thoe parts of the area under the jurisdiction of the Navy, including any is- lands, which are not occupied by Ge uanforces.
5. e ny is not interested in the following in Yugoslavia:
a, Croatia as an autonomous state..
b, Italian spheres of interest (the Albanian part of Yugo- slavia, Montenegro, ' Dal tia, and Drava, insofar as they are not under. Ge man administration).
C, The former Hungariar. areas which are vest of the Tisa.
d. Bulgarian spheres of interest (Macedonia).
4., In the new states as under 3, Germany will assure herself the following:
a, Economic privileges and exports - at least those obtained formerly from Yugoslavia (bauxite from Dalmatia, grains, meat, raw materials).a)
b, Transit riuhts and communication connections as far as Greece,
c. Shipping rights on the Danube, and protection ,thereof from Belgrade to the Bulgarin-Ruanian frontier.
5, The Fuebrer now has approved and desires entry of Bulgarian troops into Thrace, in the area between the Struma and the line Dede Agach- M~ustafa Pasha,
Bulgarian police forces or troops can also enter Yugoslav territory, but not for the time being cross west of the line Pirot-Vranje-Skoplje- the Vardar as far as the Greek border, Insofar as German movements are affected by the Bulgarian occupation, the Bulgarian forces are subordin- ,ated to the German armies in these areas.
6, The P'uehrer plans to release the Greek prisoners of war which are in G(oersa hands after the end of fighting in Greece* This plan can be
- 170 publicized inofficially already, in order to break the Greek will to re- sist and to counter ,the .British plan to use Greek- forces in other theaters. (Therefore it is out of the question to hand over Greek prisoners to Bulgaria.) British prisoners of w ,r are to be sent to Germany.,
Of Yugoslav prisoners of war only those of German extraction, Hungarianst Bulgars, and Croats should be released for-the t being. Other orders will fog Uo.m 7, Utilization of captured materiel:
a, teriel captured i slaia:
The Army High Co-aud and the Co nder in Chief, Air will determine which mate iel they will use to augment German equipment. This materiel ,is to be taken first and stored separately. This includes es- ecally air f orce equipe nt, ground installations, aviation fuel dumps,,, motor vehicles, antiaircraft s, '4.7 cmn antitank guns, and modern heavy artilleery (2 koda) Captured tanks are to be set' aside for formag unita to be used later to patrol the old Serbian area.
The remaining captured materiel will be given later to Bulgaria and in part also to Hugary. Materiel which is in Croatia will be left tere for the time being.
The Commander in Chief, Navy will contact the Hungarian High Co nd directly concerning distribution of captured Danube vessels.
b, Materiel captured in Greece:
Of the materiel captured in Greece, only what is especially valuable for us should be taken, Otherwise the materiel in Thrace shold .be given to Bulgaria, and that in the remainder of ' Greece to Italy, it should not be taken to Ger ny.
c. The Armed Forces High Comnd, War Economy* and Ar nts Di- vision will arrange for payment of the mteriel given to our allies.
Paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 were sent ahead by tele ,gram.
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signed: K tel -
_~ 11_1~- -- -~- -1-
- 172- The Fuebrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer headquarters of the Armed Forces 25 Apr. 19 1
Mr. '58/41 g.Kdos. Chefs. Wt-Abt.L (I Op) No. # of ten copies
Top secret
Directive No. 28 (Operation "Merkur")
1. An operation to occupy the island of Crete (operation "Merkur") is to be prepared with the purpose of using Crete as an air base against Britain in the eastern Mediterranean..
The plan will be prepared on the assumption that the entire Greek main- laudincluding the Peloponnesos, is in Axis hands.
2. I delegate command of the operation to the Commander in Chief Air. The forces emploV3Il be primarily the airborne corps a e air forces now operating in the Mediterranean.
The , in direct agreement with the Commander in Chief, Air, will ke available in Greece suitable reinforcements for the airborne corps, including a mixed tank detachment, which can be, transported to Crete by sea,
The i!a!v will make preparations for sea communications, which must be assureas soon as the occupation of the island begins. The Commander in Chief, Navy will reach the necessary agreements with the Italian Navy concerning protection of communications and insofar as necessary the procurement of shipping space.
3. All means are to be utilised for bringing up to the assembly area specified by the Commander in Chief, Air the airborne corps, including the 22nd. Division which has again been placed under him. The Army and Air High Commands are to furnish the Chief of Armed Forces Transports, with the necessary trucks. The transport movements must not be permitted to delay assembly of the forces or operation arossa ".
4. The Commander in Chief, Air can use the antiaircraft units of the 12th Army for antiaircraft rotection in Greece and Crete. The Coma- manders in Chia; Ai a y wil reach the necessary agreements con- cerning relieving or replacing these forces.
5. After the island has been occu ied all or part of the airborne corps Be ma 3e ava ausa e or new tasks, 'Therefore it should be planned to replace it soon by Army forces.
If necessary, Army captured guns can be used by the Commander in Chief Navy for building up the coastal defenses.
6. I request the Commanders in Chief to report the measures planned, and I request the Commander in Chief, Air also to inform me when he ex- pects to complete the preparations. I myself will issue the order for carrying out the operation,
signed: Adolf Hitler
- 172 - The ?hrer and 3apre Co er Fuebrer Headquarters of the Ared ' Forces 13 May 19kL
Order concerning? martial law in.the area ,o' o gnati.on 'Barbarossa" and s ca vas es or a etr8oos5
The primary purpose of tial law is to maintain discipline. The extensive operations areas in the Esty the type of warfare required thereb g and especially the peculiarity of the enemy, confront the mii- tary courts with tasks which they can cope with only it they confine Jurisdocton at fir'st only .to their main tasks during the. fighting and until the conquered, are, has been somewhat pacitied, in view of the litte pe.ssonel available. Tss possible only it the troo a themselves ruthlessly defend them- selves against arty threat trm e enem c v ian population.
Conse uently the following directives are issued for the area of opera- tion bar ossa" (operations area, area in the rear ot the Army, and area of political amiistration): I ,
nner of deals. with cries b enem ivllians
1. Crms by enemy civilians are outside ot the jurisdiction oathe mili y courts nt l urher notice.
2. Guerrillas are to be el nted ruthlessly by the troops in combT0at
3. Also all other attacks on the armed forces or rsons connected with em enemycivianssou e ea w on espo y e troop8 with t e most severe measures until the attackers have been de- stroyed,
4. In cases where .such measures were .neglected or were not possible at first, rsns- sus cted of' crimes are to be broa ht before an of-
fhCollective reprisals will becarried out at once upon orders of an of- ficer with at least the rank of a battalion commander against villages from which the armed forces were attacked in an underhanded manner, when circumstances are such tat the guilty individual cannot be appre- hended quickly,
5, It is expressly forbidden to keep suspicious persons prisoner in order to hnd tem over to the courts when these will again hve juris- diction over the civilian population,
6. Te coa nders in chief of the Army Groups, in agreement with the copetent co nders of "the Air Force and the Navy, can reestablish court jurisdiction over the civilian puation wherever te area" s been s afic ently paie.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command will attend to this in he area of~Lthe politics administration.~ltfog
III
Maner of ea~i with crimes b mbrs of the armed torces and reons
- 173 - connected with them against the civilian 2o ulation:
1. There is no conulsion to prosecute actions conmiitted' by members of the arne orces and persons connecter with t em a ainst enemy civilians, even when such acts constitute crimes or offenses under military aw.
2. In ud .1 such acts it should be kept in mind in each case that the co&'1 apse o , e later times of suffering of the German people, and the fight against National Socialism, with the many National Socialists who perished, were mainly the result or boishevist influence, and no German must forget that.
3, The judicial officer will investigate, therefore, whether in such cases disiplinary punishment is in order, or whether le al roceed are necessary.Tjdcial fficer orders court mas procee n s in crimes against enenl civi.lians oni when maintenance of discipline or protection of the troo s re uire this. hs is the case, for example,. in serous cr s nvo v ng ac o sexual restraint, criminal tenden- cies,' or indicating that the troops threaten to get out of hand. Gen- erally speaking, offenses which result in unnecessary destruction of quarters, supplies, or other captured, materials, to the disadvantage of our troops, should be dealt with equally severely.
Preliminary proceedings must be undertaken in each case only on the 'written order or the judicial officer.
4. Extreme caution should be exercised in evaluating the authenticity of the statements o enemy civilians.
III.
Responsibility of the troop commanders:
Within their jurisdiction the troop eommanders are personally responsible for the following:
1. That all officers subordinate to them are informed promptly about the principles under section I. and are aware of the extreme importance thereof.
2. That their legal advisers are infortmed promptly of these, directives and of the oral information given to the Commanders in Chief concerning political plans.
3. That only such verdicts are confirmed as are in accordance with these political plans. IV..
Security regulation:
Classification of this order will be reduced to secret when operation "Barbarossa" is launched.
By direction:
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signed: Keitel
I ' - '-
- 174 - The Fuiehr r and S$preme Commander .Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 1±7 May 194l o w/W st/bt. L (I Op.) N6K. Sof twenty-five copies Hr. I 7 , Chefs.
Top secret
Directive No. 29
1. eh objective of the Geran eraion in the southeast, i.e., to drive. the r tis rom e us an o lay the foundation for German air operations in the eastern part of the Mediterranean, has been reached, and is to be carried even further through operation "Merkur".
With certain exceptions (listed below), it w41l be Italy's task to
rantse the securit of Greek territor in' the future * Therefore r n ahorir es wi rlimioanerf sing with secu.>ity and ad- ministrative matters of a general nature in Greece. In particular, German authorities are to refrain from acting as intermediaries if called upon to do so by the Greeks,
As for the deliver of supplies, an agreement is to be reached with the Italian Arme orces w i regard to supply routes and their protection.
2. The following will apply to the German Armed Forces:
Army
The following German troops will remain in Greece:
a. Those forces which are essential to guarantee the security of. the supply base for operation "Merkur", They are to be closely concen- trated locally.
b. A division near Salonika (see Paragraph 3). This division will also be charged with safeguarding Lemnos and any other islands which are to be kept under German occupation.
However, the areas, including the islands, which are to serve as jumping-off points, for operation "Merkur" must remain in German hands until the operation has been completed. All German forces no longer needed according to these instructions will be withdrawn as quickly as possible,
The Italian High Command is to be informed that all arrangements which will expedite taking possession of Greece are to be made with the Comn- manding General of the 12th Army, As the "Commandin General of Gieran roo in the s he w move his hen guar ere to a on as soon as the sa on operation " erkur") permits.
Air Force:
Even after being transferred to Greece the X Air Corps will con- tinue to be independent in carrying on air warfare, taking its orders from the Commander in Chief, Air Force, to whom it will remain directly subordinate. For the defense of the Balkan area it will cooperate with the 12th.Army Command (Commanding General of German troops in the Balkans),, and for the campaign in North Africa it will cooperate with the Africa Corps. Orders on territorial matters which must be regulated in a uniform manner in the Balkans will be made by the Commanding
175 - General, 12th Army, for the X Air Corps as well.
The Air Force ground organization in Greece and on the islands will be at the disposal of the Commander in Chief, Air Force for air warfare in the eastern part of the Mediterranean., All air fields and installations not needed by us will be turned oer. to the Italian Armed Forces.
After Crete has been captured the Commander in Chief, Air Force (Air- borne Corps) will be charged with the defense of the island. He will submit his suggestion.as to when the corps should be relieved. I re- serve to myself the right to issue orders in this connection, and also with respect to the future occupation of Crete.
Navy:
In addition to Salonika and the harbor of Athens, thecoastal strip between the two ports, as far as it is needed for coastal traffic, will remain-under the jurisdiction of the German Navy. The Commander in Chief, Navy will make the necessary arrangements for this with the Italians, Later on, the German Navy will be responsible for the coastal defense of Crete. as well, if Crete is to remain occupied by German troops .
As for questions of a territorial nature, the same principles governing the X Air Corps will apply to the Navy.
The German influence on the Bulgarian coastal defense along the northern coast of the Aegean Sea is to be maintained, as in the past.
The Admiral, Southeast will carry out operations and sea-borne transpor- tation in the Aegean Sea with the Italian naval forces assigned to him, in accordance with the orders of the Commander in Chief, Navy.
In all other matters the Admiral, Southeast is directed to cooperate with the competent Italian authorities.
3. In the area around Salonika the German Armed Forces alone consti- tute the findi authority with respect to all military measures. The Army High Command (Commanding General of the German Troops in the Balkans) will submit his proposal as to the exact boundary of this area.
4f. The administration of the Greek territory remaining under the oc- cupation of German troops will be regulated by the Army High Command, in agreement with the Deputy of the German Reich in Greece. For this pur- pose the Greek administration is to be utilized as much as possible and* the employment of German personnel is to be kept to a minimum.
5. The "Military Commander, Serbia" has important economic duties to carry out; therefore the Army High Command will give him full power and will furnish him with the security troops he requires in order to be able to accomplish his mission independently.
6. I expect the Commanders in Chief to report to me on the measures taken in connection with this directive and on the agreements made with the Italians.
signed: Adolf Hitler
______I_
- 176 - The Armed Fore s igh Command Fuehrer Headquarters 44780/41 g,KChefs 'WFSt/Abt. L(I Qj ) 23 May 19k1
No. 3 of fifteen copies
Top secret Re: Rumania
Following the report of General Hitter von Schobert, the Fuebrer has reached the following decision:
Upon his arrival in 'mania, General Ritter von Shobert will be "Com- mander in Chief of the German 'Troops in Rumania", His tasks will be as follows:
a. He will make preparations for the defense measures ordered for operation "Barbarossa%, and for later attack operations0
b. " He is responsible for the protection of the entire Rumanian area, and can turn over the defense of Rumania to be handled indepen- dently by the Chief of the Armed Forces Mission, as soon as the 11th Army takes the offensive and leaves Rumanian territory.
For this purpose the Chief of the Armed Forces Mission and the chiefs of the a nt missions are subordinate to him. (Cf. the regulations issued for the protection of the oil fields and the coasts.)
c, He will discuss with the Rumanian Chief of State all questions directly affecting his tasks.
The Fuebrer has given the following orders for these discussions with the Rumanian Chief of State:
(1) General Ritter von Schobert is to call on General Antonescu on his arrival and to introduce himself as the successor of Field Marshal List in his capacity as "Commander in Chief of the German Troops in Rumania".
He is to tell General Antonescu that the Fuebrer is planning to ask General Antonesen to eome to Germany for a personal conference.
(2) The appointment of a new "Commander in Chief of the German Troops in° Rumania" is to be explained to General Antonescu to the. effect that the presetI concentration of exceptionally strong Russian forces in the western border area requires that measures be taken for the protection of the Rumanian territory. For this reason, the German Army forces in Romania are also to be increased to 6 divisions, while the concentrations in the Balkan area are being dissolved.
(3) The combined German-Rumanian task, to protect the Rumanian territory against surprise attacks, necessitates corresponding Rumanian measures. General Antonescu is requested to submit suggestions in this connection, which General Ritter von Schobert is to integrate with the German measures.
A Rumanian mobilization on a considerable scale is, however, undesirable.
(4) Any questions as to whether Germany expects war with Russia, or perhaps might attack-Russiaa, are to be evaded,
- 177 - (5) Should General Antonescu express fears that Hungary might become hostile to Rumania, it should be pointed out that this danger does not exist since Germany would not tolerate it.
(6) Following his conference with General Antonescu, General Ritter von Schobert is to submit his suggested plans and regulations to the Operations Planning Section of the Armed Forces High Command Opera- tions Staff,
In addition, General Hansen (Cavalry) is to submit an evaluation of the Rumanian Army (fighting quality of the various divisions and evaluation of the coanders,
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signed: Heitel
The Fuebhrer and Supreme Commander Fuebrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 23 May 19 11
OKW/WFSt/Abt.L (I Op) Ni. r44772/'4 gLChefs. No. 5 of twenty-two copies
Top secret
tDirecive No. 30
The Middle East
1. The Arab liberation movement in the Middle East is our natural ally against rea b in. rebellion of raq is of special impor- tance in this respect. It will strengthen the ati-British forces of the Middle East beyond the Iraqi frontier and will interfere with British communications and tie down British troops and tonnage at the expense of other theaters of operations.
Therefore I have decided to speed developments in the Middle East by supporting Iraq.
Whether the British are finally to be dislodged in their position be- tween the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, in connection with an offensive against the Suez Canal, and how this is to be done, will be decided only after operation Uabarossal.
2. In recapitulation of my successive decisions, I order for the sup- port of Iraq as follows:
a. A military mission is to be sent there.
b. The Air Force is to provide assistance.
a. Armament deliveries are to be made.
