Looking Beyond Dichotomies: Hidden Diversity of Voices In

_full_journalsubtitle: International Journal of Chinese Studies/Revue Internationale de Sinologie _full_abbrevjournaltitle: TPAO _full_ppubnumber: ISSN 0082-5433 (print version) _full_epubnumber: ISSN 1568-5322 (online version) _full_issue: 5-6 _full_issuetitle: 0 _full_alt_author_running_head (neem stramien J2 voor dit article en vul alleen 0 in hierna): Anatoly Polnarov _full_alt_articletitle_running_head (rechter kopregel - mag alles zijn): Looking Beyond Dichotomies _full_is_advance_article: 0 _full_article_language: en indien anders: engelse articletitle: 0

T’OUNG PAO Looking Beyond Dichotomies T’oung Pao 104 (2018) 465-495 www.brill.com/tpao 465

Contents Looking Beyond Dichotomies: Hidden Diversity of Voices in the Yantielun 鹽鐵論 465 Anatoly Polnarov 465 Two Notes on Xie He’s 謝赫 “Six Criteria” (liufa 六法), Aided by Digital Databases 496 Paul R. Goldin 496 Yuan Hong’s 袁宏 Evaluation of the Han-Wei Transition 511 Sebastian Eicher 511 The Tang Poet in Song Poetics, Song Poetics in the Tang Poet: The Construction of Du Fu’s Image as Verbal Master 537 Jue Chen 537 Explaining Perfection: Quanzhen and Thirteenth-century Chinese Literati 572 Mark Halperin 572 Looking Beyond Dichotomies: Hidden Diversity of Writing Landscapes into Civilization: Ming Loyalist Ambitions on the Mekong Delta 626 Claudine Ang 626 Ideology of Power and Power of Ideology in Early China. Edited by Yuri Pines, Paul Goldin, and Martin Kern. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2015. viii + 348 pp. 673 Voices in the Yantielun 鹽鐵論 Mark Edward Lewis, Stanford University 679 Emperor Wu Zhao and Her Pantheon of Devis, Divinities, and Dynastic Mothers. By N. Harry Rothschild. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2015. xxii + 357 pp. 680 Antonello Palumbo, SOAS, University of London 687 Ming Loyalists in Southeast Asia. As Perceived Through Various Asian and European Records. By Claudine Salmon. Maritime Asia, 27. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2014. viii + 134 pp., illus. 688 Angela Schottenhammer, University of Salzburg 689 Brush, Seal and Abacus: Troubled Vitality in Late Ming China’s Economic Heartland, 1500-1644. By Jie Zhao. Hong Kong: The Chinese Univ. Press, 2018. xvi + 267 pp., illus. 690 Michael Marmé, Fordham University 695 Livres Reçus / Books Received 696 Anatoly Polnarov (The Hebrew University, Jerusalem)

Introduction In 81 BCE, Emperor Zhao of Han (漢昭帝, 87-74 BCE) issued an edict ordering ministers of the state to consult with the “worthy and good persons” (xianliang 賢良, hereafter the Worthies) and “literary scholars” (wenxue 文學, hereafter the Literati) on matters of the people’s well-being.1 The summoned experts proposed the abolition of state monopolies

1) Hanshu 漢書 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1962), 7.223, 24B.1176. The designations “literary scholars” and “worthy and good persons” frequently appear in Han sources in the context of the appointment and promotion of officials (e.g., Shiji 史記 [Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959] 10.422, 12.452, 28.1384, 31.1424, and 121.3125; Hanshu, 4.116, 25A.1215, 49.2276-77, 56.2495, and 74.3133). These titles therefore suggest that the summoned debaters were holders of an office (typically, a minor one) or nominees to it, who had advanced through what was called the “recommendation system.” According to this system, nominees for appointment or promotion were recommended by local or central government officials on the basis of their moral character and abilities. For the Han recommendation system, see Yan Buke 閻步克, Chaju zhidu bianqian shigao 察举制度变迁史稿 (Shenyang: Liaoning daxue chubanshe, 1991), esp. 8-22; Yu Yingchun 于迎春, Qin Han shili 秦漢士吏 (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2000); Michael Loewe, The Men Who Governed Han China: Companion to a Biographical Dictionary of the Qin, Former Han and Xin Periods (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 109-54; Hans Bielenstein, The Bureaucracy of Han Times (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980), 132-42. According to recent archaeological data, the recommendation system was a relatively narrow avenue of entry and advancement through the Han bureaucracy; see Liu Pak-yuen (Liao Po-yüan) 廖伯源, “Handai shijin zhidu xinkao” 漢代仕進制度新考, in Jiandu yu zhidu: Yinwan Han mu jiandu guanwenshu kaozheng 簡牘與制度尹灣漢墓簡牘管文書考證 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2005), 3-55; Ōba Osamu 大庭修, “Lun Handai de lungong shengjin 論漢代的論功升進,” in Jiandu yanjiu yicong 簡牘研究譯叢, vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1987), 323-38. Still, it seems more accurate to view the debaters as service-oriented men with ties to the bureaucratic system rather than representatives of the “common people” (contra Guo Moruo 郭沫若 “Yantielun duben” 鹽鐵論讀本 in Guo Moruo quanji 郭沫若全集, vol. 8 [Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1985], 472-73).

©T’oung Koninklijke Pao 104 Brill (2018) NV, Leiden, 465-495 2018 DOI: 10.1163/15685322-10456P01

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 04:32:59AM via free access 466 Anatoly Polnarov on salt and iron, whereupon a debate ensued between the ministers and their critics. A generation later, during Emperor Xuan’s reign (漢宣帝, 74-49 BCE), the scholar and official Huan Kuan 桓寬 composed an account of this event, the Yantielun 鹽鐵論 or Debates on Salt and Iron.2 The sixty chapters of the Yantielun represent the debates in the form of a dialogue between the two sides: the officials, led primarily by the counselor (dafu 大夫),3 versus the critics of the government, composed of the Literati and Worthies. These two groups take turns in debating the officials: in the first twenty-seven chapters, the Literati lead the argument, and in the middle of chapter 28, “Guo ji” 國疾 (Ills of the state), the Worthies take over. They continue up until the end of chapter 42, “Ji zhi” 擊之 (Attack Them), after which the Literati return to the fray and stay at it until chapter 59, “Da lun” 大論 (Grand Discourse). The last chapter consists of Huan Kuan’s concluding words which reveal that the counselor is Sang Hongyang 桑弘羊 (d. 80 BCE), who served as imperial counselor (yushi dafu 御史大夫) from 87 to 80 BCE.4 The Yantielun encompasses manifold topics related to foreign affairs, administration, economics, and so forth. This, as well as the multiplicity of opinions expressed on these topics, makes the treatise an indispens- able source for political thought in the first century BCE. Scholars

2) Juri L. Kroll surmises a possible compilation date in the early years of Emperor Yuan’s 元帝 reign (48-33 bce); see Kroll, Spor o Soli i Zheleze, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: Peterburzhskoe vostokovedenie, 1997), 22-23. Loewe articulates this view even more confidently in “‘Confu- cian’ Values and Practices in Han China,” T’oung Pao 98 (2012): 26, and idem, “Han Yuandi, Reigned 48 to 33 bce, and His Advisors,” Early China 35/36 (2012-13): 363. However, the Han shu unambiguously ascribes the work to Emperor Xuan’s reign (Hanshu, 66.2903). For a survey of various opinions on the dating of the Yantielun, see Wang Yong 王永, Yantielun yanjiu 鹽鐵論研究 (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 2009), 20-23. 3) Other participants debating for the official side are the chancellor (chengxiang 丞相), the chancellor’s clerk (chengxiang shi 丞相史), and the imperial clerk (yushi 御史). The chancellor must have been Tian Qianqiu 田千秋 (d. 77 bce) (Hanshu, 19.790). Here and hereafter, the translation of official titles follows Loewe, A Biographical Dictionary of the Qin, Western Han and Xin periods, 221 bc-ad 24 (Leiden: Brill, 2000). 4) Wang Liqi 王利器, Yantielun jiaozhu (dingben) 鹽鐵論校注 (定本) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996), “Za lun” 雜論 (Miscellaneous Discourses), 60.614; hereafter, all references to the Yantielun are to this edition. For my translations I have consulted Esson M. Gale, Discourses on Salt and Iron: A Debate on State Control of Commerce and Industry in Ancient China, Chap- ters I-XXVIII, Translated from the Chinese of Huan K’uan with Introduction and Notes (Taipei: Ch’eng Wen Publishing Co., 1967); Kroll, Spor o Soli i Zheleze, vol. 1, and Spor o Soli i Zheleze, vol. 2 (Moscow: Vostochnaya Literatura, 2001); and Jean Levi, La Dispute sur le Sel et le Fer (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2010).

