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The Changing Security Dynamics of the Middle East and North Africa by Anthony H

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The Changing Security Dynamics of the Middle East and North Africa by Anthony H The Changing Security Dynamics of the Middle East and North Africa By Anthony H. Cordesman With the assistance of Grace Hwang Revised Draft: October 26, 2020 Please provide comments and suggestions to [email protected] Photo: Oleg Nikishin/Getty Images Cordesman: Changing MENA Security Dynamics Revised AHC 26.10.20 2 The Changing Security Dynamics of the Middle East and North Africa Anthony Cordesman The security dynamics of the Middle East and North Africa have changed radically over the last decade and will continue to change for the foreseeable future. What appeared to be a relatively stable pattern of national security developments and outside support before the political upheavals that began in 2011, has become the scene of three major civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Major shifts have taken place in the political stability and security structure of Algeria and Egypt. The Lebanese Hezbollah has emerged as a major non-state military actor, and the government of Lebanon has virtually collapsed. The rise of ISIS led to further major conflicts in Iraq, alongside a major new competition between the U.S. and Iran for military influence in that country. The Iranian-Arab arms race sharply intensified and led to a new pattern of clashes and missile strikes. Major changes have also taken place in the military and internal security forces of most MENA countries, with a shift away from modernizing and expanding conventional military forces and their major weapons to a focus on counterextremism, counterterrorism, and internal security. At the same time, the patterns of local alliances have changed, and MENA states have shifted to a focus on missiles and precision guided weapons as well as on a wide range of other developments in military technology and tactics. Gray area operations and hybrid warfare have become an additional focus, as has the support of rebel and other separatist factions in neighboring states. The patterns of outside military support and security assistance have also continued to evolve, along with the nature of the security and security forces of each MENA nation. Outside military support and security assistance aid has long been critical to the survival and security of a number of MENA states. Enhancing national security and winning given conflicts have been key motives, but so have enhancing regional influence, serving ideological goals, securing the position of ruling elites, and using such support to gain power for a given national government. The rhetoric of security partnerships and alliances tends to be consistently altruistic, but the reality is often self- seeking. Over the last decade, the military ties between the MENA region and outside states have helped lead to wars and/or made them far more intense. Even when outside support has helped recipient nations to improve their security and protect their populations, its real cost has increasingly come at the price of a given country’s economic development and advances in civil society. Some MENA countries have spent so much on their military and other security forces that it has come at the cost of civil development. Others have used their ties with outside states to create repressive regimes or support regimes that are dominated by their military and security forces. The nations that provide security assistance have provided such support knowing these costs, and in ways that helped to create a favorable regime – sometimes at the cost of “assisting” the creation and outcome of a civil war. In the past, outside military support has sometimes played a major role in negotiating and securing a peace, such as U.S. aid to Egypt and Jordan, which played a major role in their peace with Israel. At the same time, the history of such assistance has also been shaped by a history of major and minor wars between regional states. These have included a long series of struggles for full independence from colonial powers, major Arab-Israeli conflicts, and major conflicts in the Persian/Arab Gulf through limited and local conflicts as well as civil wars. They have also Cordesman: Changing MENA Security Dynamics Revised AHC 26.10.20 3 increasingly involved supporting struggles between governments and non-state actors – players that now have sectarian, ethnic, and extremist military forces. The current security dynamics of the MENA region have also been driven by direct military intervention and the active support of national military forces in Libya, Syria, and Iraq – and the history of these nations involve receiving outside military aid, arms, advisors, and power projection for a wide range of reasons, but many have had little to do with enhancing security and stability. MENA states have used outside support to intimidate, deter, or defeat their neighbors; to gain outside political and military support; to enhance their prestige and status; to secure the position of a given ruler or a regime; to win the support from a nation’s military and security forces in maintaining its rule; and to intimidate or defeat a given internal faction. They have also become the scene of outside support to non-state actors, rebel factions, and opposing sides in civil wars. The goal of most such assistance has not been to bring security or stability, but to defeat an existing regime, gain power by aiding the winner, and/or displace or weaken the influence of other outside powers. It can also have a major ideological dimension: to defeat or support extremist Islamist movements. Cordesman: Changing MENA Security Dynamics Revised AHC 26.10.20 4 Table of Contents LESS, RATHER THAN MORE, SECURITY ............................................................................................................... 7 THE BROAD CHANGES IN THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE POWERS ................................................................................. 8 THE CHANGING MILITARY DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL MILITARY FORCES AND THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE STATES ...... 10 NEW FORMS OF MILITARY DYNAMICS .............................................................................................................................. 10 THE DOMINANT U.S. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE IS GLOBAL SECURITY, NOT THE MENA REGION ..................................................... 11 THE ROLE OF OTHER OUTSIDE POWERS ............................................................................................................................ 12 THE DOMINANT REGIONAL NATIONAL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE IS INTERNAL SECURITY, NOT MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS...................... 12 THE SEARCH FOR STRATEGY: MILITARY DYNAMICS VERSUS INTERNAL SECURITY DYNAMICS ........................................................ 13 FORCING IMPROVEMENTS IN JOINT AND MULTI-DOMAIN WARFARE, C4I, IS&R, AND BATTLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ................ 15 LIFECYCLE, SUSTAINMENT, AND COMBAT INTENSITY ........................................................................................................... 16 BALLISTIC MISSILES, UCAVS, AND NEW LONG -RANGE ATTACK SYSTEMS .............................................................................. 16 MISSILE DEFENSE AND “LAYERED” ARTILLERY, ROCKET, MISSILE, AND AIR DEFENSE ................................................................. 17 PROLIFERATING OTHER “SMART” WEAPONS ..................................................................................................................... 17 PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO ADVANCED WEAPONS AND MILITARY TECHNOLOGY ........................................................................... 17 COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTEREXTREMISM ................................................................................................................ 17 NEW FORMS OF PARAMILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES ....................................................................................................... 18 “VOLUNTEERS,” MERCENARIES, NON-STATE ACTORS, MILITIAS, AND OTHER PROXIES ............................................................. 18 GRAY AREA, HYBRID, AND LOW-INTENSITY WARFARE ......................................................................................................... 18 THE DECLINING NEED FOR CONVENTIONAL MAJOR WEAPONS AND WARFIGHTING .................................................................. 18 POPULATION WARFARE ................................................................................................................................................. 19 HUMAN SHIELDS, AIR POWER, AND PRECISION STRIKE ........................................................................................................ 20 COUNTERPROLIFERATION ............................................................................................................................................... 20 THE CIVIL-MILITARY CHALLENGE ..................................................................................................................................... 21 THE CHALLENGES IN MEASURING THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF MENA COUNTRY FORCES AND OUTSIDE MILITARY SUPPORT ........................................................................................................................................ 22 REPORTING ON MILITARY FORCES ................................................................................................................................... 22 MILITARY INDUSTRY, MAJOR MAINTENANCE, AND MODERNIZATION CAPABILITY ..................................................................... 23 PARAMILITARY, COUNTERTERRORISM, AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES ...............................................................................
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