- 178 - 3, The military mission: (code ~e:m Sonderstab F") will be under the comman o r orce General Felmy,
Its duties are as follows:
a, To advise and support the armed forces of Iraq.
b, To establish military liaison with anti-British forces even outside of Iraq as far as possible.
c. To gain experience and kowledge regarding these areas for the German armed forces.
The corn osition of this organization will be regulated by the Chief of Staff , me orces High Command in accordance with these duties.
Regarding command jurisdiction the following will be observed:
a, All armed forces personnel to be sent to Iraq, and also the liaison staff in Syria, are under the orders of the Chief of the Mili- tary $ission.
b. The Chief off the Military Mission is under the command of the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Co nd, except that orders and di- rectives for the air force units are the sole concern of the Commander in Chief, Air.
c. The Chief of the Military Mission will be in contact only with the military authorities of Iraq, Negotiations with the Iraqi government in matters concerning the Military Mission will be conducted by the representative of the Foreign Office in Iraq.
The Chief of the Military Mission must clear in advance with the repre- sentative of the Foreign Office all military dispositions which can have repercussions in the field of foreign policy.
d. Members of the Military Mission are, for the time being, to be considered volunteers (in the same way as the Legion Condor). They will wear tropicaluniforms, with Iraqi insignia. German airplanes are likewise to be marked in the same way..
4. Air Force
The assignment of air forces, which will be limited in numbers, is in- tended besides having tactical effect to strengthen the self-confidence and will to resist of the Iraqi population and armed forces.
The Commander in Chief, Air will decide the manner and degree of German intervention.
5. Arms deliveries
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command will issue the required orders regarding deliveries from Germany and from Syria (on the basis of the agreement concluded with the French).
6. The direction of propaganda in the Middle East is the task of the
- 179 - Foreign Office, which is to cooperate in this with the Propaganda Section, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command. The basic idea of this propaganda will be: "Victory of the Axis Powers will liberate the lands of the Middle;East from the British yoke and give them the right of self-deternination.* Let those who love liberty go over to the anti-British camp." No propaganda attacks are to be made on the position of the French in S~glia , 7, Should Italian military personnel be assigned to Iraq. we will co- operate with em on the basis o s directive. Attempts will be made to have them subordinated to the Chief of the German Military Mission. signed: Adolf Hitler
The Armed Forces High Command Berlin, June 1941 144/41 &Kdos .Chef s.WFSt/WPr. No. 50 of one hundred copies
Directive for handling propaganda for operation "Barbarossa"
1. No final and complete directives for propaganda against the Soviet Union can be given at the present time, since it is altogether possible that political developments will furnish especially effective propaganda material still prior to the beginning of the operation. The following propaganda may therefore be supplemented later: a. The enemies of Germany are not the peoples of the Soviet Union, but exclusively the Jewish-Bolshevist Soviet government with its functionaries and the Communistic Party which is working for world rev- olution. be It should be pointed out that the German Armed Forces are not entering Russia as enemies of the population. The Soviets have exercised ruthless control by force over the entire population in the-area under their control, and Germany wants ,to free them from Soviet tyranny. If, however, non-Bolshevist parts of the population should offer resistance, the German Armed Forces will be obliged to break it wherever and when- ever encountered.
c. Likewise, the German Armed Forces will be obliged to use the
* Handwritten marginal note: "Except Syria."
- 180 - .full severity of martial law against anyone who through espionage, sabo- tage, or use of weapons contrary to international law attempts to injure the German Armed Forces and to support the Sovies,
d. At first no propaganda should be used aimed at breaking up the Soviet Union into separate states, While Grman propaganda should use, in each of the various areas of the Sovietanion, the language native to it, the propaganda must not lead prematurely to the conclusion that it. is planned to dissolve the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless the expressions "Russia" "Russians", "Russian armed forces" etc., must be avoided, and the ternms 1Soviet Union", "Peoples of the Soviet Union", "Red Army", etc., must be used instead.
e. Later it is important to impress upon the population the im- portance for everyone to keep on working as asual. Looting, waste of food and fodder, and destruction of machines and industrial installa- tions wll necessarily lead to poverty. and famine, For the same reason land will not be distributed to begin with, or collective enterprises broken up, even though this is planned for later. Immediate changes in the economic setup would damage everyone and only servo to increase the disruption of economic life caused by the war.
2. Reporting of all kinds by the propaganda troops will be permitted as soon as the fighting against the Soviet Union begins. Cruelties and other acts contrary to international law which the Red Army may commit should be emphasized especially. Reports based only on hearsay are not usable, They must be based on official reports of officers. It is es- pecially important that the first reports about the fighting arrive at.. the Armed Forces High Command very quickly. For this reason, mixed re- porter troops must be integrated into the very front units.
3. The Armed Forces High Command will establish .propaganda posts at Rzoszow, Warsaw, Koenigsberg, and Rovanienm, The propaganda troops are responsible for getting the information to the nearest propaganda post, while propaganda communication companies will be appointed by the Armed Forces High Command for transmitting the information from there to Berlin. In addition, direct courier services of the Army and the Air Force are to be utilized as much as possible to transport propaganda material,
4. For transmitting the texts of reports, especially from the propa- ganda posts to Berlin,' telephone communications should be utilized inso- far as they are available. Orally transmitted reports should neverthe- less be sent in writing at the next opportunity, indicating that the re- port was already sent by telephone.,
There will be facilities at Cracow, Warsaw, and Koenigsberg for sending reports by radio.
5. Active propaganda measures are more promising against the Red Army than against any previous enemies of the German Armed Forces. There- fore it is planned to use as much thereof as possible. In addition to methods of active propaganda to be used against the enemy on special orders from the Armed Forces High Command on special occasions, the armies and panzer groups are free to use all propaganda methods at the disposal of their propaganda troops in order to achieve certain ends connected with their fighting as soon as the fighting starts. As soon as the propaganda text comprises more than purely tactical material con- cerning the locality and situation at the time, it must conform to the general directives laid down in paragraph 1.
- 181 - 6. The Armed Forces High Command will issue orders directly to the Air Force for dropping pamphlets to the Soviet troops.
7. It is advisable for. the armies to prepare posters for the popula- tion, conforming in general with the directives outlined under paragraph 1, adapted in content and language to the local population. In addition, these posters can contain in very brief form the orders laid down by the commanders in chief for the local population. The posters are to be pre- pared both in German and in the language prevailing in-the specific area (e.g., Russian, Estonian, Latvian, etc.).
8. The use of loud speakers is recommended, depending on the situation, as a propaganda method not only against the enemy troops but also as a means of influencing the local population of the occupied areas. The armies and panzer groups can decide to what extent this is to be: done.
9. The 'Armed Forces High Coa nd will distribute to the armies "Nsotes about the Soviet Union" and "Directives for the Behavior of the German Troops".
The "Notes about the Soviet Union" aro to be distributed to the divisions and to the propaganda troops; the "Directives" down to and including the companies.
10. The Armed Forces High Command will supply the propaganda companies of the Army, shortly before the start of combat operations, with ad- ditional active propaganda experts, preps personnel, censors, and in some cases also radio personnel, who are to be left behind in large cities and at important radio stations when the offensive advances further, They will be detached later from the propaganda companies and will be formed into propaganda sections. To begin with, such propaganda sections are planned for the UMraine, Russia proper, and the Baltic region.
11. Wherever it is possible in occupied territories to control the press, it is desirable that several large newspapers continue to appear under German censorship. This applies especially to the Ukraine and the Baltic area. It is the main task of the censors to see to it that no reports or comments appear which might be detrimental to German interests. The main purpose of the press should be to have a calming influence on the population and to keep -it from committing any kind of sabotage. In places where it is impossible to control the press, papers and periodicals and the activities of information bureaus should be suppressed entirely.
12. It is of especial importance to gain controlof the extensive radio network of the Soviet Union as undamaged as possible, in order to util- ize it very soon for purposes of German propaganda. Therefore as a matter of principle an effort is to be made to capture and safeguard large, powerful transmitters by means of advance troops at an early stage. The combat troops are to be told specifically that they are to prevent destruction of radio transmitters.
As soon as complete censorship of radio broadcasts is assured, these should be resumed on a limited scale. For this purpose radio troops are available, which will be assigned by the Propaganda Section, Armed Forces High Command to some of the propaganda companies in accordance with paragraph 10.
The population is to be warned constantly not to participate in the fighting and to remain calm and orderly. The German News Agency (DNB) receivers of the propaganda troops should be used to supply the radio transmitters with information.
- 182 - 13. Mobile radio transmitters are provided to supplement the radio network, especially to replace important transmitters which the enemy has succeeded in destroying. The Armed Forces High Command, Propaganda Section will furnish the necessary personnel and will also regulate the use of these transmitters in detail.
14, German troops will be supplied with newspapers from Germany, infor- mation, and recreationa l material of various kinds through the branches of the:Armed Forces Propaganda Section at Rzoszow, Warsaw, and Koenigs- berg, which will establish contact with the various Army commads for this purpose.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Comand
by direction
signed: Jodl
Addition:
1. The above directives are to be distributed only to commands involved in operation "Barbarossa".
2, - Th0e armies, panzer groups, and air corps will determine the time when the directives will be given. to the propaganda troops,
3. The Army, Navy, and Air Force High Commands are to report by 15 June 1941 to the Propaganda Section of the Armed Forces High Command to which commands the directives have been sent.
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuebrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 9 June 1941
oxw/wFst/Abt.L (I op-Iv/Qu) No. 2 of twenty copies Hr. Jff 9OO/4 g.K.Chefs.
Top secret
Directive No.31
In order to establish clear and uniform command jurisdiction in the oc- cupied Balkan area, I order as follows:
1. I appoint Field Marshal General List as "Commanding General, Armed Forces ,Balkans" (Wehrmachtbefehlshaber im Sueostefn) with eadquarters
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, Balkans will be the highest rep- resentative of the Armed Forces in the Balkans and will exercise execu- tive power in the territories occupied by German troops,
- 183 - He will be under my direct command.
2. Subordinate to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Balkans are the following commanders:
a, For the area of Old Serbia: the "Commanding General, Serbia"
(General or Anti-Aircraft Artillery, von Schroeder)
b. For the area of Salonika and the islands of Lemnos, 4ytilene, Chios and Skyros:
the: "Coanding General, Salonika and the Aegean Sea"
(to be appointed by the Army High Command)
c. For the area of Athens, Crete, Cythera, Anticythera and Milos:
the "Commanding General, Southern Greece"
(to be appointed by the Commander in Chief, Air).
3. The Commanding General, Armed Forces, Balkans is to make all. mili- tary decisions for all three branches of the Armed Forces in the fields of occupation, security, supply, transportation and communications in the occupied southeastern area (with the exception of questions having to do with offensive air warfare). In forming his decisions he will take into consideration the overall task of the Armed Forces in the Southeast. Through this arrangement command will be simplified and the branches of the Armed Forces, as vel as the Armed Forces High Command, will be relieved of many details and differences of opinion caused by the functioning of various headquarters of all the branches of the Armed Forces in the same area.
The duties of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Balkans, in detail will be as follows:
a. To insure a coordinated defense against attacks and distur- bances in the Serbian andGreek terrtories occupied by German troops, including the Greek islands.
Besides the aforementioned Commanding Generals,, who are responsible for carrying out defense measures in their respective areas according to his instructions, he has command .jurisdiction in these matters over the Admiral, Southeast and the Air Force Commander in the Balkans also. The staffs of elatter two headquarters are to be incorporat into this staff. He himself will decide to what extent the staffs of the subord- inate Commanding Generals of Salonika and the Aegean Sea and of Southern Greece are to be merged with those of the other branches of the Armed Forces.
b. To execute in a uniform way the extensive transport movements by water to and from Crete, which will be required in the near future, and to provide for their protection.
- 184 1.- CO To reglat cooperation with the Italin, and, so far as is necessary, with the Bulgarian ard forgces in the Balkans.
d® To direct su I by land and sea fo all units of the Armed Forces presen1 n Te .ns, according to t weir needs and to the ex- tent permjitted by the transport space available at any given time,
a, To supervise the militar over nt of the Coanding Generals in territories occupied by Germn troops,
4. The Co ding General, Aiwd Forces, Balkans has all the owers of 8 territorial commander in those sections of Serbia and' reece occup e Ge n rops, including the Greek islands,
The territories occupied exclusively by German troops will be operational areas, where the Co ndi General, Armed Forces, Southeast w exer- c ei xecutive power through the Cod riding Generals subordinated to him.
'Where German troops are stationed in territories belonging to Italian areas of occupation, he will exercise supreme military powers onbalf of all branches of the Armed Forces, so far as this is required by the military duties of the German Armed Forces.
5, For the delimitation of the powers of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast in relation to the "Reich Deputy for Greece", see an--, nex. (Tr. .® Not included.)
6. The island of Crete will occupy a special position in the south- eastern area.
It will be the operational base from which to carry on the air war in the Eastern Mediterranean, in coordination with the situation in North Africa, (See paragraph 7,)
Organizing, strengthening, protecting, and supplying this base are, at present, the most important tasks in the southeastern area,
As the base of the Air Foree's operations, the "Fortress Crete" is to be put under an Air Force General, as special commandant. He is to exer- cise executive power in conformity with the general instructions of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Balkans, as the deputy of the Command- ing General, Southern Greece, He will be responsible for the uniform defense of the island, with all the troops stationed there and subordin- ated to him for. this purpose, He will also have jurisdiction over the Army's administrative organization.
The eastern part of the island, as far as the general line from the western edge of the Gulf of ira'bella up to and including the town of ierapetra is aalloted to the Italian garrison. In all tactical matters referring to thg common defense o e sany, the Italians will be under the command of the island co ndant, .
7.. The air war in the Eastern Mediterranean is to be carried out ac- cording to the orders of the Commander in Chief, Air,
He is to make the required arrangements with the Italian air force di- rectly.
- 185 - 8, Troop and supply transports by sea and their protection by naval or air forces will be regulated by the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Balkans, through the Admiral, Southeast in cooperation with the Italian Navy and the X Air Corps.
In case the Rumanian and Bulgarian Navies should appear in the Eastern Mediterranean; the Commander in Chief, Navy will arrange directly with theAAiral, Southeast the procedure to be followed in cooperating with them and in carrying out naval strategy.
9. Directive No_.29 of 17 May 19'1 is revoked, so far as it is super- seded y e a ove orders,
signed: Adolf Hitler
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 11 June 1941
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L(I Op.) Nr. 44886/41 No. 2 of nine copies g.K. Chefs. (in draft form)
Top secret
Directive No. 32 (*)
Preparations for the period after operation "Barbarossa"
A. 'After the Soviet-Russian armed forces have been destroyed, Germany and Italy will possess military supremacy over t European continent, excluding the Iberian peninsula, for the time being. The European area will be safe then from any serious threat by land. Much smaller Army forces than those which we have had to maintain so far will then suf- rice for the protection of Europe and for such further offensive opera- tions as will be undertaken.
Emphasis in armament can then be concentrated on the Navy and the Air Force.
Greater German-French collaboration should and will tie down additional British forces, will remove any threat to the rear of the North African theater, will further curtail the British fleet's freedom of action in the western Mediterranean, and will protect the deep southwest flank of the European battle area, including the Atlantic coast of North and West Africa, against Anglo-American attacks.
* The present directive, while it bears the number 32, is not signed and is only a draft. It is included because of the manner in which it reveals the plans of the Nazi leaders if the war had taken another course. The portions enclosed between square brackets were crossed out by hand in the text. The revisions follow this document.
- 186 - It will not be long before Spain will be asked whether or not she is ready to cooperate in driving the British out of Gibraltar.
The possibility of bringing heavy pressure ..u bear upon Turkey and Iran improves the prospects of using those nations also, directly or indi- rectly, in the struggle against GreatBritain.
1B. With this situation existing after the victorious .termination of the compaign in the East, the Armed Forces could be confronted with the following strategic missions for late fall of l94l and winter of 9'94- l942:,
1. The newly conquered Eastern area must be organized and se- cured, and must b. exploited economically, with the full participation of the Armed Forces,
How large 8a security force will have to be left in the Russian area cannot be determined accurately until later, In all probability, how- ever, 60 divisions and one air force, along with Finnish and Rumanian forces, will be sufficient for the. future tasks in the East.
2. The fight against the British position in the Mediterranean and in the Near East must be continued.
a. We must. try to bring about the main attack on the Suez Canal, beginning probably in November, and amp Ty ng rman and Italian forces based in Cyrenaica.