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Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 04:32:59AM via free access Looking Beyond Dichotomies 467 routinely read the text as an account of a straightforward clash between two bitterly opposed camps.5 This reading, in turn, is often used to corroborate dichotomous approaches to the political history of the Former Han as a whole which, seen through this prism, appears as being driven by an ongoing confrontation between two opposing forces. These an- tagonistic forces have been variously identified as schools of thought (Legalism versus Confucianism),6 political ideologies (Modernists versus Reformists),7 or scholastic camps (New Text versus the Old Text Learning).8 Attempts have also been made to integrate some of these approaches. Thus, Yan Buke 閻步克 identifies Loewe’s categories of

5) See, for example, Gale, Discourses on Salt and Iron, xli; Loewe, Crisis and Conflict in Han China (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1974), 91-112; Wu Hui 吳慧, Sang Hongyang yanjiu 桑弘羊研究 (Jinan: Qi-Lu shushe, 1981), 292-343, esp. 325-43; Wang Liqi 王利器, “Qian yan 前言,” Yantielun jiaozhu, 1-31; Nishijima Sadao 西嶋定生, Shin Kan teikoku: Chūgoku kodai teikoku no kōbō 秦漢帝國: 中國古代帝國の興亡 (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1997), 304; Kroll, Spor o Soli i Zheleze, vol. 1, 35-38; Wang Yong, Yantielun yanjiu, 7-12. Jean Levi, La Dispute, xxxv, even describes the debate in such terms as “… des entités primordiales tels Ahriman et Ormuzd qui se livrent un combat cosmique” and “…caractère quasi manichéen de l’affrontement.” 6) Wu Hui, Sang Hongyang yanjiu, 292-343; Kroll, Spor o Soli i Zheleze, vol. 1, 35-38. A series of studies published in the last decades has demolished the validity of the traditional “school” taxonomy in early Chinese studies, for example, Ren Jiyu 任繼愈, Zhongguo zhexue shilun 中國哲學史論 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1981), 431-35; Martin Kern, The Stele Inscriptions of Ch’in Shih-Huang: Text and Ritual in Early Chinese Imperial Represen- tation (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 2000), 164-82; Kidder Smith, “Sima Tan and the Invention of Daoism, ‘Legalism,’ et cetera,” The Journal of Asian Studies 62 (2003): 129-56; Mark Csikszentmihalyi and Michael Nylan, “Constructing Lineages and Inventing Traditions through Exemplary Figures in Early China,” T’oung Pao, 89 (2003): 59-99. However, the school labels are still frequently employed not only as heuristic devices but also as analytical tools in studies of early Chinese intellectual history in general and the Yantielun in particular. For recent examples, see Ming Wan, “Discourses on Salt and Iron: A First Century B.C. Chinese Debate over the Political Economy of Empire,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 17 (2012): 143-63, esp. 159-60 (note, however, that Wan admits that “lines were blurred between Confucianism and Legalism” [160]); Ping-cheung Lo, “Legalism and Offensive Realism in the Chinese Court Debate on Defending National Security 81 bce,” in Chinese Just War Ethics: Origin, Development, and Dissent, ed. Ping-cheung Lo and Sumner B. Twiss (New York: Rout- ledge, 2015), 249-80. 7) Loewe, Crisis and Conflict, 91-112. 8) Feng Youlan 馮友蘭, Zhongguo zhexue shi 中國哲學史, vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1961), 497-98, 574-76. For a survey of Chinese studies dealing with questions related to the Old/New Text scholarship, see Hans van Ess, “The Old Text/New Text Controversy: Has the 20th Century Got It Wrong?” T’oung Pao 80 (1994): 148-61. See also Michael Nylan, “The Chin Wen/Ku Wen Controversy in Han Times,” T’oung Pao 80 (1994): 83-145, and van Ess, “The Apocryphal Texts of the Han Dynasty and the Old Text/New Text Controversy,” T’oung Pao 85 (1999): 29-64, for two somewhat different attempts to present an updated view on this topic.

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“Modernists” and “Reformists” with the “New Text” and “Old Text” learning respectively.9 Undeniably, the Yantielun does invite dichotomous interpretations. One reason for this is that large portions of the text are devoted to the policies introduced or reformed during Emperor Wu’s reign (漢武帝, 141-87 BCE).10 It is thus easy to read the text strictly as a skirmish between the supporters and detractors of Emperor Wu’s innovations.11 Second, the dialogue structure of the treatise effectively conveys the feeling that the officials and government critics formed two cohesive and bitterly opposed bodies. Notably, in the concluding chapter of the Yantielun, Huan Kuan underlines the divide by briefly summarizing the parties’ standpoints in sharply contrasting terms and laments their in- ability to forge a compromise.12 And yet, as I shall argue, a close analysis of the text reveals nuances that do not tally with this strict dichotomy. I shall focus on the group formed by the government’s critics and show that it was far from a monolithic homogeneous block. Rather, their joint opposition to the government’s policies notwithstanding, the Literati and the Worthies adopted different rhetorical strategies reflecting differ ent stances toward their opponents. They moreover disagreed amongst themselves over several important political and administrative issues. By showing the dissimilarities in the rhetoric and views of the Lite- rati and the Worthies, I hope not only to provide a more complex picture of the intellectual milieu under the Former Han but also to shed light on the relationship between Huan Kuan’s work and the actual debate of 81 BCE. It is hardly credible that Huan Kuan could have deliberately

9) Yan Buke, Shidafu zhengzhi yansheng shigao 士大夫政治演生史稿 (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1996), 372; Chen Suzhen 陳蘇鎮, Chunqiu yu Han dao: Liang Han zhengzhi yu zhengzhi wenhua yanjiu《春秋》與《漢道》：兩漢政治與政治文化研究 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2011), 3-4. Note that van Ess has reached the opposite conclusion on the affinities of the parties in the Yantielun in the context of the Old/New Text controversy. See van Ess, Politik und Gelehrsamkeit in der Zeit der Han (202 v. Chr. - 220 n. Chr.): Die Alttext / Neutext-Kontroverse (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1993), 122-23. 10) For Emperor Wu’s reign, see Loewe, “The Former Han Dynasty,” in The Cambridge His- tory of China Vol. 1: The Ch’in and Han Empires, 221 B. C. - A. D. 220, ed. Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), 152-79. 11) For such a reading, see Loewe, Crisis and Conflict, 91-112; idem, “The Former Han Dynasty,” 187-90; Tamara T. Chin, Savage Exchange: Han Imperialism, Chinese Literary Style, and the Economic Imagination (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Asia Center, 2014), esp. 48-68. 12) Yantielun, “Za lun,” 60.613.

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Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 04:32:59AM via free access Looking Beyond Dichotomies 469 fashioned the diversity of the critics’ voices, and yet done so with such subtlety as to make it elude the attention of almost every reader for two millennia.13 Moreover, judging from the Yantielun’s organization and the author’s own remarks, Huan Kuan himself seems to have been obliv- ious to this absence of conformity within the opposition camp. If so, we may plausibly suggest that Huan Kuan did not invent the subtle differences between the government critics, but simply reproduced them from his earlier sources, for example, from the court records of the original event.14 Therefore my analysis, if correct, will dispel some of the skepticism toward the Yantielun that leads the treatise often to be viewed merely as a repository of ideas that “might have been advocated … before the

13) I am aware of only two works that address the differences between the rhetoric of the Literati and that of the Worthies in the Yantielun. Cao Jie 曹杰, “Yantielun zhong xianliang yu wenxue sixiang zhuzhang zhi chayi”《鹽鐵論》中賢良與文學思想主張之差異, Yin- shan xuekan 陰山學刊 19.2 (2006): 84-90, found numerous instances of such disagreements (although in some instances the author seems to overstate their significance). Regrettably, aside from the conclusion, Cao’s brief article provides little interpretation of his findings: “It is clear that the Worthies were much more practical-minded than the Literati” 可以看出賢良要比文學務實的多 (Cao Jie, “Yantielun,” 90). Ziv Halevy, “Identity and Roles in the Salt and Iron Debates” (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Hebrew Univ., Jerusalem, 2007), has argued that the tone of the Yantielun’s discussion changes when the Worthies step in as the opponents of the officials, compared to the Literati, switching from vitriolic diatribe to a more constructive and mutually respectful dialogue. According to Halevy, the Worthies were nominees eligible for entry into lower-level officialdom, while the Literati were “scholars” (Halevy uses this word to translate the term ru 儒) from outside the bureaucratic establish- ment. 14) The early Chinese court practices of recording important events and writing down speeches delivered on special occasions go back to at least as early as the Spring and Autumn period (770-453 bce). See, for example, Yuri Pines, Foundations of Confucian Thought: Intel- lectual Life in the Chunqiu Period, 722-453 B.C.E. (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawai‘i Press, 2002), 13- 26; David Schaberg, A Patterned Past: Form and Thought in Early Chinese Historiography (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Asia Center, 2001), 315-26. Reports on court conferences are common in Han historiography (see, for example, the brief survey in Nylan, “The Chin Wen/Ku Wen Controversy,” 117-19), implying that court archives normally preserved records of such events. In the afterword to the Yantielun (“Za lun,” 60.613), the author claims: “I have observed the Salt and Iron Debates and looked into the matters set forth by the ministers, the Literati, and the Worthies” (余睹鹽、鐵之義，觀乎公卿、文學、賢良之論). The ex- pression, “… observed (du 睹) the Salt and Iron Debates and looked (guan 觀) into the matters” suggests that Huan Kuan learned about the discussion through a written source. The existence and accessibility of written records of the 81 bce conference are also attested to in Hanshu, 66.2903. How exactly these records were prepared and how they might have looked is inevitably subject to speculation, although certain plausible observations can be dis- cerned—see the extensive discussion in Wang Yong, Yantielun yanjiu, 1-20.

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Throne.”15 While it is indisputable that the Yantielun bears Huan Kuan’s editorial stamp, my findings at the very least rule out the possibility that it was invented from scratch or that his account rewrites the original dispute beyond recognition. As I shall argue below, Huan Kuan in all likelihood relied on earlier materials on the original debates of 81 BCE, and his treatise reproduces these debates with a considerable degree of reliability. This conclusion will increase the value of the Yantielun as a source for the political and intellectual history of the Former Han. I shall present and analyze four subjects that show the clearest instances of divergence between the two groups of the government’s opponents: the disadvantages of state monopolies, the Xiongnu policy,16 corruption among lower officials, and the selection and promotion of candidates to office. Each of these issues is highly significant both in the narrow context of the debates and in a broader perspective on early Chi- nese political culture. It is therefore likely that the discrepancies I shall present reflect crucial differences between the agendas of the Literati and the Worthies.