Since the British forces in Egypt will probably be considerably strengthened by that time, we must attempt to send (over and above the Italian reinforcements) additional forces to the German Africa Corps in the strength of approximately 1 armored and 1 motorized division.
As soon as the situation in the East permits, these forces are to be equipped and made ready for assigment in the African theater of opera- tions.
This plan can be accomplished only if we can achieve a, satisfactory solu- tion of the transportation problem.
Transportation must be speeded up, therefore, by every means possible, including accepting the French offer and, if possible, utilizing the new sea route from the area of southern Greece.
It will be the ,Navy's duty, working together with the Italian Navy, to procure the required shipping space, chartering French and neutral ves- sels.
All possible assistance must,be given the Italian Navy in order to in- crease the unloading capacity of the North African harbors.
The question of transferring German PT boats to the Mediterranean later is to be examined.
A "Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces, Overseas" (Heimatatab Uebersee) will be set up. Its function will be to.:firect transportation preparations in a coordinated fashion, and it-ia-to co- operate with the German General attached to the Italian High Command and with the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast in accordance with the guiding principles laid down by the Armed Forces High Command.
b. Exertion of German pressure from the east in the direction
- 187 - of the Suez Canal, vith the purpose of facilitating the difficult attack against Egypt from the vest, should, be considered also.
The British defensive forces would at least be split up by such a man- euver,
For this purpose we must prepare, as early as possible, to assemble forces in Bulgaria strong enough to make Turkey politically accommiodat- ing, or to break her resistance by force of arms.
Motorized expeditionary corps are to be set up within the framework of this army, and, after the collapse of the U.S.S.R. has created favorable conditions, in the Caucasus, too, Their mission will be to break the way through Turkey and Syria into Palestine and through Iran to Basra2
c.* The Arabian independence movement must be utilized. In case major German operations are undertaken, the-position of the British in the Middle East will be made all the more difficult, the more their forces are tied down at the proper moment by disturbances and revolution- ary movements. All military, propagandistic, and political measures which will serve to bring this about must be strictly coordinated dur- ing the period of preparation. I hereby designate Special Staff F (Sonderstab F) as the central agency abroad, which is tohave avoice in all planning and measures referring to the Arabian area. It must be located in the area of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Balkans, and is to be furnished with the best experts and agents.
The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command will outline the duties of Special Staff F; wherever political questions are encountered he will act in agreement with the Reich Foreign Minister.
3. Closing the western entrance to the Mediterranean by elizinat- i ng Giral ar .
Preparaticas for operation "Felix", planned once before, are to be re- sumed again in earnest even before operations in the East have come to an end. We can expect that even the unoccupied zone of France will be opened for the passage of our supply trains, at least, if not for the passage of German troops. It is also not impossible that we might have assistance from the Frenchnaval and air forces.
After the capture of Gibraltar, only as many Army formations as will be needed to protect the Strait are to be provided for the crossing into Spanish Morocco.
It will be the task of the French to defend the Atlantic coasts of North and West Africa, to eliminate the British possessions in West 'Africa, and to reconquer the areas dominated by De Gaulle. The rein- forcements required will be granted them as the situation develops. The utilization of West African bases by the Navy and the Air Force, and possibly also the capture of islands in the Atlantic, will be easier after we dominate the Strait.
R4.Besides these prospective operations against the dominating position of the British in the Mediterranean, the siege of the British Isles must be resumed in full force by the Navy and the Air Force after. the campaign in the East has been concluded.
* 2c becomes 2d in the revised draft, Tr. N.
. no All armamunt plans serving this purpose will have priority in the over- all armament program. At the same time, the German anti-aircraft de- Tense is to be perfected to the greatest possible extent. Preparations for a landing in the British Isles willl serve a'double purpose: To tie up British forces in the homeland and, should there be indications of an impending collapse of Great Britain, to hasten and finish this proces bay a landingq~
C. It is not yet possible to foresee at what time the operations planned for the Mediterranean area and the Near East can be commenced. The strongest operational effect would be achieved through attacks as nearly simultaneous as possible on Gibraltar, Egypt and Palestine.
Whether this will be possible depends ona'number of factors which can- not be gauged yet, but also mainly on whether the Air Force will be in a position to assign the forces required for the support of all three operations at the same time.
D. I request the Commanders in Chief to do their planning and make their preparations on the basis of these preliminary intentions, and to inform me of the results soon enough that I can issue my final direc- tives while the eastern campaign is still in progress.
~_ I~C~
The Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters 30 Jun. 1941 Nr.1 44886414 .KlCh. WFSt/Abt. copies L(I OIng " No. I of two Top secret
Reference: OKW/WFSt/Abt.L(I Op.) Jr. 44886/41 g.K.Ch. of 11 Jun. 1941 and directive to the German General at Italian Armed Forces Headquarters.
Re: Draft of Directive No. 32 and directive to the German General at Italian Armed Forces Headquarters.
Pages 2 and 3 (up to and including paragraph 2b) of the draft of Direc- tive No. 32. are to be replaced by the enclosed new draft.
Former paragraph 2c becomes 2d,
signed: Warlimont
B. On the basis of the situation which will result from the victorious conclusion of the Eastern Campaign, the following strategic tasks can confront the Armed Forces by late fall of 1941 and the winter 1941-42:
- 189 - 1. The newly won eastern territory must be organized, safeguarded, and exploited econo a y, uy er u participation of the Armed Forces.
The strength of the forces needed to safeguard the Russian area cannot be determined with certainty until later. In all probability, however, about 60 divisions and 1 air force will suffice for the further tasks in the East, in addition to the forces of our allies and other friendly 3 powers.
2, The fi it against the British position in the Mediterranean and the Near East must be contnue y a concentric attck launced rom Libya Throu~7ghgypt, from Bulgaria through Turkey, and if necessary from Transcaucasia through Iran,
a. In North Africa it is important to eliminate Tobruk and thus to ostabli t e saes or continuing the German-Italian attack on the Suez Canal. This operation should be prepared for November, pro- vided that the German Africa Corps should be reinforced and equipped to the greatest possible extent, and be provided with sufficient re- serves of all kinds (the 5th Light Infantry Division should be reorganized into a full panzer division). No additional large German units should be sent to North Africa, however.
The preparations for the attack require that transport movements be speeded up with all available means, using French North African harbors and if possible the new sea route from the southern Greek area.
It is the task of the Navy, in cooperation with the Italian Navy, to provide for the necessary shipping space by chartering French and neutral ships.
The question of later transferring German PT boats to the Mediterranean should be investigated.
The Italian Navy should be given every possible assistance in improving the unloading capacity of the North African harbors.
The Commander in Chief, Air will supply the African' Corps sufficient air forces and antiaircraft artillery for the continuation of the opera- tion as these become available in the East, and will reinforce the Italian air cover for sea transports by German planes.
The Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas (Heizatatab Uebersee) has been organized to assure unified direction of transports. It will function according to the directives of the Armed Forces High Command in cooperation with the German General at the Italian Armed Forces Headquarters and with the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast.
b. In view of the expected British reinforcements in the Middle East, and especially for the protection of the Suez Canal, a German operation from Bulgaria through Turkey is to be planned, aimed at attacking the British position on the Suez Canal also from the East.
For this purpose, as early as possible sufficiently strong forces are to be assembled in Bulgaria to make Turkey politically amenable, or if necessary to break her resistance by force of arms.
c. When the collapse of the Soviet Union makes this possible, preparations for using a motorized expeditionary corps from Trans- caucasia against Iraq should be made in conjunction wit the operations underer
- 190 - d, The Arabian independence movement......
a~aa~-r~a~-B1~- -~ai~--rs~B1 -nn~o
Armed Forces Highi Co iid Fuehrer Headquarters Hr, 1O2k/41 g,Kdos, Chefs,.20 {June 1941
No. 2 of fourteen copie8
Top secret
Re: .Operation "Isabella"/
References: OWW/ St/Abt. L (I Op.) r, 44640/41 g.Kdos.. Chefs. of I May 1941
OK6xGen StE. Op. Abt, 118 Kr. 1103/41 g.Kdos. Chefs. of 3 Jun. 1941
Ob.d.L. (Lw Fue St. Ia) Kr'. 6632/41 g.Kdos. Chefs of 29 May and II Ang. of 31 May 1941
Webhr. Trap. Chef r,. 2071/41 g.Kdos. of 7 Jun._ 1941
, The 10 days alert period proposed for operation "Isabella" is based on the assumption that the operation will be carried out on our own initiative.
Should operation "Isabella" become nedessary owing to a British landing, it must be possible to put into effect the corresponding countermeasures at the earliest possible moment.
2. With the beginning of operation "Isabella", the Army will be auth- orized to cancel the manning of the North East Line which will be main- tained even though incomplete until then.
3, Reconnaissance, supply arrangements, etc., on Spanish territory are prohit e or e beginning o operation "Isabella".
4, Reconnaissance, supply arran eents, etc., after the beginning of the operaton:
a. If operation "Isabella" is carried out in consequence of a British landing, reconnaissance activities, etc., will no doubt be pos- sible before our troops cross the border.
b. Should operation "Isabella" be carried out on our own initia- tive, it cannot yet be stated which, if any, preparations can be made before we march in,
5, It can also not be predicted as yet whether, in addition to pro- viding transport facilities for supplies, the railways in unoccupied
- 191 - France will be available for the movement of troops.
6. The Spanish Government has given its consent to the building of an auxiliary railway bridge at Irun.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
By direction
signed: Warlimont
The Fuebrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 13 Jul. 1941
WFSt/Abt. LI(I Op/I org) No. 12. 'of fourteen copies 2l79/42 g.K sefs.
Top secret
Re: The tank program as part of the Army armament program
I issue the following directives for the further use and expansion of the tank arm:
1. As far as possible the tank units so far committed must be suffi- cient for the .easterncamaign.
In case of considerable losses, separate tank units can be combined and parts not needed (without tanks) can be withdrawn.
The 2nd Panzer Division is not to be used temporarily, and the 5th Panzer Division is to remain in Germany.
Total tank losses on the Eastern Front can be replaced only to the ex- tent permitted by me.
2.' During the next months, approximately 6 tank divisions are to be equipped or organized in Germany. If necessary, the units withdrawn as per section 1, second paragraph, can be used.
3. By 1 May 1942 there must be 36 panzer division. of three battalions, and, counting the SS' motorized units, 18 motorized divisions:
a. In the East: 12 panzer divisions and 6 motorized divisions.
b. For other tasks: 1 panzer army of approximately 24 panzer di- visions, including the 6 panzer divisions under section 2 and the 2 panzer divisions in North Africa.
- 192 - The Armed Forces Jigh Co nd will draw up and release a survey of the forces which will probably be needed by the Army and the Air Force after the eastern campaign.
This army is to be organized by using tank units still becoming avail- able in the East and by reorganizing infantry divisions and Army troops after fall of 1941; the tanks are to be supplied from those coming out of production up to spring 1942,
Entire tank units with captured equipment can be used.
Other equipment of these new divisions must be taken from the motorized equip nt of the Army as a whole (including captured material), insofar as supplies and current production are not sufficient.
c, The equipment for 4 additional tropical tank divisions is to be made available, if possible by fall 1941, as part of the future ex- panded tank arm,
4. The Commander in Chief, Army will keep me informed about the measures planned to carry out this directive
signed': Adolf Hitler
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 14 July 1941
OKW/WF~i~en~t/ L(II Org.No." 4 of thirteen copies NW. 44294 t. GkdIOs Chefs.
Top secret
In pursuance of the objectives of our future war aims as announced in Directive No, 32, I shall 1 y down the following guiding principles re- garding personnel and equipment
I. General:
After the defeat of Russia, when our forces will be in control of Europe, the size of the Army can 1be decreased considerably. Within the limits of this reduced army, the relative size of the tank arm will- be greatly increased.
Personnel and equipment of. the Navy will be confined to that which is necessary for the war against Great Britain and also against the United States if they should enter the war.
Military preparations will be concentrated above all on the Air Force, which is to be greatly expande
- 193 - 2. Personnel:
After hearing the suggestions of the Commander in Chief, Army, I shall decide as to the future strength of the Armay.
The size of the Replacement Army is to be fixed in proportion to the re- duced strength of the Army.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command will act in accordance with my directives in regard to personnel thus becoming available to the Armed Forces and the armament industry.
The 1922 age class will be drafted as late as possible and will be al- located.by the Armed Forces High Command, taking into consideration the future tasks of the various branches of the Armed Forces.
3. Materiel:
a, The Armed Forces as a whole:
Irrespective of'the table of equipment in force at present, arms and equipment of the troops are to be reduced to that which is necessary for field service.
All forces not designed for actual combat (security, guard, construction, and similar units) are, in the main, to make use of captured weapons and improvised equipment.
All orders for "general Armed Forces equipment" will be curtailed or cancelled immediately, depending on the supply on hand, need, and wear and tear. Wherever production can be proved to be essential, arrange- ments for continuing it must be made with the Minister for Armament and Munitions.
No expansion of production facilities (buildings and machine tools) will be permitted, except where full use of production capacity has been achieved through the employment of several shifts.
Work will cease on all permanent industrial and military constructions which either serve peacetime needs or do not 4irectl support the war effort and armaments, As for construction direr y supporting the war effort and armaments, the regulations laid.down by the Reich Commissioner for the Building Trade ("General Bevollmaechtigter fuer das Bauwesen") hitherto prevailing will remain in force. He will limit the construc- tion of buildings by civilian contractors to those which are the most essential to-the war effort.
All other orders not in compliance with these provisions are to be with- drawn immediately.
The manpower, raw material, and production facilities thus becoming available are to be released for vital armament jobs and will be put at the disposal of the Minister for Armament and Munitions without delay, so that they can be employed elsewhere.
b.z
Effective immediately all additions to the armament and equip- ment of the Army and all new production of arms, ammunition, and .equip- ment will be adapted to the future reduced strength of the Army. When- ever there is more than a six months' supply on hand, any additional
2 - f -9- requisitions for the items concerned are to be withdrawn. Production al- ready begun is to be ffinished only where' it would be uneconomical to make the change imedintely. The ffollowin1g are exceptions to the abovo-memtioned limitations:
The t nk proram ffor the motorized fforces, which is to be considerably exandred, including the production of specialized equipment and of heavy
The new program for medium anti- tank guns,, plus their ammunition and vebiclesa
The program for additional equipment for expeditionary forces, which will include four panzer divisions ffor use in the tropics, drawn from the ov r-all strength of the arored fforces.
Preprations for production which would, not contribute to the realiza- tion of this program will be baited.
As for anti-airorafft guns, the same priority will be given to the Army and the Air Force programs,* They are to be treated as a single program as far as production is concerned. Facilities available are to be util- ized to their full capacity in order to meet the monthly quotas ffixed by m.
The Navy will proceed with the submarine program. Construc- tion will be limited to that which is directly connected with the pro- gram. Any expansion off the armament program over and above this is to be stopped.
d. Air Force: The over-all arment program will concentrate in the main on carrying out the expanded Air Force ro am which I have approved. It J is of decisive importance o e whole war to complete it by the spring' of 1942e All facilities and means available to the Armed Forces and the war economy will be employed in order to accomplish this, The aluminum quota to be assigned to the Air Force will be increased as much as possible
The extent of the program and the speed with which it will be carried out is to be adjusted to the stepped-up production of light metals and petroleum.
4. Placing Army needs in the background, the pro aaam for owder and exlosives will' concentrate above all on Air Force requ rements 0 5, an -aircrafft ammunition). Plant expansion will be limited to abso- lutely essential improvements, and the construction will be of the simplest possible type. Preparations for chemical warfare will continue only along the lines hitherto followed.
5. It is of vital importance that the supl of raw materials and etroleumi be guaranteed. The Armed Forces w o every g poss le, especial y by giving preference to miners and skilled workers when re- leasing personnel, to ffurther coal production and increase the production
* Handwritten marginal note: "How about the Navy?"
- 195 - of light metals, buna, synthetics, and fuel. Construction of the in- stallations necessary for this purpose is to be given the same priority as the large-scale Air Force armament program.
6, Manpower, raw materials, and production facilities will be allo- cated in accordance with these guiding principles.
7. The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command will release the necessary orders for the Armed Forces, and the Minister for Armament and Munitions for his sector, in mutual agreement.
signed: Adolf Hitler
__~il __ I _I_
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed. Forces 18 July 1941
OKW/WFSt/Abt.L (IV) Nr. 001484/41 g.K.
I.
On 25 Jul. 1941 at 1200 noon the area west of. the Dvina (exclusive of Riga and Dvinsk, inclusive of Jekabpils and Druya) and north of the line Druya, Maletai, Ranmises, Vistytis will cease to be in the Army operations area.
II.
On that date the Reich Commissioner, Ostland, under the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, will take over the administration of this area in accordance with my order of 17 Jul. 19*1.
III.
The administration of small parts of the former state of Lithuania adjacent to the East Prussian border may possibly be placed into the hands of the President of the Province of' East Prussia at a later time, For the time being Kovno will be the seat of the Reich Commissioner. signed: Adolf Hitler
I_ __ _
- 196 - The XFue rer and Supreme Commander Fuehror Headquarters of the Armed Forces 19 July 194d
OY WFS t. Ab tL. I 0 Nr .No, 2 off thirteen copies
Top secret Directive N~os 33
Continuation of the War in the East
I. The breakthrough at the Stalin line and, the deep thrust of the tank groups have brought the second series of battles to a conclusion along the entire ffront. In the sector or the Central Army Group mopping-up of the strong enemy units which still remain between the motorized for- ces will require considerable time,
At the rear or the northern fflank off the Southern Army Group, the Kiev ffortress and the Soviet 5th Army are hindering our ffreedom off movement and the effectiveness of our operations.
2. The aim or the next operations will be to keep other strong enemy units from escaping into the open spaces or Russia, and to wipe them out,
For this purpose preparations are to be made along The ollowing .lines:
a. Sfouthaern part of the Eastern Front
The uppermost aim is to annihilate the enemy's 12th and 6th. Armies. This is to be achieved through 'aconcentric attack while they are still west or the Dnieper. The main Rumanian forces will support this operation in the south.
The enemy's 5th Army, as well, can be defeated and annihilated by means of coordinated attacks of the southern fflank or the Central Army Group and the northern fflank of the Southern Army Group.
In addition to inffantry divisions off the Central Army Group which are to turn southward, other rorces, especially motorized unit3, will be deployed to the southeast as soon as they have carried out their current mission and have secured their supply lines as well as their defense against attacks from the direction or Moscow. They are to keep those enemy troops which have succeeded in reaching the other side of the Dnieper River from escaping into the wide expanse of Russia, and are to wipe them out.
b0 Central Fart of the Eastern Front:
As soon as the numerous encircled enen y units have been dis- posed of and supply lines have been made secure, the Central Army Group will carry Gut the following mission:
While the infantry units continue to advance toward Moscow, those motorized forces which are not committed against the Dnieper River to the southeast will cut the connecting line between Moscow and Leningrad, for the purpose of protecting the right flank of the Nsorthern Army Group advancing toward Leningrad.
- 197 - e Northern part of the Eastern Front:
The advance in the direction of Leningrad will be continued only after the 18th Army has made contact with the 4th Panzer Army and after the 16th Army has succeeded in safeguarding the exposed flank satis- factorily. At the same time the Northern Army Group will endeavour to keep the Soviet forces still fighting in Esthonia from withdrawing to- ward Leningrad.
Early capture of the Baltic islands, which are potential bases for the Russian Fleet, is desirable.
d. Finnish Front:
It'.will remain the mission of the main Finnish forces, rein- forced by the bulk of the 163rd Division, to continue to attack the en- emy facing them, the main weight of operations being concentrated east of Lake Ladoga. They, together with the Northern Army Group, are to annihilate the enemy later.
The aim of the attacks under the XXXVI Corps and the Mountain Corps remains unchanged. However, they are to be instructed that for the time being they must not rely on any large-scale air support,. There-. fore operations may have to be temporarily delayed.
3. It will be the special task of the Air Force to support the attack at the southern part of the Eastern Front y concentrating planes and anti-aircraft guns there, as soon as these forces become available in the central part of the front. To accomplish this the Air Force, if necessary, will bring up reinforcements as soon as possible or regroup its forces so as to give support at focal points.
Temporarily reinforced by planes from the West, the 2nd Air Force will attack Moscow as soon as possible in "retaliation for the Soviet-Russian raids against Bucharest and Helsinki".
4. It will remain the task of the Navy to carry on traffic on the sea, especially that employed in supplying land operations, as far as is possible in view of the enemy situation on the sea and in the air. With the increasing pressure on enemy bases the Navy will also take measures to prevent, as far as possible, the escape of enemy ships to Swedish ports for internment there.
As soon as the naval forces in the Baltic Sea become available, PT boats and mine sweepers will be transferred to the Mediterranean, to start with one flotilla of each kind.
Several submarines will be assigned to the Arctic Ocean to support the German operations in Finland, which are being complicated by the arrival by sea of enemy reinforcements.
5. In the West and in the North all three branches of the Armed Forces must bear in mind the defense of the Channel Islands and the coast of Norway against possible British attacks. Measures must be taken so that planes can. be brought up quickly from the West Area to all parts of Norway.
signed: Adolf Hitler
F II
9 ri - S~I~i~------DI
The Chief of Staff of the Fuehrer Headquarters Armed Forces High Command 23 July 1941
Hr. 1,8 225 g H/41Chefs,
Top secret
Su lement to Dire tive o.
After a report by the Co uder in Chief, Army, the Fuehrer ordered as follows on 22 July, as supplement and amplification of Directive 33:
1, Southern paksrt of the Eastern Front:
The enemy forces still west of the Dnieper River must be crushed and disbanded, As soon as the operational and supply situation permits, the set and 2nd Panzer Groups are to be concentrated east of the Dnieper under the 4th Panzer Army, so that after they have seized the industrial district of IWharkov, followed by infantry and mountain divisions, they an crossgthe Don~ ands adance ito the Ca~&usus
The bulk of the infantry divisions is, first of all, to occupy the Ukraine, the Crimea, and the Central Russian territory up to the Don; the securing of the region southwest of the Bug is to be left for the time being to the Rumanian Army.
2. Central part of the Eastern Front:
After cleaning up the situation around Smolenak and at the southern flank, the Army Group must conquer the enemy still remaining between Smolensk and M4oscow, using the infantry units of both armies, which are sufficiently strong for the purpose, and advancing the left flank if possible. Then Moscow is to be captured
The 3rd Panzer Group is temporarily to be attached to the Northern Army Group in order to secure the right flank and to encircle the enemy around Leningrad.
The mobile units of the 3rd Panzer Group will probably be available again for the next tasks, i.e., the advance into the territory up to the Volga River.
3. Northern part of the Eastern Front:
Through receiving the 3rd Panzer Group, the Army Group will be able to assign strong infantry forces for an attack in the direction, of Lenin- grad and to avoid expending its mobile units in frontal attacks over difficult terrain. The enemy forces still fighting in Estonia are to be annihilated. For this purpose, their embarkation and retreat across the larva River in the direction of Leningrad has to be prevented.
The 3rd Panzer Group is to be returned to the Central Army Group when its task has been carried out.
4. The Army High Command has to plan further operations so that large parts of the Northern Army Group, including e aner Group,and also parts of the infantry forces of the Southern Army Group are the first to be withdrawn to home territory as soon as the situation permits. The 3rd Panzer Group is to be brought to 'full combat readiness by taking over
- 199 - personnel and materiel of the 4fth Panzer Group, while the 1st and 2nd Panzer Groups must, if necessary, help themselves. by merging their units.
5. For the Nav and Air Force the instructions of Directive No. 33 remain in force.
In addition they are to ease the situation of the Mountain Corps; the Navy through the determined use of its forces in the Arctic Ocean which have been reinforced in the meantime, and the Air Force by the transfer of several dive bomber groups to the Finnish theater after the conclusion of the fighting around Smolensk. This should also dampen any possible desire of the British to intervene in the fighting on the arctic coast.
6. The troops available for securing the conquered eastern areas will, considering the vast expanse or these stretches, suffice only'i the occupying power meets all resistance, not by legally punishing the guilty, but rather by spreading that type of terror which is the only means of taking from the population every desire for opposition,
The respective commanders are to be held responsible, together with' the troops at their disposal, for quiet in their areas. The commanders must find the means to keep their districts in order by employing suit- able Draconian, measures, not by requesting more security forces.
signed: Keitel
The Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters 27 Jul. 19g1 WFSt/Abt.L(IV/Qu) Nr. 0015901 Gkdos. No. 2 of twenty-four copies
Secret
Reference: OKWT/WFSt/Abt. L(IV/Qu) Nr. 44718/11l g.Kdos. Chefs. of 14 May 19'1
Re: Military Courts
All copies of the Fuehrer order of 13 May 1941 are to be destroyed in accordance with the regulations concerning secret documents:
a, ,In all commands up through the Gneral Commands.
b. In the panzer group' commands.
c. In the Army high commands and commands on the same level when it seems unavoidable that the document will fall into unqualified hands.
- 200 - (secr et Documt Regulation No., 58..)
The validity of the order is not affected by the destruction of the copies. The troop co Eders reniain personaii responsible, according to section III, for prompt notification of oiicers and legal advisers, and fr confirmation of only such verdicts as are in accordance with the political plans of the goyerment.
This r der' s to be destroyed with the copy of the Fue ber order
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signeda Keitel
The F hebxr and Supreme Co nder Fuebrer Headquarters of the Ared Forces30 July 194l
0 St Abt.L.b~I 0 ) .441298 lNo. 2 of fourteen copies
Top secret Difrec~ive o. 34
The development of the situation during the last few days, the appear- ance of strong enemy forces before and at the flanks of the Central Army Group, as well as supply conditions and the necessity for granting the 2nd and 3rd Panzer groups a pause of about 10 days for rehabilitat- ing their units, force us to disregard for the time bein the additional orders and objectives given in Directive No. o. y and its sup- plement of 23 July.
I therefore order as follows:
I. 1. In the northern art of the Eastern Front the attack, with its focal point be ween e 1 n and Narva, is to be continued in the direction of Leningrad; the purpose is to encircle Leningrad and to bring about contact with the Finnish Army.
This attack is to be covered north of Lake lmnen at -the Volkhov sector; south of Lake Ilien it should be carried only as far to the northeast as is necessary for protecting the right flank of the attack north of Lake Ii n, The situation at Velikiye Luki is to be cleared up before- hand. All forces not needed for this mission are to be added to the wing of the attack which is north of Lake Ilmen. The attack which was to have been launched against the heights of Valdal by the 3rd Panzer Group will not take place until full combat readiness has been established again by the panzer formations.' Instead, the left wing of the Central Army Group will have to be advanced as far to the northeast as the
- 201 - Northern Army Group requires for the security of its right flank.
Estonia is to be mopped up first by all the forces of the 18th Army. Not until this has been done may divisions be sent in the direction of Leningrad.
2. The Cent'al Army Group, taking advantage of. favorable terrain sectors, will s o the defensive.
Attacks with limited objectives may still be launched to whatever extent seems necessary for establishing advantageous lines of departure for future attack operations against the Russian 21st Army.
The 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups are to be withdrawn from the front for quick rehabilitation as soon as the situation permits.
3. At the southeastern part of the front operations are to be continued solely w te orces of the ouern Army Group, for the time being, Their mission must be to destroy the enemy forces west of the Dnieper and, in addition to that, to capture bridgeheads near to and south of Kiev in order to establish the proper conditions for bring- ing up the 1st Panzer Group later to the east bank of the Dnieper River.
The 5th Red Army, fighting in the swamp area northwest of Kiev, is to be engaged in battle west of the Dnieper and destroyed. Any danger of its breaking through to the north across the Pripet must be prevented in time.
4. Finnish front:
The attack in the direction of Kandalaksha is to be stopped. The danger which threatens the flank of the Mountain Corps from the Gulf of Motovki is to be removed. Only as many forces are to be left with the XXXVI Corps as are necessary for defense and for giving the im- pression that further attacks are being prepared.
The* cutting of the Murman Railroad is now to be achieved in the sector of the III (Finnish) Army Corps,. particularly in the direction of Loukhi. All forces suitable for this attack are to be transferred there. The remainder of the forces is to be added to the Karelian Army. If the attack should also be stalled in the sector of the III (Finnish) Army Corps due to terrain difficulties, the German forces are to be withdrawn and shifted to the Karelian Army. This concerns most of all the mobile portions, tanks, and heavy artillery.
The 6th Mountain Division is to be transferred to the Mountain Corps, utilizing all available ti neport routes. The Foreign Office will settle whether the railroad via Sweden to Narvik might also be used.
II. Air Force:
1. No~prtheastern .par_Jt of the front:
The Air Force is to shift the focal point of its offensive warfare to the nortieastern part of the front by detailing the bulk of - the VIII Air Corps to the 1st-Air Force. These reinforcements are to be brought up early enough so that they will be ready for operations when the attack to be launched by the Northern Army Group at that point (on the morning of 6 Aug.) begins.
2, Central part of the front:
It is the mission of the Air Force units remaining with
- 202 - the Central Amy Group to provide the fighter protection which is absolutely required in front or the 2nd and 9th Armies and to support possible local attacks, The ra ids on Moscow are to be continued.
3. Southeastern pat of the fr nt:
No new objectives No11decrease in the nmber of air forces operating with the Southern Amy Group is to be considerpd. ~eFinland:
The primry mission of the .5th Air Fore consists of support- ing the Mountain- Corps. In addition, the attack of the III (Finnish) Army Corps is t e supported at favorable points.
The required preparations are to be de for supporting the arelian Army in case this becomes necessary, signed: Adolf Hitler
~i~asa~n~rra~a~_001~
Fuebrer Headquarters
Nr.4413'6/1 *Chefs.WSt/Abt. 12 Aug. 1941 L(I Op.) No, 2 of fourteen copies
Top secret
SuOleMnt to Directive No. 3
Concerning the further progress of the operations, the Fuehrer has is- sued the following orders as a supplement to Directive No. 34:
I. ouhern artof t h e ° ° stern Front: By means of the battle or annihilation at Uman, the Southern Army Group has definitely gained superiority over the enemy and brought about the opportunity for far-reachin oprations beyond the Dnieper. As soon as the Army Group has established itself east of the river and 'secured its communications to the rear it will be strong enough, assuming a corres- ponding co stment 'of forces by the powers allied, to us and the coop- eration of the R nian Army, to achieve the ' far-reaching .objectives which will fall to its s e, without needing additional help.
Its next mission will be as follows:
a, To prevent the establishment of an organized enemy defense front on the other side of the Dnieper.
For that purpose the largest possible portion of the Russian Army units
- 203 - which are still vest of the Dnieper must be annihilated, and bridgeheads across that river must be captured as soon as possible.
b. To take the Crimean Peninsula, which is especially dangerous to the Rumanian oil area am a base for enemy air. forces .
c. To capture the Donets aa and the industrial area of Kharkov.
Mountain troops may be needed in the battle for the Crimean Peninsula. The question as to whether they should be used later on in the direction of Batum, via the Kerch road, is to be considered.
The attack against the city of Kiev proper is to be halted. Kiev is to be destroyed by means of incendiary bombs and artillery fire as soon as the supply situation permits.
This involves a large number of tasks for the Air Force. They cannot be taken care of simultaneously, but will havesto be ac'ieved one after the other, each with the strongest possible concentration of forces. Such concentrations must be formed by the addition of the'dive bomber groups, first of al, in the battles between Kanev and Boguslav, and later for the purpose of gaining a bridgehead across the Dnieper,
2. Central part of the Eastern Front:
Here the most urgent mission is to remove the enemy flanking positions projecting far to the vest, with which the enemy is tying down strong infantry forces on both wings of the Central Army Group. In this mis- sion special emphasis is to be given at the southern flank to the coop- eration between the inner wings of the Southern and Central Army Groups with respect to time and direction. The Russian 5th Army must be defin- itely annihilated after cutting the supply roads to Ovruch and Mozyr and depriving it of all further possibility of operating.
At the northern flank the enemy must be defeated as soon as possible through the use of motorized units west of Toropets. Subsequently, the left wing of the Central Army Group is to advance so far north that the Northern Army Group will be freed of concern about its weak right flank and will be put in a position to add infantry divisions to its front ad- vancing in the direction of Leningrad,
Independent from and previous to that, we must attempt to shift some division or other to the Northern Army Group as a reserve (102nd Di- vision).
Only the rehabilitation and the complete removal of these threats to the security of the flanks will make it possible to continue the attack, on a broad front and with echeloning on both flanks, against the strong enemy forces which have been assembled for the defense of Moscow. It should be the aim of this attack to deprive the enemy, before winter sets in, of his entire gover mental,armament, and traffic center arouni Moscow. That would prevent the rebuilding of the defeated Russian Army and the orderly functioning of their governmental system.
The operation against Leningrad will have to be concluded before this advance in the direction of Moscow is begun, and the airplanes which the 2nd Air Force transferred to the 1st Air Force must be at the dis- posal of the 2nd Air Force once more.