15) Gale, Discourses on Salt and Iron, xli; italics are mine. For other skeptical opinions on the Yantielun’s reliability as an account of the 81 bce conference, see Michael Loewe, “Yen T’ieh Lun,” in Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographical Guide, ed. Michael Loewe (Berkeley: Society for the Study of Early China and Institute of East Asian Studies, Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1993), 477, and idem, “‘Confucian’ Values and Practices,” 26; Mark Edward Lewis, Writing and Authority in Early China (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1999), 355; Michael J. Puett, The Ambivalence of Creation: Debates Concerning Innovation and Artifice in Early China (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2001), 264, n.111; Michael Nylan, “The Art of Persuasion from 100 bce to 100 CE,” in China’s Early Empires, ed. Michael Loewe and Michael Nylan (Cam- bridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), 498. In Chinese scholarship on the Yantielun, there is an influential view going back to the Qing scholar Yao Nai (姚鼐, 1732-1815) that Huan Kuan had “concocted” ( yizao 臆造) at least a large portion of the treatise (Yao is cited in Yantielun jiaozhu, Appendix 4, 803). For an extensive survey of Chinese studies of the Yantielun’s prov- enance, see Wang Yong, Yantielun yanjiu, 1-20. Scholars who consider the Yantielun to be at least partly reliable include Kroll, Spor o Soli i Zheleze, vol. 1, 18-19, and Donald B. Wagner, The State and the Iron Industry in Han China (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2001), 18. Furthermore, Yamada Katsumi 山田勝美, in his “Entetsuron shoin Kanshi kō” 鹽鐵論所引管子考, Shinagaku kenkyū 支那學研究 26 (1961): 1-11 and in Entetsuron 鹽鐵論 (Tokyo: Meitoku shuppansha, 1995), 9-18, analyzed quotations and stock phrases in the Yan- tielun and concluded that the text was unlikely to have been produced by a single author, suggesting that Huan Kuan drew on earlier material. 16) These two observations I owe to Cao Jie’s analysis. See Cao Jie, “Yantielun,” 85-87, for the monopolies, and 88-89 for the Xiongnu.

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State Monopolies The imperial monopolies over salt and iron had been set up in 118 BCE with the purpose of replenishing the state coffers that had been severely drained by the campaigns against the Xiongnu.17 Sang Hongyang had taken over the administration of the monopolies in 115 BCE, and since then had been closely associated with these institutions, in which he was said to have taken great pride.18 In the debate, therefore, he defend- ed both the policies he deemed beneficial and his own political authority and legacy.19 The anti-monopoly arguments of the Literati are best presented in the opening chapter of the Yantielun, “Ben yi” 本議 (Basic Arguments):

Now, when in commanderies and kingdoms20 there are salt, iron, and liquor monopolies, and balanced transportation,21 [this means that] the government com- petes with the people for benefit. This dissipates sincere and honest simplicity and brings about the transformation to meanness and greed. As a result, few among the people stick to the primary occupation, while many flock to the secondary occupations.22 … When the secondary occupations are cultivated, then the people

17) For state monopolies in Han, see Nishijima Sadao, “The Economic and Social History of Former Han,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 1, 605-7; Loewe, A Biographical Diction- ary, 75, 210. See also the excellent and thorough discussion in Kroll, Spor o Soli i Zheleze, vol. 1, 189-92, n.13-14. 18) Shiji, 30.1428; Hanshu, 24B.1164. 19) It is likely that the debate was a trap set up for Sang Hongyang by his rival, general-in- chief (da jiangjun 大將軍) Huo Guang 霍光 (d. 68 bce), who almost certainly had organized the event with the implicit aim of criticizing Sang Hongyang’s views and thus undermining his standing at court. Sang eventually lost this power struggle and was executed a year after the debate; see Wu Hui, Sang Hongyang yanjiu, 297-98; Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, “Yantielun zhong de zhengzhi shehui wenhua wenti” 《鹽鐵論》中的政治社會文化問題 in Liang Han si xiang shi 兩漢思想史 (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 2001), vol. 3, 75-77; Nishijima Sadao, Shin Kan teikoku, 305-6; Levi, La Dispute, xxiii-xxv. 20) My translations of administrative units follow Loewe, “Social Distinctions, Groups and Privileges,” in China’s Early Empires, 296-307 (namely: “kingdom” [guo 國], “commandery” [jun 郡], “county” [xian 縣], and “district” [xiang 鄉]). 21) “Balanced transportation” (jun shu 均輸) was a price-regulation mechanism. It involved collecting taxes in kind and marketing the goods in other regions for a better price (rather than transporting them to the capital), with the aim of optimizing profits and “balancing” prices: Hanshu, 24B.2052; see also a detailed discussion in Kroll, Spor o soli i zheleze, vol. 1, 192-94, n.15. 22) “Primary occupation” (ben 本 or benye 本業) normally stands for agriculture. “Second- ary” (mo 末) usually refers to trade and crafts. The desired prevalence of “primary” over “secondary” is a common trope in Han and pre-Han sources—see, for example, Jiang Lihong 蔣禮鴻, Shangjun shu zhuizhi 商君書錐指 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006) 22.128-29; Li

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are licentious; when the primary occupation is cultivated, then the people are simple. When the people are simple, their wealth will suffice [for their needs]; when the people are extravagant, hunger and cold will follow. We beg to abolish the salt, iron, and liquor monopolies and the system of balanced transportation, so as to promote the primary occupations and reject the secondary; thus, farming becomes widespread and beneficial, which is advantageous. 今郡國有鹽、鐵、酒榷，均輸，與民爭利。散敦厚之樸，成貪鄙之化。是以百姓就本者寡，趨末者眾 … 末修則民淫，本修則民愨。民愨則財用足，民侈則饑寒生。願罷鹽、鐵、酒榷、均輸，所以進本退末，廣利農業，便也。23

The Worthies discuss the subject in chapter 36, “Shui han” 水旱 (Floods and Droughts):

Agriculture is the great occupation of the empire; iron tools are of greatest use to the people. When the tools are convenient and useful, then bountiful yields are gotten with little labor invested; the farmers enjoy their occupation and diligently strive for success. If the tools cannot be used, then the fields lie waste and desolate and the crops are not gathered; [the tillers] exhaust all their strength but the yields are halved. Tools that can be used suitably are ten times more beneficial than un- suitable ones. [However], when county magistrates smelt metal to make iron tools, their need to meet quotas makes them produce mostly large-sized tools that are of no use to the people. 農，天下之大業也，鐵器，民之大用也。器用便利，則用力少而得作多，農夫樂事勸功。用不具，則田疇荒，谷不殖，用力鮮，功自半。器便與不便，其功相什而倍也。縣官鼓鑄鐵器，大抵多為大器，務應員程，不給民用。24

There are important differences in the content and form of these two arguments against monopolies. The Literati launch an all-out attack on economic activism and request the government to abandon it completely, while the Worthies focus their criticism exclusively on the man- ufacture of iron tools. Among other things, they never mention the

Xiangfeng 黎翔鳳, Guanzi jiaozhu 管子校注 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006), 48.924-25; and Hanshu, 24A.1127-34. For a focused discussion on these categories, see Roel Sterckx, “Ideolo- gies of the Peasant and Merchant in Warring States China,” in Ideology of Power and Power of Ideology in Early China, ed. Yuri Pines, Paul R. Goldin, and Martin Kern (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 227-40. 23) Yantielun, “Benyi,” 1.1. 24) Ibid., “Shui han,” 36.429-30. See Wagner, The State and the Iron Industry, 56-62, for an excellent discussion on the credibility of the Worthies in their poor opinion of the quality and size of the tools manufactured under the state’s auspices.

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Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 04:32:59AM via free access Looking Beyond Dichotomies 473 policy of “balanced transportation” that had been personally formulated by Sang Hongyang.25 Second, the Worthies target a specific technical problem that, theo- retically, might be dealt with in other ways rather than dismantling the monopoly. The Worthies therefore leave a space for compromise. For the Literati, by contrast, the very idea of state monopolies and economic activism is intrinsically flawed. In essence, they would like to leave the government with no option other than to discontinue the policies under debate. Third, whereas the Literati primarily question the ethical aspects of the government’s endeavors,26 the Worthies choose to deal with the economic categories of labor invested and benefits obtained. The Lite- rati and their straight-laced criticism are a further obstacle to agreement since they oblige the officials to acknowledge the critics’ moral superiority. The Worthies for their part share a common language with the government. In exposing policy flaws, the Worthies put the blame primarily on local authorities. They may disagree with the ministers on what is or is not advantageous, but on the whole they maintain a respectful stance towards them.

The Xiongnu Policy Along with the imperial monopolies, the campaigns against the Xiong- nu were a hallmark of Emperor Wu’s reign. His expansionist foreign policy not only went hand in hand with the ideology of domestic economic activism but also depended upon the resources that it brought. It was an abrupt departure from the pattern that had characterized Han- Xiongnu diplomacy prior to Emperor Wu’s accession, namely the system of treaties underpinned by marital alliances (where Han princesses

25) Shiji, 30.1432; Hanshu, 24B.1168. 26) Only once do the Literati criticize the monopolies on grounds that are not purely ethical: in chapter 5, “Jin geng” 禁耕 (Hindrance to Farming), they claim that the state unification of iron production has led to agricultural tools becoming uniform and therefore unfit for use in diverse regional conditions. But even here they do not fail to note that, should their advice be heeded, “the people will value simplicity and honesty … and no one will benefit [at the expense of] another” 人懷敦樸 … 而莫相利 (Yantielun, “Jin geng,” 5.68). In every other instance, the Literati use a variant of their initial argument and clearly prefer moral considerations as their weapon of choice.

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27) The he qin treaties were broken four times between 200 and 133 bce, three times by the Xiongnu and once by the Han; see Sophia-Karin Psarras, “Han and Xiongnu: A Reexamina- tion of Cultural and Political Relations (1),” Monumenta Serica 51 (2003): 141. For a general discussion on he qin, see Cui Mingde 崔明德, Zhongguo gudai he qin shi 中國古代和親史 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2005), 79-130; Nicola Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002), 193-96; Psarras, “Han and Xiongnu (1),” 132-43; Armin Selbitschka, “Early Chinese Diplomacy: Realpolitik versus the So-called Tributary System,” Asia Major, third series, 28 (2015): 61-114; Chin, Savage Exchange, 213-26. 28) For Emperor Wu’s foreign policy, see Loewe, “The Former Han Dynasty,” 163-70; Di Cos- mo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 227-51; and Di Cosmo, “Han Frontiers: Toward an Inte- grated View,” in Journal of the American Oriental Society 129 (2009): 199-214. A very detailed analysis of the Xiongnu campaigns is given in Psarras, “Han and Xiongnu (1),” 143-56. 29) Yantielun, “Ben yi,” 1.2. 30) Ibid., “Bei hu” 備胡 (Preparing Against Barbarians), 38.446. Sang Hongyang was, apparently, one of the staunchest “hawks” in the Han court. Even Emperor Wu, indisputably the most aggressive Han emperor, once had to temper Sang’s enthusiasm by blocking his initia- tive to launch yet another Western expedition (Hanshu, 96B.3912-14; Loewe, “The Former Han Dynasty,” 168-69).