3. Northern part of the Eastern Front:.
The current attack is to lead to cutting off Leningrad and to effecting
- 204 - a union with the Finnish forces,
With re rd to the cooperation of' the Air Force, it is to be kept in mind that, as far as the location of .a r-e. permits, it whould as far as possible always be employed at one point in order to achieve the strongest concentrated effect.
As soon as the situation permits, the enemy air and naval bases on dgoe and Kesel will have to be eliminated by a joint operation of por- tions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Most important for this purpose is the destruction of' the enemy airports, which evidently are being used as bases for the raids on Berlin.
The Ary will be responsible for the unified preparation of' this opera- tion,
The Chief' of' the Armed Forces High Command
signed: Keitel
Armed Forces High Commaad _ Fuebrer Headquarters
Nr.4l86/4l g.K.Chefs. WFSt/L (I Op') 15 Aug. 194&l r
Top secret
After a report by the Commander in Chief, Army, the Fuebrer ordered today as follows:
1. The Central Army Groun is to stop further attacks in the direction of Moscow. It is to go over to the defensive in sectors which are not exposed to encircling attacks of the enemy and which permit the repulse of attacks even without strong assistance f'rom our Air Force, while saing our infantry forces.
2, The operations of' the Northern Army Group must be brought to a suc- cessful, conclusion in the shortest possible time. The resumption of the offensive against Moscow cannot be considered until then. Because of the appearance of enemy cavalry in the rear of the 16th Army and the scarcity of mobile units behind the I Army Corps we are threatened by the danger that our promising offensive north of Lake Ilman will mais- carry despite the strongest air support,
Consequently, the Panzer Group commanded by Hoth will turn over immed- iately to the Northern Arm Group as many mobile units (approximately one tank and two motorized divisions) as the latter is able to commit
- 205 - and supply.
By order of the Chief of Staff of the Armd Forces High Command
signed: Jodl
Copy
The Fuebrer and Supreme 9ommander 21 Aug. 194 1 of the Armed Forces
To the Commander in Chiefs Army
The Army's proposal of 18 August for the further conduct of operations in the East is not in accordance with my intentions.
I order as follows:
1. The most important aim to be achieved before the onset of winter is not to capture Moscow, but to seize the Crimea and the indus- trial and coal region on the Donets and to cut off the Russian oil supply from the Caucasus area; in the north the aim'is to cut off Leningrad and to join with the Finns.
2. The exceptionally favorable operational situation arising from our having reached the Gomel-Pochep line must be prompdly exploited for a concentric operation with the inner flanks of the Southern and the, Central Army Groups. Its aim must be not only to push the Russian 5th Army across the Dnieper by means of an attack by our 6th Army alone, but also to annihilate this Army before it can withdraw behind the Desna- Konotop-Sula line. This is the only way for the Southern Army Group to gain a sure foothold east of the middle section of the Duieper and to continue operations with its center and left flank in the direction of Rostov-Kharkov.
3. The Central Arm Group, regardless of later operations, is to assign for tis mscion such forces as will assure that the aim of de- stroying the 5th Russian Army will be accomplished; the Army Group must still be able to repulse enemy attacks against the center of its front from positions which permit economy of forces.
The intention to advance the left flank of the Central Army Group up to the heights around Toropets, there to effect a junction with the right ing of the Northern Army Group, 'i not changed.
4. The occupation of the Crimean Peninsula is of the very eatest importance for assuring our oil supply from Rumania.
Therefore a speedy crossing of the Dnieper in the direction of the Crimea is to be striven for with all ,means, including the commitment of mobile
- 206 - it 9 bef ore the enemy brings up reinforcements.
50 , Only by cutting off Leningzrad, joining the Finns, and annihil ating the Russian 5th Army will proper conditions 'be created and enough forces liberated for attacking the Tiinohenko.Army Group with good prospects. of defeating them, as envisaged in the Supplement to Directive No, 31 of 12 August.
signed: Adolf Hitler
e Fshiaer and Supreme Co nder Fueb rer Headquarters of the Arm d Forces 6 Sept. l941l
O' 5 '/'.bt.L(I Op.) Nr.44lk92/4l No, 3 of ten copies Go ,,Chefs,
Top secret Directive No, 35
Considering that the encirclement of the Leningrad area, iu making steady progess, the initial successes which were scored against the enemy for- ces located between the inner wings of the Southern and Central Army Groups have laid the foundation for an operation of decisive character against the Timoshenko Army Group, 'which is now attacking the Central army Group. The Timoshenko Army Group must be defeated and! destroyed within the limited time which is left before winter closes in. For this purpose it will be necessary for us to concentrate all the forces of the Ar~y andthe Air Force which can be dispensed with at the flanks and which can be brought up in time,
On the basis of the report of the Commander in Chief, Army, I order as follows concerning the pre ation for and execution of these operations:
, At the southern prt of the Eas tern Front:
The chief mission will be to destroy the enemy located in the triangle of ® nchg-Kiev- onotop, This should be. achie'ed with those forces of the Southern Army Group which are advancing north across .the Dnieper,, in conjunction with the attacking southern wing of the Central Army Group. As soon as the completion of this mission permits, those units of the 2nd and 6th Armies and of the 2nd Panzer Group which become avail- able are to be regrouped for the new operation.
Beginning about 10 Sept. at the latest, the motorized units of the Southern Army Group, reinforced by infantry divisions and supported at the points of main effort by the Air Force, are to advance on and beyond Lubny to the northwest in a surprise action, from the bridgehead cap- tued by the 17th Army, At the same ti,,the 17th Army is to gain
- 207 - ground in the direction of Poltava and Kharkov.
From the lower Dnieper the attack against the Crimea is to be continued, with the support of the 4th Air Force; likewise, the attack launched from the bridgehead Dniepropetrovsk is to be continued, provided forces are available for the purpose.* An advance of motorized units south of the lower Dnieper against Melitopol would be of substantial assistance to the mission of the 11th Army.
2. At the central part of the Eastern Front:
The operation against the Timoshenko Army Group will have to be prepared in such a manner that an attack can be launched as early as possible (end of September), with the objective of destroying the enemy located in the area east of Smolensk by means of a double envelopment, to be carried out in the general direction of Vyazma with strong, concentrated tank forces at the flanks.
For that purpose focal points are to be established with motorized units as follows:
a, At the southern wing (presumably in the area southeast of Roslavl, the direction of the thrust being. northeast); the available forces of the Central Army Group, and the 5th and 2nd Panzer Divisions, which will be released for this purpose, are to be used here.
b. In the area of the 9th Army the thrust being presumably in the direction of Byeloi; the strongest possible units from the area of the Northern Army Group are to be brought up for the purpose.
The bulk of the Timoshenko Army Group must be defeated by means of this highly coordinatd, tightly-enveloping operation of annihilation; not until then is the Central Group to proceed in the direction of Moscow, along a front extending to the Oka on the right and the upper Volga on the left.
The Air Force will support the attack with the 2nd Air Force, placing the main support at the flanks. The 2nd Air Force is to be reinforced primarily from the northeast area, whenever necessary. The Air Force will detail. the bulk of the dive bomber units (viii Air Corps) to sup- port the motorized units at the two wings of the attack.
3, Atthe northern part of the Eastern Front:
In conjunction with the Finnish Corps attacking from the Karelian Isthmus, we must envelop the enemy forces fighting in the area of Leningrad (after Schluesselburg has also been captured) in such a manner that, on 15 Sep. at the latest, essential units of the motorized forces and the 1st Air Force, especially its VIII Air Corps, can become avail- able for use with the Central Army Group. Previously, however, we, must attempt to out off Leningrad more 'completely, at least in the east. \, Moreover, if weather conditions permit, a large-scale air raid on Lenin- grad should be made, with the special objective of destroying the water works.
In order to facilitate the Finnish advance beyond the fortifications
* TB clause from "likewise" to "purpose" is crossed out; a marginal note states, "crossed out as per order l/Ski. 1481/41 geh. Chefs."
- 208 - along the line of the previous Finnish-Russian border, as well as to narrow down the combat area as far as possible and -to eliminate enemy air bases, forces of the Northern Army Group should be committed to the north as soon as possible via the Neva sector.
In cooperation with the Finns, Kronstadt Bay is to be out off so completely by means of mine fields and artillery that an escape of enemy forces in- to the Baltic,.Sea (Hangoe, Baltic Islands) will be prevented.
The Leningrad battlefield is to be covered towards the east and also at the lower Volkhov as soon as forces for the purpose can be made available. An attempt to join the forces of the Karelian Army in the direction of the Svir should be made only after the destruction of the enemy in the vicinity of Leningrad has been assured.
4. Concerning subsequent operations, the following dispositions should be madeg
as The attack of the Central Army Group in the direction of Moscow from the area of the Southern Army Group should be covered by a flank squadron formed from motorized units which become available in that area, This squadron will advance in a general northeastern direction.
b. Forces of the Northern Army Group should be advanced on both sides of Lake Ilmen in orderto cover the north flank and to make con- tact with the Finnish Karelian Army.
5. Any reduction of the time involved and consequent acceleration of these movements will be to the advantage of the entire operation and will facilitate its preparation.*
signed: Adolf Hitler
The FueBrer and Supreme Co mmnder Euehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 11 Sep. 194l1
NW. 3110/1 1 gKdos. Chef 0KW No. 105 of 150 copies
Copy of copy
The a ent industry is more than filled to capacity with orders. The programs laid down by me can be taken care of only if the requirements of the various branches of the Armed Forces are integrated with one an- other, and brought into line with production capacity.
*Translator's note: On 16 Sep. the impending attack on the Timoshenko Army Group was given the cover name "Taifun" by order 0KW 411545/41 gK.Chefs. WFSt/Op. L(i op) signed Warlimont.
- 209 The programs laid down by me therefore necessitate the following mea- sures:
1. All orders of the branches of the Armed Forees must be concen- trated on i confined to the most important armament within their own sectors.
2. In ease the orders under paragraph 1 cannot be handled, the Armed Forces High Command will coordinate such orders among the various branches.
3. In principle the orders of the various branches should be adapted to the capacity of industry.
In order to carry out these measures, I order that requests of the var- ious branches for procurement and development should be routed to the procurement divisions through the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command. This commander, together with the Minister for Armament and Ammunition, will examine the possibilities for carrying out these orders in the armament industry, and he will decide for me whether and how much of the orders should be filled.
I authorize the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command to de- termine which low priority projects should be cut. If orders can be filled only by limiting high priority items of the most important pro- grams, the matter must be referred to me for a decision.
Orders for carrying out this order will be issued by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command, in agreement with the Minister for Armament and Ammunition.
signed: Adolf Hitler
Chief of Staff Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters
~~ 113 SpSep. 12l941 WFPtfAbt.L (_IV/Qu) Nr. 0203 1 g.Kdos. No. 5 of twenty-five copies
Secret
Re: Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway Ia Nr. 3410/1 g.Kdos. of 3 Sep. 1911.
Subject: The situation in Norway.
To: The Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway, General von Falkenhorst
According to reports which have been submitted, the anti-German attitude of the Norwegian population has assumed intolerable propor ons. That ti state o a airs should continue, or, worse still, grow more acute,
- 210 - constitutes a direct threat to the security of the German troops and the defense of Norway.
All service departments should therefore rece.ive instructions from now on to take much more severe measures-than hithe'rto in dealing with all offenses punishable by the Armed Foreeb. Service propaganda should clearly indicate that offenses against. the Armed Forces or the military security of the country entail an immediate threat to the life of the culprit.
The ud es should be informed that, in the case of offenses on the part or Norweg ans who take action directly or indirectly against Germany, the most severe penalities are indicated. Only the death sentence will be a real deterrent in present conditions. It is to be recommended in all serious cases. In particular, acts of espionage, deeds of sabotage., and attempts to enter the Armed Forces of a foreign power must, as ,a general principle, be punished by death. Also, sentence of death should generally be pronounced in serious cases of possession of arms against orders.
These points should also be borne in mind when making decisions regard-. ing the confirming or annulling of verdicts. Court martial judges should receive instructions to this effect.
The attitude of the military towards the population should conform to these general directions. In the case of clashes; arm should be used immediately, The greatest reserve must be demanded in dealings with Norwe gians .
The Commanding General, Armed Forces. Norway is requested to inform the Aed Forces Hih Comman of measures taken in individual cases.
The Reich Co ssioner is being sent a copy of this document.
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signed. Keitel
The Fuebrer and Supreme Co nder Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 16 Sep. 1941
OKW/WFSt/Abt.L(I Op.) Ni'. * 153811 g.KChefs .
Top secret
1. I assign the~task of suppressing the rebellion. in the southeast area to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Balkans (Webrmachtbefehls- hamber im Sued osn) General Feld Marshal List.
The main objective for the time being is to protect traffic routes and
- 211.- locations which are important to -the German war economy. Subsequently, very strict measures must be taken to reestablish order in the entire area on a long-range scale.
In Croatia (up to the line of demarcation) the necessary measures will be taken against the guerrilla bands, in agreement with the Croatian Government and the German General in Agram.
2. During the time required to complete these tasks all forces of the Army staione in the area ote reei as wel a those that are to be sent there will be concentrated under the command of the Command- ing General of the XVIII -Army Corps, General of the Infantry Boehme. He will wield executive power in the area of rebellion proper according to the instructions of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Balkans, All military and civilian offices- must follow his orders in that area.
A more detailed delimitation of his authority will be given by the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Balkans. The requirements of the Four Years' Plan must be taken into consideration.
3. For the time being, the Commander in Chief' Army will transfer into the Serbian area, besides dditiona security forces (to be used alpo in Croatia), one infantry division, armored trains, and captured tanks. In order to be ready in case of emergency, he is to prepare to bring in an additional division, as soon as one becomes available in the East,
I request that all measures taken be reported in detail to the Armed. Forces High Command.
4f. As previously, the Commander in Chief', Air Force will support the operations in the area o rebellion with the forces which he has at his disposal for that purpose. He will designate an officer (notifying the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Balkans) whose function it will be to command air forces in that area and to cooperate with General Boebfe on tactical matters.
5, Hunarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian army and air forces may not be used for hese operations without the consent of the Armed Forces High Command. However, Hungarian and Rumanian ships, offered for the pro- tection of the Danube traffic, may be used in addition to the Danube Flotilla. They eassigned missions, and the German Flotilla is to be employed, in such a way that contact between them will be avoided.
The Croatian Government has granted permission for the use of Croatian troops in the Serbian areas bordering on Croatia; these troopsthere- fore, may be used.
The Italian High Commaand will be informed of the intended measures and will be reques a to proceed in the same way in the Italian-occupied area, in cooperation with the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Balkans.
6. The Foreign Office will carry out a combined political action of the lk a s aganst the communist centers in tese coun r es.
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, Balkans will be informed of this action in detail by the official representative of the Reich.
signed: Adolf Hitler
___ __ ~ _I
- 212 - The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 22 Sep. 1941
ir. kfk1578/4l gK.Chefs. WFSt/L No. 4 of twelve copies (I Op.)
Top secret Directive No 36
I, Due to unusual terrain difficulties and poor lines of communica- tion on the one hand, and to the continually renewed reinforcement of the Soviet Russian forces in Karelia and Lapland on the other, the weak forces of the Army High Command, Norway and the 5th Air Force have not yet succeeded in reaching the Murman railroad, in spite of tremendous achievements and extremely brave effForts Enemy interference with our shipping lanes along the coast of the Arctic Ocean has decreased even more the prospect that the Mountain Corps might reach Murmansk this year.
However, we did succeed in tying down large enemy forces and in drawing them away from the main Russian front. We likewise managed to push the enemy across the former Finnish border along its whole length, thus eliminating all threats to northern Finland, particularly to her nickel mines.
II. We must adhere to the final-goal of operations in northern and central Finland, which consists or destroying the enemy forces in the vicinity of Murmansk and along the Murman railroad.
The importance of this area lies in the nickel mines, which are vital to the German war effort. The enemy-realizes this importance. It is to be expected that the British will deploy strong air forces around Murmansk and Kandalaksha (possibly even committing Canadian or Norwegian troops) and that they will send as much war materiel as possible to 'Murmansk, Even during winter, air raids on the nickel mines and the homes of the miners must be anticipated. Our efforts must be propor- tionate to the seriousness of this threat.
III. I therefore order as follows:
1. Arma High Command, Norway:
a. The attacks in the sector of the III (Finnish) Army Corps are to be halted, and forces which are dispensable are to be transferred to the XXVI Army Corps.
b. All preparations are to be made by the XXXVI Army Corps for resuming the advance in the direction of Kandalaksha during the first half of October, with the minimum mission of at least cutting off Murmansk from its railroad connection before the beginning of winter. Moreover, the question of whether a continuation of this attack will have a better prospect of succeeding during the winter than during the fall should be considered.