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The Ancients esteemed virtue and despised recourse to arms. Thus, Confucius said: “If those far away are not submissive, attract them by cultivating refinement and virtue; and when they arrive, make them content.” 古者，貴以德而賤用兵。孔子曰：遠人不服，則修文德以來之。既來之，則安之。31

The Xiongnu theme reappears in chapter 12, “You bian” 憂邊 (Worrying About the Frontiers). This time the Literati follow a different tactic and dismiss the threat altogether. The speaker compares the current unified state of the empire with the ceaseless warfare of the Warring States period and wonders:

How could the barbarian tribes of the Man or Mo32 with their barren lands be worth all this trouble and concern that bring us back to the worries of the Warring States? If Your Majesty is unwilling to abandon them to their fate, you need only manifest your virtue towards them and extend your favors to them, and the northern barbarians will surely turn to you, knocking at the doors of your fortifications of their own accord. Then the Hu33 will be regulated as external vassals, and the Xiongnu will not break their promise till the end of their days. 蠻、貊之人，不食之地，何足以煩慮，而有戰國之憂哉？若陛下不棄，加之以德，施之以惠，北夷必內向，款塞自至，然後以為胡制於外臣，即匈奴沒齒不食其所用矣。34

31) Yantielun, “Ben yi,” 1.2; for Confucius’s citation, see Lunyu 論語 16/1. 32) According to the early Chinese conception of foreign peoples, the Man 蠻 foreigners inhabited southern regions, while the Mo 貊 lived in the northeast. For Man, see Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 92-96; for Mo, see Edwin G. Pulleyblank, “The Chinese and Their Neighbors in Prehistoric and Early Historic Times,” in The Origins of Chinese Civiliza- tion, ed. David N. Keightley (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1983), 442-46. None of these terms is directly applicable to the Xiongnu, so it seems that, in the Yantielun, the compound “Man and Mo” appears in the sense of “various foreign peoples.” Such usage is found, for example, in the Shijing 詩經 ode “Bi Gong” 閟宮 (Mao 300). 33) According to Pulleyblank (“The Chinese and Their Neighbors,” 454), although the word hu 胡 appears in the names of various proto-Mongol peoples (e.g., “Eastern Hu” [dong hu 東胡]), it “became a generic term for steppe nomads and was applied in Han times espe- cially to the Hsiung-nu [Xiongnu].” 34) Yantielun, “You bian,” 12.161-62. Mo chi 沒齒 means “until the end of one’s days” (literally: [until] one’s teeth fall out); cf. Lunyu 14/9. The phrase “bu shi qi suo yong” 不食其所用 is unclear—Gale translates it as “… lack the sustenance they need” (Gale, The Discourses on Salt and Iron, 76), and Levi as “… ne dévoreront plus toutes nos ressources” (Levi, La Dispute, 12.2: 69). Kroll adopts Guo Moruo’s suggestion of replacing yong 用 with yan 言 in order to obtain the idiomatic shi yan 食言 (“break one’s promise” [cf. Shiji 3.95, 110.2903]). See Kroll, Spor o soli i zheleze, vol. 1, 178, 358, n.19, and Guo Moruo, “Yantielun du ben,” 511, n.2. Neither solution is ideal, but the versions by Guo Moruo and Kroll make more sense.

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What is noteworthy here is the dismissal of the Xiongnu threat which had been the major external challenge to the dynasty’s security throughout the Former Han period.35 In my opinion, it is doubtful that, by fram- ing the argument thus, the Literati sincerely hoped to persuade their opponents.36 Highlighting the juvenile Emperor Zhao’s “virtue” as a magical power capable of resolving actual security problems could hardly impress a veteran and pragmatic official such as Sang Hongyang. However, within the ideological confines of court debates Sang could not possibly reject the proposal, even if it was actually absurd. It is likely that the Literati’s goal was not to convince the counselor but to trick him into arguing against the imperial ideology. The Literati tackle the subject of frontier conflicts once again in chapter 51, “Lun yong” 論勇 (Discussing Bravery):

Lord Huan of Qi obtained [the services of] Guan Zhong and became an overlord; Lord Mu of Qin employed You Yu, and the eight states of the Western Rong tribes submitted [to him].37 I have heard that when worthy and sagacious men are obtained, then [even] the Man and Mo tribes come to pay tribute; I have never heard of pacifying outlying [peoples] by seizing and killing their rulers.” 齊桓公得管仲以霸諸侯，秦穆公得由余，西戎八國服。聞得賢聖而蠻、貊來享，未聞劫殺人主以懷遠也。38

35) For Han-Xiongnu relations, see Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies; Psarras, “Han and Xiongnu (1),” 55-236; and idem, “Han and Xiongnu: A Reexamination of Cultural and Political Relations (2),” Monumenta Serica 52 (2004): 37-93 (esp. 37-40 for the period span- ning the dates of the Salt and Iron Debate and the Yantielun’s compilation). 36) Kroll takes this argument at face value and surmises that the Literati’s carefree attitude might reflect their regional background. As natives of the Shandong 山東 area, remote from the borderlands, they might have been ignorant of the true extent of the Xiongnu menace (Kroll, Spor o soli i zheleze, vol. 1, 58). The Literati are explicitly said to have come from the Shandong area, see Yantielun, “Guo ji,” 28.333. 37) Overlords (霸 ba) were powerful regional rulers during the Spring and Autumn period who managed to claim superiority within the multistate framework of that time. For Lord Huan of Qi (齊桓公, r. 685-643 bce), see Hsu Cho-yun, “The Spring and Autumn Period,” in The Cambridge History of Ancient China, ed. Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999), 553-58, and Shiji, 32.1485-93; for Lord Mu of Qin (秦穆公, r. 659-621 bce), see Shiji, 5.185-94, and Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 102-3; for You Yu 由于 (dates unknown), see Shiji, 5.192-93; and for Guan Zhong 管仲 (d. 645 bce), see Shiji, 62.2131-34. For the subjugation of the Western Rong 西戎 tribes, see Shiji, 5.191-95; Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 107-16. 38) The last sentence is in response to the previous remark of the counselor who lauded the audacity of famous assassins (Yantielun, “Lun yong,” 51.537).

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Here, the Literati build upon the “ministerial discourse” of the Warring States period, which credited exemplary ministers such as Guan Zhong and You Yu with virtually every achievement of their rulers.39 In the context of the current argument, the Literati are implying that foreign affairs too can be dealt with only by worthy persons—which is clearly not how they view their adversaries in office. This combative standpoint, which recurs throughout the text, suggests that what the Literati were really concerned with was government appointments rather than the situation in distant lands. The Worthies discuss Han defense policy in chapter 38, “Bei hu” 備胡 (Preparing Against Barbarians). The speaker opens with a statement that resembles the Literati’s rhetoric:

When armies are used outside [the borders], governance is damaged within. [Hence], he who makes preparations against calamity, [actually] adds to the ruler’s worries. Therefore, when the sovereign possesses the Way, then, close or remote alike, all flock to him—King Wen was such a ruler. If [the ruler] does not possess the Way, [even his own] servants and concubines will turn against [him]— the King of Qin was such a ruler. Thus, when the civilizing element declines, the military one prevails, but when virtue prospers, the [military] preparations to be made are few. 用軍於外，政敗於內，備為所患，增主所憂。故人主得其道，則遐邇偕行而歸之，文王是也；不得其道，則臣妾為寇，秦王是也。夫文衰則武勝，德盛則備寡。40

39) The evolution of this topic can be traced back to the Mozi 墨子: “The task of counselors is to multiply worthy persons, and that is all” 大人之務，將在於眾賢而己; see Wu Yujiang 吳毓江, Mozi jiaozhu 墨子校注 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1994), “Shang xian” 尚賢 (Elevat- ing the Worthies), 2.8: 66. In his analysis of the Xunzi 荀子, Yuri Pines discerns the vision of a non-intervening monarch whose only function would be to “find good aides and entrust them with the reins of power.” See Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire: Chinese Political Thought of the Warring States Era (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawai‘i Press, 2009), 96; cf. idem, “Sub- merged by Absolute Power: The Ruler’s Predicament in the Han Feizi,” in Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei, ed. Paul R. Goldin (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 67-86; see also Lew- is, Writing and Authority, 209-18, for the theory of the minister acting as “the double of the ruler.” 40) Yantielun, “Bei hu,” 38.445. By Han times, the founder of the Zhou 周 dynasty, King Wen (周文王, d. ca. 1047 bce), had become “perhaps the most important model of political and literary behavior” (Schaberg, A Patterned Past, 33). The “King of Qin” refers, most likely, to the Qin First Emperor (秦始皇, 259-210 bce). For his image in Han times, see Yuri Pines, “Introduction to Part III: The First Emperor and His Image,” in Birth of an Empire: The State of Qin Revisited, ed. Yuri Pines, Lothar von Falkenhausen, Gideon Shelach, and Robin D.S. Yates (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2014), 227-38; Hans van Ess, “Emperor Wu of the

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Like the Literati, the speaker disapproves of military action as a means to stabilize the frontiers. However, as the Worthies develop their arguments, it turns out that they consider large-scale military expeditions not necessarily as immoral but rather as simply detrimental to the domestic stability of the state:

[The Xiongnu] assemble like a wind and dissolve like clouds. [When you] approach them, they vanish; [when you] attack, they disperse: they cannot be defeated within one generation. … The lands of the Xiongnu are vast and wide, their war horses are light-footed and swift; [thus,] they [the Xiongnu] can easily cause disturbance. When successful, they seize [booty] like tigers; when defeated, they disperse like birds. They avoid our best troops and raid [those units whose energy] is exhausted and depleted. When the troops dispatched are few, they do not suffice to protect the frontiers; when the troops are numerous, the people cannot bear [the burden] of conscription.” 風合而雲解，就之則亡，擊之則散，未可一世而舉也 … 匈奴之地廣大，而戎馬之足輕利，其勢易騷動也。利則虎曳，病則鳥折，辟鋒銳而取罷極；少發則不足以更適，多發則民不堪其役。41

The statement differs considerably from what the Literati have to say on the subject. As in the case of the iron monopoly, the Worthies are concerned with the practical impediments to confrontation with the Xion- gnu on the battlefield rather than with any moral assessment of such confrontation. It is not that military expeditions are immoral or do not conform to the model set by ancient rulers, but that they jeopardize the state’s inner stability without solving the problem at hand. The Worthies further assert that the power of the nomads “suffices to cause distur- bances,” thus directly contradicting the Literati’s attempt to downplay the Xiongnu danger. It also seems that the Literati and the Worthies are thinking of different solutions to military confrontation with the Xiongnu. The Literati repeatedly advocate the revival of appeasement as embodied in the

Han and First August Emperor of Qin in Sima Qian’s Shiji,” in Birth of an Empire, 239-57; and Stephen Durrant, “Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s Portrayal of the First Ch’in Emperor,” in Imperial Ruler- ship and Cultural Change in Traditional China, ed. Frederick P. Brandauer and Chun-Chieh Huang (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1994), 28-50. See also the brief but nuanced analysis in Puett, The Ambivalence of Creation, 188-91. 41) Yantielun, “Bei hu,” 38.446.

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“harmonious relationship” policy.42 The Worthies, however, never mention this policy. Juri Kroll has noted that the Worthies’ analysis is remi- niscent of the views of Chao Cuo 晁錯 (d. 154 BCE).43 There are clear textual parallels between the Worthies’ discourse and Chao’s address to Emperor Wen (漢文帝, 180-157 BCE), in which the statesman criticizes the practice of invariably using military force to defend the empire’s borders:

If Your Majesty does not [dispatch troops] to the rescue [of the border territories when they come under attack], then the inhabitants of these regions will lose hope and become willing to surrender to the enemy; but if [Your Majesty] does rescue them, then [again]: if the dispatched troops are few, they will not suffice [to protect the frontiers]; if the troops are numerous, then by the time they reach the distant counties, the Hu will have already left. If you want to accumulate and not abandon [the territories], then the costs will be tremendous; if you abandon them, then the Hu will subjugate [our] people. 陛下不救，則邊民絕望而有降敵之心；救之，少發則不足，多發，遠縣纔至，則胡又已去。聚而不罷，為費甚大；罷之，則胡復入。44

In another memorial Chao Cuo laid out his vision of the Han-Xiongnu problem and proposed a systematic approach to solving it:

Now the configuration of the Xiongnu lands and their military skills and arts are different from those of the Central States. When climbing up and down mountain slopes or when leaving and entering mountain streams and rivers, the horses of the Central States cannot compare with those of the Xiongnu. When heading down steep paths while simultaneously galloping and firing arrows, the horsemen of the Central States do not compare with those of the Xiongnu. When braving wind and rain, the Xiongnu will not become tired, and neither hunger nor thirst causes them any hardship—in these ways the men of the Central States do not compare with the Xiongnu. These are the special skills of the Xiongnu. … Your Majesty has called up a mass of several hundred thousand troops to punish several tens of thousands of Xiongnu troops. Your Majesty’s calculations of large and small numbers follow the formula of one fighting against ten. However, military arms are

42) Ibid., “Ji zhi,” 42.472, “Jie he” 結和 (Rejoin in Harmony), 43.479, and “He qin” 和親 (Har- monious Relationship), 48.513. 43) Kroll, Spor o Soli i Zheleze, vol. 2, 122-23, 455, n.9. For the biography of Chao Cuo, an advisor to Emperor Wen and Emperor Jing (漢景帝, 157-141 bce) see Hanshu, 49.2276-303; Loewe, A Biographical Dictionary, 27-29. 44) Hanshu, 49.2285; the italics are mine.

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the instruments of misfortune; warfare is a dangerous matter. What is large can become small and what is strong can become weak at the nod of the head. Achiev- ing victory in battle through the deaths of men who, once fallen, will not rise again, will lead to unending regrets. 今匈奴地形技藝與中國異。上下山阪，出入溪澗，中國之馬弗與也；險道傾仄，且馳且射，中國之騎弗與也；風雨罷勞，飢渴不困，中國之人弗與也；此匈奴之長技也 … 陛下又興數十萬之眾，以誅數萬之匈奴，眾寡之計，以一擊十之術也。雖然，兵，凶器；戰，危事也。以大為小，以彊為弱，在俛卬之間耳。夫以人之死爭勝，跌而不振，則悔之亡及也.45

Foreshadowing the Literati and the Worthies, Chao was skeptical about the benefits of “punitive expeditions” deep into Xiongnu lands. Like the Worthies, he was concerned with the unique military skills of the Xiong nu and the heavy costs of large-scale military campaigns. Unlike the Li- terati, Chao Cuo neither placed his trust in the solution of cultivating virtue, nor lent his support to the “harmonious relationship” policy. In- stead, he devised a two-pronged strategy: 1) Secure the frontier by estab- lishing military-agricultural settlements populated by convicts and slaves; 2) Use subjugated barbarians to form a cavalry force matching the Xiongnu.46 Chao Cuo’s memorial, had it been presented during the 81 BCE debate, would have occupied the middle ground between the standpoints of Sang Hongyang at one extreme and the Literati at the other. Eventu- ally, Chao’s advice was heeded and influenced Han defense policies throughout the dynasty’s lifetime.47 This suggests that, by the time of the debates, the line suggested by Chao Cuo was firmly established as one of the main approaches to the problem of frontier security. How ever, reading through the discussion between the counselor and the Literati one can get the impression that there were only two opposing options available: either to launch devastating military expeditions aimed at the ultimate destruction of the Xiongnu, or to restore the

45) Ibid., 49.2281. For the complete English translation of the memorial, see Garret P. Olberd- ing, Dubious Facts: The Evidence of Early Chinese Historiography (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 2012), 183-88 (I follow Olberding’s rendition with minor changes); cf. partial translations in Mark Edward Lewis, “The Han Abolition of Universal Military Service,” in Warfare in Chinese History, ed. Hans J. van de Ven (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 45-47, and Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 203-5. 46) Lewis, “Han Abolition,” 48. 47) Ibid.

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Clerks (li 吏) and Bribery The officials and their critics alike repeatedly express concern about the scale of graft at the lower levels of the state bureaucracy. The counselor is the first to acknowledge the problem, presenting it as ubiquitous and inevitable:

As for the clerks (li),49 many of them [not only] lack good qualities but also despoil the people. Senior clerks bully junior clerks, junior clerks bully the common people. That is why I am concerned not so much that the selection is not scrupulous enough as that what we get differs from what we require; not so much that their [provisions] are lacking as that their greed is insatiable. 為吏既多不良矣，又侵漁百姓。長吏厲諸小吏，小吏厲諸百姓。故不患擇之不熟，而患求之與得異也；不患其不足也，患其貪而無厭也。50

48) We may recall that the most influential policymaker of the time, general-in-chief Huo Guang, assumed the position of mediator between the debaters rather than side with the officials. 49) In this context, the term li 吏 clearly applies to junior local-level officials only, in contrast to senior officials guan 官; on this usage, see Bu Xianqun 卜憲群, Qin Han guanliao zhidu 秦漢官僚制度 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2002), 284-88. In different contexts, it could refer to senior and junior officials alike, or just to clerks: see Liu Min 劉敏, Qin Han bianhu qimin wenti yanjiu: yi yu limin, juezhi, huangquan guanxi wei zhongdian 秦漢編戶齊民問題研究—以與吏民、爵制、皇權關係為重點 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2014), 167. 50) Yantielun, “Ji tan” 疾貪 (Hating Avarice), 33.414-15.

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For the Literati, the origins of corruption are plain and simple. As in the above instances, the root of evil lies in the lack of morality among the superiors:

When the superiors are fond of ritual propriety, the common people will shun gaudy decorations; but when the superiors are fond of material goods, their subor- dinates will die for profit. 上好禮則民闇飾，上好貨則下死利也。51

The Worthies agree that corrupt practices stem from the leaders’ short- comings: “If a team of horses is not docile, it is the chariot driver’s fault; if the people are not well-governed, it is the ministers who are guilty” 駟馬不馴，御者之過也。百姓不治，有司之罪也.52 At the same time, they do not reduce the problem of corruption to the impact of the superiors’ improper morality but instead offer a rare insight into the reasons why bribery is ubiquitous. In their analysis, the clerks’ lack of integrity has very down-to-earth causes, namely, low salaries:

In antiquity, when the ranks of nobility and salaries were established, high ministers and nobles would get enough to pour largesse upon worthy people and support the shi;53 the shi would get enough to enrich themselves and their associates,54 while commoners holding office had enough to make a living and compensate for incomes from farming. Nowadays, junior clerks get salaries so meager that when duties and labor services lead them from commanderies and kingdoms to places

51) Ibid., “Cuo bi” 錯幣 (Minting Coins), 4.57; see also “Li geng” 力耕 (Tilling Diligently), 2.28-29. 52) Ibid., “Ji tan,” 33.415. 53) The graph shi 士 denotes different identities (such as “servants,” “officials,” “soldiers,” etc.) in different times and contexts. In Qin and Han, it was used mostly as a general reference to a person eligible for (but not necessarily occupying) an office. Note, however, that the Worthies distinguish the shi from “commoners who hold office;” since they speak about antiquity, the term retains the socio-hierarchical dimension. For the formation of the shi identity during pre-Imperial times, see Liu Zehua 劉澤華, Xian Qin shi ren yu shehui 先秦士人與社會 (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 2004); Yu Yingshi 余英時, Shi yu Zhongguo wenhua 士與中國文化 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2003), 1-83; and Yan Buke, Shidafu zhengzhi yansheng shigao, esp. 29-72. For a succinct summary, see Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire, 116-19. 54) Wang Liqi offers another reading of the character 黨 dang, arguing that it denotes a unit on a sub-district level. According to Zheng Xuan’s 鄭玄 (127-200) commentary on the Lunyu, it consisted of 500 households. See Yantielun, “Ji tan,” 33.416, n.5, and cf. Kroll, Spor o Soli i Zheleze, 2: 414, n.2.