The Finnish High Command will be asked to transfer the 163rd Division by railroad via Rovaniemi to the Army High Command, Norway at the proper time.
c. The advance of the Mountain Corps in the direction of
- 213 - Murmanask is to be halted for the time being. Only the northern wing is to continue the thrust, insofar as it is necessary for improving positions and deceiving the enemy. On the other hand it is necessary, if only with regard to furthering the task of the Navy, to capture at least the western part of the Rybachi Peninsula before the beginning of the winter, This would serve to eliminate enemy interference by means of artillery and PT boats at the harbor entrance of Liinahamari.
The investigations and preparations prerequisite for such an attack are to be initiated imediately; their results are to be reported as soon as possible. Suitable special weapons for use- against ground and naval targets which are still lacking will be supplied.
A decision, however, as to whether the plan of the Army High Command Norway for the winter can be realized must be left to the future. This plan consists of leaving two reinforced mountain divisions in the area around Petsamo and permitting the 2nd Mountain Division to rest in and around Rovaniemi,
If possible this should be done. The relief of the 3rd Mountain Di- vision by the 5th Mountain Division or a newly organized mountain di- vision is planned for later.
d. Large numbers of motor vehicles will be bought and rented in Sweden in order to shift supply transports of the mountain corps to the Oulu-Petsamo highway. If these vehicles should not suffice, an ad- ditional supply from Germany will be ordered.
2. I have ordered Reichaminister Dr. Todt to use Russian prisoners of war ruthlessly to construct a narrow-gauge field railway from Rovaniemi along the road to Petuamo as quickly as possible.
f. A supply of all modern means of attack which can be brought into the tundra for the purpose will be provided for the re- aumption of the attack on Murmansk-.
2. Navi:
It will be the mission of the Navy to attack enemy supply ships on the way to Muramansk, even during the winter, and especially during the period when the Air Force is more or less paralyzed.
For that purpose, in case we should succeed in capturing the western part of the Rybachi Peninsula, a suitable auxiliarybase for light naval forces is to be established if possible, in the y of Petsamo. The shipping of supplies by sea to Kirkenes and Petsamo, even if tempor- arily interrupted, must be attempted again and again.
The coastal defense in the bays of Petsaoao and Kirkenes will have to be reinforced to such an extent that it will be equal to meeting at- tacks even by heavy naval forces.
3. Air Forces
It is of paramount importance that the 5th Air Foree remain in the northern Norwegian area with strong forces suited for winter tasks.
These forces are to be large enough to be able to support the operation against Kandalakeha (which is to continue) and the capture of the Rybachi Peninsula, with good effect, right up to the beginning of the bad weather period. Meanwhile it will be necessary to attack continually
- 214 - the enemy's shipping and his lines of communication as well as his supply and storage depots.
This fight is to be continued during the bad weather season whenever opportunity offers and should be extended most of all to attacking the enemy'e shipping and to-interfering with his construction or improve- ment of strong points.
For this purpose our air force ground organization must be left to as large an extent as possible in its northern Norwegian and Finnish bases, and must be made ready to withstand the winter with every means avail- able.
Protection against enemy air attacks of our troop quarters, of supply lines, and most of all of the nickel mines and the naval base which is to be established is to be'assured.
The air force ground organization will have to be reinforced and the storage depots replenished to such an extent that it will be possible, at the proper time., to support the attack on M4urmansk with substantially reinforced air forces.
signed:; Adolf Hitler
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command Berlin, 25 Sep. 191
Nr. 00217/4l g.K. No. 2 of two copies
Secret
To: 1. Commander in Chief, Army, 2.. Commander in Chief, Navy
With regard to the necessity of proecting our extended coasts and the European countries dependent on ui i rom a tacks by the AngoPmericans, the Fuehrer is of the following opinion:
It is of decisive importance for warding off enemy operations against the coasts to have:
a. Far-reaching, effective flat-trajectory guns.
b. Long-distance torpedoes to be used by torpedo batteries from land.
c. Local anti-aircraft guns for the coastal defenses.
Re a:
It is necessary to increase further the number of medium and heavy
- 215 - mobile flat-trajectory batteries of the Army, especially the 17 cm. cannons in howitzer mounts, the 21 cm. Skoda canons (3600 traverse guns), as well as the 21{ cm. guns. In addition, heavy naval batteries are to be provided,
Re b:
The Navy is requested to order use and development of torpedoes for these tasks.
Re c:
As a matter of principle, heavy coastal batteries must be protected against enemy air raids,
signed: Keitel
______IC
Naval Staff Berlin
Ski Ia l6Ol/4l g.Kdos. Chefs. 29 Sep . 1921
Top secret
Re : The futuPL of Leningrad
I. In order to obtain a clear view of the measures tc be adopted by the Navy in case Leningrad should be occupied or banded over, the ques- tion of further military operations against this city was made clear by the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff to the Armed Forces High Command.
The result is reported as follows:
II. The Fuehrer has decided to have Lenringad wiped from the face of the earth. The yrter eatxistence or this large town is or no inerest once Soviet Russia is overthrown. Finland has also similarly declared no interest in the continued existence of the city directly on her new frontier.
III. The original demands of the Navy that the shipyard, harbor, and other installations vital to the Navy be preserved are known to the Armed Forces High Command, but in view of the basic principles under- lying the operation against Leningrad it is not possible to comply with them.
IV. The intention is to close in on the city and blast it to the ground by bombardments of artillery of all calibres and by continuous air at- tacks.
Requests that the city may be handed over, arising from the situation
- 216 - within, will be turned down, for the problem of the survival of the o ulation and of suplying it with food ia one whichI cannot an so not be ao v us. in this war for existence, we have no interes in 1eep even part of this great city's population. If necessary, a forceful evacuation towards the eastern territories of Russia should take place.
V. The consequences arising from the extinction of Leningrad and re- lating tq t1e measures for organization and personnel, already carried out or held in readiness, will be worked out at the Armed Forces High Command and the corresponding guiding principles will then be made known. If there are any suggestions on this subject at Group Command, it is requested that they be forwarded at the earliest possible moment to the Naval Staff,
Naval Staff
The Armed Forces High Command Fuebrer Headquarters
WFSt/Abt. L (IV/Qu) 5 Oct. 19+1 Jr. 002255/k& g.Kdos. No. 7 of thirty copies
Special orders in connection with'Directive 36
(The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Jr. 'Pfl578/k1 g.Kdos. Chefs. WFSt/Abt.L(I p) of 22 Sep. 1941)
The situation in the areas of Finland and northern Norway requires special measures to take care of supplies.
According to Directive 36, supplies for troops in Finland and northern Norway are to be prepared in such a way that the necessary supplies will be on hand at the proper time for the planned operations.
The Navy will make available the shipping space needed to transport the supplies, if necessary in~agreement with the Transportation Ministry, and will furnish the necessary escort forces. Ships reinforced against ice and icebreakers should be provided for the purpose.
In shipping supplies by sea, care should be taken not to expose valuable goods to enemy attack.
The following measures should be taken:
I. Administration:
1. Food su lies: The Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces overseas is to arrange with the Army Administration Office
- 217 - for food supplies a'cordlng to the needs of the Army High Command, Norway, both as regards reserve supplies anc! o.:,nrent needs. The Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Fno.r.es Overseas will see to it that the supplies are shipped promptly, so that in case of difficulties due to ice and the resulting fisru1ption of supply shipants the current needs can be filled fromisupply dumps to be established by the Army High Command in Finland and S- e4 .
Furthermore the Army' High ".s and, Norway should keep sufficient supplies in dumps in northern Norwy, so that even if there should be difficulties in shipping supplies by sea, as little use as possible will have to be made of the Oulu-Petsamo highiway, in view of the fuel shortage.
2. Living uarters:
a. Barracks:
The barracks obtained. by the Army High Command, Norway in Sweden and Finland should be shipped to northern Finland by sea, in order to avoid transport via the Oulu-Petsamo highway. If it is at all possible to transport these barracks through Sweden to Narvik, and from there by sea, this should be done.
The Navy is requested, in agreement with the Transportation Ministry, to make sure that all shipping space becoming available should be used for iron and nickel ore transports from Lulea, Narvik, or Petsamo.
b. Fuel:
If fuel requirements cannot be covered within the country (wood and peat), the Supply and Transportation Office, Armed Forces Overseas should arrange with the responsible agencies (Reich Coal Corm- missioner) for the necessary amount of coal, and ship it in agreement with the Transportation Ministry.
c. Eqipment for quartering troops:
Necessary equipment that cannot be purchased in Sweden and Finland is to be made available by the Army Administration Office. The Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas will arrange for shipment.
d. Clothing:
Winter clothing and equipment shipped so far is not suf- ficient to cover operational requirements during the winter. The Army High Command (Army Clothing Section) should give priority to the re- quests of the Army High Commnand, Norway which are still unfilled.
II. Ttruck spae:
1. The following are made available for necessary traffic on the Oulu-Petsamo highway:
a. 200 to 250 trucks without tires, purchased in Sweden.
b. One column of the Speer Construction Staff, consisting of 5 companies, or 225 trucks. c. 6 large fuel columns and 3 motor vehicle repair trains, furnished by the Army High Command, Motor Vehicle Section.
- 218 - 2. The Army High Command, Norway will arrange for the transfer of the trucks purchased directly with the responsible German offices. The Armed Forces High Command, War Economy and Armaments Division will ar- range through the Army High Command,, Motor Vehicle Section for the tires needed for these trucks.
The General Army Office, at-the request of the Army High Command, Norway, will facilitate formation of the columns by allocating personnel, weapons, and equipment.
If the Swedish government should approve the purchase and export of ad- ditional trucks, the needs of the air forces in northern Norway and ,Finland should be covered first.
3, The Supply and Transportation Office, Armed Forces Overseas will transport the trucks and motor vehicle repair trains mentioned under lb and ic at the earliest possible date to Finnish harbors for the Army High Command, Norway, in agreement with the General Army Office.
III. Oil:
The oil so far allocated to the Army High Command, Norway (headquarters Finland) is not sufficient for the tasks to be carried out,
Therefore the War Economy and Armaments Division of the Armed Forces High Command should make available the necessary oil, including that needed for transports via the Oulu-Petsamo highway, in addition to the 5,000 cu.m. allocated for September, the 5,000 cum. for October, and the 10,000 cu.m. allocated as winter supply, delivery of which the Supply and Transportation Office, Armed Forces Overseas has promised by 31 Oct. Before the Finnish harbors freeze over, as much oil should be brought in as possible with the tankers leased for German purposes in Finland.
IV. The Todt Organization has been asked to begin construction of the Rovaniemi-Vuotsa field railroad at once, The Supply and Transportation Ofrce, Armed Forces Overseas will arrange with the Todt Organization for transportation of the necessary labor and building material. Only the simplest kind of quarters should be constructed for the Russian prisoners of war used in building the railroad.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signed: Keitel
_1____~1_1_1__ _~ 1_
- 219 - ArmedB Forges Hgh Command~ Fuehrer Headquarters
OKWWF/t/Aj I t 0. 7 Oct. 1941 4 dos. Chefs. No. 2 of fourteen copies
Top secret
Ref.: OK op. Nr. 41 24/41 g.Kdos. of 18 Sep. 1941l To: Army High Command
The Fuehrer has again decided that a capitulation of Leningrad or later Moscw is not to be accepted even .if offeree enemy.
The moral justification for this measure is clear to the whole world. Just as in Kiev our troops were subject. to extreme danger through ex- plosions with time-fuses, the same must be expected toa : still greater degree in Moscow and Leningrad. The Soviet radio itself. has broadcast that the foundations of Leningrad are mined and the aity armed to the last man,
Extreme danger of epidemics is to be expected.
Therefore no German soldier is to enter these cities, Anyone who tries, to leave the city through our lines is to be forced to return under fire.
The exodus of the population through the smaller, unguarded gaps towards the interior of Russia is to be allowed. Before all other cities are taken, they are to be softened up by artillery fire and air-raids and their population forced to flee.
We cannot take the responsibility of endangering our soldiers' lives by fire in order to save Russian cities, nor that of feeding the popu- lation of these cities at the expense of the German home-land,
The chaos in Russia will be all the eater, our administration and u is no .occestrnteriores a e s more he pop a ono eci eso® ovea uss a flees o einterior of the country. All commanding officers must be acquainted with this desire of the
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Comiand
By direction
signed: Jodl
_ q______
- 220 - The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 10 Oct. 1941
O K W WFSt/Abt. L I Op.) No. F of thirteen copies r. Rb~.R.e s.
Top secret
DireLtive, No.
In consequence of the speedy and favorable development of the situation in the eastern theater of war and the reports of the Commanding General, Norwegian Theater regarding the condition of the troops and the possi- bility of future operations in Finland, I order the following:
1. Now that the bulk of Soviet Russia's armed forces in the main theater of war is smashed or annihilated, offensive operations. for the purpose of keeping the Russian forces in Finland tied up are no longer necessary It will not be possible. before the beginning of winter to take Mur'mansk or the Rybachi Peninsula, nor will we be able to cut off the Murman railroad in central Finland, because the fighting strength and the ' number of the German forces available are insufficient and be- cause it is too late in the season.
Therefore the most ressin task will be to hold on to our gains, to se- cure the nicked on o esam against attacks from land, air, and sea, and to make all necessary preparations so that Murmansk, the Rybachi Peninsula, and the Murmansk railroad can be taken for good next year, beginning operations even before the winter is over.
The following will be the order of eventst
a. The Army will go over to the defensive, taking up favorable positions which can be defended with small forces and the fewest casualties. Cold weather shelters will be built, and the Army will pre- pare for winter fighting.
b. Units will be relieved and reinforcements will be brought up.
c. A concentric attack will be made against the Murman railroad during the winter, as follows:
(1) An attack of Finnish forces advancing from the south in the direction of Byelomorsk-Kem, and if possible against Loukhi as well.
(2) An attack of German forces from the German sector against Kandalaksha.
d. The Rybachi Peninsula must be captured at the most opportune time, the entire peninsula if possible, and Murmansk must be attacked.
These operations must be timed in such a way that at any given time the bulk of all attacking forces can be concentrated against a single point.
2. While securing the defense of all sectors sparingly manned, the next task of the Commnanding General, Norwegian Theater will be as fol- lows: The troops are to be distributed in such a way that the forces which have borne the brunt of the fighting for a long time can be re- habilitated and can receive equipment for winter warfare, or they will be relieved and withdrawn as soon as reinforcements arrive. In this
- 221 - connection the following is to be accomplished: -a. As fore the Mountain Co rrs, the reinforced 6t h Mountain Di- vision will replace t~ie7hid arnd jrd M4ounta in Div is ions . Orne rounta in division is toc remain in northern F~nland, wh:ile t1-h-.e other cne will be transferred to the area, around anrsosuth of a o ',eSer4. They, W.ill be shipped home when the 5th Mountain Division arrive (a ~c %t January- 19'2). After that, another newly-set-up or r crgMrzed novt~aLn div:ision is to replace the mountain division which rem ined in ncr-thern Filn and.
b. The 163rd Infantry Division is to be a.-,._r:e to the X'XX I ,Arm Cor s as soon as it appears certain that the Mori trio opratlon be~twe he Karelian Army and the crther n Arm Ga cup agalns t the southern shore of Lake La.doga can be carried thLrc ,g-witvhout this di- vision.
During the course of the winter , e must seek to j the, ser cnner of the 169th and the 163rd Infantry Divisions frc isiora sti ue in Norway or from troops in Ger eany. 3. All relacenients, including those of the mountain divisioas, will) be car e zoun in such a way that. the bulk of tht heavy weapons, the equipment, horses, and pack animals remain, where they arse, and onl3y the troops and their light weapons sixe replaced. This will save time and shipping space. 4. As for the SS units, the following is being planned: An SS regi- ment -made up of wregian 'and. Finnish troops will replace the 9th S5 Regiment assigned at present to the 2nd Mountain Division. An Austrian S3 regiment will be brought up and united with SS Battle Group North (SS Kampfgruppe Nord.) to form a mountain brigade. The Armed Forces High Command will coordinate these measures with the other plans which have to do with the relief of headquarters and troops. 5, Since after the conclusion of current operations the Finnish High Command is planning a complete reorganization of its Army, the German and Finnish units assigned to 'the III Finnish Army Corps are to be ex- changed (the 6th Finnish Division for SS Batle. Group North). After that it is planned to place all forces in the area of' the III Finnish Army Corps under Field Marshal Mannerheim. For the beginning of the new operations Field Marshal Mannerheim will be asked to reassign at least a few small Finnish units to the German force which will attack Kandalaksha. 6. Weather permitting, the following missions will be assigned for the time being to the Air Force in the Finnish theater: a. To patrol North Norwegian and Finnish coastal waters for the purpose of safeguarding German ships and combatting enemy traffic. b. To establish sure defenses against air attack, above all in the nickel region of Petsamo, and in the unloading harbors and the naval bases. c. To undertake reconnaissance operations covering the future operational area, and to attack constantly the enemy supply base at Murmansk as well as the supply transports by ship and railroad to that area. d.. To make preparations for the employment of strong forces in
- 222- support of the planned operations.
7. It is the task of the ayy to attack ships carrying enemy supplies to Murmank and to do everyithnig possible to maintain German shipping traffic in the Arctic Ocean.
For this purpose the light naval forces in that area will be reinforced as soon as possible, and PT boats will be brought up as well.
Shore installations at Kirkenes will be improved for the purpose of set- ting up an auxiliary naval base there.
It will be necessary to assign additional shore batteries to that area so as to safeguard our own coastal shipping traffic. The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command will issue the necessary orders.
Over and above the reported plans, Kirkenes and Petsamo will each be reinforced with 1 battery of 21 cm. guns, One 28 cm. battery will be installed near Vardoe After the capture of the Rybachi Peninsula a heavy battery is to be installed there as well.
8. The cooperation between the Commanding General, Norwegian Theater, the Navy, are a'fir Force will haveto be especially close during the months to come, so that we will be prepared against potential frontal attacks and attacks from the sea.. For the purpose of simplifying this cooperation, the Navy will appoint a Naval Commander, North (Marine- fuebrer Nord), and the Air Force, withdrawing the 5th Air Force Comnd. to Norway, will appoint an Air Commander, North (Fliegerfuebrer Nord).
9. The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command will issue the ex- ecutive orders, Through him the following will be submitted to me:
a. From the Commanding General, Norwegian Theater:
(1) Schedule for the reorganization
(2) Suggestions for re-equipping the troops to prepare them for combat in the tundra and the forests of eastern Karelia
(3) Proposals concerning the operations, and requests for Army troops as reinforcements
(4) Suggestions concerning the exchange of staff officers
b. Detailed plans from the Navy and the Air Force.
10. This directive automatically supersedes Directive 36 wherever the two disagree,
signed: Adolf Hitler
__ _ _~ I_ I_ __
- 223 - The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 20 Oct. 19+1
KW/WFst tAbtL(I Qp) Nr. 44 1760 41 No. 4 of ten copies
Top secret
Consolidation and Defense of the English Channel Islands.
1. British o orations on a large scale against the western territory occup e / y us are as unlikely now as formerly. On the other hand, under the pressure of the situation in the East and for political and propa- gandistic reasons,, we have to reckon with limited actions by the British, especially with attempts to reoccupy their Channel Islands, which are so important for our convoy escort traffic.
2. Defensive measures on the Channel Islands must make it certain that a BrHtsNi attack, whether undertaken by sea or air or by both at the same time, will collapse even before landing. The possibility that the enemy will utilize a time of poor visibility for a surprise landing is to be considered.
Orders for the taking of immediate measures toward strengthening the defenses have already been issued.
The commander of the island roup, to be named by the Army, has juotrs- dcaton over all- parts o±' te Armead For~ces assigned to the ilrds, with the exception of air forces.
3, The Channel Islands are to -be consolidated into an unassailable fortress through vigorous and uiremitting efforts. In this connection I order the following:
a, The Army High Command is responsible for over-all fortifica- tion, and will integrate into the general program the instalations re- qired by the Navy and Air Force. The principles and experience gained in building the Westwall are to determine the strength of the fortifica- tions and their arrangement.
b. It is especially important, in the work of fortifying, that the _ provide for the following:
(1) A closely-knit system of installations, arranged as much as possible for flanking fire and use under conditions of poor visibil- ity (large enough for calibers effective against 100 mm, armor) in order to provide for defense against tanks which can be landed from barges.
(2) Prepared positions for mobile shock troops and tanks.
(3) Shelters for ample supplies of ammunition (applies to Navy and Air Force also).
(4) Integration of mine fields into the defense system.
The number of projects contemplated in accordance with this directive is to be reported.
c. The Navy is to do the following: (1) Install three extra-heavy batteries (one on Guernsey,
- 224 - two on the mainland) for the artillery protection of these waters.
(2) Install on the islands thenmselve' ard on the continent, possibly with the assistance of Army, additional light and medium shor batteries intended for fire upon targets at sea; in such a manner that the entire bay will be protected.
d. For the Air Force such anti-aircraft positions, including searchlights, as are required for the protection of all important insta; lations are to be constructed.
e, Foreign laborers, especially Russians and Spaniards, but also Frenchmen, may be employed in the construction work..
4C. Dportation to the continent of British subjects not native to the ii ars hVIT be ordere4 later.
5. The Commander in Chief, Army is to report to me, through the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Planning Staff, the state of the con-. struction on the first of each month.
signed: Adolf Hitler
The Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters
WdFS /Abt. L4 Op2) Nr. 441794/41 29 Oct. 1941
No. 2 of fourteen copies
Top secret
The Fuebrer has issued the following orders for the transfer of con- siderable parts of the Air Force to the central Mediterranean and for naval operations in the Mediterranean:
i. The Commander in Chief, Air is to make preparations for transferring one air force command under a field marshal general, one air corps, and a~ir defense units as specified by the Commander in Chief, Air. The long-distance night fighter group is to be transferred as quickly as possible.
2. The necessary transports for escorts and supplies are to be ini- tiated.
German and Italian forces, insofar as possible, are not to be mixed on one and the same airfield, and at least one airfield should be reserved in Sicily for the Italian air forces.
3, a. The Commander in Chief, Navy, according to his plans approved
- 225 - by the Fuehrer, will order nine submarines to operate in the eastern Mediterranean for the time being, and twelve in the western Mediterranean.
b. Furthermore he will arrange with the Italians for establishing a base in Italy, and will arrange for further base construction in Greece.
c. The remaining PT boats and motor mine sweepers allocated for the- Mediterranean are to be transferred as quickly as possible.
d. The Italians should be urged to lay additional defensive mine fields to protect German shipping and to cut the enemies east-west'com- munications, German assistance is to be given insofar as necessary and possible.,
4. The Commander in Chief, Air will discuss operations with the. Italian Supreme Command, in accordance with the following directives, in such a way that they can begin, by order of the Fuehrer, as soon as the Duce's approval has been received:
a, It is the purpose of the operations to establish, in agree- ment with the Italians, a center of Ais forces in the central Mediter- ranean as a basis for further expansion of the German Mediterranean position.
b. The tasks of the "Commander in Chief, South" (Air Force Com- mand) will be as follows:
To establish air and naval supremacy in the area between southern Italy and northern Africa, in order to safeguard the routes to Libya and Cyrenaica; for this purpose it is especially important to paralyze Malta.
To cooperate with the Axis forces in North Africa.
To disrupt enemy west-east traffic through the Mediterranean and supplies for Tobruk and Malta, in close cooperation with the naval forces operating for this purpose. c. The Commander in Chief South is subordinated to the Duce and receives rec yes or over-al tasks toug eo a an 1 upreme Command. In all matters concerning the Air Force, the Commander in Chief, Air communicates dir3ctly with the Commander in Chief, South, informing the Armed Forces High Command at the same time in important matters.
The fact that the Commander in Chief, South is operating in the Italian theater and is subordinate to the Italian Supreme Command sets a natural limitation on the freedom of decision of this commander, as well as on the commands issued by the Commander in Chief, Air.
d. The following will be under the Commander in Chief, South:
A mixed German-Italian command staff.
All German air forces in the Mediterranean area and in North Africa.
The air and anti-aircraft units made available by the Italian Armed Forces for his tasks.
e. The Commander in Chief, South will issue directives to the
- 226 - German and Italian naval forces assigned for his tasks (German Admiral 8 e to n a and Naval Group South in the eastern Mediterranean). These are in charge of operations, in close cooperatiCru with the Commander in Chief, South, Otherwise they remain subordinate to the Naval Staff.
Direct support of Army operations is to be assured with the Italian HiUi Command in North Africa and the Panzer group Africa.
f. The tasks of the Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, Southeast and of the German General at headquarters of the Italian armed forces remain unchanged.
g. All efforts will be made to supply the German troops so as to avoid burdening the Italian economy.
4. The Commanders in Chief, Air and Navy are requested to submit a schedule for the measures planned in accordance with this directive through the Armed Forces High Command.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Comimnd
signed: Keitel
The Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters
Nr. 4977/41 Chefs. WFStAbt.L I 02. 21 Nov. 1911
No. 6 of eighteen copies
Top secret
Supplementary Orders No. 2 to Directive 3:
Preparations for the attack on Kandalaksha
The attack on Kandalaksha planned for March 1942 coincides with the time of deepest snow. Normally-equipped troops are immobile at such times.
The main enemy defenses will be along the highway and railroad coming from the west to Kandalaksha, It will therefore be important to out- flank the enemy in a wide detour over frozen lakes and marshes, and the troops involved must carry their supplies with them until the highway and the railroad can be opened later. An operation of this character under arctic conditions confronts our troops with entirely new tasks. Preparations, especially training and equipment, must be undertaken at an early date. The following directives are meant to provide for these:
- 227 - I. Trainng of the commanders:e
1. General Dietl'of the mountain troops, who will be the Commander in Chief of the new "Army High Command, Lapland" (known heretofore as "Army High Command, Northland"), will carry out the first reconnaissance operations in this area in November. The order for this operation will be sent to him separately through the Army High Command, Norway (head- quarters Finland).
A report of this reconnaissance operation is to be made at Fuehrer Head- quarters.
2. General (Infantry) Weisenberger, who will be the Commanding General off the XXXVI Army Corps, and the Commanders of the- 5th and 7th Mountain Divisions will receive orders for training and probable tasks of their units following the arrival of General Dietl in Germany at the beginning of December.
3. The future Chief of the. Army High Command, Lapland is to be sent to headquarters in Finland for indoctrination.
II. Troops
1. The strength of the troops available for the winter attack is limited by the capacity of the Finnish traffic installations. As al- ready ordered, the following are to be added:
The 7th Mountain Division The 5th Mountain Division (to take over the equipment of the 3rd Mountain Division, which is being relieved) Army troops
Furthermore, the 169th Infantry Division and one third of the 163rd Infantry Division of the XXXVI Army Corps, and perhaps also what is left of the 3rd Mountain Division which it may not have been possible to withdraw, will be available.
Field Marshal Mannerheim has been requested to have one or two Finnish brigades participate.
Primarily prisoners of war will be used for road construction.
2. The priority list for transports from Germany to be drawn up by the Army High Command, Norway (headquarters Finland) must make sure that the most important Army troops for the attack on Kandalakaha will be transported first. These troops are to be assembled and equipped at the proper time by the Army High Command,
3, Only very systematic training will enable the troops to carry out the planned operation.
The training period, which is short to begin with (slow arrival of the 5th Mountain Division from Crete, reorganization of the 7th Mountain Division, and assembly of the Army troops), will be cut further, due to the fact that the troops Will be called up for shipment as transport facilities become available, and that training will have to be carried out partly in Germany and partly in Finland. The training must be adapted to these special circumstances. Experiences of persons familiar with the Alps in winter, even if they have no military training, as well as of Finnish training troops, should be utilized.
228 - III. ]Eqipmenit
1. The enemy west of Kandalaksha can be outfjlanked and destroyed only by superior FoeedFor this purpose regular ski equipment is not sufficient, MotoriI ds on broad runners will be necessary, which can transport parts of guns, heavy weapons, ammunition, food, anti-freeze solution, etc., and which can pull ski troops.
The model of this sled is to be submitted to the Fuebrer.
2. The special e iii mnt of the soldiers and the distribution of the loads on he sleds muste adapted to the need for great mobility.
3. Furtier it should be investigated whether the available snow plows are adequate for opening the supply routes for this operation. If necessary, other equipment is to be provided.
IV. Air Force
The Fuehrer has decided that as strong air forces as possible should be used to support the attack on Kandalaksha, the successful conclusion of which will be the basis for the later attack on Murmnansk, It is to be examined what forces will be available for this purpose, and what transport, supply, and transfer movements will be necessitated thereby
Such requirements should be reported soon so that they may be integrated into the transport program.
The Commander in Chief, Army and the Army High Command, Norway, the former being responsible, will closely cooperate in making the necessary preparations according to these directives (I, II, III). The Army High Command, Norway will report to the Armed Forces High Command and the Army High Command when General Dietl can arrive at Fuehrer Headquarters.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signed: Keitel
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 2 Dec. 1941
OKW/WFSt/Abt.L(I Op.) '#4l98o/'4l No. 2,of seventeen copies g.Kdos. Chefs.
Top secret
Directive No. 38
1. In order to lay a foundation for the protection and expansion of our position in the Mediterranean Theater and to establish a concentra- tion of the forces of the Axis powers- in the central part oihe )1e ter- ranean, I orer, in agreement with the Duce, t approximately one air
- 229 - corps, and whatever anti-aircraft forces are required, be transferred to southern Italy and North Africa from the units which have become avail- able in the East.
Besides its direct effect on the warfare in the Mediterranean and North Africa, it is hoped that this move will have considerable influence on all future developments in the Mediterranean Theater.
2. I charge Field Marshal Kesseiring with the command of all forces to be employed for this task and herewith appoint him Commanding General, Armed Forces, South (ob.Bfh. Sued),
His tasks will be as follows
a. To obtain air and sea supremacy in the area between southern Italy and North Africa in order to establish safe shipping routes to Libya and Cyrenaica. It is particularly important to suppress Malta.
b. To'cooperate with the German forces and those of her allies which are deployed in North Africa.
c. To paralyze enemy shipping traffic passing through the Mediter- ranean, as well as the transport of British supplies to Tobruk and Malta, in close cooperation with the German and Italian naval forces available for the task,
3. The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South will be under the com- mand of theuce and w receive his general instructions through the Italian High Command. As for matters pertaining to the Air Force, the Commander in Chief, Air will deal directly with the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South; concerning matters of importance the Armed Forces High Command is to be informed at the same time. k. The following will be subordinate to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South:
a. All forces of the German Air Force which are deployed in the Mediterranean Theater and in North Africa.
b, All Italian plane and anti-aircraft units which the Italian Armed Forces may place at his disposal in support of operations di- rected by him.
5. The German naval forces deployed in the central part of the Mediter- ranean will remain under the command of the Commander in Chief, Navy.
For the purpose of carrying out the tasks assigned to him the Commanding General, me orces, ou is authorized to ssue Instructions to the German. Admiral attached to the High Command of the Italian Navy, and if necessary to Group South as well (for the eastern part of the .IMediter- ranean). Naval headquarters will issue operational orders in agreement with the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South.
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South is to direct all requests aimed at coordinating the combined operations of the Axis naval forces to the German Admiral attached to the Italian Naval High Command.
The duties of the Commanding General, Armed Forees, Balkans and of the German General attached to Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces re- main unchanged.
signed: Adolf Hitler
- 230 - The Fuehrer and Supreme Comander Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 8 Dec. 1941
W/ t Abt.LC(I No, 3 of fourteen copies r, 41 g.7IX as.
Top secret
Directive No, 39
The severe winter which came surprisingly early in the East, and the re- sulting difficulties in bringing up supplies, compel us to stop all large-scale offensive operations and to go over to the defensive. The way in which these defensive operations will be carried out will be de- termined by the aim which they pursue, namely:
a, To hold areas which are very important to the enemy for his operations or war economy.
b. To make it possible for the forces which are deployed in the East to get the maximum rest and rehabilitation.
c. Thus to prepare conditions favorable for the resumption, of large-scale offensive operations in 192,
I order the following in detail:
I. y
1. As soon as possible the bulk of the Army in the east will go over to the defensive along a front to be fixed by the Commander in Chief, Army, which will be manned with relatively small forces. After that the rehabilitation of troop formations is to begin; particularly the tank and motorized divisions are to be withdrawn.
2. Unless enemy action is the reason for the withdrawal, positions are to be prepared in the rear before a front line is moved back. These new positions must be more advantageous, with respect to living condi- tions and defensive possibilities, than thvse vacated.
The surrender of communications arteries which are vital to the enemy may endanger other front sectors which have not yet been consolidated. Wherever this is likely to happen, the withdrawal at individual sectors is to be tined to fit in with over-all operations.