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distant as the three capital districts,55 where millet and rice are expensive, [their resources] are not enough for them to maintain themselves. Staying away from home for a long time, they become short of clothing and food; one inauspicious event may force them into selling their property and belongings. … Senior clerks despoil [them], those at the commandery level oppress those at the county level, those on the county level oppress those at the district level, and where can those at the district level find the money? There is a saying: “The flow of bribes is like de- scending water: it is inexhaustible and unstoppable.” 古之制爵祿也，卿大夫足以潤賢厚士，士足以優身及黨，庶人為官者，足以代其耕而食其祿。今小吏祿薄，郡國繇役，遠至三輔，粟米貴，不足相贍。常居則匱於衣食，有故則賣畜粥業 … 長吏侵漁，上府下求之縣，縣求之鄉，鄉安取之哉？語曰：貨賂下流，猶水之赴下，不竭不止。56

The Worthies’ criticism is nuanced, unlike the Literati’s sweeping diatribe, and contains details that escape the latter’s attention. Going beyond the moral dimension of widespread bribery, the Worthies discuss the economic and institutional circumstances that underlie it. Their phrase “those at the commandery level oppress those at the county level, those at the county level oppress those at the district level” is remark- ably akin to the counselor’s notion of “senior clerks bullying junior clerks, junior clerks bullying the people” quoted above. The impression is that both the counselor and the Worthies are quite familiar with the machinery of the civil service, and the similarity of their language could well reflect similar experience. Furthermore, the Worthies depict the low-grade clerks quite sympa- thetically, something that never happens when the Literati speak. This may corroborate Jean Levi’s and Ziv Halevy’s identification of the Wor- thies as holders of low-grade offices or nominees to these positions.57 When speaking of the clerks’ predicament, some of the Worthies could have imagined themselves in similar circumstances. They criticize the

55) Qin and Han documents from Shuihudi 睡虎地 and Zhangjiashan 張家山 contain numerous references to clerks being dispatched (yao 繇 or yaoshi 繇使) from one region to another to perform various duties, such as the supervision of labor services in the capital area, the transportation of taxes and goods (including under the “balanced transportation” system), and the delivery of official documentation. See Chen Songchang 陳松長, “Qin Han shiqi de yao yu yaoshi” 秦漢時期的繇與繇使, Hunan daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban) 湖南大學學報（社會科學版） 28.4 (2014): 20-22. 56) Yantielun, “Ji tan” 33.415. 57) Levi, La Dispute, xxiv; Halevy, “Identity and Roles,” 63.

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Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 04:32:59AM via free access 484 Anatoly Polnarov system from the vantage point of insiders, who are both more knowl- edgeable about the subject and more likely to find common ground with their opponents. The Worthies differ from the Literati in that they hint at a practical solution to the problem: raising the clerks’ salaries.58 The Literati, as in many parts of the discussion, are predisposed to criticizing the government rather than offering solutions. Their most practical advice, if any, is to relieve the current ministers of their duties and hire other men of stronger moral principles. In contrast, the Worthies display an understanding of the government’s problems and try to offer constructive criticism, thus bridging some of the gaps between the officials and the critics.

Selection and Promotion of Officials There was no single mechanism for the recruitment and promotion of officials under the Han. Common ways to join the bureaucracy included benefiting from hereditary privilege (yinren 蔭任), accumulating military merit, buying a position, rising through the institution of clerkship, direct appointment by the emperor, and recommendation by authorities.59 The multiplicity of these employment practices reflects a degree of confusion about the criteria for identifying good candidates and promoting successful administrators.60 This problem, linked as it was both to the crucial task of securing appropriate human resources for the state apparatus and to the self-definition of the service-oriented educated

58) In 59 bce (i.e., close to the presumed date of the Yantielun’s compilation), Emperor Xuan did issue a decree increasing the salaries of lower-level clerks, citing concerns very similar to those uttered by the Worthies in the above passage (Hanshu, 8.263). Moreover, according to Cai Liang, this was the only Former Han decree to address the conditions of lower-level officials. See Cai Liang, Witchcraft and the Rise of the First Confucian Empire (New York: State Univ. of New York Press, 2014), 166. The like-mindedness of the Worthies and Emperor Xuan is unlikely to be a mere coincidence: apparently, the Worthies gave voice to ideas that had been circulating among Han policy makers for some time. 59) Liu Pak-yuen, “Handai shijin zhidu” 4-13. 60) The Worthies comment disapprovingly on the matter in “Chu xia” 除狹 (Eliminate Narrow [Paths]): “Today there are miscellaneous ways of [selecting and promoting] officials” 今吏道雜 (Yantielun, 32.410).

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Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 04:32:59AM via free access Looking Beyond Dichotomies 485 elite, became a perennial issue in political debates for two millennia to come.61 Yuri Pines in his article on meritocracy in early China has focused on “conflicting views of ‘worth’ (xian 賢) and ‘merits’ (gong 功).”62 Pines has shown how, after the mid-late Warring States period, the “discourse of worthiness,” initially supposed to subvert the power of the hereditary aristocratic elite, became an increasingly manipulative tool for the self- promotion of the shi. Against this development, state-oriented thinkers, such as Shang Yang 商鞅 (d. 338 BCE) and Han Fei 韓非 (d. 233 BCE), sought to create “a meritocratic system that would not depend on the vague notion of ‘worthiness’ but [would] function, instead, according to objective criteria of merit.”63 Below I shall analyze the views of the Lite- rati and the Worthies on the selection and promotion of officials and show that their opinions diverge exactly along the lines drawn by Pines. The Literati put forward their approach to finding appropriate candidates for office in chapter 19, “Bao xian” 褒賢 (Upholding the Worthy):

[Observing someone’s demeanor] amidst the sacrificial vessels zu and dou suffices to see his ritual expertise; [knowing someone’s behavior] in the inner apartments suffices to judge his conduct. Therefore, those who wear garments of the past and recite the Way of the past would rarely abandon it and commit any misdeed. 俎豆之間足以觀禮，閨門之內足以論行。夫服古之服，誦古之道，舍此而為非者，鮮矣。64

61) In the later imperial period, controversies surrounding the civil examinations—which had become the major avenue of promotion into officialdom—were among the major sources of social and political tension. For example, see the faction struggles in the Northern Song court and riots by licentiates, as discussed in Benjamin A. Elman, A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2000), 12-19, 198-99, 204, and 207. 62) Yuri Pines, “Between Merit and Pedigree: Evolution of the Concept of ‘Elevating the Wor- thy’ in the Pre-imperial China,” in The East Asian Challenge for Democracy: Political Meritoc- racy in Comparative Perspective, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Li Chenyang (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013), 161. 63) Ibid., 184. 64) Yantielun, “Bao xian,” 19.242. Following Hans van Ess, in “Argument and Persuasion in the First Chapter of Huainanzi and its Use of Particles,” Oriens Extremus 45 (2005-2006): 255- 70, here I interpret the graph fu 夫 as an indicator of a saying that illustrates or underlines the above argument rather than as the introduction of a new subject. For an alternative translation, see Gale, Discourses on Salt and Iron, 125-26.

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The qualities favored by the Literati include literacy in the classics and proper personal conduct. These proposed standards are vague enough, leaving the ruler with little chance of adequately assessing a candidate for promotion. The Literati, however, are not disturbed by the fact that the task of selecting worthy nominees for office becomes somewhat complicated. For them, this is but a natural state of affairs, as can be seen from chapter 24, “Lun fei” 論誹 (Assertions and Aspersions):

Gao Yao said to Shun,65 “Everything depends on knowing the people, which is considered difficult even for a thearch.” 臯陶對舜：在知人，惟帝其難之。66

If the task was “considered difficult” even for the sage thearchs of the past, how could mediocre rulers of the present age hope to manage it? The Literati have no intention of making the ruler’s life easier by an- swering that question. On the contrary, having trampled on his sense of self-confidence, they now charge him with the responsibility of han- dling the task:

When the Great Flood calamity occurred, Yao stood alone aggrieved and careworn, not knowing how to cope with it; but once he obtained [the services of] Shun and Yu, the nine provinces enjoyed peace.67 For this reason, even if there is an enlight- ened ruler like Yao, without aides like Shun and Yu, his pure virtue will not prevail. 洪水之災，堯獨愁悴而不能治，得舜、禹而九州寧。故雖有堯明之君，而無舜、禹之佐，則純德不流。68

65) Gao Yao 臯陶 served as an advisor to the legendary emperors Yao 堯 and Shun 舜; the main source of information on this figure is the Shangshu 尚書 chapter “Counsels of Gao Yao” 皋陶謨. On the growing popularity of Gao Yao’s image in Han texts, see Anton (An- thony) E. Terekhov, “Formirovaniye drevnekitajskoj kogorty ‘Dvenadcati Sovershennomu- dryh’ (shi-er shen),” in St. Petersburg State Polytechnical University Journal (Humanities and Social Sciences) 167.1 (2013): 137-39. The figures of Yao and Shun will be discussed in greater detail below. 66) Yantielun, “Lun fei,” 24.300 67) According to one of the traditional accounts, Yao needed a worthy aide in order to cope with the floods that plagued his land. Searching for such a person, he elevated Shun, who in turn promoted Yu 禹, whereupon the latter finally put an end to the calamity (Shiji, 1.20-24, 2.49-51). The term “nine provinces” (jiu zhou 九州) refers to the core territories of Chinese civilization in the basins of the Yellow and the Yangzi Rivers. See Vera Dorofeeva-Licht- mann, “Ritual Practices for Constructing Terrestrial Space (Warring States-Early Han),” in Early Chinese Religion: Part One: Shang Through Han (1250 BC-220 AD), ed. John Lagerwey and Marc Kalinowski (Leiden: Brill, 2011), vol. 1, 602-22. 68) Yantielun, “Lun fei,” 24.300.