3. The front line is to be established with an eye to facilitat- ing defense and quartering of troops, It must be possible to bring up supplies without too much difficulty, especially during the period when the snow is melting.
Field-type positions behind salient. and in the rear will be laid out and constructed as quickly as possible wit1 the aid of whatever manpower can be procured,
i4. In connection with combat operations whose nature is mainly defensive, the following special tasks must be carried out:
a, Sevastpol is to be captured as soon as possible; after the conclusion or tehi iting there, instructions will be issued con- cerning the bulk of the XI Army (with the exception of the units needed
- 231 - for coastal defense),
b, . When the weather is favorable the Southern ArmjGroup must endeavor, regardless of -difficulties, to prepare and aunc-h anat- tack with the aim of capturing the lower Dkon-Donets line, even before the end of the winter. This in turn will create favorable conditions for the -pRhgcampaign against the Caucasus.
c. The Northern Arm Grou will shorten its eastern and southeastern front nor o e .,men while holding on to the highway and railroad leading from Tikhvin to Volkhovstroy and Kolchanovo. This will make it possible to mop up the area south of Lake Ladoga after re- inforeements have arrived, Only thus can Leningrad be completely, en- circled and contact be established with the Finnish Karelian Army.
d, If it should turn out that the enemy has withdrawn the bulk of his forces from the coastal strip south of Kronstadt Bay and does not intend to put up a serious here, this coasal sector is to be seized in order to economize our forces.
II., Air Force;
1. It will be the task of the Air Force to interfere with arma- ment and training centers aesuch as possible by attacking particularly Leningrad, Moscow, Tybinsk, Gorki, Voronezh, Rostov, Stalingrad, Kras- nodar, etc., for the purpose of preventing the rehabilitation of the Russian Armed Forces, Special efforts are to be made to cause permanent breakdowns of those lines of comunications without which the enemy can- not survive, and which if fully utilized by the enemy endanger our own positions at the front. Besides combatting the enemy's air force, the German Air Force will give full support to the Army in the defense against enemy ground and air attacks,
2. I approve of the planned distribution of planes, coordinated with the Army Groups, as submitted to me; also of. the proposed number of planes to remain in the East, After the Army's operations have been concluded individual units may be withdrawn for rehabilitation and training if the situations permits.
3. In order to guarantee an effective defense against possible winter attacks and in view of our own plans for winter operations (see I, 21), a ground organization is to be maintained which will allow a quick shifting of forces and will make it possible to bring up rein- forcements quickly from units withdrawn from the front, For this reason, the rehabilitation centers will be set up as close to the Eastern Front as possible®
i&, Continuous protective air reconnaissance covering a wide area is of. special importance so that regrouping of enemy forces can be recognized and watched in good time, The Army and the Air Force will coordinate their forces and their operations for this purpose..
5. With regard to the forces which are committed at the front near Moscow, I still reserve the right to order their withdrawal for the purpose of assigning them to the area of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South,
6. The Air Defense will protect troop quarters and supply depots as well as the vital communications arteries in the rear. Measures are to be taken to enable German fighters to concentrate quickly in order to be able to deal with concentrated enemy air attacks.
232 - III. The ha will see to it that the sea lanes to Helsinki, which the capture a ngoe and Osmussaar has made less dangerous, can be utilized to the utmost for merchant shipping and for transporting supplies to our forces in Finland.
At the expense of all demands and defense regulations which are not ab- solutely essential, the number of small vessels to be built in Germany and in countries allied with or occupied by us is to be increased con- siderably. These vessels will be used to transport supplies (especially in the Black Sea and-the Aegean Sea).
IV. The replacement of ersonnel of the Armed Forces must be guaranteed for 1942 even If casualties should be high. It will be necessary to take drastic measures, because the age class of 1922 alone will not meet the deands,
Therefore I order the following:
1. All Armed Forces troops which can be released from Germany or from special assignments (e.g., Armed Forces Mission, Rumania) will be made available to the front tbrough a large scale redeploymuent of per- sonel,
In this connection soldiers of the younger age classes who are in the home theater or are assigned to duty in rear areas will be exchanged with older frontline soldiers.
2. As for the exchange of troops between the eastern and the western theaters of war, the following is to be observed:
Fully. fit and usable divisions of the second and third waves and tank divisions in the West are to be exchanged'vith divisions from the East which are especially exhausted by fighting. In this connection a tem- porary weakening of the western front for the duration of the winter may be permitted.
Officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers with combat experience may be removed from eastern divisions which are to be dissolved and as- signed to these western divisions.
I shall decide, as soon as I receive the Army plan for reorganizing and redistributing the ground forces, as to whether or not any other western. divisions which cannot be used in their entirety in the East shall be dissolved and used to supply replacements for seasoned eastern divisions.
In any event, the fighting strength of the western -,army must be main- tained at a level which will secure the coastal defense and guarantee a successful outcome of operation "Attila".
3. Young workers who were classified as essential will be grad- ually replaced on a large scale by prisoners of war and Russian civilian workers, who are to be employed in groups. The Armed Forces High Com- mand will issue special instructions in, this connection,
signed: Adolf Hitler
I___
- 233 - Aed Forcea High Command Fuebrer Headquarters 14 Dec. 1941 WFSt/Abt.L (I Op.) Ni'. 00 022 1 g.K. No. 9 of sixteen copies
Secret
Re: CoastAl defense.
Ret: OXM/WFSt./Abt. L (I Op) 0021 52/41l g.K. I and II of 23 Oct. and 3 Nov. 1941.
On the 'basis of the general surveys submitted to him regarding the state of coastal defense, the Fuehrer has ordered that:
1. The coastal regions of the Arctic Ocean, North Sea, and Atlantic Ocean controlled by us are ultimately to be built into a "new Westwall', in order that we can repel with certainty any landing attempts, even at the strongest enemy forces, with the smallest possible number ot perma- nently assigned field troops.
2. For the time being, however, the great strain on our troops and materiel in other quarters compels us to restrict construction according to the tollowing guiding principles:
a, To continue to build tield fortitications and to strengthen strong points at the most threatened places by means at permanent instal-
b. To reinforce the long-range coast artillery at points which, on account of geographical conditions, are apt to encourage the enemy to establish bridgeheads for turther operations, and at points which are of prticular value to us, for example, the more signiticant har- bors, temporary anchorages, and intermediate bases, especially in the Norwegian tjords, and important military and economic objectives in the vicinity of the coast.
c. The Commander in Chief, Air is to provide the necessary air forces for reinforcing coastal detenses by assigning air detense units in the coastal areas greatly threatened from the air as part a his air defense program. Air detense units near the coast and therefore suit- able for warding off enemy landing operations are to be integrated into the detense measures of the Army and the Navy. Anti-aircraft batteries directly on the coast can be included in the artillery defense and, as tar as the air situation permits, can be utilized to repel seaborne landing attempts.
In order to save personnel, the Commander in Chiet, Air, in conjunction with the other branches of the Armed Forces, is to investigate whether it is possible to equip coastal batteries with fixed anti-aircraft guns, in addition to their regular guns, for detense against enemy air attacks, training the personnel accordingly.
d. These measures must not substantiall interfere with the ex- ecution of current or plane opration or a er e ense ro ects al- ready ordered.
e. The coastal detense forces assigned at present will have to suffice, on the whole. In fact their numbers are to be reduced as far as possible, as the detenses are gradually strengthened,
- 234 - 3, Regarding rp3orities for-construction, the following principles are to be consider Y
a. Without regard to' arrangements already made, Norwte has top priority, since geographie and cliatic conditions there, as well as the state off communications, render it more difficult to use mobile re- serves and to bring up reinforcements and also to assign strong air forces to fight the enemy at or beyond the coastline.
In addition to this,' the fjords, which extend far inland and sever im- portant road communications, especially in the north, as well as those important objectives which, though somewhat remote, are yet close enough to the coast, both offer the enemy a constant invitation for an attack.
Besides this increased need for an absolutely sure defense against land- ings, it is necessary to improve coastal navigation steadily by protect- ing the sheltered island route from the open sea and by increasing the number of emergency harbors. A lengthy interruption of coastal shipping, brought about by an enemy superior at sea, would have very grave cone- quences in Norway at the present time,
For these reasons the improvement of land communications in Norway is to be pushed with the same energy as are the purely defensive measures.
b, The Franco-Bel ian coast, including its fringe of islands, stands next on a prior y st, and especially the areas along the central part of the Channel from the Seheldt to the region west off the Seine estuary, and those on the Atlantic south of Brest and from Quiberon to the Gironde, where geographic conditions are favorable for a landing.
Next in importance is construction of defense installations on the pro- jecting parts of Normandy and Brittany, which, although navigationally difficult, are suitable for land operations, and invite the establish- ment of bridgeheads on account. of their large and important harbors.
Measures concerning the British Channel Islands which have already been ordered will not be affee ® y t ors ois
c. Third in line are the open coasts of Holland and those of West and North Jutland, which are less su3 W or a landing. Only the er Bay is more suitable for landings
d. Least urgent in this respect are the German Bi ht and the northern coast of Holland, in back of the western r s an slands, where ex rime s c ana conditions constitute the best protection. The island fringe, where the navigational conditions make an enemy ap- proac possi e, is to be defended in such a way that any sudden attacks can be coped with.
e® Coastal defense in the Baltic Sea can be further reduced in favor. of other points; however, at the approaches there must be means off defonse which guarantee at all times that the Baltic Sea can be sealed off. The defense installations on the coast of East Jutland south off Frederikshavn need not be reinforced for the time being.
4. Tie necessity of achieving the greatest effect over wide regions with the use of limited means compels us to even stronger concentration of command than provided in the basic instructions, Guiding' rIncipes for Coastal Warfare" (0Kw 627/ f11 g.K. WFSt/AbtL(II Org) of 3 May 19+1).
Therefore the Commander in Chief, Army will assume the responsibility
- 235 - for the Plannin of coastal defense,, with the participation of the other branches off the Armed Forces and teir ,commanders. The Commander in Chief, Navy retains responsibility for naval- warfare, naval communica- tions, and use of coastal artillery against sea targets. The Commander in Chief Arml is charged with buildiY .u the defenses. In the per- Poiu eo task he has command 2or y over e participating parts of the Armed Forces and their commanders, as well as the units of the Todt Organization assigned to this work. The Commander in Chief, Nay retains sole responsibility for measures taken on a 1man orth Seacoast, Measures for air protection remain in the hands of the Com-5 in Che 1 Air.
Minister. Dr. Todt ;will assign labor for the construction work. The Army High Co mnd is to request materials from the Office of War Economy and A nts, and to allocate them according to the general principles of paragraph 2.
The coastal guns are to be taken frots current production and from suit- able stocks of captured weapons.
6. The Commander in Chief, Army is requested to submit the construe- ion lsp to the Armed Forces High Command; the actual start of the wo 1 not to be made dependent on this, however,
The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command signed : Keitel
The Fuebrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 16 Dec. 194+l
Nr, 4+2282/41 g.LChefs.WSt/Abt.L(I Op.)
I order as follows:
1. The Northern Army Grou is authorized to withdraw the inner flanks of the th and itth Amies to therear of the Volkhov sector and the railroad running from Staraya Volkhovskaya to the northwest. Along this railroad line a junction. is to be established with the right wing of the 28th Army Corps.
The mission of the Army Group is then to defend this front to the last man, not to yield another step, and thus to keep Leningrad cut off.
I especially. emphasize the importance of strengthening anti-aircraft protection south and southeast of Leningrad.
2. The Central Army Group: La'ge-scale withdrawals cannot be under- taken, as they would ea to the complete loss of heavy weapons and equipment. Army commanders, all unit commanders, and officers must,
- 236 - risking their own lives, compel the troops to fanatical resistance in their positions, regardless of enemy break-throughs at the flanks or in the rear, Only such fighting will gain the time necessary to bring up from Germany and the West the reinforcements which I have ordered.
Not until reserves have arrived at vital positions in the rear can re- moval to those positions be considered,
3. The Southern Am Group is to hold its entire front. In order to gain reserves om he Crma for the Southern Army Group, the conquest of Sevastopol is to be forced by straining the last ounce of energy.
1f. Air Force:
a. The Comaander in Chief, Air will send the following units at once as reinforcements for the VIII.Air Corps:
3 newly-formed bomber groups 1 bomber group from the West, restored 'to full strength I heavy fighter group of night fighters (also the two heavy fighter groups of the VIII Air Corps are to be restored to full strength 1 transport group from the 6fth Air Force .f newly-organized transport groups
b, The four transport groups are to be formed by taking the last Ju 52's from the jurisdiction of the Chief of Training and by com- pletely stripping administrative offices and staffs of everything but the last positively necessary communications aircraft.
c. The transport group to be transferred from the 4th Air Force will carry, at the time of its transfer to the VIII Air Corps, one transfer battalion (Marschbataillon) of the Southern Army Group in ac- cordance with the dispositions of Army High Command, which will be advised by telephone.
d. The transport groups to be newly organized are to be concen- trated as far as possible in Cracow, in order to transport large units of the assembled 4th 35 Regiment from there to the Central Army Group.
5. Reinforcements for the front:
a. The most important thing is to supply riflemen (transfer battalions) to those divisions which have been weakened the most. The bringing up of tanks will be subordinated to this. Next in order of importance will be the divisions from the West, which have been provided for, and which are to be transported to the Central Army Group and com- mitted where there are too few combat units. They are to receive full winter equipment, if necessary even by stripping the divisions remain- ing in the West.
The infantry units of several divisions weak in artillery are to be taken first. All transports are to be equipped with camp stoves and ample supplies of rations.
The Army Groups will determine the priority of these transports as op- posed to supply trains. Up to the border of Germany they are to travel at an accelerated speed.
b. All the forces in Germany which can fight or do. construction work or defense duty are to be organized, provided with winter equipment at their present locations, and readied for transport unless they are assigned to absolutely vital tasks. (Guard battalions of Army, Air
- 237 - Force, and the SS in Berlin, Labor Service in the West and in Poland.)
The preparations of these units are to be reported.
c. The Chief of Army Equirpmnt and Commander of the Replacement Arm is to organze ro the epacement Army, besies the divisions already ordered, as m light infantry units asp os!ble, equipped for movement in winter, in battalion strength,wit~h skis-and sleds. Number and combat readiness of these light infantry units is to be reported to me.
signed: Adolf Hitler
Headquarters, Army High Command 19 Dec. 941l
Order the Day ttthe Army
Soldiers!
Today the Fuehxrer personally took over command of the Army as the most important weapon in this war, at a time when great decisions are immin- ent. At the same time he granted my request of some time ago to relieve me of the command of the Army because of a heart ailment.
Soldiers! For almost 4 years I have headed the best army in'the world as your commander in chief, These years witnessed a great number of most important events for Germany, and for the Army very great military successes. With pride and gratitude I look back on these years; pride in your achievements, gratitude for your loyalty.
Great tasks have been carried out; great and difficult tasks are ahead. I am convinced that you will be able to cope with those as well. The Fuehrer will lead us to victory!
Pace the future with unflinching determinationi Everything for Germany,
signed: von Brauchitsch Field Marshal
__II__ C___
- 238 - The Fuebrer and Supreme Co- nder Fuebrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 19 Dec. 1941
To the Comandeo in Chief, Army
I have decided to assume in person the High Co nd of the Army, effect- ive today.
The Chief of the General Staff, Army is to be my immediate subordinate,
The remaining powers of the Commander in Chief, Army as highest author- ity in co rid and administration of the field army will be performed on my behalf by the Chief of Staifif of the ,Armed Forces High Co nd, Field Marshal General eitel.
He is to issue the regulations and supplements made necessary by this order, in accordance wih my instrctiors,
signed: Adolf Hitler
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Copy
The Fuehrer and Supreme Co ,rider Fuebrer Headquarters of the Armed Forces 26 Dec. 19i1
Basic Order for Comunications in the Armed Forces
1. Every report, regardless of Its nature, is a tool for the com- manders, and can be a cause of decisive decisions.
2. Every report must therefore be based on absolute truth and con- scientiousness.
3. Every report must ifur.thermore be drawn up in such a way that it will present an unequivocal picture of the situation to the superior command, or will be a s traigc forward answer tc questions asked.
4f. It is dangerous to exaggete or embellish. It is honorable for a soldier to report truthfully his not living up to expectations, and to admit his mistakes
5. Every superior has the duty to examine dubious reports, and to in- sist adamantly that the above-mentioned principles are adhered to. On the other hand, the subordinates must known that reports are asked on1y when they are actually necessary.
signed:, Adolf Hitler
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- 239 -