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The ruler, according to the Literati, should engage in an unending search for virtuous functionaries. This is an immensely distressful task. The ruler is informed, first, that without such people the empire is doomed and, second, that the task of identifying proper servants of the state would be difficult even for the divine Yao. There is only one obvious and reasonable solution, even if it is unstated: These matters of selection and promotion, as well as other tasks that are “too difficult,” should be relegated to the ruler’s humble assistants, making the bureaucracy fully self-sustained and relieving the monarch of any possibility of exercising real control over it.69 This may be an example of what Pines calls the “manipulativeness of meritocratic discourse”—a set of unspoken tech- niques intended to dissuade the ruler from taking an active part in government.70 Notably, none of the criteria outlined by the Literati—literacy in the classics and personal conduct—requires any sort of practical expertise. One implicit consequence would be that a “worthy” person could be promoted to a top position without any previous administrative experience or merit. The classical example that inevitably comes to mind is that of the ancient sage Shun 舜, the hero of the earliest Chinese rags-to- riches story. According to traditional accounts, Shun was recommended to Emperor Yao and elevated to the top position in the government sole- ly because of his outstanding morality, as exemplified in his treatment of his father and stepmother. Yao then married both his daughters off to Shun, appointed him to the position of prime minister, and reduced himself to a ceremonial figurehead, while Shun actually governed the realm on his behalf. And as if that were not enough, Shun became Yao’s heir and, eventually, a thearch.71

69) Cf. Michael Nylan, “Yang Xiong’s 揚雄 Final Fayan 法言 Chapter,” in Facing the Monarch: Modes of Advice in the Early Chinese Court, ed. Garret P.S. Olberding (Cambridge, Mass.: Har- vard Univ. Asia Center, 2013), 237-72, esp. 243-46 for the emphasis on the emperor’s “hard work on behalf of the realm” in Yang Xiong’s 揚雄 (53 bce-18 ce) thought. 70) Pines, “Between Merit and Pedigree,” 176. 71) Shiji, 1.15-34; for other versions of the Yao-Shun legend and its gradual development from the beginning of the Warring States through the Han, see Sarah Allan, The Heir and the Sage, Revised and Expanded Edition: Dynastic Legend in Early China (New York: State Univ. of New York Press, 2016); Yuri Pines, “Disputers of Abdication: Zhanguo Egalitarianism and Sover- eign’s Power,” T’oung Pao 91 (2005): 243-300.

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According to the vision of the ruler-minister relationship epitomized by the Yao-Shun legend, a truly worthy minister should occupy a position so close to the ruler as to minimize, if not completely obliterate, the hierarchical relationship between the two.72 This is the Literati’s true ideal, as becomes clear from the following sentence:

When Yao promoted Shun, he treated him with respect and married [his daughters] off to him; when Lord Huan promoted Guan Zhong, he treated him with respect and made him his mentor. To betroth the daughters of a Son of Heaven to a commoner—this can be termed “attracting the worthy.” 堯之舉舜也，賓而妻之。桓公舉管仲也，賓而師之。以天子而妻匹夫，可謂親賢矣。73

A reading of the Yantielun brings out the prominence of the Shun figure in the Literati’s thinking. They appeal to him in no less than seventeen different chapters of the Yantielun; in seven of these occasions Shun is mentioned in the context of his assistance or succession to Yao.74 To compare, the ostensibly primary issue at stake, namely the salt and iron offices (all contexts included), is mentioned by the Literati in only seven chapters.75 In stark contrast, the Worthies mention Yao and Shun only once, and make no reference whatsoever to the story of Shun’s elevation.76 This appears to be a significant absence, showing that the Worthies have a very different concept of proper procedures for selection and promotion. They deliberate on the subject in chapter 32, “Chu xia” 除狭 (Elim- inate Narrow [Paths]):

72) This connotation of the Yao-Shun narrative must have been well known, as it was pin- pointed as early as in the third century bce by Han Feizi, who claimed that “Yao and Shun … inverted the relations between the ruler and minister” 堯、舜 … 反君臣之義, see Chen Qiyou 陳奇猷, Han Feizi xin jiaozhu 韓非子新校注 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2000), 2.51: 1152. 73) Yantielun, “Ci fu” 刺復 (Critique and Rebuttal), 10.131. The passage on Yao and Shun is a paraphrase of Mengzi “Wan Zhang xia” 萬章下, see Mengzi 5B/3 and 5B/6; cf. Pines, Envision- ing Eternal Empire, 168-72, and for Mengzi’s views on elevating the worthy, see idem, “Be- tween Merit and Pedigree,” 172-73. 74) Yantielun, chapters 7, 10, 17, 18, 24, 27, and 49. 75) Ibid., chapters 1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 14, and 17. 76) Ibid., “Zhi wu” 執務 (Carrying out Duties), 39.455. In this instance, Yao and Shun are mentioned simply as moral paragons; there is no reference to the relationship between them or to Shun’s dramatic elevation.

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In ancient times, before a shi could be promoted, he was [first] selected and picked from among his native village [inhabitants] through an examination of his talents and abilities (caineng 才能). Thereupon, he received an official appointment. Pro- vided that he fulfilled his duties and responsibilities successfully, he was rewarded with honorary titles and given a salary.” 古之進士也，鄉擇而里選，論其才能，然後官之，勝職任然後爵而祿之。77

The Worthies emphasize the nominee’s abilities and subsequent performance once appointed. For them, honorary titles and salaries should be used as means of control to ensure the proper functioning of the state apparatus. Unlike Shun, who had become Yao’s son-in-law before prov- ing himself in any practical task,78 an official, according to the Worthies, would be rewarded and honored only upon successful fulfillment of his duties. In early Chinese discourse, this opinion best accords with Han Fei’s pragmatic viewpoint. This philosopher was very much aware of the ministers’ ability to “utilize ‘worthiness’ in order to rob their ruler” 臣將乘於賢以劫其君.79 On the promotion of officials, Han Fei insisted on close supervision: for example, “organize them according to their tasks, check them according to their performance, assess them according to their merits” 論之於任，試之於事，課之於功.80 The Worthies seem to share this approach; hence, they insist on monitoring the bureaucracy to make sure that the officials had proper qualifications. Echoing Han Fei’s assertion that “chief ministers and chancellors must rise from among local officials” 宰相必起於州部,81 the Worthies propagate the principle of gradualism in advancement through the bureaucratic rank and file. According to their vision, a senior ministerial post would be at- tained only after meritorious service in lower positions. In the debates,

77) Ibid., “Chu xia,” 32.410. 78) According to the Shiji, the marriage of Yao’s daughters to Shun was itself a way to test the latter: “Yao married his two daughters off to him [Shun] and watched his behavior toward them” 堯妻之二女，觀其德於二女 (Shiji, 1.21). 79) Han Feizi xin jiaozhu, “Er bing” 二柄 (Two Handles), 7.130. Cf. Pines, “Submerged by Ab- solute Power,” 67-86; idem, “Between Merit and Pedigree,” 182-84; and Romain Graziani, “Monarch and Minister: The Problematic Partnership in the Building of Absolute Monarchy in the Han Feizi 韓非子,” in Ideology of Power, esp. 157-60 and 171-73. Here and in the next two instances the citations from Han Feizi are given according to the translation by Yuri Pines with minor changes. 80) Han Feizi xin jiaozhu, “Nan san” 難三 (Third Treatise on Difficulties), 38.906. 81) Ibid., “Xian xue” 顯學 (Eminence in Learning), 50.1137.

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Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 04:32:59AM via free access 490 Anatoly Polnarov therefore, the Worthies tacitly disapprove of the idea of instantaneous dramatic elevation as reflected in the stories of Shun, Guan Zhong and others, so dear to the Literati. The selection and promotion process envisioned by the Worthies is designed to serve the ruler. It does not require his direct intervention but leaves him with a means of control. While the ruler, according to the Worthies, presides over a well-functioning order, the Literati see him as reigning over a realm that is constantly falling apart.82 He is tormented by the overbearing responsibility of carrying out the impossible mission of finding good aides and, upon meeting such a man, he is expected to shower him with (yet to be deserved) honors, lest the sage may refuse to cooperate.83 The divide between the two visions runs along the lines best formulated, again, by Han Fei: “Thus, it is said: elevate the standards, not the worthy” 故曰：上法而不上賢.84 The Literati prefer to elevate worthy persons, whereas the Worthies see advantages in “elevating the standards.”

Conclusion: The Third Voice in the Yantielun and its Implications The above analysis shows that the Worthies and the Literati differ on several important political issues. In particular, they are divided in their approach to the Xiongnu: The Literati are apologists of appeasement, seeking to restore the he qin policy of the early Former Han period. The Worthies, in contrast, never focus on he qin, and their rhetoric reveals a more nuanced vision of the Han-Xiongnu conflict that is seemingly in- spired by the ideas of Chao Cuo. No less notable are the critics’ differences on the recruitment and promotion of officials: the Literati speak

82) Martin Kern has noticed a similar divergence of views on kingship in the “Yao dian” 堯典 (“Canon of Yao”) chapter of the Shangshu; see Kern, “Language and the Ideology of Kingship in the ‘Canon of Yao,’” in Ideology of Power, 147. 83) The sage could indeed regard engaging in government activities as a sort of compromise, a departure from the ideal of preserving purity and individual perfection. The eremitic ideal (comprehensively discussed in Aat Vervoorn, Men of the Cliffs and Caves: The Development of the Chinese Eremitic Tradition to the End of the Han Dynasty [Hong Kong: The Chinese Univ. Press, 1990]) was yet another way to assert that the main benefactor of the ruler-minister relationship is first and foremost the ruler, and that it is in his best interest to attract worthy servants. 84) Han Feizi xin jiaozhu, “Zhong xiao” 忠孝 (Loyalty and Filial Piety), 51.1152.

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Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 04:32:59AM via free access Looking Beyond Dichotomies 491 in favor of the instant appointment of virtuous candidates to top positions, whereas the Worthies envision a system of gradual advancement that is far less dependent on personal intervention by the ruler. On monopolies and corruption, both groups of critics share a similar perspective, but their argumentation betrays different standpoints and goals: the Worthies seem be much more aware of the day-to-day problems generated by government policies and seek to mend these problems rather than overhaul the entire system as advocated by the Literati. In addition to their policy disagreements, the Literati and the Wor- thies display salient dissimilarities in their strategies of persuasion. In this respect, three major lines of division can be drawn between them: 1) Classical idealism versus realism: The Literati base their criticism on the vision of an ideal world order, akin to that of ancient paragons who are hailed in classical literature. They interpret any discrepancy between this “empire of writing”85 and the actual government as a reason to criticize the latter. The Literati repeatedly criticize the leaders of the day for deviating from the high moral standards set by the ancient sages. The Worthies, to be sure, also adopt this mode of argument from time to time.86 However, they also make use of other arguments that demonstrate their familiarity with practical aspects of the policies discussed, revealing close knowledge of everyday administrative problems. This discourse is absent from the Literati’s pronouncements. 2) Moralist criticism versus pragmatic persuasion: For the Literati, political questions are moral questions. They perceive politics as being encompassed by the overarching moral order to which all should conform. For them, therefore, there is not much place for compromise.87 The Worthies, in contrast, often rationalize their position by appealing to considerations of effectiveness, cost, profit, and the like. This allows them to speak the same language as the government officials and there- by lays the foundation for possible mutual understanding.

85) Borrowing the term from Lewis, Writing and Authority in Early China, 337-62. 86) Most notably in Yantielun ch. 29, “San bu zu” 散不足 (Affluence and Scarcity). 87) Similar straight-laced rhetoric kept on being used to spur political polarization long after the Han. See, for example, Ari D. Levine, Divided by a Common Language: Factional Conflict in Late Northern Song China (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawai‘i Press, 2008), 72ff; Harry Miller, State Versus Gentry in Late Ming Dynasty China, 1572-1644 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 55-74.

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3) Alienation versus moderation: The Worthies and the Literati seem to pursue different goals in the debates. The Literati are quick to eschew details of any of the problems discussed and shift the blame to the government for any negative phenomena. They repeatedly blame the government in general and Sang Hongyang in particular for any mal- functioning of the state machinery. It seems that their concern is less with concrete policies than with making criticism as such. Their rhetoric is aimed not at persuading the opponent but rather at impressing the public in attendance or a larger group of educated men who would be privy to the records of the debates.88 In contrast, the Worthies are more attenuated in their criticism, and they often hint at possible practical solutions to problems if not explicitly point to such solutions. They liken their criticism to a medicine which, however bitter, will eventually benefit the patient.89 Their standpoint and language are accommodating enough to allow for compromise and cooperation. These findings have several important implications. First, they put to rest long-standing doubts as to whether the Yantielun contains materials related to the original conference of 81 BCE, or is based just on Huan Kuan’s imagination. As I have mentioned above, the dichotomous picture of the debates between the government officials on the one side and the Worthies and Literati on the other is largely the product of Huan Kuan’s editorial efforts and his oversimplifying summary of the debates. This makes it implausible that Huan Kuan would deliberately fabricate subtle yet consistent dissimilarities between the Literati and the Wor- thies, since these dissimilarities do not seem to reflect his own design.90 Judging from Huan Kuan’s postscript, the compiler himself either did not notice these differences or deemed them insufficiently important. This means that the divergence between the Worthies and the Literati comes from the source materials utilized by Huan Kuan when he

88) This distinction can be described as the difference between disputation (bian 辯) and persuasion (shui 說), as described in Juri L. Kroll, “Disputation in Ancient Chinese Culture,” Early China 11 (1985): 127-28; cf. Lisa Indraccolo, “What is ‘Rhetoric’ anyway? Briared in Words in Early China,” Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques 68 (2014): 332, 333, n.6. While in many respects the Yantielun dialogues indiscriminately fall under the category of disputation, the rhetoric of the Worthies clearly includes elements of persuasion. 89) Yantielun, “Neng yan” 能言, 40.459. 90) Cf. Levi, La Dispute, lxii, on the disconformity between Huan Kuan’s layout and the content of his work.

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Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 04:32:59AM via free access Looking Beyond Dichotomies 493 compiled the Yantielun. It is likely, then, that Huan Kuan possessed some documents on the original debate—probably, the court records of the event—and incorporated substantial portions of these original materials in his work without significantly altering their content. This is not to suggest that we can carelessly brush away the notion of Huan Kuan’s editorial efforts; on the contrary, they should surely be taken into consideration when approaching the Yantielun. At the same time, we can be confident that the text allows a glimpse into the original arguments of the debaters. Going beyond the immediate context of the Yantielun, the above analysis allows us to fine-tune the picture of political and intellectual life under the Former Han, which all too often ends up being forced into various dualist molds. I have attempted here to demonstrate the benefits of looking beyond dichotomies and polarized designations: once we overcome the habitual reading of the Yantielun as the locus classicus of polarizing discourse, we may discern a more nuanced and complex picture in which the third voice—the call for compromise—deserves to be taken into consideration. Beyond Huan Kuan’s text, other familiar lines of division and affiliations remain to be examined, adding to recent at- tempts91 to further differentiate our understanding of Han political history.

Acknowledgments This study was supported by the Confucius China Studies Doctoral Fellowship granted by the Confucius Institute at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and the Jack, Joseph, and Morton Mandel School for

91) These attempts include, among others, Michael Nylan, “A Problematic Model: The Han ‘Orthodox Synthesis,’ Then and Now,” in Imagining Boundaries: Changing Confucian Doc- trines, Texts and Hermeneutics, ed. Kai-wing Chow, On-cho Ng, and John B. Henderson (Al- bany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1999), 17-56; Martin Kern, “Ritual, Text, and the Formation of the Canon: Historical Transitions of Wen in Early China,” T’oung Pao 87 (2001): 43-91; Mark E. Lewis, “The Feng and Shan Sacrifices of Emperor Wu of the Han,” in State and Court Ritual in China, ed. Joseph P. McDermott (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999), 50-80; Fukui Shigemasa 福井重雅, Kandai jukyō no shi teki kenkyū: jukyō no kangakuka o meguru teisetsu no saikentō 漢代儒教の史的研究：儒教の官学化をめぐる定説の再検討 (Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 2005); Cai, Witchcraft; and Loewe, “‘Confucian’ Values and Prac- tices.”

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Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 04:32:59AM via free access 494 Anatoly Polnarov

Advanced Studies in the Humanities Ph.D. Honors Program. I owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Yuri Pines whose guidance and advice have been invaluable at every stage of my work. I am also grateful to the two anonymous reviewers whose comments helped me to improve this paper and avoid several embarrassing mistakes.

Abstract This study investigates the Yantielun 鹽鐵論, a text that recreates the 81 BCE court debate during which government officials clashed with “literary scholars” (wenxue 文學) and “worthy and good persons” (xianliang 賢良) over multiple policy issues. I show that a careful look at the Yantielun allows us to distinguish between the voices of the two subgroups of critics, who hitherto have been viewed almost ubiq- uitously as a uniform camp. The “worthy and good persons” appear as a “third voice” attempting to bridge the gap between the polar standpoints of the officials and the literary scholars. I argue that this hidden diversity is proof of the reliability of the Yantielun as an account of the debate and a testimony to the complexity of the intellectual and political environment of the mid- to late Former Han.

Résumé Cette étude examine le Yantielun 鹽鐵論 qui reconstitue les débats à la cour en 81 avant notre ère. Dans ces débats, les fonctionnaires se sont opposés aux « lettrés » (wenxue 文學) et aux « hommes vertueux et de qualité » (xianliang 賢良) sur toutes sortes de questions politiques. Je montre qu’une lecture serrée du Yantielun nous permet de distinguer des voix discordantes entre les deux groupes de critiques du gouvernement, qui ont pourtant été considérés jusqu’à présent par la quasi-totalité des chercheurs comme formant un camp monolithique. Les « hommes vertueux et de qualité » apparaissent comme une « troisième voie » tentant de jeter des ponts entre les points de vue diamétralement opposés des fonctionnaires et des lettrés. Je propose que cette diversité peu apparente est une preuve de la fiabilité du Yantielun comme compte rendu des débats et comme témoignage de la complexité de l’envi- ronnement intellectuel et politique de la période médiane et tardive des Han antérieurs.

提要本篇研究考察了《鹽鐵論》這一再現了公元前81年的宮廷辯論的文本；值此辯論期間，政府官員和 “文學及“賢良” 之間就多項政策的討論形成了對峙。我的研究顯示，對《鹽鐵論》的細緻觀察使我們得以進一步區分批評者們的兩種不

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同聲音——他們在此之前幾乎從無例外地被視爲一個統一的陣營。 “賢良” 所代表的是某個試圖調和官員和 “文學” 之間對立性觀點的 “第三種聲音” 。這種隱含的多樣性驗證了《鹽鐵論》作爲這場辯論的記錄的可靠性，也說明了前漢中晚期思想政治環境的複雜性。

Keywords Former Han, Yantielun, Sang Hongyang, Huan Kuan, salt and iron debate, state monopolies

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